FELICITO G. SANSON et al. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T.

SY, AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN BON FING SY

FACTS:

Petitioners Felicito G. Sanson (Felicito), his sister Celedonia (Celedonia) Sanson-Saquin, Eduardo
Montinola Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Sanson, et al) claimed that the deceased Juan Bon
Fing Sy was indebted to them. Hence, in their capacity as creditors, they filed a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City.

During the hearing, Felicito and Celedonia testified in favor of each other‘s claim, and Jade Montinola
testified in favor of her husband‘s (Eduardo) and her mother-in-law‘s (Angeles) claim. Their testimonies
were supported by checks allegedly issued by the deceased before his death. These testimonies and
evidences were countered by Melencia T. Sy, the surviving spouse and appointed administratrix of the
deceased‘s estate by invoking the Dead Man‘s Statute which according to her, disqualifies the
witnesses from testifying.

The RTC, upon finding that the Dead Man‘s Statute does not apply to the witnesses ruled in favor of
Sanson, et al. Thus, ordering the administratrix to pay in due course the respective amount due to
Sanson et al. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) set aside RTC‘s decision. Hence, this appeal to the High
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Dead Man‘s Statute applies to the witnesses presented by Sanson, et al.

HELD: NO

As for the administratrix‘s invocation of the Dead Man‘s Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule
renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.

The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify
persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are
not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third
person, if he took no active part therein. Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a
person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In
transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or
relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of
their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any
event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas
would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence the checks.

As to the second assigned error, Sanson, et al. argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as
witnesses to each other‘s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man‘s Statute;
besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.

The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review.
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each
other‘s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.

Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between
testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his
co-parties. The law speaks of “parties or assignors of parties to a case.” Apparently, the testimonies of
Sanson and Saquin on each other‘s behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition.

But Sanson‘s and Celedonia‘s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson
is a third party with respect to Celedonia‘s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson‘s
claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other‘s transaction.

In any event, what the Dead Man‘s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a
claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of
testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary
evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.

This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing on the
checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonia‘s account, she “knows” the signature of the
deceased.

While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the quantum of
proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides that “the handwriting
of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted
or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person” x x x not only did
the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison with the naked eye of the deceased‘s
signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits of
the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same account, they appear to have been
affixed by one and the same hand.

In fine, as Sanson, et al. have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims against the estate of the
deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who, however, expressly opted not
to discharge the same when she manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence
against the claims.
Cecilia Zulueta vs. CA, and Dr. Alfredo Martin

Privacy of Communication.

Doctrine: The right to privacy of communication may be invoked against the wife who went to the clinic
of her husband and there took documents consisting of private communications between her husband
and his alleged paramour.

Facts:

Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. One day, she went to the clinic of her husband,
together with her mom, her driver and Dr. Martin’s secretary and forcibly opened the drawer of her
husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and
his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs
without Dr. Martin’s knowledge and consent. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of documents and papers, as well as damages against her
wife before the RTC. The RTC ruled in his favor, declaring him to be the exclusive owner of such
documents. The writ of preliminary injunction was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her
attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

Cecilia’s side: She contends that the case of Alfredo Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr. (NOTE: the case is
between her husband, Dr. Martin and a lawyer, atty. alfonso) where the court ruled that the documents
and papers were admissible in evidence and that the use of those documents by Atty. Alfonso did not
constitute gross malpractice and gross misconduct.

Issue: WON the documents in question are inadmissible in evidence.

Held: Yes.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998

CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H.

ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, 

FACTS:

petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the
settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the then Court of
First Instance of Manila. petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad,
as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties listed therein as
belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their
late mother, Lucila de Mesa. the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the
intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.

petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de Mesa,
copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds
cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT
No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed
real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their
counsel, Escolastico Viola.

private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado
filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings No.
86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of
Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during this
period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad
Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly
fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire
estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged
petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said three children in other to deprive the
latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.

private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco. The
trial court denied private respondents' motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but allowed
them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother's estate. private
respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by petitioners, as well as
TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said properties.

After due trial, the lower court, rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S.

Abad acknowledged natural children of the deceased Ricardo M.
Abad;

(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E.

Abad, Marian E. Abad, and Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving
legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled to
succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of
Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of
said estate that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the
deceased during the period they lived together as husband and wife;

(3) Denying the petition of decedent's collateral relatives, namely:

Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be
declared as heirs and excluding them from participating in the
administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;

(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this

intestacy with a bond of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS;
and

(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all

property or properties, monies and such papers that came into his
possession by virtue of his appointment as administrator, which
appointment is hereby revoked.  1

The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latter's motion for
annulment of certain documents. it rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors' Motion for Annulment, dated October 4,
1973 to be meritorious and accordingly —

1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos.
13530, 53671 and 64021, all registered in the name of Ricardo Abad,
as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa
Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and
TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales,
and the residential house situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres
Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of the late Ricardo Abad;
 2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Lucila de Mesa, executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445,
Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial book of
Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-
Gonzales, to be inexistent and void from the beginning;

3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530,

53671 and 64021 and issuance in lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482,
108483 and 108484;

4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482

of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales
and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding certificate
of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;

5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3)
real estate mortgages executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a)
petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145, Page
No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco, identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX, Series of
1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as Doe.
No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial
book of Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola,
and orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration
or annotation thereof from the back of the torrens title of Ricardo
Abad; and

6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife,
Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to the new administratrix, Honoria
Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within five (5)
days from receipt hereof.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD,
MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED
RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.

II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE

WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY THE DECEASED RICARDO
DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF
PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.

ISSUE: WNOT THE AFFIDAVIT OF DR ARENAS, DECLARING THAT RICARDO HAD BECOME
STERILE IS ADMISSIBLE?

petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas,  Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring
8

that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea,
and that the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the
illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose
Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.

At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial court's
finding of facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court,
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal.  Petitioners, however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
9

are not binding on this Court when there appears in the record of the case some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case.  10

This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.

As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being
privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.   The rule on
11

confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in
which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the
relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his
legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any
information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the
information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the
disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.  12

Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert,
however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of
the deceased. Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the
latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact,
given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant
embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken
the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the
same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As
stated by the trial court:

In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was
pointed out that: "The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated
because of death as stated in established precedents. It is an established rule
that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be
promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy,
from the communications and disclosures which a patient should make to his
physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to
impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light
communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.

Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish
their claim by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence
presented by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged
natural children of Ricardo Abad. .

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of
Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Nelly Lim vs Court of Appeals Case Digest

In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be
successfully  claimed, the following requisites should concur
(1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
(2) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
(3) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
(4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity;
(5) the information was confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of
the patient.

Facts:
Juan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Nelly on the ground that the latter has been
allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
and until the present." During trial, Juan's counsel announced that he would present as his next
witness Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel
forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum. Nelly's counsel opposed the
motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the
latter had examined the Nelly in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia. Juan's counsel contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an
expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to Nelly in a
professional capacity. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr.
Acampado thus took the witness stand, was qualified as an expert witness and was asked
hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined
and treated Nelly for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had
prescribed.
Issues:
1. Was the information given by the physician in her testimony in open court a privileged
communication?
2. Was there a waiver of the privilege?
Held:

1. No. The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he
attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures
which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat
his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the
communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged
from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." One who claims this
privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.

Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She did not disclose
anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner;
moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and
had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to
the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions
propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information
obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever
information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of
the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her
testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded.

2. Yes. While it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the
quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no
claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the
witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite
the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it
becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged
communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of
Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition and Memorandum, and in the private
respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even
granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the
failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof. (Nelly Lim vs.
CA,  G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992)
Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is the patient’s husband who testifies on a
document executed by medical practitioners, his testimony does not have the force and effect of
the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Plainly, this
does not fall within the prohibition.

KROHN VS CA
Facts:
Edgar and Ma. Paz were married and they produced three children. Their relationship later developed
into a stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the
marital strain. The effort however proved futile.

Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report. He later filed a petition
for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz and cited the the said report. Ma. Paz denied the
report in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant."

At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the
rule on privileged communication between physician and patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence,
oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-patient privileged communication rule." Edgar
opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential psychiatric report as
evidence. The trial court issued an Order admitting the report. Hence, Ma. Paz filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA.
She argued that since the rules prohibit a physician from testifying on matters which he may have
acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be
third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying
on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report,
findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his
confidential and privileged relation with a patient."
Edgar contends that the prohibition applies only to a physician and is not applicable to the case at bar
where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband
and not the physician of the petitioner.
Issue:
WNOT prohibition applies only to a physician and is not applicable WHEN IT IS THE PATIENT’S
HUSBAND who testifies on a document executed by medical practitioners,

Held: YES
Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be
successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person
acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized
to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to
testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall
within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the
physician who examined the patient and executed the report.

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the
ground that it was privileged. He invoked the rule on privileged communications but never
questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and,
consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.

People vs. Invencion Case Digest

The filial privilege rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant
is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a
privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. 

Facts:
Artemio Invencion was charged before the RTC of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape committed
against his 16-year-old daughter, Cynthia (his daughter with his first common-law-wife, Gloria
Pagala).
During the trial, the prosecution presented Elven Invencion, the son of Artemio with his second
common-law wife. Elven testified that sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he
was sleeping in one room with his father, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened
by Cynthia’s loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping
motion.
After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants. Elven further testified that Artemio was a
very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of
her suitors.

The trial court convicted Artemio for one count of rape. Artemio challenges the competency and
credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a
witness against him under pursuant to the rule on filial privilege.

Issue:

Should Elven Invencion be disqualified as a witness pursuant to the rule on filial privilege? 

Held:

No. The competency of Elven to testify is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the rule on “filial privilege.” This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification
because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The
rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As
correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he
chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared
that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only “to tell the
truth.” Hence, his testimony is entitled to full credence.