THE REAL HERO OF

BATTLE OF CHAWINDA
CONTROVERSY
In March 2001 my book Pakistan Army till 1965's chapter on Battle of
Chawinda was published in Defence Journal Karachi.This started a
controversy about the eal hero of Battle of Chawinda as far as the most
decisive day 8th September was concerned.Below are the series of
letters then exhanged.The controversy has raged on from March 2001
till September 2008.

Agha H Amin
Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired) –The Author

EX MAJOR FAROUK ADAMS LETTER TO DEFENCE JOURNAL AND MY REBUTTAL OF 2001:---

Farouk Adams Letter to Editor Defence Journal and A.H Amin's Reply Defence Journal August
2001
The Battle of Chawinda

I refer to Agha Humayun Amin’s article on the Battle of Chawinda, and also being “direct
participant, would like to share with your readers, some of my knowledge on the subject. Since
I am writing from memory, I will touch only upon those incidents and aspects of the battle, of
which I am certain.
About a week before the war started, an A. K officer from the Gibraltar Force, exfiltrated, and
brought to HQ 24 Brigade, certain Indian Army documents. These purported to show the
presence of the 1st Indian Armoured Division opposite us. Brig Abdul Ali Malik accordingly
informed the higher HQ, and GHQ detailed Maj. Mahmud of the Army Aviation to physically
carry these documents to GHQ for evaluation. GHQ’s assessment was that these documents
were part of an Indian deception plan. Brig Malik disagreed with this assessment. So it is
incorrect to say that he had no idea what he had against him, though it is correct that when the
attack came, he had no way of knowing that this was the main effort of the enemy. But neither
did anyone else.

When the Jassar fiasco took place, Brig Malik advised 15 Div. not to move him, because he
expected a strong attack against his positions. HQ 15 Div. did not agree.

HQ 15 Div. ordered 24 Brigade to clear the imaginary enemy bridgehead at Jassar. Brig Malik
tasked 2 Punjab Regiment (my unit) to do the needful. The Commanding Officer, Lt Col Jamshed
MC Bar, SJ, suggested an attack at first light, instead of a night attack, because we had no idea
about the enemy location, terrain etc etc. But 15 Div. orders were clear and inflexible, and so
Col Jamshed, decided to lead the attack in person. But before this could be done, the actual
situation in Jassar became clear, and the attack was called off.

At about first light on 08 September, an NCO of the Engineers came into our positions. He told
of a heavy Indian attack that had severely mauled 3 F.F Regiment which was deployed as
screen. He was immediately taken to the Brigade HQ, where Brig Malik questioned him in the
presence of Col Jamshed and Major Aslam Shah, who was the B.M.

If Brig Malik had any doubt about a serious enemy thrust in his sector, that was now removed.
It took him about a minute to take, what many consider, the most important decision of the
war i.e. to advance on a broad front and engage the attacking enemy forces. This decision was
entirely Brig Malik’s, and it saved Pakistan. Had it gone wrong, he would have been court
martialled. Since he suspected that HQ 15 Div. was prone to panic, he ordered Maj. Aslam Shah
to break wireless contact with the Div. HQ (which was re-established when the enemy had been
engaged, and Tikka Khan had taken over 15 Div). Brig Malik then gave the operation orders to
his unit commanders, including Lt Col Nisar, CO 25 Cavalry. It is, therefore, absolutely incorrect
to say that Brig Malik “abdicated” his command to a unit commander. Indeed, after that first
day, 25 Cavalry was not involved in operations as regiment, because the situation warranted
squadron actions in support of infantry. And this support these squadrons unstintingly and
heroically provided. But this by no stretch of the imagination can be taken to mean the de facto
command of the Chawinda Battle was at any time exercised by Co 25 Cavalry. This remained
firmly in Brig Malik’s hands who remained unswerving and steadfast and central to the battle,
right till the very end.

After the first three days of almost continuous battle we had suffered serious depletion in
numbers, and had suffered extreme exhaustion both physically and mentally. And so we were
withdrawn from the FDLs to recover, but that same evening the situation at the front became
so alarming that we were thrust right back into the battle. It is a fair comment on the morale of
24 Brigade group that despite our bedraggled state and the mauling we had received, there was
no hesitation on the part of anyone to rejoin battle. From then, to the end of the war, 24
Brigade held its position and survived — but barely. It is difficult to explain what extreme
weariness really is.

There is mention in the article under reference, of Brig Malik’s request to be moved to the
“rear”, which was refused by Gen Abrar. If a Brigade Commander is to make such a suggestion,
he cannot just say “rear”. He has to give an alternate plan of operations which he must work
out with his staff. Gen Aslam Shah (then B.M) denies that any such suggestion was ever made,
and this fits into the experience of people like me, who were quite clearly told that for 24
Brigade, this was to be a “last man last round battle”. Therefore, if such a suggestion is
recorded, either its context is missing, or it is the result of a misunderstanding. When we were
suddenly pulled out of recuperation and sent back into battle (refer sub-para above) we were
told that we will be pulled back for refitment at the first possible opportunity. Perhaps this
could be the context.

2. And now I would like to make few general comments as under:-

Anyone reading the article under reference is bound to come away with the impression that the
Battle of Chawinda was fought exclusively by Brig Amjad Chaudhry, Lt Col Nisar, Maj.
Muhammad Ahmed, and the “direct participant” Maj. Shamshad. The infantry, it seems was
just not there. As authentic history, therefore, this article will be seen as trifle lop-sided. The
truth is that by sheer coincidence some very brave and steadfast men got thrown into what was
24 Brigade. With the courage of these men, came a good deal of luck by providence — and the
combination made for quite a number of gallant actions by all arms, and all ranks.

Brig Muhammad Ahmed was heroic, and so was Lt Col Nisar, but how can the rest of 25 Cavalry
be put into the dustbin of anonymity? Indeed I can’t think of one officer or tank commander
who did not perform.

Yes, General Abrar was a good commander. He was calm and poised and did not foist needless
interference on 24 Brigade. Brig Amjad Chaudhry too had a reputation of a good artillery
officer, though I would have to be a very brave man to declare him the best gunner officer in
the sub-continent. These officers held their nerve, and did not panic. And nor did they need to.
They were never within the sights of the enemy. But people like Lt Col Shinwari, Lt Col Jamshed
and Maj. Aslam Shah constantly were, and yet they kept their calm. And last but not the least
the composure of Brig Abdul Ali Malik deserves to be saluted. Throughout the battle his HQ was
either in the FDLs or not more than 400 yds in the rear. He kept his cool in the face of direct
enemy fire for days at end — comparison between him and the others is like comparing a
fighter in the ring with the audience. When Lt Gen (Retd) Tariq, S. J came on PTV two years ago
on the occasion of Defence Day, he talked of his experiences of the Battle of Chawinda. He was
generous in his praise of many gallant actions. But he singled out Brig Malik beyond all the rest
as the man whose battle it really was, while all the rest of us revolved around him. Having seen
him at close quarters, I cannot disagree with this assessment.

3. Lastly, to call a respected senior officer “a VCO type” General, was not in very good taste.

Farouk Adam Khan S. J

27 June 001

REPLY OF A.H AMIN TO EX MAJOUR FAROUK ADAM PUBLISHED ALONG SIDE FAROUK ADAMS
LETTER IN DEFENCE JOURNAL :---
I refer to Ex Major Farouk Adam Khan’s S.J letter on my article “ Battle of Chawinda” .

I have only touched “incidents and aspects” of the battle about which “I could be certain” based
on the “authority of tangible concrete and precise” records in the form of “ official sources of
the Pakistan Army” like Major General Shaukat Riza’s “The Pakistan Army-War 1965” sponsored
and published by the Pakistan Army and printed by the Pakistan Army Press in 1984 , The
Pakistan Army Green Book-1992 the official yearbook of the Pakistan Army published by the
Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters and accounts of direct participants like Major Shamshad.
I had the opportunity of meeting other participants like Brigadier Ahmad in 1982 , Lieutenant
Colonel Raza in 1993 and Major Shamshad in 2000. In addition, I met a large number of
participants while serving in 11 Cavalry from 27th March 1983 till 9th April 1985.

l Firstly the assertion by the worthy critic that the Indian mailbag was captured by an
exfiltrating element of Gibraltar Force. The Gibraltar Force was a fiasco of magnanimous
proportions and very few exfiltrated in good shape what to talk of capturing a mail bag. The
mail bag was captured by a deliberate ambush launched under the direction of Headquarter 15
Division under direction of Col S.G Mehdi. The official account on this episode is clear. Thus
Shaukat Riza states “Lt Col Sher Zaman (MI Directorate) ordered Col S.G Mehdi (15 Division) to
lay an ambush on the road (Samba-Kathua), and get some prisoners. At 0100 hours night
3rd/4th September, Zaman had a call from an excited Mehdi. An Indian despatch rider had
been captured. His message bag contained mail for HQ Squadron 1 Indian Armoured Division.
The bag was immediately flown to Rawalpindi.” (Refers-Pages-133 & 134-The Pakistan
Army-War 1965-Shaukat Riza-Army Education Press-1984).

l What happened after this at least on paper was a mystery till Gen N.U.K Babar cleared this
point on paper in an interview conducted by this scribe and published in DJ April 2000 issue by
stating that the mail box was dismissed as an Indian deception by the then DMI Brigadier
Irshad.

l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states about Brigadier Malik i.e “It took him about a minute to
take the most important decision of the war i.e to advance on a broad front and engage the
attacking enemy forces”. Now this is a figment of the worthy critics imagination. In “Summer
1997“ issue of “Pakistan Army Journal“ Brigadier Nisar the Commanding Officer of 25 Cavalry
gave his version of the Battle of Gadgor-Chawinda. Nowhere in the article did Nisar state that
Brigadier Malik gave him any order on the decisive 8th of September “to advance on a broad
front and engage the enemy”. On the other hand this point has been treated very clearly by
Shaukat Riza in the Pakistani GHQ’s officially sponsored account. Shaukat describes the initial
situation on the crucial morning of 8th September 1965 in the following words “At about 0600
hours 24 Brigade received the news that 3 FF had been overrun. Brigadier Ali Malik got on to
Col Nisar and ordered 25 Cavalry to do something”. (Refers Page - 148-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit)
That was the only order Malik gave. All the subsequent deployment was done by Nisar and the
brunt of the Indian attack was borne by “Bravo Squadron” of 25 Cavalry commanded by Major
Ahmad. It was Col Nisar and Nisar alone who did the broad front deployment without any
orders to resort to any broad front deployment from Brigadier Malik.

l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states that Brigadier Malik never made a request for a
withdrawal on 16th September. My source for stating that Brigadier Malik made a request for
withdrawing from Chawinda position is none other than a major direct participant staff officer
of the battle i.e Major K.M Arif the then GSO-2 (Operations) 6th Armoured Division at
Chawinda. It was 6th Armoured Division Headquarters which controlled the battle after 9th
September. It is very strange that the critic finds my narration odd rather than contesting the
authority which I quoted to support my assertion. In an article published in Pakistan Army
Green Book-1992-Year of the Senior Field Commanders, General K.M Arif (Retired) made the
following assertion i.e “The battle raged with considerable intensity on September 16. After its
failure to capture Chawinda the enemy failed to envelop it by a two pronged attack. In the
process the villages of Sodreke fell and Buttur Dograndi came under attack. The severe fighting
resulted in many casualties. The situation was confused and the outcome uncertain .So fluid the
situation became that at 1630 hours 24 Brigade Commander requested permission to take up a
position in the rear.Abrar told the brigade commander on telephone, “You know what is there
in the kitty. There is no question of falling back.We shall fight till the bitter end from our present
positions.” His words proved a timely tonic. 24 Brigade fought gallantly. Soon the danger
subsided.” (Refers -Page -6-” Abrar’s Battlefield Decisions”-Pakistan Army Green Book-Year of
Senior Commanders-Pakistan Army-General Headquarters-Rawalpindi-1992). This assertion was
made by one of the principal staff officers of the 6th Armoured Division who was present on the
scene and not a figment of my imagination.

l Even 6th Armoured Division’s War Diary contains a record of the above mentioned telephone
call.

l As to the worthy critic’s assertion in paragraph 1 about de facto command of Chawinda Battle
remaining in Brigadier Malik till the end. All that I stated was that during the most decisive
encounter of the whole battle at Gadgor on 8th September it was Nisar and Nisar alone who
exercised coup d oeil deploying his regiment entirely on his own without any orders from 24
Brigade about “any broad front deployment” or any “specific orders to deploy in any particular
disposition”. After this decisive encounter at Gadgor the Indians did not do anything till 11th
September. From 10th September 6th Armoured Division entered the scene and controlled the
Chawinda battle, 24 Brigade being one of the many brigades that it commanded.
l Refers the criticism in paragraph 2 that “the battle was fought exclusively by Amjad Chaudhry,

Lt Col Nisar, Major Mohammad Ahmad and the direct participant Major Shamshad” all I can say
is that the critic did not read my article but only scanned through it.On map opposite Page-40 it
is written that C squadron i.e Shamshad’s squadron arrived opposite Gadgor area at 1130 hours
after the situation had been stabilised. On various pages I have stated eg “ 25 Cavalry was to
Pakistan Army’s good luck, a newly raised but extremely fine tank regiment” (Refers-Page-43).
The same point is repeated on various pages.

l About Abdul Ali Malik’s command qualities Gen Fazal Muqeem notes in his “Pakistan’s Crisis in
Leadership” “The few counterattacks which 8 Division tried during the war were most
noticeable by their lack of planning.The units were hurled into battle without having been given
enough time for planning and preparations .The worst example of this attack was on December
17 when against all protestations of its very gallant commanding officer , 35 FF was sent into
battle for almost certain massacre” (Refers-Page-215 and 216-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-
Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Lahore-1973).

l Chawinda was an armour battle and this is proved by casualties suffered by tank and infantry
units. How many infantry units except 3 FF could match the casualties of 11 Cavalry in 1965 i.e
34 killed. As a matter of fact the direct participant Major Shamshad has referred to one counter
attack in which an infantry company of 2 Punjab had Nil killed and two officers got the SJ. Even
in Chamb during Grand Slam 11 Cavalry lost 19 killed on 1st September 1965 alone while 14
Punjab lost a total of 3 killed in the entire Grand Slam. (Refers-Page-108 1 & 109-Pak
Bharat Jang-Colonel Mukhtar Gillani -Rawalpindi-April -1998). As a matter of fact 11 Cavalry
suffered more casualties in Grand Slam than all ten infantry units except one i.e 13 Punjab
which had lost 24 killed as against 11 Cavalry’s 19 killed.But then the strength of an armoured
regiment is around 400 vis-a-vis 800 of infantry.

l Lastly the reference to VCO. This was purely symbolic and had nothing to do with rank or
status in the literal sense. Sher Bahadur’s efforts to divide and distribute the 4 Corps Artillery
Headquarter before the 1965 War have been discussed by an authority no less eminent than
Pakistan Army’s last C in C, Gul Hassan.This if done would have seriously compromised chances
of Pakistani success in Grand Slam and Chawinda.Without concentrated artillery at Grand Slam
or in Chawinda none including Abrar or Malik could have defeated the Indians.

Kind Regards
A.H Amin (pavocavalry@hotmail.com)

-------------------------------------------------------------
BRIGADIER KAMAL ALAMS AND COLONEL ANWARS LETTERS TO DEFENCE JOURNAL AND MY
REBUTTAL AS ASSISTANT EDITOR DEFENCE JOURNAL OF JANUARY 2002:---
Brig Kamal Alam and Colonel Anwars Criticism of Chawinda and A.H Amin's Reply Defence
Journal January 2002

Dear Major Sehgal,

In his letter in Defence Journal of Aug 2001, Mr . Amin says that in the Pak Army Journal
(Summer 97) Brig Nisar does not mention any order coming his way from his Brigade Comd on 8
Sept 1965. I am no historian but some questions immediately come to mind viz. Does Col Nisar
also mention that the Brigade Commander told him to “do something”? If not who is to be
believed, Brig Nisar or Gen Riza. And if he was not told to “do something“, what major event
galvanized him into taking this unilateral action against the enemy advance? Did he get
information about the enemy advance himself, or did someone give it to him, and if so who?
When he got his information, was he in the presence of the Brigade Commander , or was in
wireless contact with him? And when he decided to strike out on his own, did he at least inform
the Brigade? And if so what transpired; or did the rest of the Brigade merely follow 25 Cav
through guess-work?

The point I want to make is that in order to be classified as “history“ we have to first establish
whether 25 Cav was a part of a larger formation, or was acting in a vacuum. And if it was
subordinate to

24 Brigade, did it take itself out of the Brigade ORBAT on its own, or did if take the Brigade
under its own command. This relationship can only be settled by the communication between
the two. So far it has been considered a settled fact beyond any controversy, that this Brigade
and all its components fought an outstanding action. After all there have been M Ds and
presentation on the subject for the last 36 years and most officers have had a chance to take
part in one or another of these. And no adverse comment has come to tarnish the reputation of
any officer of the brigade.

It is only recently that through one sentence of Maj Gen Shaukat Riza ‘s Book almost all infantry
actions of this battle seem to have been nullified, and the brave conduct of the Bridge
Commander has been found fit to be relegated to those who functioned below par.

I am afraid that Gen Riza’s Book is primarily the amalgam of various war diaries, with very little
original research , “officially sponsored” to give the “official view“. A very good insight into its
historical value and credibility lies in what it has to say regarding the change of command in
Chamb, which is a scandal that has refused to be hushed up despite the best official efforts. On
page 121 of the book Gen Riza blatantly states that change of Command in Chamb was pre-
planned. And then he goes on to brazenly assert that this was confirmed by most officers in
GHQ and 12 Div. He forgot that this was a deliberate, set-piece attack, the operation orders for
which per force would have to be attended by GOC 7 Div, if the command was to change, and
all the lower formations would have known about it, and at least some shred of documentary
evidence of this effect would have survived, at least in GHQ. But there is not a word extant to
corroborate this cover-up. And what is worst is that immediately after the war in Staff College
under, Gen Riza was serving “a 12 Div officer” who was the GOC of this Division. He was Gen
Akhtar Malik. At a time when even subalterns like me could question Gen Malik on this subject
and get a candid reply, it is impossible to believe that Gen Riza did not know all details of this
change from the horse’s mouth. And knowing this and then wilfully distorting history is
deserving of the strongest opprobrium. And then DJ takes one line of this “history” and knocks
out all infantry actions, and goes further to malign the commander of Chawinda Brigade! And
now this is to pass for history?

Brig (Retd) Kamal Alam, TJ

14 Dec 2001
To : The Editor Defence Journal
Karachi
Sir,

I refer to letter by Mr. Farouk Adam and Mr. Amin on the Battle of Chawinda (Defence Journal
Aug 2001). In 1972, in company of some regimental at officers I met Gen A .A Malik in Mangla.
The question of 3 F F came up. He said the heaviest attacks seemed to come wherever this unit
was deployed. As such at one point he had to ask the Div HQ if there was any possibility for this
unit to be relieved and rested. The Div HQ said this was not possible. War diaries are often not
written immediately . There are often inaccuracies in them. Is it possible that this event is being
referred to by both writers? At any rate 24 Brigade War Diary should also be consulted.

Mr. Amin quotes Gen Riza’s Book i.e. Brig Malik got on to ...............” From this it is obvious that
it means the communication was by wireless or telephone. But I have attended an M D on this
battle and also heard its narration from Brig Shinwari. Both were nearer to Farouk Adam’s
explanation of events of

8 Sept. Mr. Amin says he has referred to “official sources” and “officially sponsored” GHQ
account of this Battle. This is its weak point. Our “officially sponsored accounts” unfortunately
have been cover-ups. Gen Riza wrote about such an important battle without interviewing any
infantry CO, or any officer of the Brigade HQ, when they were all alivel! What sort of history is
this?

I heard the talk by Lt Gen Tariq S. J to which Farouk Adam has referred. I have also heard him
on the subject in person. He said that all units gave their very best but also that the Brigade
Commander’s conduct, whose HQ was often in line of direct fire, was most inspiring.

After reading the original article one gets the impression that the whole battle was fought by
Col Nisar and Maj Ahmed ably supported by Brig Amjad Chowdhry’s guns. It seems infantry was
non-existant! Granted it was a tank battle and very well done by 25 Cav. But I can’t recall any
DEFENSIVE tank battle over two weeks duration without an infantry firm base. And if Chawinda
base did not hold, that would be the end of the tank battle also. But the infantry did hold,
better than any infantry brigade on either side. And the Brigade Commander showed more
pluck than any officer of his rank, also on either side. I am willing to stand corrected on this.
And if not corrected, will not this make these units and Brig Malik deserving of credit?

Lt Col Mohammad Anwar

5 Dec 2001

REPLY TO CRITICISM OF BRIG ALAM AND COL ANWAR ON ARTICLE “BATTLE OF CHAWINDA”
AND SUBSEQUENT LETTERS PUBLISHED IN DJ MARCH 2001 ISSUES AND AUGUST AND
SEPTEMBER 2001 ISSUES

It is amusing as well as encouraging to note that this scribe’s article on Chawinda Battle of 1965
published in Defence Journal March 2001 issue continues to attract flak from critics!

The latest in the series are two letters , both written by retired officers . First of all I must clarify
that my sole motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write “what men did” rather
than what “they ought ideally to have done” or what “someone later with the benefit of
hindsight tried to portray , what they had done”. Thus the analysis of Chawinda Battle done
with pure loyalty to service without any inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure and
unadulterated military history filtered dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth
from reality. How far I succeeded is for readers to judge.

History as Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a free country and ours has
been continuously under civil or military dictators since 1958. Enters Defence Journal which in
its resurrected form from 1997 picked up the gauntlet of serving as a medium of intellectual
honesty and forthright criticism and published facts which were unpalatable for some and
welcomed by the vast multitude. A breath of fresh air in a country reduced to intellectual
stagnation because of years of censorship and intellectual persecution! I had written for the
Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel but had left military history writing when in 1998 through a
dear friend I discovered that there is a new Defence Journal in Karachi which is open to some
critical writing!

I maintain as one great master of English prose said that “all history so far as it is not supported
by contemporary evidence is romance”! Battle of Chawinda published in DJ March 2001 was
thus not romance! What many in this country wrote and was outwardly military history was
essentially “Romance”! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth promiscuously mixed with reality!

Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important role! Nisar,
when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of him ! KK Singh Commander 1st
Indian Brigade also did not know what was in front of him! This mutual ignorance saved
Pakistan on that crucial day ! Later heroes were created! I repeat “Heroes were created” ! This
was what the article was all about !
What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was “casualties” ! These were
deliberately hidden since these would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would have
discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on parochial,regimental or old boy
links !How many were killed in the biggest military blunder “Operation Gibraltar”! This is Top
Secret ! How many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no mention of any figures! The real
motivation here is not national interest but to preserve or more important to “guard
reputations”
INDIAN CENTURION TANK OF INDIAN FIRST TANK DIVISION CAPTURED BY 25 CAVALRY

Brigadier Kamal Alam’s Letter

a. I stick to the assertion that the “broad front deployment” was done by Nisar and Nisar alone
and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is another matter that Nisar also did not know
what was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both contending fleets were running towards
each other at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did and what actually happened
even today is hard to understand, whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of
hindsight! Brigadier Alam offers no tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to
do with what Brig A.A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to “do something” and Nisar did
something without the least clue of what was in front of him. The important thing is that Nisar
did something rather than getting paralysed into inertia and inaction! I may add a personal note
here. I understand that Alam’s elder brother Brig Mujahid Alam COS 31 Corps while this scribe
was commanding 5 Independent Armoured Squadron was a fine soldier.

b. Alam raises the question about the controversial “Do Something” order by Brig A.A Malik to
Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry. The same words were repeated by Nisar in his article published in
Pakistan Army Journal in 1997. Then Alam raises the question about 25 Cavalry functioning in a
vacuum. 24 Brigade had two infantry units, one which had been overrun and dispersed on 8th
September i.e 3 FF and 2 Punjab which was at Chawinda. The crucial action took place at
Gadgor few miles north of Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire Indian 1st Armoured
Division. This was an extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own best judgement since
Malik had abdicated to Nisar by stating that he should do something. It is another thing that
Nisar also did not know what was in front of him and acted boldly and unconventionally. Had he
known what was in front of him he may have been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is
speculation and some part of history always remains unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted
through sheer reflex and deployed his unit in an impromptu manner. The fire fight which took
place at Gadgor between 0900 hours and 1200 hours was a pure tank versus tank affair. 25
Cavalry versus two leading tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured Division! Thus the Indian
Armoured Corps historian stated “The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two squadrons
of Pattons and in the first encounter had lost more tanks than the enemy had...the worst
consequence of the days battle was its paralysing effect on the minds of the higher
commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next move. This interval gave
Pakistanis time to deploy their 6th Armoured Division...in fact the golden opportunity that fate
had offered to the 1st Armoured Division to make worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost”
(Refers-Pages-393 & 394-History of Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-
Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus the Indians acknowledged “This regiment’s (25 Cavalry)
performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured
division and its objective, the MRL canal”.

(Refers-Page-395-Ibid).

c. At Gadgor on 8th September it was 25 Cavalry and 25 Cavalry alone which saved the day.
Major Shamshad a direct participant has already stated on record that SJs were awarded to
some officers for an attack in which not a single man was killed on both sides!

d. 25 Cavalry was part of 24 Brigade but all that Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th September at
Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On 9th and 10th September no fighting took place as
Indians had withdrawn their armoured division to the crossroads. On 10th September, 6
Armoured Division took over and 24 Brigade was a part of 6 Armoured Division. On 8th
September there was a vacuum and Nisar acted in a sitaution which can be classified as one
characterised by “absence of clear and precise orders”!
INDIAN CENTURION CAPTURED BY 25 CAVALRY AT ITS QUARTER GUARD

e. Shaukat Riza’s book is basically a compilation of existing facts. It has historical value since
Riza was allowed access to official records.

f. The change of command aspect about which Alam asserts is correct and was officially hushed
up but why should Shaukat Riza have any sympathy for the armoured corps of 1960s which was
arrogant and looked down on artillery as I personally witnessed right till 1980s as a young
officer in Kharian and Multan? Artillery officers were never welcomed in armoured corps unit
messes unless real exceptions based on personal ties and armour officers rarely visited artillery
messes.
g. Chawinda was a tank battle, thus armour suffered more casualties. On the other hand Lahore
was an infantry battle where the indomitable 1st Baluch lost something like around 30 killed in
battle , more casualties than most infantry units in the much trumpeted Grand Slam.

h. Now I offer some figures for the readers to form their own conclusions:--
UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES IN OPERATION GRAND REMARKS
SLAM
6 PUNJAB 9
9 PUNJAB 15
13 PUNJAB 24
14 PUNJAB 3 WHAT KIND OF FIGHTING THIS UNIT DID IF IT
SUFFERED 3 KILLED ?
15 PUNJAB 8
8 BALOCH 10
11 CAVALRY 19
13 LANCERS 14
REFERS-PAGE-109-PAKISTAN BHARAT JANG-1965-COL MUKHTAR GILLANI-RAWALPINDI-JULY
1998 AND UNIT SOURCES 13 LANCERS AND 11 CAVALRY

The above casualties prove that Grand Slam was both an infantry and armour battle yet armour
suffered proportionately more casualties since the effective battle strength of a tank unit is half
that of an infantry unit. 14 Punjab lost just 3 killed while 10 Guides Cavalry at Chawinda lost 3
killed in officers alone apart from 12 OR/JCOs killed! 11 Cavalry lost more in killed casualties in
1965 War than any of the above units of the Grand Slam i.e 34 killed. No fault of infantry since
Chawinda was an essentially a tank battle.

i. Brigadier Alam does not give any figures which prove that infantry suffered more casualties at
Chawinda. I have already admitted in my letter that the only infantry unit which bore the brunt
of Indian assault was 3 FF on the 8th September. 3 FF aside the brunt of the attack at Chawinda
was borne by armour units since Chawinda was a tank battle. At Lahore, the brunt of the attack
was faced by infantry since Lahore i.e 10 Division battle was an essentially infantry battle. Thus,
there were units like 1st Baloch and 16 Punjab which suffered tremendous casualties.1st Baloch
suffering casualties of 31 killed in 10 Division Area (Refers-Page-139-Col Gillani-Op Cit). 16
Punjab suffering casualties of 106 killed and 70 missing most of whom were killed (more than
total of all regular infantry units in Grand Slam) (Refers-Page-138-Col Gillani). On the other
hand there were formations which in words of Colonel Mukhtar Gillani exaggerated the fighting
and suffered nominal casualties like the 103 Brigade in 10 Division area (Refers Page-143-Col
Gillani).

j. Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big battle in terms of casualties since the Indian 1
Corps suffered less casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi Sutlej Corridor.

k. Brigadier Alam has mixed inter arm rivalry with operational leadership and personalities.
Infantry had a role in Chawinda. Every arm and service had a role. If I have not discussed
infantry actions in detail it is not because infantry did nothing at Chawinda but simply because
Chawinda was a tank dominated battle with artillery playing a crucial role. Had I been biased I
would not have stated in various articles that the greatest tank commander of Pakistan Army at
operational level was Maj Gen Iftikhar who was an infantry man. Similarly Ibrar whose conduct I
pointed out as most decisive was again an infantry man .

l. If Brigadier Alam wants to highlight the infantry side of the battle he is free to write an article
on the “Role of Infantry at Chawinda”.
m. I have also compiled some casualty figures of armour units in 1965 which will give the reader
a fair idea of who did what and who suffered more or less:—

UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES

4 CAVALRY 17
5 HORSE 5
6 LANCERS 20
GUIDES 15
11 CAVALRY 34
12 CAVALRY 8
13 LANCERS 14
15 LANCERS 8
19 LANCERS 18
20 LANCERS NIL
22 CAVALRY 1
23 CAVALRY 18
24 CAVALRY 14
25 CAVALRY 16
30 TDU 3
31 TDU 7
32 TDU 7
33 TDU 9 JASSAR 9

Note:—These casualties were compiled personally and may not be wholly or totally accurate.

n. Lastly, Alam’s assertion that DJ is distorting history. A bit naive since articles published in
journals are opinions of individual writers and not of the management. This is true for all
journals whether it is Pakistan Army Journal or Command and Staff College Citadel.

o. Finally, Brigadier Alam’s letter was crude and lacked common courtesy that one would
associate or expect from one holding the rank of a brigadier.

Lt Col M. Anwar’s Letter:—

a. I was not referring to 3 FF when I discussed Brig A.A Malik’s withdrawal request of 16
September. Hence, Col Anwar has misunderstood the point. Brig A.A Malik had requested
permission to withdraw when Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on 16th September and
occupied Buttur Dograndi and Sodreke. This fact was brought to light not by the much criticised
Shaukat Riza but by the then GSO-2 of 6 Armoured Division Major (later General K.M Arif), first
more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green Book-1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently
published book Khaki Shadows. Thus no connection with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as I
know suffered more casualties than any other infantry unit at Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably
but was launched thoughtlessly as brought out by Major Shamshad in his letter published in
Sept 2001 DJ and consequently suffered enormous casualties at Sodreke-Buttur Dograndi area.
Shamshad was the tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when it disastrously attacked Buttur
Dograndi. In opinion of Shamshad, the attack had failed not due to any fault of 3 FF but because
of poor planning by Commander 24 Brigade.

b. About the assertion of Col Anwar that official sources are cover ups, all that one can state is
that if these are cover ups why don’t experts like Brigadier Alam and Farouk Adam or Col Anwar
or Lt Gen Tariq devote some time to writing serious military history.

c. In my writings I have relied on official, unofficial and personal as well as Indian accounts. If
someone has better knowledge of facts he is most welcome to apply his intellect and come out
with a better account.

d. Anwar has a point that infantry was holding a firm base. I have not denied this anywhere. My
emphasis, however, was on the real battle, the armour battle which was fought at Chawinda. It
is up to a reader to form subjective conclusions.

e. Anwar states that infantry has been ignored, I contend that the real fact which has not been
favourably received by some is that Brig A.A Malik has not been projected as much in my article
as he had been before. Infantry, is an arm and I have great respect for it , A.A Malik was an
individual who did well and rose to three star rank despite launching poorly planned counter
attacks as brought out by

Gen Fazal i Muqeem in 1971 War as a GOC .

Lastly I want to quote a great captain of war :—

“ I am not publishing my memoirs, not theirs and we all know that no three honest witnesses of
a brawl can agree on all the details. How much more likely will be the differences in a great
battle covering a vast space of broken ground, when each division, brigade, regiment and even
company naturally and honestly believes that it was the focus of the whole affair! Each of them
won the battle. None ever lost. That was the fate of the old man who unhappily commanded”.

“Memoirs of General Sherman”

Lastly my humble submission; Chawinda was about operational leadership, not small unit
actions or projecting individuals or maligning them. If someone feels otherwise it is his
subjective opinion.

Kind regards

A.H Amin
--------------------
MAJOR SHAMSADS SEPTEMBER 2001 LETTER PUBLISHED IN DEFENCE JOURNAL REBUTTING
FAROUK ADAM AND KAMAL ALAM AND COLONEL ANWAR:---

Major Shamshads Rebuttal of Farouk Adams Account of Chawinda-Defence Journal September

2001
The Editor
Defence Journal
Karachi.
Dear Sir,

Brig (Retd) Muhammad Ahmed

The May 2001 edition of your esteemed magazine carries a letter by Brig (Retd) Mohammed
Ahmed which mentions as under,
“Major Shamshad is right, in a way, when he says only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur. The
little difference being that only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur the others were turned
back half way when the Jassar fiasco was discovered.

I would like to correct the record here.

The entire action of night 7/8 and 08 Sept has been covered in a single article appeared in Oct
1997 edition of DJ. I have nowhere stated or recorded what Brig Ahmed has ascribed to me. An
editing error has appeared in the March 2001 edition of DJ which the Brig should have
corrected rather than confirming it.

The fact is that entire regiment moved to Pasrur on its way to Jassar. The regiment was
detained at Pasrur while Charlie Squadron was despatched to Jassar which reached Narowal at
0300 hours and turned about to reach Pasrur at 0500 hours.

BATTLE OF CHAWINDA

The August issue of DJ carries a letter by Farooq Adam SJ on the subject and another by Mr A H
Amin who is on the panel of D J. Both the gentlemen have made reference to me. I, therefore,
feel obliged to put in my word to keep the record straight.

Farooq Adam, as a direct participant appears to have reservations about the description of the
battle by A H Amin who was not a participant. He has merely conducted research and has
adequately defended his point of view by quoting his source of knowledge. A H Amin has
quoted Gen Fazle Moqeem who has reflected upon command quality of Brig Ali and how 35 FF
was massacred in Nawa Pind in 1971. To support the opinion of Gen Fazle Moqeem I can quote
one out of several ill planned attacks which fizzled out in initial stages, ordered by Brig Ali in
1965. On the morning of 17 Sept 3rd FF were ordered to attack Jassora with a company. A
detailed discription has been published in May 1998 issue of DJ. For those who could not reach
that edition and also to prove inanity of command I shall describe the attack precisely. The
company was commanded by Capt Raheem Shah and was supported by my troop of three
tanks.

I submitted to CO 3FF that before attacking Jassoran, which was 2000 yards away from Railway
line, we had to clear Buttardograndi half way between Railway line and Jassoran. I also
informed him that area Jassoran-Buttardograndi is occupied by a tank regiment supported by
an infantry battalion which I faced on 16 Sept and eventually my troop was shot up by that
force. It was impossible to dislodge an armoured brigade by attacking with a company and
three tanks. My plea was brushed aside with remark that Butterdograndi had been cleared
during the night. As we formed up behind railway line heavy artillery fire was dropped on us
causing casualties to our infantry. In the FUP we located a centurian in Battalion one which was
destroyed. Finally we attacked without artillery. Capt Raheem Shah and his company displayed
tremendous courage.

8 Gharwal was entered in the middle of 5 feet high maze crop. As our men reached the
trenches they were fired at from point blank range. Many of them fell other turned and went to
ground. They were surprised: I saw this massacre standing in cupola from a distance of 50
yards. I moved the tank up and mounted the trenches. By this time I had reached the killing
range of enemy tanks deployed in Jassoran. My tank was shot up and went into flames. My
second tank was also hit and damaged. The third tank turret # 1, tank commanded by LD Kamal
prudently did come up and was saved. In this swift action two enemy tanks were also
destroyed. Here the attack fizzled out.

It is now for the reader to assess the competence of higher command. In my opinion it was
callous act to launch a company and three tank against an armoured brigade. To further
illustrate my point of view, a quotation from a book (Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman) will
be in place.

Quote “When the moment of live ammunition approaches, the moment to which his
professional training is directed, the issue of the combat, even the fate of the campaign may
depend on his decision. What is happening in the heart and vitals of a commander. Some are
made bold by the moment, some irresolute, some carefully judicious, some paralyzed and
powerless to act” Unquote. I place ours higher in the last category.

After having gone through the letter of Farooq Adam and his two earlier scripts, on the subject
(“Hero of Chawinda” published in daily The News in April/ May 1992 and “THE ALI OF
CHAWINDA”published in UNIFORM Sept 1994 issue) I can say that his writing is more of fiction
than honest description of the events on the battlefield. On reading his script of 1992, I
expressed my views which have been published in daily THE NEWS of May 1992. I reproduce
below the opening paragraph of the article which delivers goods to those who are interested to
know the facts.
Quote”On the outset I shall mention here that I have never served in the direct command of
Brig Ali. Hence there is no possibility of having ill will or malice towards him. However, I feel
that both the writers have tried to aggrandize the revered general out of proportion. I hold this
opinion as I have first hand knowledge about the Battle of Chawinda. I was a troop leader and
squadron commander in 25 cavalry which was a part of Brig Ali’s brigade. Mr Agha Babar should
show Adam’s article to his literary friends in Newyork to be appreciated as a good piece of
literature. Anyone with little knowledge about army matters and warfare will confront him with
awkward questions such as, Why should Brig Ali ask Col Nisar as to how many tanks did he
have? Was he ignorant of the organisation and deployment of his only tank regiment?. Why did
Farooq Adam leave his defensive position when enemy tanks were still more than a mile away?
Why did he not wait for the tanks to destroy once they reached the killing zone of his ante tank
weapons? Why was Chobara captured and abandoned time and again?. Was a pitched battle
fought at Chobara? If so what was the score of casualties? And many more such
questions.’Unquote.

The knowledge which Farooq Adam wants to share with the readers is of no consequence
unless he first fixes his position in a fighting unit. Was he a platoon /company commander or a
staff officer. I have gone through his three scripts mentioned above. Only at one place
(UNIFORM Sept 1994) he said that he was attached to Major Mohammad Hussain whose
company was to follow 25 cavalry tanks on the morning of 8 Sept. Was he attached to Major
Mohammad Hussain to advise him.

I will not go in details here, which of course I have, to prove that whatever Farooq has written is
all truth. Only one example is enough to prove what I state.

On page 59 of the periodical UNIFORM of Sept 1994 he writes while describing the dialogue
between Brig Ali and Col Nisar. “How many tanks do you have? One squadron of tanks right
here, another dismounting from transporters nearby”. He claims that these words were
exchanged at Chawinda in the morning at Chawinda on 8 Sept. This is totally untrue. The whole
regiment was concentrated at Pasrur. Col Nisar was called by Brig and told “enemy had come
think about it”. He must have also told him that enemy tanks were advancing on Charwa-
Cawinda track. What happened thereafter has been recorded by me in the form of 8 articles in
D J starting from Oct 1997 to May 1998. 9th and concluding article will appear in near future.
My suggestion to Farooq is to write an account of 17 days as he saw the battle moving day by
day, mere eulogy is not welcomed.

Passing orders is a simple affair.The quality of effort a commander makes to insure the
implementation of the order is what that matters. The extent of personal involvement, his
control and direction of the events, his presence at the place and time where the fate of the
battle is being decided are the factors which go in to assess the competence of a commander.
In this light I found our leader wanting.

Maj (Retd) Shamshad Ali Khan

-----------------------
BRIGADIER SIMONS LETTER OF 2008 BASED ON HIS DISCUSSION WITH VARIOUS DIRECT
PARTICIPTANTS:---

AGHA AMIN AND BATTLE OF SIALKOT-1965

JUL 24, 2008 THU 12:07 PM

I KNOW THE URGENCY AGHA AMIN HAD IN CONTACTING ME REPEATEDLY ABOUT HIS ILOG ON
CHOWINDA, BUT I WANTED CERTAIN CONFIRMATIONS BEFORE PUTTING MY VIEWS. IN THE
COURSE, I TRACED AND TALKED TO SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THIS BATTLE AND AGREE
THAT AGHA AMIN’S ACCOUNT IS MOST ACCURATE.

FIRST, HATS OFF AND A TRIBUTE TO THOSE SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT BRAVELY IN THE BATTLE
OF CHOWINDA DESPITE THE CONFUSION GENERATED BY THE PAPER TIGER COMMANDERS LIKE
GEN. ISMAIL, SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI KHAN AND MANY MORE WHO EARNED LAURELS OVER
THE DEAD BODIES OF THEIR SOLDIERS.

1. INDIAN PLANS. YES IT WAS AN FIU OPERATION SUPPORTED BY AN INFANTRY AMBUSH PARTY
THAT CAPTURED AN INDIAN DESPATCH RIDER. THOUGH THE INDIAN OPERATIONAL
INSTRUCTIONS COINCIDED WITH GEN. YAHYA’S LEADING HYPOTHESES OF AN INDIAN MAIN
OFFENSIVE IN THIS SECTOR, THESE DESPATCHES WERE RUBBISHED AS DECEPTION BY THE
MASTER PAKISTANI THINK TANK. THE ORIGINAL HYPOTHESIS WAS DOWNGRADED BY THE NEW
GOC 15 DIVISION MAJOR GENERAL ISMAIL, DEPUTY DIVISION COMMANDER BRIGADIER RIAZ UL
KARIM, CORPS COMMANDER LT. GEN BAKHTIAR RANA, AND DEPUTY CORPS COMMANDER
DESIGNATE SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI KHAN ONCE INDIAN’S ATTACKED JASSAR.

“HOWA KE PEHLEY HE JHONKEY PE HAAR MAN GAI

WOHI CHIRAGH JO HUM NE JALA KE RAKHAY THAY”

2. JASSAR ENCLAVE. IT IS AN ENCLAVE WHERE MAJOR OPERATIONS FROM NEITHER SIDE WERE
POSSIBLE AS THE TERRAIN IS DIVIDED BY RIVER RAVI. YET WHEN AN INFANTRY BRIGADE WAS
DESPATCHED IN HASTE TO DEFEND THE BRIDGE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RIVER, THE LEADING
UNIT HAD VERY LITTLE DEFENSIVE POWER IN TERMS OF PREPARATION AND DEFENCE STORES.
CONSEQUENTLY, SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS WERE OVER RUN IN DOUBLE QUICK TIME BY A
DIVERSIONARY ATTACK OF AN INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE PRIOR TO THE MAIN ATTACK ON
LINE CHARWA- CHOBARA- PHILORA. BRIGADIER MUZAFFAR MADE A VERY BIG BLUNDER OF
JUDGEMENT IN HIS ASSESSMENT AND REPORTED IN PANIC THAT AN INDIAN MAIN HAD BEEN
LAUNCHED.. AS A RESULT THE ENTIRE DEFENCE OF SIALKOT SECTOR WAS UNHINGED IN PANIC
AND 24 BRIGADE MINUS 3FF IN SCREENS AND 25 CAVALRY WERE MOVED IN HASTE TOWARDS
JASSAR. THE DEFENCE HAD TAKEN A 90 DEGREE TURN. IN THIS VACUUM WHAT REMAINED
BETWEEN INDIA AND SIALKOT WERE THE SCREEN POSITIONS OF 3FF. ON THE EVENING OF 7TH
SEPTEMBER, GOC 15 DIVISION ORDERED 24 BRIGADE AND 25 CAVALRY TO LAUNCH A COUNTER
ATTACK ON JASSAR. THE RESERVES WERE NEAR NAROWAL AND THE DIVISION HEADQUARTER
PREPARING FOR A WHITE LINEN DINNER, WHEN INDIAN DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY BEGAN
POUNDING 3FF POSITIONS. MAJOR MEHMOOD OF AVIATION THEN TOOK THE RISK OF FLYING
OVER JASSAR ONLY TO REPORT THAT THE BRIDGE OVER RIVER RAVI WAS IN TACT AND IN
PAKISTANI OCCUPATION. A SQUADRON OF 25 CAVALRY UNDER MAJOR SHAMSHAD HAD
ALREADY REACHED THE JASSAR SECTOR WHILE THE TWO REMAINING WERE ON THE MOVE. 15
DIVISION HAD BEEN CAUGHT WITH ITS PANTS DOWN.

3. PHILORI-CHARWA-CHOBARA SECTOR. INDIAN ADVANCING COLUMNS ENGAGED THE

SCREENS OF 3FF ON THE NIGHT OF 7 SEPTEMBER. BY FIRST LIGHT 8 SEPTEMBER THESE
SCREENS AFTER SUFFERING CASUALTIES AND OVER RUN FELL BACK TO LINE PHILORI-CHARWA-
CHOBARA AND ALONG WITH A COMPANY OF 2 PUNJAB TOOK HASTY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
THE SAME MORNING INDIAN ARMOUR COLUMNS OVERRAN CHARWA-CHOBARA, BYPASSED
PHILORI AND REACHED 3-4 KMS FROM CHOWINDA. AT 8:30 AM 18 SQUADRON OF PAF
COMMANDED BY SQUADRON LEADER SALAUDDIN SHAHEED CAME INTO ACTION WITH THREE
F-86 FIGHTERS WHO ENGAGED THE INDIAN ARMOUR AND IMPOSED A DELAY OF ONE HOUR
ON INDIAN ADVANCE. THIS ONE HOUR WAS VERY CRUCIAL AS IT PROVIDED TWO SQUADRONS
OF 25 CAVALRY THAT ARRIVED FROM NAROWAL ENOUGH TIME TO REGROUP AND MOVE INTO
BATTLE FORMATION FOR ENCOUNTER BATTLE. IT WAS A VERY BOLD MOVE ON PART OF THE
COMMANDING OFFICER TO TAKE ON THE INDIAN ADVANCING ARMOUR HEAD ON. PAF
PROVIDED CRUCIAL SUPPORT. THE NEXT TWO SORTIES WERE LED BY FLIGHT LIEUTENANT CECIL
CHAUDARY WITH WHOM I TALKED TODAY TO GET THE RECORDS STRAIGHT.

IN THE COURSE OF WRITING THIS, I TRACED OUT SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THIS ACTION
AND AM CONVINCED THAT ALL ACTIONS OF 8 SEPTEMBER WERE TAKEN SOLELY BY LT. COL
NISAR THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF 25 CAVALRY AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND NO ONE ELSE.
THROUGHOUT THIS BATTLE BRIGADIER A A MALIK REMAINED IN A SCHOOL AT PHILORA AND
LET NISAR HANDLE THE SITUATION. AGAIN ON 9/10 SEPTEMBER, IT WERE 25 CAVALRY AND 3FF
THAT REPULSED INDIAN ATTACKS.

4. RELIEF IN LINE. AS IF THE COMEDY OF ERRORS WAS NOT ENOUGH, THE PAPER TIGER THINK
TANK NOW LED BY SAHIBZADA YAKOOB DECIDED TO CARRY OUT RELIEF OF TROOPS ENGAGED
IN BATTLE FOR THREE DAYS. 25 CAVALRY AND 3FF WERE REPLACED BY 11 CAVALRY AND 9 FF
(MOTORISED) ON NIGHT 10/11. IN FACT THERE WAS NO RELIEF AND THE ENTIRE MOVEMENT
WAS A FIASCO. INDIANS EXPLOITED THE SITUATION AND LAUNCHED A FIERCE OFFENSIVE ON
THE 11TH MORNING. THE ADVANCING INDIANS WERE FIRST SPOTTED BY MAJOR MUZZAFAR
MALIK OF 11 CAVALRY WHO THEN ALERTED EVERYONE ELSE. IT WAS A TOUGH TASK FOR THE
NEW UNITS BECAUSE THEY HAD MOVED AT NIGHT AND WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE
TERRAIN. BRIGADIER AA MALIK WAS TO REPEAT HISTORY WHEN AS GOC IN 1971, HE
LAUNCHED A JUST ARRIVE 355FF INTO ACTION AT BERA PIND AND HAD IT MASSACRED.
THE BIGGEST LESSON OF THIS BATTLE WAS THAT BOTH ARMIES WERE IN EFFICIENT IN
HANDLING OPERATIONS AT A LARGE SCALE. INDIAN CAUTION AND RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE
AND EXPLOIT SITUATIONS RESULTED IN FAILURE OF THEIR PLAN AND HEAVY LOSSES. IN TERMS
OF CLAUSEWITZ’ FRICTION, IT WAS MOSTLY THE MENTAL BLOCKAGE ON PART OF
COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES THAT RESULTED IN MISTAKES. YET THE CONDUCT OF SMALL
UNITS ON BOTH SIDES WAS OUTSTANDING.

1965 WAS ALSO TO USHER A SPIRIT OF CAMARADERIE AMONGST THE PAPER TIGERS THAT
SURVIVES EVEN TODAY. THEY FORM A MUTUAL PRAISE GROUP WHILE THE MOST HARDY AND
TRUE ONES LIE AROUND TO ROT IN ANONYMITY

THANKS ARE DUE TO AGHA AMIN, BRIGADIER MEHMOOD (EX-SERVICEMEN FAME), GROUP
CAPTAIN CECIL AND MAJOR SHAMSHAD.

Major Shamshad Ahmad Khan (Retired) -2009 July

-----------------------------------------------------------------
MAJOR SHAMSHADS SUMMING UP LETTER OF AUGUST 2008
MEN OF STEEL by Major Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani
(Retired),majshamshad@hotmail.com,25 Cavalry
MEN OF STEEL

By

Major Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani (Retired)

25 Cavalry

This was first sent to daily DAWN but they did not have the guts to publish it on grounds that it
involved the president and the army.

The other day I came across a book entitled ,’ MEN OF STEEL,’. President General Mushrraf has
graced the book with Foreword while the preface has been written by General Khalid Mahmud
Arif (Retired). The book is based on war diaries supposed to had been maintained by the units
and the staff or the general (late ) Abrar Hussain who commanded 6 Armoured Division in 1965
on Chawinda sector. I cannot reason out as to why the book has been published now when the
event is forty years behind at this point of time. As there is nothing in the book that would have
jeopardized the security of the country, it should have come out immediately after the war.
That was the time when it could provided opportunity to higher command( there is nothing for
junior leaders in the book) to learn from the experience of the one who had fought the greatest
tank battle after world war- II. That would have saved us of many debacles in 1971 and
especially the ones committed in Sialkot sector on western front The book has five parts. Part
three (25% of the book) is the description of the events on the battlefield that is of interest to
students of military history. 75 % of the book comprises of background and statistics regarding
composition of units /formations, casualties in men and material on both sides, names of
commanders, list of recipients of gallantry awards, photographs and such like details.

I feel that late general Abrar Hussain has not authored the book because he was known to be of
the type who would never indulge in such a travesty. General K.M Arif appears to be the ghost
author of the book.

I was a participant in the events on battlefield mentioned in part 3 of the book and have a
different version.

To give authenticity to my narration, which will be diametrically opposed to the one given in the
book, it is necessary to state that I was directly involved in the events as a troop leader in C
squadron of 25 cavalry and squadron commander twice on extreme critical moments on the
battle field. I was face to face with enemy every day throughout the war. My location from day
one had been at Gadgor, Phillorah, Chawinda and Butter Dogranmdi where the battle was
fought. It is regretted that I did not have the good luck to see a red tab or even a staff officer on
front line during entire war.

From the text of part three it is clear that the general left his Headquarter, at Bhollowal ten
miles behind the front line, for the first and last time in a helicopter on 11 September in the
evening, By that time our two regiments , Guides and 11 Cavalry, had been badly mauled.. The
right time for the general to leave his HQ was in the morning when he got the news that 11
cavalry was under pressure. Had he been at Chawinda at 1100 hours he could have directed
and controlled the efforts of the three regiments and saved the day. By the evening, while
sitting in the caravan, he had launched two more regiments, Guides and 25 cavalry. Guides was
launched at a time( about 1100 hours) when 11 cavalry had retreated and Indians had taken up
defensives position to shoot up Guides who attacked with high spirits on their first day in
action. Some fine men and officers were lost in this action due to the apathy of commanding
officer who launched the regiment in haste, without artillery and infantry support contrary to
the dictates of terrain.. Lethargy and incompetence of HQ 6 armoured division resulted in our
defeat at Phillorah which was the greatest tragedy on this front.

As if that was not enough, 25 cavalry was launched at 1600 hours with a mission to occupy
Phillorah track crossing which was reported not occupied by the enemy. Thanks to our stars and
battle experience of preceding three days that we got away with loss of only one tank when we
hit against enemy defenses at Phillorah at 1700 hours. This is a classic example how to destroy
one’s forces piecemeal.

Now a word about the title of the book.

General Musharraf in the introduction of the book has mentioned that he was proud to be
apart of the force called MEN OF STEEL by its commander. It implies that late general Abrar had
ascribed the title of MEN OF STEEL to his own formation. This never happens, it amounts to
praising oneself. Such an absurdity was not expected of general Abrar who, I am told , was a
different breed.
Titles or honors are always awarded by higher authorities .It was 25 cavalry alone which was
referred to as men of steel by General Ayub Khan during the course of his talk on the eve of his
visit to the regiment immediately after ceasefire, in acknowledgement of our performance. This
had happened on Pasrur airstrip where we were camping .Army, Naval and Air Chiefs were also
present. Since the president was not to visit any other unit or formation head quarter, all
officers in the area were called at the airstrip.

There are tangible, discernable and universally accepted actions of 25 cavalry on the battlefield
that justify the suffix ‘ men of Steel’ with its’ title. The actions precisely and in short are;

1-It was 25 cavalry alone which clashed headlong with an armored division , north of Fhillorah
crossing at 0800 and pushed it back to Gudgor (2.5miles) by 1200 hours.

2-we attacked, captured Gudgor at 1700 hours and pushed the enemy further back by three
miles to Chobara.,

3- we kept the enemy at bay for another two day with no additional force in our support. Air
support was of course there.

4- On night 10/11 September we were sent to Pasrur for rest and refit On this point of time we
were placed under command 6 armoured division which had taken over Chawinda sector.

5- At about 1100 hours on 11 September C squadron 25 cavalry found itself deployed behind
Chawinda with a mission to stop the enemy at all cost that was believed to be advancing behind
our force that had retreated from Gudgor-Phillorah area in the morning. In fact Div HQ had
accepted the loss of Chawinda and therefore we were deployed behind that town to stop the
enemy advance towards Pasror.

After five hours of my insistence that Chawinda was vacant, at 1700 hours we were ordered to
advance and occupy Phillorah, which according to high command was not held by the enemy.
What happened later is along story but it should suffice to say that we hit enemy defenses in
Phillorah where tank to tank battle ensued. In the process our one tank with crew was
destroyed. The skirmish proved to be a deterrent and the enemy did not advance any further
that day.

6- On12, 13,14,and 15 September C squadron along with 3FF was defending area in the north
and up to Jassoran in the west of Chawinda. It was through this area that the enemy attempted,
for four days, to penetrate but could not succeed.

7- On 16th the enemy launched an armored Brigade to out flank Chawinda and attacked Butter
Dograndi in the rear of that town. They succeeded because the task force commander (who
later retired as Major General Wajahat Hussain), failed to coordinate with 24 Bde and left
Jassoran unoccupied providing a gap through which the enemy infiltrated and turned our flank.
We suffered heavy losses. Seven tanks were destroyed including two of 33 TDU. In the evening
we attacked Butter Dugrandi supported by artillery. . Destroyed two enemy tanks and some
infantry. Under very critical circumstances we stopped the enemy at Butter Dograndi that was
determined to reach Pasror that day. Artillery played effective roll but never fired on enemy
tanks with open sights on that day as mentioned in the book. We never allowed enemy tanks to
reach that close to our gun areas.

8- It was a troop of 25 cavalry and company of 3 FF who again attacked (without artillery) Butter
Dograndi, midway to our main objective Jassoran, on the morning of 17th and mounted enemy
trenches north of the village. Although we suffered heavy losses and could not reach the
objective, our offensive action forced the enemy to vacate Butter Dograndi and withdraw to
Jassonan in the evening and eventually across the railway line Chawinda –Sialkot.(quoted from
official history of 17 Poona Horse that was controlling the operation on Indian side).

9-It was 25 cavalry again, along with 3 Ff who repulsed an infantry brigade attack on night19/20
September. Although some of their troops had crossed over the railway line and hit the track
behind Chawinda at milestone 5, our tanks fired from behind railway line and forced the enemy
to withdraw, leaving behind dead and wounded.

Now where does the 6 armour division appear in this scenario? It has always been a troop or
squadron action through out war accept 11 September that was a fiasco .I can confront any one
who can prove me wrong.

Now the story as to how did 6 armored division became’Men Of Steel’.

I served in 6 armored division, of which 25 cavalry was a part , till September 1971. No one
called the Division as men of steel it was only 25 cavalry alone. I was shocked when I visited HQ
6 armoured Div after Indian captivity in 1974. I saw on the name boards of staff officers written
‘MEN OF STEEL’ on top. No body could explain how it happened. Knowing general K.M.Arif I can
say that he is behind this happening supported by general Wjahat Hossain(retd) who was
commanding 6 Armored Division in 1973-74.

To face the enemy is the professional obligation of a soldier. To be killed in action, get wounded
and fall prisoner is very much a normal happening in the life of soldier and there is nothing to
be proud or ashamed about it. This ancient and universal concept of soldiering does not hold
good in Pakistan. Here a soldier sitting in trench and killed by artillery fire can be given gallantry
award and also proclaimed a national hero. A gallantry award is justified only for an act
performed beyond call of duty and in the face of enemy.
Major K.M. Arif never left the Divisional HQ which was 10 miles away from front line and the
Div Commander left only once in the evening of 11 September, as mentioned an the book,
when fighting had subsided. Obviously both of them do not deserve the gallantry award.

Major Khalid .Mahmod Arif ( Later general) was GSO-2 operation of 6 armored division in 1965.

.In 1974 he was a Brigadier and held very powerful position in GHQ.

To justify undeserved gallantry awards that he and the Div commander had received and also to
cover-up the blunders committed by Div HQ, he floated the word that general Mosa Khan had
called 6 armored division as men of steel at Pasror airstrip. Knowing his vindictive nature
nobody could dare oppose him.

On his signal this word was continuously and systematically given currency for 20 years. It is
possible that he provided documentary support to this misdeed while he was in power.

It is time that we stopped fabricating and twisting history to serve the vested interests and
record true fact for our posterity.

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COLONEL SARDAR YAHYA EFFENDIS SUMMING UP OF 2008 AFTER READING BRIGADIER

SIMON AND MAJOR SHAMSHADS LETTERS OF 2008
THE GENERAL WHO FAILED WHEN VICTORY WAS AT HIS FEET

ONE OF THE MOST PHENOMENAL FAILURES OF 1965 WAR--MAJOR GENERAL RAJINDER SINGH
SPARROW COMMANDER FIRST INDIAN ARMOURED DIVISION WHO MISERABLY FAILED IN
WINNING THE 1965 WAR,WHEN ON 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965 DESPITE A PHENOMENAL
SUPERIOROTY OF 5 TO 1 IN TANKS AND 15 TO 1 IN INFANTRY HE FAILED TO OUTFLANK A LONE
TANK REGIMENT 25 CAVALRY OF PAKISTAN ARMY
THE TANK REGIMENT COMMANDER WHO EXHIBITED EXTREME COUP D OEIL AND DEPLOYED
HIS REGIMENT TO STOP A WHOLE TANK DIVISION,NOT KNOWING WHT WAS IN FRONT OF HIM
LIEUTENANT COLONEL NISAR AHMAD COMMANDANT OF 25 CAVALRY WHO ENTIRELY ON HIS
OWN JUDGEMENT DEPLOYED 25 CAVALRY ON BROAD FRONT AND BROUGHT THE INDIAN FIRST
TANK DIVISIION TO A HALT