COA To Amendments and Revisions

Constitutional Law Review Case Digest
Keziah G. Huelar, JD-4
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
SECTION 2
Guevarra vs. Gimenez

6 SCRA 813/ G.R. No. L-17171
January 30, 1965
FACTS: Sometime in 1954, the District Engineer of Sorsogon prepared a program of work and
detailed estimate for the reconstruction of the Sorsogon Central School building at Burabod,
Sorsogon. Specifications consisting of five pages were likewise prepared. The cost of painting
was left out in the detailed estimate and specifications. The papers were submitted to the
Division Engineer in Lucena, Quezon, who returned them duly approved with an authorized
appropriation of P40,000.00 "provided that painting shall be included". Whereupon, the
specification for painting was accordingly made and appended to the specifications as page six.
On August 1954 the District Engineer advertised an invitation to bid for “furnishing of all
materials, labor and plant, for reconstruction” project. Fernando Guevara’s bid of Php 37,500
was declared lowest and the contract was awarded to him.
Eighty five days after completion of the project, Guevarra file with the Director of Public
Works a written claim for the payment of Php 4,620.00 representing cost of painting not
covered by the contract. After hearing, Secretary of Public Works and Communications denied
the claim and two motions for reconsideration were also denied. On appeal, the Auditor General
also denied the claim. Guevarra appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to CA 327.
ISSUE: YES. These government employees testified as to what transpired in the

performance of their duties. The presumption is that official duty has been regularly
performed (Section 5[m], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
No evidence has been adduced to overcome this presumption save the affidavits of Nicolas and
Briones, which, is afore-stated, are of doubtful probative value. Testimonies of the employees'
should be given more weight than those of the contractors. These government employees
testified as to what transpired in the performance of their duties.
Finally, petitioner Guevara, a civil engineer, has twenty years' experience as public works
contractor. He must have acquired first-hand knowledge of the mechanics of government
contracting as well as skill in administering construction contracts. The other 13 projects he
said he had, justify our impression. The practice of contractors, before submitting any bid or
proposal, is to verify with the office of the District Engineer the fund available for a
project, approval of the plans, specifications and program of work and other relevant and
necessary matters in prosecuting a government contract. From his experience and know-how
We can be certain that petitioner, prior to submission of his bid, called on the District Engineer
of Sorsogon to make his verification. By doing so, he would have noted the first indorsement
dated August 9, 1954 approving the detailed estimate and program of work and requiring that
painting be included. From that moment, he must have been aware that he would bid for a
construction work that included painting. In the event that Guevara dispensed with verification,
he alone should bear the consequences of his negligence.
1
Orocio vs . COA
213 SCRA 109/GR 75959
August 31, 1992
FACTS: An accident occurred at the Malaya Thermal Plant of the National Power
Corporation (NPC). When the plug from the leaking tube gave way, steam and hot water
flowing therein immediately hit two (2) of the employees working on the tube leak. One of those
injured was Abodizo, an employee of O.P. Landrito's General Services (OPLGS), a janitorial
contractor of the NPC.
NPC initially advanced the amount for hospitalization expenses for the treatement of Abodizo,
and set up this as an account receivable from OPLGS to be deducted on a staggered basis from
the latter’s billing against the NPC until the same was fully satisfied.
Subsequently, OPLGS requested a refund of the total amount deducted from their billings
representing payment of the advances made by NPC. In the light of the favorable
recommendation of the NPC legal counsel, the amount of the hospitalization expenses was
refunded to OPLGS.
The Unit Auditor of the Commission on Audit disallowed the refund of the hospitalization
expenses of Abodizo contending that under the contract, there is no employee-employer relation
between NPC and the OPLGS. Hence, NPC is not answerable for such expenses.
General Counsel asked for reconsideration of the said allowance but was denied. The COA
Regional Director, herein respondent, confirmed the disallowance. The NPC General Counsel
submitted a second request for reconsideration and justifies that his legal opinion was based on
Section 15-A of RA 6395 (NPC Charter) which provides that: all legal matters shall be handled
by the General Counsel of the Corporation. Since this function is quasi-judicial in nature, the
discretion exercised in the discharge thereof is not subject to re-examination or
controversion by the respondents; when the latter did what was proscribed, they in effect
usurped the statutory function of the General Counsel of the NPC.
ISSUE: Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied upon for the disbursement in
question, preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in post-audit such disbursement?
HELD: NO. While it may be true that Section 15-A of R.A. No. 6395 (charter of the NPC)
provides that all legal matters shall be handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation, it by
no means follows that all legal opinions of the General Counsel are ex-cathedra and binding
upon all. In short, said provision does not confer upon him any degree of infallibility.
The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the COA's audit power. The
Constitution grants the COA the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds and property pertaining to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or instrumentality such as the

NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not be
bound by the opinion of the legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been
the basis for the questioned disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger
and its auditing function would be a meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights then
should be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its rules and regulations.
2
Osmeña vs. COA

G.R. No. 110045/238 SCRA 463
November 29, 1994
FACTS: Reynaldo de la Cerna was stabbed by an unknown assailant. He was rushed to the
Cebu City Medical Center, but unfortunately died. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would
not have died were it not for the “ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity
and incompetence of the medical staff” of the Medical Center.
The de la Cerna Spouses accordingly instituted in the RTC a civil action, for recovery of
damages. The City of Cebu was among the defendants. The parties agreed to an amicable
settlement. The compromise agreement included a provision for the payment of the sum of Php
30,000.00 to the plaintiffs by City of Cebu. The agreement was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City, which it ratified, and subsequently authorized “the City Budget Officer,
Cebu City, to include in Supplemental Budget No. IV of the City for the year 1989 the amount of
Php 30,000.00 for financial assistance to the parents of the late Reynaldo de la Cerna.”
The agreement was also submitted to the RTC, which rendered a judgment “finding the
agreement to be in conformity with law, morals and public policy” and enjoining the parties to
comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof. About 11 months later, however,
respondent COA, in its 3rd indorsement, disallowed the “financial assistance” thus granted.
COA’s decision maintained the view that it is not within the powers of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cebu to provide, either under the general welfare clause or even on humanitarian
grounds, monetary assistance that would promote the economic condition and private interests of
certain individuals only. Hence, this petition commenced by the City of Cebu, through its Mayor,
Tomas Osmeña.
ISSUE: May COA disallow the compromise agreement executed between the City of Cebu and
de la Cerna spouses?
HELD: NO. The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a
pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise relative thereto, are indubitably
within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in
which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even
encouraged by law.
It appears to the Court that respondent COA grievously misconstrued the undertaking of Cebu
City to pay Php 30,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased Reynaldo de la Cerna. For some reason,
perhaps partly because of the imprecise phraseology of the Sangguniang Panlungsod’s
resolution, respondent considered that undertaking as simply furnishing "monetary assistance
that would promote the economic condition and private interests of certain individuals only, said
financial assistance definitely (having) no causal relation to the general welfare of the inhabitants
of the community.”
COA failed to realize that payment thereof was part of the consideration, not merely for
the settlement of a claim, but for the settlement of an actual controversy, and constituted
one of the "reciprocal concessions" which the law considers "the very heart and life of
every compromise.” By making reciprocal concessions, the parties in Civil Case No. 4275 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 23) put an end to the action in a manner
acceptable to all of them. The City thus eliminated the contingency of being made to assume
heavier liability in said suit for damages instituted against it in connection with its operation and
management of the Cebu City Medical Center, activities being undertaken by it in its proprietary
(as distinguished from its government) functions and in accordance with which it may be held
liable ex contractu or ex delito, for the negligent performance of its corporate, proprietary or
business functions.
3
Sambeli vs. Province of Isabela

GR 92276/210 SCRA 80
June 26, 1992
FACTS: An agreement was entered into by and between the Province of Isabela and ECS
Enterprises, owned by petitioner Edmundo Sambeli, for the purchase of wheelbarrows, shovels
and radio communication equipment. After a partial delivery, the Provincial Auditor allowed the
payment of only 50% of the delivery made “pending receipt of the reply to the query to the Price
Evaluation Division, Commission on Audit (COA), Technical Staff Office, Quezon City.” After
the second delivery, another payment of 50% of the price thereof was allowed by the Provincial
Auditor, bringing the total payments made to 50% of the total cost of the two deliveries.
Meanwhile, the Price Evaluation Division, COA Technical Service Office, the Provincial
Auditor found that there has been overpricing and, hence, there has been an overpayment.
Sambeli then proposed a 10% deduction on the unpaid balance. The Provincial Auditor decided
that “a refund of the amount equivalent to the overpayment must be made by the supplier”
affirmed by the COA Regional Director.
ISSUE: May COA disallow the contract executed between ECS Enterprises and the Province of
Isabela notwithstanding the perfection of the contract of sale, the delivery made by ECS and the
partial payment made by the Province of Isabela?
HELD: YES. In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully
protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures
or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On the proposition that improper or
wasteful spending of public funds or immoral use of government property, for being highly
irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign
people's will, it behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto.
No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or use of government funds and properties.
In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility that rests
directly with the head of the government agency has been properly and effectively discharged
(Section 25 (1) ibid), and whether or not there has been loss or wastage of government resources.
It is also empowered to review and evaluate contracts. (Section 18 (4), ibid.). And, after an audit
has been made, its auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each officer whose account has
been audited and settled in whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon and certified,
and the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges or
suspensions. (Sec. 82, ibid.) (Dingcong v. Guingona 162 SCRA 782).
4
Bustamante vs. COA

G.R. No. 103309
November 27, 1992
FACTS: Petitioner Bustamante was the Regional Legal Counsel of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) for the Northern Luzon Regional Center. He was issued a government
vehicle and transportation allowance pursuant to NPC policy. The COA disallowed the release of
his transportation allowance. Bustamante appealed to COA, but was denied.
ISSUE: Did COA commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Bustamante’s
appeal?
HELD: NO. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
It is beyond dispute that the discretion exercised in the denial of the appeal is within the power of
the Commission on Audit as it is provided in the Constitution:
Section. 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; keep the general accounts of the
Government and, for such period vouchers pertaining thereto; and promulgate accounting
and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds and property.
In the exercise of such power it promulgated COA Circular No. 75-6, Prohibition Against Use
of Government Vehicles by Officials provided with transportation allowance, which
provides that:
No official which has been furnished motor transportation allowance by any government
corporations or other office shall be allowed to use mother vehicle transportation operated
and maintained from funds appropriated in the abovecited Decree. (Sec. 14, P.D. 733).
According to petitioner he is exempted from coverage of said circular contending that such
circular did not mention the NPC as one of the corporations/offices covered by it. We do not
agree with him for it is very patent that the circular is addressed, among others, to
managing heads of Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, the NPC being held
under such category of corporations. Petitioner goes on to argue that existing NPC policy
grants transportation allowance to employees in the likes of petitioner. Under the NPC
Charter, R.A. 6395, petitioner contends that the NPC has the power to formulate and
adopt policies and measures for the management and operation of the NPC.
We cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the Commission, in the exercise of its power
granted by the Constitution, usurped the statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors
for its leads to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a government-
owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to naught a
constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino people. If
We will not sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts
pertaining to this particular expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by
this government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be rendering inutile this
Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the
proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property.
5
Saligumba vs. COA

117 SCRA 134/ G.R. No. L-61676
October 18, 1982
FACTS: On the basis of the sworn complaint of Editha Saligumba, the COA instituted the
administrative case against Leonardo Estella, Auditing Examiner III, in the Auditor’s Office of
Misamis Occidental. The charge was that the respondent raped Editha Saligumba on several
occasions.
Respondent Commission, however, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but
warned private respondent to comport himself in such a manner as would forest all the filing of
similar complaints in the future. Hence, this petition for review wherein petitioner insists that the
decision of respondent Commission is contrary to evidence.
ISSUE: Is COA the right agency to determine rape cases or finding the truth on this issue?
HELD: NO. The petition has to be dismissed for the following reasons:
1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative
cases involving the discipline of its personnel.
2. Even assuming that we have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as

mentioned above, we cannot do so on factual issues; our power to review is limited to
legal issues.
6
Barbo vs. COA

G.R. NO. 157542
October 10, 2008
FACTS: Petitioners are officials of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and
designated members of the Interim Board of Directors of the San Fernando Water District
(SFWD).
On December 4, 1995 and February 12 1996, the LWUA Board of Trustees issued Board
Resolution No. 313, Series of 1995 and Board Resolution No. 39, Series of 1996 respectively.
These Board Resolutions authorized the Board of Directors of SFWD to receive
reimbursable allowances in the form of Representation and Transportation Allowance
(RATA), Travel Allowance, and Extraordinary & Miscellaneous Expense (EME);
Christmas Bonus; Uniform Allowance; Rice Allowance; Medical and Dental Benefits; and
Productivity Incentive Bonus. Pursuant to the said Board Resolutions, petitioners received
EME, Rice Allowance, Christmas Bonus, and Productivity Bonus from SFWD during the
calendar years starting 1994 until 1996.
On June 30, 1997, a Special Audit Team of COA Regional Office No. III at San Fernando,
Pampanga audited the financial accounts of SFWD for the period covering January 1, 1994 to
July 15, 1996. The COA Special Audit Team disallowed the payment of the above-
mentioned benefits and allowances received by petitioners after the same were found to be
excessive and contrary to Sections 228, 162 and 163 of the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual (GAAM) and to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 954073
in relation to Section 13 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act
of 1973) as amended.
Petitioners were directed to refund the benefits and allowances subject to the disallowance.
Petitioners contend that the COA lacks jurisdiction to declare whether or not LWUA Board
Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 are consistent with Section 13 of PD No. 198, as amended, on
matters pertaining to the compensation and "other benefits" of the Directors of the LWD. This is
allegedly the function of the courts. The Regional Director affirmed the disallowance. Petitioners
elevated the matter to COA. COA declared that the subject bonuses and allowances received by
petitioners constituted additional compensation or remuneration. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not respondent has the jurisdiction to motu proprio declare LWUA Board No.
313, S. 1995, as amended by Resolution No. 39, S. 1996, to bbe totally in conflict with Sec. 13
of PD No. 198 as amended.
(2) Whether or not Section 13, PD 198 as amended, prohibiting petitioners’ entitlement to
RATA, EME, Bonuses and Other Benefits and Allowance is valid.
HELD:
(1) YES. Court upheld the authority and jurisdiction of the COA to rule on the legality of the
disbursement of government funds by a water district and declared that such power does not
conflict with the jurisdiction of the courts, the DBM, and the LWUA. Citing Section 2,
Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution the Court declared that it is the mandate
of the COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters. Indeed, the Constitution specifically vests in the COA the
authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in
disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government
funds. This independent constitutional body is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people’s property.
(2) NO. A water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a special
charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree (PD) 198. It is undeniable
that PD 198 expressly prohibits the grant of RATA, EME, and bonuses to members of the board
of Water Districts.
7
SECTION 3
PAL vs. COA

245 SCRA 39/ GR No. 91890
June 9, 1995
FACTS: PAL is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws,
principally engaged in the air transport business, both domestic and international. At the time of
the filing of the petition on February 8, 1990, majority of its shares of stock was owned by the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a government corporation.
At the time of the filing of the petition on February 8, 1990, majority of its shares of stock was
owned by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a government corporation. To
assure itself of continuous, reliable and cost-efficient supply of fuel, PAL adopted a system of
bidding out its fuel requirements under a multiple supplier set-up whereby PAL awarded to the
lowest bidder sixty percent (60%) of its fuel requirements and to the second lowest bidder the
remaining forty percent(40%), provided it matched the price of the lowest bidder.
On August 17, 1989, COA wrote PAL a letter stating “It has come to our attention that PAL
international fuel supply contracts are expiring this August 31, 1989. In this connection, you are
advised to desist from bidding the company's fuel supply contracts, considering that existing
regulations require government-owned or controlled corporations and other agencies of
government to procure their petroleum product requirements from PETRON Corporation.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in holding that Department Order No. 19, of the defunct department of
general services applies to PAL?
(2) Whether or not COA exceeded its jurisdiction in extending the application of said department
order to petitioner.
HELD:
(1) PETITION IS DISMISSED. Pursuant to the government's privatization program, PAL's
shares of stock were bidded out early this year, resulting in the acquisition by PR Holdings, a
private corporation, of 67% of PAL's outstanding stocks. PAL, having ceased to be a
government-owned or controlled corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the
COA. Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become moot and
academic.
For although COA was correct in ruling that Department Order No. 19 applied to PAL as a
government agency at the time, it nonetheless gravely abused its discretion in not exempting
PAL therefrom.
Be that as it may, it must be noted that Department Order No. 19 itself states that the
procurement of petroleum product requirements from the then PETROPHIL, now PETRON
Corporation, is prescribed "whenever these commodities are adequately available and whenever
practicable, at prices not exceeding those set by the Oil Industry Commission."
(2) YES. . The reasons given by PAL for seeking exemption from the operation of
Department Order No. 19 were, to our mind, meritorious. They far outweigh the policy
enunciated in Department Order No. 19 of giving preference to government sources in the filling
of the needs of the government for supplies. Thus, PAL's bidding requirement conformed to the
accepted policy of the government to subject every transaction/contract to public bidding in
order to protect public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru open
competition and to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of
public contracts.
Its multiple supplier set-up was designed precisely to meet every contingency that might disrupt
its fuel supply. It bespoke of foresight, careful planning and sound business judgment on the part
of PAL. As a business operation heavily dependent on fuel supply, for PAL to rely solely on a
single supplier would indeed be impracticable.
8
To compel it to do so would amount to a grave abuse of discretion on its part as this might
well lead to irregular, excessive or unconscionable expenditures, the very evil sought to be
avoided in the creation of the COA.
COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the "exclusive
authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." The authority granted under this
constitutional provision, being broad and comprehensive enough, enables COA to adopt as its
own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of repromulgation, already
existing rules and regulations. It may also expand the coverage thereof to agencies or
instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction.
Department Order No. 19 dated May 1, 1974, in restating in full said Department Order
No. 19 in Memorandum No. 88-565, COA effectively adopted it as its own, thereby
expanding its coverage to government-owned or controlled corporations. Such action was
in consonance with its jurisdiction as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as follows:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine,
audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are
required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or
equity. x x x
As well as the settled legal meaning of the phrase "agency of the Government," as incorporated
in Section 2, Chapter I, Subtitle B, of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, thus:
“(8) ‘Government agency’ or ‘agency of the government,’ or ‘agency’ refers to any

department, bureau or office of the National Government, or any of its branches and
instrumentalities, or any political sub-division, as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporation, including its subsidiaries or other self-governing board or commission of the
Government.”
9
Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privitization

G.R. No. 112399
July 14, 1995
FACTS: PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in 1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO) as a subsidiary of Esso
Eastern, Inc. and Mobil Petroleum Company, Inc.
In 1973, at the height of the world-wide oil crisis brought about by the Middle East
conflicts, the Philippine government acquired ESSO through the PNOC. ESSO became a
wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a
subsidiary of PNOC. In acquiring PETRON, the government aimed to have a buffer against the
vagaries of oil prices in the international market. It was felt that PETRON can serve as a
counterfoil against price manipulation that might go unchecked if all the oil companies were
foreign-owned. Indeed, PETRON helped alleviate the energy crises that visited the country from
1973 to 1974, 1979 to 1980, and 1990 to 1991.
On December 8, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the

exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. The Proclamation is entitled
“Proclaiming and Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization
of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof, and Creating the
Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust.”
Implicit in the Proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the Government and the ideal of
leaving business to the private sector. The Government can then concentrate on the delivery of
basic services and the performance of vital public functions. On March 25, 1993, the
Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee (GCMCC) recommended a
100% privatization of PETRON.
Petitioners claims, among others, that there was a failed bidding, contend that there were only
three bidders. One of them, PETRONAS, submitted a bid lower than the floor price while a
second, failed to pre-qualify. Citing Section V-2-a of COA Circular No. 89-296 dated January
27, 1989, they argue that where only one bidder qualifies, there is a failure of public auction.
ISSUE: Whether or not PETRON is a public utility.
HELD: NO. The petition is dismissed. The Court clarifies the definition of a public utility and
the oil refining business by going back to the Constitution and the Petroleum Act of 1949:
Implementing Section 8 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, the progenitor of Section 5 of
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, is Section 13(b) of the Public Service Act, which provides:
The term “public service” includes every person that now or hereafter may own, operate,
manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele,
whether permanent, occasional, or accidental and done for general business purposes, any
common carrier, railroad, street railway and other similar public services.
After a long study by PNOC, PETRON was found to be "inappropriate or unnecessary" for the
government to maintain because refining and marketing of petroleum is an aspect of the industry
which is better left to the private sector. In making such finding, PNOC was guided by Section
4(a) of Proclamation No. 50, which provides:
(a) Divesting to the private sector in the soonest possible time through the appropriate
disposition entities, those assets with viable productive potential as going concerns, taking into
account where appropriate the implications of such transfers on sectoral productive capacities
and market limitation. These objectives are to be pursued within the context of furthering the
national economy through strengthened and revitalized private enterprise system.
PNOC, in privatizing PETRON, was simply exercising its corporate power to dispose of all or a
portion of its shares in a subsidiary. PNOC was created under P.D. No. 334, as amended by P.D.
No. 927, which empowers it to acquire shares of the capital stock of any other corporation and to
dispose of the same shares.
10
Besides, if only non-performing assets are intended to be sold, it would be unnecessary to

provide in the Proclamation for the rehabilitation of government corporations to make the same
more attractive to investors and potential buyers.
Petitioners urge that in effect there was only one bidder and that it can not be said that there was
a competition on "an equal footing" (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo, p. 122). But the COA Circular
does not speak of accepted bids but of offerors, without distinction as to whether they were
disqualified.
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by
government offices and corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned
bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the
interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.
11
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
PD 1606 as amended by RA 7975 and RA 10660
REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL

COURT TO BE KNOWN AS “SANDIGANBAYAN” AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal; and

compensation. –– A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and
possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan
is hereby created composed of a Presiding Justice and fourteen Associate Justices who
shall be appointed by the President. (As amended by R.A. No. 8249)
No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the

Sandiganbayan; unless he is natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age
and for at least ten years has been a judge of a court of record or been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a
pre-requisite for a like period.
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other
Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective of commission,
or, when the commission of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to
the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President.
The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall not be removed from office
except on impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in Section 2, 3
and 4 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.
The Presiding Justice shall receive an annual compensation of P60, 000.00 and
each Associate Justice P 55, 000.00 which shall be diminished during their continuance
in office. They shall have the same rank, privileges and other emoluments, be subject to
the same inhibition and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirement and other
benefits as those provided for under existing laws for the Presiding Justice and Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals.
Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court
of Appeals are increased, such increases in salaries shall be correspondingly extended to
and enjoyed by the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan.
They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
Section 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. The Sandiganbayan

shall have its principal office of the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for
the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That cases originating
from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas, or
Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when the
greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling
considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one
geographical region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall
authorize any division or divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place
outside Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines. “The Sandiganbayan may require the services of the
personnel and use of facilities of the courts or other government offices where any of the
divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject
to the orders of the Sandiganbayan. (As amended by R.A. NO. 8249)
Section 3. Division of the Court; Quorum –– The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five
(5) divisions of three Justices each. The five (5) may sit at the same time.
Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, that
when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal
qualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the
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Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by

strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member
of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division
the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the
court will be prejudice thereby, in which case the President shall, upon the
recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of
Appeals to sit temporarily therein. (As amended by R.A. No. 8249)
Section 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in

all cases involving:
(A) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade “27” and higher of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

city treasurer, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul

and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the

position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without

prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
(B) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of
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this section in relation to their office.
(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to

Salary Grade “27” or higher, as prescribe in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military
and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their
own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions
of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which
may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That
the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg 129, as well as the

implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply
to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall
at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of civil action, and no right to reserve
the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized:
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Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be
deemed abandoned. (As amended by R.A. No. 8249)
Section 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required. – The unanimous vote

of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.
In the event that the three justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice
shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit
temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a
majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.
Section 6. Maximum period of termination of cases. – As far as practicable,

the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until
terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the
case was submitted for decision.
Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions – All decisions and

final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or
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proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law
on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding
the case.
A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgement, and such
motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission
thereon.
Decisions and final orders for the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the
Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed,
the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the
Rules of Court.
Judgements and orders of the Sandiganbayan will be executed and enforced in the
manner provided by law.
Decisions and final order of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under
this decree as well as those rendered by them in exercise of their appellate jurisdiction
shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial
court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdiction, is death, review by the
Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not the accused files an appeal. (As
amended by R.A. No. 8249)
Section 8. Transfer of cases. – As of the date of the effectivity of this decree any
case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where none of the
accused has been arraigned shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan.
Section 9. Rules of Procedure. – The Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except
to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the division, the rotation
of justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court
which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court. (As amended
by R.A. No. 7975)
Section 10. (Repealed by R.A. No. 7975)
Section 11. Proceeding free of charge. – All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan

shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses.
No criminal information or complaint shall be entertained by the Sandiganbayan
except upon a certification by the Investigating Prosecutor of the existence of a prima
facie case to be determined after a preliminary investigation conducted in accordance
with a applicable laws and approved by the Chief Special Prosecutor.
Section 12. Administrative personnel. – The Sandiganbayan shall select and

appoint such personnel as it may deem necessary to discharge its functions under this
Decree including a Clerk of Court and three (3) Deputy Clerks of Court who shall be
members of the Bar.
The Clerk of Court shall have an annual compensation of P36,000.00 and the
Deputy Clerks of Court P30,000.00.
All other subordinate employees of the Sandiganbayan shall be governed by the

provisions of the Civil Service Law; Provided, that the Sandiganbayan may, by resolution
en banc, remove any of them for cause.
Section 13. Report to the President. – The Sandiganbayan shall submit an

annual report to the President, including all disbursements of funds entrusted to it,
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within two months from the end of the Fiscal Year.
Section 14. Funding. – There is hereby immediately appropriated the sum of

Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) out of any funds in the National Treasury to carry out
the provision of this Decree and thereafter to be included in the general appropriations
act. The appropriations for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in
accordance with a schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan.
Section 15. Separability of Provisions. – If for any reason, any section or

provision of this Decree is declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, other sections or
provisions thereof which are not affected thereby, shall continues in full force and effect.
Section 16. Repealing Clause – This Decree hereby repeals Presidential Decree
No. 1486 and all other provisions of law, General Orders, Presidential Decrees, Letters of
Instructions, rules or regulations inconsistent herewith.
Section 17. Effectivity – This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of December, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-eight
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Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. L-50581-50617
January 30, 1982
FACTS: Petitioner was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of
public and commercial document committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases.
He filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. A week later respondent
Court denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the
same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition, it is the claim of petitioner that
Presidential Decree No. 1486 also known as “Creating A Special Court To Be Known As
"Sandiganbayan" And For Other Purposes As Amended”, creating the respondent Court is
violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
(1) Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process, equal protection and ex post
facto clauses of the Constituiton, thus declaring it unconstitutional?
(2) Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates
against the petitioner, in the light of the difference of the procedures in the Sandiganbayan vis-à-
vis regular courts.
HELD:
(1) NO. To assure that general welfare be promoted, a regulatory measure may cut into rights
and liberty of the people, as is the end of law. Those adversely affected may only invoke this if
such classification was in the spirit of hostility and discrimination. Laws operate equally to all
persons, under the same circumstances, privileges and liabilities wise.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only
if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of
the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that
finds no support in reason For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in
term of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as
applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been
heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of
law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity
to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had
due process of law.” This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a
declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1606.
(2) NO. Petition dismissed. The classification satisfies the that it “must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan precisely in response to a problem – dishonesty in the public service.
It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far
back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is
not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
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RA 6770 - An Act Providing For the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office
Of The Ombudsman, And For Other Purposes
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.
Section 3. Office of the Ombudsman. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the
Office of the Overall Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the Office of the Deputy
for the Visayas, the Office of the Deputy for Mindanao, the Office of the Deputy for the
Armed Forces, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The President may appoint other
Deputies as the necessity for it may arise, as recommended by the Ombudsman.
Section 4. Appointment. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special
Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least twenty-one (21) nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees for each
vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled within three (3) months after it occurs, each of
which list shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
In the organization of the Office of the Ombudsman for filling up of positions therein, regional,
cultural or ethnic considerations shall be taken into account to the end that the Office shall be as
much as possible representative of the regional, ethnic and cultural make-up of the Filipino
nation.
Section 5. Qualifications. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special
Prosecutor, shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, at least forty (40) years old, of
recognized probity and independence, members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have
been candidates for any elective national or local office in the immediately preceding
election whether regular or special. The Ombudsman must have, for ten (10) years or
more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
Section 6. Rank and Salary. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the same ranks,
salaries and privileges as the Chairman and members, respectively, of a Constitutional
Commission. Their salaries shall not be decreased during their term of office.
The members of the prosecution, investigation and legal staff of the Office of the Ombudsman
shall receive salaries which shall not be less than those given to comparable positions in any
office in the Government.
Section 7. Term of Office. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special
Prosecutor, shall serve for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —
(1) In accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may
be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust.
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of
the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
(3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or
permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall serve as Acting
Ombudsman in a concurrent capacity until a new Ombudsman shall have been appointed
for a full term. In case the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman, the
President may designate any of the Deputies, or the Special Prosecutor, as Acting Ombudsman.
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(4) In case of temporary absence or disability of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall
perform the duties of the Ombudsman until the Ombudsman returns or is able to perform his
duties.
Section 9. Prohibitions and Disqualifications. — The Ombudsman, his Deputies and the
Special Prosecutor shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office or employment.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. They
shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately following their cessation
from office. They shall not be allowed to appear or practice before the Ombudsman for two
(2) years following their cessation from office.
No spouse or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree and no law,
business or professional partner or associate of the Ombudsman, his Deputies or Special
Prosecutor within one (1) year preceding the appointment may appear as counsel or agent on any
matter pending before the Office of the Ombudsman or transact business directly or indirectly
therewith.
This disqualification shall apply during the tenure of the official concerned. This disqualification
likewise extends to the law, business or professional firm for the same period.
Section 10. Disclosure of Relationship. — It shall be the duty of the Ombudsman, his Deputies,
including the Special Prosecutor to make under oath, to the best of their knowledge and/or
information, a public disclosure of the identities of, and their relationship with the persons
referred to in the preceding section.
The disclosure shall be filed with the Office of the President and the Office of the Ombudsman
before the appointee assumes office and every year thereafter. The disclosures made pursuant to
this section shall form part of the public records and shall be available to any person or entity
upon request.
Section 11. Structural Organization. — The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the
mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall
be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of the said office.
(1) The Office of the Ombudsman may organize such directorates for administration and allied
services as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions. Those appointed as
directors or heads shall have the rank and salary of line bureau directors.
(2) The Office of the Overall Deputy shall oversee and administer the operations of the different
offices under the Office of Ombudsman.t shall likewise perform such other functions and duties
assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his
prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon the
authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
The Special Prosecutor shall have the rank and salary of a Deputy Ombudsman.
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(5) The position structure and staffing pattern of the Office of the Ombudsman, including the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, shall be approved and prescribed by the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman shall appoint all officers and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, including
those of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, in accordance with the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations.
Section 12. Official Stations. — The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon,
and the Deputy for the Armed Forces shall hold office in Metropolitan Manila; the Deputy for
the Visayas, in Cebu City; and the Deputy for Mindanao, in Davao City. The Ombudsman may
transfer their stations within their respective geographical regions, as public interest may require.
Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in
every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government
to the people.
Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient.t has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or
of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the
refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may
provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2),
(3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: provided, that the
Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public:
provided, further, that any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
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(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and
records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and
with the same penalties provided therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as
shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or
hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.
The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials
and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as
complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.
Section 16. Applicability. — The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
Section 17. Immunities. — In all hearings, inquiries, and proceedings of the Ombudsman,
including preliminary investigations of offenses, nor person subpoenaed to testify as a witness
shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence,
memoranda and/or other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or
otherwise, required of him, may tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution: provided,
that no person shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any matter concerning which
he is compelled, after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, to testify and
produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or
other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding
being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the
furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under
this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal
prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from
office.
Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall be subject to
punishment for contempt and removal of the immunity from criminal prosecution.
Section 18. Rules of Procedure. —
(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective
exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
(2) The rules of procedure shall include a provision whereby the Rules of Court are made
suppletory.
(3) The rules shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, one of
which is printed in the national language.
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Section 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with
law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Section 20. Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary
investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
(4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or
(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress,
and the Judiciary.
Section 22. Investigatory Power. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to
investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private
person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person
in the investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The
officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same
penalties and liabilities.
Section 23. Formal Investigation. —
(1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in

accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.
(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the proper
disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring
public officers or employees, which shall be determined within the period prescribed in the civil
service law. Any delay without just cause in acting on any referral made by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be a ground for administrative action against the officers or employees to
whom such referrals are addressed and shall constitute a graft offense punishable by a fine of not
exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
(3) In any investigation under this Act the Ombudsman may: (a) enter and inspect the premises
of any office, agency, commission or tribunal; (b) examine and have access to any book, record,
22
file, document or paper; and (c) hold private hearings with both the complaining individual and
the official concerned.
Section 24. Preventives Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment
the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition
of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.
Section 25. Penalties. —
(1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules
provided therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one
(1) year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the
Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of
the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charges.
Section 26. Inquiries. —
(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall inquire into acts or omissions of a public officer,
employee, office or agency which, from the reports or complaints it has received, the
Ombudsman or his Deputies consider to be:
(a) contrary to law or regulation;
(b) unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular or inconsistent with the general course of the
operations and functions of a public officer, employee, office or agency;
(c) an error in the application or interpretation of law, rules or regulations, or a gross or palpable
error in the appreciation of facts;
(d) based on improper motives or corrupt considerations;
(e) unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been revealed; or
(f) inefficient performed or otherwise objectionable.
(2) The Officer of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form
concerning an official act or omission.t shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the
same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal
citing the reasons therefor.f it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first
furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require
him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof.f the answer
is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case.
(3) When the complaint consists in delay or refusal to perform a duty required by law, or when
urgent action is necessary to protect or preserve the rights of the complainant, the Office of the
Ombudsman shall take steps or measures and issue such orders directing the officer, employee,
office or agency concerned to:
(a) expedite the performance of duty;
23
(b) cease or desist from the performance of a prejudicial act;
(c) correct the omission;
(d) explain fully the administrative act in question; or
(e) take any other steps as may be necessary under the circumstances to protect and preserve the
rights of the complainant.
(4) Any delay or refusal to comply with the referral or directive of the Ombudsman or any of his
Deputies, shall constitute a ground for administrative disciplinary action against the officer or
employee to whom it was addressed.
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All provisionary orders of the Office
of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: provided, that
only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of
justice may require.
Section 28. Investigation in Municipalities, Cities and Provinces. — The Office of the
Ombudsman may establish offices in municipalities, cities and provinces outside Metropolitan
Manila, under the immediate supervision of the Deputies for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao,
where necessary as determined by the Ombudsman. The investigation of complaints may be
assigned to the regional or sectoral deputy concerned or to a special investigator who shall
proceed in accordance with the rules or special instructions or directives of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Pending investigation the deputy or investigator may issue orders and provisional
remedies which are immediately executory subject to review by the Ombudsman. Within three
(3) days after concluding the investigation, the deputy or investigator shall transmit, together
with the entire records of the case, his report and conclusions to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Within five (5) days after receipt of said report, the Ombudsman shall render the appropriate
order, directive or decision.
Section 29. Change of Unjust Laws. — If the Ombudsman believes that a law or regulation is
unfair or unjust, he shall recommend to the President and to Congress the necessary changes
therein or the repeal thereof.
Section 30. Transmittal/Publication of Decision. — In every case where the Ombudsman has
reached a decision, conclusion or recommendation adverse to a public official or agency, he shall
transmit his decision, conclusion, recommendation or suggestion to the head of the department,
agency or instrumentality, or of the province, city or municipality concerned for such immediate
action as may be necessary. When transmitting his adverse decision, conclusion or
recommendation, he shall, unless excused by the agency or official affected, include the
24
substance of any statement the public agency or official may have made to him by way of
explaining past difficulties with or present rejection of the Ombudsman's proposals.
Section 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the
personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him herein provided shall be
under his supervision and control.
The Ombudsman and his investigators and prosecutors, whether regular members of his staff or
designated by him as herein provided, shall have authority to administer oaths, to issue subpoena
and subpoena duces tecum, to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify under oath
before them and/or bring books, documents and other things under their control, and to secure
the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through application before the
Sandiganbayan or before any inferior or superior court having jurisdiction of the place where the
witness or evidence is found.
Section 32. Rights and Duties of Witness. —
(1) A person required by the Ombudsman to provide the information shall be paid the same fees
and travel allowances as are extended to witnesses whose attendance has been required in the
trial courts. Upon request of the witness, the Ombudsman shall also furnish him such security for
his person and his family as may be warranted by the circumstances. For this purpose, the
Ombudsman may, at its expense, call upon any police or constabulary unit to provide the said
security.
(2) A person who, with or without service or compulsory process, provides oral or documentary
information requested by the Ombudsman shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities
as are extended to witnesses in the courts, and shall likewise be entitled to the assistance of
counsel while being questioned.
(3) If a person refuses to respond to the Ombudsman's or his Deputy's subpoena, or refuses to be
examined, or engages in obstructive conduct, the Ombudsman or his Deputy shall issue an order
directing the person to appear before him to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt. The contempt proceedings shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Rules
of Court.
Section 33. Duty to Render Assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman. — Any officer or
employee of any department, bureau or office, subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and local governments,
when required by the Ombudsman, his Deputy or the Special Prosecutor shall render assistance
to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 34. Annual Report. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall render an annual report of
its activities and performance to the President and to Congress to be submitted within thirty (30)
days from the start of the regular session of Congress.
Section 35. Malicious Prosecution. — Any person who, actuated by malice or gross bad faith,
files a completely unwarranted or false complaint against any government official or employee
shall be subject to a penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months imprisonment
and a fine not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
Section 36. Penalties for Obstruction. — Any person who willfully obstructs or hinders the
proper exercise of the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman or who willfully misleads or
attempts to mislead the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor in replying to their
inquiries shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
Section 37. Franking Privilege. — All official mail matters and telegrams of the Ombudsman
addressed for delivery within the Philippines shall be received, transmitted, and delivered free of
charge: provided, that such mail matters when addressed to private persons or nongovernment
offices shall not exceed one hundred and twenty (120) grams. All mail matters and telegrams
sent through government telegraph facilities containing complaints to the Office of the
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Ombudsman shall be transmitted free of charge, provided that the telegram shall contain not
more than one hundred fifty (150) words.
Section 38. Fiscal Autonomy. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Office of the Ombudsman may not be reduced below the amount
appropriated for the previous years and, after approval, shall be automatically and
regularly released.
Section 39. Appropriations. — The appropriation for the Office of the Special Prosecutor in the
current General Appropriations Act is hereby transferred to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.
Section 40. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is held unconstitutional, other
provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and binding.
Section 41. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
executive orders, rules and regulations insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby
repealed or amended as the case may be.
Section 42. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Approved: November 17, 1989.
26
Garcia vs. Mojica

314 SCRA 207/ GR No. 139043
September 10, 1999
FACTS: Cebu City Mayor Garcia signed an alleged midnight deal (4 days prior to the May 1998
election) with FF Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city government. Garcia was re-elected
mayor. Newspaper reports on the matter surfaced, prompting the Deputy Ombudsman for
Visayas to investigate. The OMB-VIS, after conducting an investigation, recommended the filing
of administrative and criminal charges against Garcia. A complaint against Garcia was filed
before the Ombudsman, and the OMB-VIS preventively suspended Garcia for 6 months starting
June 1999. Garcia assailed this before the SC, claiming that the period was too long; that the
investigation and the resulting suspension violated the LGC [which provided for a minimum
period of 60 days]; and that his liability (if any) for the asphalt deal had already been condoned
by virtue of his reelection. SC upheld the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate Garcia, but
found that the imposition of 6 months preventive suspension was improper, considering that the
case against Garcia did not constitute the “strong evidence” required by Ombudsman Law; and
that the period for which Garcia was already suspended served the purpose of preventing him
from hiding evidence and influencing prospective witnesses. SC held that there was no violation
of the LGC since Garcia was being investigated under the Ombudsman Law, and the two laws
govern differently. It has been ruled in Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole that the LGC did not divest the
Ombudsman of investigatory authority over local officials; and that the LGC and the
Ombudsman are not irreconcilable on this point. While there is a distinction between preventive
suspension periods under LGC and the Ombudsman Law, SC held that such distinction was not
decisive in Garcia’s case. Finally, SC held that Garcia could no longer be held administratively
liable for the asphalt deal, because it was signed and perfected during his previous term. That the
contract was to be effective in Garcia’s current term is of no moment, as was held previously in
Salalima v. Guingona.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not OMB-VIS committed grave abuse of discretion in investigating Garcia and
ordering his preventive suspension for 6 months.
(2) What law should apply to the investigation – the LGC (RA 7160) or the Ombudsman Law
(RA 6770)?
(3) What is the effect of Garcia’s reelection on the investigation of acts done before his
reelection?
HELD:
(1) YES. Preventive suspension under Section 24, RA 6770 may be imposed when, among other
factors, the evidence of guilt is strong. The period for which an official may be preventively
suspended must not exceed 6 months. Such is not the case at bar.
(2) Both laws are applicable. In the case of Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, on the matter of whether or
not the Ombudsman has been stripped of his power to investigate local elective officials by
virtue of the LGC: “Indeed, there is nothing in the [LGC] to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to
only uphold one and strike down the other.”
(3) It is deemed condoned. A elective local official who is reelected cannot be held
administratively liable for acts committed during the previous term, even if such acts were to be
effective only during the current term. What matters is that the act was committed or perfected
during the previous term and the official has been subsequently reelected. The only conclusive
determining factor as regards the people’s thinking on the character of an elective official is an
election.
That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to
eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. SC decisions do
not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from
the date of the official’s reelection, except that it must be prior to said date.
27
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

356 SCRA 636/G.R. No. 128055
April 18, 2001
FACTS: A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed
a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID
Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for
legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for
her suspension effective for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate
without violating the Constitution.
HELD: YES. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has
both legal and jurisprudential support. It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the
court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information
filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is
bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and
buts about it.”
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear
and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more
than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and
employees indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed
the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office"
would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not
only the particular office under which he stands accused.The doctrine of separation of powers by
itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act
No. 3019 nor from its sanctions.
The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate,
branches of the government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive
prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
28
Francisco vs. House of Representatives

GR 160261/415 SCRA 44
November 10, 2003
FACTS: On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against C.J.
Davide, Jr., among others. The House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint on
22 Oct 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to that effect has not
been sent to the House in plenary.
The following day and just nearly 5 months since the filing of the first complaint, a second
impeachment complaint was filed by respondent House Representatives. Thus arose the instant
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the respondents House of
Representatives, et. al., (the House) most of which contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the Const. which
provides: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.”
The House argues: the one year bar could not have been violated as the first impeachment
complaint has not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same is clear in that it is the House, as a
collective body, which has “the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.” “Initiate”
could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Sec. 3 of the same provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at
least 1/3 of all the members of the House.4 Since the House, as a collective body, has yet to act
on the first impeachment complaint, the first complaint could not have been “initiated.”
ISSUE: Is the second impeachment complaint barred under Section 3(5) of Art. XI of the
Constitution?
HELD: YES. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that the
framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. The vote of one-third of the
House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint. [Thus, under the one year bar on initiating
impeachment proceedings,] no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action [within one year from filing of the first verified impeachment
complaint].
To the argument that only the House as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because
Sec. 3(1) of Art. XI of the Const. says "The House x x x shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment," this is a misreading and is contrary to the principle of
reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding.”
Constitutional amendments may be submitted to the people for ratification simultaneously with
the general elections.
29
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Republic vs. Villanueva

356 SCRA 875
June 29, 1982
FACTS: Lots nos. 568 and 569 in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel Bulacan, with an area of 313 square
meters were acquired by Iglesia ni Cristo in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters
from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters owned by the said
church. The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any
military reservation. They are inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the
Bureau of Forestry in 1927.
The INC, a corporation sole, thus filed an application for the registration of the two lots, alleging
that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than 30 years, citing Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Law.
The Republic, through the director of lands, opposed the application, on the grounds that as a
private corporation, INC is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain, that
the land applied for is public land not susceptible of private appropriation, and that INC and its
predecessors had not been in OCEAN possession since June 12, 1945.
CFI ordered registration of the 2 lots in the name of the INC, represented by Executive Minister
Erano G. Manalo.
ISSUE: Whether or not INC is allowed to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain.
HELD: NO. A corporation sole, a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable
lands of the public domain, in accordance with the constitutional prohibition in Section 11, Art.
XIV of the 1973 Constitution that “no private corporation or association ma hold alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.”
Further a church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of Section 48(b) which only applies
to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole, an unhappy freak of English law, has
no nationality.
The lots are not private lands, following the doctrine of Susi v. Razon. What was considered
private land in that case was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time
immemorial. Here, the lands are still public lands. A land registration proceeding presupposes
that the land is public.
All lands that were not acquired from the government belong to the public domain, except those
in the possession of an occupant and his predecessors since time immermorial. (Oh Cho v
Director of Lands).
The right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain the confirmation of his title is
derecho dominical incoativo and before the issuance of the certificate of title, the land still
belongs to the state.
30
Meralco vs. Judge Castro-Bartolome

114 SCRA 799/ G.R. No. L-49623
June 29, 1982
FACTS: The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) at Tanay, Rizal on
August 13, 1976 from Piguing spouses. After acquisition, they subsequently filed for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title on Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition and the
corresponding appeal was likewise rejected. It elevates its appeal with the following arguments;
firstly, the land in question had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive
prescription as a result of open continuous and notorious possession and occupation for more
than thirty years by the original owner, Olimpia Ramos and his predecessor in interest, Piguing
spouses, whom Meralco acquired the disputed land, and finally, the substantial rights acquired by
Ramos spouses and Peguing spouses for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, extend to
Meralco by virtue of the provision of the Public Land Law.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Meralco as a juridical person, allowed under the law to hold lands of public
domain and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
(2) Does the possession tacked to predecessor Private Corporation automatically guarantee its
rights to possession and title of the land?
(3) Whether or not it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title before any grant would be
extended to a juridical person.
HELD:
(1) NO. A private corporation or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed under the law to
hold land of public domain. Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private
corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except for lease of lands not
exceeding one thousand hectares.
(2) NO. The presumption that since they bought the property from the person who occupied the
land in open, continuous and notorious possession of the public land for more than thirty years,
does not automatically amount to rights and possession.
It would cease to be public only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen
claiming it under the law. This conclusion is anchored on the principle that "all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
The exception to the rule is only when the occupant and his predecessors-in-interest possess and
occupied the same since time immemorial. Such possessions justify the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest.
(3) YES. In this case, the court declared that it is contingent upon the issuance of title before
juridical entity may have acquired possession over the property. That means that until the
certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be
confirmed, remains public land. Thus, any levy and execution were void. As between the State
and the Meralco, the land in question remains a public land. The court also took notice that the
constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural
public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable
lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification.
31
Director of Lands vs. IAC

146 SCRA 509
December 29, 1986
FACTS: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. On October 29, 1962, said corporation
acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land.
Possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the
possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse
and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted
from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already
considered from time immemorial.
The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by
them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain; applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-
Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements. The ownership and possession of
the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when
the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite
from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the
Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the land is already a private land.
(2) Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations applies.
HELD:
(1) YES. Said lot has already been acquired by operation of law not only as a right to a grant, but
as a grant of the Government. It is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the land held by the Infiels since time
immemorial was effectively deemed as private land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure. Thus,
at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased private
property. There being no ruling in the 1935 Constitution prohibiting this sale, this was held to be
valid.
In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Gov’t, to Susi v. Razon, to Herico v.
Dar, the court overturned the decision on Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, stating that a
possession is said to be prescriptively acquired by the operation of the Public Lands Act, upon
conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the necessary conditions for a Government Grant. Thus,
the land in question effectively ceased to be of the public domain and was therefore classified as
private property at the moment of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged possession
of the bona fide right to ownership from Meralco’s predecessors-interest. There being no law
prohibiting the sale of private lands to privately held corporations, the court thus overturned the
decision.
32
(2) NO. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels
had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from
said owners. It must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.
Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it purchased the land
from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting the purchase of alienable
public lands by private corporations or associations cannot be retroactively applied.
33
Godines vs. Pak Luen

120 SCRA 632/G.R. No. L-36731
January 27, 1983
FACTS: The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father, now
deceased, to Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the ground that the sale was null and void ab initio
since it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code.
Jose Godinez and Martina Alvarez Godinez acquired a parcel of land in Jolo Town site during
their marriage. Martina died in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs. On
November 1941, Jose Godinez sold the said land to Fong Pak Luen a Chinese citizen
without the knowledge of the plaintiffs.
On January 11, 1963, defendant Fong Pak Luen executed an SPA in favor of his co-defendant
Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-
defendant Trinidad S. Navata. The plaintiffs filed this case to seek the recovery of said land
on the ground that the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates the Constitution and
the Civil Code because respondent is an alien not allowed to acquire property and since
Gidonez could not have legally conveyed the entire property being a conjugal property.
Thus, the alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not convey any title or interest
over said property and defendant Navata. Defendant Navata responded that the complaint does
not state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered in
the name of Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same and that the
cause of action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale
executed by Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941 and the action was brought only on September
30, 1966, beyond the 10 year period provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of
a constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to
a Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it.
HELD: NO. The heirs cannot recover the property sold to an alien if it had been conveyed
to a Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it. There can be no dispute that the sale in
1941 by Jose Godinez to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen residing in Hong Kong, was violative
of the Constitution which provides that aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands,
including residential lands.
Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution
prohibits. It does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the
property sold to an alien as the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad
S. Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property. The litigated property is now in
the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee.
34
Philippine Ports Authority vs. Mendoza

138 SCRA 632/ GR No. L-48304
September 11, 1985
FACTS: The Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution No. 10 placing on only one
organization the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port.
To implement its policy of integration, PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 21 which provides
that it is necessary that two or more contractors presently operating within the same port
premises who desire to continue or renew their cargo handling services must merge into only one
organization.
Accordingly, the eleven port services contractors in the Cebu City Port formed the United South
Dockhandlers, Inc. (USDI). The latter corporation was recognized by PPA and granted a special
permit to handle exclusively the cargo handling requirements of the entire port in the City of
Cebu pending the eventual award of a management contract.
Private respondents Pernito, et al. instituted an action for declaratory relief and mandamus with
preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction and damages against PPA and USDI. They
assail the policy adopted by PPA to grant only one permit to only one group as violative of the
constitutional and statutory provision on monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.
ISSUE: Whether or not PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger is

unconstitutional and void for being violative of the constitutional and statutory provision on
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.
HELD: NO. Section 2, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides that “the state shall
regulate or prohibit private monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combination in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”
Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The use of the word "regulate" in the
Constitution indicates that some monopolies, properly regulated, are allowed. Regulate means
includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but regulate should not be construed as
synonymous with suppress or prohibit. "Competition can best regulate a free economy. Like all
basic beliefs, however, that principle must accommodate hard practical experience. There are
areas where for special reasons the force of competition, when left wholly free, might operate too
destructively to safeguard the public interest. Public utilities are an instance of that
consideration." By their very nature, certain public services or public utilities such as those
which supply water, electricity, transportation, telegraph, etc. must be given exclusive franchises
if public interest is to be served. Such exclusive franchises are not violative of the law against
monopolies (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, supra).
In the case at bar, the area affected is maritime transportation in the port of Cebu. The operations
there, particularly arrastre and stevedoring, affect not only the City of Cebu, the principal port in
the South, but also the economy of the whole country as well. Any prolonged disjunction of the
services being rendered there will prejudice not only inter-island and international trade and
commerce. Operations in said port are therefore imbued with public interest and are subject to
regulation and control for the public good and welfare. PPA's policy of integration through
compulsory merger may not even be in this instance considered as promoting a monopoly
because the fact of the matter is that while the sole operator permitted by PPA to engage in the
arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Cebu is only USDI, actually USDI is comprised
of the eleven (11) port services contractors that previously used said ports but decided to merge
and ultimately constituted themselves as USDI.But over and above the platter of whether the
monopoly has been created, the overriding and more significant consideration is public interest.
Accordingly, PPA's policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provision
on monopolies.
35
The Secretary of DENR vs. Mayor Jose Yap et. al.

G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
FACTS: The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the petition for
declaratory relief filed by Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. to have a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land they have been occupying
in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945,
or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes
on them.
Later in 2006, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island
into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable
and disposable).
ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay
Island.
HELD: YES. Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine
dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
All lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented.
The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the
island into private ownership. Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does
not create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to argue that
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law.
There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under
CA No. 141, namely:
(1) Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
36
(2) The classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the
island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested
right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not

automatically give them a vested right in Boracay.
Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The
SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws
applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for
a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their
continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
37
Republic of the Philippines vs. CA

G.R. No. 155450
August 6, 2008
FACTS: On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree
No. 3819284 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag),
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
(private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing
an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On
19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 115855 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly
stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-1277, issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B
consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,7 issued in the
name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office
No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of
Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a
portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of
the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of
timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan.
HELD:
(1) YES. As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree
No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property,
including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial
court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were
entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original
proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court
declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond
review.
When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses
Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant
to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or
forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish
regime or thereafter. The land classification maps24 petitioner attached to the complaint also do
not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public
purpose.
he law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,26 which
provides:
Section 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
38
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the
subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been
declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this
Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare
lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries
established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on
which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification
requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that
during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or
mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial
courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that
the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874.
Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may
be claimed under any existing law at that time.
39
Province of North Cotabato vs. The Government

GR No. 183591
October 14, 2008
FACTS: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government.
MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to
the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which
consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral
domain aspect.
Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5,
2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter,
in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with
foreign countries. The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides
for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.With
regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the
Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described as associative.
With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of
the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as
mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not respondents violated constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the
MOA-AD.
(2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.
HELD:
(1) YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the
exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace
agenda.
.
a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is replete
with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building.
In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society;
b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any
project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein.
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from
40
their total environment RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).
(2) NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with
the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same
does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of
the Memorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to the government peace
panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary
amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP
Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such
an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
41
Nicasio Alcantara vs. DENR

GR No. 161881
July 31, 2008
FACTS: Nicasio Alcantara is a lessee under Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542
(FLGLA No. 542) which he claimed to be subsisting since 1983 issued by DENR with an area of
nine hundred twenty-three (923) hectares of public forest land located at Sitio
Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City. In which the land is claimed as ancestral land of
indigenous B’laan and Maguindanaoans since time immemorial and that only after World War II
that Christian settlers started occupying the area.
On April 10, 1990, private respondents, representing the B'laan and Maguindanao tribes, filed a
complaint against petitioner before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the land to the
indigenous communities. Alcantara questions the authority of the COSLAP and alleged that it
was the secretary of the DENR who should have jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public
lands.
Despite opposition, Alcantara was able to renew FLGLA No. 542 in 1993 for another 25 years,
or until December 31, 2018. On October 29, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8371, or
the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA), which was intended to recognize and promote all the
rights of the country's Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) within
the framework of the Constitution. Later, COSLAP rendered its decision in favor of the
complainant indigenous people and recommended to DENR to cancel Alcantara’s renewed
FLGLA No. 542 and declare the area as ancestral lands of the B’laans. Alcantara filed before the
Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the decision of the COSLAP, but the CA affirmed in toto the
decision of the COSLAP, ruling that the issues and arguments it raised had all been addressed
squarely in the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. 145838 which upheld the COSLAP's
decision and which had long become final and executory.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner, based on his alleged residual rights, may continue his enjoyment of the
land up to the expiration of FLGA No. 542 on December 31, 2018.
(2) Whether respondents DENR officials committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing
the COSLAP's decision.
HELD:
(1) NO. Petitioner has had no residue of any right and no entitlement to the land, from the
very beginning. The question whether FLGLA No. 542 is valid has been settled conclusively in
G.R. No. 145838 in which the Court made final finding that FLGLA No. 542 was issued
illegally, and that it was made in violation of prevailing laws. It was likewise declared that
FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410 which
states that all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared
part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands
are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members
of the indigenous cultural group concerned. Petitioner’s alleged "residual right" has no legal
basis and contradicts his admission that FLGLA No. 542 has been declared invalid by the Court
in its decision in G.R. No. 145838.
(2) NO. The Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent
DENR officials in their implementation of the COSLAP decision, FLGLA No. 542 is a mere
license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural
resources and public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the
Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a
mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or
modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. Thus, a privilege or license is
not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the due process and non-impairment
clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the
people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to
42
the police power of the State. Such a privilege or license is not even a property or property right,
nor does it create a vested right; as such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance.
Oroport Cargohandling Services Inc. vs. Phividec Industrial Authority

G.R. No. 166785
43
July 28, 2008
FACTS: In 2003, Oroport participated in a bidding for the management and operation of
Mindanao Container Terminal (MCT). No bidder won in the two public biddings conducted so
Phividec Industrial Authority (PIA) took over MCT operations. Oroport then sued PIA and
Phividec in the RTC for injunction and damages. It accused PIA of illegally operating MCT
without a license from PPA or a franchise from Congress. It also alleged unfair competition since
PIA handled cargoes of the general public. It further invoked unlawful deprivation of property as
it stands to incur investment losses with PIA’s take-over of MCT operations. RTC ruled in
Oroport’s favor. In a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by PIA with the CA, CA
annulled the orders of the RTC ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing them. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by Oroport.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the CA err in ruling that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction?
(2) Whether or not PIA can temporarily operate as a seaport cargo-handler upon agreement with
PPA (Philippine Ports Authority) sans a franchise or a license?
HELD:
(1) NO. CA did not err in annulling the writ of preliminary injunction and in ruling that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of this multi-billion government infrastructure project.
Rep. Act No. 8975 is clear that it is not within the RTC’s jurisdiction to issue an injunctive writ
against the operation of a government infrastructure project. Since Oroport failed to specify what
property was robbed of it, the CA ruled that PIA does not need a license from PPA to operate
because the MOA (Check case.) and its amendment granted PIA exclusive control and
supervision of MCT on all cargo-handling services, including the discretion to impose rates and
charges not higher than those PPA-prescribed.
Rep. Act No. 8975 reserves the power to issue injunctive writs on government infrastructure
projects exclusively with this Court and the RTC cannot issue an injunctive writ to stop the
cargo-handling operations at MCT. The issues presented by Oroport can hardly be considered
constitutional, much more constitutional issues of extreme urgency.
(2) YES. PIA properly took over MCT operations sans a franchise or license as it was
necessary, temporary and beneficial to the public.
The decision to bid out cargo-handling services is within the province and discretion of PPA
which necessarily required prior study and evaluation. This task is best left to the judgment of
PPA and cannot be set aside absent grave abuse of discretion on its part. As long as the standards
are set in determining the contractor and such standards are reasonable and related to the purpose
for which they are used, courts should not inquire into the wisdom of PPA’s choice. After the
two public biddings failed, PIA was left with no other option but to take over MCT operations so
that it could earn, pending the award to a qualified bidder, some amount to pay the loan to JBIC
and to avoid being declared in default.
The law authorizing PPA to take over arrastre and stevedoring services in government-
owned ports and cancel permits issued to private operators is a valid exercise of police
power; it does not violate due process of law as the exercise of police power is paramount over
the right against non-impairment of contracts. Moreover, a regulated monopoly is not proscribed
in industries affected with public interest such as in port rendition of arrastre/stevedoring
services in Philippine ports.
Petition denied.
ESTACS
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. vs CA
44
348 SCRA 265

December 15, 2000
FACTS: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper
were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of
complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains
obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents.
Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written
statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants,
instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged
to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the
Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions.
Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of
the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the
defendants.
HELD: YES. The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS
and the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon
them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always
absolute.
The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out
disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students.
Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or
expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when such article
materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power,
like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the
authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.
UP and Alfredo De Torres vs. Civil Service Commission

196 SCRA 221
April 3, 2001
45
FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of the Philippines
in Los Baos (UPLB) who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September 1,
1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government’s official
representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and Pacific (CIRDAP).
When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an
extension of said leave of absence for another year, but was denied. UPLB Chancellor Raul P. de
Guzman apprised him on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and warned of the possibility of
being considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) if he failed to return and report
for duty as directed. After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the
incumbent Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was reporting back to duty at ACCI-UPLB.
However, Chancellor Villareal considered his absence to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to
re-apply with UPLB.
ISSUE: Whether or not a new appointment is still necessary for Dr. de Torres to resume his post
at the University despite having remained continuously with the Civil Service, not having been
dropped from the rolls of the University, and after returning to fulfill his service contract as a
government scholar.
HELD: NO. The issuance of a new appointment in favor of Petitioner De Torres is not
needed, because he was not formally dropped from the rolls of the University of the
Philippines.
The assailed CSC Resolutions were issued in excess of authority, because the CSC had violated
the Subido-Romulo Agreement and disregarded the University’s academic freedom, which
includes the right to determine who may teach and who may be dropped from the service.
Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules based on which respondent justified
Petitioner De Torres automatic separation from the service - has been repealed and superseded
by PD 807, as well as EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) which decrees prior notice before
actual dropping. Even assuming that the said provision was not repealed, the issuance of the Rule
was ultra vires because it was not related to or connected with to any specific provision of the
mother law, RA 2260; and the assailed CSC Resolutions violated petitioners right to due process,
because he had not been given prior notice of his actual separation.
As part of its academic freedom, the University of the Philippines has the prerogative to
determine who may teach its students. The Civil Service Commission has no authority to
force it to dismiss a member of its faculty even in the guise of enforcing Civil Service Rules.
Guingona vs. Carague

196 SCRA 221
46
FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by
PD No. 81, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled
“Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society,” and by PD No.1967,entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent
and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”
Petitioner senators question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service
in the 1990 budget which was authorized by PD 81. Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81, PD 1177
(Sec 31), and PD 1967 be declared unconstitutional, and (2) restrain the disbursement for debt
service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. While respondents contend that the
petition involves a political question (repeal/amendment of said laws).
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and
are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which
requires, among others, that "all appropriations, bills authorizing increase of public debt" must be
passed by Congress and approved by the President.
ISSUE: Is the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget violative of Art VI,
Sec 29 (1) of the Constitution?
HELD: NO. Our Constitution under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that
the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives
of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives does not require
a definite, certain, exact or “specific appropriation made by law” unlike the Nebraska
Constitution invoked by petitioners.
Our Constitution simply states that moneys paid out of the treasury must be made pursuant to an
appropriation made by law. More significantly, our Constitution does not prescribe any particular
form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall
be made, except that it be “made by law” such as precisely the authorization under the
questioned presidential decrees.
In other words xxx an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the
present Congress). The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a
general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8371
47
AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF

INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CREATING A
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING
IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the
Constitution:
1.Recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and
development;
2. Protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic, social and
cultural well-being and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain;
3. Recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their cultures,
traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and
policies;
4. Guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure
of human rights and freedoms without distinction or discrimination;
5. Take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and
guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit
on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant
to other members of the population; and
6. Recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural
integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well
as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more responsive to the needs and
desires of these communities.
Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce
and guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions,
values, beliefs, interests and institutions, and to adopt and implement measures to protect their
rights to their ancestral domains.
Concept of Ancestral Lands/Domains

Ancestral lands/domains shall include such concepts of territories which cover not only the
physical environment but the total environment including the spiritual and cultural bonds to the
areas which the ICCs/IPs possess, occupy and use and to which they have claims of ownership.
Indigenous Concept of Ownership

Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources
found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept
of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICC’s/IP’s private but community
property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It
likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.
Composition of Ancestral Lands/Domains

Refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas,
and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which
are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively
48
occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators.
Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of ICCs/IPs

Consistent with the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and International Human
Rights Law, the State shall, with due recognition of their distinct characteristics and identity,
accord to the members of the ICCs/IPs the rights, protections and privileges enjoyed by the rest
of the citizenry. It shall extend to them the same employment rights, opportunities, basic
services, educational and other rights and privileges available to every member of the society.
Accordingly, the State shall likewise ensure that the employment of any form of force or
coercion against ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.
The State shall ensure that the fundamental human rights and freedoms as enshrined in the
Constitution and relevant international instruments are guaranteed also to indigenous women.
Towards this end, no provision in this Act shall be interpreted so as to result in the diminution of
rights and privileges already recognized and accorded to women under existing laws of general
application.
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

To carry out the policies herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on
ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation
and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-
being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as the rights thereto
The NCIP shall protect and promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard
to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions.
49
50

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Constitutional Law Review Case Digest

Keziah G. Huelar, JD-4

Guevarra vs. Gimenez

ISSUE: YES. These government employees testified as to what transpired in the

In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or instrumentality such as the

Osmeña vs. COA

Sambeli vs. Province of Isabela

Bustamante vs. COA

Saligumba vs. COA

2. Even assuming that we have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as

Barbo vs. COA

PAL vs. COA

“(8) ‘Government agency’ or ‘agency of the government,’ or ‘agency’ refers to any

Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privitization

On December 8, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the

ISSUE: Whether or not PETRON is a public utility.

Besides, if only non-performing assets are intended to be sold, it would be unnecessary to

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

PD 1606 as amended by RA 7975 and RA 10660

REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL

Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal; and

No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the

Section 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. The Sandiganbayan

Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by

Section 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without

this section in relation to their office.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg 129, as well as the

Section 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required. – The unanimous vote

Section 6. Maximum period of termination of cases. – As far as practicable,

Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions – All decisions and

Section 10. (Repealed by R.A. No. 7975)

Section 11. Proceeding free of charge. – All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan

Section 12. Administrative personnel. – The Sandiganbayan shall select and

All other subordinate employees of the Sandiganbayan shall be governed by the

Section 13. Report to the President. – The Sandiganbayan shall submit an

within two months from the end of the Fiscal Year.

Section 14. Funding. – There is hereby immediately appropriated the sum of

Section 15. Separability of Provisions. – If for any reason, any section or

Section 17. Effectivity – This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —

(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and

(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.

Section 18. Rules of Procedure. —

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;

Section 23. Formal Investigation. —

(1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in

Section 25. Penalties. —

Section 26. Inquiries. —