f.•·i r· A ~~:.~a. u. Jt Ope ratjon s c:o f ;: he J.D1 •_::; t· l\ [-t~· or· nt~ Di vl:.

Jc>n

Du 1r· ing Opc-:>ra.tion DE~ s e1 ·· t· Storrr,

Febr u ar y 24 - 28, 1 991

Captain Re>~ Ha.ll

IOAC 4-91
Se minar 5
De c ember 1991
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Division Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1

Division Operational Graphics • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anne x A

Division Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex B

PZ Diagram, FOB Cobra ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anne x C •

Air Movement Table, FOB Cobra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex D

Operational Graphics, FOB Cobra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex E

Downed Aircraft Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . Annex F

 Spear h E~a d E• c~ b l.J :i. t ~:;, !~ (::~ pu h1i <~· i'·\ n C' 1 <:'• l" cl · •:·' !" p :; , I 1·· ;;~ .: : j ~ . .,_, ,, , tjp ;..;

I +: l DO k 1.:.• ri ,::,; c;; i. f i:: h f':• I r :::, q :i. ~=:; ![I i q h '-':

continue their attack into S~udi Ar abia. On Au gust 10, the

101st Airborne Divi s ion (Air Assa ult) wa s al erted for d eplo~me n t

to Saudi Arabia <Na~lor, 10l. At that time the Division Read~

Force was 1st Battalion, 502d Infan try . I wa s the S-3 (Air) for

that ba.ttalion. I was in the process bf clearing to attend IOA C

on August 28. With the thought of a quick Gulf War, I did l ike

man~ others and had m~ orders cancelled.

The deployment seemed to drag on. The initial air frames

went to logistical assets and command elements from the division.

The priorit~ then shifted to 3rd Battalion, 502d Infantr~. On

September 1, I departed for S a udi Arabia with the last of the

battalion•s soldiers. We exp ect ed a war to start shortly after

we arrived in Saudi Arabia. It did not. We had plenty of time

to prepare for the war.

It was the first time since the war in Vietnam that the

101st Airborne Division (Ai r Assault) planned and executed air

assault operations in a combat s ituation. For this reason,

politics and public relation s influenced the planning as much as

tactical considerations did . The operation had to be big. On

the first cia~ of the ground warl 1st Brig ad e established a

forward o o erating base (FOB) Cobra. ninet~-th re e miles insi de

On the second and third da~ of the grou nd war, 3 rd Br igade

air assaulted to an area of operations (AO) Eagle~ about sixty

rr•iles. fr·om P..aghcla d. (See map ~ divi ·'=i ion opel"C:d:i ons). T he final

operation involved 2d Brigade establish ing FOB Viper , about

ninety miles east of FOB Cobra , on the fourth day of the ground

!.. 1.
.. o,•2 ~·""" L

·r he or~atest c h a llenge to

u.s 1.1• a s not thE' ~Jr·oun d u! r.<r . how ever. The c ha llenge had been in

waiting for the ground war.

Boredon wa s the one aspect of warfare that we had not

trained ourselves to deal with. It was like an ever-present

enem'::J. For nearly six months, we had been in Saudi Arabia just

waiting for some type of military action to relieve the

monoton'::J. We had too much time on our hands with too little to

do. Most of us had difficulty adapting to the extremely slow

pace. The soldiers amused themselves in a variet':::l of ways. Some

would th row scorpions and camel spiders into a small arena for

gladiatorial contests. One of our men even shaved his eyebrows

out of boredom. Card games and board games were quite common.

There had been much conjecture about when and if a war would

sta.r·t . Rumors infected the battalion daily. i'1ora 1 e was not

high. Fortunately, all of the available time did give us the

opportunity to train and plan for the conduct of a war in the

desert.

In one way, my battalion (1st Battalion, 502d Infantry) had

been lucky. (See division task organization) . In March of 1990,

along with 3/101 and 9/101 Aviation, we participated in a

rotation at the National Training Center <NTC > with a brigade

from the 24th ID. Because mo st command billets were frozen at

. 1
the beginning of Operation Desert ~· 0

~·nleJ.o~ t ho=-e sa.rr1e three

battalion commanders, with recent NTC e xp e r ience, commanded

during the ground war. Additionally, some of the air assault

( 2)
 ·-
d
.1••
t :-. ::··

The principal factor affecting helicopter operati on s in the

desert is a condition called "brown-out." This condition forces

pilots to land by their instruments because the sand stirred up

by their rotor blades reduces their visibility to zero. Our

experience at the National Training Ce~ter taught us that the

best way to reduce the amount of sand one helicopter kicked up

from affecting subsequent aircraft was to increase the distance

between the helicopters and have them land in echelon formation.

Because of the increased .distances between aircraft, five

helicopters per pickup zone CPZ) was the most a battalion

caul d control.

After several months of changing missions and choosing

different objectives, the division's final plan called for a

Brigade Task Force (1st Brigade and l/502d) to secure a forward

operating base, called FOB Cobra, at the beginning of the ground

war, to provide a logistical base that could support

follow-on operations. The division's attack helicopters would

fly armed reconnaissance of the flight routes in and out of FOB

Cobra for seven days prior to the start of the ground war

(G-DAY). The o r iginal projection put G-Day on Februar~ 21, so

the reconna i ssance began on Februar~ 14. During what became ten

days of reconn a issance ~ the OH-SBD helicopters made vide o tapes

of the flight r outes and potential sites for FOB Cobra.

In addition to helping finalize the plan, the purpose of the

reconnaissance wa s to eliminate any pockets of resista n ce.

( 3)
 I-· ·i ITIF' ..

p l'"' •.:~ v' i dE·~ SE~ C t.J 'r~ _i ·:·· • 1

enemy fire or mechanical diffi c ul t ies. On February 17, 1st

Platoon, Company C from l / 502d IN wa s on str i p alert. When ten

Iraqis made attempts to surrender to some AH-64 Apache

helicopters, aircraft were di s patched to get 1st Platoon. The

ten Iraqi s were picked up by fiv e Pathfinders in helicopters

from 2/17th Ca va lry. However, more Iraqis were spotted, and the

platoon was sent to a bunker complex about fifteen miles inside

Iraq <MT 275910). Using AH-64 Apaches in overwatch, the platoon

netted thi r ty-one enemy prisoners-of-war, <EPW's) (Glover, 7).

Three days later, AH-1 Cobras f r om 3rd Battalion, lOlst

Aviation, with AH-64 Apaches from 2nd Battalion, 229th Aviation,

and Air Force A-lO"s attacked another bunker complex . Company B

from 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, went in to secure the

surrendering Iraqis. The bunker complex (later call Objective

Toad) turned out to be larger tha n expected, and the other two

rifle companies from the battalion were called in. They captured

a total of 435 EPW's .

The reconnaissance of the flight routes (later called MSR

N~wmar k et) and of potential sites for an ope~ating base, finally

confirme d a locati on for FOB Cobra. FOB Cobra itself would

comprise about sixty square miles of featureless desert

(Cha.duJick , 8 4 ). It was div i d ed up so the infantry would occupy

the outer perimeter and t he support units would be closer to the

center. <See graphics of FOB Cobra).

( 4)
ta k e;.

floors. This reduced th e a llow a bl e cargo load ( ACL) to 5000 lbs.

or fifteen combat-loaded infantrymen. The ACL on the Chinook s

was 18,000 lbs. This ACL permitted two XM966 TOW HMMWV"s with a

crew of tour and seven TOW missiles each to be lifted. The

Chinook loads on the 1/502d PZ were internal. It took about:

thirty minutes to load the HMMWV's in the Chinooks. On PZ C--4~

we loaded the four TOW HMMWV"s from 5th Platoon, Company D~ along

with one U. S . Air Force Tactical Air Control Party <TACP) HMMWV;

a cargo HMMWV~ with two vehicle radios plus medical supplies; and

two scout motorcycles. (See PZ Diagram, FOB Cobra).

Under 1st Brigade PZ control, 2d and 3rd Platoons of Company

D, 1/502d, prepared their TOW vehicles for sling-loading

"shotgun" style. The normal procedure for tandem sling-loads was

to attach the two HMMWV's together, bumper-to-bumper with a Yo-He

device. The "shotgun" technique put the Hl'1r1WV' s side-by-side.

This allowed the Chinooks to fly lower and faster than with a

Yo-He sling l oad.

While most of the soldiers moved into PZ posture, those

soldiers and vehicles not flying by helicopter to FOB Cobra,

moved to an assembly area to prepare for a ground convoy under

the control of the Battalion E xecu tive Officer. This convo'::) •JJas

part of a larger 1st Brigade convoy called Task Force Citadel,

which contained a total of 722 vehicles. The convoy s move d along

MSR Newmarket to FOB Cobra.

(5 )
.

ca.pa bi l it u of em p loi.:Ji ng the anthr· c-~ ·· v :i.r u s . The Iraqis had

modified civilian vehicles to clandes tineli.:J dispense the virus.

There was an increased thre at o f anthrax in the Euphrates River

I am not certain wh en t he d ecis ion was made to

vaccinate the division's soldiers. Th e problem was in obtaining

the vaccine, though. As Feb ruari.:J 23 d re w to a close, the

medical platoon made a hurrie d attempt to vaccinate all of the

soldiers for anthrax on the PZ's.

H-Hour was scheduled for 0600 hours on February 24,

<G-Dai.:J) . The 1/502d pick-up zones <PZ's) corresponded to the

same LZ numbers, with Company A going to LZ 10 CMU 952634),

Company B with the battalion's mortars going to LZ 11 <MU935590 ) ,

and Company C headed for LZ 12 <MU 907567). After securing our

po rtion of FOB Cobra, we h a d to integrate follow-on forces from

2d Brigade into the 1st Brigade perimeter and be prepared for

upcoming missions withi n forty-eig h t hours. <See 1/502d

graphics, FOB Cobra).

Late in the evening on Feb ruar y 23, under cover of

da.rkness, helicopters inser ted fou r long-range surveillance

teams from 2/17th CAV on to FOB Cobra <Naylor, 12). As the

morning o f February 24 broke, it became ob vious that H-Hour would

have to be delay e d. There wa s a heavy ground fog near the PZ,

a n d the atta ck helicopter pilots route reconnaissance and

LZ overwatch, re ported even heavier fog o n FOB Cobra. H-Hou r w<:~.s

mov ed to 0700 hours. The fog did not lift, so the 1st Brigade

Commander bumpe d H-Hour t o 0 800 hours. At 0700 hours, three

( 6)
 of Pathf i r,d ~o->l" r..:; PC!u.i pped ·~.l :t '··h t!E• E~c:c · n ~:; •.t.IE·Y'f.~ in ~.; er· t;;=· d alc·-· c
·. tE:.'i::\ 11 •S

thE~ f light rout ..::·s tu hr~lp guide the hf::'l iccq::d: E.~l"S . V isibilit~ oi d

not i mpro ve much, but r a the r than d e l a~ H-H ou r again, the 1st

Brigade Commander decided to pr oceed and "fly s lowly." At 07:25

hours, the first lift consisting of 67 Black Hawks, 30 Chinooks,

and 10 UH-1 Iroquois or "Hueys" beg an it s way towards FOB Cobra.

This began the l ar gest air a s sault in history. It involved

over 300 helicopters of attack, utility, and cargo

classifications . The establishment of FOB Cobra, 75 nautical

miles inside Iraq, represented the deepest penetration of any

coalition force on the first day of the ground war. After the

helicopters carried the infantrymen to FOB Cobra, those same

helicopters returned about an hour-and-a-half later to fly in the

remaining soldiers and supplies.

The air assault into FOB Cobra went according to plan for

the 1st Brigade Task Force. The navigation of the pilots was

extremely good, partly because the lead helicopters in each

serial were equipped with global positioning systems (GPS's or

"sluggers"). Once on the objective, the soldiers quickly

reorganized and established hasty fighting positions. The

soldiers initially had to abandon their heavy rucksacks on the

LZ and later retrieved them with the help of the TOW HMMWV's.

The scouts on motorcycles acted as couriers and used a slugg2~ to

get accura te positio ns o f the various units.

Although there wer e few surpr ises for my b attal io n, it ~as a

different case for Company A, 1st Battalion, 327th Infant ry. The

AH-64 Apaches on ro ute securit y spotted enemy on Company A's LZ.

. t
•
-r·r·l E"~ L_L U..' -~- -::. s r, j_ f l f.':? d t Ci d i. i t r (--·· ,· --, ; I ~-- ·::-;:

s ou t h .

AH-1 Cobras and A- 10's pou ndi ng th e ~ra qi po s ition to their

north. The Company Comm~nder led h1 ~ forward observers to a

position near the Iraqi bunker com pl e ~ . The were able to direct

accurate artillery fire on the Iraq :s . After a period of being

pounded by 105mm artillery, the Irao1 s "surrendered. Company A

took 339 Iraqi prisoners (Naylo r , 14 1.

For the remainder of the day, C-inooks and Black Hawks

continued to fly in fuel and supplies. A rapid refuel point was

established for the helicopters. This filling station would be

key to future operations.

On the second day of the grou~d war (G+1), 3rd Brigade began

its assault into the Euphrates River Valley to an area called AO

(Area of Operations) Eagle. Its obJ ective was to interdict Iraqi

movement along on Highway 8, about 60 miles southeast of Baghdad

<Steele, 30). This became the nort hern most point any allied

force moved during the war. Before 3d Brigade could finish its

assault, a sandstorm or §b~m~l hit the area and grounded the

helicopters. On G+2 the weather abated, and 3rd Brigade finished

their move to AO Eagle. The distance from 3rd Brigade's location

in Tactical Assembly Area CTAA) Cam p bell, . on the _ Saudi border, to

AO Eagle was about 155 statute m ile~. Helicopters returning

from AO Eagle had to refuel in FOB Co bra before proceeding to

TAA Campbell .

Late in the day of February 26. under cover of darkness,

4/101 AVN flew into 1/502d IN Batta ! ion's sector and landed

( 8)
 j_ i·· ·-· 01...' +:
. 1,;!

wha t the next mj ss ion woulri be. Th e B1ac~ H0wk pilots we re just

as un i nformed as we we re.

At 2335 hours, the 2d Brigade TO C se nt us a message that the

next mission would be to establish FOB Viper~ about ninety

statute miles due east of FOB Cobra. The mission would also

include 3rd Battalion~ 502d Infantry, ~nd 3rd Battalion~ 327th

Infantry. H- Hour would be at 1000 hour s, and the air mission

brief would be at 0600 hours~ G+3. With so little information to

go on, the staff issued the companies an operations order at 0330

hours. The companies moved into PZ posture before sunrise.

At the air mission briefing, H-Hour was moved up to 0900

hours. Aviation Brigade neglected to inform the pilots from

4/101 AVN about the briefing~ and they did not attend. Some of

the battalion's HMMWV's had to move to a PZ controlled by the

artillery battalion. These vehicles were to be flown in by CH-47

Chinooks. All Chinook loads would be internal to give the

aircraft greater evasive capabilities. Flight speed for the

Black Hawks would be 120 knots. In many respects, this mission

mirrored the operation into FOB Cobra.

The pilots from 4/101 AVN were hastily briefed on the PZ.

The only change the companies made to their plan was to have the

first lift of infantry go in without their rucksacks, and t he

second lift of resupplies and reinforcem ents wou l d bring in all

of the rucksacks and leave them on the LZ. Despite the thousand s

of maps that the S-2 section was transp orting, there was only a

couple of maps of the objective area. The Company Commander s

( 9)
t hese as ~nit locations be ca me avail0ble . , -
.l ac ,.·
j•
of

deliberate planning time, the air as sa ult to sec ure FOB Viper

went l.J.Jell. The helicopters insert i nq Companr.:.J C, l /502d IN,

landed amongst cluster munitions that British Tornados had

dropped, but the men were able to move out of the minefield

sa. fellJ.

Once the battalion was on the ground, the soldiers again

quickly established a defensive perimeter, dug hasty fighting

positions, and began local patrolling. Company A was in the

northwest, while Company B was center sector with the Battalion

Mortars and Battalion Headquarters. Company C was located in the

southeastern part of the battalion's sector. Company D screened

to the front and flanks.

Although there were only a few enemy soldiers on FOB Viper,

there was an overabundance of arms and ordinance. Apparently,

deserting Iraqi Republican Guards had sold weapons to the local

Bedouins. In addition to unexploded coalition weapons, the rifle

companies found many Iraqi mortar rounds, RPG-7 grenades, and

land mines. The battalion's Battlefield Intelligence

Coordination Center Officer (BICC) and the battalion interrogator

visited the various Bedouins in the area, established a type of

alliance with them, and collected the Iraqi weapons from them.

A hea vlJ stream of supplies and personne l continued to flow

into FOB Viper. The Battalion Staff began planni ng for future

operations. The next operation called tor 2d Brigade to seize

the airport to the northwest o f Basra to establish an airhead.

One battalion woul~ establi s h a blocking position to

( 10 )
·.
2 8, the Briqs de TOC sent ~ mPs s age t~~t ther P wo uld be a poss i ble

cease- fir e at 0 500 hours. The c onvoy o f vehicles arrived at FOB

Viper at first light on the twenty-eighth. Later that day, the

vehicles which did not get lifted from the artillery PZ the day

before, finally arrived by CH-47. The battalion remained at FOB

Viper until redeploying to Saudi ArabiA by helicopter on March 3.

Although the 101st is supposed to be an air assault

division, there are not enough helicopter s . The Black Hawk

Battalions are all understrength with only two companies, each.

During each air assault, we had to mass all three medium lift

battalions to move one infantry brigade . In addition to the

limited number of helicopters, the allowable cargo load further

reduced our lift capabilities. The Black Hawk is rated to carry

twenty-two infantrymen when its seats are removed. The ~\evlar

blanket weighs 500 lbs., which reduces the ACL. Despite months

of playing with the soldier's load, we never did train our men to

survive off of their LCE's for 24~48 hours. Sitting on rucksacks

that weighed too much to carry off of the LZ's, the men further

reduced the ACL of the Black Hawks to fifteen soldiers. We

should have put eighteen or nineteen infantrymen, without

rucksacks on each Black Hawk with two drag-bags of ammunition.

This would have allowed us to move three companies, instead of

two, on the first lift. The second lift would then require fewer

aircraft to bring in resupplies.

Another lesson deals with internal versus external loads.

The "shotgun" · technique proved very effective for e x ternal loads.

( 11 )
•

maneu v erability o f helicopt e r s. Th~ ~ e avy lift pilot s fina l ly

o pted to trade increase d load i ng t i me for in c r eas ed

s urvivability. This i s wh y all ve hicl es flown into F OB Viper

were internal loads.

The final issue involve s l uck. We we re lucky. After ten

days of armed reconnai ssanc e, we as su m~d that the fligh t route s

were secur e . Th i s is why the pilo t s risked using the same f l ight

routes for subsequent lifts. We la ter found out that the routes

were not completely secure. Fortunately, mo s t of the Iraqi

soldiers along the flight routes were so intimidated by the sight

of so many helicopters that they did not engage them. Even during

subsequent lifts, the poorly disc i plined Iraqi soldiers did not

fire on the helicopters. In t he future, we need to ma ss more

combat power on the first lif t whi l e surpr ise is on our side.

Otherwise , ne x t time we might n ot be so l ucky.

( 12)
,,

Baer , Robert A.• Captain, Aviation. Former Liason Officer,

Briagade Aviation Element, 2 d Brigade, 101st ABN Div.
Pe rs onal In tervi ew , De c embe r 8th, 1991.

Chadwick, Frank and Caff re y, Ma tt. §~!f_~~~-E~~i-~QQk·

Bloomington, IL: GDW , 1991.

Glover, ,Joe L., Captain, Inf a ntl~ y: "Unit History, 1st

Battalion, 502d Infantry, Desert Shield-Desert Storm."
Unpublished Thesis, Fort Campbell, KY, 1991.

Naylor, Sean D. "Flight of Eagles: 101st Airborne Division's

Raids into Iraq." ~~my_Iim~§, July 22, 1991, 8-14.

Steele, Dennis. "155 Miles into Iraq: The 101st Strikes

Deep." ~~my, August 1991, 30-35.
l2~L. ~ !: i9~9~ ~ g - ~~ig ~ g~ ~r:~Lr: ct g~f1 f.;':'
1st Bn, 3:::::7th IN 1s t P.n, 502d I f\i 1s t f.. n ~ l87 t h IN
2d En, 3:27th HJ Compan\::1 I\ :::d Bn . 187th IN
3rd Bn, 327th IN Compan\::1 P,(-)* 3rd Bn, 187th IN
Compan\::1 C
Compan!:) D
HHC
2d Bn, 502d IN**
3rd Bn, 502d IN

* Before deploying to Saudi Arabia, Company B released one

platoon to serve as door-gunners for 9th Bn, 101st Aviation.
Because of replacements during Operation Desert Shield, Company
B's personnel strength rose to 112 with only two platoons.

** XVIIIth Airborne Corps reserve until G+4.

..:: d ~J qu.ct cit"' on~ 17 t l r~ L1 RE~g :i r.- l e-r·; t
j-, c. ~·:~ \/ -:3

~ Lin e (each l ine tr o o p ha s o OH- 5 8' s , 6 AH -1 Co bra s)

Tr G~ ? S
1 Lif t Troop (10 UH-60 B:ack Hawk s )
3 EH - 60 " Quick Fi x " Blac k Hawk ~
1 Pa thfinde r Det ac hment
1 Long-Range Surve illance Detachment

1st Battalion, 1Dl s t Aviation <Attack)

~ Companies ( each Company has 4 OH-58's, 6 AH-64 Apa c hes)
3 UH-60 Black Hawks

3rd Battalion, lOlst Aviation <Attack)

3 Companies (each Company has 6 OH-58"s, 6 AH-1 Cobras)
3 UH-1 Iroquois "Hueys"

2d Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment*

3 Companies (each Company has 4 OH-58's, 6 AH-64 Apaches)
3 UH-60 Black Hawks

9th ID Aviation*
5 OH-58D's

4th Battalion, 1Dlst Aviation ( Medium Lift)

2 Companies (each Company has 15 UH-60 Black Hawks)

5th Battalion, 1Dlst Aviation (Medium Lift)

2 Companies (same as 4-101)

9th Battalion, 101st Aviation <Medium Lift)

2 Companies (same as 4-101)

6th Battalion,
·' .
101st Aviation
3 Co~panies (each Company has 10 UH-1 Iroquois or "Hueys")

7th Battalion, 101st Aviation <Heavy Lift)

3 Companies (each Compan~ has 15 CH-47 Chinooks )

XVIIIth Airborn e Corps Chinoo k C6mpany*

1 Company !15 CH-47 Chinoo k s)

* Indicate s units not normally assigned to the 101st Air borne

Division (Baer~ Interview).
 PZ Diagram
FOB Cobra

1st Lirt
PZ 10 BZ ·11 PZ 12

~75m.
<P ~
~ ~ ql
~ ql ~
q) ·•
:
_ ,. ~
-~
q> <;:>
<f)
PZ 05 (External Loads)*

PZ Cit

....

' • ,· .
* PZ Controlled by 1st Brigade
 FOB Cobra
2d Lift

PZ 10 PZ 11 PZ 12

pz C5 (External Loads)
• v ., l

PZ 10
----- f:Z_ll .E .~. -1;;
Lead Ail~ cr·aft Co A Co A 10! GLD 2, ADA HQ .-....::. Cc· c
2d Air c r a ft Co l~ Tf\C 2 (5 -3 ) Co c
3rd Aircraft TAC 1 (P.N CDR) P.n Mor tar s Co c
4th Aircraft Co A Bn 1'1o rtars Co c
5th Aircraft Co A Co c Co c
6 th Aircraft Co /.>,

.El_s;;=~
Lead Chinook TACP HMMWV~ TOW HMMWV~ KL250 Motorcycle
2d Chinook Cargo HMMWV, TOW HMMWV~ KL 2 50 Motorcycl e
3rd Chinook TOW HMMWV , TOW HMMWV

2d Lift

.El_lQ El_1..1 .El_l~

Lead A/C Co A Co B 13, PPS-15 TM Co B 10~ HHC 5
2d A/C Co A 13~ Stngr T!'-1 Co B Co c
3rd A/C Co A Co B Co c
4th A/C Co A 9, HH C 6 Cc· B Co c
• I~
5th P,,l, Co B Co B Co c, Stngr Tr·1
6th A/C Co p. 17
.J..~, Stinger Tf'-1
 - 0 • ,

3 9 m ';., f'Z. f-1> L -z._

3 '1 ~,-i'l f>Z -fb L -z.
,......,, "" ,·,.., LZ. 8 ~?,,·,... ;, '- 'Z. t.''!.FT 1 .PIJG.t 1
lf-? ,.,.., /,... L z_ +iJ ~. lt'P
Y-?,.,., ,·,.., '- "Z. +0 ~ (( p . ~
;0 1"1'/lr. AR!O
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1.5" ,..,,.,.... ,-,.., R.~P
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I 0 rn ,",... /, ·'"
AIR MpVEMENT TABLE ,
TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT:.d~-if--4R..t2£.Q.£€8 1'1'11
H-:.HOUR=---------------------<DTG} COPY __ :_ _____ QF -------
•
.-YN tFTECt-
J
. # !SLING . • I PZ NAME!. LZ NAME. & RP LAND REMARKS
UNIT UNIT II LOAD TIME TIME
ILTFT SE~Al it'J.tA&-1<. p{'~/0 . LOCATION LOCATION
IF ·- . LA~
A c:oB~A P-z. '3b0
5-loJ
J-3~7
1 \ l ... y H-3~ 1 L-t-crs6 7 Y1 11 1.11- 'f IJJ.#ouf( I ANDL"l.. "3bo
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AFZB-KF-H B·FEBRUARY 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION.

SUBJECT: ·. 5th ~attalion, 101st Av1ation Regiment SERE/SAR procedures.

(DRAFT) .

1. General procedures.

a. When an aircraft is down due to enemy fir~ or major maintenance

problem, the ··ai(crew will immediately make a mayday call to thier assigned
flight " on a cdmmon air to air frequency. If the aircraft is single shipi
the call will be made on the Guard Emergency Frequency <243.0) and contain
·.··aircraft ~allsign and location. After identifying a suitable landing
area, the ai~craft will land, shutdown, and secure all sensitive
items/equipmert.

. (1) Aircrew actions when down with troops. If an aircraft is

down. with a formation enroute to the LZ, the remainder of the flight will
conti~ue _as briefed with the mission. The downed troops and aircrew will
be recov~red by the flight upon return from the LZ and with direction from
the AMC. Single " aircraft or aircraft down from a flight wi ll initiat~
rescue p r ocedure~.

<2> Aircrew actions when down with no troops.

·.
_(a) . . In formation, the trail aircraft will follow the
disabled ~i rcraft .to the ground. If the .aircraft is ahead · of · the · 4lot,
. ·trail will immediately recover the aircrew a·nd annotate the location of
. - ~he ~irfra~e • . If the aircraft is behind the flat. the trail aircraft will
·ensure that a safe landing - was made an~ render any assistance required.
Coordination for- recovery of crew and al. rframe wi 11 be made upon miss~ on
.completion.

(3) Flight actions when an aircraft ·is down. One aircraft

~ ~~thin the flight - will monitor 282~2 until crew is extracted or the flight
. is mission ~omplete.
~~>:'
. . b. If immediate recovery was not available, 5-101 DART will attempt
·-;",recovery at 1 hour ·prior ·to sunrise and 1 hour after sunset. DART
- ~ircraft · will • attem~t recovery in the vicinity ~f the downed aircraft,
' attempt 'to ~ontact the downed crew on 282.8, and search for visual
~ft~.,EO~f.ll. ~~o~•. .s~g~al I f . downe~ ·-~':'iator. • pi ckttp. points . are · fe·a.s i bl e, "" they
:>· .,· · · ·~t~~
!f-;~{:11:
. . . . oe Drlefed .. . prlor to the mlSSlOn. . . . ·~
. .w
. ~
'· . . .
·:= ~;_;~~ ~ :·:· ;__. - -- : : :.' :~ - - . ,., . _. ·_. r~
:_ ~i ; !=.' ·: ·' c: · · ·< AWAcs :.are . also available for coordinatiol') of recove_r;y ·v...~f_or:-c~e
... .. ..... ·"'
· ~Lderwt f&:L't'fttU(~-~- ·-·· _
· .._
~ll!lf»J~~
. . .
-~w~~
. . .
.. . . -· . . .-,.,.' ·i
~scue ' prci~~dures.
The following procedures should be followed to
ensure t he most e x ped i ti ous rec overy o f the d owned a 1r c r e w. I
j
a. Immediately after landing. I
(1) Assess the ph ysical condition of personnel on b oard for life-
j
.J
·· ; ·.·. ·
- ---- --' ---- - - -- - - - - - -- - - -· - - -- - ·- - --- ----- ------ !
 ,., .... - .._

- ~·
threatening injuries.

<2> Zero all secure equipment and navigation equipment.

any sensitive/classified papers. Order for destruction of secure
eqLti pment or the aircraft ·wi 11 be briefed prior to the mission.

<3> Atte~t initial contact.

·(a) Transmit a 15 second beacon signal (243. 0).

II ffequency.
(b) Transmit an initial.contact message on 243.0/vo i ce
Call will be a mayday call three times, tactical calls ;0 n
physical conditiq_n~ repea-t mayday.
a~d

J (4) Immediately switch frequency to 282.·8 and listen . for

I frier1dly response. Authenticate all responses utilizing . the lettc,-
week, word/number of the day·, or · joint authentication table.
of the
·-•. ·I· ':·
II
IIIt (5) Ensure your location is accurately relayed to the fr · 11d~y ·
responding element.

b. No response to initial contact.

!I
.'·
<U Move away from the landing site to an initial hole-L: ;< site ·
approximately 1/2 to 1 mile away.
:J
<2> Avoid contact with the local · population during the -..,e •

l
ll :·.

... ..
<3> Do not atfeml:it-'!· to· ertiUJl·i sh ··contact wi.t.h D.ARli->'Or·-A~ :;. ·~=L~unti_ l

I.1
in concealment.
I·
c. Arrival at hole-up site •

(1) Assess hole-up site security.

<2> Review preplanned SERE plan.

1 (3) Review premission intelligence btiefing.

I ·.
·.
(4) Attempt another· i ni ti al contact if the area is secL :· -2.

(5) Attempt initial contact calls on the hour until · cor -=. act is .
mdde .with AWACS or DART.
1·.·
·(6) If contact is made, monitor 282.8 for instructions -:~ch
t:o
hour·
282.-8 fr.om
'"
"
1 hour .
10 minutes past if contact was made with AWACS.
before sunris'
e · to .
Also, mot - tor
-
DART re~overy • . During this time, attempt a single call to th·e DA1: team
<callsign ~ ~~ophet> and give callsign and location.
.
~unrise and st,.tnset to f · hol.tr <: ter for

(7) Execute rescue/recovery procedures when appropriat e .

(8) If contact ·is :not made, e >: ecute SARSAT procedu_res.

WARNING
* *
I Db not attempt SARSAT procedures if enemy direction finding
in the area of the holeup site.
equipn ·~n t is

I .
. ~ .
 (a) Activate the SARSAT system by setting the AN/PRC 90 to
and transmitting your callsign and location <in UTM> and
repeat call sign • .·

(b) Continue to transmit on 243.0 for 4 minutes by ' holdin~

the transmitter switch open (cover the microphone with hand · to ~prevent
unwantid detection>.

(c) Activitate the-SARSAT system during the satellite

window.

4. Rescue.f.Becovery Procedures.
I ··:, . .
\

1.~ a. Pro.~~~r aLlthenti cation is mandatory for the receipt of assistance.•

b. Isoprep information is the primary means of aircrew

identification/authentication.

c. Wo~d/Number of the day are alternate means of aircrew ·. . .j

identifica~i~n by CSAR and the primary means for other responding ~ircraft· ~..~
-:.:':
to include·DART.
.'·
d. Night Recovery.
...
C1) The strobe light with blue cover will be the primary means
for visual acquirement of a1rcrew.
... . ' (2·,·: ·-·The
strob~ · shoi..tl'd only be ti..1rned on af.ter · proper,- . . ·
authentication and CSAR/DART requests its use.
..... .. . .. ~. : ·;· ~'· :
·- .,_,:·

(3) If contact has not been made with a recovery aircraft, strobe
should be turned on during DART window or any time a . helicopter is heard~

. e. Day Recovery.

(1) After authentication is accomplished or the downed aircrew

has a positive ID of the aircraft being signalled, pen flare~ will'be used ..
in secure areas to signal rescue .aircraft. · ·'
. . · >~
.""·.·
(2) VS 17 panel is primary visual si~nal ahead of the FLOT. ...;
C'
.J. Actions on Contact with CSAR/DART.

a. Do not rush toward the rescue aircraft. . ·•

b. Remain · in concealment · 6ntil the helicopter has landed, Wait for

the r~~cue aircrew to come to you.

c. Slowly approach . the helicopter if the rescue aircre~ ~ dpes not

immediate! y approach your position. -~·-.--~: ~ :~.:: ·\.- ._..

d. Do not make threatening movemerits.

l .
'6. Evasion·.·· ·

a. If the aircraft is downed alon g a n e s t a b li shed flight . route~ the

 ai~cr~w ~ill E&E to the nearest secure ACP along that route of flight
<only if required to move due- to · METT-T>. The decision .to le~ve the _
aircraft's immediate location should be made only as a last ~es6rt~ The
chance of single individuals being seen in the vastness of the de~ert is
remote.

b. · Movement to an ACP or DAR should be considered if tapture _is

imminent. Do not attempt to E&5 through known enemy forces:

c. If the aircrew is downed i,p the .vicinity of . friendly .forces, it is - . .

recommended that they attempt ot link up with friendly for~e~ should cinly
be attempted if'the location of those forces is known. Do not · atte:;:pt to
E&E t~rough known enemy forces.

/
JOHN S. SAPIENZA
MAJ, AV
S-3

DISTRIBUTION:
I Commander, 5-101 Avn Regt
L Commc3:nder, B . Co
j·· Commander, C Co
Commander, D Co
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