Journal of International Development: Vol. 9, No.

7, 939±949 (1997)

POLICY ARENA

ACCOUNTING FOR THE `DARK SIDE'

OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: READING
ROBERT PUTNAM ON DEMOCRACY
JAMES PUTZEL*
Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, UK

Abstract: Recent theoretical work employing the concept of `social capital' in the study
of democratization remains plagued by conceptual confusion and a curious neglect
of politics. This paper critically examines the work of Robert Putnam and other
institutional theorists and suggests that a misguided attempt to locate a singular frame-
work to explain both economic and political performance fails to recognize that the
conditions underpinning successful capitalist development may not always be congruous
with those favouring democratic politics. The work on social capital is coloured by an
idealization of the role of the family and of the American political past, in¯uenced by
current communitarian thinking. Finally, an uncritical acceptance of the determinist
notion of `path dependence' eclipses the role of political action and ideas in the assess-
ment of political outcomes and prospects for democratization. # 1997 John Wiley &
Sons, Ltd.

J. Int. Dev. 9: 939±949 (1997)

No. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 0. No. of References: 35.

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of social capital, as popularized in recent years by institutional theorists

like Robert Putnam, has much to o€er in analyses of the prospects of democratization
in the developing and former socialist countries. Putnam de®nes social capital
as `trust, norms and networks' that facilitate social co-ordination and co-operation
for mutual bene®t (Putnam, 1993a, p. 167; 1993b). By systematically examining the
extent of social capital in society, he o€ers both a conceptual and methodological
framework to understand and to measure the development of civil society seen as so

* Correspondence to: J. Putzel, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, Houghton
Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK.

CCC 0954±1748/97/070939±12$17.50
# 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
940 J. Putzel

crucial to the democratization process.1 His focus on patterns of trust and `informal
institutions' (norms, conventions, unwritten codes of behaviour) contributes to recent
scholarship that seeks to look beyond formal institutions (constitutions, legal codes)
and organizational forms (parliaments, political parties, etc.) to explain the prospects
for establishing or consolidating democracy in the developing world.2 A concen-
tration on the realm of informal institutions, the site of social capital formation, also
helps to explain why systemic political change has been so dicult to consolidate,
whether in the socialist transition after 1917 in Russia or the democratic transitions in
Russia or South Africa today. Like North, Putnam underlines that, `Informal norms
and culture change more slowly than formal rules, and tend to remold those formal
rules' (North, 1995, p. 25; Putnam, 1993a, p. 180).
By placing a notion of social capital at the centre of explanations about the relative
performance and possibilities of democratic political systems, Putnam (1993a, p. 176)
also o€ers a counterpoint to theorists who have conceptualised state e€ectiveness in a
`zero-sum' relationship with societal organization (Migdal, 1988; Huntington, 1968).
This allows him to propose a `strong society, strong state' complementarity, which I
have argued elsewhere is so crucial to the process of deepening democracy (Putzel,
1995; 1997). However, as we shall see, Putnam's tendency to pander to communit-
arian and conservative anti-statist biases leads him to be less than consistent in
promoting the interrelationship between strong states and strong societies.
At the same time, the corpus of Putnam's work on social capital and democrat-
ization su€ers from a combination of inconsistency and conceptual stretching and an
overly ambitious drive, that he shares with other institutional theorists, to identify a
single explanatory framework to account for the entire gamut of political and
economic performance. Social capital has become the latest elixir within discussions
about development, becoming `all things to all people' in a fashion not dissimilar to
the fate of `human development' and `sustainable development' in recent years.3
In a manner similar to, though not quite as single-minded as, Francis Fukuyama
(1995), Putnam stretches the concepts of social capital and trust to near breaking
1
In fact Putnam's most important contribution probably lies in his methodological approach that both
marries quantitative and qualitative research and provides a model for evaluating the performance of
government organizations and institutions (see especially Putnam, 1993, chs 3 and 4). Since the mid-1980s
there has been an explosion of literature on the latest `wave of democratization' (comprehensively reviewed
in Potter, et al., 1997).
2
The new institutional literature is terribly sloppy in its use of basic concepts, even in de®ning institutions
themselves (as illustrated by Nabli and Nugent, 1989). This comes as a result of the penchant of economists
to relegate all non-economic factors (that in fact in¯uence economic behaviour) to an amorphous, and for
some, inconsequential, `institutional realm', as well as a rather diverse and imprecise use of the terms
`institutions', institutional' and `institutionalisation' in the disciplines of political science and sociology.
Douglas North (1995, p. 23) provides a comprehensive de®nition that lays out the distinction between
informal and formal institutions and between institutions and organisations, which one would hope might
serve as the basis for common discussion across the disciplines in the future:
Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that structure human interaction. They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common
law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of
conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both. Organisations are the players: groups of
individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives.
The language of `constraints' is perhaps overly Hobbesian and might better be thought of as the `enduring
regularities of human interaction' (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995, p. 582), since they enable human action as
much as they constrain it.
3
On the uses and abuses of `human development' see Nicholls (1996) and on `sustainable development',
Lele (1991).

J. INT. DEV. VOL. 9: 939±949 (1997) # 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
 Reading Robert Putnam on Democracy 941

point to argue that successful capitalist development and the successful consolidation
of Western liberal democracy spring from a common source.4 However, what has
been good for capitalism at given points in history in given social contexts has not
always been good for democracy and vice versa. What is more, even as proponents of
`social capital' have sought to move away from economic reductionism in explaining
political evolution, they have at times fallen prey to the reductionism of Douglas
North's (1981) notion of `path dependence', that eclipses the role of political
organization and action in political outcomes (Putnam, 1993a, p. 177). Finally, there
is a tendency in Putnam's work, perhaps coloured by the political mood in the United
States, that panders to a nostalgia for a somewhat imaginary democratic golden age,
idealizing the family and the associations of conservative America.

2. WHAT IS GOOD FOR MARKETS IS NOT NECESSARILY GOOD

FOR DEMOCRACY

Robert Packenham (1973), in examining US post-war policy toward the developing

world, argued that American liberalism approached foreign aid policy with the belief
that `all good things go together', thus with economic development would follow
democracy, American style. One of the clearest lessons of post-war development
experience has been that the establishment of formal democracy and successful
capitalist growth have not necessarily been mutually reinforcing. The most spec-
tacular achievements in capitalist economic growth have occurred in the more
authoritarian political systems of East and Southeast Asia. The patterns of accretion
of social capital that have underpinned this growth have had very little democratic
content. What has been good for capitalism in Singapore, including strict adhesion to
civic norms, has not been particularly favourable to the development of democracy
(Rodan, 1993).
John Harriss, in his introduction to this collection, points to contrasting con-
ceptualisations of `social capital'. In much of the original work with the concept,
social capital Ð born of family relations and community social organization
(Coleman) or the `connections' of Bourdieu (also located mainly in the family) or
Coleman's later social-structural resources which constitute `a capital asset' Ð accrues
to individuals or speci®c groups within society, as an identi®able resource, that can be
`valuable in facilitating certain actions', but `may be useless or even harmful for
others' (Harriss and De Renzio, 1997). Putnam, and Fukuyama after him, develop
the concept in quite a di€erent direction seeing the resource of social capital as
accruing to entire political communities, as an emergent property of society as a whole.
They do not simply see it in Coleman's terms as a `public good' (i.e., a by-product of
social and economic activity) but as intrinsically for the public good.
This is not necessarily a negative development of the concept. However, a profound
confusion has been created within the discussion of social capital by failing to specify
this theoretical leap. There is a need to distinguish carefully between what might be
seen as the mechanics of trust (the operation of networks, norms etc) and the political
content and ideas transmitted through such networks and embodied in such norms.
We can see how the mere existence of networks and norms underpinning trust

4
See Giovani Sartori (1970) on `conceptual stretching'.

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942 J. Putzel

between individuals or groups can facilitate exchange by reducing risks and making
behaviour more predictable. But whether or not these networks will contribute to
democracy has much more to do with the political ideas and programmes transmitted
through them.
One of the clearest insights of New Institutional Economics has been its identi-
®cation of transaction costs (the often unaccounted for costs of any contract) as an
important element in economic exchange. The risks associated with the opportunism
and bounded rationality (imperfect information, idosyncratic knowledge and
uncertainty) of actors in any exchange relationship are costly (Williams, 1975).
Reducing those risks can have an important positive e€ect on the relative competi-
tiveness of an economic actor. Both logic and research have demonstrated that
business actors that succeed in establishing networks of trust within the market place
can greatly reduce their risks and thus increase their pro®ts. Overseas Chinese business
networks in East and Southeast Asia have managed to establish an advantage in the
market place in precisely this way. Networks based on `®ctitious kinship' ties have built
trust between economic actors that allowed secure sources of inputs, guaranteed
markets, the pooling of investment capital, built-in sanctions against malfeasance and
regular access to market information. While there was a centuries old tradition of
trading among a small section of the overseas Chinese population, the 20th century
networks were largely born of necessity, by Chinese minority communities very much
`under siege' in their Southeast Asian homes. Often without the possibility of owning
land, or aspiring to the professions or political careers, commerce became both a
survival mechanism and the principal means to attain wealth and security. In such a
situation, reputation came to be a most valuable asset and thus the process of exchange
led to the creation of trust (Brown, 1995).
This is a kind of social capital, in the terms of Coleman and Bourdieu, but it is
speci®c to the Chinese networks. The trust built within these networks had little to do
with the practice of politics. It was not a resource of society `as a whole', except in the
rather di€use sense of contributing to economic growth. It was a resource accruing to
the Chinese themselves and, in fact, by their very success the Chinese excluded or pre-
empted indigenous groups from engaging in many lines of trade. Many of the social
networks formed within business communities throughout the world accomplish
similar goals to those of the Chinese in Southeast Asia.
But is this type of social capital particularly good for democracy? Do these net-
works foster `civic engagement' in the societies as a whole? The simple answer is no.
There is considerable evidence that they did contribute to civic engagement within the
Chinese communities themselves. However, these communities have not by any
stretch of the imagination become particularly outspoken advocates of democratiza-
tion. In the Philippines under the Marcos dictatorship, the Chinese Filipino com-
munity fared better than they had done at any previous time (Ang See, 1995). They
had little interest in replacing the regime with a more democratic one. In Indonesia
and Malaysia today, it is not at all clear that minority Chinese communities would
favour a transition toward more democratic rule, opening greater possibilities for
ethnically inspired attacks against Chinese communities from the more disadvantaged
majorities.
In discussing the history of German development, Francis Fukuyama examines
the role of guilds that served as the basis of the modern apprenticeship system so
celebrated in its contribution to German economic prosperity, but were also the

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 Reading Robert Putnam on Democracy 943

breeding grounds for `intolerance and lack of openness' that characterized com-
munitarian German culture, associated with the rise of National Socialism. Despite
his overall e€ort to present an ultimate congruence between the development of
modern capitalism and liberal democracy, Fukuyama acknowledges that, `What had
grim consequences from the standpoint of political development, however, turned out
to be very useful from the standpoint of economic modernization' (Fukuyama, 1995,
pp. 248±249 and ch. 31).
In writing about the US, Putnam echoed the institutional economists, pointing out
that the diamond trade is concentrated in ethnic enclaves:
When economic and political dealing is embedded in dense networks of social
interaction, incentives for opportunism and malfeasance are reduced. This is
why the diamond trade, with its extreme possibilities for fraud, is concentrated
within close-knit ethnic enclaves. Dense social ties facilitate gossip and other
valuable ways of cultivating reputation Ð an essential foundation for trust in a
complex society (Putnam, 1993b).
But is there anything that makes these ethnic enclaves of diamond traders
particularly democratic? They appear to be no more prone to democracy in Russia
today than they have been historically in South Africa. While examining divergent
patterns of social capital may shed light on both patterns of economic development
and political performance, the mere existence of networks and norms that facilitate
economic exchange says little about whether such networks will `make democracy
work'.

3. THE `DARK SIDE' OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

One of the most extraordinary aspects of Putnam's detailed examination of the basis
of democratic development in Italy is his almost total neglect of the fascist interlude
under the authority of Benito Mussolini and his Partido Nazionale Fascista that ruled
the country uninterrupted from 1922 to 1943.5 This is all the more surprising an
omission in that Mussolini himself was said to have spoken of the Po Valley, the site
of vibrant social capital in Putnam's work, as the `cradle of the Fascist movement'
(Lipset, 1963, pp. 165±166). Regardless of whether one accepts the liberal, Marxist or
Polanyi's more systemically determined explanation of the rise of fascism (Goldfrank,
1990, p. 89; Polanyi, 1944, ch. 20), the associational legacy of northern Italy appar-
ently did little to thwart the rise of modern fascism Ð the antithesis of democratic
governance. It is perfectly plausible that the same social networks that permit
Fukuyama (1995, pp. 16, 210) to label German and Japanese societies as marked by
high levels of trust also made them particularly susceptible to fascism. The networks
and relationships bred by association do not in themselves guarantee political
outcomes, even though, against his own historical evidence, Fukuyama ®nally asserts
that they do (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 356).

5
It is equally surprising how few of the commentaries on Putnam have identi®ed this most obvious of
lacunae. Tarrow (1996) is the exception.

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944 J. Putzel

Elinor Ostrom recognizes this when she reminds us that `social capital can also
have a dark side':
cartels and organized crime are networks of relationships that lower overall
productivity while generating disproportionate bene®ts for a few bene®ciaries. A
system of government based upon military command and the use of instruments
of force can also destroy other forms of social capital while building its own
(Ostrom, 1997, p. 162).
One of the problems in Putnam's work has been to con¯ate `social capital',
especially as manifested by associational membership, with the wider attributes that
he himself described as `civic community'. In his idealization of de Tocqueville's view
of associations as the fount of all that is good in democracy, and his focus on `social
networks that foster trust', he neglects the other half of his own de®nition of civic
community. The positive e€ects of associational membership, argues Putnam, `do not
require that the manifest purpose of the association be political'. `Taking part in a
choral society or a bird-watching club can teach self-discipline and an appreciation
for the joys of successful collaboration' (Putnam, 1993, p. 90). But we have to ask,
`self-discipline' and `successful collaboration' to what end?
The civic community, as Putnam himself describes it, also requires what he labels
as `civic engagement' or `active participation in public a€airs' and what Ostrom
(1990) called the `pursuit of the public good'. It requires, as well, a notion of `political
equality' or `citizenship' which `entails equal rights and obligations for all'. In a
footnote, Putnam warns against the danger of imputing democratic characteristics to
associations per se:
Not all associations of the like-minded are committed to democratic goals nor
organized in an egalitarian fashion: consider, for example, the Ku Klux Klan or
the Nazi party. In weighing the consequences of any particular organization for
democratic governance, one must also consider other civic virtues, such as
tolerance and equality (Putnam, 1993a, p. 221).6
Unfortunately, the indicators he uses are poor substitutes for this comprehensive
vision of civic engagement. The ®rst, of course, is associational life. The second,
inspired again by de Tocqueville, is readership of a daily newspaper. While I am not
familiar with the quality of newspapers in Italy, based on the US or Britain, one
would want to qualify this indicator by distinguishing between the `quality press' that
contains serious news analysis, on the one hand, and the much more widely read
`gutter press' found in the tabloids or local newspapers characterised by parochial
concerns (and often in the US, in any case, by extremely narrow political agenda).
What is more, newspapers, like associations, can carry any message, including

6
In his writing on democracy in the US, Putnam (1993b) has also explicitly acknowledged the need to
di€erentiate between positive and negative consequences of social capital: `Social inequalities may be
embedded in social capital. Norms and networks that serve some groups may obstruct others, particularly
if the norms are discriminatory or the networks socially segregated. Recognizing the importance of social
capital in sustaining community life does not exempt us from the need to worry about how that community
is de®ned Ð who is inside and thus bene®ts from social capital, and who is outside and does not. Some
forms of social capital can impair individual liberties, as critics of communitarianism warn. Many of the
Founders' fears about the ``mischiefs of faction'' apply to social capital. Before toting up the balance sheet
for social capital in its various forms, we need to weight costs as well as bene®ts. This challenge still awaits.'

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 Reading Robert Putnam on Democracy 945

`uncivic' ones, and perhaps banal ones (like the latest scores in sporting competitions
that all those members of soccer clubs no doubt buy the paper to read).
His other two indicators of voting in referenda and (the particularly illuminating
focus on) `preference voting' are at least more political in character and do in their
respective ways indicate a level of engagement in politics and, particularly in the latter
case, some re¯ection of the quality of that engagement. However, even in Putnam's
more positive indicator of civic engagement as voting in programmatic referenda, it
should be remembered that democratic exercises can be conducted towards non-
democratic ends. As Lipset (1963, ch. 5) demonstrated, anti-democratic extremists of
all political hues have used the ballot box to achieve power.

4. IDEALIZING THE FAMILY AND `THE DEMOCRATIC PAST'

Perhaps a more disturbing trend within the literature on social capital is that which
tends to idealize the family as the most productive site of social capital and therefore a
pillar of civic virtue and democracy. This is accompanied by an equally disturbing
romantic view of a golden age of democracy in the American past.
Despite the fact that Putnam points to `force and family' as a `primitive substitute'
for civic community in his study of Italy (Putnam, 1993a, p. 178), in his writing on
the US, Putnam identi®es the family as the most important site of social capital
formation:
the most fundamental form of social capital is the family, and the massive
evidence of the loosening of bonds within the family (both extended and nuclear)
is well known. This trend, of course, is quite consistent with Ð and may help to
explain Ð our theme of social decapitalization (Putnam, 1995, p. 73).
Fukuyama (1995, pp. 4±5) argues that civil society is built upon `the family, the
primary instrument by which people are socialized into their culture and given the
skills to allow them to live in broader society and through which the values and
knowledge of that society are transmitted across the generations'.
While the family certainly is the major site of socialization in most societies, civil
society, if it is to have meaning at all, must be seen as that public space that exists
between the state and the family where individuals have the potential to interact as
citizens with equal rights. To be sure, there is a kind of trust Ð of predictability Ð that
is associated with the intimacy of the family, but it is not by any means democratic in
essence. In fact democracy rests in large part on a notion of individuals as citizens
endowed with inalienable rights, despite their location in family, ethnic group, or
class. The citizen is located as the member of a larger community precisely outside the
family and free of the state in the space of civil society Ð that same space where civic
engagement can be bred.
As feminists have pointed out, families are hierarchical organizations and one of
the more important sites of reproduction of patriarchal relations within society.7 They
act as the sites of transmission of chauvinism and racism `across the generations'. In
7
See Pateman (1988) and Barret and McIntosh (1982). Because these critics of the family take the white
middle class nuclear family as the norm, they don't consider the enabling aspects of the family, or its role
for instance in supporting victims of racism. Nevertheless, this literature o€ers an important counterpoint
to the new communitarians.

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946 J. Putzel

fact, one reason why it is so dicult to e€ect a transformation of informal institu-

tions Ð of norms and values Ð is because they are constantly reproduced within the
intimacy of the family. Some of the most enduring forms of oppression linked with
patriarchy and racism are perpetuated even in the `most civic' of places. It is precisely
for this reason that change cannot wait for a communitarian consensus within society
but requires concerted action by the state as the ®rst step: removing legislated
inequalities; punishing rape ruthlessly; and punishing overt discrimination and
sexism.
In the debate over the decline of social capital in the United States, there is a strong
tendency to idealize the past and ascribe a character of democratic tolerance to
American associationalism Ð the Lions and Elks clubs and bowling leagues Ð that
bears little resemblance to the deeply conservative and exclusionary roles many of
these groups have played in small town USA. In his now famous article on the decline
of social capital in the US, Putnam underlines the symbolic signi®cance of the fact
that many more Americans are `bowling alone' rather than participating in the
bowling leagues of bygone days (Putnam, 1995). Levi, in a scathing criticism of
Putnam's romanticism, points out that `Timothy McVeigh and other co-conspirators
in the Oklahoma City bombing were members of a bowling league', adding that `this
is a case where it may have been better to bowl alone' (Levi, 1996, p. 52).
While the US has, in many ways, set the standard of best practice in the elaboration
of the institutions and organizations of modern liberal democracy, democratic
America has much to account for. Putnam (1993a, p. 165) cites the example of `barn
raisings' on the American frontier as exemplary of the social capital that underpins
democracy, but others might associate it with a survival mechanism of a community
participating in the genocidal warfare conducted against the indigenous inhabitants
of the North American continent in the name of `Manifest Destiny'. In defence
of democracy, the US used `agent Orange' and organized `Operation Phoenix' in
its battle to save the Vietnamese people from the ravages of an undemocratic
Communism. The US bombing of Cambodia certainly helped to make its territory
ripe for the rise of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. In fact, one reading of the modern
day US struggle to make the world safe for democracy could conclude that the illiberal
means employed by the US and other Western democracies pushed independence
movements and those who aspired to development in former colonial territories
directly into the hands of illiberal communism.

5. POLITICAL IDEAS, POLITICAL ACTION AND THE STATE

John Harriss (in this issue) has already pointed to the debilitating prospects laid out
for those in zones of `social capital de®ciency' o€ered by Putnam's adherence to `path
dependence' (Putnam, 1993a, pp. 178±81). There is a curious parallel between the
proposition that social capital is an endowment bequeathed by history (`them as has,
gets') and Robert Nozick's (1974, ch. 7) theory of entitlement that argues that justice
means accepting the distribution of property rights inherited from the past. Beyond
being an ideologically deeply conservative message, based on what has been shown to
be a spurious reading of Italian history (Sabetti, 1996), the proposition of path
dependence entirely eclipses the role of political ideas, political action and the state in
determining democratic prospects.

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 Reading Robert Putnam on Democracy 947

There is no reason to doubt Putnam's observations about the relative e€ectiveness

of institutional reform in di€erent parts of Italy. Indeed, material from his survey of
political leaders is convincing and potent (1993, pp. 99±106), including discussions
with them about `political equality' and other substantive issues. There remains,
however, considerable doubt as to the role of social capital per se in determining the
observed diversity of democratic outcomes. Tarrow (1996), in a penetrating criticism
of Putnam's reading of the di€erences between northern and southern Italy, o€ers a
plausible argument that other political factors may well account for the diversity of
civicness, like the past activity of political mobilization, or the relative condition of
dependence (where southern Italy was trapped in a quasi colonial position in relation
to the North).
It is not surprising that trade union membership is much more pervasive in the
more civic areas of Italy (Putnam, 1993a, p. 107). It is far more plausible that this is a
result of the kind of political organizing that has occurred in the recent past than the
result of a proclivity of citizens to join in birdwatching societies. To anyone familiar
with the practices of the orthodox Catholic Church, it is not at all surprising that
areas where the Church is dominant (and this must be seen as a kind of political
dominance), are areas that are less civic in other ways. Perhaps membership in choral
societies is more prevalent in the civic north precisely because in the uncivic south
people are singing in Church.
This brings us to the importance of political parties, promoting particular political
ideas, and to the quality of state intervention in creating the conditions for civicness. It
is indeed extraordinary that Putnam (1993a, pp. 119±120) so readily writes o€ the
evidence of a precise correlation between civicness and the presence of communist
party (PCI) government as a key explanatory factor in his study of Italy. For those
who ®nd themselves in social settings lacking the substance of civic engagement,
forming a political organization to get on with the business of constructing civic-
mindedness and good governance would appear to be a far more promising strategy
than accepting the propositions of `path dependence' and reconciling oneself to the
inheritance of history.
Putnam (1993, p. 175) advances the important observation that `networks of civic
engagement that cut across social cleavages nourish wider cooperation' Ð a necessary
condition for consolidating and deepening democracy. Elsewhere I have demon-
strated how the absence of such networks has been a major weakness of democratic
restoration in the Philippines (Putzel, 1995). However, Putnam does not necessarily
provide evidence that his choral clubs and soccer teams actually accomplish this.
As Levi (1996) points out, there is neither any evidence that the skills and habits
learned in such associations are `transferable', nor that they are even relevant to the
construction of democratic practice.
Football clubs may indeed establish lasting social networks, but it is necessary to
examine what determines whether these networks simply breed hooliganism, or serve
as the basis for fascist or democratic political movements. Clearly, it is the articulation
of goals, the power of ideas and the ecacy of organization that will determine the
political purposes, if any, that such networks serve. In considering Putnam's work on
the US, Theda Skocpol (1996) reminds him that associations can and have been built
up in concert with the state Ð a strong state and strong civil society must go together.
Putnam clearly does not share the overt anti-statist biases of Fukuyama. Indeed, in
an article relating his study of Italy to the discussion of democracy in the US he argues

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948 J. Putzel

against the communitarian line saying, `Conservatives are right to emphasize the
value of intermediary associations, but they misunderstand the potential synergy
between private organization and the government'. Nevertheless, while he says that,
`Social capital is not a substitute for e€ective public policy', he asserts that it is both a
`prerequisite for it and, in part, a consequence of it'. This conceptual confusion needs
to be confronted, and clari®ed, if Putnam's theory of social capital is to inform
understandings of how the state can be employed to increase the stock of social
capital. Clearly, in discussing prospects in the US, Putnam sees the state playing such
a role:
Wise policy can encourage social capital formation, and social capital itself
enhances the e€ectiveness of government action. From agricultural extension
services in the last century to tax exemptions for community organizations in
this one, American government has often promoted investments in social
capital, and it must renew that e€ort now. A new administration that is, at long
last, more willing to use public power and the public purse for public purpose
should not overlook the importance of social connectedness as a vital backdrop
for e€ective policy (Putnam, 1993b).
If the concept of social capital is to enhance both our understanding of democracy,
as well as practical e€orts to establish and consolidate democratic systems of `good
government', then an e€ort needs to be made to theorize the possibilities of investing
in and constructing social capital. This can only be done by discarding deterministic
readings of `path dependency' and analysing the political substance, content and
determinants of the networks and norms established through social interaction.

REFERENCES

Ang See, T. (1995). `The socio-cultural and political dimensions of the economic success of the
Chinese in the Philippines'. In Ellen Huang Palanca, (ed.) China, Taiwan, and the Ethnic
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