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NickJ. Fox
Foucault,Foucauldiansand sociology
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS
Foucault;socialtheory;ontology;epistemology
Brit.Jnl. of SociolonVolume no. 49 Issue no. 3 September 1998 ISSN 0007-1315 (C)London School of Economics 1998
416 NickJ. Fox
of discursive formation
may not have been fully
my argument will be that addressed. In this paper,
Foucault's ontology is itself
tradictory, and this ambiguity ambiguous and con-
may be carried over into
ology. While I am Foucauldian soci-
suggesting neither that such
fatal flaw (perhaps indeed ambiguity is necessarily a
it is an antidote to
nor that we must modernist meta-narrative),
somehow be 'faithful' to
I shall suggest that Foucault (Armstrong 1997:
sociologists who would apply the 15),
cally appraise the approach might criti-
implications of Foucault's
extremely cautious when ontology, and remain
extrapolating (and perhaps subtly
position to sociological tasks. adapting) the
Foucault was critical of
theories which consider
unitaryand centralized power as 'sovereign': a
construct (Foucault 1980b:
169)and hence primarily 115, Wickham, 1986:
repressive in character. A
power,Foucault argued principal technology of
withthe gathering of (1976,1979, 1980a), is the gaze,which is concerned
information, to inform and create
subject-matter.Discourses create a discourse on its
neithertrue nor false effectsof truthwhich are of
(Foucault 1980b: 116-19). themselves
ofa productive power Because of this association
with the fabrication of
speaks of power/knowledge- effects of truth, Foucault
a phenomenon which
to
either component. cannot be reduced simply
Armstrong (1983) succinctly
sums up this association
Power assumes a
relationship based on some
and sustains it; conversely, knowledge which creates
in which certain power establishes a
particular regime of truth
knowledges become admissible
or possible. (1983: 10)
Arange of studies in
sociology have used a
mentthese knowledges or Foucauldian model to docu-
(Sawicki 1991, Weedon 1987), 'knowledgeabilities'. For example,
patriarchy
architecture masculinity (Hearn and Morgan
(Prior 1988), criminology 1990),
munitymedicine and public nealth (Pfohl and Gordon 1988),
com-
Petersen 1997), dentistry (Nettleton(Armstrong 1983, 1994, Lupton 1995,
(Rose
1989, Tyler 1997), religion 1992), developmental
(Moore psychology
(Kaite
1988), education 1994, Paden 1988),
(Goodson and Dowbiggin pornography
beauty
and fitness (Probyn 1988, 1990, Grant 1997),
In
many of these studies, the Glassner 1989), and death
gaze of power, operating (Prior 1987).
techniquesof surveillance, supplies through modernist
turns the raw material for a
people into subjects of discourse which
authority professions (or disciplines). The
of such disciplines are power and
between played out in the everyday
professionals (or privileged encounters
they others) and their
children, patients or clients, subject-matter, be
other
words, power/knowledge is workers, family members or lovers.
In
ity. implicated in the formation of
subjectiv-
This
relation between power and
theorists,
and the attraction of subjectivityis clearly of interest to
Foucault's social
apparent formulation may be related to its
transcendence of both structuralism
Rabinow
1982, Smart 1985: 16). It and humanism (Dreyfus
breaks with and
that
poweris something which is structuralism in that it denies
merely coercive in a
traditional Marxist or
Foucault,Foucauldiansand sociology 417
The centrality of the concept of discourse in Foucault's work, and its associ-
ation with knowledge and power, suggests a continuity between his project
and the sociology of knowledge; in particular the kinds of approaches in
sociology which have looked at the social construction of scientific and
other knowledges (Nettleton 1992: 133). But is there a continuity here? For
Foucault, the term 'discourse' referred both to the historically contingent
sets of practices (for instance, the practices which constitute clinical medi-
cine) which limit human actions and what may be thought, andto the theor-
etical concept which accounts for the fact that humans actually do act and
think in line with these 'regimes of truth' (for instance, that people do - by
and large - co-operate with a clinical gaze which turns them into patients).
Foucault's archaeological and genealogical accounts address the first of
these conceptions of discourse, and it is understandable how these seem
attractive to sociologists as explanations of the impact of the social upon
how people behave - a central concern of sociology since Durkheim. What
seems to follow from this, is a willingness to accept Foucault's theorization
of how discourse 'in and of itself' works, as reflected in the sometimes
unthinking use of the term in sociology and cognate disciplines.l An explor-
ation of this theory of discourse may suggest a more cautious response from
sociology.
Foucault sought to develop a basis for understanding what makes know-
ledge possible, to attempt an 'archaeology' of knowledge, underpinned by
'rules' which operate independently of subjectivity (Foucault 1974: 15-16).
As such it has some aspects in common with linguistics, in which a set of
grammatical rules authorizes an infinite set of language statements. Thus
418 NickJ. Fox
there is a 'deep' level of rules, and a surface level
of discursive statements.
Discursive practices, he says
. . . are characterised by a delimitation of a
field of objects, the definition
of a legitimate perspective for the agent of
knowledge, and the fixing of
norms for the elaboration of concepts and
theories. (Foucault 1977b:
199)
has a life of its own independent of human agency (Foucault 1977b: 200-1),
and cannot be reduced to particular texts or practices. It is also clear that,
given the unknowability of power/knowledge, discerning its 'hidden
meaning' could not be the objective of analysis, Foucauldian or otherwise.
This ontology of discourse is quite different from humanist sociological
notions of the structuring of agency (Smart 1985: 71, Hacking 1986: 35).
To summarize, discourse cannot be reduced to texts or other 'authored'
practices, does not directly mirror the 'reality' of historical events (the non-
discursive), and is the surface manifestation of a deeper power/knowledge,
which is anonymous, disseminated and cannot be known in a traditional
sense. Nor is discourse simply a new way of thinking about social structure,
which in traditional social theory- however deterministic - can always be
'explained' (as roles, the economic base or whatever): Foucault's concep-
tion of discourse is radically divorced, both from 'reality' and from tra-
ditional notions of human subjectivity. It follows that strategies appropriate
to a humanistic framework, for instance recourse to authorial intention, his-
torical events or contexts, cannot be adopted when utilizing this model.
The unfamiliarity of such a notion of an ahistorical, non-authored dis-
course governed by a free-floating, anonymous, disseminated power/know-
ledge requires most cautious methodological rigour when applied to
sociological analysis. Two opposing attractors await the unwary, and
examples of both are discernible in the work of Foucauldian sociologists.
The first of these is a tendency for essentialism concerning power/know-
ledge, such that power is seen as unitary and unifying, working through
disciplinary discourses to achieve its ends. This can be seen most clearly in
neo-Marxist or structuralist analyses, in which power is 'functional', closely
associated with the interests of some group or institution (Wickham 1986:
153, 170-4). The second tendency leads in the opposite direction, to a posi-
tion in which power/knowledge is acknowledged as unknowable and thus
either vacuous (Rorty 1992: 330) or simply to be quietly forgotten about
altogether, in favour of a focus on the surface phenomenon of discursive
practice.
Foucault was aware of how easy it would be to essentialize power
(Freundlieb 1986: 158-162), but argued this would be to undermine his per-
spective on it as strategic, rather than something to be possessed, such that
. . . its effects of domination are attributed not to 'appropriation', but to
dispositions, manoeuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one
should decipher in it a network of relations constantly in tension, in
activity . .. that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather
than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory.
(Foucault 1979: 26)
At the level of the rules governing discourse, power/knowledge was a
principle of 'dispersion' rather than a unity (Freundlieb 1986: 162), and
was located between rather than within institutions (Foucault 1979: 26).
Fox
J.
Nick
time (Smart 1985: 42), in other words to the objects of history - in par-
ticular, bodies, selves and subjectivity in general.
Foucault's genealogies draw more heavily on the surface manifestations
of discursive practices, the human productions of texts or non-textual prac-
tices, and there is thus the potential for any text or practice to be labeled
'discursive', eliding the distinction between written texts and 'discourse',
between which Foucault quite clearly differentiates (Foucault 1977a: 123,
138; 1977b: 200). Genealogy supplies apparently convincing analyses of his-
torical changes in discursive practices, filled with examples drawn from the
surface manifestations. The existence of a discourse is discerned induc-
tively, and with enough ingenuity any text can be linked to a 'discourse'.
To give two examples: firstly, Paden's exploration of Puritan writings since
the fifth century discerns the development of a reflexive identity, such that
he concludes
. . . Puritan writing, in spite of its God-centred theology, not only pre-
supposed the importance of the self, the 'seeing I', but also pre-figured
the modern division of the self into opposing parts.... Puritan suspicion
of self represented a practice with implications which go well beyond the
mythological agenda that invented it. By the logic of reflexive self-
examination, every religious assertion . . . could become subject of its
own possible self-deception. (Paden 1988: 78)
Similarly, having documented various Victorian texts which reported
studies of the association of sugar with dental decay, Nettleton suggests
that
Each of these studies with their various and often conflicting conclusions
was an attempt to find the 'truth' about the relationship between sugar
and caries. But there was a more fundamental truth which each of these
studies has already presumed, namely the existence of mouths, teeth,
sugar and disease.... In effect, arguments for and against (sugar's) value
were all part of the same discourse. (Nettleton 1992: 81)
Such studies are based in the Foucauldian premise that the rules of dis-
cursive formation provide the 'conditions of existence' of particular state-
ments, which make it possible to say certain things and not others: the
'discourse' is inductively derived from the texts under study. But what pre-
cisely is happening here? In Foucault's position, discourse is anonymous,
dependent neither on human intent or historical context, and cannot be
reduced to the texts of specific 'authors' (Foucault 1977a: 121), yet geneal-
ogy concerns itself principally with texts, from which we 'uncover' the dis-
course. Freundlieb suggests (1986: 176) that behind such analysis is a
'hidden model of historical sociology' which links discursive practices to his-
torical events (non-discursive practices) in precisely the way which Foucault
rejected. Capitalism, industrial development, the physicality of the body,
particular historical events or whatever form an unacknowledged backcloth
which structure the analytical work of discerning the 'rules' of discursive
422 NickJ. Fox
because they touch them, cut them, break them into sections, regional-
ize them, and multiply their surfaces, and equally outside of bodies,
because they function between bodies.... (Foucault 1977c: 169-70)
For Foucault, the important thing was not the body itself, but that it was
both realized in the play of power and also the site of possible transgres-
sions or refusals of power (Game 1991: 45). Civilization as the project of
history relentlessly writes this body, seeking its total destruction by its trans-
figuration into a cultural object (Butler 1990: 129-30). This formulation
reveals another aspect of the determinism of Foucault's ontology.
Foucault's version of the body, despite his obvious political and personal
inclinations to be on the side of those who are resistant (Haber 1994), turns
out to be 'totally imprinted by discourse' (Butler 1990), and 'passive and
largely deprived of causal powers' (Lash 1991: 261-70). While Foucault's
analysis worked well in circumstances where discursive regimes of truth
were successful in constructing relatively unresisting subjectivities (for
example, the sick, the mentally ill), such a model cannot analyse the con-
ditions under which resistance to power becomes possible, why some
people resist and others do not, and how resistance may be successful, all
issues of great interest to sociologists from Marx through Goffman to
Bauman. Furthermore, although the model may be a useful tool for analy-
sis, it cannot be a catalyst for resistance (Haber 1994: 111):while resistance
is alwaysan aspect of power (Foucault 1980a: 142), to codify resistance is to
destroy it.
The passiveness of such a non-embodied body comes across in some
sociological writing. Lupton (1997) chides Armstrong for his determinism,
and we can find many examples of similar reification. Thus, Harding's dis-
cussion of hormone replacement therapy (HRT) and the construction of
the female body concludes that
HRT can be viewed as a technology of power directed at bodies which
establishes, at the level of the body, unequal distributions of power and
thereby contributes to the manufacture of sexed subjects and the defi-
nition of conditions of being a sex. Sex can be seen as an effect of the
investments in the body made possible by discourses, in this case on HRT,
producing its natural and normal precondition and subsequent second-
ary characterisations. (Harding 1997: 147)
By denying any essential self, such analyses leaves the non-discursive physi-
cal body entirely divorced from the discursive body written by power/know-
ledge. Such a position has seemed unsatisfactory to many sociologists; to
post-structuralistfeminists - whose agenda is both analytical and political -
in particular. Sawicki sees the subjectification of women by discourses on
reproduction as creating possibilities for resistance to patriarchy, for
example, through demands for infertility treatment by lesbians and single
women (Sawicki 1991: 84) . Butler warns that Foucault seems to be adhering
to a long and suspect tradition in which the body is the passive recipient of
Foucault,Foucauldiansand socioloe 425
In Power/Know-
.
.
tlon
.
DISCUSSION
feminist sociology, this position has been highly productive, although as has
been shown in this paper, on occasions this scholarship cuts across funda-
mentals of Foucault's positions concerning subjectivityand 'empowerment'
in its challenge to patriarchy. In hands less skilled than Foucault's own,
efforts to use the Foucauldian notion of the self come to look much like
phenomenological sociology.
The second justification for the use of Foucauldian or quasi-Foucauldian
approaches might consist in an argument for a post-modern, fragmentary
social theory, accepting of paradox and contradiction, and committed to
opening up new readings rather than seeking truth in a definitive account
(Owen 1997). From such a perspective, the kinds of problems with using
Foucault in sociology which this paper has illustrated are not problems at
all, but features of the end of a modernist meta-narrativefor sociology. The
structure/agency dichotomy is not resolved by Foucault, rather it is seen as
incapable of resolution: and ceases to be a problem. Foucauldian genealo-
gies can proliferate, and even those which are contradictory in their analy-
ses can co-exist: Foucault's role now becomes that of an unsettler,
reminding us that social science is itself part of the history of ideas. Yet
Foucault is actually a bad candidate for this kind of sociology, given the
extent to which his work itself constitutes a kind of meta-narrative (Nettle-
ton 1995), typified - according to Mouzelis (1995) by vagueness, grandios-
ity and over-generalization.
While I have sympathy with a political project to destabilize sociology's
modernist project (as perhaps would Foucault given his analysis of the
human sciences in The Orderof Things),my own appraisal of the Fou-
cauldian corpus is different. While Foucault has contributed to the post-
structuralist movements of the late second millennium which have
radicalized the agendas of philosophy, literary theory and emancipatory
politics, I believe the translation of Foucault into sociology is largely vapid,
except to the extent that philosophy, literary theory and emancipatory poli-
tics impinge on the discipline. In this paper I have sought to show its limi-
tations: firstly that the kinds of questions the discipline asks are much wider
than those within Foucault's project, secondly that the 'tools' he created
won't work beyond these limits, and thirdly that when adapted by Fou-
cauldians so they do appear to work, the methods are indistinguishable
from more traditional approaches.
In place of an emphasis on Foucault's work as the source of key concepts
for a sociology which rethinks structuralist approaches, which addresses the
problem of subjectivity, and engages ethically and politically, theorists
needs to look elsewhere within the body of work known as 'post-structural-
ist' or 'postmodern' which is now influencing many branches of the social
sciences including psychology (Smith 1991), politics (White 1991), organiz-
ation studies (Kilduff 1993), geography (Bondi 1990), gender studies
(Ashenden 1997) and cultural studies (Landow 1992, Moi 1985). At the
most basic level, post-structuralistconcerns with textuality render them con-
gruent with the kinds of ethnographic and interview-based studies which
430 NickJ. Fox
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
NOTE
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