EXECUTIVE BRIEFINGS

POLITICS & ECONOMY: JOE BIDEN

Adit Jain, IMA India
December 2020

A New Era in Global Affairs

The ostensible Indian enthusiasm about Joe Biden’s election as President of the United States, should
not blurry the concerns of India’s foreign office as it seeks to protect the gains it unexpectedly received
during the Presidency of Donald Trump. Progressive analysts believe that a Biden administration will
be good for America and perhaps also for its traditional allies. But whether it helps India’s strategic
interests remains a question. President Trump altered the equations that bind America’s relationship
with Europe, the Middle East and Asia. It would be fair to conclude that in the final count his tenure
was good for India. This was largely on the premise of personal equations with Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. Whilst India, like several countries, went through economic pain, as a result of certain
American decisions, strategic ties prospered as the Trump administration placed it high on the pecking
order of international security alignments. Military hardware, previously unavailable, was generously
offered. Be that as it may, Indian policy makers remained on tenterhooks in dealing with the White
House. Under a Biden Presidency, America’s policy direction can be assumed to be more predictable
whilst not entirely favourable.

Key issues of importance to India

A number of issues remain significant through inter-linkages and collateral spill-overs in changing
geopolitical structures. First, the treatment handed out by a future Biden administration towards China
and Pakistan could disrupt the status quo. The opposition towards China understandably had flip-side
benefits for India. Still, it remains unlikely that a Democratic administration will radically change US
policy, as the anti-China sentiment enjoys bipartisan support in Congress. In the same vein, Pakistan’s
obvious drop into the Chinese camp, through stronger military and economic ties, would compel
Washington to treat it with a fair degree of wariness.

On trade issues, India would logically seek its previously privileged access to the US market to be
restored as an emerging economy. President Trump had abolished many of these benefits. It seems
unlikely, at this juncture, that Mr Biden would reinstate them without an exchange deal which serves
the interests of American companies. As things stand, the US is one of India’s top trading partners with
bilateral exchanges in the region of USD 90 billion. Despite efforts on both sides and the professed
closeness between the two administrations, a trade deal could not be concluded during Mr Trump’s
tenure. It is possible that due to the pandemic, which diverted interests towards more pressing issues,
the required effort to conclude even a mini-deal was not forthcoming. During his campaign, Mr Biden
remained visibly silent on the revocation of trade tariffs. Therefore, as things stand, it seems
implausible that a trade agreement can be established without a meaningful quid pro quo from India.
However, analysts believe that a more liberal US visa regime for Indian professionals is likely to be
offered as an olive branch.

The big headache for India’s administration is in the area of human rights and religious freedom, an
issue that many Democrats consider to be a core value. Their interpretation of the administrative
changes implemented in the state of Jammu & Kashmir is that they violate these principles. It follows
therefore that a Biden-led White House would seek greater scrutiny of domestic Indian political
developments, possibly leading to a pushback.

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On the issue of security and strategic imperatives, the United States is likely to rebuild damaged
equations with its European allies and create a common front against an increasingly adversarial China.
This would remain of paramount importance to New Delhi as it would have a domino effect in the
extended Asian neighbourhood. America’s policy in Afghanistan of complete dis-engagement may also
be revisited, providing temporary comfort to India. A Biden administration will be keen to work with
New Delhi to support a rules-based order and a stable Indo-Pacific region where no country,
specifically China, is able to threaten its neighbours with military assertiveness. On the flip side,
Washington would pressurise India towards restarting dialogue with Pakistan and reducing the current
rhetoric through more bilateral communication.

Within Asia, the Trump administration has been keen to convert the Quad – including Australia, Japan
and India – into what would primarily be a military or strategic grouping. Until recently, India resisted
these moves in order to not antagonise China. But America has been candid that should India need
America as an ally then the Quad must be formalised in the near future. It would later expand by adding
new members like Taiwan and South Korea. Given that these, and existing members, already have
bilateral military alliances with the US, India’s inclusion into the Quad remains crucial for the
arrangement to gain substance. Eventually, Indian policy makers need to decide whether they have the
wherewithal to deal with China on their own or would require external support in the event of conflict.
India’s misgivings understandably stem from the fact that it would wish to avoid being dragged into a
naval conflict arising out of a Chinese invasion of say, the island of Taiwan or any other part of the
South China Sea. Such a battle would be far removed from Indian shores.

Mr Biden has earlier spoken of his fondness for India but as an open liberal democracy. In fact, he
declared that in 2020 the two closest nations in the world would be India and the United States and if
that occurred, the world would be a safer place. The areas of partnership, he believed, would include
pushing India’s case for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, continued
cooperation on terrorism, strengthening ties on global issues like climate change and health and an
exponential increase in bilateral trade. Mr Biden did play an important role, both as Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and subsequently as Vice President, in deepening strategic
engagement with India and towards the conclusion of the nuclear deal. The core principles of
democracy, equality under the law and freedom of expression and religion would provide the
foundations of this relationship.

But in the final count, America’s equations with India and its motivation to strengthen bilateral and
strategic engagements would depend on the growth of India’s economy and that of its market. If India
exhibits growth rates of 8-9% the treatment meted out by a Biden administration would be very
different to an India that grows at 4-5%. The importance of nation states is usually in direct proportion
to their economic clout.

Broader challenges facing the Biden administration

Some years remain important in history and Mr Biden will assume office just at such a juncture. The
pandemic has created the framework for a geopolitical reset. It has not just sent the global economy on
a tailspin; it has in fact changed the direction of important forces that are shaping the modern world.
Globalisation has been damaged; the digital revolution has accelerated; and the geopolitical rivalry
between America and China has intensified. The world has never been more divided in recent decades.
China has emerged stronger, while the western world has suffered immense setbacks with glaring
weaknesses in their administrative responses to the pandemic. China’s economy will grow at over 7%,
while Western countries will shrink. Liberal democracies now look towards a 78-year old individual
whose political career began in the 1970s when the world was a different place.

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IMA India Adit Jain’s articles and opinions can be found on his blog at www.aditjain.com Peer Group Forums
This content is the intellectual property of IMA India and is copyright protected and legally privileged. Unauthorised copying,
reproduction or distribution of this information would amount to an infringement of law and would invite applicable penalties.
The first policy challenge for the incoming administration would be the Middle East. Any attempt to
negotiate with Iran on reinstating the nuclear deal would not only depend on the political mood in
Tehran but would also lead to gripes by US allies, including Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United Arab
Emirates. The fact that the UAE and Israel have established diplomatic ties is a result of American
mediation. Mr Biden would have to tread very carefully in balancing these interests with an altered
stance on Iran. In any event, Iran would insist on a complete withdrawal of US-imposed sanctions as a
prelude to further negotiations. This is unlikely to find acceptance in Washington.

Second, the Trump years witnessed some damage in America’s relationship with its European partners.
Mr Trump believed Europe needed to hit a little harder with higher financial commitments to their
military alliance, NATO, amounting to 3% of GDP. In Europe, only the United Kingdom and Poland
fulfilled this obligation. Consequently, relations with France and Germany were impaired, leading to an
understandable degree of distrust. Mending these equations will now be a top priority of the US
Department of State. The Biden administration would seek to work more closely with NATO allies on
a tenable security paradigm in Europe. America is therefore expected to increase both financial and
moral commitment to Europe.

Reclaiming global leadership

Mr Biden would also be expected to set the tone for rallying the global community towards tackling
grave challenges such as health, climate change and security. He is a consensus-building moderate
whose own political positions have generally been close to his party’s centre of gravity. As a veteran of
diplomacy, a multilateralist and an institution builder, he is expected to send strong signals on issues
which require global cooperation. These include America re-joining the Paris Climate agreement,
reinstating its membership to the World Health Organisation and, most importantly, joining Covax, a
global coalition to distribute a Covid-19 vaccine. In order to reaffirm America’s commitment to NATO
and a Trans-Atlantic Economic, Trade and Security Alliance, he will head quickly to Europe with Berlin
and Paris as his first stops. There will be increased criticism of China for its mistreatment of the
Uighurs in the Xinjiang province and its suppression of human rights in Hong Kong. Mr Biden’s
treatment of authoritarian regimes such as those in Russia, North Korea and parts of Africa will also be
quite different to the previous four years.

America’s foreign policy will be built on the foundations of multilateralism and global cooperation.
Unlike the isolationist approach seen over the past few years, Mr Biden will seek to build a trans-
Atlantic grand bargain on trade and climate change. The Department of State, whose budgets had been
chopped over the past few years, would be reinvigorated in order to ensure that America continues to
play the leading role on global matters. How much will be accomplished in the years ahead remains to
be seen but the expectations from a Biden Presidency are high. Many countries will therefore need to
tweak their own domestic and foreign policy approaches in order to fit in to a new world order.

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IMA India Adit Jain’s articles and opinions can be found on his blog at www.aditjain.com Peer Group Forums
This content is the intellectual property of IMA India and is copyright protected and legally privileged. Unauthorised copying,
reproduction or distribution of this information would amount to an infringement of law and would invite applicable penalties.
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