Eisenhower and The First Forty Days Aft PDF

Eisenhower and the First Forty
Days after Stalin's Death: The

Incompatibility of Détente and
Political Warfare
KLAUS LARRES
With hindsight from a post-198 9/90 perspective the Cold War years
may appear to have been a period of long peace and relative stability.1
However, at the time Dwight D. Eisenhower became the 34th
President of the United States in January 1953 the world was neither
a very stable nor a safe place. Stalin's sudden death in early March
1953 did not change this. The world continued to be divided into
two implacably opposed camps, characterized by an unrelenting
ideological and power-political battle between the two superpowers.
After the dictator's death the State Department, Eisenhower and the
White House staff as well as the British Foreign Office (FO) agreed
that Stalin's successors would hardly be interested in instigating a
new policy course and disturbing the status quo. It was assumed that
the new men in the Kremlin would be glad if the capitalist world
would leave them alone for a while. They would then be able to
pursue their foreign policy along safe, traditional, Cold War lines,
while settling in internally, and resolving any struggles for power
which might surface.
Unlike the professional diplomats in the State Department, some
of the President's White House advisers concluded that, as the Soviet
Union did not intend to embark on a new foreign policy, this
presented a chance for the United States to take the initiative, and
Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.6, No.2 (July 1995), pp.431-469

PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
432 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
launch a surprise policy offensive. This would disrupt the process of

consolidation of the new leadership in Moscow, and gain support
from the Soviet people. The new President appeared, therefore, to
have a unique opportunity to win a decisive battle in the Cold War.
Much to the dismay of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his
aides, the White House was in favour of instigating a political warfare
campaign against Stalin's successors. Eisenhower and his advisers
were keen on using a major presidential speech to undermine the
position of the new leaders in the Kremlin and possibly begin rolling
back Soviet power and influence. This clash between the professional
foreign policy experts in the State Department and the largely very
inexperienced and at times somewhat naive staff in the White House
went for the most part unseen. Neither was the contemplated
psychological warfare campaign general knowledge. After all,
Eisenhower's first major foreign affairs address on 16 April 1953 -
the 'Chance for Peace' speech - did not suggest any pending political
warfare offensive.
Despite the recent proliferation of Eisenhower scholarship,
historians so far have paid little attention to the new President's
initial objectives and the internal considerations which led to the
'Chance for Peace' speech.3 They have thus largely overlooked the
significance of the address in a fair analysis of Eisenhower's attitude
towards the Soviet Union and Communism. Indeed, the radical re-
evaluation of the Eisenhower Presidency during the last ten years has
more or less obscured some of Eisenhower's more hard-line
inclinations.4 Unlike the Cold War revisionists of the 1960s, who
bitterly attacked the image of a largely benevolent American foreign
policy, the new generation of Eisenhower scholars have turned a
formerly highly negative picture into a very flattering one. The
President used to be portrayed as a bungling and inefficient
executive, who preferred playing golf to dealing with domestic and
external affairs. It was generally assumed that foreign policy was left
to his all-powerful Secretary of State.5 This picture has since been
altered. It may now safely be argued that Eisenhower was entirely in
charge of American foreign policy. He was certainly not dominated
by Dulles. In fact, Dulles hardly ever dealt with any important foreign
policy matters without first consulting Eisenhower.'
Nevertheless, these long-overdue attempts to erase the taint of
EISENHOWER AFTER STALIN'S DEATH 433
presidential failure from Eisenhower's reputation have now gone to

the other extreme. An Eisenhower cult seems to be influencing the
academic community.7 A post-revisionist re-evaluation of the
Eisenhower presidency is urgently required. While it is still
indispensable to look at the decision-making process of the
administration,8 the objectives of Eisenhower's political strategies
should not be neglected. His failure, for example, to stand up to
McCarthy and rescue the nation from the Committee on Un-
American Activities is now being interpreted as a cleverly designed
tactical manoeuvre. Largely on the basis of Eisenhower's own diary
and letters, it is alleged that the President attempted to ignore
McCarthy and let the red scare peter out by depriving the Senator of
the attention of both the administration and the media.' One
wonders, however, if this did indeed constitute a conscious political
strategy, or does it simply excuse the President's disinclination to
arouse the antagonism of McCarthy's many supporters throughout
the country? Above all, it must be asked how far Eisenhower himself
believed in the necessity of an anti-Communist crusade. What was
Eisenhower's real attitude towards Communism and the Soviet state,
and how did he envisage turning his convictions into political reality?
Some light can be shed on Eisenhower's perception of the Soviet
Union at the beginning of his presidency by analysing the
developments which led to his 'Chance for Peace' speech in April
1953 and by looking at the reasons for his desire to give the address
in the first place. Early in 1953 - despite a tactical shift in attitude
towards the end of March - it seems as though Eisenhower,
supported by his advisers C D . Jackson and Walt Rostow, was one of
the nation's leading cold warriors. This has been almost entirely
ignored in the re-evaluation of the Eisenhower administration.
Instead, the President's 'Chance for Peace' speech and the claim of
the ensuing huge public relations exercise that the address was 'a
most serious effort... [to] contribute to the relaxation of tensions and
to facilitate a settlement of issues that now dangerously disturb the
world' has been taken too much at face value.10
In Piers Brendon's biography of Eisenhower, for example, the
author states with reference to Stalin's death and the President's
address that 'Ike saw the chance of a thaw in the Cold War and
wanted to make a serious peace proposal. It is impossible to doubt
the sincerity with which he discussed the proposition'." Not

surprisingly, the economist and former Eisenhower associate Walt
Rostow goes even further.12 He claims that America's foreign policy
experts felt 'that it was the duty of the United States to hold up to the
new Soviet leadership the option of ending the confrontation in the
center of Europe ... [by initiating] a proposal to undo the split of
Europe and actively propose a democratic unified Germany ...'."
Brendon and Rostow agree that the newly-elected President saw a
serious chance for peace after Stalin's death. A deal with the new
leaders in the Kremlin seemed to be possible once the Soviet dictator
had been safely buried. When, however, one analyses the events of
the first weeks after Stalin's death, it becomes clear that the President
certainly did not intend actively to seek an opportunity to end the
Cold War. Moreover, it is not the case, as the German historian Josef
Foschepoth believes, that Eisenhower was simply sceptical about the
new Soviet leadership, but rather passive and prepared to wait for
some positive action from the Kremlin.14 In fact, influenced by C D .
Jackson, Eisenhower consciously attempted to bring about an early
propaganda victory against the new men in the Kremlin.15 It is
therefore quite impossible to substantiate David Callahan's
contention that Eisenhower asked his experts 'for a speech that
would extend a friendly gesture to Stalin's successors'.16 The exact
opposite seems to have been closer to Eisenhower's real intentions.
To do justice to Brendon, he does admit that 'although Ike hoped that
the tide of history might turn toward peace, he ensured that it did
not. For, at Dulles's behest, he reiterated all the traditional
denunciations of Soviet aggression and all the familiar demands for
Communist withdrawal from eastern Europe and elsewhere. Ike was
a man divided against himself. His genuine bid for peace was an
equally genuine manoeuver in the Cold War'.17 This comes closer to
the point, but Eisenhower was not in fact divided against himself.
Unlike many of his confused experts in the State Department, he
knew precisely why he wanted to make a dramatic appeal to world
opinion. And, above all, it certainly was not Dulles who urged a more
aggressive tone on to Eisenhower.18 Steven Fish's claim that
Eisenhower's speech 'was indeed a statement of good intentions that
contrasted with Dulles's shrill, rhetorical approach to Cold War
problems' is utterly mistaken. The President was responsible himself
for the initial and the final substance, tone, and underlying aims of
the 'Chance for Peace' speech.20
Britain, the United States and Stalin's Death
Soon after Stalin's sudden death was announced on 6 March 1953,

his successors in the Kremlin appeared to be open to a world-wide
relaxation of tension. The new collective leadership embarked upon
a general process of change before Stalin was even 'cold in his grave',
as the British diplomat Paul Grey expressed it in a despatch to
London.21 Already during the funeral oration for Stalin on 9 March,
Malenkov, the new Soviet Prime Minister, emphasized that the Soviet
Union believed in 'a policy ... of prolonged coexistence and peaceful
competition of two different systems, capitalist and socialist ...'."
Suddenly, the development of a general thaw in East-West relations
did not seem to be impossible any more.23 This, at least, was how the
British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, interpreted the
encouraging signals gradually emanating from the Kremlin. In the
months immediately after Stalin's death Churchill, some other
Western politicians and several commentators believed once again
that it might be possible to resolve the Cold War conflict by
overcoming the division of Europe and Germany at a three- or four-
power conference with the Soviet Union. In fact, Churchill was
thinking of reopening and concluding the Potsdam Conference.24 He
intended to make sure that the British government would play a
decisive role in bringing about any new post-war settlement. The
Prime Minister hoped to achieve the reunification of Germany and a
German-Soviet non-aggression treaty guaranteed by Great Britain
herself.25 Almost immediately after Stalin's death the still sceptical
British Foreign Office let the American Embassy in London know
that the 'Prime Minister would undoubtedly be "itching" for such a
meeting, that it might well offer advantageous possibilities but that it
should not ... be allowed to lead us into any "provocative" step'.
While the British Prime Minister favoured a 'parley at the summit'
with Stalin's successors,27 Eisenhower and most other Western
decision makers, including Foreign Secretary Eden and the diplomats
in the Foreign Office, were very much opposed to such a policy. They
436 DIPLOMACY fi: STATECRAFT
were more than suspicious about the alleged change of mind of the
new leaders in Moscow. They believed that the Soviet Union merely
wished to be more accommodating in order to gain time for the
consolidation of the new leadership at home. It was apparent that
Malenkov and his colleagues felt very insecure in their new positions,
perhaps anticipating civil unrest and riots after Stalin's death. At this
juncture it seemed to be critically important for the Kremlin to avoid
trouble with its own satellite countries and, of ccurse, with the
West.28 Although both the Foreign Office in London and the State
Department in Washington expected a certain easing of international
tension, they assumed that the Soviet Union would not waver in its
determination to make world Communism succeed and maintain a
grip on the countries of eastern Europe.29 Sir Alvary Gascoigne, the
British Ambassador to Moscow, claimed: 'a really genuine change of
heart which might bring about a basic change of policy is out of the
question'.30
This view corresponded closely with the prevailing attitude in the
State Department. Ever since the end of the Second World War,
America's foreign policy experts had been expecting S talin's gradual
relinquishment of the 'active direction of affairs' and his withdrawal
to an elder statesman status.31 As part of a normal rourine procedure
tentative plans for action in the event of Stalin's sudden departure
had been drawn up during the six months before the dictator's death.
The diplomats, however, had not taken the task very ssriously.32 And
soon, the transition from Truman to Eisenhower was being used to
disregard seemingly less urgent matters. Thus President Eisenhower,
who placed so much importance on proper planning procedures,33
was perfectly correct when he exclaimed in exasperation during a
cabinet meeting shortly after Stalin's death:
Ever since 1946,1 know that all the so-called experts have been
yapping about what would happen when Stalin dies and what
we, as a nation, should do about it. Well, he's dead. And you can
turn the files of our government inside out - in vain - looking
for any plans laid. We have no plan. We are not even sure what
difference his death makes.34
And indeed, at the time of Stalin's death there was not even an
American Ambassador in Moscow,35 which meant that Jacob Beam,

the Charge d'Affaires, was in charge of the Moscow Embassy. Already
on 4 March, when the Soviet government issued the first
communique on Stalin's serious illness, Beam thought that Stalin's
attack was very likely 'unexpected and quite possibly unprepared
for'. He was 'inclined to see [the] picture as one of confusion,
uncertainty, and temporary restraint in [the] ruling group'.36 An
Intelligence Estimate drawn up by the Department of State basically
agreed with Beam's conclusions. It also expressed the belief that the
Soviet leaders would face 'a tremendous readjustment problem',
though the paper made clear that the struggle for the succession
would probably not be of 'a nature to disrupt the regime'.37 However,
as soon became clear, as regards the substance of future Soviet policy
the Intelligence Estimate was utterly mistaken. The paper did not
foresee any changes in domestic or foreign policy. It expected further
'unremitting hostility' towards the West and 'a continued "hard"
Soviet policy on Korea, Germany, and all other outstanding issues
between East and West'. Although Stalin's underlings might have
advocated policies different from their leader in the past, in the
immediate future 'the policy decisions taken by Stalin will tend to be
frozen for a more or less prolonged period with no one Soviet leader
strong enough, or daring enough, to attempt changes'.38
In general, Stalin's death made hardly any impact on the thinking
of the experts in the United States and in Britain. After 5 March they
were no more enthusiastic about the Western allies' entering into any
negotiations with the Soviet Union than at the time of the Stalin Note
in March 1952,39 when he had offered the creation of a united but
neutral Germany with a small army for its self-defence. The dangers
involved seemed to be so great that the Western leaders and West
German Chancellor Adenauer decided not even to consider the
proposal by meeting the Soviet dictator at the negotiating table. To
negotiate with Stalin was too risky. Western politicians believed that
a neutral Germany in a matter of time would be dominated by the
USSR.40 After Stalin's death Washington and London did not exclude
the possibility that Moscow might soon tempt the Germans yet again
to opt for reunification and neutrality. Most experts consequently
believed that all negotiations with the Kremlin should be avoided.
Churchill's idea of convening a summit conference was certainly out
438 DIPLOMACY &: STATECRAFT
of the question. Instead, there was no time to be lost in going ahead

with anchoring the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) safely into
the Western camp. It was hoped that this could be achieved with the
ratification of the European Defence Community (EDC), signed by
its six member states in May 1952.41 German soldiers were to be
integrated into a mixed European army which would largely be
dominated by the French, thus making sure that West German
rearmament could not get out of hand. The plan was acceptable to
Chancellor Adenauer. After all, simultaneously with, the EDC the
Contractual Agreements had been signed which would restore West
German sovereignty, end Allied occupation of the country and ensure
the full and almost equal integration of the FRG with the West.42
Once this had been achieved the West would be able to negotiate
from strength and a summit meeting might then be considered.43
The NSC Meetings of 4 and 11 March 1953
Even before Stalin's death was finally confirmed, a strategy to seize

the initiative had been embarked upon at a meeting of the National
Security Council (NSC) in the morning of 4 March.44 During the
session the President made clear his 'desire to see whether and in
what way the announcement of Stalin's illness could best be exploited
for psychological purposes'. He thought the moment had come 'for
introducing the right word directly into the Soviet Union ... it would
be possible on this occasion to penetrate the Iron Curtain'.
Eisenhower stressed 'that this was a psychological and not a
diplomatic move'.45 He may also have used these words to make sure
that his aide C D . Jackson would be responsible for implementing his
new strategy, rather than John Foster Dulles and the diplomats in the
State Department, whom he expected to oppose hi; plans.46 The
President did not mention anything about launching a serious peace
proposal and generating a general detente.
Before the NSC Council met, Eisenhower had already consulted
Jackson, his newly-appointed Special Assistant for Cold War
Operations, and CIA chief Allen Dulles, about a special
announcement on Stalin's death which he wished to make.48 Jackson
thought a presidential statement addressed directly to the Soviet people
would be an excellent idea, as the present situation 'was the first

really big propaganda opportunity offered to our side for a long time
... to stress our devotion to peace ...\ 4 ' He hoped that the Kremlin's
traditional 'hate America' campaign could thus be fought 'with real
forcefulness'.50 Most members of the NSC agreed. Surprisingly, only
the men commonly regarded as the real hardliners in the
administration showed some anxiety and urged greater caution.51
Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson feared that to appeal to
the Soviet people over the heads of their government might be
interpreted as an 'appeal ... to overthrow their masters', a tactic
which had already boomeranged in the past. John Foster Dulles,
known for his aggressive liberation rhetoric in public, wholeheartedly
agreed with Wilson. He regarded the whole venture as a gamble and
thought the United States was more likely to lose than to gain from
it." However, Dulles and Wilson only urged caution in the
application of psychological warfare tactics to the new situation,
without daring to advocate the dropping of the whole venture in the
face of Eisenhower's enthusiasm.53 But Wilson and Dulles were
overruled. As the Soviet Embassy had called a press conference for 11
a.m., Eisenhower was keen to get his statement to the media first.54
In fact, his short statement was quite innocuous and not couched in
aggressive terms. The effect of it on the Soviet people seems to have
been negligible.55
It is not so much the content of Eisenhower's statement that
makes it important, as the fact that it constituted the opening of the
first deliberate attempt at political warfare by the new American
government. Furthermore, it revealed already an early division in the
administration: the political warfare enthusiasts in the White House
led by Eisenhower and Jackson, versus the more cautious Dulles and
Wilson and the Departments of State and Defense."
While opinion within the administration differed about how to
react to Stalin's removal from power, there soon developed a
consensus about what kind of policy the new leadership in the
Kremlin could be expected to follow. The view expressed in the State
Department's Intelligence Estimate of 4 March was dismissed as
unrealistic. Instead, Vice-President Richard Nixon feared a peace
campaign by the new men in the Kremlin. As there was considerable
pressure on the administration from Congress to reduce military
440 DIPLOMACY (ic STATECRAFT
expenditure, he stated that, as a precaution to stop demands for any

rapid decrease of the American military machine, 'Congress should
be warned that Stalin's successor might very well prove more difficult
to deal with than Stalin himself. On this issue Dulles and Eisenhower
wholeheartedly agreed.57 The National Security Council instructed
the CIA to provide a new evaluation of the impact of Stalin's death.
The NSC also asked both the State Department and Jackson to
recommend appropriate courses of action by 9 March.58
Jackson's proposal centred around 'A Message to the Soviet
Government and the Russian Peoples', which it was suggested the
President should deliver the day after Stalin's funeral in order to
obtain maximum effect. A possible Soviet peace offensive which
would almost certainly obtrude upon the EDC - whose ratification
was encountering major opposition in the French parliament - could
thus be pre-empted. After all, the French and the British Prime
Minister might well use a more amenable Soviet policy as an excuse
to press for negotiations with Moscow, as a successful outcome might
make West German rearmament and the whole EDC enterprise
redundant.59 Walt Rostow, a member of the ad hoc group of
government experts in 'psychological warfare'60 led by Jackson and
George Morgan, the director of the Psychological Strategy Board
(PSB), drafted the presidential message on 6 March. Ii: was supposed
to 'remake eight years of bad [Truman] history'."
The statement proposed a four-power conference, at either head
of state or foreign minister level. The meeting should work out
agreements on such complicated issues as the general control of
armaments, special security arrangements for Europe in order to
overcome the division of Germany by free elections, and the solution
of the Austrian problem. All this was conditional on the end of the
Korean War. Otherwise there would be 'no sound basis for
movement towards larger common goals'. It further stated that the
United States was ready 'to enlarge its contribution to the
development of underdeveloped areas' if the four-power meeting
succeeded in reducing the burden of armaments. Jackson hoped that
this proposal would 'develop an attractiveness equivalent to the
Marshall Plan'. But the paper also made clear that until alternative
measures of collective security had been agreed upon, the United
States would continue to develop its military strength. There would
also be no second Yalta, as every nation about which action was to be

taken should participate in the negotiations.'2 Jackson emphasized
the importance of delivering the presidential message to the Soviet
Union's satellite countries with a 'straight face' and 'in high-
seriousness'.'3 Perhaps Jackson himself had doubts about the actual
content of the speech. Almost everything had been said before. This
was certainly the view of the director of the Policy Planning Staff
(PPS), Paul Nitze, when he explained 'that there was very little new
in the plan and therefore that it amounted largely to a propaganda
move'/ 4
When he showed the draft to George Morgan, Jackson
commented that the 'opening gun in the political warfare campaign
would be a Presidential statement of some sort'." The achievement of
a general relaxation of the Cold War does not seem to have been
foremost in his mind. Jackson, Eisenhower's speech-writer Emmet
Hughes, Charles Bohlen, Counsellor in the State Department and
Ambassador-designate to Moscow, and Paul Nitze met on the same
day to discuss the proposal.66 The crux of the problem was soon
pointed out by Hughes. He explained that the substance of the
presidential statement very much depended on to whom the 'big
speech' should be addressed.
Will it be aimed at Soviet satellites, to stir their insurrection? Or

quite the contrary: will it be aimed, over their bowed heads, to
Moscow, to bring the Soviets into a field of East-West
negotiation? It cannot aspire to both.67
In a memorandum dated 7 March 1953, Bohlen begged the State

Department to keep in mind that the United States could help to stir
up some anti-Soviet developments in China and the eastern European
satellite states but that 'we cannot instigate them in the first instance'.
Any dissenting group in the Soviet orbit would want 'assurances of
material and not moral support. If we are not prepared to give such
support it is better to say nothing'. Bohlen clearly advocated the
latter course. He thought that 'a direct frontal political or
psychological assault on the Soviet structure or leadership would only
have the effect of consolidating their position and postponing the
possibility of dissension in the top leadership'. Instead, Bohlen
believed that the West should confront the Soviet Union with a totally
new political and diplomatic situation which had not existed under
Stalin, as a means of testing the new leaders. He concluded that:
A suggestion of this nature might be the one for a meeting of the

four Foreign Ministers for general discussion without an agenda
and for a strictly limited period of time to exchange views.68
Bohlen's view was not identical to the one held by Jackson, who
insisted on a fixed agenda, and the precondition of a truce in Korea.
Instead it was remarkably close to Winston Churchill's
unconventional ideas, which, however, were not very popular in the
White House and consequently did not strengthen Bohlen's influence
with Eisenhower. After all, on 11 March Churchill wrote a letter to
Eisenhower enquiring, 'now that the personalities are altered',
whether the developments in Moscow had changed the President's
attitude towards the 'possibility of collective action', regarding a
detente offensive. Churchill thought it was high time :o 'turn over a
leaf in the Cold War.69 According to British Deputy Under-Secretary
of State Frank Roberts, Eisenhower was 'horrified' by Churchill's
views.70 In his reply of the same day the President doubted 'the
wisdom of a formal multilateral meeting', as this would enable
Moscow once again to obstruct every serious effort on the part of the
West, and to use the conference as a propaganda opportunity.
Eisenhower hinted that he was contemplating making a speech very
soon which would give the world 'some promise of hope'. He
explained that within his administration a 'number of ideas ... [had]
been advanced, but none of them ... [had] been completely
acceptable'.71 A few days before this exchange of letters, the British
Ambassador in Moscow had expressed his apprehension about the
kind of policy upon which the American government might wish to
embark after Stalin's death. Gascoigne wrote:
My particular fear at this moment is that elements of the US

Government may try to replace our present policy of
containment by a more forward and positive one in arguing that
this is the moment to deal with Russia when the s lability of her
political situation has been impaired.71
The Ambassador's worry was entirely justified, although it is most

unlikely that he knew about the President's psychological warfare
plans. In Washington, the decisive NSC meeting, the 'initial
showdown' as Rostow called it,73 where Jackson's paper of 6 March
would be discussed was to take place on 11 March.74 But it was
already evident that strong opposition to the presidential speech
would be voiced from within the State Department.75 On 10 March
several important memoranda were submitted to the NSC, all of
which argued against the contemplated psychological warfare
policy.76 Walter Bedell Smith, Dulles's deputy,77 wrote a particularly
blunt paper. He argued:
It does not follow ... that the best way to exploit Stalin's death
at this time is by an aggressive heightening of cold war
pressures, especially in the field of covert propaganda. Indeed,
increased pressures at this time will probably tend to assist the
new regime to consolidate its position and might thus prevent
the later emergence of opportunities which could be exploited.
... the Department does not believe that a major Presidential
speech along the lines indicated would be an advantageous
move at this time, and that indeed it might well be contra-
productive.78
Smith strongly advised against a four-power meeting of Foreign

Ministers and a commitment to make specific proposals for the
relaxation of international tension. If such a suggestion were included
in Eisenhower's speech the ratification process of the EDC would
certainly be delayed. The underlying rationale within the ranks of
senior State Department officials was well expressed in a
memorandum which Robert W Tufts, a member of the PPS, wrote
about a discussion he had had with C D . Jackson, while they had
been working on the 'crash plan' for the psychological exploitation
of Stalin's death. Tufts had explained to Jackson that:
although the US Government should fully exploit any

opportunities afforded by Stalin's death, I did not think the
plans being discussed were wise. My major point was that a
psychological plan should be developed to support the main
444 DIPLOMACY & STATFXRAFT
effort of the US Government, whatever that might be, and that

it was difficult to devise a satisfactory psychological plan until
the direction and nature of this main effort were known.80
Thus the administration's policy seemed to be all about propaganda

and making an impression. No one in the State Department really
knew what the substance of American policy was supposed to be
beyond the preparation of a political warfare campaign. Did the
President only aim at upsetting the new leaders in the Kremlin in
order to make life more difficult for them, or had he actually
embarked on the famous 'liberation' policy?" Was he set on
overthrowing the regime in the Soviet Union? In any case, nobody in
the State Department mentioned even once the viewpoint that
Eisenhower and his psychological warfare advisers had embarked on
a peace policy in order to achieve a thaw and a general detente in the
Cold War. This does not seem to have even remotely crossed their
minds.
It cannot have been very comforting to Secretary Dulles and the
other State Department officials who attended the NSC meeting on
11 March, when Jackson announced that, as far as his working group
was concerned, they were 'ready to shoot'. He furthermore
emphasized that the plan he had drafted 'was in line with the position
that President Eisenhower had set forth in the course of the
campaign, as well as the views during the same period enunciated by
Secretary Dulles. There was nothing in it new and strange and
nothing which ... would not fit into the framework of this
administration's thinking on psychological strategy'.82 Jackson does
not seem to have realized the difference between the proclamation of
a policy of liberation during an election campaign, and the more
practical and cautious policies any government has to pursue when
actually confronted with political realities once voted into power.
Dulles began his own statement to the NSC by repeating all the
arguments which had already been put forward in Nitze's, Bohlen's
and Smith's memoranda. However, the Secretary of State realized
that Eisenhower was so set upon delivering a speech, that he did not
make any further attempts to dissuade the President from giving the
address. Dulles now embarked on a different strategy, by attempting
to alter the substance of the speech." Instead of Jackson's proposal
for a Foreign Ministers' conference on European issues which would

almost inevitably include the discussion of disarmament and the
unification of Germany, he referred to Nitze's idea of replacing the
suggestion of a four-power conference by a call for the ending of
hostilities in Korea and Indochina. The Secretary of State's
alternative programme basically consisted of the suggestion that the
President's speech should not concentrate on European affairs but
emphasize East-West tension in Asia. If a solution in Asia
materialized, 'the path would be open to further negotiations on
other matters'. Dulles believed that such a strategy was more
advantageous 'than to begin from the European end' with the risk of
undermining the Atlantic alliance.84 Dulles emphatically warned:
We too have a coalition to manage. In our attempt to destroy the

unity of the Soviet orbit we must not jeopardize the unity of our
own coalition. We must draw together and not fall apart at this
moment in history, and it seemed especially doubtful ... as to
whether this was the appropriate moment to carry the offensive
direct to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was now involved
in a family funeral and it might well be best to wait until the
corpse was buried and the mourners gone off to their homes to
read the will, before we begin our campaign to create discord in
the family. If we moved precipitately we might very well
enhance Soviet family loyalty and disrupt the free world's.85
In the event that a four-power conference should take place after

all, Dulles spoke out against putting 'discussion of German unity on
the agenda for such a Foreign Ministers' meeting', which would only
ruin every prospect of the ratification of the EDC, which to Dulles
was of vital importance to cement the Western alliance and prevent
future European wars.86 The Kremlin would only 'dig up' all their old
plans for Foreign Ministers' meetings, and nothing positive would be
achieved. He continued by saying:
he was in no position to guarantee that the great EDC plan

would materialize, whatever we did, but he was sure that the
proposal to discuss German unity with the Soviets in a Foreign
Ministers' Conference was tantamount to inviting the fall of the
French, German and Italian Governments, and possibly even

rendering Mr. Eden's position in the British government
untenable. Thus he felt compelled to advise against this part of
Mr. Jackson's plan.
... if an attempt were made to create German unity by some
other vehicle than the EDC, then certainly the EDC would be
finished.87
The President entirely agreed with Dulles that a four-power meeting

was undesirable. The Soviet Union, the President believed, would
stall indefinitely on its agenda. But 'something dramatic' was needed,
he said. 'A four-power conference would not do it, but the President
might say that he would be ready and willing to mest with anyone
anywhere from the Soviet Union provided the basis for the meeting
was honest and practical'.88 This, of course, was not really that much
of a novel idea and was moreover a rather vague and imprecise
proposal - though the prospect of a bilateral US-USSR summit and
the exclusion of Britain was exactly the policy Churchill was gloomily
anticipating.89
The NSC meeting concluded with an indecisive discussion of the
timing and the place of the President's address. Evenmally, the NSC
agreed that Jackson 'should immediately draft an address by the
President in the light of the discussion at the meeting, for early
delivery at a time and place to be determined'.90 Jackson at once
instructed Rostow to revise the paper of 6 March. A: first sight the
battle between Jackson and the White House versus Dulles and the
State Department, between the psychological warfare planners and
the cold warriors, seemed to have ended in a draw. But the fact that
Jackson, rather than Smith, Bohlen or Nitze, had been asked to
continue writing Eisenhower's speech represented a victory for the
former. Furthermore, the meeting had made clear that Eisenhower
would definitely give a speech. The voices within the State
Department advising against an early presidential statement had been
ignored. The bulk of the text as drafted by Jackson and Rostow had
been regarded as suitable, though Nitze's insistence in his
memorandum that a truce in Korea should be made a clear
precondition for any four-power conference had been accepted.91
During the NSC meeting on 11 March, Eisenhower did not
express his conviction as openly as he had done at the previous one

that the US should embark on a psychological offensive in the Cold
War. However, there can be no doubt that this was the intention of
his envisaged speech. With the draft of the proposed address Jackson
had submitted a supporting statement which gave a detailed rationale
of the aims which the presidential words should set out. By accepting
the bulk of Jackson's draft, it may safely be assumed that Eisenhower
found himself also in agreement with the underlying thinking of
Jackson's supporting statement. It expressed the view that the
'emotional shock' and 'even bewilderment' of the Soviet people over
Stalin's death constituted 'a major Soviet vulnerability' and would
give the United States 'the possibility of seizing a general initiative in
the Cold War'. It was therefore 'a major American interest to make
the peoples of the Communist world see Stalin's death as the end of
an era and not as part of a continuing line of development'. The
proposed initiative would ensure that the probable policy division
within the Soviet regime could be exploited in order to 'contribute to
difficulties in the stable disposition of Stalin's power'.'2 This, of
course, still did not give a full explanation of what the United States
intended to achieve with its psychological initiative. In a
memorandum of 8 March, however, Jackson expressed the
conviction that the US should 'overload the enemy at the precise
moment when he is least capable of bearing even his normal load'.
He declared that if his plan were realized it would not be
'inconceivable' that 'out of such a program might come further
opportunities which, [if] skilfully exploited, might advance the real
disintegration of the Soviet empire'.93 Jackson was clearly in favour
of turning a carefully designed roll-back policy into reality.94
In view of the decisions taken at the NSC meeting it seemed to be
impossible to prevent Eisenhower's speech. The only option left to
Dulles and the State Department was to try to influence the substance
of the President's address, and this was what they attempted. In the
following five weeks, the shape of Eisenhower's forthcoming speech
on 16 April was influenced by three interlinking developments: the
speech-drafting process which reflected the continuing disagreements
between Eisenhower's advisers and the State Department, the
exchange of views between the President and Churchill, and above all
the Soviet peace campaign.95
The Soviet Peace Campaign
The Anglo-American experts were utterly surprised when the new

Soviet leadership not only continued its co-operative gestures but in
fact embarked on a serious peace campaign. Before a session of the
Supreme Soviet on 15 March, Malenkov explicitly pointed out that
'there is no litigious or unresolved question which could not be
settled by peaceful means on the basis of the mutual agreement of the
countries concerned ... including the United States of America'." A
few days later, the USSR suddenly expressed itself in favour of
exchanging sick and disabled prisoners of war in Korea, and gave
several hints of being seriously interested in a truce.'7 Soon, there
were various other hints of a rapidly unfolding peace campaign.
Traffic tie-ups around Berlin were lifted, and the Kremlin even
offered quadripartite negotiations on air safety in the Berlin air
corridors." The Soviet Union also waived its long-standing claim on
some Turkish territory, and on military control of the Dardanelles
and the Bosphorus." After months of firm refusal, Moscow agreed to
the appointment of Dag Hammarskjold as the new Secretary-General
of the United Nations.100 Even the long-standing 'hate America
campaign' within the Soviet Union was gradually allowed to peter
out.101 The Kremlin also approached a Norwegian representative at
the United Nations, mentioning the possibility of a meeting between
Malenkov and Eisenhower which could be used to discuss
disarmament and atomic energy control.102 There were also several
internal measures such as a general amnesty for some categories of
political prisoners.103 Moscow even acknowledged that the so-called
'doctor's plot' had been based on false accusations. It was admitted
that the confessions of the eight prominent physicians, who Stalin
during his last months accused of having conspired to poison senior
Soviet politicians including himself, had been achieved through
'impermissible methods of investigation'. The surviving doctors were
released immediately.104 To Jacob Beam in Moscow this seemed to be
'most concrete evidence' of the new regime's break with Stalinism.105
The American administration was, however, much more sceptical.
Not just Eisenhower, C D . Jackson and Allen Dulles but also virtually
none of the State Department officials believed in the possibility of a
sudden end to the Cold War.106 It was assumed that Moscow's peace
campaign was entirely based on the Soviet realization that certain

compromises with the West had to be entered into in order to obtain
a lull in the Cold War. German Chancellor Adenauer agreed. He
warned the Americans not 'to succumb to the blandishments of a
detente which for the time being was nothing but a pipedream'.107
Yet, in view of the popular appeal of the Soviet Union's peace
campaign American politicians became increasingly worried.
Remembering the Stalin note of March 1952 regarding German
reunification on the condition of simultaneous neutralization,
Charles Bohlen believed everything seemed to be 'building up
towards a new offer on Germany'. He even feared 'that with Stalin
gone this offer might be a really big one involving Soviet withdrawal
from Eastern Germany'.108 As it could be expected that the Western
public would enthusiastically embrace such a proposal this would, of
course, make the realization of the EDC and the integration of the
Federal Republic of Germany with the West impossible. Walter
Lippmann succinctly summarized the convictions of the Eisenhower
administration by writing that 'the Western diplomatic structure was
fragile and highly vulnerable to a serious Soviet peace offensive'.109
No American politician considered even fleetingly that the Soviet
Union was making genuine compromise proposals with the aim of
de-escalating, let alone ending, the Cold War. Bedell Smith told some
visiting West German politicians that 'such a [Soviet] bid would not
be sincere and would be nothing but an attempt to prevent or delay
the establishment of a European Army'.110
In the following weeks, Jackson's draft paper was revised and
rewritten several times.111 As Jackson was one of the few people in the
Eisenhower administration who on a personal level got on quite well
with Dulles,112 he tried to undermine the opposition of the State
Department to his various draft speeches by bringing Dulles into the
speech-writing process, instead of excluding him from it.113 However,
co-operation proved difficult. Dulles and the State Department were
still unhappy with the way matters were developing. In a
memorandum to Bedell Smith, James Bonbright, the Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs, made it clear that even the
new version of Jackson's paper drawn up after the NSC meeting on
11 March failed 'to indicate with sufficient clarity and emphasis the
longer-range aspects of the situation created by the death of Stalin
and the succession of Malenkov'. This was quite understandable, as

the main difference between the original and the revised version of
Jackson's paper was the deletion of the proposal for an international
conference. The officials in the State Department condnued thinking
that 'heightened pressure' did not seem to be desirable."4
One of the immediate results of the Soviet peace campaign was
the postponement of Eisenhower's address. When the original plan
to deliver the speech on the day after Stalin's funeral on 9 March had
been shelved, because of the opposition from within the State
Department, Jackson had envisaged the delivery of the address on 19
March, either before the UN General Assembly, or on television to
the American people. The Soviet peace campaign, however, seemed
to make a careful reconsideration of the speech inevitable. This
resulted in further haggling about its content between Jackson and
the State Department. By 17 March four new draft speeches had been
drawn up by Jackson and Hughes, which were all geared toward
delivery before the United Nations, but it was decided ihat the speech
was not yet in a satisfactory state. The idea of delivering it to the UN
General Assembly was abandoned. Eisenhower believed that using
the UN would only 'invite more sterile debate there'.1'5
The President felt increasingly uneasy, even threatened, by the
almost universal popularity of the Soviet peace campaign. While
giving a background talk to an Overseas Writers' luncheon, CIA
Director Allen Dulles admitted that no one 'predicted quite as sudden
a Soviet Peace Offensive as has actually taken place'.1" Eisenhower
was especially influenced by Malenkov's speech to the Supreme
Soviet on 15 March, and now certainly 'disposed to move ahead'
with his own. He thought that 'it was too bad that he had not made
his speech before Malenkov'."7 Any propaganda effect emanating
from his own initiative would now make much less of an impact on
world opinion. After all, it was the Soviet Union and rot the United
States that had opened a peace campaign; Washington would be seen
as just reacting to the initiative by the Soviet Union. In view of the
increasingly daring moves of the Russian peace campaign, which even
Rostow found 'quite impressive'"8 and which had just proposed - as
the State Department had feared - the start of negotiations for a
German peace treaty, Eisenhower intervened decisively on 16 March,
the day after Malenkov's speech before the Supreme Soviet. It now
seemed insufficient to be content with a psychological warfare

campaign. A change of tactics was urgently necessary. This time the
President had to offer something concrete.119 According to Hughes
the President said to him in a highly emotional state:
Look, I am tired ... of just plain indictments of the Soviet

regime. I think it would be wrong ... for me to get up before the
world now to make another of those indictments. Instead, just
one thing matters: what have we got to offer the world?... What
are we trying to achieve? ... Let us talk straight: no double talk,
no sophisticated political formulas, no slick propaganda devices.
Let us spell it out, whatever we really offer ... withdrawal of
troops here or there by both sides ... United Nations supervised
free elections in another place ... and concretely all that we
would hope to do for the economic well-being of other
countries. ...12°
It is clear that Eisenhower had become highly nervous of the

implications of Malenkov's speech, which was not couched in the
usual vague and general terms, but contained some precise proposals
of what could be done to relax East-West tension. Eisenhower
certainly addressed the right question: what should be the aim of his
envisaged speech? The President began to move away from
supporting Jackson's and Rostow's rather aggressive political warfare
goals. After Malenkov's address Eisenhower drew on his 'basic
reservoir of common sense'121 and decided that the speech-writing
process had to be given some new impetus. Accordingly, from now
on Emmet Hughes became much more involved in the drafting of the
speech, and Jackson's role became less important than it had been in
the immediate aftermath of Stalin's death.122 Hughes, strongly
supported by Paul Nitze, approached the matter in a realistic way. He
intended to mention the dangerous burden of the arms race and
consequently the importance of arms control measures.123 Hughes
was also careful to take into account the President's ideas of
emphasizing issues such as raising the general standard of living in the
world. They consisted of somewhat unrealistic proposals which the
journalist Sam Lubell had suggested to Eisenhower in a letter.124
Jackson countered sharply that the leaders in the Kremlin would
hardly be mollified in their global ambitions by 'genial, bourgeois talk

about schools and hospitals for the ignorant and sick'.125 He had, of
course, realized his waning influence and the shifting emphasis of the
speech. In order to reverse this, Jackson urged giving more attention
to the eastern European nations in the presidential address by calling
upon them to rise up against Soviet domination:
I cannot re-emphasize too strongly the importance of the

wording regarding the satellite countries. ... what we are really
paving the way for is a sphere-of-influence peace between Russia
and the US, it would strike a mortal blow to that whole area.
And that is the area where the gravest problems to the new
Soviet regime can be started. Therefore, that section ... should
be firmed up ...126
Dulles was much less impressed by the speech before the Supreme
Soviet than Eisenhower. He thought that MalenkovY. address had
come about in a normal way 'and he had just added a few paragraphs
aimed at us'.127 The British Foreign Office also believed that 'we
should be wise to treat Malenkow's speech as being no different from
previous Soviet declarations of peaceful intentions'.2S Moreover,
Dulles was convinced that the President's speech should not be too
concrete, as the administration would have to consult the allies when
it tried to convert the proposals into reality.129 The Secretary of State
was still unhappy about the whole exercise. Above all, he was
strongly opposed to any direct or implied indication that there might
be a need for an East-West conference. This would almost certainly
push the US into discussing the German question, which would
inevitably lead to the further postponement of the ratification of the
EDC in France. At a meeting on the morning of 17 March he
explained in exasperation:
What all this gets down to is the question of whether we are

ready to start negotiating directly. The President hasn't seemed
to feel this way, in his various exchanges with Churchill. But
perhaps he has changed his mind.130
Despite these occasional outbursts, Dulles had gradually resigned

himself to accepting that there would be a presidential speech whose

content he did not really have the power to influence. According to
Hughes, Dulles 'murmured his distrust and dislike for the whole
project almost to the end'.131 All in all, Dulles regarded the more
compromising policy of the new men in Moscow and their peace
campaign with a mixture of satisfaction and suspicion. He believed
that Western rearmament and the forthcoming integration of the
Federal Republic with the West had provoked the new Soviet
policy.132 However, the Kremlin's new strategy and Eisenhower's
envisaged reaction threatened to lead to a summit conference, thus
paradoxically endangering the very policy the West had been
pursuing so successfully.133 Dulles certainly did not want to slacken in
his efforts for keeping up pressure on the Soviet Union, but neither
did he want to go too far, as this could only result in unpredictable
reactions and dangerous misunderstandings. It must therefore have
been a relief to him that Jackson was no longer in charge, and that in
all likelihood the speech would not largely consist of belligerent
psychological warfare slogans. The Secretary of State soon became
either so unconcerned or so frustrated about his lack of influence that
he left Washington for a short holiday on 10 April, a week before
Eisenhower was to deliver his address.134 Around this time, the
almost-final draft of the speech was submitted to Eisenhower. The
President sent it to London and Paris, as he had decided that it was
about time that the allies were informed.
While the French leader Rene Mayer wholeheartedly agreed with
the speech,135 Churchill criticized some of its content as sounding
excessively aggressive. The ageing Prime Minister thought that the
change in the Soviet Union might well lead to a revolution, since the
most dangerous moment for a dictatorial regime was the minute it
began reforming. He suggested the postponement of the delivery of
the address until the purpose and full extent of the change of attitude
in the Soviet leadership was clear.136 Churchill explained that it
'would be a pity if a sudden frost nipped spring in the bud ...\137 In
Washington the suspicion grew - and Emmet Hughes even speaks of
a 'general concurrence' - that 'Churchill's deep, unspoken concern
was to guard and reserve for himself the initiative in any dramatic
new approach to the Soviet leaders'. Dulles, however, used the
opportunity given to him by Churchill's reply to voice once again his
general doubt as to the 'need for any speech'."8 In his answering

letter, Eisenhower told Churchill that he agreed with the need to
avoid appearing to threaten the Soviet leadership. He promised to
revise certain paragraphs of the address.139 The President had shifted
away from his original intention of using his speech as a major
political warfare offensive designed to undermine the position of
Stalin's successors. Eisenhower now found himself increasingly in
agreement with the view of the experts in the State Department.
The Delivery of the Speech and the Aftermath
On 16 April 1953, Eisenhower, while suffering from severe food

poisoning, delivered his speech to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors in Washington. He called upon the Soviet Union
to use the 'precious opportunity' provided by Stalin's death 'to
awaken ... and to help turn the tide of history'. The President said
that Moscow's first step had to be agreement to an end of the Korean
War. Without mentioning an East-West conference, he declared that
subsequently the discussion of the German and Austrian question and
a general disarmament treaty should be embarked upon. Eisenhower
hoped that the Kremlin would be prepared to submit to inspection by
UN arms officials, and to permit the eastern European countries to
choose their own form of government. The financial savings achieved
by a lessening of world tension could be used to increase the global
standard of living with the aid of the UN. 'This would be a declared
total war, not upon any human enemy but the brute forces of poverty
and need.'140 The international reaction to Eisenhower's address was
very positive. Even Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador in
London, declared that the speech was 'not bad but too vague'.14' The
New York Times called the address 'magnificent and deeply moving',
although, the paper commented, it had obviously been made to 'seize
the peace initiative from the Soviets'. The New Yorker believed that
Eisenhower had 'scored an immense triumph with boih world and
American opinion' which 're-established American leadership in the
world'.142
The American administration had indeed ensured that no one on
earth would be able to ignore Eisenhower's address. The speech was
broadcast live in the United States and in Britain, the text of the
declaration was given to all American Embassies abroad, and
diplomats were instructed to draw the attention of politicians to
particular points of the address. The State Department sent out more
than three million copies for distribution in Europe and Latin
America. Film and tape recordings of the President delivering the
speech were also distributed all over the world. The 'Voice of
America' made sure that the address was repeatedly broadcast into all
the eastern European countries.143
Eisenhower's close adviser Sherman Adams called the speech 'the
most effective ... of Eisenhower's public career, and certainly one of
the highlights of his presidency'.144 This is open to grave doubt. The
President had, after all, merely asked the new Soviet leadership to
alter its entire foreign policy in exchange for American goodwill.145
Thus nothing really changed because of it. No one within the
Eisenhower administration thought of attempting to realize the
global Marshall Plan, envisaged by C D . Jackson. As the speech was
not followed up by any concrete action on the part of the United
States; not even the temporary thaw between East and West after
Stalin's death developed into anything more permanent.146 Instead,
the American administration contemplated in May the use of atomic
bombs to achieve a quick end of the war in Korea.147 All in all, a
Soviet-American rapprochement proved as difficult as it had been
before. This did not change when the Korean War eventually came to
an end in the summer of 1953 - although the end of the war had
always been regarded as 'an essential prerequisite to any future
improvement in the world situation'.148 As the EDG had still not been
ratified and consequently the integration of the Federal Republic of
Germany with the West had not yet been achieved, Dulles's and
Eisenhower's opposition to a conference with the Soviet Union
continued.149
In his own speech on 18 April, only two days after Eisenhower's
address and to the same audience of newspaper editors, the Secretary
of State once again expressed doubts as to whether the Soviet peace
moves were due to a basic change in policy or merely a tactical shift.
Dulles still believed the Kremlin was attempting 'to buy off a
powerful enemy and gain a respite'. It certainly would be an 'illusion
of peace', he said, if there was 'a settlement based on the status quo'.
456 DIPLOMACY 6c STATECRAFT
It was of the utmost importance, he added, that the United States

made 'clear to the captive people that we do not accept their captivity
as a permanent fact of history'.150 This was much closer to Dulles's
election campaign speeches in 1952 and to Jackson's point of view
than to the opinion he had uttered in private to Eisenhower and his
colleagues in the government during the previous few weeks. One
may only surmise that Dulles was mainly speaking tD comfort the
right wing of the Republican party. Perhaps he also wanted to make
sure that the Soviet Union did not misunderstand Eisenhower's, at
first sight, less belligerent although substantially very similar speech.
Moscow might feel encouraged to propose a four-power conference,
an idea which in view of the President's alleged 'peace offensive' the
United States would have found difficult to turn down.151
This must also have worried Eisenhower, as it is highly unlikely
that the President had not seen Dulles's follow-up speech to his own
address. After all, immediately after Stalin's death Eisenhower had
himself been strongly in favour of embarking on a psychological
warfare campaign to weaken and destabilize the new government in
Moscow. Dulles had in fact repeatedly warned against such a
dangerous strategy, which could result in unforeseen international
complications. While Dulles was primarily concerned with the
realization of the EDC and the integration of the Federal Republic
with the West, Eisenhower had proved that early in 1953 he was the
more genuine anti-Communist hawk and the real cold warrior of the
new American administration.151 Dulles was first of all keen on
consolidating the Western position; Eisenhower believed in the
possibility of undermining the Soviet system quickly and perhaps
bringing about an early end to the Cold War.153 However, the almost
universal popularity of the Soviet peace campaign made Eisenhower
realize that a psychological warfare offensive might easily backfire.
Only then did he gradually move closer to the more realistic, and in
fact less aggressive political strategy of Dulles and the State
Department.154 It was not so much Dulles as the impact of the
skilfully conducted Soviet peace campaign that convinced the
President of the value of this new strategy. Only after the Soviet peace
campaign had gathered momentum did Eisenhower take the decision
to soften the envisaged psychological warfare offensive against the
USSR. In all likelihood, the President did not alter his cold warrior
outlook on the world in early 1953, but he was too much of a

politician to ignore changes in international affairs for any length of
time. We can take Richard Nixon's word for it that Eisenhower 'was
a far more complex and devious man than most people realized'.155
The British politician Lord Salisbury told Churchill after several
meetings with Eisenhower in June 1953: 'I should add that I found
the President, to my surprise, very strongly anti-Russian, far more so
than Dulles.'15' Konrad Adenauer was not misled either. Already on
20 April 1953, on the Chancellor's return from his first visit to the
United States, he told Frank Roberts that:
despite appearances, the President knew what he was doing and

had his ship well under control. This applied particularly to
external affairs.... American foreign policy was definitely that of
President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles's role was simply to
execute it.157
It is still impossible to repudiate the view of both the British

Foreign Office and the Eisenhower administration that Malenkov's
peace initiatives were not merely traditional Cold War policies by
different tactics.158 However, this does not mean that the West was
justified in not even attempting to find out exactly what the new
leaders in the Kremlin had in mind. A slightly more open and flexible
approach would not have undermined Western security. After all, the
EDC did eventually fail. In fact, Eisenhower became somewhat more
flexible after a short while, although he was never prepared to meet
the Soviet leaders at a summit before the integration of the FRG with
the West had been achieved. But despite his initial tendency to go for
almost all-out political warfare a la Jackson and Rostow, Eisenhower
soon recognized how unrealistic this was, how much opposition -
even from within his own government - he would have to overcome.
Although based on different political aims, in this regard the
problems the American President and the British Prime Minister
encountered with their foreign policy experts were very similar.
While Churchill insisted on his strategy, continued to fight for it and
eventually paid the price of becoming increasingly marginalized and
pushed into retirement, Eisenhower changed his strategy. He settled
for a middle-of-the-road course which neither compromised his
personal views much nor led him into any further running battles
with his experts. It also provided future historians with enough
ammunition either to utterly condemn or to greatly praise him.
Hence the need for a more balanced post-revisionist position
regarding Eisenhower's policy towards the Soviet Union.
The Queen's University of Belfast
NOTES
1. See John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future', in Geir
Lundestad and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), Beyond the Cold War: New Dimensions in
International Relations (New York, 1993), pp.7-22. See also very critically Bruce
Cumings, '"Revising Postrevisionism" or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic
History', Diplomatic History, Vol.17 (1993), p.556, n.49.
2. The speech is published in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS),
1952-54, VIII, pp.1147-55; and in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the USA:
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953 (Washington, DC, 1960), p.179.
3. A rather uncritical and lengthy account of the development of the speech is given in
Harold Stassen and Marshall Houts, Eisenhower : Turning the World toward Peace
(St. Paul, 1990), pp.153-74. See also, for example, Carl M. Brauer, Presidential
Transitions: Eisenhower through Reagan (New York/Oxford, 1986), pp.51-2.
4. One of the few historians who realizes this and who is generally convinced that
Eisenhower's policies involved 'a determination to pursue Dolitical warfare,
psychological warfare, and economic warfare everywhere and at all times' is Blanche
W Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy (Garden City, NY, 1981),
quote: p.172. Other more critical authors include Frederick W. Mirks III, 'The Real
Hawk at Dienbienphu: Dulles or Eisenhower?', Pacific Historical Review, Vol.59
(1990), pp.297ff.; also Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol.II: The President,
1952-1969 (London/Sydney, 1984), pp.63-5; Richard H. Immerman, 'Confessions
of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal,' Diplomatic History, Vol.10
(1990), p.339; Stephen E. Ambrose with Richard H. Immennan, Ike's Spies:
Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981); and to some
extent Thomas F. Soapes, 'A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Eisenhower's Strategy for
Nuclear Disarmament', Diplomatic History, Vol.4 (1980), pp.57ff.
5. For the traditional image of Eisenhower see, for example, Richard Rovere, Affairs of
State: The Eisenhower Years (New York, 1956); Marquis Childs, Eizenhower. Captive
Hero: A Critical Study of the General and the President (New York, 1958); Roscoe
Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command
of American Power (London, 1960); Townshend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster
Dulles (Boston/Toronto, 1973); Richard Goold-Adams, The Tine of Power: A
Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles (London, 1962).
6. For a very convincing revision of the traditional image of the relationship between
Dulles and Eisenhower , see Richard H. Immerman (ed.), John Foster Dulles and the
Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton, 1990); Richard H. Immerman, 'Eisenhower
and Dulles. Who made the Decisions?', Political Psychology, Vol.1 (1979), pp.21ff.;
Fred I. Greenstein, 'Eisenhower as an Activist President: A New Look at the
Evidence', Political Science Quarterly, Vol.94 (1979/80), pp.575ff. See also H.W.
Brands, Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New
York, 1988); and Michael Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times
(New York/London, 1972); Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die
amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1953-59 (Bonn, 1993).
7. A prime example of this cult is the contention of Harold Stassen, a former member
of Eisenhower's cabinet, that 'Eisenhower should be recognized as the most brilliant
leader for world peace in this century' (Stassen and Houts, Eisenhower, ii).
Revisionist authors who, despite their differing conclusions, view Eisenhower's
Presidency in a largely very positive light include Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol.II;
Blanche W. Cook, Dwight D. Eisenhower : Antimilitarist in the White House (St
Charles, MO, 1974); Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (Oxford,
1981); Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New
York, 1982); Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic
Policy, 19S3-1961 (Baltimore, 1982); Robert F. Burk, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Hero
and Politician (Boston, 1986); Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D.
Eisenhower (Lawrence, KS, 1981); Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and
Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics (Lexington, KY, 1977). The latest
overviews of the rapidly increasing literature on the Eisenhower era can be found in
Stephen Rabe, 'Eisenhower Revisionism', Diplomatic History, Vol.17 (1993),
pp.97-116; Immerman, 'Confessions', pp.319ff.; Robert Burk, 'Eisenhower
Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship', Historian, Vol.50
(1988), pp.l96ff.; Anthony James Joes, 'Eisenhower Revisionism and American
Politics', in Joana Krieg (ed.), Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman
(Westport, CT, 1987), pp.283ff.
8. McMahon believes that revisionists have been too preoccupied with the
decision-making process as such. See Robert J. McMahon, 'Eisenhower and Third
World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists', Political Science Quarterly,
Vol.101 (1986), pp.453ff. See also Tor Egil Forland, '"Selling Firearms to the
Indians": Eisenhower's Export Control Policy, 1953-54', Diplomatic History, Vol.15
(1991), pp.243; Immerman, 'Confessions', pp.320-23. Post-revisionist studies of the
Eisenhower era, a research field which is still in its infancy, include apart from
Forland, McMahon, and Immerman, who attempts to create something like a
post-revisionist synthesis, Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The
Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill, 1988); Edward C. Keefer, 'President
Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War', Diplomatic History, Vol.10
(1986), pp.267ff.; David L. Anderson, J. Lawton Collins, John Foster Dulles, and the
Eisenhower Administration's "Point of No Return" in Vietnam', Diplomatic History,
Vol.12 (1988), pp.267ff.; Marks, 'The Real Hawk', pp.297ff.; Thomas Zoumaras,
'Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy: The Case of Latin America', in Richard A.
Melanson and David Mayers (eds.), Re-evaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign
Policy in the 19S0s (Urbana, IL, 1987), pp.155ff.
9. See Greenstein, Hidden-Hand Presidency, pp.169-227. It is, for example, also too
easy simply to state: 'Suffice it to say, he [Eisenhower] judged McCarthy a danger to
America's ideals and institutions and devised a strategy to contain if not eradicate
him.' Immerman, 'Confessions', p.329, n.43. Very illuminating regarding
Eisenhower's and Dulles's opportunism as far as McCarthy was concerned are
Thomas G. Corti and T. Michael Ruddy, 'The Bohlen-Thayer Dilemma. A Case Study
in the Eisenhower Administration's Response to McCarthyism', Mid-America, Vol.72
(1990), pp.119ff. On the tense relationship between Dulles and Bohlen, see T.
Michael Ruddy, The Cautious Diplomat: Charles E. Bohlen and the Soviet Union,
1929-1969 (Kent, OH/London, 1986), pp.109ff.; Walter Isaacson and Evan
Thomas, The Wise Men. Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen,
Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy (New York, 1986), pp.566-9.

10. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1147: Walter Bedell Smith, Acting Se:retary of State, to
American Embassy in Moscow, 15/4/53.
11. Piers Brendon, Ike: The Life and Times of Dwight D. Eisenhower (London, 1987),
p.255. See also Stassen and Houts, Eisenhower, p.153.
12. Rostow's economic beliefs are analysed in Barry Supple, 'Revisiting Rostow',
Economic History Review, 2nd Series, Vol.37 (1984), pp.107ff.
13. Walt W. Rostow, Europe after Stalin: Eisenhower's Three Decision: of March 11, 1953
(Austin, TX, 1982), pp.3-4.
14. Josef Foschepoth, 'Churchill, Adenauer und die Neutralisierung Deutschlands',
Deutschland-Archiv, Vol.17 (1984), p.1288.
15. The 'new men' in the Kremlin - Malenkov, Molotov, Beria - were of course not that
'fresh' any more. They were at best middle-aged, and had been Stalin's lieutenants
for several decades. In the following I use the contemporary terminology of the
Eisenhower era and do not differentiate between the terms 'political warfare' and
'psychological warfare'. Jackson's influence on Eisenhower was largely limited to the
year 1953. In March 1954, Jackson, formerly a Time Magazine journalist, left the
White House to begin work as a journalist on Time-Life. For a good characterization
of C.D. Jackson, see Cook, Declassified Eisenhower, pp.73, 120-34; Blanche W
Cook, 'First Comes the Lie: C.D. Jackson and Political Warfare', Radical History
Review, Vol.31 (1984), pp.42ff.; and above all Brands, Cold Warriors, pp.17-37.
16. David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War (New York,
1990), p.149.
17. Brendon, Ike, p.255.
18. Dulles's greater than generally supposed flexibility is analysed with regard to the
recognition of China in William Snyder, 'Dean Rusk to John Foster Dulles, May-June
1953: The Office, the First 100 Days, and Red China', Diplomatic History, Vol.7
(1983), pp.79ff.
19. M. Steven Fish, 'After Stalin's Death: The Anglo-American Debate over a New Cold
War', Diplomatic History, Vol.10 (1986), p.354. Callahan exaggerates: 'Dulles ...
saw no reason to call off his holy war against communism simply because there were
some new faces in the Kremlin' (Dangerous Capabilities, p.49).
20. Cook, Declassified Eisenhower, p. 179, states that 'Eisenhower monitored every word
of every one of the many drafts' of his speech.
21. Public Record Office, London (PRO): FO 371/106 504/NS 1013/19, telegram no.54
(first quarterly report, 1953), 8/4/53. An excellent overview of the various internal
and external measures by the new government is given in the document 'Chronology
of Principal Events in Soviet Affairs, January-June, 1953', dated 16/7/53 (draft
paper), in PRO: FO 371/106 510/NS 1015/39; also Eisenhower L brary, Abilene, KS
(EL): Jackson Papers, Record 1953-54, 'Soviet Lures and Pressires Since Stalin's
Death, March 5 to 25, 1953', annex, 26/3/53; and a document with the same title
for the period from 26 March to 13 April, annex, 15/4/53. Set also Harrison E.
Salisbury, Moscow Journal (Chicago, 1962), pp.364-66, 369-71; and National
Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (NA): 761.00/5-2153,
telegram no.480, 21/5/53.
22. Quoted in G.D. Embree, The Soviet Union between the 19th and 20th Party Congress,
1952-1956 (The Hague, 1959), p.37. For Beam's report on Stalin's funeral, see
FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, pp.1105-06; and Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside
Story (New York, 1956), p.72.
23. See for example PRO: FO 371/106 504, 505 (Oct. 1952-July 1953), pp.106,
515-19 (March-Dec.1953); FRUS, ibid., pp.1125-9: Special Estimate 39 (12/3/53);
see also Fish, 'After Stalin's Death', pp.333ff.; Waldemar Besson, Die Außenpolitik der
Bundesrepublik: Erfahrungen und Maßstäbe(Munich, 1970), pp.136, 145.
24. See John Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955
(London, 1985), pp.653-4: diary entry, 22-25/8/53. See also Colville's contribution
in John Wheeler-Bennett (ed.), Action this Day: Working with Churchill (London,
1984), p.129. See also the following note.
25. This was what Churchill referred to as the 'master thought' of the Treaty of Locarno
of 1925. The dominant factor in Churchill's consideration was the realization that
only a global detente would allow Britain to catch up with the two superpowers in
the economic and military field, and remain one of the great powers of the world.
Churchill was aware that if no detente with the Soviet Union was achieved and the
armaments race and Cold War competition between the superpowers continued,
Britain would lose out, and be forever bound to the will of the United States. If
detente could be realized Britain would be able to reduce its world-wide military
commitments and concentrate on its economic and technological development. See
PRO: FO 371/103 660/C 1016/32, Minute Dixon to Strang and Roberts, 19/5/53,
about his conversation with Churchill on 16/5/53; ibid., Minute Strang to Dixon,
19/5/53, about his conversations with Churchill on 18/5/53; PREM 11/449 (also in
FO 800/794), Churchill to Strang, M 178/53, 31/5/53; FO 371/103 704/C 1073/4,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 14/5/53; and ibid., C 1073/3, FAZ, 12/5/53.
See also House of Commons Debates (HC Deb.), 5th series, Vol.515, 11/5/53,
col.896-7; Klaus Larres, Politik der Illusionen. Churchill, Eisenhower und die
deutsche Frage, 1945-55 (Göttingen, 1995), pp.l33ff. Donald Cameron Watt,
'Churchill und der Kalte Krieg', Schweizer Monatshefte (Sonderbeilage), Vol.61,
No.11 (1981), p.18; Rolf Steininger, 'Ein vereintes, unabhängiges Deutschland?
Winston Churchill, der Kalte Krieg und die deutsche Frage im Jahre 1953',
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, Vol.34 (1984), pp.105-44.
26. NA: 741.00/3-653: telegram no.4964 from London, 6/3/53; see also
741.00/2-2653, telegram no.4808 from London, 26/2/53.
27. See for example Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA)(ed.), Documents on
International Affairs, 1949-50 (London, 1953), p.56.
28. See FRUS 1952-54, VII, pp.433-4. See Larres, Politik, pp.72ff.; also Wolfgang
Leonhard, Kreml ohne Stalin (Cologne, 1963), pp.81-2; Jacob Beam, Multiple
Exposure: An American Ambassador's Unique Perspective on East—West Issues (New
York, 1978), p.31.
29. PRO: PREM 11/540: FO paper NS 1022/4 (9/4/53) 'Soviet policies after Stalin's
death'; FRUS 1952-54, VIII, pp.1100-43.
30. PRO: FO 371/106 533/NS 1051/17 (27/3/53).
31. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1087: Department of State Intelligence Estimate,
'Implications of Stalin's Collapse', 4/3/53; see also ibid., 1080-1: Memorandum E.
Lewis Revey, Office of Policy and Plans, 25/2/53.
32. Acting on a request made by the Political Strategy Board (PSB) in a paper entitled
'Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power' in November 1952, the
State Department had forwarded stand-by instructions for use in the period
immediately following the dictator's death to the PSB on 21 January 1953, the day
after Eisenhower 's inauguration. This paper (PSB D-24) is partly published in FRUS,
ibid., 1059-60. See also EL: Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box No.29,
Folder Psychological Warfare, Memorandum C.D. Jackson to National Security
Adviser General Robert Cutler, 4/3/53.
33. Anna Kasten Nelson, 'The "Top of Policy Hill": President Eisenhower and the
National Security Council', Diplomatic History, Vol.7 (1983), p.324; see also Joseph
G. Bock, The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant: Friendship and
Friction at the Water's Edge (New York, 1987), pp.31-42.
34. Quoted in Emmet Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the
Eisenhower Years (London, 1963), p.101. The Cabinet meeting took place on 6
March. See also FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1098; Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol.H,
pp.67-8.
35. Ambassador George Kennan had been declared persona non grata in September 1952
by the Soviet government; the consideration of the nomination of Charles Bohlen as
his successor was still pending before the Senate. In his memoirs Bohlen drew a very
positive picture of Beam. He wrote: 'He [Beam] had not been in Moscow very long
[since December, 1952], but he was an astute observer and had kept Washington fully
informed of the period when Stalin was ill and of events following the dictator's
death. I had been impressed by Beam's telegrams ... and hoped to retain him as
counsellor ...'. Charles Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (London, 1973),
p.338. See also Beam's Memoirs, Multiple Exposure, pp.28ff.
36. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, 1084: Beam to State Department, 4/3/53.
37. The State Department thought, quite correctly as it turned out. that a triumvirate
might be established with the Party chieftain as primus inter pares. Ibid., pp.1086-90:
Department of State Intelligence Estimate, 4/3/53.
38. Ibid., p.1090.
39. See PRO: FO 371/125 037/ZP 9/19, (25/4/53).
40. On the controversy whether or not the Stalin note was meant seriously and should
have been 'checked out' see especially Rolf Steininger, The German Question: The
Stalin Note of 19S2 and the Problem of Reunification (New York, 1990); Herrmann
Graml, 'Die Legende von der verpassten Gelegenheit: Zur sowjetischen
Notenkampagne des Jahres 1952', VierteljahrsheftefürZeitgeschichte, Vol.29 (1981),
pp.307-41; also Manfred Kittel, 'Genesis einer Legende: Die Diskussion um die
Stalin-Noten in der Bundesrepublik 1952-1958', in ibid., 41 (1993), pp.355-89.
41. EDC member states were: France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries
(Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxemburg).
42. For the Pleven-Plan and the developing problems surrounding the EDC see Edward
Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (London, 1980); Hans-Erich
Volkmann and Walter Schwengler (eds.), Die Europaische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft:
Stand und Probleme der Forschung (Boppard, 1985); John W. Young, 'German
Rearmament and the European Defence Community', in John W. Young (ed.), The
Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, 1951-55 (Leicester, 1988),
pp.81ff.; Saki Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955
(Cambridge, 1991), pp.59ff.
43. Motivating Western politicians was the prospect that in the long run and once
ratification of the EDC was secured it might be possible to negotiate the integration
of the whole of Germany into the West in return for some sort of security agreement
with the Soviet Union, whose precise terms had not yet been worked out. PRO: FO
371/125 034/ZP 3/35/6 (30/9/53); also FO 371/103 664/C 1071/9 (6/5/53); CAB
129/ C(53)256 (14/9/53); Eden, Full Circle, pp.64-74, 291-4, 295ff. This, of course,
was also Adenauer's reunification philosophy. According to his 'magnet theory' the
Germans in the GDR would soon be so attracted to the economic prosperity and
freedom in the western part of the nation that the position of the communists in East
Berlin would gradually be undermined. This is not the occasion to discuss the
question whether or not German unification in October 1990 proved Adenauer
right. See Rudolf Morsey, Die Deutschlandpolitik Adenauers: Alte Thesen und neue
Fakten (Opladen, 1991); and the very critical review by Henning Köhler in Die Zeit,
No.6 (31/1/1992), p.44.
44. For Eisenhower's use of the formal meetings of the NSC and informal talks with his
advisers in order to arrive at sensible decisions, see Nelson, 'The "Top of Policy
Hill"', pp.310ff.
45. The memorandum of the discussion of the 135th NSC meeting on 4/3/53 is published
in FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, pp.1091-5, quotes: p.1091.
46. See Stassen and Houts, Eisenhower, pp.155-6.

47. The psychological warfare activities of the Eisenhower era had effectively
commenced in the summer of 1952, with the convening of two seminars in
Princeton. The CIA, State Department, PSB, the National Committee for a Free
Europe, and the Center for International Studies (CENIS) were represented. The
participants agreed that Truman's policy of containment had to be substituted by 'a
more dynamic and positive policy'. Jackson, and representatives from Radio Free
Europe, believed that eventually the 'ultimate liberation of the enslaved nations'
should be achieved (quotes in Cook, Declassified Eisenhower, pp.177-8). On 24
January 1953, the so-called William H. Jackson committee was appointed and given
the task to reform the structure of the NSC. The recommendation of the committee
was responsible for the eventual foundation of the Operation Co-ordinating Board
(OCB) in the summer of 1954 as a replacement for Truman's PSB, which had been
established in 1951. The OCB became thus responsible for psychological warfare
actions. See Cook, ibid., pp.175-9.
48. Harold Stassen, the Director of Mutual Security, and Eisenhower's press secretary
Jim Hagerty attended the meeting as well. See Stassen and Houts, Eisenhower, p.154.
49. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1092. According to Stassen and Houts, ibid., p.156, Jackson
also speculated that 'if the President were to remain silent we would not only miss
the opportunity he had outlined, but the very silence of the Chief Executive would
be subject to misinterpretation by those who sought to misinterpret him'.
50. Stassen and Houts, ibid.
51. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1092. For an interesting account of the NSC meeting by a
participant, see Stassen and Houts, ibid., pp.154-62.
52. FRUS, ibid. See also Brands, Cold Warriors, pp.19, 123. Martin Beglinger,
'Containment' im Wandel: Die amerikanische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik im
Übergang von Truman zu Eisenhower (Stuttgart, 1988), p.83, is mistaken when he
sees Wilson as a member of the group around C.D. Jackson. Also Sherman Adams,
First-Hand Report: The Inside Story of the Eisenhower Administration (London,
1961), p.96, confuses the situation. He claims: '... Eisenhower agreed with Dulles
and Jackson that the psychological time had arrived ... to deliver a major speech ...'.
On Defense Secretary Wilson's rather unimportant role within the Eisenhower
administration, see E. Bruce Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and the Controversy at the
Pentagon, 1953 to 1957 (Detroit, 1979).
53. Although speaking of the 'Chance for Peace' speech Emmet Hughes refers to 'The
watchful, not too aggressive, opposition of Dulles ...' and of the Secretary of State's
'delicately muted opposition' (Ordeal, p.109). These words summarize Dulles's
cautious half-opportunistic, half-insistent behaviour towards Eisenhower nicely. See
also Hoopes, Devil, p.171; Paul Nitze with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden,
From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision - A Memoir (New York,
1989), p.144.
54. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1092. The statement is published in ibid., p.1085; and in the
Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, p.75.
55. At least no reports to the contrary were received in the West. See The Times
(London), 5-7 March 1953.
56. The NSC document reveals that also Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey
agreed with Eisenhower. In his memoirs Bohlen mentions that Dulles briefly showed
him Eisenhower's statement and Bohlen acknowledged: 'I thought it was a good
statement' (Witness, p.321). In view of his critical standpoint, which will be
elaborated on in the following pages, this is difficult to believe. It can only be
explained by the fact that Bohlen was not a participant at the NSC meeting and
therefore did not know what intentions Eisenhower had in mind. Very likely, he only
judged the President's statement by its innocuous content. According to Stassen and
Houts, Eisenhower, pp.161-2, this NSC meeting 'became the President's first official
break with Dulles'.
57. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1093.
58. Ibid., p.1094. See also Rostow, Europe, pp.103-4 ('Extracts from the Author's Notes
on the Origin of the President's Speech of April 16, 1953', pp.102-10; this document
is also published in FRUS, ibid., pp.1173-83. In the following I quote from Rostow's
book).
59. Regarding the close connection between the EDC, German rearmament and the
various proposals to convene a summit conference with Moscow, see Dockrill,
Britain's Policy, pp.l24ff.; Larres, Politik, pp.67ff., 127ff.; James G. Hershberg,
'German Rearmament and American Diplomacy, 1953-1955,' Diplomatic History,
Vol.16 (1992), pp.511ff.
60. Hughes, Ordeal, p.101.
61. Rostow, Europe, p.87.
62. For a discussion of the myth surrounding the Yalta Conference and its impact on
British and American post-war foreign policy, see Donald Cameron Watt, 'Britain
and the Historiography of the Yalta Conference and the Cold War', Diplomatic
History, Vol.13 (1989), pp.76ff.
63. See Rostow, Europe, pp.87-90, quotes: pp.86, 87, 90.
64. Nitze in a memorandum to Dulles, dated 19/3/53. Published in Rostow, Europe,
pp.140-1. Nitze had a very tense relationship with Dulles, who asked him in May
1953 to transfer to the Defense Department to work under Charl:s Wilson. In June,
however, Nitze was dismissed from this post as well, as he was still regarded as having
been too close to the Truman administration. Above all, by getting rid of Nitze, the
Eisenhower administration attempted to appease McCarthy. See Isaacson and
Thomas, Wise Men, p.570; Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Garte: Paul Nitze and
the Nuclear Peace (New York, 1988), pp.60-2; Nitze, Hiroshima, pp.146-8.
65. Rostow, Europe, p. 105.
66. Ibid., pp.3-5.
67. Hughes, Ordeal, p.102. In his memoirs Hughes claims that he was the one who was
mainly responsible for drafting Eisenhower's speech and he praise; the valuable help
he received from Paul Nitze. At this stage this is, however, nor born out by the
documents nor by the account given by Rostow. See ibid., pp.108, 119-20; FRUS,
1952-54, VIII, pp.1107-8: Memorandum Nitze, 10/3/53; Rostow, ibid., pp.104-5.
68. FRUS, ibid., pp.1101-2: Memorandum Bohlen, 7/4/53. See also Ruddy, Cautious
Diplomat, pp. 127-8.
69. Peter G. Boyle (ed.), The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 19S3-SS (Chapel
Hill/London, 1990), p.31: Churchill to Eisenhower, 11/3/53.
70. Frank Roberts, Dealing with Dictators: The Destruction and Revival of Europe,
1930-70 (London, 1991), p.165.
71. Boyle (ed.), Correspondence, pp.31-2: Eisenhower to Churchill, 11/3/53.
72. PRO: FO 371/106 515/NS 1010/2, telegram no.122, 6/3/53.
74. According to ibid., p.5, the originally planned formal discussion of the matter with
Eisenhower on 9 March was postponed to 11 March, as Dulles was out of
Washington until the late afternoon of 10 March.
75. Ibid., p.105.
76. Nitze, Bohlen and Bedell Smith submitted very critical papers. See FRUS, 1952-54,
VIII, pp.1107-12. Basically, the whole State Department, including Dulles and
Robert Bowie - who became Nitze's successor as Director of the PPS - agreed that
quiet, secret negotiations were much more sensible than a public me dia spectacle. See
Soapes, 'A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace', p.61. Bohlen considered the forces of
nationalism within the Soviet Empire as the chief element working against the
continuation of its control over the satellite countries. He emphasized, however, that
'the process of increased nationalism may be a very long-term process*. See FRUS,
1952-54, VIII, pp.1108-11: Memorandum Bohlen, 10/3/53, quotes: pp.1109-11.
77. The British characterized him as 'conscientious, by American standards, about
reflecting the opinions of his political superiors'. See PRO: FO 371/106 532/NS
10345/4, Watson, British Embassy, Washington, to Hohler, FO, 5/2/53. On Smith see
also William Snyder, 'Walter Bedell Smith: Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Military
Affairs, Vol.48 (1984), pp.6-14.
78. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1112: Memorandum Smith, 10/3/53.
79. Ibid., pp.1111-13: Memorandum Smith, 10/3/53; see also Rostow, Europe, pp.5,
111-12. According to Brands, Cold Warriors, p.75, already in the late 1940s Smith
had concluded that the US had to "manage' the Cold War instead of attempting to
win it by means of some sudden action. Smith assumed that in the short or the long
run the Cold War would end on American terms anyway.
80. FRUS, ibid., p.1113, n.4: Memorandum Tufts, 10/3/53. On Tufts see Callahan,
Dangerous Capabilities, pp.148-9.
81. See Bohlen's memorandum of 7/3/53, in FRUS, ibid., pp.1101-2; and Hughes,
Ordeal, p. 102.
82. The minutes of the 136th NSC meeting, on 11 March 1953, are published in FRUS,
ibid., pp.1117-25, quotes: p.1119.
83. See Brands, Cold Warriors, p.19: 'Dulles, however, counselled circumspection, and
the administration confined itself to an address by Eisenhower advocating peace'.
84. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1120. See also PRO: FO 371/103 660/C 1016/32 (19/5/95).
85. FRUS, ibid.
86. Marks, 'The Real Hawk', pp.299ff., rightly emphasizes the 'overriding importance'
of the EDC for Dulles's diplomacy (quote: p.299). See also note 59.
87. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1121.
88. Ibid., p.1122.
89. The President did not exactly distinguish himself as an expert in Soviet affairs during
the meeting. For some reason he came to the extraordinary conclusion 'that Stalin
had never actually been undisputed ruler of the Soviet Union'. The minutes of the
NSC meeting state: 'Contrary to the views of many of our intelligence agencies, the
President persisted in believing that the Government of the Soviet Union had always
been something of a committee government.... had Stalin, at the end of the war, been
able to do what he wanted with his colleagues in the Kremlin, Russia would have
sought more peaceful and normal relations with the rest of the world ... [but] Stalin
had had to come to terms with other members of the Kremlin ruling circle.' Ibid.,
p.1118. This quote can certainly be taken as a prime example of Eisenhower's
tendency to think aloud at NSC meetings. See Keefer, 'President Dwight D.
Eisenhower ', p.277. Eisenhower had already expressed a very similar attitude at the
NSC meeting of 4 March. See Stassen and Houts, Eisenhower, p.161.
90. FRUS, ibid., pp.1124-5.
91. Allegedly this is what Jackson told Rostow immediately after he emerged from the
NSC meeting. See Rostow, Europe, pp.6-7. The condition of a prior Korean truce for
a summit conference is not mentioned in the minutes of the NSC meeting, although
Rostow had referred to it in his memorandum of 6 March without, however, drawing
particular attention to it.
92. Jackson's supporting statement, dated 11/3/53, is published in Rostow, ibid.,
pp.87-90; quotes: pp.87-9. See also note 63.
93. Memorandum Jackson, 8/3/53; published in Declassified Documents, 1978, No.115
D.
94. A few months later, with regard to the uprising in the GDR on 17 June 1953, Jackson
and Rostow advised Eisenhower once again to embark upon a psychological warfare
466 DIPLOMACY 8c STATECRAFT
offensive. They believed 'that the chances of unifying Germany without major war
had vastly increased'. Rostow even tended to the view to encourage the GDR
population to begin with a 'full scale revolt'. Quoted in Brands, Cold Warriors, p.124.
See also Klaus Larres, 'Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the United States, and the
East German Uprising of 1953', Twentieth Century History, Vol.5, No.3 (1994).
pp.320-50.
95. See Rostow, Europe, p.46.
96. The text of Malenkov's 15 March address is published in RIIA (e d.), Documents on
International Affairs, 1953 (London, 1956), pp.11-13, quote: pp.12-13. See also
FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1131, n.2: Editorial Note; and ibid., pp.1105-6, n.3: Beam
to State Department, 9/3/53. The reaction of the British FO can be found in PRO:
FO 371/106 524/NS 1021/21, 17/3/53.
97. PRO: FO 371/106 533/NS 1051/17: Gascoigne, Moscow, to Hobler, FO, 27/3/53;
FRUS, ibid., p. 1138: Memorandum Carlton Savage to Nitze, 1/4/53; Peer Lange,
'Konfrontation mit dem westlichen Bündnis in Europa', in Dietrich Geyer (ed.),
Osteuropahandbuch. Sowjetunion, Aussenpolitik I, 1917-19SS (Cologne, 1972),
p.550; Rostow, Europe, p.47.
98. Moscow hoped that the negotiations would be helpful to prevent further accidents
such as the shooting down of a British bomber which had strayed from the Berlin air
corridor into the GDR on 12 March. The Kremlin apologized for the incident. PRO:
CAB 128/26, Part II, C.C.(53)20th Conclusions, Minute V, 17/3/53; 21st
Conclusions, Minute 1, 20/3/53; 22nd Conclusions, Minute 7; 24/3/53; PRO: FO
371/106 090; and FRUS, ibid., p.1130: Memorandum of telephone conversation
between Dulles and Eisenhower, 16/3/53. See also PRO: PREM 11/896; Evelyn
Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries, 1951-1956 (London, 1986), pp.82-3: Diary
entry, 24-30/3/53.
99. Boyle (ed.), Correspondence, pp.66-7: Churchill to Eisenhower, 4/6/53; see also
Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol.VIII: Never Despair, 194S-1965 (London,
1990), pp.834-5.
100. See Shuckburgh, Descent, pp.82-3: Diary entry, 24-30/3/53; RIIA (ed.), Survey of
International Affairs, 1953 (London, 1956), pp.17-18.
101. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1137: Beam to State Department, 20/3/53. On 18 Mar.
Beam informed the State Department that the long-lasting anti-America campaign by
Stalin had only increased the fear of the Soviet population that a war between the
superpowers could break out. He concluded: '... one [of the] most popular measures
regime could adopt would probably be [the] cessation [of the] anti-US campaign'
(quote: ibid., p.1132).
102. Ibid., p.1138: Memorandum Savage to Nitze, 1/4/53; Princeton University Archive
(PUA): John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversation Series, Box 1, telephone
conversation between Dulles and UN Ambassador Lodge, 31/3/53; EL: Jackson
Papers, Record 1953-54, 'Soviet Lures and Pressures since Stalin's Death, March 5
to 25, 1953', 26/3/53.
103. For the view of the British FO on the amnesty, see PRO: FO 371/106 583. See also
RIIA (ed.), Survey, 1953, p.10; Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since
World War II (New York, 1971), p.198.
104. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, pp.1140-3: Beam to State Department, 4/4/53, quote: p.140.
See also Yakov Rapoport, The Doctors' Plot (London, 1991), pp.l77ff.
105. FRUS, ibid., p.1141: Beam to State Department, 4/4/53.
106. See Larres, Politik, pp.72ff.; also Leonhard, Kreml, pp.81-2; Beam, Multiple
Exposure, p.31.
107. Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945-53 (translated by Beate Rubm von Oppen;
London, 1966), p.438; see also pp.434-7.
108. PRO: FO 371/106 532/NS 10345/9, Minute Roberts to his superior, Permanent
Under-Secretary William Strang, about his conversation with Bohlen, 9/4/53.

Roberts, however, seems to have doubted that the Soviets were prepared to embark
upon a new policy towards Germany on the basis of reunification. See Herbert
Blankenhorn, Verständnis und Verständigung: Blätter eines politischen Tagebuchs
1949 bis 1979 (Frankfurt/M., 1979), pp.144-5. On 11 April 1953, Ambassador
Bohlen commenced his duties at the American Embassy in Moscow. See Isaacson and
Thomas, Wise Men, p.575.
109. PRO: FO 371/103 659/C 1016/9, Article by Lippmann entitled 'Today and
Tomorrow. Dr Adenauer in Washington' in the New York Herald Tribune, dated
7/4/53.
110. FRUS, 1952-54, VII, pp.410-11: Memorandum of conversation between Smith and
the West German MPs Gerhard Schröder, Franz-Josef Strauss, Karl Pfleiderer, and
Hans von Merkatz in Washington on 30/3/53. Smith subsequently explained to Roger
Makins, the British Ambassador in Washington, that convening a summit conference
'might well be enough to kill the E.D.C.'. PRO: FO 800/778, telegram no.726,
6/4/53.
111. The PSB furthermore set up the so-called 'Working Group (Stalin)' (WGS) which was
made responsible for following up Eisenhower's speech by co-ordinating the action
'on the psychological exploitation of the situation' and to 'discourage some rather
extreme suggestions ...'. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, pp.1135-6: PSB Implementation of
NSC Action 734 d (3), 19/3/53, quote: p.1136. The influence of this working group,
however, seems to have been negligible. See NA: lot 64D563, PPS Records, 1947-53,
Box 29, Folder Europe, 1952-53, minute by Edmund A. Guillion, 18/5/53, and the
accompanying document 'Follow-up on President's Speech of April 16, 1953'.
112. See for example Brands, Cold Warriors, p.251.
113. On 12 March, for example, Jackson drafted a letter to Dulles asking for a definitive
assurance that the State Department would take over a 'positive and even central
role' in the envisaged plans, as it was quite likely that a four-power meeting might be
'forced upon the United States in the coming months, even if the proposed speech
did not offer it'. Rostow, Europe, p.109.
114. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, pp.1133-4: Memorandum Bonbright to Smith, 18/3/53. The
revised version of Jackson's paper is published in Rostow, ibid., pp.91-3.
115. Memorandum of a telephone conversation between Hughes and Dulles on 16/3/53.
Published in Rostow, ibid., p.57. A proposal that it be delivered to the Pan-American
Union on 12 April was also given up. Ibid., pp.52-4.
116. PUA: Allen Dulles Papers, Selected Correspondence, Box 56, Memorandum Walter
Waggoner to the journalists Krock and Whitney about Allen Dulles's talk, 3/4/53. See
also Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Vol.1: Mandate for Change,
1953-56 (London, 1963), pp.148-9.
117. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1130: Memorandum of a telephone conversation between
Dulles and Eisenhower, 16/3/53.
119. Nitze, Hiroshima, p.143.
120. Hughes, Ordeal, pp.103—4. In all probability Eisenhower said this on 16 March
1953. See ibid., p.107; Rostow, Europe, p.56.
121. In a different context this expression is used by Keefer, 'President Dwight D.
Eisenhower', p.288.
122. Hughes, Ordeal, pp.105ff., especially pp.107-8.
123. Rostow, Europe, p.58; Hughes, ibid., pp.108-10, 119-20.
124. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1122. See also Stassen and Houts, Eisenhower, p.168.
Already in the course of the NSC meeting of 11 March the President had said that
'what we should do now is propose that the standard of living throughout the world
be raised at once, not at some indefinite time in the future. Such an appeal as this
might really work. ... the economic incentive would have terrific attraction in Russia'
and this, he believed, 'might even result in a settlement in Korea' Apart from saying
that the 'emphasis in the current psychological plan, and notably in his speech, must
be on the simple theme of a higher living standard for all the world ...', Eisenhower
did unfortunately not elaborate on how this could be achieved. None of his aides
thought it advisable to ask too many detailed questions. See ibid. pp. 1122-4.
125. Quoted in Hughes, Ordeal, p.107.
126. Memorandum Jackson to Hughes, 30/3/53. Published in Rostow, Europe, p.58. This
contrasted clearly with Eisenhower 's first public response to the Soviet Union's new
strategy during a press conference on 19 March. 'I can only say that that is just as
welcome as it is sincere.' Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, p.104.
127. Memorandum of a telephone conversation between Hughes and Dulles, 16/3/53.
Published in Rostow, ibid., pp.56-7.
128. PRO: FO 371/106 524/NS 1021/21, Minute Hohler, 17/3/53. Harry Hohler still
expressed the same opinion during an interview in Washington on 27/9/90. See also
ibid., NS 1021/23, Gascoigne to FO, telegram no.40, 20/3/53.
129. Memorandum of a telephone conversation between Hughes and Dulles, 16/3/53.
Published in Rostow, Europe, pp.56-7.
130. Quoted in Hughes, Ordeal, p.106.
131. Hughes, ibid., p.109. See also Dulles's memoranda to the President, dated 6/4/53,
and to Hughes, dated 10/4/53. They are published in Rostow, Europe, pp.132-3,
138-9.
132. FRUS, 1952-54, VII, p.427: Memorandum of a conversation between Eisenhower,
Dulles, Adenauer and Hallstein on 7/4/53 during the German Chancellor's first visit
to Washington. See also Nitze, Hiroshima, p. 144.
133. Dulles said to Hughes: 'I grow less keen about this speech ... because I think there's
some real danger of our just seeming to fall in with these So\iet overtures. It's
obvious that what they are doing is because of outside pressures, and I don't know
anything better we can do than to keep up these pressures right now.' Quoted in
Hughes, Ordeal, p. 109.
134. Before Dulles left Washington he made sure, however, that Eisenhower would
mention the Austrian question in his speech. PUA/EL: John Fos:er Dulles Papers,
Drafts of Presidential Correspondence, Box 1, Memorandum Dulles to Hughes,
10/4/53 (also published in Rostow, Europe, pp.138-9); see also Nitze, Hiroshima,
p.144.
135. The speech was not shown to French Foreign Minister Bidault as the US believed that
he would leak the draft to the press. Roger Makins, the British Ambassador in
Washington, believed that consequently 'Bidault of course will be hopping mad'.
PRO: FO 800/839, telegram no.791, 14/4/53. See also PRO: PREM 11/429. For the
reaction of the French government to Eisenhower's draft speech, see FRUS,
1952-54, VI, pp.1342-4; PRO: FO 800/698, Memorandum Duff, Paris, 28/4/53. See
also John L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New York, 1967), pp.129-30; Fish, 'After
Stalin's Death', p.335.
136. See more detailed Larres, Politik, pp.112-21; Boyle (ed.), Correspondence, pp.41-2:
Churchill to Eisenhower, 11/4/53.
137. Boyle (ed.), ibid., pp.43-4: Churchill to Eisenhower, 12/4/53.
138. Hughes, Ordeal, p.111.
139. PRO: FO 800/839, Makins, Washington, to FO, telegram no.791, 14/4/53.
140. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, pp.1151-4, quotes: pp.1051, 1053.
141. PRO: FO 800/698, Memorandum by the British Minister Selwyn Lloyd about his
conversation with French Ambassador Massigli in London, who it formed Lloyd of
his recent talk with Gromyko, 20/4/53. On the Soviet reaction, see also Stassen and
Houts, Eisenhower, p.173.
142. See Hoopes, Devil, p.173; Donovan, Eisenhower, p.74; Hughes, Ordeal, pp.113-14.
143. Donovan, ibid., p.110; Cook, Declassified Eisenhower, pp.180-1.
144. Adams, First-Hand Report, p.97.
145. See Burk, Dwight D. Eisenhower, p.136.
146. Regarding Eisenhower's general lack of effort to vigorously pursue the realization of
his ideas John Lewis Gaddis speaks even of 'a persistent failure to follow through on
his usually quite sound initial instincts, a curious unwillingness to grasp the reins of
power at all levels' (Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), p.163). See also Forland,
'Selling Firearms to the Indians', pp.243-4.
147. See Keefer, 'President Dwight D. Eisenhower ', pp.276-80.
148. FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.1156: Bohlen to State Department about his conversation
with Soviet politician Voroshilov, 20/4/53.
149. See in much greater detail Larres, Politik, pp.127ff., 185ff.
150. Dulles's speech, entitled 'The Eisenhower Foreign Policy, a world-wide peace
offensive', is published in Rostow, Europe, pp.122-31; quotes: pp.127, 130.
151. See for example Memorandum Nitze to Dulles, 19/3/53. Published in Rostow,
Europe, pp.140-41. See also PUA: John Foster Dulles Papers, Drafts of Presidential
Correspondence, Box 1, President's Speech, April 1953 (i), Memorandum Nitze to
Dulles, 2/4/53.
152. A similar conclusion is reached in regard to the American Indochina policy by Marks,
'The Real Hawk', pp.297-9, 318-21. See also note 4 above.
153. Immerman, 'Confessions', p.341 (writing in 1990), even believes that if Eisenhower
had instead 'sought to reassure the Soviets, especially after Stalin's death, he may
have fostered some of the changes we are witnessing today.'
154. On Dulles's realism see already Guhin, John Foster Dulles. He regards Dulles 'as a
thoroughly pragmatic craftsman whose approach to international politics was
unimpaired by ideological or moral precepts' (p.2).
155. Nixon claims this in his 1962 book Six Crises. Quoted in Greenstein, Hidden-Hand
Presidency, p.9.
156. PRO: PREM 11/419, T. 221/53, 16/6/53. See in a similar vein: CAB 128/26, Part II,
C.C.(53) 44th Conclusions, Minute 4, 21/7/53.
157. PRO: PREM 11/446: Minute Roberts, 20/4/53.
158. Despite the gradual opening of the former Soviet and East German archives, so far
no concrete evidence for a changed foreign policy course has emerged. It does,
however, appear increasingly likely that Moscow was, for example, seriously
contemplating to give up the GDR. See for example Larres, 'Preserving Law and
Order', pp.333-6; Lew Besymenski, '1953-Berija will die DDR beseitigen', in Die
Zeit, No.42 (15 Oct. 1993), pp.81-3; and the transcripts of the meetings of the
Central Committee of the CPSU: D.M. Stickle (ed.), The Beria Affair: The Secret
Transcripts of the Meetings Signalling the End of Stalinism (New York, 1992); James
Richter, Re-examining Soviet Policy towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum
(Woodrow Wilson Center: Cold War International History Project, Working Paper
No.3; Washington, DC, 1992); see also Rudolf Herrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt-
Dokument. Das Politbüro der SED und die Geschichte des 17. Juni 1953, ed. and
introduced by Nadja Stulz-Herrnstadt (Reinbek, 1990), pp.14-23, 64ff., 162f., 207,
222-4; Wilfriede Otto, 'Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1952/53: Forschungs-und
Wahrheitsprobleme', in Deutschland-Archiv, 26 (Aug. 1993), pp.948-54.

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Eisenhower and the First Forty

Days after Stalin's Death: The

Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.6, No.2 (July 1995), pp.431-469

launch a surprise policy offensive. This would disrupt the process of

presidential failure from Eisenhower's reputation have now gone to

the sincerity with which he discussed the proposition'." Not

Britain, the United States and Stalin's Death

Soon after Stalin's sudden death was announced on 6 March 1953,

American Ambassador in Moscow,35 which meant that Jacob Beam,

of the question. Instead, there was no time to be lost in going ahead

The NSC Meetings of 4 and 11 March 1953

Even before Stalin's death was finally confirmed, a strategy to seize

would be an excellent idea, as the present situation 'was the first

expenditure, he stated that, as a precaution to stop demands for any

also be no second Yalta, as every nation about which action was to be

Will it be aimed at Soviet satellites, to stir their insurrection? Or

In a memorandum dated 7 March 1953, Bohlen begged the State

A suggestion of this nature might be the one for a meeting of the

My particular fear at this moment is that elements of the US

The Ambassador's worry was entirely justified, although it is most

Smith strongly advised against a four-power meeting of Foreign

although the US Government should fully exploit any

effort of the US Government, whatever that might be, and that

Thus the administration's policy seemed to be all about propaganda

for a Foreign Ministers' conference on European issues which would

We too have a coalition to manage. In our attempt to destroy the

In the event that a four-power conference should take place after

he was in no position to guarantee that the great EDC plan

French, German and Italian Governments, and possibly even

The President entirely agreed with Dulles that a four-power meeting

express his conviction as openly as he had done at the previous one

The Soviet Peace Campaign

The Anglo-American experts were utterly surprised when the new

campaign was entirely based on the Soviet realization that certain

and the succession of Malenkov'. This was quite understandable, as

seemed insufficient to be content with a psychological warfare

Look, I am tired ... of just plain indictments of the Soviet

It is clear that Eisenhower had become highly nervous of the

hardly be mollified in their global ambitions by 'genial, bourgeois talk

I cannot re-emphasize too strongly the importance of the

What all this gets down to is the question of whether we are

Despite these occasional outbursts, Dulles had gradually resigned

himself to accepting that there would be a presidential speech whose

general doubt as to the 'need for any speech'."8 In his answering

The Delivery of the Speech and the Aftermath

On 16 April 1953, Eisenhower, while suffering from severe food

It was of the utmost importance, he added, that the United States

outlook on the world in early 1953, but he was too much of a

despite appearances, the President knew what he was doing and

It is still impossible to repudiate the view of both the British

Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy (New York, 1986), pp.566-9.

46. See Stassen and Houts, Eisenhower, pp.155-6.

Under-Secretary William Strang, about his conversation with Bohlen, 9/4/53.

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