GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, petitioner, v. RON ZABARTE, respondent.

G.R. No. 1411536. February 26, 2001

Facts:
On January 24, 1994, Ron Zabarte commenced to enforce the money
judgment rendered by the Superior Court for the State of California on
petitioner. On 18 March 1994, petitioner said that the said court had no
jurisdiction over the people involved. Respondent on the other hand
said that petitioner’s appeal is not material. Petitioner maintained that
that said Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment was obtained
without the assistance of counsel and without sufficient notice to him
and therefore, was rendered in violation of his constitutional rights to
substantial and procedural due process.
Respondent said that petitioner can no longer question the judgment of
the said court because he failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction in his
answer. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Zabarte. The claim for
moral damages, not having been substantiated, is denied. Petitioner
said that the RTC should have dismissed the action for
the enforcement of a foreign judgment, on the ground of forum non
conveniens. It reasoned out that the recognition of the foreign
judgment was based on comity, reciprocity and res judicata. The CA
denied this appeal, hence this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted in a manner contrary to law when it
affirmed the Order of the trial court granting respondent’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and rendering judgment against the petitioner.
Ruling:
Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of
actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, and not a
genuine issue as to any material fact. It is resorted to in order to avoid
long drawn out litigations and useless delays. Petitioner contends that
by allowing summary judgment, the two courts a quo prevented him
from presenting evidence to substantiate his claims. The court does not
agree. Summary judgment is based on facts directly proven
by affidavits, depositions or admissions. In this case, the CA and the RTC
both merely ruled that trial was not necessary to resolve the case.
Petitioner’s affidavit of facts had raised no genuine issue, thus no
necessity for a resolution of issues.
In the absence of proof of California law on the jurisdiction of courts,
we presume that such law, if any, is similar to Philippine law. The court
based this conclusion on the presumption of identity or similarity, also
known as processual presumption. Petitioner failed to establish
substantial proof that the foreign court had no jurisdiction over the
case. In any event, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti does not apply to this case.
This doctrine contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and
the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. In this
case, petitioner merely argues that the other two defendants whom he
represented were liable together with him. This is not a case of
unjust enrichment. The court does not also see this case to be contrary
to law, morals, public policy or the canons of morality obtaining in the
country. Petitioner owed money, and the judgment required him to pay
it. That is the long and the short of this case. The petition is denied.
Pioneer Concrete Philippines Inc v. Antonio D. Todaro (G.R. No. 154830)
Facts:

Pioneer International Limited (PIL), an Australian company engaged in

the ready-mix concrete business, established herein petitioner PCPI to
undertake its business in the Philippines. PIL contacted respondent
Todaro and asked if the latter is available to join them in their intention
to establish plant operations in the country to which the latter agreed.
Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the
former consented to engage the services of the latter as consultant for
2-3 months, after which he would be employed as manager of concrete
operations should PIL decide to invest in the Philippines. PIL started its
operation however it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ
Todaro on a permanent basis. Respondent thus filed a complaint for
sum of money and damages against petitioner. Petitioner meanwhile
contends that the case should fall with the NLRC as the damages arose
from an alleged breach of employment contract. Both the trial court
and CA ruled in favor of respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between PIL

and respondent.

Ruling: NO.
In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between
petitioners and respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private
respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks
payment of damages on account of petitioners’ alleged breach of their
obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled that an
action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute.
In the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the
provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that
the present action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over
it belongs to the regular courts.

This Court has consistently held that where no employer-employee

relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which
may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or
any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that
has jurisdiction.

https://www.scribd.com/document/444467037/Wing-On-Company-v-
SYYAP-docx

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno

454 US 235, 08 DEC 1981
Facts.
There was a plane crash in Scotland, where five citizens of Scotland
were killed. The aircraft was manufactured in Pennsylvania by Piper
Aircraft Company (Defendant) and the propellers were made in Ohio by
Hartzell Propeller, Inc. (Defendant). The plane was registered in Great
Britain and owned and operated by people from the United Kingdom.
The wreckage was in England. An investigation conducted by The British
Department of Trade concluded that there was no evidence of
defective equipment and that the crash was probably due to pilot error.
Reyno, Plaintiff, a legal secretary for the attorney of the decedents’
survivors, was appointed administratrix of the decedents’ estate by a
California probate court. Plaintiff commenced separate wrongful death
actions against the Piper and Hartzell in California Superior Court,
claiming negligence and strict liability. They also filed suit in the United
Kingdom against the owner and operator. Plaintiff admits that she filed
suit in the United States because of its laws regarding liability and
capacity to sue. Defendant filed motion to remove to the District Court
in California which was granted. Piper moved to transfer to the District
Court in Pennsylvania. Hartzell moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to transfer. The District Court quashed
service and transferred the case to Pennsylvania. Plaintiff then served
Hartzell with process in the District Court in Pennsylvania. Defendants
moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens.
Issue.
Should a case be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens
when all the witnesses and evidence are in another country, the other
country’s jurors would be more connected to the problem, it is
inconvenient to the parties to try the case in the jurisdiction where it
was brought, and the other country’s law will be applied?
Held. Yes. Reversed.
The possibility of a change of law should not be given substantial
weight in a forum non conveniens analysis. Plaintiffs can choose among
many forums, and generally choose the most favorable one. If they do
not choose the most favorable but the action can be dismissed anyway,
it would not be proper. In addition, courts would have to interpret the
law of foreign districts, which would pose a lot of problems and
inconsistencies. This is why there is a doctrine of forum non
conveniens, to get rid of this kind of confusion.

Upholding the Court of Appeals’ judgment would also increase the flow
of litigation, and the courts would be overwhelmed.

Choice of law should only be considered in this scenario when the

remedy in the alternative forum is totally inadequate or when the
alternative forum lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The facts of the case
do not show either scenario.

Giving the plaintiff’s interests less weight is justified when the plaintiffs
are foreign. Under this circumstance, the choice of forum is not
necessarily convenient. The connections with Scotland were not
necessarily “overwhelming”, but the District Court correctly found that
there would be fewer evidentiary problems. If Defendants had to prove
exactly what persons it would be difficult to identify and bring as
witnesses, Defendants required expenditures would defeat the purpose
of their motion.
 https://www.scribd.com/document/389378910/Conflict-
Five-Cases

yan carlos r. Monegro vs. luis rosa

no. 98-16846 may 3, 2000

The thirteen plaintiffs are aspiring professional baseball players who live
in the Dominican Republic.   When they were between sixteen and
twenty years old, they were recruited by Luis Rosa, the Giants' former
Latin America scout.   At Rosa's instigation, each player signed a seven-
year minor league contract with the Giants.   Although the contracts
initially provided that all the plaintiffs would play baseball for the San
Pedro Giants in the Dominican Republic, the contracts could be
assigned, and the players transferred, to minor or major league teams in
the United States.   Underscoring this potential for transfer, many of the
contracts contained addenda stating salaries in Bellingham, Washington,
Scottsdale, Arizona, and Shreveport, Louisiana.

Playing for the San Francisco Giants or some other United States team
was the plaintiffs' common goal.   All thirteen plaintiffs claim that Rosa
expressly conditioned their continued employment and/or reassignment
to United States teams upon their submitting to his sexual advances, and
that Rosa appropriated part of their earnings or signing bonuses for his
own use.   They also allege that the Giants' management knew or had
reason to know of Rosa's misconduct.   In April 1998, plaintiffs initiated
this suit against the Giants, Rosa and Hiatt.

In June 1997, plaintiffs had brought substantially similar allegations to

the attention of authorities in the Dominican Republic.   As a result of
their complaints, a combined criminal and civil suit against the Giants
and Rosa is now pending in the Dominican Republic.   Noting the
pendency of this “parallel” proceeding, the defendants moved in June
1998 to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the alternative grounds of forum
non conveniens and abstention.   The district court granted the
defendants' motion on the ground of forum non conveniens.   Plaintiffs
timely appeal.

II

 A forum non conveniens determination “is committed to [the] sound

discretion of the trial court,” and “may be reversed only when there has
been a clear abuse of discretion.”  Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys.
Pte Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1995).   A district court may abuse
its discretion by relying on an erroneous view of the law, by relying on a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or by striking an
unreasonable balance of relevant factors.

Issue

A threshold issue is whether, a forum non conveniens motion in federal

court is governed by federal or state law.

Ruling

We join these circuits and hold that federal rather than state law governs.
  We agree with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that “the interests of the
federal forum in self-regulation, in administrative independence, and in
self-management” are more important than any interest in uniformity
between the federal and state forums in a single state.

There are two types of cases in which forum non conveniens dismissals
have been deemed appropriate in federal court.   In the first type, now
rarely encountered, a foreign or domestic plaintiff chooses a forum with
little or no relation to either the defendant or the action in order to
disadvantage the defendant.   See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947);  Koster v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947).   In
the second type, now more commonly encountered, a foreign plaintiff
chooses the home forum of an American defendant in an action that has
little or no relation to the United States in order to take advantage of
more favorable American procedural or substantive rules.

Erie Railroad co. v. Tompkins - 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938)

RULE:
Except in matters governed by the U.S. Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.
Whether the law of the state shall be declared by its legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state,
whether they be local in their nature or general, be they commercial law
or a part of the law of torts.
FACTS:
A man was hit by a door projecting from a train while he was walking
along a railroad right of way. He filed a negligence action against the
railroad company, seeking damages for injuries he sustained. The circuit
court  ruled in favor of the man, refusing to consider the railroad
company’s claim that it was not liable for the injuries under state
common law. It held that liability was a question of general law about
which federal courts were free to render independent decisions. On
appeal, with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
the case was affirmed. The case was elevated on appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
ISSUE:
In a liability suit, should the law of the state be applied instead of
common law?
ANSWER:
Yes
CONCLUSION:
The Court held that there was no federal general common law, and that
except in matters governed by the U.S. Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied by federal courts in any diversity case
was the law of the state. The U.S. Constitution recognizes and preserves
the autonomy and independence of the states in their legislative and
judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the
judicial action of the states is in no case permissible except as to matters
by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United
States.

K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho and Fu Hing Oil Co., LTD., vs.
Court ofAppealsG.R. Nos. 90306-07July 30, 1990Justice Cortes

Facts:
On January 7,1987, Kumagai Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to
as Kumagai), acorporation formed and existing under the laws of Japan,
filed a complaint for the collection of asum of money with preliminary
attachment against Atlantic Venus Co., S.A. (hereinafter referredto as
"Atlantic"), a corporation registered in Panama, the vessel MV Estella
and CrestamonteShipping Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
"Crestamonte"), a Philippine corporation.Atlantic is the owner of the
MV Estella. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 8738930 ofthe
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Manila alleged that Crestamonte, as
bareboat chartererand operator of the MV Estella, appointed N.S.
Shipping Corporation (hereinafter referred to as"NSS"), a Japanese
corporation, as its general agent in Japan. The appointment was
formalized inan Agency Agreement. NSS in turn appointed Kumagai as
its local agent in Osaka, Japan.Kumagai supplied the MV Estella with
supplies and services but despite repeated demandsCrestamonte failed to
pay the amounts due.
Issue:
Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction?

Ruling:
Private respondents have anticipated the possibility that the courts will
not find that K.K.
Shell is expressly bound by the Agency Agreement, and thus they fall
back on the argument that
even if this were so, the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be a
valid ground to cause the
dismissal of K.K. Shell's complaint-in-intervention

In other words, considering the dearth of evidence due to the fact that
the privaterespondents have yet to file their answer in the proceedings
below and trial on the merits is stillto be conducted, whether or not
petitioners are indeed maritime lienholders and as such mayenforce the
lien against the MV Estella are matters that still have to be
established.Neither are we ready to rule on the private respondents'
invocation of the doctrine offorum non conveniens, as the exact nature
of the relationship of the parties is still to beestablished. We leave this
matter to the sound discretion of the trial court judge who is in the
bestposition, after some vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstancesrequire that his court desist from assuming
jurisdiction over the suit.

MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd (1987) A.C 795 at 819

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC et al

vs.CA et al.
G.R. No. 102223
August 22, 1996
FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND
DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC)
are both domestic corporations.. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or
ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, USA.
There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines.
ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as “Representative
Agreement”. Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its
“exclusive representative” in the Philippines for the sale of ITEC’s
products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated
commission. Through a “License Agreement” entered into by the same
parties later on, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name
“ITEC” in its own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became
legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).
One year into the second term of the parties’ Representative Agreement,
ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC
allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their
agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine
Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
(DIGITAL), the President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of
using knowledge and information of ITEC’s products specifications to
develop their own line of equipment and product support, which are
similar, if not identical to ITEC’s own, and offering them to ITEC’s
former customer.
The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC.
Defendants filed a MTD the complaint on the following grounds: (1)
That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and
SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping
which justifies the application against it of the principle of “forum non
conveniens”. The MTD was denied.
Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was
dismissed as well. MR denied, hence this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner corp, despite allegations of lack of capacity to sue because of
non-registration?
2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on
the principle of forum non convenience?
HELD: petition dismissed.
1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been “engaged in”
or “doing business” in the Philippines for some time now. This is the
inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and
agreements entered into by ITEC with its various business contacts in
the country. Its arrangements, with these entities indicate convincingly
that ITEC is actively engaging in business in the country.
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in
Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business here against a
Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited by
said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to
challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the
same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to
deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic
corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a
corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity.
In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over
this commonly used scheme of defaulting local companies which are
being sued by unlicensed foreign companies not engaged in business in
the Philippines to invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such foreign
companies. Obviously, the same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to
prevent the injunctive action filed by ITEC to enjoin petitioner from
using knowledge possibly acquired in violation of fiduciary
arrangements between the parties.