Con Com Section 6

1. Aruelo vs. CA

Facts:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein
only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35,
Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the
filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of
the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.

Issue:
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

Held:
No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by
the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before
the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought
before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought
before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by
courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions
to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests orquo warranto cases pending before
the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings
in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all
courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

Concom Section 7
8. Supreme Court Revised Admin. Circular No. 1-95
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the Court
of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.
1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board,
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under
Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.
2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the
Labor Code of the Philippines.
3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the
period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.
4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law
for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full a mount of the docket fee before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.
5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7)
legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and
on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be
indicated as such by the petitioner.
Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals
the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of
docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon
verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the
petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the denial.
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review;
(c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the
record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates
showing that it was filed within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.
7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the petitioner to
comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the
deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal thereof.
8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment
on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court, however, may
dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or
that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven
(7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the
record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall point out insufficiencies or
inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state the reasons why the petition should be
denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be
filed with the Court of Appeals.
10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be
required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof, and on
the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agencies
concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition;
otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.
11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been
given due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the court or agency concerned to transmit the
original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to
be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may
require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record.
12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem
just.
13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set
the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days
from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or
memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself.
14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service Commission
and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the
effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions for review hereunder and
shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the
aforesaid agencies which may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise
be considered as petitions for review and shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for the same purpose.
In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of
receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the
date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may require the filing of
amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further documents or records as it may
deem necessary in view of and consequent to the change in the mode of appellate review.
15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and
superseded by this Circular.
16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and
shall take effect on June 1, 1995.
May 16, 1995.

CSC Section 2
15. Lopez vs. CSC

FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana, was appointed
as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal, Manila South Harbor and Manila
North Harbor, respectively. A law was passed wherein the DOTC was reorganized, and the number of
Assistant Harbor Master in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was reduced from (3) three to (2) two.
After a careful evaluation of a placement committee of the PPA, Luz was rated third. Luz
protested/appealed the appointment of Lopez, but the PPA General Manager said Luz was not qualified
for the two slots. Luz then appealed to the CSC. The CSC ordered for a re-assessment which the PPA
complied. Still, the CSC found that the re-assessment was not in order. It ruled that the immediate
supervisor of respondent Luz was in the best position to assess the competence of the respondent and not
a psychiatric-consultant who was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. It directed
the appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez’ appointment and instead substituting its decision for
that of the PPA.

RULING:
The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in promoting the morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil servants is not disputed by petitioner
Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment delegated to the heads of departments
or agencies of the government is not controverted by the respondents. In the appointment, placement and
promotion of civil service employees according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially
where it is assisted by a screening committee composed of persons who are in the best position to screen
the qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance and capabilities of the
future appointees. The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees
possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. To go beyond
this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the appointing authority and to give to the
Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does not confer. This does not mean that
the Commission's act of approving or disapproving becomes ministerial. The Court has defined the
parameters within which the power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the respondent
Commission. In the case of Luego v Civil Service Commission,143 SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled
that all the Commission is actually authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the
qualifications and appropriate eligibility: "If he does, his appointment is approved; if not it is
disapproved." We further ruled that the Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply
because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. The Commission cannot exceed
its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority. Petition is GRANTED.

COMELEC Section 1
3. Brillantes vs. Yorac
Facts: 
The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the
President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on
Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that “(I)n no case shall any
Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”
Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal
matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the
Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of
the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of “administrative expediency,” to prevent
disruption of the functions of the COMELEC. 

Issue: 
Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the
regular Chairman. 

Held: 
NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” They are
not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.
Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and
in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on
certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the
absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it,
even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the
Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The
situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without
the participation of the President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely
have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that
choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

COMELEC Section 2
8. Arroyo vs. DOJ
NATURE:
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo  in G.R. No.
199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our
September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents
Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III
(Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and
DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14,
2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed
perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing
the creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1.    Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the
Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the
2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2.    The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary
investigation is hereby declared VALID.

ISSUES:
1.    Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the
Comelec.
2.    Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the
Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction

HELD:
1.    The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in
the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we the court cannot consider the creation of the Joint
Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

2.     The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction"
authorized by the amendatory law. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to
deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on
simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where
one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary
investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same
complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second
office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

COMELEC Section 4
15. National Press Club vs. COMELEC

Facts:
R.A. 6646 was enacted which prohibits any newspaper, radio, any person making the use of media to sell
or give free of charge of space or time for political purpose except COMELEC Petitioners who were
representatives of mass media assails its constitutionality on the ground that it amounts to censorship
because it single’s out for suppression only publications of a particular content and it abridges freedom of
speech of candidates.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 6646 is valid.

Held:
Yes, the law banning political ads has since been repealed but the court made important observation
which is still pertinent.

The technical effects of Art. IX (C) (4) of the constitution may be seen to that no presumption of
invalidity arises in respect of exercise of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the COMELEC
for the purpose of serving equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such
supervision or regulation may result in same limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. The
applicable issue is the general, time honored are that statute is presumed to be constitutional that party
asserting unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincing, proving that assertion.

Section II has not gone outside the permissible brands of supervision and regulation of media operations.
During election period Sec. II is limited in duration of applicability and enforceability. Sec. II doesn’t
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers and radio or TV stations on news events
relating to qualified political parties.

Petitoners: representatives of mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for
political advertisements; 2 candidates for office (1 national, 1 provincial) in the coming May 1992
elections; taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of
credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.

COA Section 2
2. Orocio vs. COA
 
FACTS:
An accident occurred at the Malaya Power Plant of the National Power Corporation (NPC) on May 25,
1982 where two individuals suffered injury - Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC employee, and Domingo
Abodizo, a casual employee O.P. Landrito’s General Services (OPLGS), the janitorial contractor of the
NPC. The two injured personnel were brought to the hospital. NPC initially advanced the amount for
hospitalization expenses for the treatment of Abodizo, and set up this as an account receivable from
OPLGS deducted on a staggered basis from the latter's billing against the NPC until the same was
fully satisfied. Subsequently, OPLGS requested a refund of the total amount deducted from their billings
representing payment of the advances made by the NPC. The amount of hospitalization expenses was
refunded to the contractor OPLGS. The Unit Auditor of the Commission on Audit disallowed the refund
of the hospitalization expenses of Abodizo contending that under the contract, there is no employee-
employer relation between the NPC and the OPLGS employees. Hence, NPC is not answerable for such
expenses. General Counsel asked for is consideration of the said disallowance denied. The COA Regional
Director, herein respondent, confirmed the disallowance. NPC General Counsel submitted a second
request for reconsideration and justifies that his legal opinion is based on Sec 15-A of
RA 6395 (NPC Charter) which provides that “... all legal matters shall be handled by the General Counsel
of the Corporation...”
 
ISSUE:
Whether the disbursement on the basis of the legal opinion of the legal counsel of the NPC is within the
scope of the auditing power of the COA?

HELD:
The Constitution grants the COA the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds and property pertaining to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The
matter of allowing in audit a disbursement account is not a ministerial function, but one which
necessitates the exercise of discretion. Besides, the OPLGS, Abodizo's employer, admitted that the
incident was purely accidental and that there is no showing whatsoever in the incident report of any
negligence on the part of NPC or its employees. Wherefore, the instant petition is GRANTED. In so far as
it holds petitioner personally liable for the disallowed disbursement and the Debit Memo, dated July 22,
1986, of the Manager of the Accounting Department of the National Power Corporation, are hereby
set aside for being null and void. So ordered.

COA Section 3
9. Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization
PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
in 1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." ESSO became a wholly-owned company of
the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC.
PETRON owns the largest, most modern complex refinery in the Philippines. It is listed as the No. 1
corporation in terms of assets and income in the Philippines in 1993. President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Implicit in the Proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the Government and the ideal of
leaving business to the private sector by creating the committee on privatization. The Government can
then concentrate on the delivery of basic services and the performance e of vital public functions. The
Presidential Cabinet of President Ramos approved the privatization of PETRON as part of the Energy
Sector Action Plan. PNOC Board of Directors passed a
resolution authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon
Brothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI CapitalCorporation for financial advisory services to berendered
to PETRON. The Petron Privatization
WorkingCommittee (PWC) was thus formed. It finalized aprivatization strategy with 40% of the shares to
be sold to a strategic partner and 20% to the general
public The President approved the 40% — 40% — 20%privatization strategy of
PETRON. The invitation to bid was published in severalnewspapers of general circulation, both local and
foreign. The PNOC Board of Directors then passed Resolution No. 866, S. 1993, declaring ARAMCO the
winning bidder. PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase
Agreement, the two companies signed the Shareholders' Agreement. The petition for prohibition in G.R.
No. 112399 sought: (1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of shares constituting 40%
of the capital stock (40% block) of Petron Corporation (PETRON) and the
award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V (ARAMCO) as the highest bidder and (2) to stop the
sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The petition for prohibition and
Certiorari in G.R. No. 115994 sought to annul the sale of the same block of Petron shares subject of the
petition in G.R. No. 112399.ARAMCO entered a limited appearance to question the jurisdiction over its
person, alleging that it is a foreign company organized under the laws of the Netherlands, that it is not
doing nor licensed to do business in the Philippines, and that it does not maintain an office or a business
address in and has not appointed a resident agent for the Philippines (Rollo, p.240).
Petitioners however, countered that they filed the action in their capacity as members of Congress.

ISSUE:
WON Petitioners have a locus standi.

DECISION:
Petition is dismissed.

LOCUS STANDI
In Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez , G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994,
we held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the
Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. In the
latter case, the
acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantialinjury which can be questioned by members of Congress
(Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]).In the absence of a claim that the contract in
questionviolated the rights of petitioners or impermissiblyintruded into the domain of the Legislature,
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.
However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).
Under said ruling, taxpayers may question contractsentered into by the national government orgovernmen
t-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in
Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal
standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action.
PRIVATIZATION
The only requirement under R.A. No. 7181 in order to privatize a strategic industry like PETRON is the
approval of the President. In the case of PETRON's privatization, the President gave his approval not only
once but twice. PETRON's privatization is also in line with and is part
of the Philippine Energy Program under R.A. No. 7638.Section 5(b) of the law provides that the
Philippine Energy Program shall include a policy direction towards the privatization
of government agencies related to energy.
BIDDING
On the claim that there was a failed bidding, petitioners contend that there were only three bidders. One
of them, PETRONAS, submitted a bid lower than the floor price while a second, failed to pre-qualify.
 
Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of bidding when: 1) there is only one offer or; or (2) when all
the offers are non-complying or unacceptable. In the case at bench, there were three offerors: SAUDI
ARAMCO, PETRONAS and WESTMONT. While two offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for
submitting a bid below the floor price and WESTMONT for technical reasons, not all the offerors were
disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding under the COA Circular, all the offerors must be disqualified.