IMPLEMENTING BACK-UP PROTECTION USING MICROPROCESSOR
BASED MULTIFUNCTION RELAYS
Copyright Material IEEE
Paper No. PCIC-2001-5
Terence G. Hazel Jacques Tastet
Senior Member IEEE Technip
Schneider Electric La Défense 6
38050 Grenoble, France 92973 Paris, France
Abstract – The use of microprocessor based multifunction
relays is on the increase due to the advantages they offer
such as communications, measurements, simplified wiring,
and reduced space requirements. Since many protection
functions are included in one device however, there has been
some concern about providing adequate protection should a
multifunction relay fail. A reliable protection scheme is very
important in order to protect capital equipment and operating
personnel, and reduce down time by selectively clearing
faults. This paper analyses some of the different means that
have been used to achieve satisfactory levels of back-up
protection using microprocessor based multifunction
protection relays featuring the protection functions normally
provided in large petrochemical plants.
Index Terms – protection relays, back-up protection,
circuit-breaker, multifunction relay, microprocessor, electrical
distribution
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews the back-up protection features of an
electrical distribution system typically found in a large
petrochemical installation. After discussing the inherent
back-up protection found in such systems, the authors show
how certain features of microprocessor multifunction relays
can be used to increase the reliability of the system and
enhance the performance of the protection system as a
whole.
A protection relay is part of the complete circuit required
for the isolation of a section of an electrical distribution
system. The protection circuit also includes a circuit-breaker
with its trip coil, instrument transformers, auxiliary power
supply, and control wiring. In addition to offering several
protection functions in the same device, the typical
microprocessor multifunction relay described in this paper
also has a self monitoring function that is capable of
detecting abnormal conditions within the complete protection
circuit. The use of this feature to enhance back-up protection
will be discussed.
For this paper the authors have assumed that
microprocessor relays have been chosen for the application,
and full use is made of the features they offer such as
communication with higher level systems, self monitoring,
and different sets of protection settings. The importance of
1
Noël Quillion Bruno Lusson
Schneider Electric Schneider Electric
38050 Grenoble 38050 Grenoble
France France
related parameters such as the maximum earth fault current
is also reviewed.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS
A. Redundancy versus Back-up Protection
The purpose of protection relays is to detect a fault and
give a trip order to the switching device that is closest to the
fault location. A fault in a motor feeder will generally result in
the non-availability of the motor and should it be critical for
the process, only the use of a standby motor will allow
production to continue. Fig. 1 shows an electrical distribution
system typical of large petrochemical plants (please refer to
Fig. 22 at the end of the paper for a list of all the symbols
used). Switchboards are normally double ended which
means that the loss of a transformer supplying one of the
busbars will not result in a loss of supply since the other
transformer generally has sufficient capacity to supply both
busbars. From a process point of view it is necessary to
have redundant motors and transformers as shown to ensure
continued production. Correct operation of the protection
circuit including back-up protection may ensure optimal
clearance of the fault but will not in itself prevent a loss of
production. In other words good back-up protection will not
fix a bad design.
Generally the redundancy in petrochemical plants is
designed based on the occurrence of single events such as
the loss of one transformer or one drive. The philosophy of
back-up protection goes one step further since it is based on
the simultaneous occurrence of two failures: an electrical
fault AND a protection circuit fault. A typical example is
breaker-failure protection that trips all surrounding circuit-
breakers should a fault occur AND the circuit-breaker not
open as required.
B. Unit and Time graded Protection Systems
For protection purposes, the power system is often divided
into zones such that no part is left unprotected. A selective
protection system ensures that only the circuit-breakers
nearest the fault will trip thereby limiting the effects on the
healthy part of the system. There are two basic methods
used, unit protection and time graded protection. Back-up
protection concepts are very different for both of these
methods.
In unit protection the currents at the boundary of the zone
are compared. A typical example of this is busbar differential
protection. Unit protection is inherently very fast since it is
possible to determine whether or not the fault is within the
zone and if so initiate immediate tripping of the protective
devices. Any fault occurring outside the zone will not be
detected however, which means that unit protection does not
have an inherent back-up feature. Back-up protection for a
particular zone will therefore require additional equipment, or
it must be included in a larger zone.
The time graded method is based on the fault current
flowing through adjacent zones and thus being detected by
several protection relays. If the relays are correctly set, the
circuit-breaker closest to the fault will be tripped before those
in upstream zones have time to operate. Back-up protection
F F
QA QB
NC NC
QC
33kV bus A NC 33kV bus B
C. Typical Microprocessor Based Multifunction Relays
Fig. 2 shows the complete protection circuit, which
includes the multifunction protection relay, a circuit-breaker,
instrument transformers, and an auxiliary power supply.
auxiliary power supply
trip/close signals
protection
relay
Fig. 2. Complete protection circuit
The architecture of a typical microprocessor multifunction
relay is illustrated in Fig. 3. State of the art relays have
continuous self monitoring which controls watchdog contacts
that change state should there be an internal failure.
Although the self monitoring will find most failures, some
such as a disconnected sensitive earth fault toroidal current
transformer may not be detected.

internal bus
Current
QT1P QT2P acquisition
Power Display unit /
F F supply Keyboard
Voltage
acquisition Communication
CPU (to remote
control)
T1 T2 Control logic
logic I/O
watchdog
Memory contacts
Circuit-breaker
control I/O
F F
QT1S QT2S
NC NC Fig. 3. Typical microprocessor multifunction relay
QT1-2
NO For this reason we still recommend periodic testing even
6.6kV bus A 6.6kV bus B
when self monitoring is provided. Any back-up scheme
which uses the watchdog contacts of microprocessor relays
QM QF
F QM must therefore still provide the minimum back-up protection
for the case of undetected failures in the relay, as well as for
F F F other faults such as circuit-breaker failure.
The relay is often connected to an Electrical Monitoring
and Control System (EMCS) to allow remote control of the
electrical distribution system and monitoring of all electrical
M M
equipment such as motors and transformers for maintenance
purposes.
Fig. 1. Basic single-line diagram
D. Correct Use of Self Monitoring in Microprocessor Devices
is therefore inherent with this method. This inherent back-up
protection will not eliminate the fault quickly however, and As mentioned above, self monitoring is capable of detecting
this could result in damage to equipment or loss of system most internal failures in protection circuits. The watchdog
stability. Different means of reducing the tripping time will be contacts should therefore be connected to the higher level
presented later in the paper. system to generate an alarm and to give precise information
The position of the bus-tie current transformers shown for as to what relay is defective. The maintenance staff should
the 33kV partial differential protection is one of the solutions repair the faulty device without delay and this is often enough
commonly used. It is important that the position of all to prevent damage to equipment and loss of production. The
instrument transformers be reviewed during the design watchdog contacts can also be used to provide back-up
phase. protection by other relays and to change protection settings

2
of upstream relays as will be described later in the paper. All
microprocessor relays are not created equal and these
features should be carefully reviewed when selecting relays
and the appropriate back-up protection scheme.
The watchdog relay coil is normally kept energized by the
self monitoring function. Care must be taken in using these
contacts to prevent nuisance trips. For example a watchdog
contact used to change settings of another relay should be
wired in series with an auxiliary contact of its circuit-breaker
to block the changes if the circuit-breaker is open.
E. Design and Commissioning
For the purposes of this paper we assume that:
1) there are no design errors
2) the protection settings are correct
3) the commissioning has been done correctly
The authors' experience and reference [1] show that very
often the reason for extensive damage in installations is not
the fault of the protection equipment but how it was
implemented. The best back-up protection scheme is of no
use if the equipment is incorrectly wired and the relays
incorrectly set. Before deciding to add additional equipment
in existing installations, it is recommended to thoroughly
check what has already been installed to ensure that it is
connected properly and that the protection settings are
correct. Adding equipment makes circuits more complicated
and therefore harder to operate and maintain.
III. EFFECT OF DOUBLING RELAYS ON
AVAILABILITY
One point that is sometimes raised when applying
microprocessor based protection relays is that all protection
functions are in the same device. Often doubling the
protection relay is given as a solution. Since the protection
relay is only a part of the protection circuit we decided to
compare the availability of 2 motor feeders, one feeder using
a single microprocessor relay, the other having 2 identical
microprocessor relays, each with its associated auxiliary
supply and circuit-breaker trip coil as shown in Fig. 4. In
both cases there is only one set of current transformers, and
one circuit-breaker in the protection circuit. For the
availability comparison we considered the following
undesirable events for both circuits:
Event 1: The busbar is deenergized.
Event 2: The motor is deenergized.
Event 1 can occur if there is an insulation failure in the
circuit-breaker itself, or if there is simultaneously a failure of
the protection circuit AND an electrical fault in the motor
feeder. The fault is eliminated by the supply side circuit-
breaker resulting in a loss of the complete busbar. Event 2
can occur if there is an electrical fault in the motor feeder
or due to a nuisance trip from the protection relay. The
failure rates and mean time to repair data for the calculations
were obtained from the IEEE Yellow Book for the circuit-
breaker, current transformers, cable etc. and from
manufacturer's data for the microprocessor based protection
relays. The results for both events are summarized below:
3
F F1 F2
M M
Fig. 4. Analysis of redundant vs simple protection
1. Event 1: The principal cause for a deenergization of
the busbar is an insulation fault of the circuit-breaker. The
failure of a relay does not have a significant impact on this
since it must be coupled with an electrical failure to cause the
incoming circuit-breaker to trip. This is very unlikely since
most of the possible causes for protection relay failure will be
detected by the self monitoring feature thereby reducing the
time period when an electrical fault will have to be eliminated
by the supply side circuit-breaker.
2. Event 2: Adding a second relay will double the risk
of a nuisance trip. Since the calculations also take into
account electrical faults on the motor feeder circuit which
have a much higher impact on the availability, the addition of
a second relay does not result in a significant change in the
availability of the motor.
This simple comparison shows that adding extra relays will
not have a significant effect on the availability of the electrical
distribution system provided that the self monitoring features
of the microprocessor relay are correctly implemented. In
addition, although not considered in the analysis, there is an
increased risk of incorrect implementation of more complex
schemes, and as pointed out in [2] maltrips are often not fully
random, but more likely to occur when the system is faulted.
This tends to increase the possibility that both protection
relays will fail during a fault condition even though this is not
taken into account in our simulations. Doubling the
protection relays should not be the immediate and only
answer to the question "Is my protection system sufficiently
reliable?" As is demonstrated in the following sections of the
paper there are other means of enhancing reliability that
should be considered before adding additional equipment.
IV. TYPICAL PETROCHEMICAL PLANT
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
The electrical distribution system and protection functions
shown in Fig. 1 are typical of a large petrochemical plant.
Examples of switchboards having both the tie normally open
and normally closed are discussed since both are often used.
The single-line diagram used for discussion is based on
medium-voltage distribution only. The reason for this choice
is that:
• High voltage connections are often subject to utility
protection requirements and the user has little choice in
protection. For plants where this is not the case, the
 discussion related to the 33kV switchgear can be
applied.
• Microprocessor relays are more frequently used in high
voltage than low voltage although this trend is changing.

In Fig. 1 all circuit-breakers are normally closed except for 26, 49,
the bus-tie of the 6.6kV switchboard. All protection functions 51, 51N,
QT1S
included in the same rectangle are implemented by the same 51G, 63 QT2S
(tripped)
microprocessor protection relay. When the relay has an
internal fault none of the protection functions will operate. 6.6kV bus A QT1-2 6.6kV bus B
Breaker failure protection (50BF) is not shown on the single
line diagram since it is not commonly used for medium 51, 51N
voltage distribution. Since multifunction relays can often QM QF
provide this function we recommend its use. This can reduce
the time required for upstream circuit-breakers to clear faults 46,49, F
thereby reducing damage to equipment. 50, 50N,
51LR
For each analysis protection curves are used to illustrate
the back-up protection features. For ease of reading we have
used a time margin of 300ms and an operating time of
100ms for instantaneous protection. The time margin used
M
for a particular application will depend on the circuit-breaker
Fig. 5. Motor feeder with one incoming
operating time, the type of protection relay, and the
characteristics of the chosen curves.

V. ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM BACK- circuit will automatically use the lower settings as shown in
UP PROTECTION Fig. 7. Since this is the standard operating condition these
will be the fault clearing times normally used and will still
The back-up protection features implemented in the single guarantee selective tripping and back-up protection.
line diagram will be reviewed for different parts of the circuit. t (s)
1000
For each case we will present methods such that the back-up 0 1 2
3
protection can be improved, often without adding additional
equipment or functions. The analysis will consider both QT2S
protection circuit faults detected by the self monitoring 100

function of the relay, and other faults such as breaker failure.

Except for the transformer circuit, the analyses are based
QT1-2
only on phase-to-phase faults. The same type of reasoning 10
0

can however be applied to earth faults.

A. Motor Feeder
1
QM 3
2
Fig. 5 shows a 6.6kV motor on bus A being supplied from
the incoming of bus B via the tie circuit. Fig. 6 shows the
0.1 1
fault clearing times of the all of the 6.6kV relays. Since time
graded protection is used, inherent back up is provided as
illustrated by Fig. 6. The disadvantage of this scheme is the
I (A)
long time needed to clear a fault occurring on bus B (about 0.01
100 1000 10000
700ms) even when the motor is supplied from bus A, which
is the normal configuration shown in Fig. 1. Since Fig. 6. Motor back-up protection
microprocessor based relays often have multiple protection
curves, it is very easy to reduce the time delay of the The next improvement that can be easily implemented is
incoming protection relay when the tie is open (normal shown in Fig. 8. The watchdog contact is shown in each
operating configuration). An auxiliary contact of the tie feeder relay (F1, F2 and F3). This contact is open when the
breaker is wired to an input of the relay of each incoming relay is energized and no internal faults have been detected,
circuit. When the tie is open the relay of each incoming which is the case for relay F2. Relay F1 has an internal fault
resulting in a closed watchdog contact. Each watchdog
contact is connected directly to the trip coil of the associated
circuit-breaker. In order to prevent nuisance operations when
a feeder has been deenergized such as for F3, an auxiliary
contact of the associated circuit-breaker is wired in series
with the watchdog contact.

4
 t (s)
1000 t (s)
0 1 2 1000
0 1 2 3

QT1S
QT1S
100
100

0
10 0
10

1 QM 1 QM
2 2

3
0.1 1 1
0.1

Time delay setting of QT1S

automatically reduced to supplementary 50 function
value of QT1-2 I (A)
of QT1S I (A)
0.01 0.01
100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000

Fig. 7. Motor protection: reduced time delay at incomer level
In addition to the normal output connected to the trip coil
of its associated circuit-breaker, the relay F4 of the incomer
has a separate output which closes instantaneously should
fault current be detected. Should a fault occur in the circuit
which has a faulty relay such as F1 in this example, the
separate output contact of relay F4 will be connected via the
watchdog contact of relay F1 to the circuit-breaker trip coil
and will open the circuit-breaker immediately, thus providing
back-up protection. The curves associated with this back-up
protection are shown in Fig. 9. The authors recommend use
of this simple and effective system for all switchboards.
51,
50, 51N,
50N 51G
F4
QT1S
Fig. 9. Incomer relay back-up protection
conditions. When a relay has an internal fault the operators
should immediately switch to the standby motor and proceed
with replacement of the relay without delay. If a standby
motor is not avalaible and there is a risk of overloading the
motor during the time required to replace the faulty relay,
addition of a simple overload relay for additional back-up
protection should be considered.
B. Prevention of Unauthorized Transfers
Fig. 10 shows the intertrip signals often associated with an
automatic transfer scheme (ATS). The logic for the transfer
scheme can be performed in the multifunction relay F1 of the
incoming circuit. In such cases a malfunction of F1 will not
result in an unauthorized transfer since the transfer logic will
not be operational. For cases where the logic is performed
outside of F1 as shown in Fig. 10 consideration should be
given to what happens should the incomer relay F1 have a
fault condition (detected by self monitoring or not). Correct

back-up 33kV bus A

6.6kV bus A
trip circuit
QT1P
QM1 QM2 QM3 intertrip from QT1S initiate automatic transfer

46, 46, 46, 51(1),

49, 49, 49, 51(2), 50N F2
etc. etc. etc.

F1 F2 F3

intertrip
from QT1P
M1 M M2 M M3 M
26, 27,
Fig. 8. Back-up protection using incomer relay 49, 51, F1
51N,
Both the inherent and improved back-up protection 51G, 63
described above are effective for earth and phase faults but
do not provide any back-up protection for overload QT1S
ATS
6.6kV bus A

Fig. 10. Intertripping to prevent unwanted transfer

5
operation requires F1 to block the transfer for uncleared 1000
t (s)
0 1 2 3
faults that occur downstream of the incoming circuit-breaker
QT1S. Should a short circuit occur on the 6.6kV bus (earth
faults are discussed in the following section) and F1 be out of 100
service, the upstream relay F2 will detect the fault, trip QT1P,
intertrip QT1S, and initiate the automatic transfer. F1, being QT1P
out of service, will not deliver the required blocking signal to 51G(*)
10
the ATS and this could result in closing the tie breaker to the
6.6kV bus fault. In order to prevent such incorrect operations
from occurring, we recommend that all signals to trip QT1S QT1S
3
transit relay F1 as shown in Fig. 10. The automatic transfer 1
QM 50N 2 51G
logic cannot close the tie breaker until the incoming breaker 1

QT1S is open. Having the trip signal from the ATS as well QT1S
as the intertrip from the upstream circuit-breaker transit F1 0.1 0 51N (*)
as shown, will prevent QT1S from opening should F1 be
faulty, thus effectively blocking any incorrect transfer. * Note: Block ATS if protection
function trips breaker.
Intertrips to upstream circuit-breakers should be direct (e.g. 0.01
QT1S to QT1P) in order to prevent relay faults from inhibiting 1 10 100

opening a circuit-breaker. Fig. 12. Back-up earth fault protection

C. Earth Fault Protection

D. Transformer Protection
Fig. 10 also shows that there is no earth fault back-up
protection for QT1S since both the 51N and 51G functions For the following discussion about transformer protection,
are in F1. We recommend that the upstream relay F2 have we will first consider measures that can be taken to enhance
a 51G function as shown in Fig. 11. Back-up protection will back-up protection for the circuit of Fig. 11. Fig. 13 shows
33kV bus A the standard transformer protection settings for the phase
protection. Since time graded protection is used back-up
protection is inherent in this scheme. The first improvement
QT1P
51(1), 51(2), 1000
t (s)
0 2 1
50N, 51G
QT1P 51(1) maximum
F2 through fault
current
100

0
26, 27,
49, 51,
10
51N, QT1P 51(1)
51G, 63 QT1S QT1S
F1
6.6kV bus A 1
QT1P 51(2)
1

QM
0.1 2

FM

0.01
earth fault 1000 10000 1e+005

M Fig. 13. Standard transformer protection settings

Fig. 11. Back-up earth fault protection
now be provided for all parts of the 6.6 kV system. The earth
fault protection curves are shown in Fig. 12. As will be
discussed in the next section, should a fault condition be
detected in a relay by self monitoring, the earth fault time
delay settings can be reduced to allow quicker fault
elimination.
that can be implemented very easily is the changing of
settings of F2 should an internal fault be detected in F1. Fig.
14 shows the reduction of the tripping times when this simple
measure is implemented. The inverse time portion of the
modified curve of F2 provides satisfactory back-up overload
protection even though it is not as effective as the
thermostat. Should an internal fault be detected in F2, the
33kV bus A incoming relay can be used as a back up as
discussed previously in the section on motors.

6
1000
t (s)
easier understanding of the discussion, relays F1 and F2 are
0
QT1P 51(1) - both shown as having two different sets of protection
current and time maximum through functions: one set is specific for the incoming circuit (67,
settings lowered fault current 67N, 51, 51N), and the other set (51, 51N) is for the partial
100
differential circuit consisting of the incoming and bus-tie
current transformers connected in parallel. The protection
curves for these functions are shown in Fig. 17. Since the
10

QT1P 51(1) - time

setting lowered 67, 67N, 51, 51N 67, 67N, 51, 51N
1
51, 51N 51, 51N
QT1P 51(2) - unchanged F1 F2

0.1 0
QA QB
NC NC
QC
33kV bus A NC 33kV bus B
0.01
1000 10000 1e+005

Fig. 14. Automatic lowering of upstream protection settings QT1P QT2P

For large power transformers it is very common to use

transformer differential protection (87T) as primary protection Fig. 16. 33kV switchboard protection
as shown in Fig 15. The use of this relay is an example of
unit protection described in the first section of the paper. It partial differential protection is selective only with respect to
will also provide quicker tripping for faults located on the outgoing feeders, busbar faults are cleared relatively quickly
transformer secondary, upstream of the incoming circuit- as shown. Care must be taken when defining the tripping
breaker. As is the case for unit protection in general, the 87T matrix for the relays. Directional protection should trip only
will not provide any overload protection. Overload protection the incoming circuit-breaker whereas the other protection
as well as back-up protection will be provided by F2. functions should trip both the incoming and the bus-tie
Transformer differential protection is often combined with circuit-breakers.
restricted earth fault protection (87REF), once again allowing
t (s)
1000
2 0 3
1
QA 67

QT1P
100 QA 51

51(1), 51(2),
50N, 51G F2 QA - QC
10 partial
87T differential
87REF QT1P 51(1)
F3 1
1

26, 27, 0

49, 51, QT1P 51(2)

51N, 0.1 32
51G, 63 F1 QT1P 51(1) maximum through
fault current
QT1S 0.01
100 1000 10000

Fig. 17. Time reduction with partial differential protection

Fig. 15. Differential and restricted earth fault protection There is no inherent back-up protection in this scheme
unless we consider the relays upstream of F1 and F2. Since
for quicker fault clearance typical of unit protection.
the upstream relays are often supplied under a separate
contract it is not evident that satisfactory back-up protection
E. Incoming 33kV Main-Tie-Main with Tie Normally Closed
can be achieved.
In order to provide back-up protection and to reduce the
Fig. 16 shows the protection functions of double-ended
clearance time for busbar faults, relays F1 and F2 can be
switchgear operating with the bus-tie normally closed. For
replaced with busbar differential protection and overcurrent

7
protection as shown in Fig. 18. The busbar differential 250A (10% of 2500A). Another reason is that the earth fault
protection becomes the primary protection and is backed up current should be at least twice the value of the cable
by the other relays. The relay on the bus-tie will also provide charging current. Distribution systems with long lengths of
back-up protection for the incoming relay for upstream faults

15
87B

fault duration (s)

F4
51, 51N,
67, 67N
F1
QA
NC
QC
10
33kV bus A NC 33kV bus B

QT1P 51,
51N
51(1), 51(2), F2 severe damage
50N, 51G
F3 5
slight burning

negligible arc burning

Fig. 18. 33kV switchboard differential and back-up protection
that normally would be cleared by the directional protection
(67, 67N). 1
The failure of the bus-tie circuit-breaker to open will
probably result in total loss of power since it is common to
0 100 200
both busbars. Should a fault in the bus-tie protection circuit
fault current (A)
be detected by self monitoring, the bus-tie circuit-breaker
should be immediately tripped by the watchdog contact of the Fig. 19. Effect of arc burning on stator core
bus-tie relay in order to isolate each busbar and limit the laminations during earth fault
influence of faults to only one busbar section. cable will therefore require high values of earth fault current.
Care must be taken in choosing the right value for earth
VI. EARTH FAULT CURRENT LIMITATION fault current. Too low a value may result in non-operation of
some protection relays or overvoltages, whereas too high a
In order to prevent damage to rotating equipment the value may result in severe damage to rotating machines. The
magnitude and duration of earth fault current should be kept
within acceptable limits as defined by manufacturers'
damage curves. Fig. 19 gives a typical set of damage curves
for medium voltage motors and shows the 3 regions where 50, 50N,
there is negligible, slight, and severe damage. The curves 51 51N
show that earth fault current should be limited to less than
about 50A assuming that earth fault protection will operate
with a minimum time delay (this is normally the case for
motor feeders). In order to provide proper protection for the
windings, the earth fault protection should be set at
approximately 10% of the maximum earth fault current (5A in Fig. 20. Residual connection for earth fault protection
this case). Reliable measurement of these low values of
earth fault current can be achieved with core balance current
transformers shown on the motor feeder circuits. protection engineer should participate in the decision in order
There are however, other technical reasons for having to ensure that he will be able to set the relays correctly.
higher values of earth fault current. One reason is that in
many cases core balance current transformers cannot be VII. REDUCTION OF TRIP TIMES
used (bus-tie circuit), and the earth fault current is measured
by means of residually connected current transformers (CT) Many projects today require medium voltage switchgear
as shown in Fig. 20. Due to tolerances in the CTs, reliable that can withstand the effects of internal arcs. Annex AA of
measurements can be made down to about 10% of the rated IEC standard 60298 specifies the test requirements for such
CT current. For example, earth fault protection for a circuit gear and allows the duration of the test to be less than the
having residually connected CTs rated 2500A/5A would be duration of the short-time withstand current assuming that
possible only if the maximum earth fault current exceeded internal faults will be cleared very quickly. Time graded
protection cannot provide both quick fault clearance and

8
protection grading. In order to achieve the fault clearance
times compatible with arc resistant switchgear, unit IX. REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN
protection such as busbar protection is often used as
previously discussed. Another method that does not require For correct operation of the protection system, the design
an additional protection relay or additional current should take into account the following points:
trip CB
1. Continuous operation should not depend on one
circuit or one busbar only. Ensure that maintenance
T1+0.3s 0 can be carried out without total deenergization of the
plant.
(51)
2. Make sure you can live with what happens when back-
I>Is
(50)
up protection operates. If not then the design of the
electrical distribution system is not correct.
T2 0 3. Microprocessor multifunction relays from different
manufacturers often have very different
characteristics. Review all features when selecting a
F2 relay.
6.6kV bus A 5. Make use of other relays when present to enhance
back-up protection. Adding extra components will
often decrease reliability due to the difficulty of
correctly designing and maintaining more complicated
0.2s 0 systems.
6. Choose the maximum earth fault current carefully as it
has an impact on both earth-fault and unit protection.
trip CB 7. When intertripping is performed, the relay should send
the trip order directly to the other breaker and not
T1 0 through the related relay. This is more reliable for
(51)
clearing faults. The one exception is for intertripping
in the case of automatic transfer to prevent disastrous
closing to a faulted bus.
blocking signal
X. CONCLUSION
sent when F1 I>Is
detects fault fault
(50)
The protection scheme typically found in the electrical
distribution system of petrochemical plants has a certain
F1 level of inherent back-up protection. This can be easily
enhanced by the correct use of the self monitoring function of
Fig. 21. Logic to reduce trip time multifunction microprocessor based relays. Back-up
transformers is logic selectivity as shown in Fig. 21. In this protection can often be improved without adding additional
scheme a downstream relay F1 which detects a fault will protection functions or relays by using available functions of
send a signal to the upstream relay F2 to wait during the time existing relays as shown for motor feeders. Since certain
required to eliminate the fault. Should the upstream relay features of multifunction relays from different manufacturers
detect a fault and not receive a signal to wait, it will trip its will not be the same, their influence on the performance of
circuit-breaker immediately. Tripping times similar to those back-up protection should be reviewed very early in the
obtained with unit protection can be achieved and are design phase in order to obtain the best combination of
compatible with the arc withstand duration. Logic selectivity protection and continuous operation. Any analysis of back-
is available in many multifunction relays. up protection must look at the complete protection circuit
consisting of the circuit-breaker, the instrument transformers,
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTION the auxiliary power supply, and the relay. Just adding
RELAYS additional relays will probably do more harm than good. As
Mark Twain said, "It's ok to put all your eggs in one basket,
As can be seen from the analyses, multifunction protection but watch that basket!"
relays should have following features:
XI. REFERENCES
1. Allow quick replacement (i.e. without disconnecting
control wiring). [1] Andrew R. Leoni; John P. Nelson; "Some Lessons
2. The replacement relay must be quickly configurable Learned from Commissioning Substation and Medium
with the same configuration as the replaced relay. Voltage Switchgear Equipment," in IEEE PCIC
3. The self monitoring should detect most internal faults, Conference Record, 2000, pp 33-39.
as well as breaker trip coil faults. [2] Math H. J. Bollen, Causes of Long Interruptions, in
4. The relay must have successfully passed all EMC Understanding Power Quality Problems, IEEE press, pp
tests to ensure correct operation. 36-37

9
[3] Don Rosen, Roy E. Cossé, Jim Bowen, Norman Stringer,
Thomas Malone, Bill Wood, "Do You Want to Put All
Your 'Relay Eggs' in One Basket?" in IEEE PCIC
Conference Record, 1999, pp 195-206
[4] Lorraine Padden, Joseph Dudor, "Protective Relay
Applications for Generators and Transformers", in IAS
Magazine, Vol. 3, No. 4, July/August 1997, pp22-35
[5] IEC standard 60255 Electrical Relays
XII. VITAS
distribution branch. He joined the electrical Department of
Technip in 1976 where he has provided team leadership for
several major international oil & gas projects involving power
generation and distribution. For the last 6 years, he has
been the Head of Technip France electrical Department. His
main interests are in power reliability, providing continuity of
service and safety in major petrochemical complexes such as
refineries. Mr. Tastet participates in European conferences
concerning centralized control and the safety of electrical
distribution systems.

Terry Hazel graduated from the University of Manitoba
Canada with a BScEE in 1970. He worked for one year as a
power coordination engineer in Perth Australia and for
several years in Frankfurt Germany as a consulting engineer
for construction and renovation of industrial power
distribution systems. Since 1980 he has worked for
Schneider Electric (formerly Merlin Gerin) in their projects
group where he has provided team leadership for several
major international projects involving process control and
power distribution. His main interests are in power quality,
and the reliability of electrical distribution systems. Mr. Hazel
is a senior member of IEEE and is author of a PCIC paper
and tutorial.
Jacques Tastet graduated from the EEIP School in France
with an Engineering Degree in 1974. He worked for one year
for the French EdF Distribution Board in the power
Noël Quillion received his degree from the Electrical
Engineering Institute, Grenoble, France in 1977. Following
graduation he worked for several years with Schneider
Electric (formerly Merlin Gerin) as a power system analysis
specialist and provided training for both employees and
customers. Since 1991 he is with their protection and control
systems department designing and implementing protection
schemes for industrial applications.
Bruno Lusson graduated in 1989 from the Lille Engineering
School in France. Prior to 1994 he worked with Jeumont
Schneider in the power electronics branch dealing with high
power variable speed drives and rectifiers for aluminum
smelters and electric arc furnaces. He is now with Schneider
Electric and is a power system analysis specialist interested
particularly in power quality issues and system reliability.

current microprocessor 49 thermal overload

transformer F1 based multifunction
circuit-breaker
relay
51 overcurrent
voltage
transformer microprocessor
51(n) set n of
based multifunction
relay with groups of overcurrent protection
circuit-breaker
(shown in the core balance protection functions
closed position) current transformer 51LR locked rotor

ATS automatic transfer system logic

51N earth fault on
3-phase circuits
51G earth fault on
auxiliary contact M motor T1 0 time delay of T1 seconds neutral connection
(normally closed) associated with to ground
(51) overcurrent protection
63 Buchholz

transformer I>Is instantaneous protection

auxiliary contact (50) function block 67 directional overcurrent
(normally open)

neutral earthing 67N directional earth fault

resistor direct trip signal
auxiliary contact
connection to 87B busbar differential
(normally open intertrip signal
ground
but shown in the
closed position) 87T transformer differential
auxiliary relay coil 26 thermostat
fault
87REF restricted earth fault
condition
46 negative sequence

Fig. 22. List of symbols

10