CASE FOR GENERAL SOVEREIGNTY.

“A central point (if not the starting point) for general sovereignty models is their commitment
to libertarian freedom.” (656)

I. Biblical/ Theological Arguments.

A.Humans have Libertarian Free Will (656-7)
1. Choose between options
2. Respond to Gospel
3. Moral accountability
B.God’s Plans are Foiled (657-8)
1. Specific examples. (King Saul)
2. Human sin.
3. Not all are saved.
4. Reductio: if compatibilism, then plans would not be foiled.
 OBJECTION: How can we be confident that God will accomplish any of his plans.
(659-60)
Reply: 1) God anticipates and responds.
2) Work though others without coercion. E.g., Joseph.
3) God is tremendously resourceful.
 OBJECTION: Then God is not actually sovereign. (660-1)
Reply: 1) God’s power is not lessened because he has chosen to limit his use of
power. E.g., incarnation, creation.
2) Sovereignty does not mean no limits because there are already limits.
E.g., cannot actualize contradiction, sin.
3) God is loving, but to be loving is to be vulnerable towards the beloved.
4) Libertarian free will means God is self-limited.
C.God’s decrees are conditional. (661)
D.Problem of evil (unsaved). (661-4)
1. If compatibilism, then God could have… (661-3)
i. Saved all men
ii.Prevented the fall
iii.Prevented evil
2. God’s goodness means He wills our happiness, but many aren’t happy.
Therefore we have libertarian free will. (663-4)
E.Open view arguments.
1. Positive (664)
i. If God is relational and open, then God governs generally.
ii.Arguments for God’s openness.
2. Negative – Response to biblical specific sovereignty arguments.
i. OT (664-5)
ii.NT (665-8)
II.Philosophical Arguments.
A.Argument from the nature of freedom. (668-9)
1. Deterministic view of free action does not fit our basic intuitions about
freedom.
i. Part of the intuition is that we control our choice.
ii.If determinism is true, then antecedent conditions determine our
choice, not us.
2. Universal determinism.
i. Franken quote (669)
B.If one is free, then one has control over his actions. (669-71)
1. If one has control, then can truly choose do either A or not A.
2. Determinism does not allow for this ‘either’.
3. Consequence argument.
C.Ability to do otherwise required for moral responsibility. (672)
1. Formally stated.
2. Support for first premise.
i. Multiple options required to be morally responsible.
ii.Ought implies can. (not in book)
D.Objection against Indeterminism. (673-5)
1. If acts are not causally determined, then they are random, chance or
arbitrary acts. But such acts cannot be morally responsible..
2. Replies:
i. Two meanings of chance. (673-4)
• Chance1- unexpected, unplanned. This does not rule out
being caused. E.g. car accident.
• Chance2- uncaused.
• So an indeterminate act could be a chance1 act but not a
chance2 act.
• For the determinist to define chance as chance2 begs the
question.
ii.Distinction between being determined and being caused. (674-5)
• Determined: x is determined if prior to x the state of affairs
and laws of nature can produce only one result, x.
• But an action can be caused without being determined.
• A causal sequence can be open due to the temporal
element. E.g. randomizing box and cat.
iii.Thus, caused acts need not be determinate and indeterminate acts
need not be uncaused.
E.Deliberation.
1. Deliberation requires believing there are many possibilities.
2. If determinism, then there can be no true deliberation.