1

ISSUES RAISED

I. WHETHER JUDICIARY IS ‘STATE’ UNDER ART.12

II. WHETHER THE ‘BLANKET BAN’ RESTRICTION ON PUBLIC

MEETINGS IN ROAD SIDES IS REASONABLE UNDER ARTICLE
19(2) AND ARTICLE 19(3).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. THE JUDICIARY IS ‘STATE’ UNDER ART.12

A. Definition of ‘state’ under Art.12 of the Constitution.

B. The scope of the expression ‘other authorities’ in Art.12
C. Judiciary is included in the expression ‘state’.

II. THE ‘BLANKET BAN’ RESTRICTION ON PUBLIC MEETINGS IN

ROAD SIDES IS NOT REASONABLE UNDER ART.19(2) & 19(3).

A. Earlier view on ‘Prohibition’ and ‘Reasonable Restriction’.

B. Test of ‘Reasonable Restriction’.
C. ‘Public Order’ as a Reasonable Restriction.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. THE JUDICIARY IS ‘STATE’ UNDER ART.12

1. The petitioner hereby submits that the instant petition ought not to be dismissed
on the ground that the judiciary is not included under the expression ‘state’ mentioned in
Art.12, that respondent may raise.
A. DEFINITION OF ‘STATE’ UNDER ART.12 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
2. The Constitution of India puts the definition of ‘State’ in Part III with other
fundamental rights. This is itself for the protection of the citizens of India against those
activities of the State which curbs their fundamental rights. The definition under Art.12
says that unless the context otherwise requires the term ‘State’ includes the following:-
a. The Government and Parliament of India, i.e., Executive and Legislature of the
Union.
b. The Government and the Legislature of each State, i.e., Executive and Legislature
of States.
c. All local or other authorities within the territory of India.
d. All local and other authorities under the control of the Government of India.
The term ‘State’ thus expressly includes executives as well as the legislative organs of the
Union and States.
B. THE SCOPE OF THE EXPRESSION ‘OTHER AUTHORITIES’ IN ART.12
3. In Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal,1 the Supreme Court held that the
expression ‘other authorities’ is wide enough to include all authorities created by the
Constitution or statute on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not necessary that the
statutory authority should be engaged in performing governmental or sovereign function.
Similar test was also applied in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram.2

1
AIR 1967 SC 1857
2
AIR 1975 SC 1331
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4. But afterwards a broader outlook was given to the definition of ‘State’, this was
mainly because the reach of the Government was growing night and day into the daily
lives of the people and government through its various agencies was handling the day to
day life of the common citizen. Consequently in Airport Authority’s case,3 Bhagawati, J.,
preferred, the broader test as suggested by Mathew, J., in Sukhdev’s case4. In this case the
Court held that if a body is an agency or instrumentality of government it may be an
‘authority’ within the meaning of Art.12 whether it is a statutory corporation, a
government company or even a registered society.
C. JUDICIARY IS INCLUDED IN THE EXPRESSION ‘STATE’.
5. In America it is well settled that the judiciary is within the prohibition of the 14th
Amendment.5 In Naresh Sridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra,6 the Supreme Court
held that even if a Court is the State a writ under Art.32 cannot be issued to a High Court
of competent jurisdiction against its orders, because such orders cannot be said to violate
the fundamental rights. But in this case through the majority judgment and minority
judgment of Hidayatulla, J., it is clear that the main issue dealt with in this case was
whether there was any fundamental right violation or not. It is for this reason submitted
that the issue whether judiciary is ‘state’ was not addressed properly in this case.
Hidayatulla, J., held in this case, in a dissenting decision, that the judiciary was subject to
fundamental rights. The inclusion of certiorari as a writ in Art.32 for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, prominently proves that there are some fundamental rights which can
be violated by a judge acting judicially in a court stricto sensu.
6. Art.12, which defines ‘the state’ for the purpose of Pat III, does not expressly
exclude the judiciary and though Art.12 does not expressly include the judiciary, it is
submitted that the judiciary with Legislature and the Executive is included in the ordinary
meaning of a ‘state’ as one of the three great departments of a state. Further it’s submitted
that the ordinary meaning is not outside the inclusive definition of the ‘state’ given in
Art.12. This submission is supported by Art.13 which declares that any law, rule,
regulation, and the like, which violates fundamental rights, is void.7

3
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628.
4
ibid. AIR 1975 SC 1331
5
Virina v. Rives, (1980) 100 US 313, 318, 25 L Ed. 667.
6
AIR 1967 SC 1
7
H.M. Seervai – Constitutional Law of India, p 393 (4th ed.)
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7. It is also submitted that, in the light of the seven Judges Bench of the Supreme
Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,8 where it has been held that the court cannot pass
an order or issue a direction which would be violative of fundamental rights of citizens, it
can be said that the expression ‘State’ as defined in Art.12 of the Constitution includes
judiciary also. And so it is submitted that the instant petition ought not to be dismissed on
the ground that the judiciary is not included under the expression ‘state’ mentioned in
Art.12.
II. THE ‘BLANKET BAN’ RESTRICTION ON PUBLIC MEETINGS IN
ROAD SIDES IS NOT REASONABLE UNDER ART.19(2) & 19(3).

8. The petitioner hereby submits that the ‘blanket ban’ restriction on public meetings
in road sides is not reasonable under Art.19(2) & 19(3) of the Constitution. The petitioner
also submits that the instant petition ought not to be dismissed on the ground of the
restriction being reasonable under Art.19(2) & 19(3), which the respondent may raise.
A. EARLIER VIEW ON ‘PROHIBITION’ AND ‘REASONABLE RESTRICTION’.
9. The questions which have most engaged the attention of the Courts have centered
round the restrictions to which the right to freedom under Art.19(1) are subject. For a
time different views were expressed on the question whether the word ‘restriction’ in
Art.19(2) to Art.19(6) included ‘prohibition’, till the Supreme Court answered affirmative
in Narendra Kumar v. Union of India.9 In that case, Das Gupta, J., reviewed the earlier
Supreme Court decisions with the following result: the observations of Kania, C.J., and
Das, J., in A.K. Gopalan v. Union of India,10 that ‘restriction’ did not mean ‘deprivation’
were made in the context of a conflict between Art.19(1) (d) and Art.21 and could not
have been intended for general application.
10. In Ramunni Kurup v. Panchyath Bd., Badagara,11 s.81, Madras Village
Panchayath Act,1950 and the notification issued thereunder, closing down private
markets, were held void solely on the ground that Art.19(5) contemplated the regulation
and not total prohibition, of the exercise of that right. So this was the view on the
‘restriction’ prior to the Narendra Kumar case.
8
AIR 1988 SC 1531
9
AIR 1960 SC 430
10
AIR 1950 SC 27
11
AIR 1954 Mad 754
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B. TEST OF ‘REASONABLE RESTRICTION’.

11. The phrase ‘reasonable restriction’ in Art.19(2) to Art.19(6) connotes that the
limitation imposed on a person in the enjoyment of his right under Art.19(1) should not
be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is actually required in the interest of
the public. The word ‘reasonable’ implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the
choice, of a course which reason dictates. The expression seeks to strike a balance
between the individual rights guaranteed by Art.19 and social control permitted under
clauses (2) to (6) of the Art.19.
12. “Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to
contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the
freedom guaranteed in Art.19 and the special control permitted by clause (6) of Art.19 it
must be wanting in that quality”.12 There is no exact standard or general pattern of
reasonableness that can be laid down for all cases. Each case is to be judged on it own
merit. The standards varies with the nature of the right infringed, the underlying purpose
of the restrictions imposed, the extent and the urgency of the evil sought to be remedied,
the disproportion, of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the time. These factors
have to be taken into consideration for any judicial verdict.13
13. The restriction must be reasonable from the substantive as well as procedural
standpoint.14 The court must determine the reasonableness of a restriction by objective
standard and not by substantive one. In State of Madras v. V.G. Row,15 the Court said “In
evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conceptions of what is reasonable
in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the
scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part,
and the limit to their reference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be
dictated by their sense of responsibility and self restraint and the sobering reflection that
the Constitution is meant not only for people of their own way of thinking but for all, and
that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the
imposition of the restriction, considered them to be reasonable”.

12
Chintamani Rao v. St. of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118.
13
St. of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196.
14
N.B. Khare v. St. of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 211.
15
AIR 1952 SC 196.
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14. In Himatlal v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad,16 it was held that the right to
hold public meetings flows from Art.19(1)(b) & (d),the State cannot impose unreasonable
restrictions upon it. Further in a concurring judgment by Mathew, J., stated that “public
meetings in open spaces and public streets forms part of the tradition of our national
life… and people have come to regard it as a part of their privileges and immunities.”
15. In the instant case the petitioner was first granted permission to hold the public
meeting in front of the campus of University of Vectonia, but later the permission was
withdrawn on the ground that the meeting may create law and order problems. The act of
the Commissioner is very well seen as an arbitrary one which is in violation of the
reasonable restriction mentioned in the Art.19(2) & 19(3).17 The act of the respondent is
in itself an arbitrary one because the sudden appearance of a law and order problem
which did not occur when the permission was granted first time shows a suspicious arm
behind the withdrawal of the permission. And the order of the Hon’ble High Court has
just been made use of to withdraw the permission, without any real dedication to
implement the order because if it were so the respondent would have not granted the
permission first, and that too in a condition where the court has ordered to implement its
order in full letter and spirit.
16. Similarly the order of the Hon’ble High Court of Neethisthan in a PIL banning
public meetings in road sides and public places, which has a binding effect on the
Government under Art.215 of the Constitution and thus makes it a law in the land, exerts
excessive restriction on the right to freedom guaranteed under Art.19(1)(a) & 19(1)(b) as
it bans all sort of meetings without going into the merits of the purpose for which it ought
to be done. In Chintamani Rao v. St. of M.P.,18 it was held that it is the courts and not the
Legislature which has to judge finally whether a restriction is reasonable or not, but in
this instant case the order of the Hon’ble High Court of Neethisthan is itself an excessive
restriction.
C. ‘PUBLIC ORDER’ AS A REASONABLE RESTRICTION.
17. Public order is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order.
‘Public order’ is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility. The test for

16
AIR 1973 SC 87.
17
As it was held in Chintamani Rao v. St. of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118.
18
AIR 1951 SC 118.
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determining whether an act affects law and order or public order is to see whether the act
leads to the disturbances of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a
disturbance of the public order or whether it affects merely an individual being the
tranquility of the society undisturbed.19 Public order thus implies absence of violence and
an orderly state of affairs in which citizens can peacefully pursue their normal avocation
of life.20 There must be reasonable and proper nexus or relationship between the
restriction and the achievement of public order.
18. In the instant case the petitioner had applied for permission to hold a public
meeting pained at the happening in the Vectonia campus.21 Being a reasonable citizen of
India he some how wanted to bring awareness in the students and others that this type of
activities would only create panic and the result would be worse than what it is.22 The
order of the Hon’ble High Court of Neethisthan, which has been relied upon by the
Commissioner as one of the main reasons to deny permission to hold public meeting in
road side apart from the speculation that law and order problems would be created, is
premised on the ground of violation of right to fundamental freedoms and right to life,
but the order itself in this instant case is violative of the fundamental rights of another
citizen because this blanket ban on meetings in road sides is far away from reasonable
restriction mentioned in Art.19(2) and (3).
19. Public order, which the respondent may raise as a reasonable restriction implies
absence of violence and an orderly state of affairs in which citizens can peacefully pursue
their normal avocation of life,23 and the petitioner through the public meeting wants to
restore this public order which has been frequently disturbed by the activities of the
warring factions of the students union in the heart of the city. So it is submitted that the
order which the Hon’ble High Court has passed is excessive, as far as this instant case is
considered.

19
Kanu Biswas v. St. of W.B., AIR 1972 SC 1656.
20
Basudev v. Rex, AIR 1949 All 513 (FB).
21
The reference is to the deadly clash between the warring factions of student, seriously hurting two and
subsequently the dawn to dusk hartal by the student unions and the damage to public property thus
incurred.
22
The reference is to the decreasing representation in Civil service and admissions to premier institutions of
the nation from Neethisthan. And also to the loss of public property by the student organizations and also to
the loss of public order due to these clashes between the student organizations.
23
Basudev v. Rex, AIR 1949 All 513 (FB).
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20. The motive behind this public meeting is to restore the Public Order which has
been frequently disturbed by the regular fights in the University of Vectonia, which is
located at the heart of the city and any such disturbance would spill out and eventually
throws the city out of gear. In this respect it is submitted that the motive of the petitioner
to restore the public order which otherwise is disturbed should be given special
preference in this instant case and so uphold the outlook of this Hon’ble court that the
reasonableness of a restriction as per Art.!9(2) to (6) is to be decided as per the merits of
the case.24

PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare that;
1. The judiciary is included in the definition of ‘state’ mentioned in Art.12
2. The ‘blanket ban’ restriction on public meetings in road sides is not reasonable
under Art.19(2) & 19(3) of the Constitution.
and pass any order it may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.

All of which is humbly prayed,

Counsel for the Petitioner.

24
As it was held in Chintamani Rao v. St. of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118.