Marine Policy 117 (2020) 103945

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Marine Policy
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Welfare economics and wicked problems in coastal and marine governance

Rolf A. Groeneveld
Wageningen University, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN, Wageningen, the Netherlands

A B S T R A C T

Coastal and marine governance has been characterised as a ‘wicked’ problem due to difficulties in definition, uncertainty, and conflicting perspectives and values.
Social Cost-Benefit Analysis (SCBA), which is an application of welfare economics, ’tames’ such problems by assuming away many of these complexities. This article
reviews the simplifying assumptions underlying SCBA in four major areas. First, welfare-economics and SCBA assume a utilitarian, consequentialist frame and a clear
problem delineation, whereas wicked problems are difficult to define and delineate. Second, welfare economics can deal with risk and uncertainty as long as all
policy alternatives, states of nature, and success criteria are known, whereas for wicked problems it is not known with certainty which alternatives are to be evaluated
and by which criteria, and which states of nature are possible. Third, welfare economics can deal with a variety of perceptions as long as the legitimacy of each
perception is uncontested, whereas in wicked problems some stakeholders’ or experts’ views are contested by others. Fourth, welfare economics can deal with a
variety of preferences and hence conflicting interests, as long as all values are individual and substitutable, whereas in wicked problems some values cannot be
substituted as they represent ‘sacred’ values such as religion and identity. Despite its limitations, however, the explicit definition of the assumptions behind SCBA
make it a helpful benchmark to determine what makes a given problem in coastal and marine governance wicked.

1. Introduction
The difficulty of marine governance goes beyond mere complexity
[1]. Seas are three-dimensional systems that are difficult to monitor and
poorly understood; rights of access and property are contested; coastal
and marine areas are strongly interconnected biophysically and socially;
and a multitude of interests are involved [1,2]. The decision who gets
access to marine resources, for which activities, where, and when, in­
volves considerations of a biophysical, social, economic, and moral na­
ture that are difficult to disentangle.
Social Cost-Benefit Analysis (SCBA) is commonly used to appraise
marine policies [3–6]. Examples of SCBA in coastal and marine gover­
nance include adaptation to climate change (see e.g. Refs. [7–9]; water
quality standards [10]; deep sea mining [11]; marine protected areas
[12,13]; and offshore wind energy (see e.g. Ref. [14].
However, SCBA may also oversimplify the problems at hand. Jentoft
and Chuenpagdee [1] argues that marine governance is a ‘wicked’
problem (cf [15]. Unlike ‘tame’ problems, which can be technically
complex but are unambiguously defined and solved, wicked problems
lack a clear definition, they are highly uncertain, and there is no
consensus on which solution is preferred. The ‘wicked’ characteristics of
many problems addressed by the social sciences are typically ignored by
welfare-economic policy appraisal tools such as SCBA.
What exactly constitutes a wicked problem, however, is itself subject
to confusion. Various definitions of wicked problems exist (see e.g.
Ref. [16–19]. This definitional vagueness has led to a considerable
degree of term inflation, and some authors have warned that the term is
being applied too liberally [20–22]. In contrast, the basis of SCBA, i.e.
welfare economics, is characterised by a set of clear and explicit as­
sumptions that enable practitioners to express the desirability of policy
options in quantitative, i.e. monetary terms.
The wicked problems concept and SCBA therefore represent two
alternative ways to frame normative dilemmas in coastal and marine
governance. The first frame, wicked problems, acknowledges the many
complexities and contradictions faced by policy makers, but in preser­
ving that complexity it struggles to provide clear policy recommenda­
tions; it also lacks a clear and universally accepted definition. The
second frame, SCBA, provides seemingly clear policy recommendations
based on a well-defined normative model, but only at the expense of
‘taming’ the wicked problem, i.e. assuming away many aspects of the
problem relevant to policy makers.
Therefore, contrasting the assumptions made in welfare economics
with the characteristics of wicked problems will be useful for both policy
scientists and economists. There is a need in policy science for a clearer
diagnosis of what makes a given problem wicked. Peters [21] argues
that the term “wicked problems” has been applied to problems that, in
the strictest sense of the term, should not be considered wicked. Alford
and Head [20] suggest a typology of wicked problems that acknowl­
edges that some problems are more wicked than others, and in different
respects. Neither, however, have considered welfare economics as a
frame of reference to diagnose the wickedness of a given problem.
For economists, studying wicked problems can highlight the most

E-mail address: rolf.groeneveld@wur.nl.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103945
Received 27 May 2019; Received in revised form 7 March 2020; Accepted 12 March 2020
Available online 20 March 2020
0308-597X/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
R.A. Groeneveld
important limitations in welfare economics and by extension SCBA, and
suggest promising avenues for future research on the embedding of
economic analysis in public decision-making procedures. There is an
extensive literature on the applicability of SCBA and monetary valuation
to coastal and marine governance [5,6,23–25]. So far, however, this
literature has focused on the availability of scientific data and models,
and it has hardly discussed the philosophical foundations of
welfare-economic analysis itself. An exception is Oinonen et al. [24],
who acknowledge that in addition to the instrumental and anthropo­
centric values included in SCBA there are more qualitative consider­
ations that are also important, but the authors do not explain or explore
what those considerations might be. Torres and Hanley [25] highlight in
their discussion the need for more interdisciplinary approaches to
address concerns of rights, fairness, and social and environmental im­
pacts that cannot be monetised as these concerns are difficult to include
in an SCBA. None of these sources discuss or mention the wicked
problems concept, and to the best of my knowledge Batie [26] is the only
study discussing in detail the challenge posed by wicked problems to
economics, albeit in general terms.
The objective of this paper is to trace the limitations and simplifying
assumptions of welfare economics, and its application in SCBA, vis-� a-vis
the characteristics of wicked problems, with a focus on coastal and
marine resources. In doing so the paper aims to shed light on the
following questions: (1) which are the assumptions commonly made in
welfare economics that ‘tame’ the problem at hand? and (2) how can
welfare economics serve as a benchmark to identify the ‘wicked’ char­
acteristics of problems in marine governance?
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses SCBA and its
foundation in welfare economics, the literature on wicked problems, and
their position in the public decision-making process. Section 3 discusses
four major characteristics of wicked problems: problem definition, risk
and uncertainty, conflicting beliefs, and conflicting values; and the as­
sumptions made in welfare economics to ‘tame’ the problem. Section 4
discusses the main findings and suggestions for further research.
2. Welfare-economic analysis and wicked problems in the
marine policy cycle
2.1. Theoretical basis of Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
SCBA is an application of welfare economics, which in turn is an
application of utilitarian ethics. The founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy
Bentham, argued that actions be judged by their utility, i.e. the extent to
which they increase pleasure or reduce pain [27]. Welfare economics
interprets utility as a cardinal representation of an individual preference
ordering rather than a variable of hedonic experience, but two relevant
characteristics of utilitarianism remain. First, utilitarianism is conse­
quentialist: it judges the morality of an action by its consequences rather
than the act itself or the intentions behind it. Second, utilitarianism is
welfarist, i.e. it follows “the principle that the goodness of a state of
affairs depends ultimately on the set of individual utilities in that state,
and […] can be seen as an increasing function of that set” [28]:464).
Although utilitarianism is not necessarily anthropocentric [29], a third
relevant characteristic of the application of welfare economics in SCBA
is that it considers only the utility of human beings.
SCBA differs from private cost-benefit analysis, i.e. CBA as under­
taken by a private firm, in that it is designed to appraise decisions from a
public perspective. When deciding about an investment in a project,
private companies identify and quantify the project’s costs and benefits,
and discount future costs and benefits by the market interest rate to take
into account the opportunity costs of the capital invested. In SCBA,
public decision-making bodies appraise policy decisions by identifying,
quantifying, and monetising all effects on society. Like in a private CBA,
future effects are also discounted, albeit with a social discount rate that
reflects not just the interest rate but also considerations of irreversibility
of environmental damage and intergenerational equity [4].
2
Marine Policy 117 (2020) 103945
Compared to private CBA carrying out an SCBA raises two major
difficulties. The first difficulty is the lack of a market price for many
relevant effects. Whereas private CBA takes market prices for granted,
SCBA also takes into account effects for which no markets exist, such as
environmental pollution, degradation of biodiversity, or restoration of
ecosystems [4]. Monetising such issues as health, safety, and aesthetic
quality also raises ethical objections [30]. Proponents of welfare eco­
nomics argue that when really pressed for a decision, people do make
choices that they initially deem unpalatable: they choose cheaper but
riskier commuting options, or do not donate all their wealth to charity.
Once we accept this assumption of substitutability, we can estimate
people’s Compensating Variation (CV), i.e. the monetary transaction
that makes the individual as well off as without the change, or their
Equivalent Variation (EV), i.e. the monetary transaction that makes the
individual as well off as they would have been with it.
Second, whereas a private company only has its own interest to
worry about, SCBA aggregates the effects over multiple individuals.
Interpersonal comparison of CV or EV is hampered by income differ­
ences: when two people with different income levels have the same CV
for an environmental effect, the effect is probably more important in
utility terms to the poorer person than to the richer person [31]. SCBA
can potentially weight income groups differently based on (1) the in­
dividual’s marginal utility of consumption, i.e. richer individuals’
higher willingness to pay for a change with the same utilitarian value;
and (2) the marginal moral value of utility, i.e. the marginal increase in
society’s welfare due to an increase in the individual’s welfare [31].
Equity weights are not commonly used, however, because most SCBAs
follow the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation principle [32,33] that a
policy is considered welfare-improving if its winners can compensate the
losers and still be better off.
Intergenerational equity gives rise to similar contests between moral
premises. Traditionally SCBA discounts future effects to take into ac­
count future economic growth as well as genuine impatience. For
problems with long time horizons (affecting future generations) and
high uncertainty, the discount rate is debated (see e.g. Refs. [34,35].
2.2. Role of Social Cost-Benefit Analysis in public decision-making
Formally SCBA is carried out in the appraisal phase of the policy
cycle, i.e. when objectives have been defined and alternative policies to
achieve the objectives need to be selected [36–38] Within the appraisal
phase, however, one can distinguish several sub-phases, from a general
exploration of the solution space to the selection of specific policy in­
terventions. In each of these sub-phases SCBA is used, albeit at different
levels of detail from “rough” back-of-the-envelope SCBAs to shorten a
long-list of options, to detailed analyses to appraise a specific policy
proposal [36–39].
In coastal and marine governance application of SCBA is driven by
legal requirements as well as increasing claims on marine areas. Policies
in the United States where a CBA was obliged under Executive Order
12866 [40] included, among others, various measures taken within
fisheries management plans, environmental regulations for marine
vessels, and management of marine protected species.1 The European
Union’s Water Framework Directive (WFD) [41] and Marine Strategy
Framework Directive (MSFD) [42] require the consideration of costs and
benefits in the appraisal of Programmes of Measures to achieve Good
Environmental Status. Although SCBA has not been used widely in
marine spatial planning, its role is likely to increase [43].
The WFD and MSFD have also led to a growing literature on the
applicability of SCBA, particularly the monetary valuation of ecosystem
services, in marine governance. Apart from some methodological issues
with valuation methods such as contingent valuation and benefits
1
Analysis of datasets available on https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
XMLReportList. Code and data available on request.
R.A. Groeneveld
transfers [5,23], the main barrier to the application of ecosystem service
valuation and SCBA in marine governance appears to be the lack of data
and models to quantify the ecological processes that link human impacts
to ecosystem services [5,6,23,24].
Ecosystem service valuation is also relevant for the growing promi­
nence of Natural Capital Accounting (NCA) in marine governance (see e.
g. Ref. [44–47]. Although NCA is a potentially valuable governance tool,
a fundamental difference from SCBA is that whereas NCA describes the
state of ecological assets as they are and develop over time, SCBA is
applied to specific policy decisions. In other words, whereas SCBA
mostly resides in the appraisal phase of the policy cycle, the comparative
advantage of NCA lies in the other phases, i.e. to identify problems,
prioritise objectives, and monitor progress [48].
2.3. Wicked problems
The idea that some problems are not merely complicated, but diffi­
cult to a degree that makes these problems ‘wicked’, was first introduced
by Rittel and Webber [15] (R&W). The then-dominant technocratic
paradigm approached social planning as a natural-science problem [22],
but R&W urge planners to acknowledge that social problems have
distinct characteristics that make them essentially impossible to solve –
rather, they are ‘resolved’, i.e. solved over and over again. Whereas
natural science addresses ‘tame’ problems, with clear definitions, ob­
jectives, and success indicators, social science addresses ‘wicked’ prob­
lems, i.e. problems that are poorly defined, have unclear objectives, and
where it is difficult to say whether the problem has been solved.
R&W list ten characteristics of wicked problems. First, they lack
definitive formulation, not least because problem definition and solution
are difficult to separate. Wicked problems can only be understood
through one’s actions to solve them, different problem definitions exist,
and each problem definition suggests a different solution. Second,
wicked problems have no stopping rule: one cannot say whether the
problem has been solved, not least because policy makers can always
find ways to do better. Therefore, policy makers stop addressing a
wicked problem not because they have solved it or have run out of op­
tions, but because they run “out of time, money, or patience” [15]:162).
Third, solutions are not true or false, but can at best be ranked in terms of
‘good’ or ‘bad’. Even such rankings may be impossible because multiple,
possibly conflicting, criteria exist. Fourth, the effects of wicked problems
and their solutions may only become visible in the distant future, pre­
cluding a timely and ultimate test of success. Fifth, wicked problems
offer no opportunity for learning by trial-and-error because all solutions
have lasting and irreversible repercussions. Sixth, the full set of potential
solutions is uncertain as it depends on such factors as ethics, public
acceptance, and creativity. Seventh, every wicked problem is essentially
unique, so that lessons learned from one wicked problem cannot be
transferred to another wicked problem. Eighth, wicked problems are
generally symptoms of deeper problems. Therefore, ’solutions’ aimed at
the immediate wicked problem may fail to address or even exacerbate
the underlying problems; on the other hand, trying to identify and
address the ‘fundamental’ problem risks postponing solutions indefi­
nitely as the problem lacks a ‘natural’ level where its fundamental causes
are found. Ninth, multiple explanations or driving forces exist for the
problem, and each suggests a different solution. Tenth, the costs of being
wrong are high.
This list of characteristics has been redefined and expanded (see e.g.
Ref. [1,26,49]. Kreuter et al. [49] adds the dynamic nature of wicked
problems and their definitions, so that solutions that seem appropriate
now become less so in the future; and the absence of shared values, or
conflicts between values. Jentoft and Chuenpagdee [1] emphasizes the
fact that different stakeholders hold different perspectives of the prob­
lem, leading to ambiguity in the problem definition.
To these characteristics can be added the emerging problem that
facts or scientific findings are disputed, for example in policy domains
such as vaccination (see e.g. Ref. [50,51], genetic modification [52], and
3
Marine Policy 117 (2020) 103945
climate change (see e.g. Ref. [53,54]. Rather than indicating genuine
scientific uncertainty, public disputes over scientific expertise corrode
trust in the legitimacy of experts and the knowledge they bring to the
decision-making process. In such situations policy-makers face a choice
between legitimising maverick views with limited grounding in scien­
tific fact, or disenfranchising the actors that hold those views.
The concept of wicked problems has also attracted criticism. Peters
[21] notes that the label “wicked” has been applied rather liberally to a
host of problems. All policy problems to some degree have at least some
of the characteristics of wicked problems, although some resemble the
concept more than others. Turnbull and Hoppe [22] notes a false di­
chotomy between the natural sciences and the social sciences, where
supposedly the former is value-free and the latter is not. Moreover, the
dichotomy between wicked and tame problems suggests a binary un­
derstanding of wickedness that ignores that some problems can be more
wicked than others. Even problems deemed tame by R&W involve a
scientific practice that is a social process with all the sociocultural and
political complexities that come with it.
3. Wicked problems and the assumptions of welfare economics
3.1. Classification of wicked problem characteristics
Alford and Head [20] classifies wicked problems along two di­
mensions: the problem itself and the actors involved. For the purpose of
this article it is helpful to further refine these two characteristics. The
first dimension, i.e. the problem itself, can be wicked for two reasons:
whether the problem is defined clearly and whether all aspects of the
problem are known with certainty. The definition entails the identifi­
cation of relevant causal factors and the mechanisms by which they lead
to undesired outcomes, as well as the problem’s geographical, temporal,
and societal scope. Uncertainty entails the fact that some aspects of the
problem, such as causal factors or outcomes of interventions, are un­
known. With regard to the second dimension, i.e. the actors involved,
Alford and Head [20] argues that the problem can be wicked because
knowledge is fragmented, or because actors have conflicting interests.
This distinction is similar to the distinction between positive and
normative analysis common in economics [55]: people can disagree
because they accept or have access to different facts or perspectives, i.e.
on how things are; or they can disagree on values, i.e. how things should
be. Hence this article describes wicked problems by four characteristics:
(1) they are difficult to define; (2) they entail variables that are uncer­
tain; (3) actors disagree about facts or perspectives; and (4) actors
disagree about values. The remainder of this chapter discusses each of
these four characteristics of wicked problems, their examples in marine
governance, and the corresponding assumptions in welfare-economic
analysis.
3.2. Wicked problems are difficult to define
3.2.1. Definition problems in marine governance
Marine systems are complex social-ecological systems where bio­
logical, social, and economic issues are closely linked [1]. Problems such
as overfishing or poverty have a multitude of causes, so that it is often
difficult to single out one cause of a problem. This complexity has
consequences for the framing of problems, and for the setting of
geographical and temporal boundaries.
A good example of a framing problem in marine governance is how
overfishing is understood in economics and other fields. The common
explanation in economics for depletion of fish stocks is that such stocks
are open-access resources that require well-defined property rights in
order to be managed sustainably. Longo and Clausen [56], on the other
hand, take a Marxist perspective that highlights intense commodifica­
tion of bluefin tuna in world markets as the main driver of its decline.
Each of these perspectives emphasizes a different factor in the depletion
of bluefin tuna stocks, i.e. lack of property rights and high demand for
R.A. Groeneveld Marine Policy 117 (2020) 103945

the resource, and while both perspectives can be right each suggests a 3.3.2. Risk and uncertainty in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
different solution. Another example is the correlation of fishing with Decision-making under uncertainty in welfare economics can be
poverty in developing countries, which has been interpreted as a sign of formalised as a problem of maximizing expected utility (cf [72]:
stock depletion as well as fishing being an occupation of last resort [57]. ( )
X
With respect to geographical and temporal boundaries, marine eco­ max f ðsÞ � uðfcv ða; sÞjv 2 VgÞ (1)
systems are often strongly connected to other ecosystems or regions [2], a2A
s2S
making the delineation of a marine problem rather arbitrary. It can also
The utility function, u, ranks outcomes of policies in terms of their
take a long time before effects of an intervention manifest themselves
desirability, which is assumed to be a cardinal variable and depends on
[2]. This long time lag between intervention and effect creates un­
the value, cv , of a set of variables, V, deemed important by the decision
certainties even in well-monitored systems.
maker. In fisheries policy, V could include the economic performance of
the commercial fleet, the number of jobs in the fishery, and the health of
3.2.2. Problem definition in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
the fish stock, whereas u determines how different combinations of
SCBA frames problems in at least two ways. First, its consequen­
economic performance, employment, and stock health are ranked. The
tialism frames the problem as one of maximizing the expected outcome
value of each variable depends on the action taken by the policy-maker
of policy, rather than finding the ‘root cause’ of a problem. This could
(a 2 A) and the state of nature (s 2 S), where the latter depends on a
override considerations of justice, which is a common objection to
stochastic process.
utilitarianism [58]. Second, the use of financial and economic theories
Expected utility theory [73] states that if the decision maker knows
and language frames all effects of policies, including ecological impacts,
the probability fðsÞ of each state of nature, they should choose the action
as commodities that can be traded off against money [59,60].
that gives the highest expected utility, which is defined as the sum over
SCBA places boundaries with respect to whose interests count
all states of nature of the product of the state’s probability and the utility
(‘standing’); which options are to be considered; what is the time hori­
that is realised under the state, given the action chosen.
zon; and which effects are to be taken into account. With respect to
Suppose all sets and functions in Equation (1) are known: i.e. we
standing, SCBA guidelines generally recommend that only the interests
know all possible actions (A); all relevant variables (V); all possible
of national residents are to be considered (see e.g. Refs. [36–38]. This is
states of nature (S) and their probability (fðsÞ); the value of all relevant
problematic in marine systems as they often cover multiple jurisdictions,
variables under each combination of action and state of nature (cv ); and
or are otherwise linked to other marine bodies. It also raises the question
we can rank all possible outcomes by their desirability (u). Then the
how future generations are dealt with: whereas much of the literature on
problem is unpredictable, complicated, but not wicked: it can be for­
the ethics of discounting implies that future generations have standing
malised in mathematical terms and solved with methods common in
[35,61], some argue that future generations should only count as far as
operations research.
the current generation cares about them [37,62].
If f is unknown, while all possible actions (A), relevant variables (V),
SCBA also limits the number of policy alternatives to be appraised,
and states of nature (S) are known, it is impossible to calculate expected
because it is impractical to appraise all conceivable alternatives. The
utilities, but strategies to make rational decisions are still available: one
common procedure to use SCBA at different levels of precision in
can choose the action whose worst outcome (over all states of nature) is
different phases of policy development helps minimize the risk that al­
the least unfavourable, or the action with the lowest possible regret
ternatives are overlooked. The Dutch SCBA guideline [36] recommends
[72].
that the initial list of options be kept wide in order to cover the
It is also possible that different experts offer different estimates of the
parameter space as much as possible. The Dutch, UK [38], and EU [63]
probability distribution (fðsÞ) [74]. A common approach to address this
guidelines also recommend including a “minimum” option in addition to
situation is to assign each expert a probability of ‘being right’ (see e.g.
the baseline and the other policy alternatives.
Ref. [75], which would then still allow for the application of expected
In general the principle in SCBA is that the time horizon should be
utility theory. If such probabilities are not available, the problem can
long enough to cover all effects expected from the policy. In practice,
still be solved by maximizing worst outcomes or minimizing regret.
however, the recommendations vary from 10 to 30 years [63], to 10–60
So far the decision problem can be formalised as one of maximizing
years [38], to infinite [36]. This matters particularly for short time ho­
expected utility, maximizing worst outcomes, or minimizing regret. A
rizons as for longer time horizons the effect of extending the time ho­
crucial assumption, however, is that all three aforementioned sets are
rizon is also discounted more heavily.
complete: we have identified all possible actions (A), relevant variables
Lastly, some effects are not taken into account for a variety of rea­
(V), and states of nature (S). If any of these sets are not complete, the
sons, such as lack of scientific knowledge to quantify an effect, or that
problem becomes what Walker et al. [76] term “ignorance”.
the expected magnitude of the effect does not justify the costs of quan­
Decision-making under ignorance can be characterised as a truly wicked
tifying it [38]. Economic theory also dictates that effects on secondary
problem.2
markets should not be taken into account unless these markets are not
Identifying all possible actions (A) can be difficult because the
competitive [64].
availability depends not only on available technologies, but also on less
tangible factors such as social acceptability and human ingenuity. States
3.3. Wicked problems are uncertain
of nature can be interpreted broadly such that they include how different
parts of the marine system are related, and what the consequences will
3.3.1. Uncertainty and wickedness in marine governance
be of a given action on the relevant variables. Much is yet unknown
Dealing with uncertainty is a key element of coastal and marine
about the marine environment, and this lack of information rules out not
governance [65]: many relevant processes are inherently stochastic;
only the availability of probability distributions, but also a complete
observations and models are imperfect; and human responses to policies
consideration of possible outcomes. Lastly, even if all actions and their
are difficult to predict [66,67]. Ways to deal with these uncertainties,
consequences are known, our set of relevant variables (V) may be
such as Monte Carlo analysis [68] and ensemble analysis [69], require a
incomplete. The importance of particular ecosystem services, such as
great deal of knowledge and assumptions about the system to be ana­
lysed [70]. Moreover, some marine zones, such as the mesopelagic zone
[71], are so fundamentally poorly understood that there may be many
“unknown unknowns” that by definition cannot be modelled. 2
Note that an incomplete set of experts or probability distributions will not
make the problem necessarily wicked. After all, in the worst case it implies that
(f ðsÞ) is unknown, which can be dealt with formally.

4
R.A. Groeneveld
landscape quality or the presence of charismatic species, may only be
realised once the impacts on those qualities are experienced.
3.4. In wicked problems actors disagree on facts
3.4.1. Conflicting beliefs and perspectives in marine governance
Actors can disagree on what the facts are, and on how those facts are
to be interpreted. The emerging literature on “post-truth” suggests that
acceptance of some propositions, such as the reality of climate change or
the effectiveness of vaccines, depends not only on the science behind
them, but also on other factors, including trust in the messenger [77,78].
For example, stakeholders disputed expert knowledge on the ecological
effects of powerboat races in the Dutch part of the Wadden Sea because
the researchers were contracted by the organisers of the races [79]. The
initial approval by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority
(AFMA) of Seafish Australia’s trawling operations was reversed due to
public pressure, despite being based on scientifically devised quota [80].
Even if basic facts are undisputed, however, actors can interpret
them differently. Different actors may adopt different frames or
emphasize different causal factors, risking a “blame game” between
actors [81]. For example, salmon resources in Canada’s lower Fraser
River are under pressure by different sources, including anglers and
indigenous fishers, with each group pointing the finger at others while
feeling unjustly blamed for the threat to salmon stocks [82]. In Dutch eel
management environmental groups and experts suggested closed fishing
seasons as the most cost-effective means to restore depleted eel stocks,
which made fishers feel singled out as it did not address other drivers of
stock decline [83].
3.4.2. Conflicting beliefs and perspectives in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
That different actors take different propositions as facts suggests that
multiple states of nature are imaginable, i.e. different actors can assign
different values to the same variable or its probability distribution. The
rational economic approach to this problem is to assume that each of
these states of nature is equally valid (if not equally probable), which
implies that the problem can be approached as one of decision-making
under uncertainty (see e.g. Ref. [75].
This approach works as long as all perspectives and hypotheses can
indeed be considered legitimate. In the aforementioned cases, however,
actors do not only have differing views and hypotheses, but they also
dispute the legitimacy of other actors or their ideas. In this situation
cost-benefit analysts and policy makers cannot avoid choosing sides in a
debate that is not their expertise: either they include a controversial
hypothesis in their uncertainty analysis, thus legitimising it; or they
dismiss it, thus confirming the prevailing consensus and alienating some
of the stakeholders.
If actors differ in the interpretation rather than the acceptance of
facts, the consequentialist frame of SCBA could help focus minds on
consequences of the solution under consideration rather than the “blame
game” [84]. But then again, actors may still interpret any given solution
as an indictment, regardless of its efficiency. Note that this is not about
the distribution of costs and benefits, which can be solved by compen­
sation payments from ’winners’ to ’losers’, but about people feeling
unjustly targeted by a policy, which is more difficult to compensate.
3.5. In wicked problems actors disagree on values
3.5.1. Conflicting values in marine governance
The literature on social values in fisheries demonstrates that fishers
are motivated not only by profit maximisation, but also by notions such
as fishing as a way of life [85], occupational or ethnic identity [86,87],
or religious values [88–90]. Values such as fairness, upholding tradi­
tions, and a sense of place are part of the social fabric of fishing com­
munities [91,92]. Indeed, such values are not confined to fishers as other
coastal residents also express a sense of identity and attachment to place
[93,94].
5
Marine Policy 117 (2020) 103945
Because coastal and marine zones are shared entities, conflicts be­
tween uses and values are inevitable. Fisheries reform has to balance
notions of economic efficiency with communal values such as fairness
and occupational identity [85,91,95]. Notions of conservation or animal
welfare may also clash with traditions and historical use rights [86,94].
A potential source of conflict is the growth of marine renewable
energy (MRE). MRE is essentially a sedentary activity that requires a
degree of permanence and exclusiveness akin to private property rights
[96–98]. Other marine uses such as transport, fishing, and recreation are
usually transient, so that their rights to marine space are less exclusive.
Therefore, spatial rights granted to MRE are likely to clash with existing
private and public rights [96]. Resolving such conflicts involves issues
such as fairness and justice, especially to current users.
3.5.2. Conflicting values in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
A fundamental assumption in SCBA is that whatever values are at
stake, and however they vary over actors, all relevant values are indi­
vidual, commensurable, and substitutable. People can differ in prefer­
ences with respect to policy alternatives, but as long as the attributes of
those policy alternatives can be substituted at the level of an individual,
an increase in income can compensate a loss in, say, the aesthetic quality
of a beach. This assumption allows cost-benefit analysts to express the
importance of environmental changes in terms of CV or EV, and to
aggregate those values over individuals [31]. Theoretically it is possible
that actors have an infinite willingness to accept, i.e. that their loss of an
environmental attribute is so dramatic that no finite amount of money
can compensate their loss. In practice, however, such cases are avoided
or assumed away. In open-ended stated preference surveys exceptionally
high statements of willingness to accept or willingness to pay tend to be
dismissed as protest bids, and the models usually estimated in
stated-choice surveys impose substitutability between attributes [99].
Many of the values at stake in coastal and marine governance,
however, are shared values (see e.g. Ref. [100,101]. Unlike individual
values, the trade-off of which can be left to individuals, shared values
transcend the individual as they express an understanding of right and
wrong at a societal level [102].
Moreover, the commensurability assumption does not hold when
people hold ‘sacred’ values, such as friendship or religion, in addition to
‘secular’ values such as consumption and leisure [103]. For example,
McGraw et al. [104] demonstrates that people are less likely to bargain
or to look for cheaper alternatives when buying a gift for a friend or a
romantic partner. Another study demonstrates that after having traded
off nature conservation against spending money on material items,
people are more likely to donate money to charity as a form of moral
cleansing [105].
4. Conclusions and recommendations
This review highlights the ways in which welfare economics and its
application to policy appraisal, Social Cost-Benefit Analysis (SCBA),
assume away the characteristics of coastal and marine governance that
make it a ‘wicked’ problem [1,15]. The assumptions allow SCBA prac­
titioners to formulate policy decisions as constrained optimisation
problems, but they also obscure considerations that may be highly
relevant to policy makers. Tracing the assumptions thus made clarifies
the limitations of welfare-economic analysis, and at the same time it
provides a helpful benchmark to assess the ’wickedness’ of a given
problem.
Welfare economics, or more accurately its application in SCBA, as­
sumes that the boundaries of the problem are clearly defined so that
there is no ambiguity who has standing and where geographical and
temporal boundaries are drawn; policy alternatives should be judged by
their consequences; all possible policy alternatives, states of nature, and
relevant criteria are known; all known facts are undisputed and if they
are, at least all available beliefs are deemed equally legitimate; and all
values at stake regard individual, ‘secular’ values that can be
R.A. Groeneveld
compensated with money. These assumptions are bound to be violated
in real life, albeit to various degrees. Marine systems often have no clear
boundary so that the drawing of social, geographical, and temporal
boundaries may become rather arbitrary; actors may judge policy al­
ternatives by other criteria than their consequences, such as whether
those ‘guilty’ of the problem are properly punished; it may be uncertain
whether all possible policies, outcomes, or criteria are being included in
the decision, i.e. there may still be ‘unknown unknowns’; actors may
hold beliefs deemed illegitimate by others; and the decision may involve
shared values that transcend the individual, or ‘sacred’ values that
people refuse to trade off against income. Although these observations
point to limitations of SCBA, it should also be stressed that these
simplifying assumptions are necessary to enable a consistent and intui­
tive quantitative normative framework that evaluates policy alterna­
tives by a metric common to all involved, i.e. money. Moreover, framing
the problem in consequentialist terms may help avoid a “blame game”
[81,84]. Nevertheless, policy makers should be aware of the consider­
ations not included in SCBA because of these assumptions.
As the assumptions underlying welfare economics and SCBA enable
practitioners to treat coastal and marine governance as a ‘tame’ con­
strained optimisation problem, they can also help define more sharply
what makes a problem truly wicked. Rather than defining a wicked
problem, it may more helpful to employ welfare economics to define
what makes a problem tame: (1) its definition is unambiguous; (2) all
available policy options, possible outcomes, and relevant criteria are
known, even if their probability distribution is unknown; (3) all facts are
universally accepted, or if not, all available beliefs are commonly
deemed legitimate; (4) all actors accept consequentialism as a moral
guide; and (5) all values at stake are individual and ‘secular’, i.e. can be
compensated with and traded off against income. If these criteria are
met, then there is little left to make the problem ‘wicked’. Of course no
realistic policy issue meets all these criteria, but it is likely that some
problems violate more criteria, and given criteria to a greater extent,
than others. The assumptions underlying welfare economics discussed in
this review can be helpful in understanding what exactly makes a
problem wicked, to what extent it is wicked, and what policy appraisal
tools and decision-making procedures are needed to select policies to
address the problem.
The discussion of welfare economics and wicked problems in this
review raises a number of open research questions in each of the four
categories of wickedness. Regarding the definition and delineation of
the policy problem, how does SCBA as a policy appraisal tool interact
with the wider political decision-making process? To what extent do
political considerations impact the delineation of a given SCBA, and to
what extent does this determine its outcomes? There is some literature
on how SCBA is used by policy makers, and how it changes their de­
cisions, especially for infrastructure (see e.g. Ref. [106–108] and envi­
ronmental policy (see e.g. Ref. [109–111]. To what extent the insights of
this literature extend to typical marine issues, such as marine spatial
planning and fisheries policy, is yet unclear. Lastly, the possible role of
SCBA as a conflict-solving tool by putting problems in a rational, con­
sequentialist frame [84] yet needs to be tested in a wider range of cases.
Regarding uncertainty, it is unlikely that SCBA itself can be improved
to deal with the possibility that the set of policy alternatives, states of
nature, or relevant criteria is incomplete, but solutions may be possible
in the wider decision-making process in which SCBA is embedded, or in
complementary tools to explore and evaluate alternatives and outcomes.
Such complementary tools should employ the variety of views and
values among stakeholders in order to cast a wide net and maximize the
likelihood that all relevant alternatives, outcomes, and criteria are
covered. Hence including a variety of stakeholders in policy design and
appraisal is essential [112,113]. Once possible outcomes have been
identified, a possible tool to assess their plausibility is Future-Perfect
Thinking [114], where a specific future or event is assumed, and the
mechanisms that may lead to that particular outcome are traced back to
the present. So far, however, these methods have been largely untested
6
Marine Policy 117 (2020) 103945
as complements to SCBA.
The possibility that actors hold beliefs contested by other actors
raises questions regarding the impartiality of SCBA, and the communi­
cation of its results to stakeholders and policy makers. To what extent
can SCBA take a highly contested scenario into consideration without
legitimising it, or reversely, to what extent can practitioners decide not
to take a scenario into consideration without disenfranchising the
stakeholders who deem it likely? These questions require insights from
political science, anthropology, and social psychology. It is important to
realise that the issue is not just whether scientific facts are communi­
cated clearly and objectively. Recent literature suggests that beliefs may
be driven by differences in values or group loyalty rather than a disin­
terested consideration of the available evidence [115,116], so that
finding consensus requires an appeal to values as much as to facts.
Lastly, the presence of shared or sacred values suggests that there are
limits to economic valuation, and outside those limits are values that are
nevertheless important for policy makers. This raises the question how
prevalent shared or sacred values are in coastal and marine governance,
how they can be identified and distinguished from individual, secular
values, and how they should be dealt with in public decision-making
processes. The presence of sacred values has so far been investigated
through behavioural experiments (see e.g. Ref. [104], stated choice
surveys [117], and focus group discussions [118]. These methods need
to be applied to a variety of cases to understand the prevalence and
importance of sacred values in coastal and marine governance. Dealing
with sacred values in policy appraisal raises the question to what extent
trade-offs can be reframed in a way that allows for monetisation,
whether monetary valuation (and hence SCBA) should be strictly limited
to secular values, and how deliberative valuation procedures can pro­
vide a richer insight into the values at stake [100,119,120].
Unavoidably, tracing the limitations and assumptions of welfare
economics and its application in SCBA emphasizes it weakness and may
give the impression that its use as a policy appraisal tool should be
avoided. On the contrary, this review demonstrates one of the strengths
of welfare economics and SCBA: economists and legal scholars make its
assumptions explicit, so that they can be criticised and tested. This lends
SCBA a clarity that enables practitioners to delineate which consider­
ations are included and which ones are not. It is the same clarity that
makes welfare economics a helpful benchmark to determine the wick­
edness of a given problem. Nevertheless, there is plenty of scope to
improve the application of SCBA in coastal and marine governance, and
particularly in how it is embedded in the overall public decision-making
process.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Rolf A. Groeneveld: Conceptualization, Investigation, Writing -
original draft, Writing - review & editing.
Acknowledgements
Helpful comments from Katrien Termeer, Art Dewulf, Simon Bush,
Hans-Peter Weikard, and an anonymous reviewer are gratefully
acknowledged. All remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the
author.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103945.
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