Aguirre vs.

Rana

Facts:

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees, Aguirre filed against Rana a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar charging him with
unauthorized practice of law among others. Aguirre alleges that Rana, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel
for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Aguirre further alleges that Rana filed with the MBEC a pleading wherein Rana represented himself as
counsel.

Rana was allowed to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.
The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that the respondent actively
participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not Rana should be admitted to the Bar.

Held:

No. The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for the candidate before he took the lawyers oath. In
the pleading of objection, respondent signed as counsel for the Vice Mayoralty candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. In
the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.

Respondent himself also wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for
Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the
winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member
of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer
of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had
to be performed, namely: his lawyers’ oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.
 Cayetano v Monsod

Facts:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991.
Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the
last ten years

Issue:

Whether or not respondent possess the required qualifications of having engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years provided in the Constitution.

Held:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law.”

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86.55%. He has been paying dues as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsod’s
past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor, verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
 Cruz v. Atty. Cabrera

Facts:

Cruz, the complainant, files an administrative charge against Cabrera, the respondent, for misconduct in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth-year law student, appears in court in his own
behalf as he instituted a case against his neighbor who is represented by the respondent as counsel. During a
hearing, the respondent uttered remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the performance
of his duties as a lawyer. Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court
to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as
respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer. The words “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were
uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit
complainant before the public.

Issue:

WON the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct.

Held:

The respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna” does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to
warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in
the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an
account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for
the court to condone even contemptuous language.
 Cruz v Mina

Facts:

Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third-year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the
bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge
Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid
down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:

WON, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

Held:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure
are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the
supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision
of a member of the bar.
 In Re: Atty. Marcial Edillion A.M

Facts:

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a resolution on Admin case against Atty. Edillion on matter
involving his membership due delinquency, recommending striking his name from the rolls of attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues. Atty. Edillion contends that the Rules of Court 139-A and the IBP
by-laws are unconstitutional and thereby questioning the power of the court to compel him to become an IBP
member as well as the provision of the Rules of Court requiring payment for membership fee of the IBP.

Issue:

WON the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

Held:

Yes. The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from
bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fee as one of the
requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual
dues.
 Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

Facts:

Petitioner files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He
contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his
retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law
profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual
membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of
non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

Issue:

WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual membership.

Held:

The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by the State, which
is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the
fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not .
Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is denied.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues . At most, as
correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay
abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to
pay dues could have been discontinued.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities.
 Santos Jr. v Llamas

Facts:

This is a complaint against respondent for misrepresentation and non-payment of IBP membership dues. For
years, the respondent does not indicate proper PTR no. in his practice of the law profession . If at all, he only
indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the following
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present . Now
of old age, he contends that he is engaged in the limited practice of his profession and as a senior citizen, he is
exempt from paying taxes and membership dues with the IBP.

Issue:

WON the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

WON the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being
a senior citizen.

Held:

Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

No. He is not exempt since Rule 139-A requires all IBP members to pay the annual fee and failure thereof for 6
months merits suspension of the membership and for 1 year becomes a ground for removal of the member’s name
from the Rolls of Attorney regardless one is a practicing lawyer or not. His non-renewal of his PTR is a
misrepresentation to the public and the courts that he has paid his dues violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to
avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now
intends to resume his law practice.

Issue:

WON petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship.

Held:

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage
in such practice.
 Alawi v Alauya

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in
Marawi City. Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one
of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He also wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an
administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,”
which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
“attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,”
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:

WON Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney.

Held:

He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.”

The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
 Ulep v Legal Clinic

Facts:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist
from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming
that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in
the light of the caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue:

WON the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice of law and whether the same are
in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility.

Held:

The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in the case of Cayetano
vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal services in the Philippines. It is
allowed that some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been permitted with a limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefore. Canon 3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not supposed to use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives
of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04).

The Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer have been engaged of
concerning the manner of the conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. There are existing exceptions under the law on the rule prohibiting the
advertisement of a lawyer’s services. However, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found and held that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions.

The respondent’s defense with the case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when there is an exception to the
prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific
services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stand therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state.” The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same
or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly,
any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
In the Matter of James Joseph Hamm
FACTS:
James Hamm was convicted for a drug-related murder and was sentenced to prison for 25
years to life. Hamm applied for and was granted a commutation of sentence by then-governor
which reduced his prison sentence to 16 years to life. Then Hamm was paroled. He had taken
the LSAT exam for law school while in prison, scoring in the 96 percentiles. Once released, he
studied law and graduated with honors. Hamm passed the bar exam, but his application
seeking admission to the Arizona bar was rejected by the Character & Fitness
Committee.
Four key areas of concern shaped the Committee’s decision: (1) Hamm’s criminal conduct;
(2) omissions in his application; (3) Hamm’s failure to pay child support; and (4) Hamm’s
mental and emotional instability. So, he filed a case to Arizona Supreme Court.
RULING:
The SC in examining whether Hamm met the burden, the court expressed that Hamm failed to
accept full responsibility on the crime he committed. On the issue on failure to pay child
support, the court was not persuaded on Hamm’s explanation as he knows the law so he
should have known about his obligation.
While the court noted that a murder conviction was not a per se permanent disqualification, it
seems unlikely that any showing of rehabilitation could truly tip the scales in favor of the
applicant. Besides the murder conviction, other concerns, including Hamm’s failure to pay
child support, factored into the ultimate decision to decline his application. The
Committee looks for hallmarks of a good lawyer, including the ability to make ethical
(and legal) choices, the strength to take responsibility for past wrongs, and dedication to the
truth.
Murder case: In examining whether Hamm met the burden, the court considered the extent to which he accepted
responsibility for his crimes. The court expressed concern that even though Hamm took responsibility, he failed to
take responsibility for his role in Staples’ death, the fleeing victim whom he shot. Furthermore, Hamm stated
that his intent was to rob the victims, but Hamm shot both victims before attempting to rob them. Hamm also
proceeded to shoot the victims multiple times after they were incapacitated. Hamm’s failure to accept responsibility
cut against his years of rehabilitation.

Failure to pay child support: Next, the court examined Hamm’s failure to pay child support. Soon after the
initial separation from his wife, Hamm was arrested for failing to pay child support. However, Hamm did
not begin paying any of his child support obligation until twenty-nine years later, when he began the bar
admission process.
Additional Info: Even though his application was denied, Hamm works as a private criminal justice consultant for
several attorneys in the Phoenix, Arizona area. He also is qualified in the courts as an expert on prison policy and
procedure, time computations and performs volunteer work for Middle Ground Prison Reform, a non-profit agency
formed by Donna Leone in 1983.
International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC
FACTS:
In 1977, International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) hired private respondent Nestor B. Micosa
as laborer who was convicted guilty of homicide but appreciating, however, in his favor the
presence of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary
surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance. He applied for probation
which was granted. However, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head wrote Micosa urging
him to resign from employment.
The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide is a
crime involving moral turpitude as the killing of a man is conclusively an act against justice
and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law, thus a valid ground for his dismissal
under the Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations.
Issue:
WON a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from
employment and corollarily, whether a conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude.

Ruling:

The court herein ruled that the appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-
defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.

Details: The facts on record show that Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto
Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the
attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and
desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts
show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person.

Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing   citing In Re Basa  and Tak Ng v. Republic  as
10 11 12

everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. As to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. 1

Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.  Moral 14

turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question
of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.  While . . . generally but not
15

always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime
as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but
rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are  mala
prohibita only.

Soriano vs. Dizon

FACTS
This case is about the complaint-Affidavit filed by Soriano for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel
Dizon, filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
Dizon was on his way home when Soriano overtook his car. Dizon, then under the influence of
liquor, tailed Soriano’s taxi until Soriano stopped. The two alighted from their vehicles and a
heated argument ensued. Dizon then took a gun from compartment of his car, wrapped its
handle with a handkerchief, then shot Soriano in the neck. Concerned residents came to
Soriano’s aid and brought him to the hospital. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury which has
paralyzed the left side of his body. He filed charges against Dizon for violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and asked that his conviction for frustrated
homicide should result in his disbarment.
Dizon was then convicted of frustrated homicide. His application for probation was granted on
the condition that he would pay civil liabilities to the victim.
Issue:
Whether the crime committed by Atty Dizon involved moral turpitude
Whether Atty Dizon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, warranting his disbarment
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to disbar Dizon over his conviction
for a crime involving moral turpitude as his actions erode the public perception of the
legal profession.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have
become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not
involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI vs. NLRC case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the
Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. However, the present case is totally different because Dizon is the aggressor.
By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-
importance. As it were, he acted like God on the road, who deserved to be venerated and
never to be slighted. The High Court said Dizon’s reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected
poorly on his fitness to continue practicing law.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and
his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. Respondent also displayed a dishonest and
duplicitous behavior. Dizon tried to reach an out-of-court settlement with the family of Soriano
but when the negotiations failed, he instead made it look like it was the family who approached
him to get a referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon fabricated a story saying that it was
Soriano and two other persons who mauled him. According to three doctors, there was no proof
of assault on Soriano.
When lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not the
mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen
dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the
bar.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but
certainly to their good moral character. Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to
show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the
law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.

Power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser
penalty would accomplish the end desired.

Membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.

Linsangan vs. Tolentino

FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Linsangan alleged that Tolentino convinced his clients to transfer legal representation.
Tolentino promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims.
To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

There was also a "respondent’s" calling card:

Issue: WON acts of Tolentino are grounds for disbarment
Ruling:
Respondent Atty. Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately
from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyer’s services are to be made known.

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.

Practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares.

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. 16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17  as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.18

Respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1avvphi1

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not
steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result
or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano’s connection to his office. 21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated
Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client.

A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services
by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Teves vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
EDGAR Y. TEVES was a candidate for the position of Representative. Herminio G. Teves filed
a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was
convicted of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary
or financial interest in a cockpit which is expressly prohibited by the present Local
Government Code. Herminio G. Teves alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for
public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude carrying an
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude.
Ruling:
The Court herein ruled that crime committed by petitioner R.A. 3019 did not involve moral
turpitude. While possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the
local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does
not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such
possession of interest inherently immoral.
A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves
immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that: Not every criminal
act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." Also, in IRRI vs. NLRC, whether or not a
crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on
all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
Zari vs. Flores
Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City, recommended
the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI,
City Court, on grounds of having been convicted of libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude and persistent attempts to unduly influence the complainant amounting to undue
interest in cases pending before Branch VI and gross discourtesy to superior officers as
manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous language in
addressing the City Judges.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute grounds for dismissal from the service.
WON libel is a crime involving moral turpitude
RULING:
On the issue WON respondent’s acts constitute grounds for dismissal from the service.
Respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, was DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the
City Court of Quezon City.
It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically justify removal of a public officer.
However, the fact of conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together with the letter he wrote
to then Executive City Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Judge Minerva C. Genovea,
which contains defamatory and uncalled for language shows the tendency of the
respondent to malign people.
Also, in his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on
June 10, 1969, the respondent stated "That I am a person of good moral character and integrity
and have no administrative, criminal or police record." This averment is not true because the
respondent had been convicted of libel.
On the issue of WON libel is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by
law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The
doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not,
however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited.’

However in another, the Supreme Court seems to imply that libel is not a crime involving moral turpitude.

‘The mere filing of an information for libel, or serious slander, against a municipal officer is not a
ground for suspending him from office, as such offenses do not necessarily involve moral turpitude.
‘Some of the particular crimes which have been held to involve moral turpitude are adultery, concubinage, 2 rape,
arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, 3 criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of
public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under promise of marriage,
4 estafa 5 falsification of public document estafa thru falsification of public document.

Barrientos vs. Daarol

Facts:
Complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Daarol on grounds
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Barrientos is a single, college student about 20 yrs old during her relationship with Daarol who
was about 40 yrs old. Daarol courted Barrientos and after a week of courtship complainant
accepted respondent's love and they had sexual intercourse. It was only after Barrientos got
pregnant when Daarol informed her that he could not marry complainant as he was married but
capable to remarry for having been separated from his wife for 16 yrs.
Respondent told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and assured her of a monthly
support of P250.00. Respondent returned to Dipolog City and actually sent the promised
support.
Barrientos came back to Dipolog after she delivered her baby. She tried contacting Daarol but to
no avail.
Issue:
WON acts of Daarol constitute as ground for disbarment.
Ruling:
The Court herein ruled respondent Daarol guilty of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a
member of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the
gullible complainant. But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of
respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite
my being married." and even suggested abortion.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol
has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Good moral character is a condition which
precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with
upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

Narag vs. Narag

Facts:
Julieta B. Narag filed a complaint against her husband Atty. Dominador M. Narag, for disbarmet
whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for
Lawyers.
Spouse of Atty. Narag alleged that her husband courted one of his students, later maintaining
her as a mistress and bore 2 children. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive,
jealous woman who abused him and filed the complaint out of spite. After several hearings, the
facts became clear, that the respondent indeed abandoned his family as against morals.
Issue:
Whether or not acts of Atty. Narag are grounds for his disbarment.
Ruling:
The court herein ruled that conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment. The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law
profession. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the
bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme
Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.
As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members
of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. 29

Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community. 30 Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree  31 or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 

Royong vs. Oblena

The Solicitor-General submitted a report before the Court recommending the disbarment of Atty.
Oblena. Such report was due to the complaint filed by Royong,nephew of Oblena’s common-
law wife, Bricia for alleged rape who is then 17-18 yrs old.
The Solicitor General investigated and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge
between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex.
In view of his own findings, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape,
nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. So Solicitor General made another complaint
charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at
the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus, rendering
him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent
removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit
relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married
woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Issue:
WON illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with
Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
Ruling:
The court herein ruled the disbarment of Atty. Oblena. Respondent did not possess a good
moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with
Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his
status, did not render him a person of good moral character.
His moral depravity is most apparent for taking advantage of and having carnal knowledge with
the 17-year old niece of his common-law wife. Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit
relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral
compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by
these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either
his professional or non-professional activities. The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated
to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment.
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in
1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person
of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of
himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one
which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what
he or other people think he is.
Ui vs. Bonifacio
Facts
Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on grounds of immoral
conduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with her husband, Carlos Ui. It is respondent’s
contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because she had known him to be a
bachelor and they were married abroad and that when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true
civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with
her.
Issue
Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law.
Ruling
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality,
was DISMISSED. the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with
what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil
status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.
The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.