Italy v Venezuela
to try a foreigner for an offence committed on the high seas, but within British territorial waters,
Sambiaggio case - Short Summary
HJMB
Sambiaggio, an Italian, suffered damages when revolutionists extorted from him his property during
the Venezuelan civil war. Under the Treaty of 1861, Italy claims indemnification of damages from
the Venezuela government.
Umpire denies.
the Government should not be held responsible for the acts of revolutionists
because —
1. Revolutionists are not the agents of government, and a natural responsibility does not exist.
2. Their acts are committed to destroy the government, and no one should be held responsible for
the acts of an enemy attempting his life.
3. The revolutionists were beyond governmental control, and the Government can not be held
responsible for injuries committed by those who have escaped its restraint
Umpire cites:
When strangers enter a state they must be prepared for the risks of intestine war, because the
occurrence is one over which, from the nature of the case, the government can have no control,
and they can not demand compensation for losses or injuries received, both because, unless it can
be shown that a state is not reasonably well ordered, it is not bound to do more for foreigners than
for its own subjects xxx
He also declared that the treaty did not expressly provide for Italy’s claim. This kind of responsibility
cannot be implied because it is a derogation of general principles of law--what state will allow itself
to be held liable for acts of individuals or groups, such as rebels or revolutionists, who/which want to
destroy its government?
The umpire therefore accepts the rule that if in any case of reclamation submitted to him it is
alleged and proved that Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise due diligence to prevent damages
from being inflicted by revolutionists, that country should be held responsible. In the present
instance no such want of diligence is alleged and proved
Regina (Queen) vs Keyn
Facts
Ferdinand Keyn (defendant) was the captain of the German vessel the  Franconia. While navigating
less than three miles off the shore of Great Britain, the Franconia struck a British vessel, killing a
woman. The Franconiawas not stopping at port in Great Britain but merely passing by when the
accident occurred. Great Britain (plaintiff) charged Keyn with manslaughter. The trial court
convicted Keyn. Keyn appealed.
Issue:
At a technical level the case involved a question of criminal jurisdiction, the right of an English court
which, at this time, were taken to extend three miles out to sea. 
Ratio: The court considered the significance of the existence of an academic consensus as to the
meaning of an international convention. Cockburn CJ said: ‘even if entire unanimity had existed in
respect of the important particulars to which I have referred, in place of so much discrepancy of
opinion, the question would still remain, how far the law as stated by the publicists had received the
assent of the civilized nations of the world. For writers on international law, however valuable their
labours may be in elucidating and ascertaining the principles and rules of law, cannot make the law.
To be binding, the law must have received the assent of the nations who are to be bound by it. This
assent may be express, as by treaty or the acknowledged concurrence of governments, or may be
implied from established usage . . ‘ and
‘Nor, in my opinion, would the clearest proof of unanimous assent on the part of other nations be
sufficient to authorize the tribunals of this country to apply, without an Act of Parliament, what would
practically amount to a new law. In so doing we should be unjustifiably usurping the province of the
legislature. The assent of nations is doubtless sufficient to give the power of parliamentary
legislation in a matter otherwise within the sphere of international law; but it would be powerless to
confer without such legislation a jurisdiction beyond and unknown to the law, such as that now
insisted on, a jurisdiction over foreigners in foreign ships on a portion of the high seas.’
CASE OF THE STEAMER THREE FRIENDS.
Argument on the Piracy Charges Preferred by the Government
Heard Before the Supreme Court of the
United States.At the Conclusion of the Argument the Court Adjourns Until the First Monday in
March, Without An.nouncing Any Opinion on the Question at Issue.
WASHINGTON, Fab. 15.—The Unitdd Bastes Supreme Court to-day heard arguments ha tne case
of the Uultadi States vs. the steamer Three Friends on the motion of the Attorney-General for a
certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals of tii.- Fifth District, bringing the case to the Supreme Court.
The st. amer liad been libeled tor condemnation on the charge of violating the neutrality laws cot::
rolling the relations! between the United States and Spain.
j Assistant Attorney-General WattnsV) ; made the argument for the GovernIntent, He began by
stating the question) I briefly, and then discussed at length) [the question of the nature of a
recognition of belligerency. He explained ths effect of the Act of IM7 la the use of the words ••(• >!
ony. district of people."
He said it was clear that the steamer 1 had been equipped to be employed, against the Spanish
authorities by tho Cuban insurgents. He read extracts from the President's last message t(» show
that sufficient recognition of the Cuban belligerents had been given by the executive to justify the
courts in giving them their attention. The Florida District Court had taken the position that it could
not, under the statute, take such cognisance, but Mr. Whitney argued to the contrary. The only
question, he said, was whether tho statute was applicable for the reason that the belligerency of the
Cubans had not been formally recognized, it was true in the technical meaning of international law
that the Cubans had noC been recognized as belligerents, but then if this was the case, there were
other statutt s concerning the piracy and enlisting of men for hostilities against a friendly power
which were applicable. As a matter of fact there was nothing in the statutes to require ay recognition
of belligerency to set tho. law hi n .. 'jio^. W. Haiietfephillips an d A. W. Cockrell appeared for the
owners of the Three Friends
Mr. Phillips desired to know if the question as to whether the words "colony, district of people." in
the law of IM7 applied to the Cuban insurgent* as presented by the record in this case. No sin fa
body as the reipublie of Cubawas, he said, anywhere referred to. As a matter of fact, the Attorney-
General had been the first among the responsible officers Of the Government to employ this
phrase. He claimed that there had been a mistake as to the legal meaning of that word "neutrality."
Which is inseparable from a belligerency to which the neutral is not a party. He asserted that the
words insurgents and revolutionists have no legal meaning, but when recognized by a neutral
Government such recognition amounts to a recognition of belligerency or independence. He
contended! that all the court could do is to decide* whether on the records presented and;' the
charges in the libel the court beloWj | was justified in sustaining the excepj tions. Mr. Cockrell urged
that the libel failed to show the original intent a 9 ! required by law of the offending person, and that
it did not even show who the offending persons ware, "Could the> Government." he asked,
"establish the Specific intention required without; prosing its existence in the mind of j the person
who had fitted out the yes-Attorney-General Harmon closed ,for the Government. He said that whlls
the Cuban insurrection had not shown itself to be strong enough to warrant I the recognition of
belligerency, stilt' there had been satficient recognition* that a state of war existed* So far as formal
recognition was concerned ha [claimed the insurgerfts were better off, without it. lb' closed with an
appeal ! for the obst rvance of the neutrality j laws, and urged that Congress had, | provided
abundant means for their eni forcement. i At the conclusion of Mr. Harmon's? argument the court
adjourned without announcing tiny opinion until the firsC j Monday in March. Filibuster* Bermuda.
WASHINGTON, Feb. I...—The Secretary of the Treasury instructed the Col- ! lector of Customs at
Philadelphia to ' withhold clearance papers from the alleged filibuster Bermuda, which was
preparing to leave. The Bermuda is a ! British vessel, and it is said her nia- ! jesty's Consul at
Philadelphia has given his consent to her departure, but the ! Treasury officials require the Captain
to make oath that he will not violate the laws of the United States if granted I clearance. An Offer to
George Green. | SYRACUSE, Feb. 1...— The Empire j Athletic Club has wired George Green I
(Young Corbett) an offer of a purse of [$1,500 and $300 for expenses to meet "Tommy" Ryan in this
city on April 14th. providing that Ryan wins hia coming match with Tom Tracey in thiscity. This is a
duplicate of the offer ! made by the Olympic Club of San Francisco. ( British fleet With Strong
Opposition. LONDON. Feb. lo.—The morning j papei-s publish telegrams stating that the British
naval expedition advancing; j toward Benin City for the purpose of j punishing the King of Benin,
murderer |of Consul Phillips' party, had met) [strong opposition. Commander Pritchard was killed in
fighting at Sapelo. It has recently been ascertained that almanacs and calendars date back to the
year 200 A. D.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION          GR 139465, 17 October 2000
FACTS: 
On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country".  Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its supporting papers and
On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. 
The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of the said treaty.
It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7
thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon
certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State). 
On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S.
Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of 
(a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), 
(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), 
(c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), 
(d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and 
(E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). 
On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel
of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. 
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999 requested
copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all documents and
papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he
shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. 
On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, 
for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give
him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition
request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); 
certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the
Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in
court; 
and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act
directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. 
The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. 
On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the
to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. 

IN SUMMARY:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the
United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609
prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a foreign
country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he be given ample time to comment
on said request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
HELD:
NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation where there is
a conflict between a rule of the international law and the constitution. Efforts must first be made in
order to harmonize the provisions so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the
municipal law must be upheld. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over the municipal law in the
municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to
a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition request and the
deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as
"justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law
or judicial pronouncements.The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute
or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of
the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That
would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
G.R. No. 118295   May 2, 1997
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.
Facts: 
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of
its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and
resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals
and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that
the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit,
restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2,
Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.
Held:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty,
particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in
the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did
not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international
law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x
x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with
coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree
to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record
agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of
naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of
hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims,
the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international
organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered
absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put
by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient
nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.”
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the
apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and Supreme Court. 
reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International
Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic
envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over
G.R. No. 101949 any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the
238 SCRA 524 Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the
immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. 
December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.
Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands
in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an
act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of
the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. 

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name
Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in
(PRC).  The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents
nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a
the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed
with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather
Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property. 
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both accordingly. 
were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright
Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that
respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios,
the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. 

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and
damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction
based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already