AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
4077
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182793 July 5, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
- versus - DIONISIO CALONGE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For review is the Decision dated November 29,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 01516 which affirmed with modification the
Joint Decision dated August 10, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27
in Criminal Case Nos. 4077-4080 finding the above-
named accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of parricide and frustrated parricide.
The facts as culled from the records:
Rosita A. Calonge was appellant’s legitimate wife, with
whom he had three (3) children, namely: Melody, Dony
Rose and Kimberly whose respective ages at the time of
the incident were nine (9), seven (7) and six (6) years.
The family lived in a four (4) by five (5) meters house at
a farm land near the house of Rosita’s parents at
Barangay Cabuluan, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.
On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 o’clock in the
morning, the Villaverde Police Station received a
radio call from the barangay captain of Cabuluan that
a massacre took place in their locality. By 7:30 a.m.,
the responding team led by PO3 Alfelmer Balut
arrived at the area. Rosita’s bloodied body was
found lying on the ground about fifteen (15) meters
away from their house. Her right hand was loosely
clasping a knife. Lying on his back near the stairs
was appellant who was also wounded but still
conscious. Beside him were a bolo and a flashlight,
both stained with blood. While the windows of the
house were locked with a piece of tie wire, the door Criminal Case No.
was already opened, its metal lock was found three That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at
(3) to five (5) meters from the door and seven (7) to Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of Villaverde,
ten (10) meters from the body of Rosita. Inside the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within
two (2) “bedrooms” of the house separated only by a the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
curtain, they found the lifeless bodies of the two (2) named accused, with intent to kill, evident
young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other child, premeditation, treachery and superior strength, did
Melody, was also bloodied but alive and conscious. then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
They brought Melody to the Veterans Regional with the use of a bladed/pointed object, stab
Hospital where she was treated and confined for ROSITA CALONGE y AMLAG, legal wife of the
seventeen (17) days. accused, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal
Police investigators found no signs of struggle or wound which caused her instantaneous death, to
forcible entry as the things inside the house were not the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
disarranged. Photographs of the three (3) dead CONTRARY TO LAW.
victims (Rosita, Dony Rose and Kimberly) were also Criminal Case No. 4078
taken at the crime scene. When interviewed by the That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at
policemen, Melody’s grandmother, Ana O. Amlag, Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of Villaverde,
said that Melody told her it was their father (appellant) Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within
who attacked her, her mother and her sisters. the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
Melody’s grandparents said they knew it was named accused, with intent to kill, evident
appellant because they had heard Rosita shouting premeditation, treachery and superior strength, did
that appellant will kill them. On the other hand, when then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
appellant was asked what happened and who with the use of a bladed/pointed object, hack
attacked him, he answered he does not know. KIMBERLY CALONGE y AMLAG, 06 years old,
Appellant asked to be treated also and they brought daughter of the accused, thus inflicting upon the
him to the hospital. latter mortal wounds which caused her
While still in the hospital, Melody, assisted by her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice
first cousin Ana Fe Huang, gave her statement to the of her heirs.
police. She identified her father, who had a quarrel CONTRARY TO LAW.
with her mother the previous night, as the one (1) who Criminal Case No. 4079
hacked her and also fatally stabbed her mother and That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at
two (2) sisters. Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of Villaverde,
On January 17, 2002, appellant was charged with Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within
parricide and frustrated parricide under the following the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
Informations: named accused, with intent to kill, evident
 premeditation, treachery and superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with the use of a bladed/pointed object, stab DONY
ROSE CALONGE y AMLAG, 07 years old,
daughter of the accused, thus inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which caused her
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice
of her heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 4080
That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at
Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of Villaverde,
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation, treachery and superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with the use of a bladed object, hack Melody
Calonge y Amlag, 09 years old, daughter of the
accused, thus inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds
and performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of Parricide as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused, that is, the timely medical attendance
given which prevented the victim’s death, but
nevertheless resulted to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution presented as
witnesses PO3 Alfelmer Balut, Dr. Telesforo A. Ragpa
(Municipal Health Officer), Lourdes Amlag, Dr. Lirio
Marie Ronduen-Adriatico and Melody A. Calonge.
The sole witness for the defense was appellant who
gave a different version of the incident. According to
appellant, he came home on the night of November
30, 2001 at around 6:00 o’clock. After taking coffee,
he took supper with his family. At about 8:30 p.m., he
put Kimberly to sleep while his wife together with
Dony Rose was in the kitchen preparing for their food
the following morning because they will go to church.
He could not remember what time he fell asleep but
when he woke up in the morning, he was no longer in
their house but in a hospital. Only then he realized
that he was wounded on the chest and neck. He
tried to inquire from people in the hospital what
happened but no voice came out of his mouth. He
does not know who caused his injuries as he could
not recall anything that transpired from the time he
slept until the morning of December 1, 2001.
Appellant denied that he and his wife quarrelled the
previous night. What he knows is that his wife had a
quarrel with spouses Manong Sante and Manang
Paula, as the latter who is the sister of his wife did not
want them to stay in the place. On cross-
examination, appellant claimed that the doors of the
house were still open at that time because somebody
else was still using the kitchen. He denied that he
sharpened his bolo that same night, as in fact all his
carpentry tools were placed in their kitchen. As to his
flashlight, appellant insisted it was his wife who was
using it that night but he admitted that it was already
placed very near the door where he had put Kimberly
to sleep. He actually placed his bolo, flashlight and
those other items in a shelf just four (4) meters away
from where he slept.
On August 18, 2005, the trial court promulgated its
Joint Decision dated August 10, 2005 convicting
appellant of the crimes charged, the fallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Dionisio
Calonge y Verana GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of parricide and one count of
frustrated parricide, he is hereby sentenced as
follows: (1) for the killing of Kimberly Calonge and
Dony Rose Calonge, the said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer death penalty by lethal injection
for each case; to pay the heirs of the said victims,
the sums of P75,000.00 for each case as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
to pay the heirs actual damages in the sum of
P21,255.00 for the death of Kimberly, Dony Rose
and Rosita A. Calonge; (2) for the killing of Rosita
Calonge, the said accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to pay
the heirs of Rosita the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) for the crime of frustrated parricide for
wounding Melody Calonge, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as the minimum term to 20 years of
[reclusion temporal] as the maximum term; to pay
the victim moral damages in the sum of
P25,000.00; exemplary damages in the sum of
P20,000.00 and P11,015.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s
judgment but modified the death penalty imposed on
appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 4078 and 4079
(parricide committed against Kimberly and Dony
Rose) by reducing it to reclusion perpetua. Appellant
filed a notice of appeal and accordingly the records of
the case were elevated to this Court.
On August 11, 2008, the Court resolved to require
the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs,
if they so desired. In a Manifestation dated October eyewitness engender doubt as to their reliability and
29, 2008, the Public Attorney’s Office, representing veracity.
the appellant, informed the Court that it would no Appellant further argues that Melody’s identification
longer file a supplemental brief; it was adopting its of appellant as the perpetrator of the crimes remained
main brief on record. The Office of the Solicitor uncorroborated. The failure to present such other
General, representing the People, likewise omitted to alleged witnesses (her grandparents) was not
submit a supplemental brief. satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. He assails
Appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction by the Melody’s testimony as highly incredible. While
RTC and CA on the following grounds: Melody claimed that she saw appellant hacked and
I. stabbed her sisters, the fact is that, during that time,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING according to her, she was sleeping together with her
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY mother in another room inside their house. Moreover,
OF PROSECUTION WITNESS MELODY it was impossible for Melody to have seen that the
CALONGE DESPITE ITS EVIDENT person who killed her mother and two (2) sisters was
CONTRADICTIONS AND APPARENT appellant when in fact, according to her, there was no
UNREALITY. light inside their room when the incident happened.
II. Clearly, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN of proving the identity of the offender.
FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED- We disagree.
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS It is plain that the errors imputed to the trial court
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. are factual and chiefly assail its evaluation of the
Appellant contends that the trial court overlooked credibility of witnesses. The doctrinal rule is that
the following inconsistencies and contradictions in the findings of fact made by the trial court, which had the
testimony of Melody: (1) the alleged opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to
misunderstanding between her parents prior to determine the probative value of the other testimonies
December 1, 2001, which she first denied but are entitled to great weight and respect because the
changed it during a subsequent hearing when she trial court is in a better position to assess the same,
claimed her parents had a quarrel before the stabbing an opportunity not equally open to the appellate
incident occurred, (2) the time of such quarrel for court. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the
which she gave three (3) different answers (8:00 to findings and conclusions of the RTC and CA in this
9:00 p.m. of November 30, 2001; 2:00 early morning case.
of December 1, 2001; and 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. of It was established from prosecution evidence that
November 30, 2001), and (3) whether it was Melody the lone survivor Melody saw appellant using his bolo
or her mother who was first hacked by her father. and knife, struck at her mother who was able to evade
These inconsistent statements of the alleged it and run outside the house. Appellant then turned to
Melody, and hacked her three (3) times before
stabbing Dony Rose and Kimberly who were both still
sleeping. After finishing off his family, appellant
inflicted his lone superficial wound before lying down
on the floor, apparently to avoid suspicion that he was
himself the culprit and create an impression that a
trespasser had attacked all of them in the night.
Melody vividly recounted to the court what she had
witnessed while pretending to be still asleep even
after she was hacked by appellant.
Melody’s account was corroborated by the findings
of prosecution witnesses Dr. Ragpa (who conducted
the autopsy on the bodies of the three [3] victims) and
Dr. Ronduen-Adriatico (who examined and treated
Melody). Dr. Ragpa testified that Rosita sustained
only a single stab wound on the chest. He explained
that the width of such wound, 2 ½ inches, was caused
by a single upward thrust and pulling out of the bladed
instrument. The six (6)-inch deep wound hit the lower
tip of the heart and resected the pulmonary vessels.
For Rosita, the cause of death was hypovolemic
shock due to resected pulmonary blood vessels. As
for Kimberly, she sustained a hacking wound on the
left axilla (armpit), probably inflicted in a lying position,
which cut the head of the left humerus and resecting
the axillary blood vessels. Kimberly also died from
hypovolemic shock due to injured/resected left axillary
blood vessels. Dony Rose had one (1) incised wound
and one (1) stab wound on her chest, which
penetrated the left ventricle of the heart. She
likewise died of hypovolemic shock due to penetrating
stab wound on the chest. On the other hand, Dr.
Ronduen-Adriatico testified that Melody sustained five
(5) wounds and had three (3) amputations of the three
(3) digits of her right hand. She found the wounds
located at the left side of the head, lower lip, left side
of the neck, left shoulder, chest and the third, fourth
and fifth fingers. Although the only fatal wound is that
at the left side of the neck, the combination of all
wounds would have caused the death of Melody had
there been no timely medical assistance rendered on
the patient. The neck wound was a fatal injury (victim
could have died in less than six [6] hours) because of
its proximity to large blood vessels such as carotid
and tubular vessels.
We hold that the trial court did not err in finding
Melody’s testimony clear and unequivocal, despite
her answers not being as complete as would be
desired, considering her age and difficulty
translating the questions to her in the Ifugao dialect.
Her account of the incident was consistent with the
physical evidence, particularly the findings of Dr.
Ragpa and Dr. Ronduen-Adriatico on the injuries
sustained and cause of death of the victims as a
result of the carnage wrought upon their family by
appellant.
The inconsistencies mentioned by appellant relate
only to minor details and not to the fact of the fatal
stabbing of his wife and two (2) children in his own
hands. We have consistently ruled that not all
inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony affect their
credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimonies. Thus, although there may
inconsistencies on the testimonies of witnesses on
minor details, they do not impair credibility where
there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and positive identification of
assailants. Discrepancies referring only to minor
details and collateral matters – not to the central fact
of the crime – do not affect the veracity or detract
from the essential credibility of a witness as long as it
is coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.
It must be further stressed that during her
testimony, Melody had to be assisted by an
interpreter as she responded to the questions in the
Ifugao dialect. Besides, ample margin of error and
understanding should be accorded to young
witnesses who, much more than adults, would be
gripped with tension due to the novelty of the
experience of testifying before a court. Despite the
language barrier, Melody remained categorical and
of steadfast in declaring that it was her very own father,
appellant, who hacked her, her mother and her
younger sisters using his bolo and knife in the early
morning of December 1, 2001 at their house. Thus,
she testified during the direct examination:
PROS. TURINGAN:
Q. Do you recall of any incident at that evening that
is relevant to this case involving the killing of your
sister Dony Rose, Kimberly, your mother and the
fact that you were wounded?
A. Yes, there was sir.
Q. What was that incident that you recall Melody?
A. He hacked us, sir.
Q. Who hacked you?
A. My papa, sir.
COURT:
be Q. Do you know the full name of your papa or
nickname?
A. Yes, sir I know.
Q. What is the full name of your papa?
the A. Dionisio Calonge, sir.
xxxx
PROS. TURINGAN:
Q. What did your father use in hacking you
Melody?
A. The knife and the bolo, sir.
xxxx
PROS. TURINGAN:
These bolo and knife, how are they related to
the bolo and knife used by your father in hacking
you, your sister and your mother?
A. He stabbed and then he hacked, sir.
Q. By the way, these bolo and knife, do you know
who own these bolo and knife?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who own these bolo and knife Melody?
A. My father sir.
Q. How are these knife and bolo related to the bolo
and knife used by your father in hacking your sister,
yourself and your mother?
A. He used that bolo in hacking and stabbing my
mother and my sister, sir.
Q. Who was hacked first by your father Melody?
A. I, sir.
Q. After hacking [you] Melody. . .By the way, what
part of your body was hacked by your father?
A. This one, sir. (Witness showing to the Court the
three fingers that were cut from the middle finger up
to the small finger of the left arm and also below the
shoulder of the left arm).
Q. Where else, Melody?
A. (Witness showing to the Court the scar located
at the left side of her lower lip and also at the back
of her left ear).
Q. After your father Melody hacked you, what
happened next?
A. My mother, sir.
COURT: A. December 1, 2001, sir. Q. Please tell the Court how you were able to see
Q. What was done to your mother? Q. In the early morning of December 1, 2001 your father hacked and stabbed you, your mother
A. He stabbed her, sir. were there other persons in your house aside from and sisters?
PROS. TURINGAN: you, your father, mother and your sisters? A. (No answer yet)
Q. And after he stabbed your mother, what did A. None, sir. COURT:
your father do next Melody? Q. The weapons used by your father in hacking Q. x x x Why don’t you start with where was she at
A. He returned back and used the bolo in hacking and stabbing you, your mother and your sisters, if the time the hacking and stabbing took place?
me three times, sir. you can see them could you be able to identify PROSECUTOR:
Q. After that, what happened next Melody? them? We withdraw that, your Honor. Aside from
A. Next, sir my father used the bolo in stabbing my A. Yes, sir. these bolo and knife Melody, was your father
sister’s armpit and used in hacking her abdomen. Q. There are here a bolo and a knife Melody, holding any other things?
Q. Which of these bolo and knife did he use in can you please examine these bolo and knife and A. Yes, sir.
hacking and stabbing your sister? tell the Court if these are the same weapons used Q. What was that Melody?
ATTY. TABAGO: by your father in hacking and stabbing you, your A. Flashlight, sir.
Who? Sister? mother and your sisters? Q. Can you identify that flashlight it (sic) [if] you
A. Both, sir. A. Yes, sir. can see it Melody?
COURT: Q. Who owns these bolo and knife Melody? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you saying that your father was holding two A. My father, sir. Q. There is here a flashlight marked as Exhibit “I”.
weapons at the same time? As to appellant’s assertion that Melody could not Can you please examine this flashlight and tell the
A. Yes, sir. have seen her father stab her two (2) sisters who Honorable Court if it is the same flashlight you
Alright, go ahead. slept on the other room since it was still dark inside mentioned?
PROS. TURINGAN: the house, Melody (during cross-examination) had A. Yes, sir.
Q. After that what did your father do? described their “rooms” as not actually separated by Q. Who owns this flashlight Melody?
A. He pretended to stab his body, his neck and his walls. She could thus see her two (2) sisters and A. My father, sir.
abdomen, sir. appellant from where she was sleeping. The xxxx
Q. What did your father use in stabbing and policemen who investigated the crime scene also Q. Could you please tell the Court how this
wounding himself? found that the partition was just a curtain. Melody flashlight was being held by your father?
A. The bolo, sir. slept beside her mother while her sisters were beside A. He put in his head the flashlight, sir.
Q. You are referring to this Exh. “G”? their father on the other “room.” And while indeed it Q. Can you demonstrate how he placed in his
A. Yes, sir. [Emphasis supplied.] was still dark when appellant started hacking his wife head Melody?
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT and daughters, Melody had sufficient illumination A. (Witness demonstrating how he placed the
BY PROS. TURINGAN: provided by the flashlight used by appellant. This was flashlight at the left side of her head with the use of
Q. When was that again when your mother and mentioned by Melody in the later part of her direct a rubber tied on the flashlight). [emphasis
your sisters were hacked and stabbed by your examination: supplied.]
father?
 On cross-examination, Melody fixed the time of the
incident at 4:00 in the morning when she woke up to
prepare food. However, she went back to bed
because she knew that appellant was already awake.
Her mother and sisters were still asleep. Appellant
then started hacking, first her mother, who evaded the
blow and was able to run outside to seek help from
her grandmother and aunt. Returning to Melody,
appellant hit her three (3) times before following her
mother outside. At this point, Melody also recalled
that her parents quarrelled on the night of November
30, 2001. Before they went to sleep, she saw her
father sharpening his bolo. When she asked
appellant what he was doing, he replied that he will
kill Uncle Santy and his family. Melody said that she
pretended to be still asleep when she woke up the
next morning because she had seen appellant placed
that bolo under his pillow. As to the exact time the
quarrel took place, it can be gleaned from the
transcript of stenographic notes that Melody initially
could not estimate with reference to the night before
they slept, but she eventually declared that her
parents quarrelled from 6:00 o’clock until 7:00 o’clock
in the evening of November 30, 2001.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of accused. The key element in parricide is
the relationship of the offender with the victim. All the
elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently
proved by the prosecution.
Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the
actual stabbing of her mother and two (2) sisters, the
attendant circumstances point to no one else but the
appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the
actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an
accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently
establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been
that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction
if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven
and the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While no general rule can be laid down as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice
in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.
As correctly found by the CA, the following
circumstances taken together established without
doubt that it was appellant who inflicted fatal wounds
on Rosita, Melody, Dony Rose and Kimberly inside
their house early morning of December 1, 2001: (1)
after having a quarrel with Rosita the previous night,
appellant was seen by Melody sharpening his bolo
which he later hid under his pillow; (2) the bolo, knife
and flashlight used in the hacking of the victims
belong to appellant, and which were found in his
possession when policemen arrived at the scene; (3)
the medical findings showed that the victims’ injuries
were caused by sharp and bladed instruments; (4)
there were no sign of forcible entry as the things
inside the house were not disarranged; (5) the only
persons inside the house were appellant, Rosita and
their three children who slept in adjacent rooms
separated only by a curtain; (6) the only house near
appellant’s house was that of his parents-in-law; (7)
Rosita was heard by her relatives shouting for help
before their bodies were discovered; (8) appellant
sustained only superficial wounds and was found
conscious by the policemen; (9) appellant could not
explain or say anything about how and when he and
the victims were injured; and (10) Melody saw her
father initially strike at her mother before the latter ran
outside the house, and then stab her also five (5)
times.
Appellant simply raises the defense of denial, which
is inherently weak and cannot prevail over the positive
identification made by Melody that he was the one (1)
who hacked her, her mother and her sisters.
Moreover, an affirmative testimony is far stronger
than a negative testimony especially when it comes
from the mouth of a credible witness, as in this case,
the child of the assailant who survived his murderous
rampage.
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, the penalty for parricide is composed of two (2)
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death.
In the killing of Dony Rose and Kimberly, the trial
court was correct in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when
the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the
victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or
to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more
sudden and unexpected than when a father stabs to
death his two (2) young daughters while they were
sound asleep and totally defenseless. Thus, for the
parricide committed against both Dony Rose and
Kimberly, appellant was properly meted the death
penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 4079 and 4078. Since
the killings were committed in 2001, the trial court was
correct in imposing upon appellant the supreme
penalty of death. In view, however, of the passage
and effectivity of R.A. No. 9346 on June 24, 2006,
proscribing the imposition of the capital punishment,
the CA correctly modified the imposable penalty on
appellant to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, in line with Sections 2 and 3 of the said law.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following
shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law
violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended. (Underscoring
supplied.)
As to the killing of Rosita, neither treachery nor
evident premeditation was present considering that
she was able to parry the first thrust of appellant and
ran away outside the house, and there is no evidence
proving that appellant determined to commit the crime
even as Melody recounted that she saw his father
sharpening his bolo before they slept the previous
night. Evident premeditation needs proof of the time
when the intent to commit the crime is engendered in
the mind of the accused, the motive which gives rise
to it, and the means which are beforehand selected to
carry out that intent. All such facts and antecedents
which make notorious the pre-existing design to
accomplish the criminal purpose must be proven to
the satisfaction of the court. There is paucity of
evidence as to the time, motive and the means
chosen by appellant to carry out the intent to kill his
entire family. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the trial court was correct in
sentencing appellant to the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua in Criminal Case No. 4077.
On the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court in
the amount of P75,000.00 each and another
P50,000.00 each as moral damages, for the deaths of
Dony Rose and Kimberly, the Court sustains the
same. Likewise, the heirs of Rosita are entitled to
civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and another P50,000.00
as moral damages.
With regard to the frustrated felony, Article 250 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that –
ART. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder,
or homicide. – The courts, in view of the facts of the
case, may impose upon the person guilty of the
frustrated crime of parricide, murder or homicide,
defined and penalized in the preceding articles, a
penalty lower by one degree than that which should
be imposed under the provisions of Article 50.
The courts, considering the facts of the case, may
likewise reduce by one degree the penalty which
under Article 51 should be imposed for an attempt
to commit any of such crimes.
We therefore find the penalty imposed by the trial
court proper and correct for this offense.
The trial court awarded Melody moral damages in
the amount of P25,000.00, and another P20,000.00
as exemplary damages which are justified under
Articles 2219 (1) and 2229 of the Civil Code. Further,
under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary
damages are awarded to serve as a deterrent to
serious wrongdoings, as vindication of undue
suffering and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured person, and as punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct.
Melody is likewise entitled to the sum of
P11,025.00 as cost of her treatment and hospital
ization. Anent actual or compensatory
damages, it bears stressing that only substantiated
and proven expenses or those which appear to have
been genuinely incurred in connection with the death,
wake or burial of the victim will be recognized by the
courts. Prosecution witness Lourdes Amlag testified
that the family incurred expenses in connection with
the funeral, wake and burial, totalling P21,255.00, as
shown in the itemized list submitted to the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision dated November 29, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01516 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
With costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 188704 July 7, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
- versus – PEDRO ORTIZ, JR, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the April 29, 2009 Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No.
31164, affirming the June 7, 2007 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Manila (RTC) which
found accused Pedro Ortiz, Jr., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the killing
of one Loreto Cruz.
Accused Pedro Ortiz, Jr., along with his nephew,
Jojo Ortiz, was charged with murder for the killing of
Loreto Cruz in two (2) consolidated cases before the
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 18. The
accusatory portions of the two (2) Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 03-215663
(People v. Jojo Ortiz y Quitada)
“That on or about June 22, 2003, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating with one another whose true
name, identity and present whereabouts are still
unknown and mutually helping each other, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of one LORETO CRUZ Y
CRUZ, by then and there suddenly shooting the
latter with a .38 revolver bearing Serial No. 47970
with trademarks Armscor on the right cheek,
thereby inflicting upon said LORETO CRUZ Y Cruz
mortal gunshot wound which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.”
Criminal Case No. 03-219216
(People v. Pedro Ortiz)
“That on or about June 22, 2003, in the City of
Manila, Philippines the said accused conspiring and
confederating with one JOJO ORTIZ Y GUTABA,
who was already charged with the same offense
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed
as Criminal Case No. 03-215663, and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of one LORETO CRUZ Y CRUZ, by then
and there suddenly shooting the latter with a .38
caliber revolver bearing Serial No. 47970 with
trademarks Armscor on the right cheek, thereby
inflicting upon said LORETO CRUZ Y CRUZ, a
mortal gunshot wound which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.”
As culled from the evidentiary records, it appears
that on June 22, 2003, between 9:00 and 10:00
o’clock in the evening, Loreto Cruz, an Executive
Officer of Barangay 597, Zone 59, Guadalcanal St.,
Sta. Mesa, Manila, together with Barangay Tanod
Angelito de Guzman and Kagawad Gil Bactol, was
watching television inside the barangay hall. Without
anyone noticing him, accused Pedro Ortiz, Jr. entered
the hall and called out, “Ex-O!” When Loreto Cruz
turned, the accused shot him with a .38 caliber
revolver. The bullet hit the left side of his face. Upon
realizing what happened, Tanod de Guzman tried to
wrest the gun from the accused. In their struggle,
another shot was fired hitting a table nearby.
Kagawad Villena then grabbed the accused who
called out for his nephew, Jojo Ortiz. Responding to
his call, Jojo, with a samurai, uttered, “Bitiwan mo
yan, para wala tayong problema.” Kagawad Villena let
go of the accused. Wasting no time, the accused and
his nephew fled from the scene. Thereafter, Loreto
Cruz was rushed to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital
where he expired. The accused and his nephew,
Jojo, were later apprehended and criminally charged
with murder.
Although the accused pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment, he admitted killing Loreto Cruz in the
course of the trial because he was not satisfied with
the way the victim dealt with his sons’ case.
According to the accused, his sons were merely
playing “kara y kruz” but were detained for illegal drug
use. As the Executive Officer, the victim promised
that his sons would be released from detention after
three to four months. Five months passed and his
sons remained in jail. On his part, Jojo Ortiz denied
any participation in the commission of the crime and
only admitted the fact that he helped his uncle when
he saw him being grabbed by the barangay officials.
On June 7, 2007, the RTC found the accused guilty
of the crime charged but acquitted co-accused Jojo
Ortiz. The RTC did not consider evident
premeditation but appreciated treachery as a
qualifying circumstance because of the manner by
which the killing was executed. It wrote: “the victim
was killed frontally and in a sudden and unexpected
manner. Although, accused Pedro Ortiz narrated that
he shot the victim after the latter sneered at him, the
nature and location of the wound and the manner of barangay hall did not render Loreto Cruz totally
the shooting deprived the victim opportunity to put up defenseless from any possible attack against his life.
a defense.” In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
In acquitting Jojo Ortiz, the RTC ruled that “Pedro countered that there was treachery because of the
Ortiz shot the victim alone. The killing was carried suddenness of the attack while the victim was
out without the participation of Jojo Ortiz who did not watching television. It wrote: “Even if Cruz was aware
personally hit or harm the victim. Nothing in the of the accused’s threat against him, the suddenness
testimonies conveyed a coordinated action, concerted of the attack deprived him of any real chance to
purpose or community of design to commit the defend himself or to retaliate. The weapon used and
criminal act.” Thus, the decretal portion of the RTC the nature of the injury inflicted, which pertained to the
Decision reads: lone gunshot fatally wounding the victim, clearly
“WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Pedro shows that accused deliberately and consciously
Ortiz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. He adopted the particular mode of attack to ensure the
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion commission of the offense with impunity.” The OSG
perpetua and to pay the heirs of Loreto Cruz the likewise prayed that exemplary and temperate
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and damages be added to the award of damages.
P50,000.00 as moral damages. Accused Jojo Ortiz On April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals agreed that
is acquitted of the crime charged. there was treachery and affirmed the ruling. It pointed
SO ORDERED.” out that the accused, with a firearm in hand, barged
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals and into the Barangay hall, called out “Ex-O,” and
assigned the following errors: suddenly shot the victim at close range, evident of his
“I intent to ensure the success of his attack with no risk
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN to himself. The CA also added that while it is true that
APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING the accused called Loreto Cruz “Ex-O” as he shot the
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY latter, “he did so only to make sure that the person he
II would shoot was his intended target and not to afford
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN his victim a chance to defend himself.”
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF Hence, this appeal.
MURDER.” The only issue before this Court is whether or not
The accused argued that the RTC erred in the accused employed treachery or alevosia so as to
appreciating the element of treachery as an qualify the killing of one Loreto Cruz to murder.
aggravating circumstance. He insisted that the victim The Court rules in the affirmative.
knew all along that there was a threat to his life but Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code
chose to ignore it. He likewise stressed that the provides that “there is treachery when the offender commits
presence of three Barangay tanods outside the any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.” The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack by the aggressors on
unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressors, and
without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victims.
In this case, the accused purposely sought the
unsuspecting victim with intent to inflict a mortal
wound on him. He shouted “Ex-O” just in time for the
victim to turn towards his line of fire. When the victim
faced him, the accused instantly pulled the trigger
hitting him on the left side of his face. The way it was
executed made it impossible for the victim to respond
or defend himself. He just had no opportunity to repel
the sudden attack, rendering him completely helpless.
The accused argues that there could not have been
any treachery because the victim knew the threat to
his life. The Court has consistently held that
treachery can still be appreciated even though the
victim was forewarned of the danger because what is
decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner
that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable
to retaliate. In this case, although it is true that the
victim knew that the accused had a grudge against
him, he never had any inkling that he would actually
be attacked that night. In fact, records reveal that the
victim was preoccupied with watching television with
his back turned against the accused when the latter
suddenly barged into the barangay hall. Accused,
moreover, used a firearm to easily neutralize the
victim, which was undeniably a swift and effective way
to achieve his purpose. Lastly, but significantly, the
accused aimed for the face of the victim ensuring that
the bullet would penetrate it and damage his brain.
It is likewise true that the victim was with two other
barangay officials at the time of the shooting. It
should be emphasized though that these two
barangay officials were also watching television and
were also caught by surprise. The accused had
already shot the victim before they could even react.
These acts are distinctly indicative of the
treacherous means employed by the accused to
guarantee the consummation of his criminal plan.
Thus, as treachery attended the killing of Loreto Cruz,
such circumstance qualified the killing as murder,
punishable under paragraph 1 of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code.
When death results due to a crime, recovery of
these awards are allowed: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper
cases.
The RTC only awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. The Court
deems it proper to award exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00 following precedents. “Under Article
2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
awarded in criminal cases when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances, in this case,
treachery. This is intended to serve as deterrent to serious
wrongdoings and as vindication of undue sufferings and
wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. The
imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under
Article 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an example for
the public good.”
The Court likewise grants P25,000.00 as temperate
damages in keeping with current jurisprudence allowing it
where the funeral and burial expenses spent for the victim
cannot be fully substantiated or there is no proof of actual
damages.
WHEREFORE, the April 29, 2009 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31164 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused is
further ordered to pay P30,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188124 June 29, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS AND JOEL
LORICA LABAD, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
1
Before us on appeal is the Decision of the Court of
2
Appeals affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Parañaque in Criminal Case No. 02-
01426 convicting appellants Jonel Falabrica Serenas
alias "Joe-An" (Joe-An) and Joel Lorica Labad (Joel)
of the crime of murder.
Appellants were charged under the following
Information:
That on or about the 8th day of December 2002 in
the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with one John
Doe, whose true name and present whereabouts is
still unknown, and all of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one Nino Noel Ramos, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal stab wound, which caused his
death.3
The facts, as narrated by prosecution witnesses,
follow –
On 8 December 2002, at around 10:00 o’clock in
the evening, Niño Noel Ramos (Niño) had just
brought his girlfriend, Dianne Charisse Gavino
(Dianne), home in Sto. Niño, Parañaque City. On his
way back to La Huerta, he passed by a bridge
connecting the barangays of Sto. Niño and La Huerta.
Thereat, Niño was stabbed and mauled.4
Cesar Ramos (Cesar), Niño’s brother, was in the
vicinity of N. Domingo Street in La Huerta when he
heard a commotion on the bridge. As he was about to
proceed to the bridge, he met Niño and noticed that
his brother was soaked in his own blood. Niño relayed
to Cesar that he was stabbed by Joe-An. Cesar
immediately brought Niño to the hospital where the
latter expired thirty (30) minutes later.5 At the police
station, Cesar claimed that appellants told him that
they merely "took fancy" on Niño.6
Dianne initially related in her affidavit executed at
the police station that her cousin informed her of a
commotion on the bridge. Upon reaching the bridge,
she met a friend who told her that her boyfriend, Niño,
was stabbed and brought to the hospital. She added
that one day before the incident, she and Niño were
walking along the bridge when they passed by the
group of appellants and heard Joe-An utter the words,
"Iyang mama na iyan, may araw din siya sa akin."7 In
her testimony during the trial however, she narrated
that she actually saw Joe-An stabbing Niño.8
PO3 Ramoncito Lipana (PO3 Lipana) was at the
police station in La Huerta on 8 December 2002 when
a woman named Dianne came to report a stabbing
incident involving her boyfriend. PO3 Lipana, together
with PO2 Jesus Brigola (PO2 Brigola) and PO3
Marlon Golfo, immediately proceeded to the crime
scene. Upon arriving thereat, the police saw two men
scampering away upon seeing them. They chased the
two men, later identified as Joe-An and Joel. The
police managed to catch the appellants while they
were hiding near a bangka under the bridge.
Appellants were brought to the police station where
9
Dianne identified them as the assailants of Niño.
Dr. Valentin T. Bernales (Dr. Bernales), the medico-
legal officer who issued the autopsy report, testified
that the victim was stabbed twice at the back and the
assailant was situated within arm’s length. The victim
succumbed from the stab wounds, both of which, are
fatal. Dr. Bernales also noted that there were contuse
10
abrasions on different parts of the victim’s body.
Appellants invoked denial and alibi as their
defense. Joe-An, a resident of Wawa, Sto. Niño,
alleged that he was at his house on 8 December
2002. While he was taking his dinner, he saw people
running towards the bridge. He went out of the house
to check on what had happened. He approached a
group of people talking about the commotion.
Thereafter, he saw the police and barangay tanods
arrive. He was immediately handcuffed and asked to
go with the police. Joe-An alleged that he was
physically forced by the police to admit the killing of
11
Niño. Joe-An denied knowing the victim or his
girlfriend, Dianne, but admitted that Joel is an 4. P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees;
12
acquaintance. and
Joel likewise denied his participation in killing Niño. 5. To pay the cost of suit.14
He stated that he was sleeping at around 11 p.m. on Lending full credence to the testimonies of the
8 December 2002 when he was awakened by an prosecution witnesses, the trial court concluded that
argument involving his mother and four (4) men the appellants conspired in assaulting and stabbing
outside his room. He then got out of the room and Niño. It gave full weight to the dying declaration
saw PO3 Lipana, PO2 Brigola, and two other police uttered by Niño to his brother, as well as the
"assets." The group invited him for questioning. When statement of Dianne, who allegedly witnessed
the two assets suddenly grabbed him, Joel resisted appellants threaten Niño the night before the incident.
but he was forcibly brought to the police station. He It also appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
saw Dianne at the station but the latter did not identify treachery and evident premeditation in the
him as the culprit. Instead, Dianne even sought his commission of the crime. Furthermore, the trial court
help to identify the person who killed her boyfriend. regarded the uncorroborated testimonies of
This fact notwithstanding, the police refused to let him appellants to be "full of inconsistencies and unworthy
go. He testified that he did not know the victim or of weight and credence."15
Dianne personally.13 On 13 September 2006, appellants filed a notice of
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appeal informing the RTC that they are appealing the
appellants, the dispositive portion of which reads: decision to the Court of Appeals.16
WHEREFORE, considering that the prosecution was The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
able to prove the guilt of both accused beyond decision of the RTC by awarding exemplary damages
reasonable doubt, accused JONEL FALABRICA in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus:
SERENAS alias JOE-AN and JOEL LORICA LABAD WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of appealed from, being in accordance with law and the
RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to R.A. 9346 evidence, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
which repealed the death penalty law. However, MODIFICATION that exemplary damages in the
pursuant to Sec. 3 thereof, they are not eligible for amount of P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of the
parole. victim. The Decision in all other respects STANDS.17
Accused JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS alias On 13 August 2008, a notice of appeal was filed
JOE-AN and JOEL LORICA LABAD are jointly and assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals before
severally liable to pay the heirs of NIÑO NOEL this Court.18
RAMOS, the following amounts, to wit: On 26 October 2009, the parties were required to
1. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex-delicto; simultaneously file their respective supplemental
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; briefs.19 In two (2) separate manifestations, both
3. P23,000.00 as actual damages;
parties opted to adopt their briefs submitted before
20
the Court of Appeals.
Summarizing the arguments of both parties, the
issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the testimonies
of the witnesses are sufficient to prove appellants’
guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) whether the killing
was qualified by treachery and evident premeditation;
(3) whether conspiracy has been adequately proven.
In convicting appellants, the lower courts relied
heavily on the testimonies of witnesses Cesar and
Dianne, which they deemed to be credible.
Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on its
findings are accorded great respect, if not conclusive
effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The exception is when it is established that
the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances that, if
21
considered, would change the outcome of the case.
We respect the findings that Jonel Falabrica Serenas
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder not by
virtue of identification by Dianne but as established by
the dying declaration of the victim. Upon the other
hand, we reverse the conviction of Joel Lorica Labad.
The trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
accorded full weight to the testimony of the
prosecution witness, Dianne, who declared on the
witness stand that she actually saw appellants maul
and stab the victim, thus:
Q Miss witness, do you know the person of Niño
Noel Ramos?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know him?
A He was my boyfriend, sir.
Q And where is Niño Noel Ramos now?
A He’s dead already, sir.
Q Why do you know that he is dead?
A Because I saw that day when he was stabbed,
sir.
Q You said that you know when he was stabbed.
When was that?
A On December 8, 2002, sir.
Q What time was that?
A At around 10:00 in the evening, sir.
Q Where did it happen?
A It happened on a bridge between La Huerta and
Sto. Niño, Parañaque City, sir.
Q Do you know the person who killed your
boyfriend?
A Yes, sir.
Q If they are inside the courtroom, can you point to
them?
COURT:
Witness pointing to the second and the third
detention prisoners from among five (5) who when
asked by the Court, "Ano’ng pangalan mo, ‘yong
pangalawa?" answered by the name of Joel Labad.
"IKaw? "Jonel Serenas po."22 [emphasis supplied]
Appellants argue that Dianne gave conflicting
statements regarding the identity of the assailants. In
her affidavit, she narrated that a friend informed her
that Niño was stabbed and taken to the hospital.
During trial however, Dianne testified that she
witnessed the actual stabbing incident.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) refutes
the alleged inconsistencies in the statements made by
Dianne in the affidavit and during trial. It claims that
Dianne was categorical in her testimony that she saw
appellants stab her boyfriend. Furthermore, her
testimony in open court is superior to statements
made in her affidavit, which statements may have
been made when she was not in her right mind.23
The Court of Appeals dismissed the alleged
inconsistencies by giving greater weight to the
statement made in court by Dianne than that made in
the affidavit she executed before the police.
We do not agree.
Dianne’s testimony is doubtful to say the least. This
Court is mindful of the rule that if there is an
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony
of a witness, the latter should be given more weight
since affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually
incomplete and inaccurate. Corollary to this is the
doctrine that, where the discrepancies are
irreconcilable and unexplained and they dwell on
material points, such inconsistencies necessarily
discredit the veracity of the witness' claim.24 The
second rule is apt to the case at bar.
Nowhere in her affidavit did Dianne point to
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. From the
tenor of her affidavit, Dianne’s suspicion that
appellants committed the crime merely arose from the
alleged threats made by appellants on the victim the
day before the incident. The pertinent portion of her
affidavit is hereby reproduced:
T: Mayroon ka bang natatandaan pagbabanta kay
Niño Noel bago ito nangyari sa kanya?
S: Opo, naalala ko po kahapon ika 7 ng Disyembre
2002 humigit kumulang na alas 9:45 ng gabi noong
kami ay papauwi dahil hinatid niya ako sa bahay,
pagdaan naming sa Wawa Sto. Niño may apat na
kalalakihan, naka upo sa may daanan malapit sa
laruan ng pool, ang isa ay narinig ko nagsalita ng
"IYANG MAMA NA IYAN, MAY ARAW DIN SIYA
 SA AKIN," hindi ko naman ito pinansin at tuloy tuloy
po ang lakad namin.
T: Nakilala mo ba kong sino ang apat na
kalalakihan?
S: Akin pong napag-alaman ang dalawang
magkatabi na sina, Michael Baluyot at @Joe-An.
T: Sino naman ang iyong narinig nagsalita ng
pagbabanta sa kanila kong natatandaan mo pa?
S: Opo, si @Joe-An po.
T: May ipapakita ako sa iyo, ano ang masasabi
mo?
S: Opo, siya po ang nagsalita ng pagbabanta,
affiant pointing to the person when asked identified
himself as JONEL SERENAS Y FALABRICA,
@Joe-An, 23 yrs. old, single, jobless, residing at
5058 Wawa Sto. Niño, P’que City.
T: Mayroon akong ihaharap sa iyo, ano naman ang
iyong masasabi sa kanya?
S: Opo, siya po ang sumagot kay Joe-An ng "Oo
nga, Oo nga" na umaayon sa nasabing
pagbabanta, affiant pointing to the person inside
investigation when asked voluntarily identified
himself as MICHAEL BALUYOT Y ALIC, 17 yrs old
single of 117 Wawa, Sto. Niño, P’que City referred
to this office by PO2 Ramoncito Lipana, et al. for
investigation.25
We cannot simply brush aside the fact that while
Dianne pointed to the persons who threatened to do
harm on the victim, she failed to identify who the
perpetrators of the crime are. To the mind of the
Court, this omission in Dianne’s affidavit is so glaring
on a material point, i.e., the failure to attribute
authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of
Dianne altogether becomes suspect.
Nevertheless, the prosecution’s case did not Q Cesar, will you please tell this Honorable court
necessarily crumble. The victim’s dying declaration is where were you on the night of December 8, 2002
a most telling evidence identifying Joe-an. at about 9:30?
Appellants question the alleged dying declaration of A I was near the crime scene, sir.
the victim in that they were not sufficiently identified Q Where is this place?
as the persons responsible for Niño’s death. A In N. Domingo, La Huerta, Parañaque City, sir.
Appellants anchor their argument on the utterance of Q At that time, what did you notice?
the word "Joe-An" when the victim was asked on who A There was a commotion on top of the bridge, sir.
stabbed him. Appellants advance that the victim may Q So, what did you do?
have been referring to some other person. Moreover, A We verified it, sir.
the victim did not even mention "Joel" or "Joel Labad," Q After that, what did you do?
26
the other suspect. A I saw my brother coming, sir.
The OSG defends the victim’s dying declaration Q Who is this brother of yours that you saw?
and insists that there was no mistake that the victim A Niño Noel Ramos, sir.
was indeed referring to Joe-An, considering that the Q When you saw Niño Noel approaching, what did
27
latter was familiar to him. you do?
As an exception to the rule against hearsay A I asked him what the commotion was all about,
evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem sir.
statement is evidence of the highest order and is Q What did he answer?
entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of A He told me that he was stabbed, sir.
his impending death would make a careless and false Q What else did he tell you?
28
accusation. A I asked him who stabbed him, sir.
In order for a dying declaration to be held Q What was his answer?
admissible, four requisites must concur: first, the A He answered [to] me that it was Joe-an, sir.
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding Q What else did he tell you?
circumstances of the declarant's death; second, at the A He asked me to bring him to the hospital, sir.
time the declaration was made, the declarant must be Q What did you do when he asked you to bring him
under the consciousness of an impending death; to the hospital?
third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and A I held him up and brought him to the hospital, sir.
fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal Q Why? What was the condition of your brother at
case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the that time?
29
declarant is the victim. A He was bloodied, sir.30
Niño’s ante mortem statement was relayed to his All requisites for a dying declaration were
brother Cesar, in this wise: sufficiently met by the statement of the victim
communicated to Cesar. First, the statement
pertained to Niño being stabbed, particularly pin- Q And you only came to know about these persons
pointing Joe-An as the perpetrator. Second, Niño at the police precinct, is that correct?
must have been fully aware that he was on the brink A Yes, sir.
of death considering his bloodied condition when Q Because Dianne and your brother told you so?
Cesar met him near the bridge. Third, the A Yes, sir.31 [Emphasis supplied]
competence of Niño is unquestionable had he While the police officers caught Joel hiding under
survived the stabbing incident. Fourth, Niño’s the bridge, this incident appears to be circumstantial
statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution and cannot stand to prove Joel’s complicity without
for his murder. any corroborating evidence. Admittedly, Joel’s
Note however that based on the testimonies of defense of denial and alibi are inherently weak,
witnesses, there was no direct evidence linking however, it is doctrinal that the weakness of the
appellant Joel to the crime. Cesar testified, thus: defense cannot be the basis for conviction. The
Q But you only knew that there was a stabbing primary burden still lies with the prosecution whose
incident when you were told by the victim that he evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and who
was stabbed? must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt the
32
A Yes, sir. guilt of the accused before there can be conviction.
Q And he told you that he was stabbed by a certain, At this juncture, we acquit appellant Joel.
who was that? With respect to Joe-An, the lower courts properly
A Joe-an, sir. appreciated the presence of treachery in qualifying
Q Only Joe-an? the crime to murder.
A Yes, sir. There is treachery when the offender commits any
Q And aside from this, he was not mentioning any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
other person? methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
A That is the only name he mentioned but there directly and especially to ensure its execution, without
were three (3) or four (4) persons who mauled him, risk to himself arising from any defense which the
33
sir. offended party might make.
Q The accused in this case, of course, you do not The medical records support the finding of
know them? treachery. The nature and location of his wounds are
A I know them by their faces, sir. indicative of the positions of the victim and his
Q Why did you say so? assailant at the time the incident occurred. The trial
A Because I often pass by that place, sir. court drew a better picture of how the victim was
Q But you did not see these persons at that time of stabbed, thus:
the incident? It is clear under the circumstances that the victim
A I saw them but I cannot see their faces because it has no opportunity to retaliate the aggression of the
was quite far, sir. accused when he was stabbed because according to
Dr. Valentin Bernales, Medico-Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation considering the
locations of the wound which was sustained by the
accused, the assailant was about an arm [sic] length
away and believed to be at the back of the victim who
was standing and almost in the same level when the
first stab wound was inflicted. As to the second
wound, according to Dr. Bernales, the victim appears
already lying face down on the ground when stabbed
by the accused which to some extent is consistent
with the testimony of Cesar that his brother/victim was
mauled by four (4) other persons. This may be the
reason why the victim sustained contuse abrasions on
the different parts of his body.34
The victim was suddenly attacked by appellant on
his way home from his girlfriend’s house. He was
stabbed twice from behind. The mode of attack on the
victim was clearly executed without risk to the
attacker. We cannot discount the fact that there were
other participants to the crime. Appellant could not
have acted alone based on the testimony of the
witnesses and the medico-legal report. However, the
identity of the other assailants was not proven by the
prosecution.1avvph!1
While affirming that treachery attended the
commission of the crime, we however rule out the
presence of evident premeditation.
In order for evident premeditation to be appreciated,
the following requisites must be proven: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has
clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of
time between the determination and execution, to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act
and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will. In the instant case, appellant
uttered the words "iyang mama na iyan, may araw din
siya sa akin." Even conceding that these utterances
were in the form of a threat, it still cannot be
presumed that at the time they were made, there was
indeed a determination to kill and that appellants had
indeed clung to that determination, planning and
meditating on how to kill the victim.
Finally, appellants question the sufficiency of
evidence to prove conspiracy. They aver that there
was no concerted action pursuant to a common
criminal design between the appellants. Moreover, the
manner by which appellants conspired with one
another in stabbing the victim was not discussed in
35
the trial court’s decision.
The OSG submits that conspiracy may be deduced
from the manner by which the crime was perpetrated.
It recalled that appellants waited by the bridge where
the victim passes by whenever he visits his girlfriend.
Upon seeing the victim, they grabbed and mauled
him. Moments later, Joe-Ann stabbed the victim.
Thereafter, appellants escaped and hid under the
bridge where they were eventually apprehended.
Clearly, they have performed overt acts in furtherance
36
of the common design of killing the victim.
There is nothing on record that would prove that
conspiracy existed. The circumstantial evidence cited
by the OSG are not sufficient to prove that appellant
conspired with other individuals to perpetrate the
crime. Further lending doubt to this claim is the fact
that the alleged co-conspirator’s identity was not
established.
In sum, we find that the prosecution has proven that
appellant Joe-An is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of murder. The acquittal of the other
appellant, Joel, is in order on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
As to appellant’s pecuniary liability, we find it proper
to increase the award of civil indemnity and moral
37
damages to P75,000.00 each. The trial court’s grant
of P23,000.00 as actual damages is increased to
P25,000.00, but as temperate damages in line with
38
the ruling in People v. Villanueva. We uphold the
grant of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, with the
victim’s mother having hired a private prosecutor to
prosecute the case.39 We increase the award of
exemplary damages to P30,000.00 in line with recent
40
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED.
Appellant JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS is found
GUILTY of the crime of murder and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered
to pay the heirs of the victim Niño Noel Ramos the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
For failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, appellant JOEL LORICA
LABAD is ACQUITTED. The Director of Prisons is
ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is
being held for some other lawful cause, and to inform
this Court of such action within five days from receipt
of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188610 June 29, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. ALBERT SANCHEZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated February 27, 2009, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02902, which affirmed with modification, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina
City in Criminal Case Nos. 06-8245-MK, 06-8246-MK,
06-8247-MK and 06-8248-MK, finding appellant Albert
Sanchez y Galera guilty of two (2) counts of murder
and two (2) counts of frustrated murder.
The accusatory portions of the criminal informations
filed against Sanchez for the crimes aforestated are
respectively reproduced below:
Criminal Case No. 06-8245-MK for Murder
That on or about the 27th day of January 2006, in
the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with knife, with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one Jufer James De leon y Cruz, a
minor, 11 years of age, thereby inflicting upon him
fatal wounds which caused his death soon after the
said killing having attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation,
which upgrades the killing to Murder.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 06-8246-MK for Murder
That on or about the 27th day of January 2006, in
the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused,
armed with knife, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Edgar De Leon, thereby inflicting upon him
fatal wounds which caused his death soon thereafter
the said killing having attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation,
which upgrades the killing to Murder.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 06-8247-MK for Frustrated
Murder
That on or about the 27th day of January 2006, in
the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused,
armed with knife, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Jeane De Leon y Cruz, thereby inflicting
upon [her] stab wounds which would ordinarily [cause]
her death, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence thereof, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of cause/s independent of [his]
will that is due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Jeane de Leon y Cruz,
which prevented [her] death.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Criminal Case No. 06-8248-MK for Frustrated
Murder
That on or about the 27th day of January 2006, in
the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused,
armed with knife, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Jelyn Mae de Leon y Cruz, thereby inflicting
upon the latter stab wounds which would ordinarily
[cause] her death, thus, performing all the acts of
execution which would have [produced] the crime of
murder as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of cause/s independent
of his will, that is due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Jelyn May De Leon y
Cruz, which prevented her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, Sanchez, duly assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to all the charges.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented in
evidence the testimonies of John Ray De Leon, Jelyn
Mae De Leon, Jeane De Leon, Dr. Arnel Marquez, the
Medico-Legal Officer of Rizal who performed an
autopsy on the cadaver of two of the victims, and the
2
arresting and investigating police officers.
On the other hand, the defense waived its right to
present evidence.
The pertinent facts, as gathered from the records,
may be summarized as follows:
3
On June 26, 2006, siblings John Ray, Jufer James
(Jufer), Jelyn Mae (Jelyn), Jorvi and Junel, all
surnamed De Leon, were at home by themselves,
their parents, Edgar and Jeane,4 having gone out to
buy certain items for their catering business. Between
9:00 to 10:00 p.m. of that day, Sanchez entered the
De Leon’s house in dela Paz St., Marikina City, and
there and then told John Ray, then 10 years old, that
his father Edgar would give him some money.
Sanchez then proceeded to the master’s bedroom at
5
the second floor of the house. John Ray was familiar
with Sanchez, the latter having once stayed with the
family as a houseboy. When John Ray asked him to
leave, Sanchez proceeded to the comfort room on the
ground floor where Jufer was then inside defecating.
Sanchez was still inside that room when spouses
Jeane and Edgar arrived.
Later learning where Sanchez was, Edgar asked
the former to come out. Sanchez would thereafter
request Edgar for money, claiming that his sister is
confined in a hospital in a nearby town.
From her room, Jeane later went downstairs, joined
Edgar and Sanchez, and explained to their irritated-
looking former houseboy that they could only spare
PhP 100 as they had just purchased several items for
their business. In the meantime, Edgar handed
Sanchez P100, telling him just to come back the
following day. With a hostile expression, Sanchez
accepted the money, then left. Later, Jufer confided to
his mother that Sanchez, while in the rest room, had
pointed a knife at and threatened to kill him.
Obviously terrified by the threat, Jufer slept in his
parents’ room that night.
Very early the following morning, June 27, Jeane
prepared breakfast for her school children. Noticing
Jufer’s absence at the breakfast table, she asked the
13-year-old Jelyn to get her kid brother down.6 Jelyn
went to Jufer’s bedroom upstairs and there found him
lying on his bed face down. Suddenly, somebody
grabbed her from behind, covered her mouth, pointed
a knife on her neck and later stabbed her.7 The
assailant then pushed her towards the bed, told her to
be quiet and pressed her face down near her brother
until she could not breathe. Jelyn recognized the
voice to be that of Sanchez. And while Jelyn was
calling out to get Jufer’s attention whom she thought
was merely asleep, Sanchez stabbed her on the
chest. Jelyn reacted by boxing and kicking Sanchez,
shouting for help at the same time. And even as
Sanchez gave her a piece of cloth to wipe the blood in
her neck and motioned her to keep quiet, Jelyn
managed to plead for her life.8
 Meanwhile, Jeane who decided to look for Jufer
herself heard a commotion and a thudding sound.
When she checked what it was, son Jorvi rushed
towards her to inform her that Sanchez was inside the
house. The nervous Jeane then hurried to Jufer’s
room upstairs where she saw Sanchez holding a knife
against Jelyn’s bloodied neck. Then Jeane uttered,
9
"Dali, tumawag ka ng 161." At that instance, Sanchez
shoved Jeane inside Jufer’s room even as she
pleaded for their lives. In response, Sanchez placed
his fingers on his lips to signal silence. Thereafter,
Jeane turned her son, Jufer, upside down only to
discover that he was bathed in blood. Jufer weakly
10
uttered, "Mama, si Kuya Albert sinaksak ako." At this
point, Sanchez ran outside the room.
Jeane, cradling her bloodied son, intending to bring
him to the hospital, again instructed daughter Jelyn to
call 161. While carrying Jufer outside the room, Jeane
noticed Sanchez assaulting Edgar near the stairs.
She then brought Jufer to her room so she could help
Edgar. In the process, she spotted a knife in the
hallway floor, and picked it up as she approached
Edgar who was then sitting on the floor. At that
juncture, Sanchez turned his ire towards her and
11
stabbed her on the lower left side of the chest .
When the injured Edgar stood up in an obvious bid to
help his wife, Sanchez again lunged at and stabbed
the former. Her own attempt to hit Sanchez with the
knife she picked up earlier, however, proved
unsuccessful. In fact, Sanchez continued with his
stabbing spree inflicting on her injuries on her lower
left eye and stomach. Then he returned to Edgar,
stabbing him on the stomach and side, causing his
large intestines to spill out. Only after Edgar again fell
did Sanchez run out of the house.
After Sanchez has left, Jeane helped her husband
up, gathered all her children in one room, placed her
bloodied son beside his equally bloodied father and
locked the door. She then cried out for help. At this
time, Jufer was no longer moving, while Edgar was
hardly breathing.
At around 6:35 in the morning of January 27, 2006,
POl Reynaldo Candelaria, responding to radio call
reporting a stabbing incident, proceeded to the De
Leons’ place. A trembling John Ray met and told tell
him who stabbed his father. When Candelaria opened
the gate of the house, he saw Sanchez running
towards the back of the house holding a knife. And
after a chase, Candelaria, with the help of nearby
residents, caught up with and arrested Sanchez. At
the Amang Rodriquez Hospital where
operatives brought him and where Jeane and Jelyn
were sent for treatment, mother and daughter
identified Sanchez as the assailant.
Meanwhile, the bodies of Jufer and Edgar de Leon
were brought to the Eastern Police District crime
laboratory for autopsy.
The uniform entry, "Stab wounds, trunk", appeared
12
in the separate autopsy reports prepared by Medico
13
Legal Officer Jose Arnel M. Marquez as the cause of
14
death of both Jufer and Edgar De Leon.
other hand, the Medico-Legal Certificate15 issued by
Dr. Alejandro Geronimo stated that Jeane de Leon
was confined at the hospital from January 27, 2006 to
February 4, 2006 for treatment of multiple stab
16
wounds. In the case of Jelyn, she was confined and
17
treated also for multiple wounds.
Jeanne and Jelyn’s combined hospital
amounted to PhP 300,000, while the internment and
burial expenses for Edgar and Jufer totaled to PhP
150,000.18
When the defense was called for initial presentation
of its evidence, the defense counsel, in open court,
manifested, with the conformity of the accused, that
the defense is waiving its right to present evidence.19
On July 23, 2007, in consolidated Crim. Case Nos.
06-8245-MK to 068248-MK the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 272, the RTC20
rendered a decision finding accused Sanchez guilty of
two (2) counts of murder and two (2) counts of
frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered, as follows:
police 1. In Criminal Case No. 06-8245-MK, accused
ALBERT SANCHEZ y GALERA is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation and is hereby sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim Jufer James de Leon the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, P42,500.00
as actual damages, and P100,000.00 as moral
On the damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 06-8246-MK, accused
ALBERT SANCHEZ y GALERA is also found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by
treachery and evident premeditation and is hereby
bills sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of the victim Edgar De Leon the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, P42,500.00
 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral
damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 06-8247-MK, accused
ALBERT SANCHEZ y GALERA is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER under Article 248 in
relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
the absence of modifying circumstances, he is
hereby sentenced to in indeterminate prison term of
TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS
and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay his victim Jeane de Leon the
amount of P40,786.55 as actual expenses and P
50,000.00 as moral damages; and
4. In Criminal Case No. 06-8248-MK, the accused
ALBERT SANCHEZ y GALERA is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER under Article 248 in
relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
the absence of modifying circumstances, he is
hereby sentenced to in indeterminate prison term of
TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS
and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay his victim Jelyn Mae de Leon
the amount of P66,341.85 as actual expenses and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The period during which the herein accused was in
detention during the pendency of these cases shall be
credited to him in full provided he agrees to abide by
and comply with the rules and regulations of the City
Jail of Marikina.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, Sanchez went to the CA on appeal,
docketed as CA G.R. HC-No. 02902, on the lone
submission that the RTC erred in convicting him of
murder and frustrated murder when the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation
have not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Eventually, the CA rendered on February 27, 2009 a
Decision affirming that of the RTC, with the following
modification: the increase in the award of civil
indemnity, but the reduction of the award for moral
damages in Criminal Case Nos. 06-8245-MK and 06-
8246-MK, respectively. The fallo of the CA’s decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the
appealed decision dated 23 July 2007 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS in that: (a) the awards of civil
indemnity in Criminal Case Nos. 06-8245-MK and 06-
8246-MK are respectively increased to P75, 000.00;
while the amounts of moral damages in said cases
are reduced to P50, 000.00 respectively.
As did the RTC, the CA found the killing of Edgar and
Jufer and the wounding of the Jeane and Jelyn to
have been attended by treachery and evident
premeditation.
On March 12, 2009, appellant filed a timely Notice
of Appeal of the appellate court’s decision.
By Resolution of September 16, 2009, the Court
accepted the appeal and required the parties to
submit supplemental briefs, if they so desire within 30
days from notice. Each, however, manifested the
willingness to submit the case on the basis of the
records and the pleadings already submitted.
The Ruling of the Court
By virtually reiterating his arguments raised before
the CA, appellant admits criminal responsibility for the
death of Edgar and Jufer and the almost fatal injuries
of Jelyn and Jeane. He now presents the following
point as conclusion that the appellate court should
have made: that the prosecution failed to prove with
moral certainty the circumstance of treachery and
evident premeditation, hence, he should be acquitted
of the crimes charged convicting him instead of the
lesser crimes of homicide and frustrated homicide.
The desired downgrading of appellant’s criminal
liability, from murder to homicide (two counts) and
from frustrated murder to frustrated homicide (two
counts) cannot be granted. The instant appeal is,
accordingly, dismissed.
Article 24821 of the Revised Penal Code defines
"Murder" as the unlawful killing of a person, which is
not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery or
evident premeditation, among other circumstances,
attended the killing. The presence of one of the
circumstances enumerated in Art. 248 of the Code
would suffice to qualify a killing as murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense, which the offended party might
make. For treachery to be appreciated, two conditions
must concur:
(1) The employment of means, methods or manner
of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety
from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of
the offended party; and
(2) The offender’s deliberate or conscious choice of
means, method or manner of execution.22
 In the case at bar, circumstances do obtain to
justify the finding of treachery in the killing of Jufer.
Consider: Appellant surreptitiously entered the De
Leons’ residence at around 5:00 o’clock in the
morning of June 27, 2006 and snuck up inside Jufer’s
bedroom, while the other De Leon children were busy
preparing for school and their mother attending to
their breakfast. The family was unaware that appellant
went to the second floor and stabbed Jufer, at that
time merely 11 years old who most likely had no
opportunity, but surely without the needed heft and
strength to ward off, much less overpower, the
appellant.
The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by
an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor.23 The trial court correctly appreciated the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery in
the killing of Jufer.
The Court can grant that no one witnessed the
actual killing of Jufer. This fact alone, however, is not
an argument against the criminal liability of the
appellant for the lad’s gruesome death. As may be
recalled, appellant was in Jufer’s room, holding a
bloody knife over the unmoving boy lying face down
on bed when Jelyn entered his brother’s room. More
importantly, Jufer, before breathing his last, positively
identified appellant him as his assailant.
Jurisprudence teaches that there is treachery when
an adult person attacks and causes the death of a
24
child of tender years. As the Court elucidated in
25
People vs. Cabarrubias, the killing of a child is
characterized by treachery even if the manner of
assault is not shown. For, the weakness of the victim
due to his tender years results in the absence of any
danger to the accused.
What Jufer uttered just before he expired - "Mama,
si Kuya Albert, sinaksak ako"- is admissible in
evidence against the appellant pursuant to Section
37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a
dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death.
A dying declaration is an evidence of the highest
26
order; it is entitled to the utmost credence on the
premise that no one person who knows of his
impending death would make a careless and false
accusation. At the brink of death, all thoughts of
concocting lies disappear.
Treachery is likewise appreciated in the stabbing of
Jelyn. When Jelyn went up to look for Jufer, appellant
approached her from behind, covered her mouth and
stabbed her. The relative physical positions of the
unsuspecting Jelyn and appellant when the latter
commenced the attack and the suddenness thereof
caught Jelyn unaware and unable to defend herself.
Jelyn’s testimony on direct examination established
27
the elements of treachery:
Court: What time was it when you were eating?
Witness: 5:30 0’clock in the morning your Honor.
Court: Of what date?
Witness: January 27, 2006 Your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Gonzales: You said that after eating you were
looking for Jufer, what did you do to find him?
Witness: I went to their room sir.
Atty. Gonzales: When you said to their room, which
room are you referring?
Witness: The room of Jufer, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Gonzales: What happened next after that?
Witness: I was looking for him and when I found
him, somebody covered my mouth, sir.
xxxx
Court: Where was he [Jufer], inside the room?
Witness: He was on the bed lying face down, Your
Honor.
Atty. Gonzales: You said that someone covered
your mouth, what did you do when that somebody
covered your mouth?
Witness: I kept silent, I felt something x x x a
pointed object on my neck, sir.
Atty. Gonzales: After that, what transpired next, if
any?
Witness: I was pinned down and I was stabbed, sir.
Court: Did you see this someone who covered your
mouth?
Witness: Not yet Your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Gonzales: Madam witness, you said a person
covered your mouth, you did not do anything but
despite that he stabbed you?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Gonzales: You said that you were pinned
down by this person, what happened next?
Witness: He pressed my head until I could not
breath[e] anymore, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Gonzales: But at the time you were stabbed
by that person, were you not able to talk to your
brother Jufer?
Witness: No sir. (Underscoring added.)
The notion of Jelyn being helpless when appellant
made his brutal moves finds corroboration from her
mother’s testimony, as follows:
COURT: What time did you wake up during the day
[June 27, 2006] ?
WITNESS: 5:00 o’clock in the morning your Honor.
COURT: What about the children?
WITNESS: Same time your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. GONZALES: What did he [Jorvi] tell you?
WITNESS: When he approached me, he told me,
"Mama, nasa itaas si Kuya Albert"
ATYY. GONZALES: What was your reaction when
your son told you that Kuya Albert was upstairs?
WITNESS: I felt nervous because I realized that the
commotion I heard was coming from upstairs, sir.
ATTY. GONZALES: What did you do after that?
WITNESS: I immediately went inside the house and
went upstairs, sir.
ATTY. GONZALES: When you were upstairs, what
happened next?
WITNESS: When I went upstairs I saw my daughter
Jelyn Mae bloodied at the right side of her neck, sir.
ATTY. GONZALES: What was your reaction when
you saw that your daughter was bloodied at the
right side of her neck?
WITNESS: I immediately uttered, "dali tumawag ka
ng 161"
ATTY. GONZALES: After that what happened?
WITNESS: I went inside the room of Jufer, sir. And
when I entered the room, Albert shoved me, sir.
ATTY. GONZALES: By the way, where was this
Albert when you entered the room?
WITNESS: When I saw Jelyn, Albert was on her
back holding a knife, sir.
ATTY. GONXALES: What was Jelyn doing at that
time?
WITNESS: I saw there was fear on her face, sir.
xxxx
COURT: Was your son still alive at that time?
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. He said something to
me x x x "Mama, si Kuya Albert, sinaksak ako"
COURT: Where was the accused when your son
Jufer told you that?
WITNESS: He suddenly ran outside, Your Honor."
The manner appellant assaulted and eventually
killed Edgar also indicated treachery. Like his wife
and children, Edgar had at the start no idea of
appellant’s armed and dangerous presence in the
house on the fateful morning in question. Jelyn
28
testified that, while she and her mother were being
held in the room by appellant, Edgar came up but
appellant pushed past Edgar by the stairs, stabbed
him, then grabbed another knife from the kitchen
before coming back upstairs to finish Edgar off. The
attack against Edgar when he was on his way to the
upper floor was so sudden and unexpected, negating
any suggestion that he was in a position to defend
himself. These circumstances are manifestly
indicative of the presence of conditions under which
treachery may be appreciated, i.e., the employment of
means of execution that affords the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself. Even more, the fact
that appellant inflicted more stabbing blows on Edgar
after he fell on his bottom gravely wounded and with
his large intestines spilling out, clearly exhibits the
treacherous nature of the killing.
Joshua Ray De Leon testified being awakened by
the noise and seeing his father near the top of the
stairs, while appellant, wielding a knife, was at the
middle of the stairs following the former. Because of
fear, he hid in the hallway bathroom but witnessed the
stabbing through the slightly opened bathroom door.
Treachery is not, however, attendant in the stabbing
of Jeane. While at the back of their house, son Jorvi
informed her that appellant was upstairs. In fact, she
instructed her daughter Jelyn to call 611 as she asked
the appellant to spare their lives. Appellant even
warned her to keep quiet.29 After she discovered that
Jufer was wounded, she started to carry him outside
their bedroom, only to see her husband wrestling with
the appellant. She had the presence of mind to put
down her son, pick up a knife she found on the floor
and attempted to stab the accused.
ATTY. GONZALES: Going back to my question,
after you saw your husband wrestling with Albert
Sanchez, what did you do if any?
WITNESS: I ran towards to help my husband
because I saw Albert stabbed him on his side and
my husband fell down, sir.
xxxx
ATTY. GONZALES: Now while the accused was
stabbing your husband, what did you do next?
WITNESS: I ran and I noticed a knife and I held it,
sir.
ATTY. GONZALES: After you were able to hold the
knife, what did you do next?
WITNESS: I approached him while Edgar was
sitting down. When I approached him, he stabbed
 me (witness pointed to her lower side of the chest),
sir.
xxxx
COURT: According to you, you were able to see a
knife?
WITNESS: I noticed the knife on the hallway, Your
Honor.
COURT: On your way out of the room?
WITNESS: Yes Your Honor.
COURT: On the floor?
WITNESS: Yes Your Honor.
COURT: After you went out of the room, did you
notice if the accused was still holding a knife?
WITNESS: Yes Your Honor. Because he was
stabbing Edgar.
COURT: You picked up that knife from the floor?
WITNESS: I just saw another knife, Your Honor.
COURT: The one you noticed?
WITNESS: I picked it up, Your Honor.
COURT: You went to the accused?
WITNESS: Yes Your Honor.
xxx
COURT: When you were stabbed, you were
holding a knife?
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: You did not fight back?
WITNESS: When I saw the intestines of my
husband, I trusted the knife on him, I thought I was
able to stab him, Your Honor.
In fine, Jeane was sufficiently forewarned of the
aggression against her and her family by the
appellant. Appellant was on a killing frenzy when
Jeane faced him up close at Jufer’s room. An attack
from appellant was then something not unexpected.
Hence, treachery cannot be appreciated against
appellant, although his sex and weapon gave him
superiority of strength as against Jeane. An attack by
a man with a deadly weapon upon an armed and
defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of
abuse of that superiority which his sex and weapon
used in the act afforded him, and from which the
30
woman was unable to defend herself.
The next issue is whether or not the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation attended the
assault on the De Leon family. Both the RTC and the
CA resolved the question in the affirmative.
We agree with their parallel determinations.
For evident premeditation to be considered, the
following must be established: (1) the time when the
accused determined (conceived) to commit the crime;
(2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to
his determination to commit the crime (kill his victim);
and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the decision
to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow
the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his
31
act. Premeditation presupposes a deliberate
planning of the crime before executing it. The
execution of the criminal act, in other words, must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection. As here,
there must be showing of a plan or preparation to kill,
or proof that the accused meditated and reflected
upon his decision to execute the crime.321avvphi1
In the case at bar, the interplay of the following
circumstances indicate the presence of evident
premeditation. First, the night before the stabbing
incidents, appellant went to the De Leon residence to
ask for money. Edgar, with much reluctance, gave
appellant only P100. Jeane noted appellant receiving
the money with a hostile expression on his face.
Appellant was no longer working for the De Leon, so
he was not required to go back to the house. But he
did return the following morning, January 27, 2006,
armed, surreptitiously entering the house and
proceeding to Jufer’s bedroom while everyone was
busy having breakfast and preparing for school.
Second, Jufer told his mother that while relieving
himself in the comfort room, appellant pointed a knife
at him. John Ray corroborated the pointing-of- knife
scenario. On the witness box, John Ray testified that
on the night of June 26, 2006, appellant was toying
with a knife while talking to him and Jufer, threatening
to kill them both should they report the matter to their
parents.
Last but not least, six different knives, all with blood
stains, were found at the crime scene.33 Two pairs of
gloves34 were discovered near Jufer’s body. These
compelling pieces of evidence presuppose planning.
There can be no serious argument that appellant was
determined to commit a crime as early as on the night
of January 26, 2006, when he uttered the threat to kill
Jufer at the bathroom. Jelyn and Joshua Ray testified
to seeing appellant holding a knife while talking to
Jufer.35 Appellant had the whole night to contemplate
his action and reflect upon its consequences before
he entered the household the following morning.
Finally, the covert manner appellant gained entry in
the house and stabbed the victims showed a careful
deliberation of his criminal intent. As the CA aptly
observed, taking into stock the incidents that
happened on the night of January 26, 2006, the fact
that he hid in the room of Jufer after sneaking into the
De Leon’s household early the next morning and the
real evidence found in the house, appellant’s
"commission of the crime was not clearly a product of
accident, it was evidently a premeditated one."
 Clearly then, the presence of the attending
circumstances of treachery and/or
premeditation qualified the killing of Edgar and Jufer
to murder, which, under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is punishable by reclusion
36
perpetua to death. Article 63 of the same Code
provides that if the penalty prescribed is composed of
two indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and
there is an aggravating circumstance the higher
penalty should be imposed. Since,
premeditation can be considered as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance, treachery, by itself, being
sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper imposable
penalty – the higher sanction - is death. However, in
view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346,
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty for the killing of each of the victim is reduced
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua thus imposed by
the CA on appellant for each count of murder is
correct. So is the award of PhP 75,000 as civil
39
indemnity ex delicto. 1avvph!1
The Court, however, modifies the award of moral
damages, which is mandatory in homicide and murder
without need of allegation and proof other than the
40
death of the victim. To conform with recent
jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the proper
imposable penalty is death, if not for R.A. 9346, the
award of moral damages is increased to PhP 75,000
41
for each count of murder. The award of exemplary
damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 is additionally
in order if, as here, the crime was committed with an
aggravating circumstance, be it generic or qualifying.
The Court thus grants the same to serve as deterrent
to serious wrongdoings, as a vindication of the
wanton invasion of the rights of the victims, or
43
evident punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
As to the stabbings of Jeane and Jelyn, appellant
committed frustrated murder as he inflicted on them
mortal wounds which could have had taken their lives
had it not been for the prompt medical intervention, a
cause independent of appellant’s will.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 27,
evident 2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02902 finding Albert
Sanchez y Galera guilty of two counts of murder and
two counts of frustrated murder and sentencing him to
serve prison terms therein defined without parole is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
37
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Jufer James
and Edgar De Leon the increased amount of PhP
75,000 as moral damages and the amount of PhP
38
30,000 as exemplary damages, respectively, for each
count of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 06-8245-MK
and 06-8246-MK.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186382 April 5, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- Appellee,
-versus- DOMINGO PANITERCE, Accused-Appellant
R E SO L U T I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us is an appeal filed by Domingo Paniterce
y Martinez (Paniterce) assailing the Decision dated
August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
42
CR-H.C. No. 01001, entitled People of the Philippines
v. Domingo Paniterce,” which affirmed with
modification the Decision dated March 2, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37, in
Criminal Case Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078, 6079, 6080
and 6081. The RTC found Paniterce guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness.
In four Informations, all dated February 11, 2002,
th
4 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Hedy S. Aganan
charged Paniterce with four counts of rape of his
daughter AAA. Except for the dates of the
commission of the rapes, the four Informations
identically read:
Criminal Case Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078 and 6079
That sometime in the year 1997 in x x x Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with grave abuse of
confidence being the father of the offended party
with lewd designs by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously succeed in having carnal
knowledge with his daughter AAA, a 10 year-old
minor, against her will and without her consent, to
her damage and prejudice in such amount as may
be awarded by the Honorable Court.
In two Amended Informations, both dated
December 3, 2002, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Daniel M. Salvadora charged Paniterce with two
counts of rape of his other daughter BBB. Aside from
the dates of the commission of the rapes, the
Informations similarly state:
Criminal Case Nos. 6080 and 6081
That on or about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of
August 26, 2000 x x x Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with grave abuse of confidence
being the father of the offended party with lewd
 designs by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
committed RAPE upon his 12- year old daughter
BBB by then and there, caressing and inserting his
finger inside her vagina against her will and without
her consent, to her damage and prejudice in such
amount as may be awarded by the Honorable
Court.
When arraigned, Paniterce pleaded not guilty to all
the charges.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a
Decision on March 2, 2005, with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
prosecution having proved the guilt of accused
Domingo Paniterce of the crimes of Rape as
charged in the aforementioned Informations, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalties of
imprisonment, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 6076, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto
mayor as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as maximum for Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code as the alleged molestation took place
in April 1997 and RA 8353 took effect only on
October 22, 1997;
In Criminal Cases Nos. 6077, 6078, 6080 and
6081, he is hereby sentenced to suffer in each
every case the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay AAA and BBB Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each as moral
damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as exemplary damages;
In Criminal Case No. 6079, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay AAA the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.
On June 4, 2005, Paniterce was committed to the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City.
Paniterce filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01001. The appellate court rendered a Decision
on August 22, 2008 affirming the RTC judgment with
modifications, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court
convicting DOMINGO PANITERCE is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. For Acts of Lasciviousness, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 6077, 6078, 6080 and 6081, appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer in each [and] every case
an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of
prision correccional, as maximum and to pay AAA
and BBB Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each
as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
2. For Rape, in Criminal Case No. 6079,
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay AAA the amount
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as exemplary damages.
The decision of the trial court finding appellant
guilty for Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case
No. 6076 is AFFIRMED without any modification.
On 16 September 2008, Paniterce, through
counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of
Appeals conveying his intention to appeal to us the
aforementioned Decision dated August 22, 2008 of
the appellate court. The Court of Appeals gave due
course to Paniterce’s Notice of Appeal on September
23, 2008, and directed its Judicial Records Division to
elevate to us the original records in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01001.
On 15 April 2009, we required the parties to file
their supplemental briefs, and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections to confirm the commitment of
Paniterce at the Bureau of Corrections and submit his
report thereon within 10 days from notice.
Paniterce filed his Supplemental Brief on June 16,
2009, while the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation on June 18, 2009 stating that it would
no longer file a supplemental brief considering that
Paniterce did not raise any new issue in his appeal.
On July 22, 2009, we submitted G.R. No. 186382 for
resolution.
However, in a letter dated October 12, 2009, Julio
A. Arciaga, the Assistant Director for Prisons and
Security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed us
that Paniterce had died on August 22, 2009 at the
New Bilibid Prison Hospital. Paniterce’s Death
Certificate was attached to said letter.
Given Paniterce’s death, we are now faced with the
question of the effect of such death on the present
appeal.
Paniterce’s death on August 22, 2009, during the
pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his
criminal liabilities for the rape and acts of
lasciviousness committed against his daughters, but
also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on
said crimes.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the
following guidelines in People v. Bayotas:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore.”
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
xxxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate him to imprisonment, and ordering him to indemnify
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the his victims – had become ineffectual.
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. WHEREFORE, in view of the death of accused-
This separate civil action may be enforced either appellant Domingo Paniterce y Martinez, the Decision
against the executor/administrator or the estate of dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
the accused, depending on the source of obligation G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001 is SET ASIDE and Criminal
upon which the same is based as explained above. Case Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078, 6079, 6080, and 6081
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear before the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City are
a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
action by prescription, in cases where during the SO ORDERED.
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with the provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on
Paniterce’s appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of
the crimes charged has become irrelevant since,
following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and
our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Paniterce
had incurred criminal liabilities, they were totally
extinguished by his death. Moreover, because
Paniterce’s appeal was still pending and no final
judgment of conviction had been rendered against
him when he died, his civil liabilities arising from the
crimes, being civil liabilities ex delicto, were likewise
extinguished by his death.
Consequently, the appealed Decision dated August
22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals – finding Paniterce
guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness, sentencing
MINORITY (Exception):
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008]
JOEMAR ORTEGA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
[1]
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated October 26, 2000
[3]
which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated
May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega
(petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The Facts
[5]
Petitioner, then about 14 years old, was charged
with the crime of Rape in two separate informations
both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,
then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory
portions thereof respectively state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality
of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence
intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge
of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in
the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge
of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Upon arraignment on September
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the
trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses
[10]
FFF and MMM. Among her siblings CCC, BBB,
[4]
DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the
family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family
members were close friends of petitioner's family,
aside from the fact that they were good neighbors.
However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger
[6]
sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed
their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.
AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3)
times on three (3) different
The first occasion happened sometime in August
1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old
and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of
[12]
and Luzviminda Ortega (Luzviminda),
petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to
stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was
[13]
sick. During the first night at petitioner's residence,
petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together
with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke
AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped
AAA. The second occasion occurred the following
day, again at the petitioner's residence. Observing
that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to
their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified
that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and
she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner
warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he
would spank her.[14] AAA did not tell her parents about
her ordeal.
10, 1998, The third and last occasion happened in the
[9]
evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the
house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in
watching a battery-powered television. At that time,
Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's
siblings were busy watching, petitioner called AAA to
come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed.
While inside the said room which was lighted by a
kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door,
removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts
and panty, and in a standing position inserted his
penis into the vagina of AAA.[15] AAA described
petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the
[11]
There, size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that
she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.[16]
occasions. This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his
testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in
their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB
was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked
mother of from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse.
BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a
pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to
stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB
reported the incident to his mother, MMM.[17]
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about
what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted
his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM
learned that this was not the only incident that
petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous
occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report
her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would
spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the
matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left
her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to
sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's
vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish
and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses
FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night. The
following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called
Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house.
MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner
did to her daughter, and consequently, she demanded
that AAA should be brought to a doctor for
[18]
examination.
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to
[19]
Dr. Lucifree Katalbas (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural
Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and
found no indication that she was molested.[20]
Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12,
1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson),
Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office.
[21]
Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report
showing that there were "abrasions on both right and
left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the
posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor
injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively
fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and
could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr.
Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her
findings required the confirmation of the Municipal
Health Officer of the locality.
[22]
Subsequently, an amicable settlement was
reached between the two families through the DAWN
Foundation, an organization that helps abused
women and children. Part of the settlement required
petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact
[23]
with AAA. As such, petitioner stayed with a certain
priest in the locality. However, a few months later,
petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to
bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of
petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and
confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's
parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts
of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only filed the
two (2) instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses
[24]
Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. He is the
second child of three siblings ― an elder brother and
a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations
made against him. He testified that: his parents and
AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left
AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother,
petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB
and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda
and his younger sister; he never touched or raped
AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did
not threaten AAA in any instance; he did not rape
AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely
accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she
defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of
washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's
anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with
[25]
his parents, went to AAA's house; they were
dancing and playing together with all the other
children at the time; while they were dancing,
petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at
the instance of which BBB ran and reported the
matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda,
saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse;[26] petitioner explained to MMM that they
were only playing, and that he could not have done to
AAA what he was accused of doing, as they were
together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a
younger sister;[27] BBB was lying; AAA's parents and
his parents did not get angry at him nor did they
quarrel with each other; petitioner and his parents
peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in
the evening; however, at about four o'clock in the
morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned
by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving
there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as
AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her;
and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a
doctor for examination.[28]
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son.
She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of
the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM
in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of her
siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB
are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted AAA
and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996,
she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter in a
separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996,
she was at AAA's house watching television and
conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were
having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where
they were seated, she could clearly see all the
children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and
dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any
unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were
conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner
and AAA were having sexual intercourse; upon
hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM
immediately stood up and looked for them, but both
mothers did not find anything unusual as all the
children were playing and dancing in the dining area;
Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's
statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not
examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did
they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they
peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following
day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was
spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB
nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this
instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to
spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for
examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr.
Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was
molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson.
After getting the results of the examination conducted
by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this
instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM
accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner
vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped AAA.
Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their
employer who recommended that they should seek
advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center,
both agreed on an amicable settlement wherein
petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner
stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost
two (2) years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner
would come home to visit his parents and to bring his
dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came
home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a
rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation
erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda.
Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases. On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the
[29]
ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense
The RTC's Ruling of denial could not prevail over the positive
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and
defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive her brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent
identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also
crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty held that the respective medical examinations
and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is
not perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a established that the slightest penetration of the lips of
serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal
close relations of both families. Thus, the RTC laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the
disposed of this case in this wise: CA opined that petitioner acted with discernment as
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded
accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond great weight and respect to the factual findings of the
reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies
of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases of witnesses.
Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration[32] of
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Resolution[33] dated November 7, 2001.
Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Hence, this Petition based on the following
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be grounds:
imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years I.
and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE
maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT
offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic). II.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
[30]
the CA. COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR.
upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the III.
RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal. THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT,
[31]
AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT
The CA's Ruling PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED
AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED
RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM
WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S
FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND
CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE
ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION
[34]
OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual
findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we
are not prevented from overturning such findings if the
CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which if considered might affect
the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the
testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that
penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain.
Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of
AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and
his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would
leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on
the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age
at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis.
However, such allegation is completely belied by the
medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the
alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on
AAA and found that there were no signs or indications
that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits
that the CA committed a grave error when it
disregarded such medical report since it disproves the
allegation of the existence of rape and, consequently,
the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the
presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner
subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA,
petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent,
unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As
such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason
that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the
very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the
age of six, could not be controlled or subdued.
Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in
filing the instant case, as she wanted to extort money
from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out
that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that
the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of
AAA were relatively fresh and the same could
disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering
that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination
on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven
(11) days after the alleged incident of rape, and that
AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost
a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case
of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable
that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove
their case and to depart from the initial confession of
AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally,
petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely
[35]
coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.
On the other hand, respondent People of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the
petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions
before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did
not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since
despite the absence of abrasions, rape is
consummated even with the slightest penetration of
the lips of the female organ; what is relevant in this
case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner
raped her in August and December of 1996; even in
the absence of force, rape was committed considering
AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have
any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is
established that the crime of rape could be committed
even in the presence of other people nearby.
Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the
evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the
highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe
directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine
whether said witness was telling the truth or not.
Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with
discernment when he committed the said crime, as
manifested in his covert acts.[36]
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,[37] or the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was
enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect
on May 20, 2006.[38] The law establishes a
comprehensive system to manage children in conflict
with the law[39] (CICL) and children at risk[40] with child-
appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs
and services such as prevention, intervention,
diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care
programs geared towards their development. In order
to ensure its implementation, the law, particularly
Section 8[41] thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain
duties and functions[42] such as the formulation of
policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency
and to enhance the administration of juvenile justice
as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the
CICL. The law also provides for the immediate
dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64,
65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory
Provisions.[43]
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title VIII
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law
Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. -- Upon effectivity
of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and
below at the time of the commission of the crime shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer. Such officer, upon thorough
assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or
refer the child to prevention programs, as provided
under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and
undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation
center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary
to the best interest of the child.
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. -- If
the child is detained pending trial, the Family Court
shall also determine whether or not continued
detention is necessary and, if not, determine
appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is
necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the
court shall immediately order the transfer of the child
to a youth detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and
Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. -- The
PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed
to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from
the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in
conflict with the law under their custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of
Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court
Proceedings. -- If a child reaches the age of eighteen
(18) years pending diversion and court proceedings,
the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with
the local social welfare and development officer or the
Family Court in consultation with the Social Services
and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme
Court, as the case may be, shall determine the
appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court
executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the
child in conflict with the law has already availed of
probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other
similar laws, the child may apply for probation if
qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted
and are Serving Sentences. -- Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the
age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.
They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions
provided under this Act and their sentences shall be
adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately
released if they are so qualified under this Act or other
applicable laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in
this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by
both the RTC and the CA. However, with the advent
of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending
before this Court, a new issue arises, namely,
whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344
apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time
he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13
years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed
the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for
rape, the complainant's candor is the single most
important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted
solely on that basis.[44] The RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill
motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous
crime of rape and to positively identify him as the
malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to
BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual
intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner
asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the
imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for
no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop
so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations
and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that
such a traumatic experience would damage their
daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not
true.[45] We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted
the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of
AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner's
parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that
in most cases of rape committed against young girls
like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total
penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to
the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that
actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of
the hymen is not required.[46] Therefore, it is not
necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded
in having full penetration, because the slightest
touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia
of the pudendum constitutes rape.[47]
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the
exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by the complete absence of any of the
conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness
of the act, no criminal liability arises.[48] Therefore,
while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability
[49]
attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar, we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied
in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In
expounding on intelligence as the second element of
dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence;
without this power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an
illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the
infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him)
from criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine
years of age and below are not capable of performing
a criminal act.
[50]
In its Comment dated April 24, 2008, the OSG
posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the
provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as
early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC
and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001.
R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with
the petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no
longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No.
9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive
effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18
years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68
thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may
[51]
avail himself of the provisions of Section 38 of R.A.
No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of
sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG
argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws
favorable to the accused may be given retroactive
application, such principle does not apply if the law
itself provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly
provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal
Responsibility. -- A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically
provides that cases of children 15 years old and
below, at the time of the commission of the crime,
shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption
from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's
age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but
the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the
offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age
of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to
15 years old. [52]
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is
imperative that this Court accord retroactive
application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No.
9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in
criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the
[53]
accused are given retroactive effect. This principle
is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. -- Penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle
has been given expanded application in certain
[54]
instances involving special laws. R.A. No. 9344
should be no exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's
retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on
the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on
Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly
propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69,
the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE
CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE
WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE
LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE
IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD
INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM,
PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW
15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER
OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have
enough facilities for these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the
CWC, the DSWD does not have the capability at the
moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall
be transferred whenever the facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a
clarification. When we speak here of children who do
not have criminal liability under this law, we are
referring here to those who currently have criminal
liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this
measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be
released either to their parents or through a diversion
program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will
have to be a process of sifting before that. That is why
I was proposing that they should be given to the
DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process, except
that apparently, the DSWD does not have the
physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we
have no argument. We will now have to just craft it to
ensure that the input raised earlier by the good
Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to
be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the
issue should also be incorporated in the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The
moment this law becomes effective, all those children
in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the
present Penal Code, for example, who will now not be
subject to incarceration under this law, will be
immediately released. Is that the understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall
under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements,
Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet
available, what will happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age,
which has not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for
example, for conferencing family mediation,
negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These
methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily
have to remain in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr.
President. But it will still require some sort of
infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel
from the DSWD will have to address the counseling.
So, there must be a transition in terms of building the
capacity and absorbing those who will benefit from
this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be
specifically provided for as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the Santiago amendment
is accepted. [55]
x x x x
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
x x x x
Senator Pimentel.
x x x x
Now, considering that laws are normally
prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I would
like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate
some kind of a transitory provision that would make
this law apply also to those who might already have
been convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution
of their penalties as adults when, in fact, they are
juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do
have a provision under the Transitory Provisions
wherein we address the issue raised by the good
Senator, specifically, Section 67. For example, "Upon
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15)
years old and below at the time of the commission of
the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the
child shall be referred to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer." So that would be
giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be
prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have
already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the
instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted
as adults awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to
include that as an additional amendment, subject to
style.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that
because that is a reality that we have to address,
otherwise injustice will really be . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would
also include that as a separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final
conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that
at the time of the commission of the offense he is a
minor under this law, he should be given the benefit of
the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is
correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept
[56]
that proposed amendment.
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent,
which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute.
Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of
cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid
it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent
of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the
essence of the law, and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a
law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with
the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of a statute when it leads away from the true
intent and purpose of the legislature and to
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a
legislative enactment. In construing statutes the
proper course is to start out and follow the true intent
of the legislature and to adopt that sense which
harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the
fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the
legislature.[57]
. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in
[58]
favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning
of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled
with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to
herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified,
for the simple language of the new law itself
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13
years old at the time of the commission of the alleged
rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live
birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the
testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner's age
was never assailed in any of the proceedings before
the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the
time of the commission of the crime, was below 15
years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted
from criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from
criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape
committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly
provides that there is no concomitant exemption from
civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling
of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner
and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00
as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual
or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a
conviction for rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately
awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil
indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled
to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for
each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, without the necessity of additional
pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral
damages are granted in recognition of the victim's
injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of
rape.[59]
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take
consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect
our children from the harshness of life and to
alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of
CICL and children at risk in our country, has been
enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us
that major concerns have been raised on the effects
of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale
for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under
R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the
age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15
years old has compounded the problem of
employment of children in the drug trade several
times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay
Kagawads and the police, most particularly, complain
that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in
using children 15 years old or below as couriers or
foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that
Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective
in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are
proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years
old or below who openly flaunt possession, use and
delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because
their age exempts them from criminal liability under
the new law.[60]
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the
instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape,
a heinous crime committed against AAA who was
only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was
raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the
law's greater protection. However, this consequence
is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No.
9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by
[61]
this Court. Any perception that the result reached
herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed
to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to
give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language of the law. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done
so in this case.[62]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal
Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against
petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare
and development officer of the locality for the
appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless, the
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private
complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and
moral damages in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two
Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council (JJWC).
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181829 September 1, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.
SATURNINO VILLANUEVA, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the November 5, 2007 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02210 which affirmed with modification the November
2
28, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51. The CA found
appellant Saturnino Villanueva guilty
reasonable doubt of three counts of qualified rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay his victim the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
for each count.
Factual Antecedents:
On November 6, 2002, three Informations were
filed against appellant for the crime of rape. The
accusatory portions of the Informations read:
Crim. Case No. T-3157:
That on or about the 9th day of June, 2002, at
dawn, x x x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused who is the
complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means
of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
3
intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 12 years of age,
against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of said "AAA."
CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.4
Crim. Case No. T-3158:
That on or about the 27th day of September, 1999,
in the evening, at x x x, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is
the father of complainant, armed with a bladed
weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9
years of age, against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudicie of said "AAA."
beyond CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.5
Crim. Case No. T-3159:
That on or about the 28th day of September, 1999,
at dawn, at x x x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused who is the father of
complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means
of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9 years of age,
against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of said "AAA."
CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.6
father of When arraigned on November 14, 2002, appellant
pleaded not guilty to all charges.7
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the
appellant is the father of "AAA." It was likewise
agreed that "AAA" was below 12 years of age when
the rape incidents happened.8 "AAA’s" birth and
medical certificates were likewise marked as Exhibits
"A" and "C," respectively.9
Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.10
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented "AAA" as its witness.
"AAA" narrated that when she was about 4 years old,
of this her mother left her in the care of her father, herein
appellant. Since then, she had been living with her
father.
 "AAA" claimed that appellant sexually abused her Q Now, after your father tied you on September 27, Q How did he [threaten] you?
on September 27 and 28, 1999 and on June 9, 2002. 1999, what did he do, if there’s any? A That if I would report the matter to anyone he
During her testimony, "AAA" narrated that: A He raped me, sir. would kill the person to whom I will report, sir.
PROS. ULANDAY: COURT: Q Do you remember June 9, 2002 at 3:00 o’clock
Q Will you please state your name, age and other Q What do you mean by x x x saying he raped you? dawn?
personal circumstances? xxxx A Yes, sir.
WITNESS: A He undressed me, sir. Q Why do you remember that particular date?
A I am "AAA," 13 years old, out-of-school youth, xxxx A Because he again raped me, sir.
presently residing at x x x11 COURT: Q Who raped you?
xxxx And we make of record that [witness is now] in A My father, sir.
PROS. ULANDAY: tears.13 Q In what particular place [were] you raped?
Q Madam Witness, do you still remember xxxx A In our house, sir.
September 27, 1999? PROS. ULANDAY: xxxx
A Yes, sir. Q Madam Witness, during the last hearing you Q You claimed that you were raped by your father,
Q Why do you remember that particular date? uttered the word "incua na." What do you mean by how did he rape you?
A That was the birthday of my father and the date that? A He undressed me, sir.
when he touched me, sir. A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir. Q What else did he do aside from undressing you?
xxxx Q How long a time did your father [insert] his penis A He poked a knife at me, sir.
Q Who rape[d] you? into your vagina? Q And after poking a knife at you, what happened
A My papa, sir. Witness pointed to the accused. A About two minutes, sir. next, if any?
xxxx Q At early dawn of September 28, 1999, what A Then he touched (kinuti) me, sir.
PROS. ULANDAY: happened if any, between you and your father? Q What part of your body was touched by your
Q You claimed that your father touched and used A The same, sir. father?
you. How did he begin in touching you? Q What do you mean by the same? A My vagina, sir.
A He tied me, sir. A That he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir. Q How did he touch your vagina?
xxxx Q Before your father inserted his penis into your A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q What part of your body was x x x tied by your vagina, what did he do, if there was any? Q What happened when he inserted his penis into
father? A He first undressed me, sir. your vagina?
A My mouth, sir. Q While he was undressing you what were you A I cried, sir.14
Q What other parts of your body, if there [are] any? doing, if any? After the presentation of "AAA’s" testimony, the
A My hands and my feet, sir. A I failed to do any, sir. prosecution rested its case.
PROS. ULANDAY: Q Why did you fail to do any? Version of the Defense
My witness is crying, your Honor.12 A Because I was afraid, sir. The defense presented appellant as its first
xxxx Q Why were you afraid at the time? witness. In his testimony, appellant admitted that
A Because he threatened me, sir. "AAA" is his daughter.15 He also admitted that on
September 27 and 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, he
was living in the same house as "AAA."16 However,
when asked regarding the rape charges filed against
him by his daughter, appellant denied the same.
Thus:
Q And this daughter of your[s] now charge you
[with] rape in Crim. Case Nos. T-3157/3158/3159
for allegedly having sexual intercourse with her
against her will and consent. What can you say
against these charges by your daughter?
A [Those are] not true, sir.17
The defense next presented Marcelino Villanueva
(Marcelino) who testified that he is the father of the
18
appellant. He claimed that "AAA" filed the rape
cases against appellant because the latter forbade
her to entertain suitors.19 Marcelino also alleged that
after appellant was incarcerated, "AAA" eloped with
her 20-year old boyfriend and that "AAA" only
separated from her boyfriend when she was brought
under the care of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.20 When asked how old "AAA" was
when she allegedly eloped with her boyfriend,
Marcelino answered that "AAA" was only 13 years
21
old.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court lent credence to the testimony of
"AAA." However, it noted that although it was agreed
upon during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor
below 12 years of age, the fact remains that "AAA"
was 12 years, six months and 19 days when she was
22
ravished by the appellant on June 9, 2002. The
court below also observed that "AAA has always been
a pathetic child of oppression, abuse and neglect" and
that "[h]er innocence, tender age, dependence [on
appellant] for survival, and her virtual orphanhood
sufficed to qualify every sexual molestation
perpetrated by her father as rape x x x."23
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused SATURNINO
VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of rape, defined and penalized by Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, perpetrated
against [his] daughter on September 27, 1999,
September 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, x x x and as
mandated by Article 266-B, same Code, the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH
for each offense, to indemnify the complainant "AAA"
for damages in the amount of P50,000.00 per [count],
and to pay the costs.
24
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his brief filed before the appellate court, appellant
claimed that the prosecution failed to present
evidence that would overcome the presumption of his
innocence. Appellant also alleged that the trial court
erred in lending credence to the unrealistic and
25
unnatural testimony of "AAA." He claimed that it was
unusual for "AAA" not to offer any resistance to the
advances allegedly made by him considering that he
was unarmed. According to the appellant, "AAA"
should have struggled or at least offered some
resistance because she was not completely
26
helpless. Appellant also suggested that "AAA" must
have been coached because initially, she did not
know the acts which constitute rape. However, during
the succeeding hearings, "AAA" allegedly testified in
27
detail the bestial acts committed against her.
Moreover, appellant argued that the prosecution
failed to formally offer in evidence the medical
certificate and to present the doctor who conducted
the medical examination to testify on his findings.28
Likewise, "AAA’s" birth certificate was not formally
offered. Neither did the Municipal Civil Registrar who
allegedly prepared the same take the witness stand.
Thus appellant claimed that assuming he was indeed
guilty of the crimes charged, he should only be held
liable for simple rape and not qualified rape because
the minority of the victim was not duly established.29
Further, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,
appellant should not be sentenced to death.30
On the other hand, appellee maintained that
"AAA’s" credibility was beyond doubt31 and that it was
unnecessary to offer proof of resistance where the
assailant exercised moral ascendancy against his
victim, as in this case.32 Appellee insisted that the
crimes committed were three counts of qualified, and
not simple, rape considering that "AAA" was a minor
and the offender was her father,33 and that the parties
had already stipulated during pre-trial as regards the
age of the victim.34
On November 5, 2007, the appellate court rendered
its Decision disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated 28 November 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51 in Crim. Case Nos.
T-3157, T-3158 and T-3159 finding accused-appellant
Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of three (3) counts of qualified rape under Articles
266-A and 266-B is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, the penalty of death imposed on appellant is
reduced to reclusion perpetua for each count of
qualified rape, without eligibility for parole under Act
No. 4103, as amended. Further, accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the private complainant/victim ["AAA"],
for each count of qualified rape, the amounts of Php
75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php 75,000.00 as moral
damages and Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
35
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court found no reason to reverse the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of "AAA."36
Although there were occasions when "AAA" would not
immediately answer the questions propounded to her,
the CA opined that it was because she was either
distressed in recounting her horrible experiences or in
tears.37 The appellate court likewise considered the
fact that "AAA" was only 13 years old when she
38
testified on her harrowing experiences.
The appellate court likewise brushed aside
appellant’s contention that "AAA" did not offer any
resistance. According to the CA, appellant’s moral
ascendancy over "AAA" substitutes for violence or
39
intimidation.
The CA also concluded that even without the
medical certificate, appellant could still be held liable
for three counts of rape. His conviction could rest
exclusively on the credible testimony of "AAA" and the
medical certificate would only be corroborative
40
evidence. Anent the birth certificate, the CA recalled
that during pre-trial, the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the appellant had already been
stipulated upon. Hence, the said elements have been
sufficiently alleged in the Informations and proven
41
during trial.
Finally, the CA held that appellant’s denial is
intrinsically weak and self-serving especially
considering "AAA’s" credible and straightforward
42
testimony.
Our Ruling
Both the appellant and the appellee opted not to file
43
their supplemental briefs.
The appeal is partly meritorious.
At the outset, we must state that we entertain no
doubt that appellant thrice raped his daughter, "AAA."
We examined the records and we find "AAA’s"
testimony convincing and straightforward. We
therefore have no reason to reverse or modify the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of the
victim’s testimony, more so in this case where the
said findings were affirmed by the CA.
We also agree with the ruling of the appellate court
that appellant could be convicted of rape even without
the medical certificate. "In rape cases, the accused
may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
victim, provided the testimony is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
44
normal course of things." As stated above, "AAA’s"
testimony was credible and convincing. As such,
appellant’s conviction could rest solely on it. The
medical certificate would only serve as corroborative
evidence.
We, however, agree with the appellant that both the
medical certificate and "AAA’s" birth certificate,
although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial,
should not have been considered by the trial court
and the CA because they were not formally offered in
evidence. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly provides: "The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified."
In this case, we note that after the marking of the
exhibits during pre-trial, the prosecution did not
formally offer the said medical certificate or birth
certificate in evidence. In fact, the prosecution rested
its case after presenting the testimony of "AAA"
without formally offering any documentary exhibit at
all.
Our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha45 is
instructive, thus:
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial
matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver
to submit it. Consequently, as in this case, any
evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded
and rejected.
xxxx
The Rules of Court [provide] that ‘the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.’ A formal offer is necessary because judges
are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the
trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which
the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the
other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine
the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover,
it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be
required to review documents not previously
scrutinized by the trial court.
xxxx
Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the
testimonial evidence presented and exclude the
documents not offered. Documents which may have
been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial
or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence
cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither
can such unrecognized proof be assigned any
evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that
there is a significant distinction between identification
of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The
former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an
exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party
rests its case. The mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean that it has already been offered as part of
the evidence. It must be emphasized that any
evidence which a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by
the party; otherwise, it is excluded
46
rejected. ten.lihpwal
We reiterated the above ruling in Dizon v. Court of
47
Tax Appeals where one of the issues presented was
whether the Court of Tax Appeals and the CA gravely
abused their discretion "in allowing the admission of
the pieces of evidence which were not formally
offered" by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.48 In
finding the case impressed with merit, the Court held
that:
Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is
categorically described as a court of record. As cases
filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall
prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably,
no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of
evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on
documentary evidence require that these documents
must be formally offered before the CTA. x x x
xxxx
x x x [T]he presentation of the BIR’s evidence is not a
mere procedural technicality which may
disregarded considering that it is the only means by
which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of
BIR’s claims against the Estate. The BIR’s failure to
formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA’s
directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is
aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason
was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal
49
omission. This, we take against the BIR.
We are not unaware that there is an exception to
50
the above-stated rule. In People v. Mate,
Mate (Mate) was charged with the crime
"Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder and Frustrated
51
Murder." During arraignment, he entered a plea of
"guilty." The court then propounded clarificatory
and questions to determine whether the
understood the consequences of his
Immediately thereafter, the trial court promulgated its
decision finding the accused guilty as charged and
52
sentenced him to death. It was only after the
rendition of the judgment that the trial court conducted
hearings for the reception of the prosecution’s
evidence.53
From the prosecution’s evidence, it would appear
that during the investigation, Mate voluntarily made
extra-judicial statements as contained in Exhibits "A,"
"B," and "J." Also, after his conviction, he appeared as
witness for the prosecution against his co-accused
where he affirmed his extra-judicial statements in
Exhibits "A," "B," and "J." However, the state
prosecutor failed to formally offer said exhibits.
In debunking the defense’s contentions that the trial
court erred in rendering a judgment of conviction on
Mate even before the prosecution could present its
evidence, and in considering the exhibits which were
be not formally offered, the Court held thus:
The defense contends that the trial court committed
a serious error in rendering judgment of conviction
immediately after Mate had pleaded guilty to the
crime charged on the basis of his plea of guilty and
before receiving any evidence. While the trial court
committed an error in rendering judgment immediately
after the accused had pleaded guilty, and, thereafter,
conducted hearings for the reception of the evidence
for the prosecution, such an irregularity, is insufficient
Silvestre to justify the setting aside of the judgment of
of conviction, considering that it is supported by the
judicial and extra-judicial confessions of the accused
and by other evidence. x x x
xxxx
accused The defense questions also the failure of the state
plea. prosecutor Cornelio Melendres to make a formal offer
of his exhibits, although they have been marked and
identified. Such an oversight appears trivial because
the entire evidence for the prosecution is recorded.
Even without the exhibits which have been
incorporated into the records of the case, the
prosecution can still establish the case because the
witnesses properly identified those exhibits and their
testimonies are recorded.
Exhibits "A", "B", and "J" are all admissible against
Mate because it appears with clarity that he
voluntarily and spontaneously gave those narrations
without compulsion from anybody. In fact, . . . when
he testified against Ben Bohol he affirmed those
narrations again.54
In Mato v. Court of Appeals,55 we concretized the
above ruling by holding that evidence, although not
formally offered in evidence, may be "admitted and
considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, viz: first, the same must
have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, the same must have been incorporated
in the records of the case."56 In Ramos v. Dizon,57 we
deemed the exhibits to have been incorporated into
the records because they had been "presented and
marked during the pre-trial of the case."58 Likewise,
the first requisite was deemed satisfied because one
of the parties therein explained the contents of the
exhibits when interrogated by the respondents’
59
counsel.
In the instant case, we find the rulings espoused in
60 61
People v. Mate, Mato v. Court of Appeals,
Ramos v. Dizon62 not applicable. Thus, we find that
both the trial court and the CA erred in allowing the
admission of "AAA’s" medical certificate and birth
certificate. The records would show that the lone
witness for the prosecution did not identify the said
exhibits or explain their contents. When "AAA" was
placed on the witness stand, she merely stated that
she was 13 years old. No reference was ever made to
her birth certificate. The same is true with the medical
certificate. After the marking during the pre-trial, the
prosecution did not refer to it in any stage of the
proceedings. Neither did it present the doctor who
prepared the same.
Moreover, appellant’s admission during the pre-trial
63
that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age would
not help the prosecution’s case. First, the trial court
found this admission inaccurate as in fact, "AAA" was
already above 12 years of age when the rape incident
transpired on June 9, 2002. Second and more
important, appellant’s admission during pre-trial is not
admissible as it violates Section 2, Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court which explicitly provides that: "All
agreements or admissions made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing
and signed by the accused and his counsel, otherwise
they cannot be used against the accused. x x x." In
64
People v. Chua Uy, we held that:
Even granting for the sake of argument that
RAMON admitted during the pre-trial that Exhibits "D"
to "D-4", inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride, the admission
cannot be used in evidence against him because the
Joint Order was not signed by RAMON and his
and counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No
agreement or admission made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against
the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by
his counsel.
Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial
order must be signed not only by him but his counsel
as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further
safeguard the rights of the accused against
improvident or unauthorized agreements
admissions which his counsel may have entered into
without his knowledge, as he may have waived his
presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any
doubt on the conformity of the accused of the facts
agreed upon.
In this case, records would show that the Pre-trial
Order was not signed by both appellant and his
counsel.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the
prosecution did not present any satisfactory evidence
to prove "AAA’s" minority. "In the prosecution of
criminal cases, x x x, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which an accused is charged must be
established. Qualifying circumstances or special
qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise,
there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified
form. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of
rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her
relationship to the accused-appellant must be both
alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt."65
In view of the foregoing, we find appellant guilty
only of three counts of simple rape66 the penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Accordingly, the awards of civil indemnity must be
reduced to P50,000.00 and moral damages to
P50,000.00. Finally, the award of exemplary damages
is proper. "Exemplary damages may be awarded in
criminal cases as part of civil liability if the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Relationship as an alternative
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code is considered aggravating in the crime of
or rape."67 In this case, the aggravating circumstance of
relationship was duly established. Appellant himself
admitted when he testified in open court that he is
"AAA’s" father. However, the award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00
in line with prevailing jurisprudence.68
WHEREFORE, we find appellant Saturnino
Villanueva GUILTY of three counts of simple rape and
accordingly sentence him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his victim "AAA"
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count.
SO ORDERED.
ANTI-FENCING LAW:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146584. July 12, 2004]
ERNESTO FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal via a petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 19110 affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22,
finding petitioner Ernesto Francisco guilty of violating
Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as
the Anti-Fencing Law, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties corresponding to the latter, and
to pay the corresponding value of the subject pieces
of jewelry.
The Indictment
The petitioner was charged of violating P.D. No.
1612 under the Information filed on June 23, 1993,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That in or about the month of November 1991, in
the municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Ernesto Francisco
y Spenocilla, with intent to gain for himself, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously buy,
receive, possess and acquire from one Pacita
Linghon y Liza, not the owner, several pieces of
jewelry, to wit:
One (1) pair of earrings (Heart Shape)
--- P 400,000.00
One (1) White Gold Bracelet
---- 150,000.00
One (1) Diamond Ring
---- 100,000.00
One (1) Ring with Diamond
---- 5,000.00
with the total value of P655,000.00, belonging to
Jovita Rodriguez y Cruz, which he knows, or should
be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Contrary to law.
The petitioner was arraigned, with the assistance of
counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
forthwith ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution
Jovita Rodriguez was a resident of Barangay
Manggahan, Rodriguez, Rizal. She was engaged in
business as a general contractor under the business
name J.C. Rodriguez Contractors. Macario Linghon
was one of her workers. She and her husband, the
former Municipal Mayor of Rodriguez, Rizal, acquired
several pieces of jewelry which were placed inside a
locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house.
Jovita hid the key to the cabinet inside the room. The
couple and their son resided inside a compound.
They hired Pacita Linghon, Macario’s sister, as one of
their household helpers us sometime in February
1989. Pacita swept and cleaned the room
periodically. Sometime in May 1991, she left the
employ of the Rodriguez family.
Sometime in the third week of October 1991, Pacita
contacted her brother Macario, who resided in Sitio
Baloongan, Barangay Paltok, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
and asked him to sell some pieces of jewelry. She
told Macario that a friend of hers owned the jewelry.
Macario agreed. He then went to the shop of
petitioner Ernesto “Erning” Francisco located at
Pacheco Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which had a poster outside that said, “We buy gold.”
Macario entered the shop, while Pacita stayed
outside. Macario offered to sell to Ernesto two rings
and one bracelet. Ernesto agreed to buy the jewelry
for P25,000, and paid the amount to Macario. He
also gave Macario P300 as a tip.
Sometime in November 1991, Pacita asked
Macario anew to sell a pair of earrings. He agreed.
He and a friend of his went to the shop of Ernesto and
offered to sell to Ernesto the pair of earrings for
P18,000. The latter agreed and paid Macario the
amount. Ernesto gave a P200 tip to Macario. After
these transactions, Macario saw the petitioner in his
shop for about five to six more times and received
some amounts.
Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was asked to
be a principal sponsor at a wedding. She was
shocked when she opened the locked cabinet
containing her jewelry, and found that the box was
empty. She noticed that the lock to the cabinet was
not broken. Among the pieces of jewelry missing
were one pair of diamond heart-shaped earrings
worth P400,000; one heart-shaped diamond ring
worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet with
diamond stones worth P150,000; and one ring with a
small diamond stone worth P5,000. She suspected
that it was Pacita who stole her jewelry. She was,
however, occupied with her business ventures that
she had little time to gather evidence and charge
Pacita.
On August 19, 1992, Jovita filed a complaint for
theft against Pacita and her mother Adoracion
Linghon with the Counter-Intelligence Group of the
Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon
City. She stated that she owned several jewels, viz:
one (1) heart-shaped pair of earrings with diamond
worth P400,000; one (1) heart-shaped ring with
diamond worth P100,000; one (1) white gold bracelet
with diamond stones worth P150,000; and, one (1)
ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She
also averred that Pacita had stolen the pieces of
jewelry, and that she and her mother Adoracion
disposed of the same.
A team of police investigators, including PO1
Santiago Roldan, Jr. of the Counter-Intelligence
Group, invited Pacita and Adoracion to Camp Crame,
Quezon City, for investigation in connection with
Jovita’s complaint. Pacita arrived in Camp Crame
without counsel and gave a sworn statement pointing
to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold
Jovita’s jewelry. On August 23, 1992, Pacita gave a
sworn statement to PO1 Roldan, Jr., admitting that
she sold one pair of heart-shaped earrings with
diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped
diamond ring, and one ring “with big and small
stones” to “Mang Erning” of Meycauayan, Bulacan, for
the total price of P50,000 to cover the cost of her
father’s operation and for food. When asked about
the full name of the person to whom the jewelry was
sold, Pacita replied that she knew him only as “Mang
Erning.”
Pacita accompanied a group of five police officers,
which included SPO1 Dremio Peralta and PO1
Roldan, Jr. to the shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the “Mang Erning”
who had purchased the jewelry from her. The
policemen alighted from their vehicle and invited the
petitioner for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon his
insistence, the petitioner was brought to the police
station of Meycauayan, Bulacan. When they were at
the police station, the petitioner, in the presence of
SPO4 Valdez, offered an amount of P5,000 to the
policemen as a bribe, for them not to implicate him in
the case. PO1 Roldan, Jr. rejected the offer. They
again invited the petitioner to go with them to Camp
Crame, but the petitioner refused and demanded that
the policemen first secure a warrant for his arrest
should they insist on taking him with them.
Nevertheless, Pacita was charged with qualified
theft in the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 76. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2005. Adoracion was also charged with violating
P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1992. The cases were
consolidated and jointly tried.
Meanwhile, Jovita succeeded in convincing Macario
to testify against the petitioner, assuring him that he
would not be prosecuted for violation of P.D. No.
1612. Macario agreed to testify against the petitioner.
PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta executed a joint
affidavit on their investigation.
On September 1, 1992, Jovita executed a sworn
statement in the office of the police station of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, charging the petitioner of
buying stolen jewelry worth P655,000. A criminal
complaint against the petitioner for violation of P.D.
No. 1612 was filed in the Municipal Trial Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 92-13841. During the preliminary investigation,
Pacita and Macario testified that they sold a set of
earrings, bracelet and two rings to the petitioner for
P50,000 at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
According to Pacita, she found the jewelry belonging
to Jovita while she was cleaning the room in the
house, and that she brought the jewelry home. The
court found probable cause against the petitioner, and
issued a warrant for his arrest.
On June 23, 1993, an Information was filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor with the RTC charging the
petitioner with violating P.D. No. 1612.
In the meantime, on August 20, 1993, judgment
was rendered by the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 76, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005,
finding Pacita guilty of theft and Adoracion guilty of
fencing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond reasonable
doubt. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in these cases, as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 2005, finding accused
Pacita Linghon y Liza GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of theft, as defined and penalized
under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentencing her to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of Nine (9) years and Four (4)
months of prision mayor as minimum to Eighteen (18)
years, Two (2) months and Twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal as maximum, to return to
complainant Jovita Rodriguez the unrecovered stolen
pieces of jewelry subject of this case and if restitution
is not possible, to indemnify the said complainant in
the amount of P1,300,000.00; and to pay the costs.
2. In Crim. Case No. 1992, finding accused
Adoracion Linghon y Liza GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of violation of PD 1612,
otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, and
sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of Twelve (12)
years of prision mayor; to indemnify complainant
Jovita Rodriguez in the amount of P45,000.00; and to reasonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 1612. The THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
pay the costs. decretal portion of the decision reads: THAT THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is WITNESSES ARE ALL HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
The Case for the Petitioner hereby rendered as follows: II
The petitioner testified that he was a resident of 1. Finding the accused GUILTY beyond THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. He had a shop reasonable doubt of the violation of Pres. Decree No. THAT THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE WAS NOT
located at Pacheco Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) and is hereby sentenced to SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-
Bulacan, where he bought and sold jewelry. He had suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
been in this business since 1980. He did not transact mayor maximum, as minimum, to 20 years of III
with Pacita regarding Jovita’s missing jewels. In fact, reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, with the THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING ON
he did not even know Jovita and met her only during accessory penalties corresponding to the latter. THE CONTRADICTING TESTIMONY (sic) OF
the preliminary investigation of the case before the 2. Ordering the accused to pay to private PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He, likewise, denied complainant Jovita Rodriguez the corresponding IV
knowing Pacita Linghon, and claimed that he first saw value of the subject items of jewelries (sic): THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE
her when she accompanied some policemen in one (1) pair of earrings, heart shaped TESTIMONY OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS AS
civilian clothes to his shop, where he was thereafter TO THE ALLEGED ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S
invited to Camp Crame for investigation. He saw P400,000.00 OFFER OF BRIBE WITHOUT SHOW OF MONEY.
Pacita again only during the preliminary investigation one (1) white gold bracelet V
of the case. The petitioner also averred that he had THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
no transaction with Macario of whatever nature. 150,000.00 THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
The petitioner further testified that when the one (1) diamond ring On December 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment
policemen in civilian clothes approached him in his affirming the decision of the RTC.
100,000.00
shop, they asked who “Mang Erning” was, as the sign The Present Petition
one (1) ring with diamond
in his shop carried such name. When he responded In the present recourse, petitioner Ernesto Francisco
5,000.00
to the question, the policemen identified themselves asserts that:
TOTAL VALUE
as members of the police force. The petitioner then The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial
gave them his full name. When the policemen invited court’s decision finding petitioner guilty beyond
P655,000.00
him for questioning, he refused at first. Eventually, he reasonable doubt of violation of the (sic) Presidential
with 6% interest on all amounts due from the filing of
agreed to be interrogated at the municipal hall, where Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-
the information on June 23, 1993 until said amounts
the policemen insisted on bringing him to Camp Fencing Law.
have been fully paid.
Crame. He told them that he would go with them only The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the
SO ORDERED.
if they had a warrant of arrest. He denied ever offering conflicting testimonies of prosecution witnesses, all of
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of
any bribe to the policemen. which consisted of hearsay evidence.
Appeals contending that:
On November 29, 1995, the court rendered The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to
I
judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt. He avers that the prosecution
failed to prove that Pacita stole the jewelry subject of
the charge, and that Macario sold the said pieces of
jewelry to him. He, likewise, posits that the
prosecution failed to present Pacita as its witness to
prove that she stole the pieces of jewelry and sold the
same to him, and to adduce in evidence the jewelry
allegedly sold to him. He contends that the
testimonies of Macario and PO1 Roldan, Jr., on his
investigation of Jovita’s complaint for theft, are
hearsay evidence. The appellant argues that
assuming that Macario sold the subject jewelry to him,
Macario had no personal knowledge that the same
belonged to Jovita. The petitioner avers that the
testimony of Macario, the principal witness of the
prosecution, is inconsistent on substantial matters;
hence, should not be given credence and probative
weight.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) maintains that the prosecution was
able to prove all the elements of the crime charged. It
asserts that the first element was proved through
Pacita’s conviction for theft in Criminal Case No.
2005; the second element was shown to exist with
moral certainty via the testimony of Macario
identifying the petitioner as the one who bought the
subject pieces of jewelry, corroborated by the
testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the third element
was proven by evidence showing that the petitioner
had been in the business of buying and selling jewelry
for a long period of time, and that he had the
expertise to know the correct market price of the
jewelry he purchased from Macario and Pacita. The
OSG asserts that the petitioner must have been put
on his guard when the subject pieces of jewelry worth
P655,000 were sold to him for only P50,000. It
contends that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses referred to by the petitioner
were minor, and could not be made as a basis to
disregard the trial court’s findings of facts, which are
entitled to great respect and credit.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are
as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knew or should have shown that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused,
intent to gain for himself or for another. Fencing is
malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a
prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of
possession by the accused of any good, article, item,
object or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property. The stolen
property subject of the charge is not indispensable to
prove fencing. It is merely corroborative of the
testimonies and other evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the
prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence, on the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that
Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked
cabinet in the main house of her then employer.
Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and
the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access
to the cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry.
We, however, agree with the petitioner that the
decision of the RTC of Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal
Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not
constitute proof against him in this case, that Pacita
had, indeed, stolen the jewelry. There is no showing
that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005 was
already final and executory when the trial court
rendered its decision in the instant case.
On the second element of the crime, the trial and
appellate courts held that the prosecution proved the
same beyond reasonable doubt based on the
testimony of Jovita during the trial in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1992 and 2005; that Pacita had confessed to
Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the
petitioner; the joint affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr. and
SPO1 Peralta on their investigation of the complaint
of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to
said investigation; the RTC decision in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the testimonies of Pacita
and her brother Macario during the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 before
the MTC of Meycauayan as shown by the transcripts
of the stenographic notes taken during the
proceedings; the supplemental sworn statement of
Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and, the testimony of Macario before the trial
court.
However, we find and so hold that –
First. Jovita’s testimony in Criminal Cases Nos.
1992 and 2005, that Pacita had confessed to her that
she had sold four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is
inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prove
the truth of the said admission. It bears stressing that
the petitioner was not a party in the said criminal
cases. The well-entrenched rule is that only parties to
a case are bound by a judgment of the trial court.
Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment of
said case. Jovita did not reiterate her testimony in the
said criminal cases during the trial in the court a quo.
The prosecution did not present Pacita as witness
therein to testify on the admission she purportedly
made to Jovita; hence, the petitioner was not able to
cross-examine Pacita. The rule is that the acts or
declarations of a person are not admissible in
evidence against a third party.
Second. The testimony of Pacita during the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-
13841, as well as her supplemental affidavit, is,
likewise, inadmissible against the petitioner since
Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. The petitioner
was, thus, deprived of his constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine a witness against him.
Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that on
August 23, 1992, Pacita pointed to the petitioner,
while the latter was having a drinking spree, as the
person who bought the subject jewelry from her, is
indeed admissible in evidence against the petitioner.
It is, likewise, corroborative of the testimony of
Macario. However, such testimony is admissible only
to prove such fact - that Pacita pointed to the
petitioner as the person to whom she sold the subject
jewelry; it is inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacita’s
declaration to the policemen, that the petitioner was
the one who purchased the jewelry from her. It must
be stressed that the policemen had no personal
knowledge of the said sale, and, more importantly,
Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. Indeed, the
petitioner was deprived of his right to cross-examine
Pacita on the truth of what she told the policemen.
Fourth. On the other hand, the testimony of Macario
during the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case
No. 92-13841 is admissible in evidence against the
petitioner since he testified for the prosecution and
was cross-examined on his testimony during the
preliminary investigation.
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to
prove that the petitioner purchased the jewelry from
Macario and Pacita are the following: the testimony
and affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of
Macario during the preliminary investigation and trial
in the court a quo.
Although the well-entrenched rule is that the
testimony of a single witness is sufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction, it is required that
such testimony must be credible and reliable. In this
case, we find the testimony of Macario to be dubious;
hence, barren of probative weight.
Macario admitted when he testified in the court a
quo that his testimony during the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841 and his
testimony in the court a quo were inconsistent. He
even admitted that some portions of his testimony on
direct examination in the court a quo were
inconsistent with his testimony on cross-examination
and on re-direct examination. These admissions are
buttressed by the records of the case, which show
that such inconsistencies pertained to material points
and not merely to minor matters. Thus, during the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-
13841, Macario admitted that on October 10, 1991,
he and his sister Pacita sold two rings and one
bracelet to the petitioner for P25,000, while in
November 1991, he and Pacita sold a pair of earrings
to the petitioner for P25,000. On direct examination in
the court a quo, Macario testified that he and Pacita
sold the earrings to the petitioner in May 1992, not in
November 1991, and only for P18,000. On cross-
examination, Macario testified that he and his sister
Pacita went to the petitioner’s shop in Meycauayan,
Bulacan and sold the subject jewelry on both
occasions. On further cross-examination, Macario
changed his testimony anew, and declared that he
sold the jewelry to the petitioner for P18,000 and not
P25,000; only to change his testimony again, and
declare that he sold the jewelry for P25,000.
However, Macario testified during the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841 that
when he transacted with the petitioner for the second
time, he was with a friend, and not with his sister
Pacita. On redirect examination, Macario declared
that in October 1991, he and Pacita sold four (4)
pieces of jewelry, namely, two rings, one bracelet and
a pair of earrings, contrary to his testimony on direct
examination. He also testified that he and his sister
sold the earrings in November 1991. Because of the
contradicting accounts made by Macario, the court
made the following observations:
Court
q According to you, you were “nalilito” but you
gave the correct answer, you are not “nalilito” here
but you gave the wrong answer. Bakit ganoon,
sabi mo nalilito ka roon (sic) pero ang sagot mo
pala tama. Dito hindi ka naman nalilito, bakit mali.
Bakit ka nalilito eh tama iyong P25,000.00. Hindi
ka nalilito, mali ang sabi mo.
 a Because I am scare[d] here that’s why I gave
the wrong answer.
q You better think about it.
a I was confused, Sir.
The testimonies of Macario are even contrary to the
averments of the Information, that the petitioner
received the said jewelry from Pacita.
Assuming, for the nonce, that the petitioner
purchased the said jewelry from Macario, there is no
evidence on record that the petitioner knew that they
were stolen. Significantly, even Macario did not know
that the jewelry was stolen. He testified that his sister
Pacita told him before he sold the jewelry to the
petitioner that they belonged to a friend of hers.
Atty. Lerio
Q At that time you and your sister sold those
jewels to “Mang Erning” did … do you know already
[that] it was Mrs. Rodriguez who is the owner of
those jewels?
A No, Sir, I do not know.
Q And who do you know was the owner of that
jewels and that time you and your sister sold those
jewels to “Mang Erning”?
A According to my sister, it is (sic) owned by a
friend of hers.
Court
Q How did you come to know of this “Mang
Erning?”
A Only at that time when we brought the jewels.
Q But previous to that, do you know him?
A No.
Macario learned, after the case against Pacita had
already been filed in the trial court, that the jewelry
was, after all, owned by Jovita. However, he failed
to inform the petitioner that the said jewelry was
stolen. Following is the testimony of Macario:
Atty. Lerio
Q When you learned that those jewels were
owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, did you, if at all,
informed (sic) “Mang Erning” about it?
Court
Q No basis, when did you come to know that the
jewels belong to Mrs. Rodriguez?
A In 1992, when my sister already had a case.
Q What did you do when you come (sic) to know
about that?
A I was not able to do anything but just to help
my sister with her case and also to help the case of
Mrs. Rodriguez.
Atty. Lerio
Q After that, after knowing that these jewels are
(sic) owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, was there any
occasion where you (sic) able to inform “Mang
Erning” that those jewels were owned by Mrs.
Rodriguez?
A No more, I have no more time.
The prosecution cannot even validly argue that the
petitioner should have known which pieces of
jewelry were stolen, considering that Macario was
selling the same for P50,000 when the said pieces
stolen from Jovita were alleged to be worth
P655,000. This is so because the prosecution failed
to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove
the value of the said stolen articles. The
prosecution relied solely on the bare and
uncorroborated testimony of Jovita, that they were
worth P655,000:
Atty. Lerio
Q Now, will you tell this Court some of those
jewels which you own?
A I own several jewels and the one (sic) in
question are: 1-pair of earrings, diamond heart-
shaped P400,000.00; 1-ring, heart-shaped diamond
worth P100,000.00; 1-bracelet, white gold full of
stones, diamond worth P150,000.00; 1-diamond
ring with small stones worth P5,000.00. So, all in
all, the jewelry is (sic) worth P665,000.00.
When asked by the trial court to declare the present
market value of the stolen jewelry, Jovita merely
declared:
Atty. Lerio
Q Now again, when did you acquire those jewels
if you can still remember?
A I remember several years ago when my
husband is (sic) alive.
Court
Q Please tell the court, [is] the market value of the
jewels the same today?
A No, that is (sic) the market value several years
ago.
Q So, can you explain [if] the market value, more
or less, [is] the same today?
A No. The price, if we will appraise now, is much
bigger.
When required by the petitioner, through counsel,
to bring to the court any receipts reflecting the price of
the pieces of jewelry to show that she purchased the
same, Jovita answered that she had no such
receipts. Thus:
Court
Q You bought it from [a] private person?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Bernal
 Q What then is your proof that you bought these
jewelries (sic) from a private person?
Atty. Lerio
That was already answered, Your Honor. She
said, no receipt.
In People v. Paraiso, we cited our ruling in People
v. Marcos that an ordinary witness cannot establish
the value of jewelry, nor may the courts take judicial
notice of the value of the same:
…[A]nd as we have ruled in the case of People vs.
Antonio Marcos, an ordinary witness cannot establish
the value of jewelry and the trial court can only take
judicial notice of the value of goods which are matters
of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration. The value of jewelry is not a matter of
public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable
demonstration and in the absence of receipts or any
other competent evidence besides the self-serving
valuation made by the prosecution, we cannot award
the reparation for the stolen jewelry.
It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct
evidence that the accused had knowledge that the
jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to
prove facts and circumstances from which it can be
concluded that the accused should have known that
the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement
serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the
elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable
the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for
the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of
the property; otherwise, the court will fix the value of
the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in
People v. Dator:
In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof
relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the
bag and its contents at P100.00 based on the
attendant circumstances of the case. More
pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes, this
Court held that if there is no available evidence to
prove the value of the stolen property or that the
prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding
penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant
should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft
involving the value of P5.00.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 19110 affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612
for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 149872-73. March 14, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ROSDIA HAJILI alias “Hadji Usdi,” and NORMINA
UNDAY, appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The buy-bust operation in this case is supported by
the credible and straightforward testimonies of the
police officers. Appellants’ desperate attempt to taint
them with accusations of bias and irregular procedure
is not supported by the evidence. Hence, the
affirmation of the appealed judgment is inevitable.
Statement of the Case
Rosdia Hajili and Normina Unday appeal the
February 21, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16) in
Criminal Case Nos. 16263 and 16264. They were
found guilty of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment as
follows:
“1. In Criminal Case No. 16263, finding both Rosdia
Hajili y Sakilan a.k.a. Rosdia Hajili y Jayadi alias
‘Hadji Usdi’ and Normina Unday y Aloh GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
Violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, also known as The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, and SENTENCING each of said
accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and its accessory penalties, to pay a fine
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00)
pesos each, and to pay the costs; and
“2. In Criminal Case No. 16264, finding accused
Rosdia Hajili y Sakilan a.k.a. Rosdia Hajili y Jayadi
alias ‘Hadji Usdi’ GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and SENTENCING
said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.”
Appellants were charged in two separate
Informations, both dated August 24, 1999.
In Criminal Case No. 16263, the Information reads:
“That on or about August 23, 1999, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually
aiding and assisting x x x one another, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to
another, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did
then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously,
sell and deliver to PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA, PNP
Tumba droga agent, who pose[d] as buyer, five (5)
big transparent plastic packs containing 241.6338
grams of white crystalline substance which when
subjected to qualitative examination gave positive
result to the tests for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), knowing same to be a
regulated drug.”
The Information in Criminal Case No. 16264
charges them as follows:
“That on or about August 23, 1999, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
being authorized by law, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in [their] possession
and under [their] custody and control one (1) medium
transparent plastic pack containing white crystalline
substance having a total weight of 4.0859 gram which
when subjected to qualitative examination gave
positive result to the tests for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), knowing the same to be a
regulated drug.”
During their arraignment on September 23, 1999 for
Criminal Case No. 16263 and on October 25, 1999 for
Criminal Case No. 16264, appellants, assisted by
their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charges. After a joint trial of the cases, the lower
court rendered the assailed Judgment.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
presents the prosecution’s version of the facts as
follows:
“Around 3 o’clock in the afternoon of August 21, 1999,
PO3 Enrique Climaco Rivera, then assigned to the
Task Force Tumba Droga Team I, Zamboanga City,
was on duty at police headquarters. Momentarily, a
lady informant reported to P/Ins. Alfredo Francisco,
the team leader, that a certain Rosdia was selling
prohibited drugs at the second floor of Mindpro
[Citymall]. P/Ins. Francisco brought the lady
informant to PO3 Rivera. P/Ins. Francisco instructed
PO3 Rivera to go with the informant and verify the
report. And after confirming the report to be true, he
should negotiate with the suspect to buy shabu worth
P200,000.00. The informant told PO3 Rivera that
Rosdia was a big-time pusher.
“PO3 Rivera and the lady informant proceeded to the
second floor of Mindpro [Citymall] to look for Rosdia.
After failing to find her at the mall, PO3 Rivera and the
lady informant left. They agreed to return to the place
the afternoon of the following day.
“In the afternoon of August 22, 1999, PO3 Rivera and
the lady informant went to Mindpro [Citymall] and
proceeded to the second floor where they saw Rosdia
taking a snack in an eatery. The informant told PO3
Rivera that she alone would approach Rosdia. After
talking briefly to Rosdia, the informant waved at PO3
Rivera to join them. The informant introduced Rosdia
to PO3 Rivera saying: ‘Nelson, si Rosdia, yong
sinasabi ko sa iyo.’ PO3 Rivera and Rosdia shook
hands. PO3 Rivera introduced himself as Nelson
Yap, while Rosdia introduced herself as Rosdia Hajili.
Rosdia asked PO3 Rivera if he had money. PO3
Rivera told her that he had P200,000.00 which he left
at the hotel. Rosdia told him that the amount was just
equivalent to five (5) lowest. One (1) lowest is a pack
of shabu weighing more or less 50 grams. PO3
Rivera agreed to buy five (5) lowest. They agreed to
meet again at 11 o’clock the following morning at the
same place. Rosdia told PO3 Rivera to bring the
money. Thereafter, PO3 Rivera and the informant
left. They agreed to meet at the gate of the
puericulture center fronting the Mindpro [Citymall]
between 10:00 to 10:30 in the morning of the
following day.
“SPO3 Rivera returned to headquarters and reported
what transpired to P/Insp. Francisco. They withdrew
the amount of P200,000.00 from the Finance Section
of the police. P/Insp. Francisco got a bag, put the
money inside, and brought it to the office of Task
Force Tumba Droga. P/Insp. Francisco conducted a
short briefing on the planned buy-bust operation. The
target of the buy-bust operation was a certain Rosdia
Hajili who was frequently seen at Mindpro [Citymall].
PO3 Rivera was designated poseur-buyer while PO3
Alfredo S. Trumata would act as Rivera’s back-up.
The other members of the team were assigned as
perimeter guards. It was agreed that when PO3
Rivera remove[s] his bull cap, it would mean that the
deal was consummated. The members of Task Force
Tumba Droga Team present at the briefing were
P/Insp. Alfredo Francisco, PO3 Enrique Rivera, SPO1
Eduardo Bernardo, SPO1 Amado Mirasol, SPO1
Marcelino Herbano, PO3 Alfredo Trumata, PO3
Renato dela Peña, PO3 Allan Obut, PO1 Yasser
Salonga and PO1 Hilda Montuno.
“The next day, August 23, 1999, about 9 o’clock in the
morning, PO3 Rivera and the rest of the members of
the team were at the office of Task Force Tumba
Droga. P/Insp. Francisco again conducted a short
briefing. He reminded the members of the team to
deploy themselves in strategic positions at the
[Citymall] where they could not be seen. P/Insp.
Francisco would post himself near the toilet where he
could see PO3 Rivera. P/Ins Francisco handed over
to PO3 Rivera the bag containing P200,000.00 in
bundles of P10,000.00 each. The members of the
team then proceeded to Mindpro [Citymall]. SPO3
Rivera boarded his motorcycle followed by the other
members.
“About an hour later, SPO3 Rivera and the informant
met. They proceeded to the second floor of Mindpro
[Citymall] where they waited for Rosdia Hajili.
Moments later, Rosdia arrived and approached PO3
Rivera and the lady informant. She asked SPO3
Rivera if he had the money with him. PO3 Rivera
opened the bag and showed the contents to her.
PO3 Rivera counted one bundle amounting to
P10,000.00 in the presence of Rosdia. He took a
P100.00 bill and gave it to the lady informant. He told
the informant to buy snacks for them. After Rosdia
was convinced, she told PO3 Rivera to come back at
2 o’clock in the afternoon in the same place to finalize
their transaction.
“At 1:30 in the afternoon, after a short briefing in their
office, PO3 Rivera and the other members of the Task
Force Tumba Droga Team returned to Mindpro
[Citymall]. He brought the black bag containing
marked money in the lesser amount of P6,000.00 and
crumpled bond paper. Rosdia arrived at 2 o’clock in
the afternoon accompanied by a man and a woman.
Rosdia told PO3 Rivera that they would finalize the
transaction at Baliwasan Chico, Sampaloc Drive. At
first, PO3 Rivera expressed apprehension in bringing
a big amount of money in that critical place. Rosdia,
however, told him not to worry as she was from that
place. PO3 Rivera excused himself. He went to the
comfort room. He was followed inside by P/Insp.
Francisco. PO3 Rivera informed Francisco that the
transaction would be finalized in Baliwasan Chico, at
Sampaloc Drive. P/Insp. Francisco told PO3 Rivera
to go ahead because members of the team would be
there. PO3 Rivera returned to their table. Rosdia
Hajili and her two companions went down and
boarded a tricycle. PO3 Rivera and the lady
informant followed in another tricycle. The two
tricycles headed towards Baliwasan Chico. P/Insp.
Francisco and his team members furtively followed
the two tricycles.
“The group arrived at Baliwasan Chico about 2:45 in
the afternoon. Rosdia and her companions, together
with PO3 Rivera and the lady informant, passed
through a blue steel gate and into a bungalow house.
Rosdia talked to one of its occupants. PO3 Rivera,
the lady informant and Rosdia’s two companions were
left waiting at the terrace. Rosdia returned to the
terrace and told PO3 Rivera and the lady informant
that the house belonged to her friend. Rosdia
instructed her companions to summon a certain
Normina. Rosdia’s companions left and proceeded to
the interior portion of Sapang Palay. After a few
minutes, Rosdia’s companions returned with Normina
Unday. Rosdia’s companions then left the house.
Rosdia instructed Normina to get the shabu. Normina
also went out and headed for Sapang Palay.
“A few minutes later, Normina Unday returned
bringing with her a folded white plastic bag clasped
under her armpit. She gave it to Rosdia Hajili.
Rosdia inspected the contents of the white plastic bag
and handed it over to PO3 Rivera. She told PO3
Rivera: ‘Lima yan.’ PO3 Rivera inspected the white
plastic bag with the label TONG’S, containing five (5)
transparent plastic packs of crystalline substance.
PO3 Rivera then gave the pre-arranged signal to the
buy-bust team members by removing his bull cap.
Rosdia Hajili asked PO3 Rivera, ‘Yung pera?’ PO3
Rivera pretended to open the bag he was carrying. At
that juncture, PO3 Rivera noticed the group of P/Sr.
Insp. Francisco and PO3 Trumata entering the gate.
PO3 Rivera identified himself as a policeman. He told
Rosdia Hajili and Normina Unday that they were both
under arrest. Normina Unday attempted to run but
PO3 Rivera grabbed hold of her wrist and made her
sit on the bench. Rosdia Hajili remained seated on
the bench and did not offer any resistance.
“PO3 Alfredo Trumata placed Rosdia Hajili under
arrest. He confiscated from her a brown shoulder bag
with brand name BON containing a medium size
transparent plastic pack of suspected shabu.
“PO3 Rivera turned over to the investigator, PO3 Dela
Peña, the white plastic bag, marked TONG’S,
containing five (5) big transparent plastic packs which
contained white crystalline substance and the marked
money in P100.00 bills amounting to P6,000.00
placed in two (2) brown mailing envelopes which
were, in turn, placed inside a black bag. PO3
Trumata turned over a brown shoulder bag with brand
name ‘BON’ which he confiscated from Rosdia Hajili.
Inside, PO3 Trumata found a medium[-sized] heat-
sealed transparent plastic pack containing suspected
shabu.
“After their arrest, Rosdia Hajili and Normina Unday
were brought to the police station. PO3 Rivera placed
his markings ‘ECR’ (Enrique Climaco Rivera) on the
confiscated items at the Office of Task Force Tumba
Droga, particularly on the white plastic bag with the
label TONG’S and on the five (5) big transparent
plastic packs containing suspected shabu.
“P/Sr. Insp. Mercedes Delfin-Diestro, Forensic
Chemist, PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 9,
conducted laboratory tests on the five (5) big
transparent plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 241.6338 grams and
one (1) medium-sized transparent plastic pack
containing white crystalline substance, weighing
4.0889 grams. The specimens submitted proved
POSITIVE for METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (shabu), a regulated drug.”
Version of the Defense
Denying the charges and claiming to be victims of a
police frame-up, appellants present their version of
the facts as follows:
“x x x. Rosdia Hajili y Jayadi, testified that x x x [s]he
was previously arrested by the police and charged in
court in connection with the violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law, wherein she was detained and later
acquitted. Among the arresting policemen was PO3
Trumata. On the day in question, August 22, 1999,
she denies being at the Mindpro [Citymall] in the
afternoon of the said date, since it was a Sunday, and
that on the afternoon she had attended a wedding at
the Garden Orchids Hotel together with Evangeline
Asmad y Ayani who testified she met her neighbor,
Appellant Rosdia Hajili. They even had their picture
at the wedding taken together with Helen Sakkam.
Appellant Hajili further aver x x x that she never went
to Mindpro Citymall on that fateful day. As she was
feeling ill and so much so that she had to go see a
quack doctor (‘tawal-tawal’) for her fever at the house
of Hadja Fatima in Baliwasan Chico. While she was
being treated by Delma Abubakar, the quack doctor,
policemen suddenly entered the house, among one of
them was whom she recognized as PO3 Rivera in
connection with her case for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law. She further declared before August 21,
22 and 23, 1999 she knew Rivera was a Police
Officer.
“On the other hand, Accused-Appellant x x x Normina
Unday y Aloh, testified that x x x [s]he came to
Zamboanga City for the first time on August 14, 1999
with her sister who was leaving for Saudi Arabia.
They stayed at the house of Hadja Fatima who is the
friend of her sister. When her sister left for Saudi
Arabia, she was employed as a house helper of Hadja
Fatima. She further avers that on the afternoon of
August 23, 1999, she was inside the bathroom of
Hadja Fatima’s house taking a bath and washing
clothes when suddenly there was a knock at the
door. Upon opening it she was confronted by a
policeman holding a pistol by the door who brought
her to the sala where x x x other policemen [were]
gathered. At that time she was still wet. The
policeman talked to them nicely that they will bring
her and Rosdia Hajili to the police station and
afterwards they will bring them back home. They
were then taken to the police station at Sta. Barbara.
After being searched they were then brought to the
police station at Divisoria [where] they stayed for two
nights, after which they were then brought to the city
jail. Accused-Appellant Unday further x x x denies
that she brought shabu upon the instruction of
Accused-Appellant Rosdia Hajili to the house of Hadja
Fatima. She said that she has not sold shabu to
anyone at any time.”
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave credence to the evidence of the
prosecution and found the buy-bust operation lawful.
It held that the apprehending police officers could not
have merely concocted the facts, which they had
clearly and convincingly narrated in their respective
testimonies. Thus, it upheld the presumption that
they had performed their duties in a regular manner,
since no evidence to the contrary had been
presented.
Moreover, the trial court rejected appellants’
defense of frame-up, because it found the testimonies
of the accused and their witnesses to be dubious and
unconvincing. It declared as suspicious the statement
that the police officers had simply barged into the
house and escorted both of the accused to the police
station without any explanation. It was convinced that
the policemen had been led to the house by the
accused Hajili in connection with a drug transaction
she had previously arranged with PO3 Rivera.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
In their Brief, appellants raise the following
assignment of errors for our consideration:
“I
That the court a quo erred when it did not dismiss the
charges against both appellants on the ground that
their guilt was not prove[n] beyond reasonable doubt.
“II
The trial court erred when it held there was
conspiracy between the two appellants.
“III
The trial court erred when it resolved the case against
both appellants because public officers have in their
favor the presumption that they did their job regularly
in the performance of their duties.”
In short, appellants are questioning (1) the sufficiency
of the prosecution evidence and (2) the regularity of
the conduct of the buy-bust operation.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the following elements must first be established: (1)
proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2)
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the
illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in a prosecution for illegal
possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown
that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or
an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law,
and (3) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug.
A review of the records and the transcripts of
stenographic notes of these cases reveals that the
prosecution has proven the presence of these
elements.
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely
on the credibility of the police officers who conducted
the buy-bust operation. Furthermore, this Court is
guided by the entrenched rule that the assessment of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court, which had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct or
attitude of the witnesses. The findings of the lower
court on this point are accorded great respect and will
not be reversed on appeal, unless it overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of the
case.
PO3 Enrique Rivera, the poseur-buyer in the
buy-bust operation, positively identified Hajili and
Unday as the peddlers of the confiscated shabu.
He testified thus:
“Q So, on the following day, August 22, at about
past 3:00, tell this Honorable Court where were
you?
A I was at the vicinity of the Puericulture Center,
fronting the Citymall waiting for the informant.
Q [Was] that [the] time and date and place x x x
you [met] the informant?
A Yes, after a few minutes, she arrived and after
we met we proceeded to the second floor of the
Citymall.
Q This time, when you arrived at the second floor
of the Citymall, what happened?
A When we arrived at the second floor, she was
able to spot the subject taking a snack in one of the
tables and she told me to wait for a while, while she
goes and talks to the subject person.
Q And you said the informant was able to spot the
target person taking a snack at that time[.] Was
she alone or with a companion x x x when she was
taking the snack?
A That time she was alone.
Q Your informant told you to wait because she
will go and approach the target. What happened
when the informant approached the target?
A I saw them having a conversation[.] [A]fter that
she [waved] her hand so I proceeded to where they
were seated.
Q What did you do after [she waved] her hand?
A I proceeded to were they were and when I
arrived there, she introduced me to the subject
person.
Q How were you introduced to the subject
person?
A The informant introduced to me that I gave her
name as Nelson. She said, ‘Nelson, si Rosdia,
yong sinasabi ko sa iyo’ and then we [shook]
hands.
Q You said your informant introduced you to the
target and she gave to you the name Rosdia Hajili
after you gave your name as Nelson Yap. If you
see her again, will you be able to identify her if you
see her again?
[A] Yes.
Q If she is in the courtroom, please point to her?
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a person when asked [her]
name identified [her]self as Rosdia [Hajili].
COURT:
Q You were introduced as Nelson?
A Nelson Yap, your Honor.
FISCAL LIM:
Q After that introduction, what happened next?
A Rosdia asked me ‘Ikaw ba yong buyer?’ I
said[,] ‘Yes,’ so she asked me if I have money and I
said ‘Yes, I have money but I left it at the hotel.’ So
she asked me how much am I buying then I told her
worth P200,0000. And I ask what is the equivalent
of that and she told me it is just equivalent to 5
lowest. That is the term x x x used [by] drug
traffickers which means more or less 50 grams per
plastic worth P40,000.00.
Q You said, Mr. Witness that Rosdia [Hajili] told
you that your money worth P200,000.00 is only
equivalent to five (5) lowest, what happened next,
after that?
A So, I agreed that it was okay then she also told
me, all right, in that case we will see each other
tomorrow at 11:00, the same place, but you have to
bring along the money. According to her, I have to
bring money to make sure that I really have such
amount.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said, you returned back to your office.
About what time was that when you arrived there at
your office?
A It was already 4:00 o’clock.
Q When you arrived in the office, tell this
Honorable Court what did you do there?
A When I arrived, Ins. Francisco was around so I
informed him about the deal that I was able to take
with the subject Rosdia Hajili and was able to
transact and we agreed to have a deal and that I
have to bring money tomorrow at 11:00 o’clock, the
same place, so I also [told] Ins. Francisco that the
money worth P200,000.00 is only worth 5-lowest.
Ins. Francisco told me that, all right, we will
withdraw money from the Finance Section.”
“FISCAL CABARON:
Q Mr. Witness, what time was that when you
arrived at Mindpro [Citymall] in the morning of
August 23, 1999, when you met your Informant
there on your way to the second floor?
A About 10:10 in the morning.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened when you said she appeared,
who was that suspect who arrived?
A Rosdia Hajili.
xxx xxx xxx
A She approached x x x our table and sat down
and asked me if I have the money.
Q What did you tell her?
A I told her ‘Yes, I have the money. I am
bringing it now with me.’
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said, that the suspect, Rosdia Hajili,
peeped inside your bag and after she checked on
your bag, what happened next?
A After she peeped [at] the money that I
[brought,] I even took x x x [it] and counted [it] in her
presence [and it] amounted to P10,000.00 and after
that I x x x/got P100.00 and gave [it] to my
Informant and told [her] to buy some snacks for us.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened after that?
A During our conversation x x x my Informant
returned x x x and brought snacks and we ate and
after consuming it, the suspect Rosdia Hajili told
me that she was satisfied and she told me that we
will be seeing again at 2:00 o’clock on the same
afternoon, the same date, the same place.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened when you met there?
A We waited for the arrival of the subject Rosdia
Hajili and it was already 2:00 o’clock, the same
day[.] I noticed that x x x this time she was x x x
with two companions[,] a male and a female
compa[n]ion[.] [There] were three of them.
Q What happened Mr. Witness after the suspect
arrived together with the two companions?
A We were waiting and x x x she told me that we
will be finalizing at Baliwasan Chico and I asked
where[.] What particular place at Baliwasan Chico
and she told me at Sampaloc Drive and x x x I told
her it is critical in that area [to bring a] big amount of
money and we [might fall victims] there and she
gave me an assurance that she is from that place
and I agreed and we proceeded there.
COURT:
Q [Where] at Baliwasan Chico?
A Sampaloc Drive.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL CABARON:
Q [What happened after] you agreed that you will
be going with her at Baliwasan Chico, Sampaloc
Drive?
A I [told her] that I have some personal necessity
and I went to the Comfort Room and Inspector
Francisco followed me and I informed him that we
will be transferring to Baliwasan Chico and he gave
me the assurance that I can go with them and I
must not be worried because the group will follow
behind.
xxx xxx xxx
Q About what time was that when you left and
boarded tricycles and proceeded to Baliwasan
Chico?
A About 2:25 in the afternoon.
Q Were you able to arrive at Baliwasan Chico?
A Yes. We arrived there at Baliwasan Chico.
Q Particularly could you point to any point of
reference in Baliwasan Chico where you went
together with Rosdia Hajili and her two
companions?
A We went to the cemented road and inside
there about 60 meters from the main road
particularly near the house of former City Director
Colonel Mohammid.
Q About what time was that when you arrived
there?
A More or less it was already up to 2:45 in the
afternoon.
Q What happened Mr. Witness, when you arrived
there?
A When we arrived there they went inside the
house and we also followed[. I] and my Informant
and her two companions were left in the terrace of
the said house while Rosida Hajili proceeded inside
and I was also able to see that she was talking with
one of the occupants of the house.
Q What happened next after you saw Rosdia
Hajili talked with the occupants of the house inside?
A Then, she went back and told me that we can
stay there for a while; that is the house of a friend,
we can stay there x x x for the final deal.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did you do there, Mr. Witness, at the
terrace?
A We only wait[ed] there and after informing me
that we can stay there[,] she instructed her two
companions, the male and the female
companions[,] to proceed and [fetch a] certain
Nurmina.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did these two persons do after Rosdia
Hajili directed them to call a certain Nurmina?
A The two companions left and proceeded to the
interior part of the place at Sapang Palay Portion
and after [a] few minutes they returned x x x
bringing [a] bag along with them with another lady
there [who was] later on identified as Nurmina.
Q When you said that a male and a female
[companion] of Rosdia Hajili returned and [brought
along another female that was] later on identified as
Nurmina?
A Yes.
Q And if this Nurmina is around the Court Room,
will you be able to identify her?
A Yes.
Q Look if this Nurmina is inside the Court Room
please point to her?
A (Witness pointing)
[COURT INTERPRETER:]
Witness pointed to a woman in Court and when
asked her name identified herself as Nurmina
Unday.
[FISCAL CABARON:]
Q What happened next when Nurmina Unday
arrived together with the two companions of Rosdia
Hajili?
A Her two companions left us in the house and
proceeded to the portion of the main door and
proceeded outside and Rosdia Hajili instructed
Nurmina Unday to get the shabu and so,
immediately Nurmina Unday went out of the house
and proceeded again where they came from at
[Sapang Palay].
Q What happened next when Nurmina Unday left
and proceeded to the inner portion of [Sapang
Palay]?
A After a few minutes Nurmina Unday came back
and she was bringing along with her a white plastic
cello[phane] and upon arrival Nurmina Unday
handed the white plastic cello[phane] to Rosdia
Hajili.
Q What happened next when Nurmina Unday
handed the plastic cello[phane] to Rosdia Hajili?
A Rosdia Hajili opened the plastic cello[phane]
and inspected the contents and later on she gave
me the cello[phane] and told me ‘Lima Yan’.
COURT:
Q Where were you at that precise time?
A I was on the bench of the terrace.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL CABARON:
Q What did you do after this Rosdia Hajili handed
to you this plastic cello[phane] and said[,] ‘Lima
Yan’, what did you do?
A I also inspected the contents of it -- the
contents of the Jollibee plastic bag containing
crystalline substance -- and it [contained] shabu
and while inspecting it when I saw that it is shabu I
made my pre-arranged signal x x x and I noticed
that at the same time when I gave my pre-arranged
signal Rosdia Hajili was asking the payment ‘yung
pera’ and when she demanded the payment I
pretended to open the bag and, at this juncture, I
noticed that the group of Inspector Francisco and
Trumata was already inside the gate and at this
juncture, I also identified myself as a policeman[,]
‘Pulis kami huwag kayong kikilos arestado kayo’.
Nurmina Unday was about [to] run and I was able
to hold her wrist and I let her sit on the bench and
Rosdia Hajili remained sitting with no resistance[.]
She remained seated on the bench and, at this
juncture, Your Honor, Alfredo Trumata placed
Rosdia Hajili under arrest and I was able to see that
Alfredo Trumata recovered a x x x small brown
shoulder bag from Rosdia Hajili and I noticed that
Alfredo Trumata recovered a plastic chasi
containing a suspected shabu from that bag.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL CABARON:
Q Mr. Witness, what else transpired after the
group of Inspector Francisco was already there and
you have already effected the arrest of the two
suspects Nurmina Unday and Rosdia Hajili?
A At this juncture, I turned over the shabu plastic
bag inside the cello[phane] containing the
suspected shabu to our Investigator PO3 Renato
Dela Peña and the marked money [which was]
(P6,000.00) six thousand pesos and the crumpled
bond paper and returned to PO3 Renato Dela Peña
and Alfredo Trumata turned over to our Investigator
the bag of Nurmina Unday containing a small
plastic cello[phane] containing shabu.
Q What happened to the Informant after you
arrested the two suspects Nurmina Unday and
Rosdia Hajili?
A x x x [W]hen there [was a] commotion [the
Informant] went out of the house and she
disappeared and she left.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL CABARON:
Q Now, after the arrest of Rosdia Hajili and
Nurmina Unday, Mr. Witness, you said you turned
over the cello[phane] which [contains] the five
packs of shabu inside the cello[phane] (plastic) x x
x to the Investigator and likewise you turned over
the bag which [contains the shabu recovered from]
the buy-bust operation, what did you do next?
A Inspector Francisco called thru the radio to
fetch us with the vehicle[.] x x x [As] soon as the
vehicle arrived we boarded in the vehicle with
Renato Dela Peña, Alfredo Trumata and the two
suspects boarded the vehicle and then, we
proceeded to the station.
Q What happened when you arrived at the
station?
A Upon arrival we booked in the investigation x x
x the two suspects.
Q You said you booked them in[. Was] the arrest
of the two suspects registered in your Office?
A Yes. It was registered.”
The foregoing testimony was substantially
corroborated by PO3 Renato Dela Peña and PO3
Alfredo Trumata. The clear, straightforward and
consistent testimonies of the police officers
sufficiently support the trial court’s conclusions.
The allegation that Appellant Hajili knew the
poseur-buyer to be a policeman is not a ground for
inferring that she could not have sold the illegal
drugs to him. Such sales to police officers do take
place nowadays.
Furthermore, the prosecution was able to establish
that the substance obtained from appellants was
shabu. Physical Sciences Report No. D-531-99
states: “Qualitative examination conducted on the
above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to
the tests for the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (shabu), a regulated drug.”
Conspiracy
We are not persuaded by the argument of
appellants that conspiracy was not duly proven. Their
behavior during the entrapment shows that there was
conspiracy between them. Direct proof is not
essential to the establishment of conspiracy, as it may
be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime. All
such acts imply conspiracy when they indubitably
point to or indicate a joint purpose, a concert of action
and a community of interest.
Second Issue:
Defense of Frame-up or Hulidap
Appellants contend that they are victims of a police
frame-up or hulidap. They assert that without any
authority, permission or search warrant, the police
officers suddenly barged into the house where they
were staying and demanded money from its
occupants.
We are not convinced. Once the elements of a
crime have been established, the defense of frame-up
or hulidap must be clearly proven by the defense.
This defense is difficult to substantiate, as we have
held in People v. Chen Tiz Chang:
“Courts generally view with disfavor this defense
commonly raised in drug cases, for it is easy to
concoct and difficult to prove. Moreover, there is a
presumption that public officers, including the
arresting officers, regularly perform their official
duties. In the present case, the defense failed to
overcome this presumption to present clear and
convincing evidence to prove ‘hulidap.’”
In the cases at bar, the defense failed to support its
allegations. The testimonies of appellants and other
defense witnesses are silent on the claim that the
apprehending policemen demanded hush money.
Also, as aptly observed by the trial court, assuming
that appellants had been brought to the police station
and detained without any explanation, they could
have filed charges -- administrative or criminal --
against the policemen. No complaints, however, were
ever reported.
Likewise, we find no merit in appellants’ claim that
the Zamboanga City policemen’s use of the same
method in conducting buy-bust operations is a THIRD DIVISION respondent’s demand,[6] Gregorio Amante refused to
reflection of the irregularity of the procedure. It must G.R. No. 143572 September 30, 2005 return the vehicle. Hence, respondent instituted a
be noted that there is no rigid or textbook method of GREGORIO “GEORGE” AMANTE AND VICENTE replevin suit with the trial court.[7] Asserting
conducting buy-bust operations. The choice of AMANTE, Petitioners v e r s u s BIBIANO ownership of the vehicle, petitioner Vicente Amante,
effective ways to apprehend drug dealers is within the SERWELAS, Respondent the proprietor of Amante Motors, intervened in the
ambit of police authority. Police officers have the DECISION suit.
expertise to determine which specific approaches are CORONA, J.: On April 29, 1996, the trial court rendered a
necessary to enforce their entrapment operations. The subject of this petition for review on certiorari decision[8] declaring respondent as the lawful owner
The courts’ duty in these cases is to ensure that the under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision[1] of the vehicle:
rights of the accused have not been violated during of the Court of Appeals dated December 28, 1999 The illegal seizure of the vehicle was triggered by
buy-bust operations. declaring respondent Bibiano Serwelas as the lawful the suspicion of the defendant[9] that [the] said
Finally, the reliance of appellants on People v. Lim owner of a contested vehicle. vehicle was spirited out of Amante Motors by Danilo
is misplaced. Contrary to their assertion in their Reply The facts, as found by the appellate court, follow. [Bicomong] who was formerly the plant supervisor
Brief, the facts in that case are hardly similar to those Danilo Bicomong was the registered owner of a therein.
in the instant cases. In the aforementioned case, we 1990 Isuzu Jitney with motor no. 139328, chassis no. Aside from the suspicion and the inconclusive
found substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of SPMM 35092-90-C and plate no. DHH 230, conclusion of the technician that the chassis
the police officers who had conducted the buy-bust evidenced by certificate of registration no. 00567641. number of the vehicle in question was “re-stamped”
operation. Significantly, the testimony of the poseur- [2] He was employed as plant supervisor of Amante no other evidence – like registration certificate –
buyer on the sale of illegal drugs was not credibly Motors. was adduced by defendant/intervenor, to support
corroborated, thus, creating uncertainty on whether On July 17, 1992, Bicomong sold the vehicle for the claim of ownership.
the crime had indeed been committed. P200,000 to respondent in a deed of absolute sale.[3] xxx xxx xxx
There were no such attendant circumstances in the On October 7, 1992, respondent had the vehicle Besides, it was not shown that the certificate of
present cases. As mentioned earlier, appellants failed registered in his name, as shown in certificate of registration of Danilo was spurious or fake. It was
to destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. registration no. 14058314.[4] He then operated it as a not also shown that the subject vehicle was
The former alluded to inconsistencies that were, common carrier on a boundary system.[5] registered in the name of either the defendant or
however, not specifically identified and supported. On December 9, 1993, the vehicle was seized by intervenor[10] or Amante Motors. Now, between
What is essential is that the prosecution witnesses the police highway patrol group in General Mariano the plaintiff[11] who purchased the vehicle in good
positively identified appellants as the ones who had Alvarez, Cavite without a warrant, upon the request of faith and for value and with supporting genuine
possessed the dangerous drug and sold it to the petitioner Gregorio Amante, the manager of Amante documents and the defendant/intervenor who
poseur-buyer. Motors. merely presumed that they owned the chassis, the
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the The vehicle was brought to Camp Vicente Lim in choice is clear.[12]
appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against Laguna and, after being subjected to macro-etching The trial court also awarded damages to
appellants. examination by SPO1 Elfin B. Rico of the Philippine respondent for lost earnings[13] amounting to
SO ORDERED. National Police Crime Laboratory Service, was later P103,200 plus P37,963 as premium for the replevin
released to petitioner Gregorio Amante. Despite bond of respondent.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision holding respondent as the rightful
owner of the vehicle. It ruled that respondent had
established ownership of the vehicle to the exclusion
of the whole world. [14] It also affirmed the award of
damages as unrealized earnings[15] but deleted the
award for replevin bond premium since no claim for it
was made in the complaint.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
Petitioners impute errors involving questions of fact
which we are not at liberty to review. Our jurisdiction
is generally limited to reviewing errors of law that
may have been committed by the Court of
Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated but not so
well-heeded rule that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, especially when they are in agreement with
those of the trial court, are accorded not only respect
but even finality, and are binding on this Court.
Barring a showing that the findings complained of
were devoid of support, they must stand for this Court
is not expected or required to examine or refute the
oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties.[16] The trial court, having heard the
witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner
of testifying, is in a better position to assess their
credibility.
In any event, we carefully reviewed the records of
this case and found no compelling reason to disturb
the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the
appellate court.
Respondent’s ownership of the vehicle was proven
by the certificate of registration in his name. Petitioner
Vicente Amante, on the otherhand, could not present
any certificate of registration to support his claim.
Between one who is armed with a certificate of
registration clearly establishing his ownership and
another whose claim is supported only by
unconvincing allegations, we do not hesitate to rule
for the former.
A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle
creates a strong presumption of ownership in favor of
one in whose name it is issued, unless proven
otherwise. In this case, we have not found sufficient
proof to destroy the presumption. Petitioners seek to
dispel the presumption by alleging that the vehicle
was stolen by Bicomong from them and therefore the
respondent was a buyer in bad faith. In this
connection, petitioners raise the following points:
1. Bicomong was merely a supervisor at Amante
Motors owned by petitioner Vicente Amante.
2. Bicomong had no motor shop of his own.
3. Bicomong had no other [source] of income or
livelihood aside from being a supervisor at Amante
Motors and did not own any passenger-type
jeepney.
4. [R]espondent was brought to the shop of Amante
Motors where he chose and picked the subject
motor vehicle from among the jeepneys on display
thereat for sale.
5. [T]he jeepney chosen by respondent at the shop
of Amante Motors was the very same vehicle in
question delivered to him by Danilo Bicomong at his
residence [in] Cavite.
6. [T]he subject motor vehicle was among the
passenger-type jeepneys manufactured and/or
assembled by Amante Motors spirited out of the
shop of Amante Motors by Danilo Bicomong.
7. [T]he macro-etching examination conducted by
SPO1 Elfin B. Rico of the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory Service on the subject motor
vehicle clearly revealed “presence of signs of
grinding on the metal surface where the chassis
number is normally located” per his Physical
Investigation Report No. PI-369-93 dated
December 9, 1993.
8. Chassis no. SPMM-35092-90C (the chassis
number in Bicomong’s certificate of registration)
was merely re-stamped on the chassis of subject
motor vehicle as per the aforesaid Physical
Investigation Report No. PI-369-93 of SPO1 Rico.
9. [T]he chassis bearing no. SPMM-35092-90-C, as
found re-stamped on the chassis of the vehicle in
question by SPO1 Rico is with the police authorities
of San Pablo City, Laguna.
10. [T]he dorsal side of the hood of subject motor
vehicle, when its paint was scratched, showed the
original chassis number secretly stamped thereon
by petitioners.
11. Danilo Bicomong was not even presented in
court to prove his alleged ownership of [the] subject
motor vehicle; and
12. Danilo Bicomong, among others, was charged
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo
City for theft of subject motor vehicle and other
jeepneys as per Resolution of the San Pablo City
Prosecutor’s Office. [17]
We are not convinced. There is no clear indication
that the vehicle was stolen by Bicomong, much less
that respondent had knowledge thereof. Hence, the
presumption of ownership created by respondent’s
certificate of registration stands.
More telling are the following observations.
The fact that Bicomong was only a supervisor at
Amante Motors did not conclusively prove that he
never at any time owned a jeepney for sale. That was
pure speculation. One’s wealth is not measured
solely by his occupation. There are so many
possibilities which might have explained
Bicomong managed to own one although that is no
longer within the extent of our review.
Next, as supervisor of Amante Motors, Bicomong
was clothed with authority to deal and transact with
customers. When respondent was shown
vehicles on display, it was not necessary for him to
verify in whose names the vehicles were registered.
What a customer normally does under
circumstances is to take a look at the items and take
his pick.
Petitioners wish to establish bad faith on the part of
respondent for purchasing a jeepney which was
registered not to Amante Motors but to Danilo
Bicomong. Was this sufficient proof of bad faith on
the part of a purchaser? Whatever internal
arrangement the motor shop may have had with
Bicomong regarding why the latter’s vehicle was
among those on display in its premises was not the
responsibility of respondent buyer to inquire into.
What was crucial was the valid certificate of
registration in Bicomong’s name, true and clean on its
face. Respondent buyer was not required to go
beyond that.
Petitioners also assert that the delivery of the
vehicle to respondent’s residence should have made
him suspicious. We do not agree. In order to attract
buyers, sellers are known to extend all kinds of
gimmicks and accommodations, one of which could
have been the delivery of the vehicle right at a buyer’s
doorstep.
Next, in an attempt to prove that the vehicle was
stolen from them, petitioners presented evidence
such as the police report on the macro-etching
how examination conducted on the vehicle. There is
something legally anomalous about this, however.
The seizure of the vehicle on December 9, 1993 by
the highway patrol group (which led to such
examination) was done without a court warrant.
the Obviously, Gregorio Amante could not have effected
the seizure without the cooperation of his “friendly
contacts” in the police force. This, on the mere
such suspicion that it was spirited out of the Amante Motor
Shop sometime in 1992. How are we supposed to
rule on this in the light of the Bill of Rights guaranteed
by the Constitution? One of the most protected
rights of every person is the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures[18]. The
fundamental law mandates that these must be carried
out only on the strength of a judicial warrant,
otherwise evidence secured therefrom is deemed
tainted. In the language of the fundamental law, it is
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.[19]
Although the exclusionary rule admits of some
exceptions such as customs searches, searches of
moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain view,
consented searches, searches incidental to a lawful
arrest and “stop and frisk” measures,[20] the case at
bar does not fall under any of the foregoing.
Moreover, the element of immediacy between the
time of the commission of the offense and the time of
the seizure was missing. The alleged commission of
the theft was in 1992 while the seizure was effected
only in 1993. There was thus no compelling reason
for the haste in seizing the vehicle because petitioner
Gregorio Amante could have easily obtained a
warrant if he really believed that the vehicle had been
stolen from them.
We rule therefore that the reports, based as they
were on chattel illegally seized, were inadmissible in
evidence and thus carried no weight.
Finally, the resolution of San Pablo City Assistant
Prosecutor Esperidion Gajitos[21] could not but
strengthen respondent’s claim of good faith. Petitioner
Gregorio Amante’s criminal complaint for violation of
RA 6539[22] and the Anti-Fencing Law was filed in
court only against Bicomong. Respondent was
exonerated of any liability whatsoever.
All told, we find no reason to disturb the findings of
both the court a quo and the appellate court on the
good faith of respondent.
As to the issue of damages, we concur with the
Court of Appeals that only petitioner Gregorio Amante
should be held liable for the unrealized rentals of
respondent during the period he was deprived of the
vehicle’s possession. Petitioner Vicente Amante was
not privy to the unlawful seizure and detention of the
vehicle.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 28,
1999 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Respondent Bibiano Serwelas is hereby declared the
owner of the disputed vehicle. Petitioner Gregorio
Amante is hereby ordered to pay respondent the
amount of P103,200 as unrealized rentals plus
P37,963 as premium for the replevin bond.[23]
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-02-1731. February 16, 2005]
SHIRLEY C. RUIZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE
ROLINDO D. BELDIA, JR., Regional Trial Court,
Branch 57, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
[Assisting Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 272, Marikina City,] respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In an Affidavit-Complaint[1] filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), complainant Shirley C.
Ruiz charged respondent Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr.
of Branch 57, Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, with gross ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of authority in connection with the
grant of bail and issuance of a release order in favor
of one Lourdes Estrella Santos.
Ruiz is the private complainant in I.S. No. 2000-
1031 for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law[2] pending
before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Santos, who
was arrested during entrapment operations relative to
the carnapping of Ruiz’s vehicle, was one of the
respondents therein.
After her arrest on May 24, 2000, Santos was
detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City, pending the
filing of formal charges in court. Upon inquest, she
executed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125[3] of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Rule 112,
Section 7[4] of the then applicable 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Inquest Prosecutor thus set
the hearing of the preliminary investigation on May
31, 2000 at 2:00 PM.[5]
However, on May 30, 2000, Santos obtained an
Order of Release[6] signed by respondent Judge
Beldia who was then detailed as assisting judge of
Branch 272, Regional Trial Court of Marikina City
(RTC-Marikina City). Respondent Judge Beldia
apparently granted bail to Santos and approved the
corresponding bail bond without serving notice to the
prosecutor.
Consequently, Ruiz filed the instant administrative
complaint contending that respondent Judge Beldia
had no authority to grant bail to Santos since the
Investigating Prosecutor has yet to conclude the
preliminary investigation. She claimed that for as long
as the information has not yet been filed in court, a
court has no power to grant bail to a detained person
since it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
In his Comment[7] dated August 14, 2000,
respondent Judge Beldia maintained that Section 1
(c), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows any person
in custody, even if not formally charged in court, to
apply for bail.
Meanwhile, the OCA directed the Clerk of Court,
Branch 272, RTC-Marikina City, Atty. Elvira Badillo-
Adarlo, to confirm whether a formal petition for
admission to bail was filed by Santos or her counsel
and, whether Executive Judge Reuben P. de la Cruz
and Presiding Judge Olga P. Enriquez were absent or
unavailable on May 30, 2000 when the release order
was issued.[8]
On June 18, 2002, Atty. Badillo-Adarlo informed the
OCA that the records of release orders and bailbonds
in her custody did not include the subject release
order issued by respondent Judge Beldia. As such,
she could not tell whether a formal petition for
admission to bail was filed by Santos. She likewise
confirmed that Executive Judge De la Cruz and
Presiding Judge Enriquez were present and available
on the day that Judge Beldia issued the release order.
[9]
On November 20, 2002, the complaint was re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter. At the
same time, the parties were required to manifest
whether they are willing to submit the case for
resolution based on the pleadings filed.[10] The
parties failed to file their manifestations, hence the
filing thereof was deemed waived.
In its report[11] dated July 31, 2002, the OCA
recommended that respondent Judge Beldia be held
liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined in the
amount of P5,000.00. It opined that although a
person in custody and who is not formally charged in
court could apply for bail pursuant to Section 17 (c),
Rule 114, the grant thereof by Judge Beldia was
nonetheless irregular. It noted that no formal petition
or application for bail was filed by Santos, and even if
one was filed, the Marikina courts could not have
properly taken cognizance of the same since Santos
was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. There
was also no showing that the regular judge of Branch
272, RTC-Marikina City, was unavailable to act on the
application for bail.
We agree with the recommendation of the OCA.
Record shows that Executive Judge De la Cruz and
Presiding Judge Enriquez were present on May 30,
2000 to act on the bail application of Santos. When
respondent Judge Beldia acted on the bail application
of Santos on May 30, 2000, his designation was
merely an “assisting judge” in the RTC-Marikina City,
his permanent station being in Branch 57, RTC-San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental. As such, his
authority in the Marikina court is limited and he could
only act on an application for bail filed therewith in the In addition, it appears that no formal application or There is no dearth of jurisprudence on the rules to
absence or unavailability of the regular judge. petition for the grant of bail was filed before the RTC- be applied in the grant of bail.[19] These same rules
Concededly, a person lawfully arrested and detained Marikina City. There were no records of the have been incorporated in the Rules of Court, of
but who has not yet been formally charged in court, application or the release order issued by respondent which a judge must have more than just a superficial
can seek his provisional release through the filing of Judge Beldia. Neither was there a hearing conducted understanding, if he were to discharge his functions
an application for bail. He need not wait for a formal thereon nor the prosecutor notified of the bail properly and competently. Indeed, everyone,
complaint or information to be filed since bail is application. especially a judge, is presumed to know the law.
available to “all persons” where the offense is Under the present rules, a hearing on an When, as in this case, the law is so elementary, not to
bailable.[12] Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of application for bail is mandatory.[15] In Cortes v. be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Criminal Procedure provides that a judge could grant Judge Catral,[16] we ruled that in all cases, whether [20]
bail to a person lawfully arrested but without a bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be
warrant, upon waiver of his right under Article 125 of notice of hearing must be given to the prosecutor, or faithful to the law and maintain professional
the Revised Penal Code, as Santos had done upon at least his recommendation on the matter must be competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more
her inquest. sought. The rationale for this was explained in this than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
Undeniably too, Santos was entitled to bail as a wise: procedural rules; it is imperative that he be
matter of right since the offense with which she was Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of
charged does not carry the penalty of life of each case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive
imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or death.[13] ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth,
Notwithstanding, it was incumbent upon respondent reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional to the end that he be the personification of justice and
Judge Beldia to grant bail to Santos in accordance provision that bail should not be excessive. Therefore, the rule of law.[21]
with established rules and procedure. Respondent whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending
Judge Beldia failed in this respect and must thus be reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of
held administratively liable. the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1,
Section 17, par. (c) of Rule 114 distinctly states: for his recommendation because in fixing the amount 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. – … of bail, the judge is required to take into account a serious charge punishable by either dismissal from
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in number of factors such as the applicant’s character service, suspension or a fine of more than P20,000.00
court may apply for bail with any court in the and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he but not exceeding P40,000.00. In this case,
province, city, or municipality where he is held. is a fugitive from justice.[17] considering that the incident took place on May 30,
(Emphasis supplied) Judge Beldia disregarded basic procedural rules 2000 which is before the effectivity of A.M. No. 01-8-
The Certificate of Detention[14] issued by the PNP- when he granted bail to Santos sans hearing and 10-SC, and malice or bad faith on the part of
TMG-SOD shows that Santos was detained at Camp notice and without the latter having filed a formal respondent Judge Beldia not having been
Crame in Quezon City. Thus, as correctly pointed out petition for bail. Accordingly, the prosecution was established, and further, this being his first
by the OCA, the application for bail should have been deprived of procedural due process for which administrative offense, we deem it just and
filed before the proper Quezon City court and not in respondent Judge Beldia must be held accountable. reasonable to impose upon him a fine of P5,000.00.
Marikina City. [18] [22]
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of Branch 57, Regional
Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental is
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, and is
FINED in the amount of P5,000.00. He is further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
COMPLEX CRIME:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171526 September 1, 2010
RODEL CRISOSTOMO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision1 dated September 22, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01192, affirming
with modification the Decision 2
rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12,
in Criminal Case No. 1632-M-2001, finding petitioner
Rodel Crisostomo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Factual Antecedents
The Information filed against petitioner and his two
companions designated only as John Doe and Peter
Doe contained the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about the 12th day of February, 2001, in
the municipality of San Miguel, province of Bulacan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and helping one another, armed with a
gun, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent [to] gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation upon person, enter
the gasoline station owned by Jose Buencamino and
once inside, take, rob and carry away with them
P40,000.00, belonging to the said Jose Buencamino,
to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
amount of P40,000.00, and on the occasion of the
commission of the said robbery or by reason thereof,
the herein accused, in furtherance of their conspiracy,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
attack, assault and shoot Janet Ramos, cashier of
said gasoline station, thereby inflicting on her serious
physical injuries which directly caused her death.
3
Contrary to law.
During his arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of
4
not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 12, 2001, at around 12:20 in the
afternoon, Rodelio Pangilinan (Rodelio) was working
at a gasoline station owned by Jose Buencamino
(Jose) at Buliran, San Miguel, Bulacan. He was by the
gasoline tank which was two or three arms length
from the cashier’s office when three armed men on
board a motorcycle arrived. Two of the men
immediately went to the cashier while the driver
stayed on the motorcycle. Inside the office, one of the
men pulled out a fan knife while the other, armed with
a gun, fired a shot at Janet Ramos (Janet), the
cashier. They forcibly took the money in the cash
register and the man with the gun fired a second shot
that fatally hit Janet in the right side of her head. The
this two armed men returned to their companion waiting
by the motorcycle and together sped away from the
scene of the crime.
Rodelio gave a description of the driver of the
motorcycle but not of the two armed men who entered
the cashier’s office since they had their backs turned
to him. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
prepared a cartographic sketch based on the
information provided by Rodelio. Jose, the owner of
the gas station, stated that the stolen money was
worth P40,000.00. Receipts in the amount of
P14,500.00 were presented as funeral expenses.
On February 23, 2001, the petitioner was detained
after being implicated in a robbery that occurred in
San Miguel, Bulacan. During his detention, Rodelio
and another gasoline boy arrived and identified him in
a police lineup as one of the three robbers who killed
Janet.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner denied committing the crime for which he
was charged. He maintained that the face of the man
depicted in the cartographic sketch by the NBI was
completely different from his appearance in the police
lineup in which Rodelio pointed at him as one of the
perpetrators. He argued that the only reason why
Rodelio pointed to him in the police lineup was
because he was the only one in handcuffs.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court rendered its Decision convicting
petitioner of robbery with homicide. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein accused RODEL
CRISOSTOMO y DE LEON guilty as principal beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide as charged, there being no circumstances,
aggravating or mitigating, found attendant in the
commission thereof, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
heirs of victim Janet Ramos in the amount of Our Ruling be given to the issue of alleged prejudice and
P75,000.00, the owner or operator, Jose The petition is unmeritorious. partiality of the trial judge.
Buencamino, Jr., of the gasoline station that was The trial court properly denied the motion for Petitioner is guilty of the complex crime of robbery
robbed, in the amount of P40,000.00 plus P14,500.00 inhibition. with homicide.
as funeral expenses (Exh. "H") defrayed by said Petitioner claims that his motion for inhibition Robbery with homicide exists "when a homicide is
owner for its cashier Janet Ramos, as actual should have been granted since his counsel filed a committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the
damages, and to pay the costs of the proceedings. case against the wife of the trial judge involving a land robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with
In the service of his sentence said accused, a dispute. Petitioner alleges that the case rendered the homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
detention prisoner, shall be credited with the full time trial judge partial, biased and, thus, incapable of elements: (1) the taking of personal property
during which he had undergone preventive rendering a just and wise decision. belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with
imprisonment, pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised We are not convinced. It must be stressed that as a the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
Penal Code. rule, "a motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after x and[,] (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery,
5
SO ORDERED. x x the Court had already given its opinion on the the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense,
Not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for merits of the case, the rationale being that ‘a litigant was committed. A conviction requires certitude that
6
Reconsideration and Inhibition, which was denied by cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the
7
the trial court in an Order dated January 13, 2003. the court x x x (only to) raise an objection of this sort malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals after a decision had been rendered’." Here, robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of
Upon review of the case pursuant to this Court’s petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and Inhibition human life but the killing may occur before, during or
ruling in People v. Mateo,8 the CA affirmed with was filed on November 29, 200212 after the trial court after the robbery."16
modification the conviction of petitioner. The rendered its Decision on November 14, 2002.13 In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced
dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads: Accordingly, the trial judge did not commit any proof beyond reasonable doubt that the genuine
In VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed impropriety in denying the motion to inhibit as it came intention of the petitioner and his companions was to
decision is AFFIRMED, with a modification that the after the case had been decided on the merits. rob the gasoline station. Rodelio testified that at
awarded civil indemnity is reduced from P75,000.00 Further, in a motion for inhibition, "[t]he movant around 12:20 in the afternoon of February 12, 2001,
to P50,000,00. Costs de oficio. must x x x prove the ground of bias and prejudice by the petitioner and his companions arrived on board a
9
SO ORDERED. clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge motorcycle at the gas station located at Buliran, San
Issue from participating in a particular trial."14 "Bare Miguel, Bulacan. While the petitioner stayed on the
Before us, the petitioner assails the Decision of the allegations of partiality x x x [is not sufficient] in the motorcycle, his companions entered the cashier’s
CA and raises the following issue: absence of clear and convincing evidence to office. One of them pulled out a fan knife while the
WHETHER X X X THE X X X COURT OF APPEALS overcome the presumption that the judge will other fired his gun at Janet. After divesting the
COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE undertake his noble role to dispense justice according amount of P40,000.00, the man with the gun fired a
15
TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN THE to law and evidence and without fear or favor." fatal shot to the head of Janet. The petitioner’s
APRPECIATION OF FACTS AND APPLYING THE Petitioner’s bare allegations in his motion to inhibit are companions returned to and boarded their
17
LAW IN CONVICTING ACCUSED OF ROBBERY not adequate grounds for the disqualification or motorcycle, and sped away together.
WITH HOMICIDE.10 inhibition of the trial judge. Thus, credence should not
 From the foregoing, it is clear that the overriding
intention of the petitioner and his cohorts was to rob
the gasoline station. The killing was merely incidental,
resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
The petitioner attempts to discredit Rodelio, the
eyewitness presented by the prosecution,
asserting that his testimony is in conflict with the
statements in his affidavit. In his testimony, Rodelio
said that it was one of the men who entered the
cashier’s office who was holding a gun while in his
sworn statement, he alleged that petitioner had a .45
caliber pistol which was poked at him.
Such an argument fails to impress as discrepancies
between sworn statements and testimonies made at
the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the
witness. "Sworn statements/affidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to open court declarations
because the former are often executed when the
affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to
afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the
incident which transpired. Testimonies given during
trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus,
testimonial evidence carries more weight than sworn
18
statements/affidavits."
"Further, to the extent that inconsistencies were in
fact shown, they appear to [this] Court to relate to
details of peripheral significance which do not negate
or dissolve the positive identification [by
eyewitness of the petitioner and his co-accused] as
19
the perpetrators of the crime."
That Rodelio had to be subpoenaed five times and
be arrested in order to testify for the prosecution do
not weaken the case against the petitioner and his
cohorts. During cross-examination, Rodelio explained
that his failure to respond immediately to the
subpoena was because he does not know how to go
to court. Thus:
Q: Why did you fail to appear before this Honorable
Court when you were first summoned to appear
before this court?
by A: Because my employer was sick, sir.
COURT:
Q: Who was that employer?
A: Ping Buencamino, your Honor.
ATTY. KLIATCHKO:
Q: Assuming that he is sick why did you not go to
this Honorable Court?
A: I have no companion. I have no idea.
Q: You have no idea about what?
A: I do not know how to come to this court, sir.20
Even assuming that Rodelio was initially reluctant
to testify and get involved in the ensuing criminal
prosecution against the petitioner and his co-accused,
this "is but normal and does not by itself affect [his]
21
credibility."
The petitioner also avers that he was not the
person depicted in the cartographic sketch. However,
"a cartographic sketch, unlike a photograph, is only
intended to give the law enforcers a general idea of
the likeness of a suspect and is never expected to
exactly resemble his actual facial appearance. Even
the description of the suspect given in
the cartographic sketch may not be unerringly exact."
What is important is the fact that the petitioner was
positively identified by Rodelio as the perpetrator of
the crime even without a moustache and curly hair.
We are not likewise impressed with petitioner’s
assertion that the case against him was weakened
with the failure to present Reinerio, the other
eyewitness to the commission of the crime and one of
the prosecution’s proposed witnesses. As a rule, "the
prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whom to present as witnesses. [It] need not
present each and every witness but only such as may
be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt."23 Here, the testimony of Reinerio would
merely corroborate the statements of Rodelio on the
witness stand, which when considered together with
the other evidence presented by the prosecution,
established beyond reasonable doubt the culpability
of the petitioner and his cohorts. Further, there is
nothing on record which would show that Rodelio was
actuated by ill motive or hate in imputing a serious
offense of robbery with homicide against the
petitioner.
We are also not impressed with the petitioner’s
insistence that his identification in the police lineup
was highly irregular. There is simply no factual basis
to prove that he was the only suspect in the lineup
with handcuffs that prompted Rodelio to point to him
as the suspect. It is worth stressing that the police
investigators are presumed to have performed their
duties regularly and in good faith.24 In the absence of
sufficient proof to overturn this presumption,
petitioner’s positive identification by Rodelio remains
the free from any stain of wrongdoing.1avvphi1
22
Besides, not only did Rodelio identify the petitioner
in the police lineup, he also positively identified
petitioner when he testified in court.
The petitioner’s contention that he did not conspire
with the other accused in the commission of the crime
cannot be given credence. There is no doubt that the
petitioner participated actively in the commission of
the crime. He was positively identified as the driver of
the motorcycle with his two male companions on
board. They arrived together at the gasoline station.
His cohorts then went inside the office to conduct the
robbery while he remained on the motorcycle and
waited for his cohorts. After his two companions stole
the money and killed the cashier, they sped away
from the scene of the crime in each other’s company
using the same motorcycle.
Against the testimony of the prosecution’s
eyewitness, the petitioner could only rely on the
defense of denial. This defense, however, deserves
scant consideration since "denial cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial,
just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who
[testified] on affirmative matters."25
"The concerted manner [in which the petitioner and
his] companions perpetrated the crime showed
beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy.
Where conspiracy is established, it matters not who
among the accused actually shot and killed the victim.
The consistent doctrinal rule is that when a homicide
takes place by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide
whether or not they actually participated in the killing,
unless there is proof that they had endeavored to
26
prevent the killing." There was no evidence adduced
in this case that petitioner attempted to prevent his
companions from shooting the victim. "Thus,
regardless of the acts individually performed by [the
petitioner] and his co-accused, and applying the basic
principle in conspiracy that the ‘act of one is the act of
all,’ [the petitioner] is guilty as a co-conspirator. Being
co-conspirators, the criminal liabilities of the sustained since these are expenditures supported by
[petitioner and his co-accused] are one and the receipts. Also, the courts below correctly held
same."27 petitioner liable to return the amount of P40,000.00
The Proper Penalty which was stolen from the gas station before the
The crime of robbery with homicide is punishable victim was shot and killed.
under Article 294 (as amended by Republic Act No. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
7659) of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01192 that affirmed
28
perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial
Code states that when the law prescribes a penalty Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, in Criminal
consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the crime is Case No. 1632-M-2001 is AFFIRMED with further
neither attended by mitigating nor aggravating MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby ordered to
circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. pay the heirs of the victim moral damages in the
Considering that no modifying circumstance was amount of P50,000.00.
proven to have attended the commission of the crime, SO ORDERED.
the trial court correctly sentenced the petitioner to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.29
The Civil Liabilities
In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each is
granted automatically in the absence of any qualifying
aggravating circumstances.30 These awards are
mandatory without need of allegation and evidence
other than the death of the victim owing to the fact of
the commission of the crime. In this case, the CA
properly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. In addition, we also award the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.31
To be entitled to compensatory damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and the best evidence obtainable to
the injured party. "[R]eceipts should support claims of
actual damages."32 Thus, as correctly held by the trial
court and affirmed by the CA, the amount of
P14,500.00 incurred as funeral expenses can be
PROBATION:
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006
URBANO M. MORENO, Petitioner versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and NORMA L. MEJES, Respondents
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M.
Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated
June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution of the
Comelec First Division dated November 15, 2002
which, in turn, disqualified him from running for the
elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify
Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the
ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment
of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan,
Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition
states no cause of action because he was already
granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of
Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties,
was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that
under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976
(Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation
shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order
of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly
terminated his probation and restored to him all the
civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction,
including the right to vote and be voted for in the July
15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the
Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be
disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted
recommendation. On motion for reconsideration
filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the
First Division was affirmed. According to the
Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the
Government Code provides that those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. Since Moreno was released
from probation on December 20,
disqualification shall commence on this date and end
two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to
Moreno merely suspended the execution of his
sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office.
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the
provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited
by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is a
much later enactment and a special law setting forth
the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local
officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the
disqualification under the Local Government Code
applies only to those who have served their sentence
and not to probationers because the latter do not
serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law
should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which
for applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming
that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as
Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied
pardon of his previous misconduct.
this In its Comment dated November 18, 2005 on behalf
of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec
definitively settled a similar controversy by ruling that
Local conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude
stands even if the candidate was granted probation.
The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code subsists and remains totally
unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment dated March 27,
2006, reiterating his arguments and pointing out
2000, material differences between his case and Dela
Torre v. Comelec which allegedly warrant a
conclusion favorable to him. According to Moreno,
Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving
moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the
petitioner in that case, applied for probation nearly
four (4) years after his conviction and only after
appealing his conviction, such that he could not have
been eligible for probation under the law.
 In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and
was granted probation within the period specified
therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a
result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of
the Local Government Code does not apply to him.
The resolution of the present controversy depends
on the application of the phrase “within two (2) years
after serving sentence” found in Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code, which reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
. . . .
We should mention at this juncture that there is no
need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention, the crime
of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment,
involves moral turpitude falling under the first part of
the above-quoted provision. The question of whether
Arbitrary Detention is a crime involving moral
turpitude was never raised in the petition for
disqualification because the ground relied upon by
Mejes, and which the Comelec used in its assailed
resolutions, is his alleged disqualification from running
for a local elective office within two (2) years from his
discharge from probation after having been convicted
by final judgment for an offense punishable by Four
(4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and
Four (4) Months. Besides, a determination that the
crime of Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude
is not decisive of this case, the crucial issue being
whether Moreno’s sentence was in fact served.
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not
squarely applicable. Our pronouncement therein that
the grant of probation does not affect the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code was based primarily on the finding
that the crime of fencing of which petitioner was
convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance
which does not obtain in this case. At any rate, the
phrase “within two (2) years after serving sentence”
should have been interpreted and understood to apply
both to those who have been sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and
to those who have been sentenced by final judgment
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the
provision means that the phrase modifies both parts
of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
The Court’s declaration on the effect of probation
on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, we
should add, ought to be considered an obiter in view
of the fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled to
probation because he appealed his conviction to the
Regional Trial Court which, however, affirmed his
conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an
appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy
of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which
is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of
an accused who, although already eligible, did not at
once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in
his appeal.
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears
innocuous enough at first glance. The phrase
“service of sentence,” understood in its general and
common sense, means the confinement of a
convicted person in a penal facility for the period
adjudged by the court. This seemingly clear and
unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a
controversy worthy of this Court’s attention because
the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to
have broadened the coverage of the law to include
even those who did not serve a day of their sentence
because they were granted probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should
not have been disqualified because he did not serve
the adjudged sentence having been granted probation
and finally discharged by the trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an
order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of
probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of
the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office
and from the right to follow a profession or calling,
and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order
granting probation the paragraph which required that
petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and
that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly
suspended upon the grant of probation.
 It appears then that during the period of probation,
the probationer is not even disqualified from running
for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the
duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under
probation cannot be equated with service of the
sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the sentence. During the
period of probation, the probationer does not serve
the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is
merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG
have misapprehended the real issue in this case.
They focused on the fact that Moreno’s judgment of
conviction attained finality upon his application for
probation instead of the question of whether his
sentence had been served.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this
case by simply applying the law to the letter. Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally
disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by
final judgment for an offense punishable by
imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2)
years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those
who have not served their sentence by reason of the
grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be
equated with service of sentence, should not likewise
be disqualified from running for a local elective office
because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not
even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order
finally discharging Moreno fortifies his position. Sec.
16 of the Probation Law provides that “[t]he final
discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore
to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of
his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any
fine imposed as to the offense for which probation
was granted.” Thus, when Moreno was finally
discharged upon the court’s finding that he has
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his
case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction were restored
to him, including the right to run for public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code which gives
room for judicial interpretation, our conclusion will
remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local
Government Code afford us no clue as to the
intended meaning of the phrase “service of sentence,”
i.e., whether the legislature also meant to disqualify
those who have been granted probation. The Court’s
function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to
interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the
Local Government Code. Interpretare et
concordare legis legibus est optimus
interpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere
privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity
conferred by the state, which is granted to a
deserving defendant who thereby escapes the
extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the
offense of which he was convicted. Thus, the
Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards
regarding who are qualified for probation. For
instance, it provides that the benefits of probation
shall not be extended to those sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6)
years; convicted of any offense against the security of
the State; those who have previously been convicted
by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one
(1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those
who have been once on probation; and those who are
already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of the Probation Law became applicable.
It is important to note that the disqualification under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers
offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision
does not specifically disqualify probationers from
running for a local elective office. This omission is
significant because it offers a glimpse into the
legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct
class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present
Local Government Code was enacted in 1991, some
seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided.
When the legislature approved the enumerated
disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge
of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of
probation on the disqualification from holding public
office. That it chose not to include probationers within
the purview of the provision is a clear expression of
the legislative will not to disqualify probationers.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the
Probation Law should be construed as an exception
to the Local Government Code. While the Local
Government Code is a later law which sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of local elective
officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation
which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of
statutory construction that a later statute, general in
its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special
statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions
of such earlier statute.
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code in a way that broadens the scope of the
disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec
committed an egregious error which we here correct.
We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for
Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram,
Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent
Punong Barangay at the time of his conviction of the
crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have
obtained a fresh mandate from the people of
Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15,
2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the
poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec where
he said that “it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but
little understood legalisms.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc
dated June 1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First
Division dated November 15, 2002, as well as all
other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Commission on
Elections is directed to proceed in accordance with
this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
(People vs Silvino Chatto March 18, 1983)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-63400 March 18, 1983
EDUARDO TOLENTINO y SAMONTE, petitioner,
vs. HON. AMANTE Q. ALCONCEL, Judge, Circuit
Criminal Court, Sixth Judicial District, Manila,
respondent.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the order
of respondent Judge Amante Q. Alconcel of the
Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, in CCC VI-84[81],
denying petitioner's application for probation under
P.D. 968.
Petitioner was charged before the Circuit Criminal
Court of Manila with violation of Section 4, Article II of
Rep. Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment on
September 4, 1981, petitioner entered a plea of not
guilty.
On October 8, 1981, after the prosecution had
presented part of its evidence, petitioner manifested
his desire to change his plea of not guilty to that of
guilty to the lesser offense of possession of Indian
Hemp [marijuana], under Section 8 of Article II of Rep.
Act No. 6425.
As no objection was interposed by the fiscal, the
court allowed petitioner to withdraw his former plea of
guilty and to enter a plea of guilty to said lessor
offense. Petitioner was thereupon sentenced to
imprisonment of six [6] months and one [1] day to two
[2] years and four [4] months, to pay a fine of
P1,000.00, and to pay the costs, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On October 13, 1981, petitioner applied for
probation. Respondent judge forthwith directed the
probation officer of the City of Manila to conduct a
post sentence investigation on said application and to
file said report thereon within 60 days. After
conducting such investigation, the probation officer
submitted its report, recommending that petitioner be
placed on a two-year probation upon the claim that
the latter was already on his way to reformation and
that a prison cell would turn him into a hardened
criminal.
Such recommendation notwithstanding, the
respondent judge issued the challenged order of
March 9, 1982, denying petitioner's application on the
ground that it will depreciate the seriousness of the
offense committed. 1
On March 23, 1982, petitioner moved for
2
reconsideration of the March 9 order, but the same
was denied. The petitioner's "Ex-Parte Motion for
Hearing on the case for Probation and for Deferment
of Execution of Judgment" 3 was likewise denied.
Hence, the instant recourse. Petitioner's theme is that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
in holding that "probation will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed."
We find these contentions devoid of merit. Section
5 of P.D. 968 provides, to wit:
SEC. 5. Post Sentence Investigation.— No person
shall be placed on probation except upon prior
investigation by the probation officer and a
 determination by the court that the ends of justice
and the best interest of the public as well as that of
the defendant will be served thereby.
It is evident from the foregoing that the potentiality
of the offender to reform is not the sole, much less
the primordial factor, that should be considered in
the grant or denial of an application for probation.
Equal regard to the demands of justice and public
interest must be observed. Thus, Section 8 of P.D.
968 lays down the criteria for the placing of an
offender on probation, as follows:
Sec. 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on
Probation.—In determining whether an offender
may be placed on probation, the court shall
consider all information, relative to the character,
antecedents, environment, mental and physical
condition of the offender and available institutional
and community resources. Probation shall be
denied if the court finds that:
a) ...
b) ...
c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the
offense committed.
"The conclusion of respondent judge that "probation
will depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed" is based principally on the admission by
the petitioner himself, as reflected in the report of the
probation officer, that he [petitioner] was actually
caught in the act of selling marijuana cigarettes.
Petitioner did not deny or dispute the veracity of the
fact that he was caught in flagrante delicto of selling
marijuana cigarettes. He merely attempted to justify
his criminal act by explaining in his motion for
reconsideration that "he did it only to make some
4
money for the family during Christmas. Such
admission renders a hearing on the application for
probation an unnecessary surplusage and an Idle
ceremony.
Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests
5
solely upon the discretion of the court. As aptly
6
noted in U.S. vs. Durken, this discretion is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society
and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.
Proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country has
remained a serious threat to the well-being of the
people. It has necessitated an all-out intensified
campaign on the part of the law-enforcers against
users as well as pushers thereof. If only to emphasize
the gravity of the drug menace, the Batasan
Pambansa has seen fit to increase the penalty for
violation of Section 8, Article II of Rep. Act 6425.
Thus, while under Rep. Act 6425, as amended by
P.D. 44, possession or use of marijuana was
punishable by imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day to
2 years and 4 months and a fine ranging from
P600.00 to P6,000.00-the penalty imposed upon
petitioner herein-possession and use thereof is now
punishable by imprisonment ranging from 6 years and
1 day to 12 years and fine ranging from P6,000.00 to
7
P12,000.00 under B.P. Blg. 179.
The observation of the Solicitor General on this
increase of penalty is apropos:
The implication is clear. The penalties were
increased to take it out of the range of
probationable offenses. Thus, the State has spoken
and considers that this is one case where probation
will depreciate the offense committed, and will not
serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the
community, particularly, the innocent and gullible
young. 8
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby
dismissed. Respondent judge is hereby directed to
effect execution of judgment in CCC No. VI-84 [81]
without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61958 April 28, 1983
PLUTARCO YUSI and DAISY YUSI, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE LETICIA P.
MORALES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NUEVA ECIJA, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
May persons who apply for the benefits of the
Probation Law withdraw their application during the
period for filing an appeal and ask that their appeal
from the judgment of conviction be given due course?
The petitioners are spouses who were convicted for
estafa in Criminal Case No. 2260 in a decision of the
respondent court dated May 20, 1982. The court
sentenced the petitioners "... to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of
arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR and SIX
(6) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum, to
pay P5,400.00 to Naty V. Pagdanganan for the value
of the piano, and to pay the costs of the suit."
On June 22, 1982, when the decision dated May
20, 1982 was promulgated, the petitioners appeared
in court without their counsel of record. The
respondent court appointed a certain Cesar Villar who
happened to be in court to act as petitioners' counsel
de oficio during the promulgation. On that occasion,
the petitioners through their counsel de oficio
manifested that "... they are going to avail of the
benefits of the Probation Law and prayed that they be
released under the same bond." (Annex "B", Reno p.
14) The court immediately granted the petitioners'
prayer "... with a condition that the accused will submit
within this day a certification from the bonding
company that it is willing to accommodate the
accused under the same bond for a period of five (5)
days beginning today."
On June 23, 1982, the petitioners filed with the
respondent court an application for probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1257 (Annex "C", Rollo, P.
15).
Acting on the petitioners' application for probation,
the respondent court on the same day, June 23,
1982, issued an Order directing the probation officer
of Cabanatuan City to conduct an investigation on the
application for probation and to submit his report on
the matter within sixty (60) days from receipt in
accordance with Sections 5 and 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 968 as amended. (Annex "A", Rollo, P.
18).
On June 28, 1982, or seven (7) days from the date
of promulgation of the decision and within the
reglementary period to file an appeal, the petitioners
filed with the respondent court their Notice of Appeal
(Annex "E ", Rollo, p. 19).
On July 6, 1982, the respondent court issued an
Order denying the notice of appeal on the ground that
the petitioners waived their right to appeal the
decision when they filed their application for probation
(Annex " F ", Rollo, p. 20).
On July 16, 1982, Atty. Antero Torres filed with the
court an appearance as counsel in collaboration with
the petitioners' counsel of record, and on behalf of the
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
July 6, 1982 order. On July 24, 1982, the petitioners
filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.
(Annexes "G" and "H", Rollo, pp. 21-24).
On August 19, 1982, the respondent court issued
an order denying both the motion for reconsideration
and the supplemental motion for reconsideration
(Annex "J", Rollo, p. 28).
Hence, this petition was filed to set aside the above
orders.
In a resolution dated October 11, 1982, we
considered the People of the Philippines impleaded
and required the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition.
Upon the filing of the Solicitor General's comments,
which we treated internally as an anwer, and
dispensing with the filing of briefs or memoranda, we
resolved to declare the case submitted for decision.
The only issue is whether or not the petitioners whose
application for probation was granted after conviction
of the crime of estafa may still withdraw such
application for probation and within the reglementary
period appeal the judgment of conviction.
In not giving due course to the petitioners' notice of
appeal the respondent court relied on paragraph 3,
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968
(ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORE, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES) as amended which considers
an application for probation of a convicted accused to
be a waiver of his right to appeal or an automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal.
And now, the question before us is whether or not
such a waiver or withdrawal is irrevocable.
We rule that it is not. We find the strict and
unyielding application of the "waiver rule" under the
Probation Law unwarranted.
Under the factual circumstances of the instant case,
the respondent court in granting the application for
probation and denying the prayer to withdraw, failed
to take into account the fact that the petitioners'
counsel of record was not present when the
petitioners applied for probation. True, they were
represented by a counsel de oficio appointed by the
court on the spot but the counsel de oficio was not
fully acquainted with their case. He could not have
considered fully the strength of a possible appeal
when he advised them about the effects of the
application for probation. More so when we consider
the thin line that divides a criminal case for estafa and
a civil case for collection of a debt.
And this fact surfaced when, on June 28, 1982 after
the petitioner discussed their case with a brother-in-
law, Judge Eladio C. Sequi of the Municipal Court of
Carranglaan, Nueva Ecija, the petitioners filed their
notice of appeal upon the Judge's advice. It must be
noted that the notice of appeal was filed just seven (7)
days after the promulgation of the decision.
Considering that the application for probation is an
admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the
crime which led to the judgment of conviction and that
the application for probation is considered a waiver
upon his part to file an appeal, it is in the best
interests of justice that the court should take the
necessary steps to insure that the accused has been
fully apprised of the full import of his application
before the court acts on it.
In the case at bar, the respondent court hastily
granted the manifestation and application for
probation on June 22, 1982, the same day that the
decision was promulgated and approved the formal
application the following day without taking steps to
be informed that the petitioners were aware of the full
import of their application.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 968 which
established the Probation System was envisioned
among other things, "to provide an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender which might be less
probable if he were to serve a prison sentence"
(Section 2(b), Presidential Decree No. 968).
Under the facts of this case, the petitioners cannot
be considered "penitent offenders." They appeared to
have improvidently filed their application for probation
and should be allowed to withdraw it and to appeal
the decision.
We agree with the Solicitor General when he
observes that:
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no real reformation of a wrongdoer
which is the reason for probation unless there is a
willingness on his part to right the wrong he has
committed. Probation is envisioned for the accused.
He may or may not avail of its benefits. Although
probation is founded on consent, waiver and/or
contract, public policy requires that interpretational
objectives set forth in Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 968 be given full effect. Probation
cannot therefore be forced or compelled on a
convict. To permit this would only serve to invite its
violation. Instead, a greater emphasis should be
exerted in securing the probationer's effective
participation in society's major social institution.
Since 'probation is an island of technicalities
surrounded by sea of discretion' (Carl H. Imlay &
Charles R. Galsheen, 'See What Condition Your
Condition Are In,' Federal Probation, XXXV (June
1971)', it should, therefore, be liberally construed in
favor of the accused (herein petitioners). Having
opted to discontinue with the application for
probation in its initial stages and prior to the
submission of a post sentence investigation report
and within the period interposed an appeal from the
adverse decision, petitioners should be allowed to
withdraw their application for probation and pursue
their right to appeal therefrom.
The underlying philosophy of probation is indeed
one of liberality towards the accused. It is not served
by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions. Probation is a major step taken by our
Government towards the deterrence and minimizing
of crime and the humanization of criminal justice. In
fine with the public policy behind probation, the right
of appeal should not be irrevocably lost from the
moment a convicted accused files an application for
probation. Appeal and probation spring from the same
policy considerations of justice, humanity, and
compassion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated
June 23, 1982, July 6, 1982 and August 19, 1982 of
the respondent court are nullified and set aside. The
respondent court is directed to give due course to the
petitioners' notice of appeal.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-59298 April 30, 1984
FLORENTINA L. BACLAYON, petitioner,
vs. HON. PACITO G. MUTIA, as Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
TEEHANKEE,
This is a petition to review by certiorari the order
dated December 21, 1981 of respondent Pacito G.
Mutia, 1 then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court
(now Municipal Trial Court) of Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental, which imposed as a condition in granting
probation to petitioner Florentina L. Baclayon that she
refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the
crime of Serious Oral Defamation by the then
Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, then
presided by respondent Pacito G. Mutia for having
quarrelled with and uttered insulting and defamatory
words against Remedios Estillore, principal of the
Plaridel Central School. Her conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate
Court) and the appellate court, taking into account the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of her rank and
age and the fact that the crime was committed in the
office of the complainant in the public school building
of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties during office hours, increased the penalty
imposed by respondent judge and sentenced
petitioner to one year, 8 months, 21 days of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional in its minimum period.
The sentence was promulgated on September 9,
1981. On the same date petitioner applied for
probation with respondent judge who referred the
application to a Probation Officer. The Post-Sentence
Investigation Report favorably recommended the
granting of petitioner's probation for a period of three
(3) years.
On December 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued
an order granting petitioner's probation, but modified
the Probation Officer's recommendation by increasing
the period of probation to five (5) years and by
imposing the following conditions: têñ.£îhqwâ£
(a) To present herself to the jprobation officer
designated to undertake her supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within
seventy- two hours from receipt of said order;
(b) To report to the Probation Office or any
specified place designated by the Probation Officer
at least once a month in person;
(c) To reside at the premise approved by the
Probation Officer and not change her residence
without prior written approval;
(d) To permit the Probation Officer to visit her
house and place of work or an authorized Social
Worker;
(e) To refrain from drinking intoxicating liquor to
excess;
(f) To pay the cost;
(g) To satisfy any other condition related to the
rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly
restrictive of her liberty or incompatible with her
freedom of conscience; and
(h) To refrain from continuing her teaching
profession.
Petitioner's plea for deletion of the last condition
was rejected by respondent judge. Hence, the petition
at bar alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
imposition of the said condition that petitioner should
"refrain from continuing her teaching profession." The
petitioner submits that said condition is not only
detrimental and prejudicial to her rights but is also not
in accordance with the purposes, objectives and
benefits of the probation law and prays that the said
condition be deleted from the order granting her
probation. On petitioner's motion, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
judge from enforcing the said questioned condition.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a
probationer may be classified into general
mandatory and special or discretionary.
mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of
the Probation Law, require that the probationer should
(a) present himself to the probation officer designated
to undertake his supervision at such place as may be
specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of
said order, and (b) report to the probation officer at
least once a month at such time and place as
specified by said officer. Special or discretionary
conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the
same Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the
courts may additionally impose on the probationer
towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of
prison. The enumeration, however, is not inclusive.
2
Probation statutes are liberal in character
enable courts to designate practically any term it
chooses as long as the probationer's constitutional
3
rights are not jeopardized. There are innumerable
conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation
of the probationer when viewed in their specific
individual context. It should, however, be borne in
mind that the special or discretionary conditions of
probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to
help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and
self-respecting individual Conditions should be
interpreted with flexibility in their application and each
case should be judged on its own merits — on the
basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the
4
probationer. The very liberality of the probation
should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate
instead unrealistic terms.
Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is the only
profession she knows and as such she possesses
special skills and qualifications. Thus, she was
or designated as District Guidance Coordinator and
The always designated as District-in-Charge whenever the
District Supervisor is out of town. She is usually
selected to represent her district in seminars,
meetings and conferences. She also excelled in her
study of Child Study and Development. It also
appears that she is an outstanding member of the
Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council, having served
as Physical Education & Girl Scout Field Advisor of
the District, Adviser of the District Girl Scout Leaders
Association, Adviser of the Distinct Federated Girl
Scout Barangay Troop Committee, acts as resource
person in District and Division Level Girl Scout
encampments and re-elected Board Member of the
Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council. To order the
and petitioner to refrain from teaching would deprive the
students and the school in general the benefits that
may be derived from her training and expertise. While
it is true that probation is a mere privilege and its
grant rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this
discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit
5
of the accused. Equal regard to the demands of
 6
justice and public interest must be observed. In this
case, teaching has been the lifetime and only calling
and profession of petitioner. The law requires that she
devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation
during probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in
teaching would practically prevent her from complying
with the terms of the probation.
Respondents contend that petitioner's final
conviction carries with it the accessory penalties in
addition to the principal penalty of imprisonment; and
since petitioner was sentenced to arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, she must likewise suffer the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office
and from the right to follow a profession or calling,
and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage. This cannot apply to petitioner,
however, because she was granted probation. The
imposition of her sentence of imprisonment was
thereby suspended and necessarily, the imposition of
the accessory penalties was likewise thereby
suspended.
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a
"sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the
7
imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but
is rather an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a
conditional order placing the convicted defendant
under the supervision of the court for his reformation,
to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the
conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment of sentence if the conditions are
8
violated.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court grants the
petition and hereby orders that paragraph (h) of the
questioned order granting probation which requires
that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession be deleted. The temporary
restraining order is hereby made permanent. No
costs.
(People vs Cabatingan July 19, 1984)
INTERMEDIATE SENTENCE LAW:
EN BANC
G.R. No. 166617
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
Versus AGUSTIN ABELLERA, Respondent
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition for review is the decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00097 affirming respondent Agustin Abellera y
Camana’s conviction by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 275 of Las Piñas City, for statutory
rape, two counts of simple rape and attempted rape
committed against his minor daughters AAA and BBB.
The antecedent facts follow.
In 1986, then seven-year-old AAA was at home
attending to the laundry when respondent arrived
drunk. When respondent tried to grab her, she
pushed him away but he was too strong for her.
Respondent undressed her, removed her underwear
and forced himself on her. She felt excruciating pain.
Thereafter, respondent warned her not to tell anybody
what happened, otherwise he would kill her.
On August 4, 1992, AAA, then already 14 years old,
was with her youngest sister when respondent
instructed her to go home immediately. The moment
she arrived, respondent began undressing her.
Thereafter, he inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina.
Pointing a knife at the latter’s neck, respondent
warned her not to tell anyone about the incident.
In 1996, AAA’s younger sister, BBB, went through
the same ordeal in respondent’s hands. On April 2,
1996, BBB was washing the dishes at home when
respondent arrived drunk and ordered her to undress.
Thereafter, he took off his clothes and dragged her
inside a room. She cried and pleaded with her father
to stop but he warned her not to refuse him otherwise
he would kill her, her mother and her siblings.
Respondent then positioned himself on top of her,
sucked her breasts, inserted his fingers, then his
penis, into her. After the dastardly act, he told her to
take a bath and go to sleep.
On October 7, 1996, respondent sent BBB’s brother
on an errand. After the boy left, he undressed her and
forced her to lie down. She begged respondent not to
repeat what he had done to her in the past but the
latter took no heed. Instead, he again threatened to
kill her if she refused. She kicked respondent in the
groin which forced him to stand up in pain.
On the same day, BBB reported the incident to
barangay officials. Respondent was arrested and
brought to the Las Piñas police station where he was
detained. Subsequently, the following Informations
were filed against him:
Criminal Case No. 97-0007 for statutory rape:
Sometime in 1986, in the Municipality of Las Piñas
and within the jurisdiction of the Court, the
[respondent], being the father of [AAA], then a
seven (7) year old minor, through moral
ascendancy and influence and by means of force
and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
[had] carnal knowledge with [AAA] against her will
and consent.
Criminal Case No. 97-0007-A for Violation of RA
7610 in relation to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC):
On or about the 4th day of August 1992 in the
[M]unicipality of Las Piñas and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the [respondent], being the
father of [AAA], then a fourteen (14) year old minor,
through moral ascendancy and influence and by
means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA]
against her will and consent.
Criminal Case No. 96-0460 for rape:
On or before the 2nd day of April 1996, in the
Municipality of Las Piñas and within the jurisdiction
of this Court, the [respondent], being the father of
[BBB], a 14 year-old minor, through moral
ascendancy and influence and by means of force
and intimidation, willfully and unlawfully, and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with said minor
against her will and consent.
Criminal Case No. 96-0461 for attempted rape:
On or about the 7th day of October 1996, in the
Municipality of Las Piñas and within the jurisdiction
of this court, the [respondent], being the father of 14
year-old [BBB] through moral ascendancy and
influence, and by means of force and intimidation
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the
commission of rape directly by overt acts by pulling
[BBB] inside the bedroom of their house, forcibly
removing her panty, lying her down and placing
himself on top of her[,] removing his shorts with the
manifest intent of having carnal knowledge with her
against her will but the accused did not perform all
the acts of execution which should have produced
the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, because the complainant
vigorously resisted and she was able to run away.
Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
Aside from AAA’s and BBB’s testimonies in court,
the prosecution presented their birth certificates
proving their relationship to respondent and
establishing their ages during the rape incidents.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. In
Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos. 97-0007, 97-0007-A and
96-0460, he insisted it was impossible for him to
commit the crimes since his wife was always at home.
In Crim. Case No. 96-0461, he claimed that, on
October 7, 1996, he was in his neighbor’s house
fixing a karaoke appliance. He later on “joined a
drinking spree” there. According to respondent, his
daughters filed the cases only because they were
angry at him for not sending them to school.
Respondent’s neighbor, Allan Alvero, corroborated
respondent’s testimony saying he was in his house on
October 7, 1996.
AAA’s and BBB’s mother, youngest sister and aunt
also testified in respondent’s defense. According to
them, the whole family attended AAA’s graduation on
April 2, 1996 and, on October 7, 1996, BBB was not
home but studying in Cabanatuan City.
After trial, the court a quo found respondent guilty
of the charges. The dispositive portion of its decision
read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered finding the [respondent]
AGUSTIN ABELLERA Y CAMANA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in the Informations as follows:
a. of Rape in Criminal Case No. 96-0460 committed
against his daughter [BBB] in 1996 for which he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659;
b. of Statutory Rape in Criminal Case No. 97-0007
committed against his daughter [AAA] in 1986 for
which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
[Reclusion Perpetua];
c. of Rape in Criminal Case No. 97-0007-A
committed against his daughter [AAA in 1992] for
which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
[Reclusion Perpetua]; and;
d. of Attempted Rape in Criminal Case No. 96-0461
committed against his daughter [BBB] in 1996 for
which he is sentenced to a prision term of fifteen
(15) years of Reclusion Temporal; and to pay [AAA]
and [BBB] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and costs.
This case was first brought to us on automatic
review. However, following People v. Mateo, we
transferred it to the CA. There, respondent assigned
the following errors to the trial court: (1) giving full
credence to the testimonies of the complainants; (2)
rejecting his testimony, his wife’s and youngest
daughter’s and (3) convicting him.
In a decision dated January 21, 2005, the CA
affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision
convicting respondent. The CA ruled:
The trial court correctly imposed upon [respondent]
the penalty corresponding to each case, save in
Crim. Case No. 96-0461 where [respondent] was
charged with attempted rape of then [14-year old
BBB], i.e., by use of force and intimidation. For said
crime, the trial court sentenced him to a prison term
of fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal.
Under paragraph 1, Article 335, of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of rape is
reclusion perpetua. According to Article 57… the
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony. Following the graduated scale in
Article 71…the penalty imposable upon
[respondent] in the attempted rape is prision mayor.
Absent any modifying circumstance, the maximum
term of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of prision mayor or from 8
years and 1 day to 10 years; while the minimum
term is one degree lower than prision mayor, i.e.,
prision correccional, from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years.
Moreover, the impositions by the trial court of the
civil liabilities [need] clarification and modification.
In line with the current jurisprudence, civil indemnity
is imposed without need of proof other than the fact
of the commission of the offense. Moral damages
should be awarded taking into account that [AAA]
and [BBB] were minors at the time of rape, and
considering too[,] the immeasurable havoc on their
female psyche as a result of the abominable
crimes.
For the rapes committed against [AAA] in Crim.
Case Nos. 97-0007 and 97-0007-A, [respondent]
shall be held to pay her P75,000.00 and
P50,000.00, respectively, as civil indemnity and
another P50,000.00 as moral damages in each
case, or the total amount of P225,000.00. For the
simple rape committed against [BBB] in Crim. Case
96-0460, the sum of P50,000.00 each as civil
indemnity and as moral damages; and for the
attempted rape against her in Crim. Case No. 96-
0461, the amount of P25,000.00 representing the
civil indemnity and the like sum as moral damages
--- are imposed [respectively] upon [respondent].
WHEREFORE, the appealed Joint Decision of
conviction is AFFIRMED, finding [respondent]
AGUSTIN ABELLERA y CAMANA guilty of rape as
separately charged in the four (4) Informations.
However, in Crim. Case No. 96-0461, the penalty is
MODIFIED in that he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of [t]wo (2) [y]ears and [f]our
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
[e]ight (8) [y]ears and [o]ne day of prision mayor, as
maximum. The civil liabilities of [respondent] are…
MODIFIED, to the extent that he is hereby ordered
to pay the rape victims, as follows:
a) for the statutory rape against [AAA] in Crim.
Case No. 97-0007, the sum of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
b) for the simple rape against [AAA] in Crim. Case
No. 97-0007-A, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
c) for the attempted rape against [BBB] in Crim.
Case No. 96-0461, the sum of P25,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent now assails the CA decision.
After a careful study of this case, we affirm
respondent’s conviction for statutory rape, two counts
of simple rape and attempted rape.
Respondent’s guilt was clear beyond the shadow of
a doubt.
In Crim. Case No. 97-0007 (statutory rape), AAA
testified:
q: What happened during that year 1986 if you
remember?
a: It was nighttime[.] I do not remember the [exact]
time, our father arrived and he was drunk.
q: Where were you then?
a: I was at our house, sir.
q: What happened when your father arrived on that
particular time?
a: I was fixing our laundry when he grabbed me.
q: What did you do when your father grabbed you
while fixing your clothes?
a: I resisted, sir.
q: What did your father do when you resisted?
a: He forced me to undress including my panty, sir.
q: Did he succeed in undressing you?
a: Yes, sir.
q: What happened after your father was able to
remove your dress and panty?
a: He forcibly entered his penis, sir.
In Crim. Case No. 97-0007-A (simple rape), AAA
stated:
q: Madam Witness, on the night of August 4, 1992,
do you remember where were you then?
a: Yes, sir.
xxx
q: What were you doing on that particular date and
time?
a: I just arrived from selling balut, sir.
q: Madam Witness, while you were inside your
house during that particular date and time, do you
remember what happened next, if any?
 a: Yes, sir.
xxx
q: What happened next?
a: When we reached the house[,] I was shocked
because he suddenly entered my room and
undressed me.
q: What did you do when your father undressed
you?
a: I told him not to do what he was thinking.
q: What did your father do when you [told] him not
to do what he intended to do?
a: He told me, “I will kill you if you will not obey me.”
q: What did you do when your father said [he will kill
you]?
a: I was crying and begging. (Witness started to
cry).
xxx
q: What did your father do after that?
a: [H]e removed my panty and he forcibly inserted
his penis [into] my private parts.
q: Was he able to insert his penis to your private
parts?
a: Yes, sir.
q: What did you do when your father inserted his
penis to your vagina?
a: I tried to resist and prevent him at the same
[time,] I was crying and begging him not to do [it].
q: What else happened after you resisted?
a: He continued and forced his penis [into] my
vagina until he succeeded.
In Crim. Case No. 96-0460 (simple rape), BBB
narrated:
q: Madam Witness, at about 8 o’clock in the
evening of April 2, 1996, do you remember where
were you then? xxx
a: On April 2[,] my father arrived drunk.
q: What happened next after your father arrived
drunk?
a: He asked me to undress myself, sir.
xxx
q: After you undressed yourself what did your father
do?
a: He also undressed himself.
xxx
q: Madam Witness, what did your father do when
removed his clothes?
a: He brought me inside the room, sir.
xxx
q: What did you do when your father pulled you or
drag you?
a: I was begging him not to do what he [intended] to
do.
xxx
q: When you say he proceeded to [do] his intention,
what do you mean by that?
a: He put his body on top of me.
q: What happened when your father placed his
body on top of you?
a: He sucked my breast, sir.
q: What else did your father do to you?
a: He inserted his finger in my private parts, sir.
q: What happened next when your father inserted
his finger into your organ?
a: He likewise inserted his penis, sir.
In Crim. Case No. 96-0461 (attempted rape), BBB
said:
q: Madam Witness, on October 7, 1996, at about 7
o’ clock in the evening, do you remember where
were you then?
a: I was at home, sir.
q: What were you doing inside your house?
a: I was fixing our clothes.
q: When you were fixing your clothes, do you
remember if anything unusual…happened?
a: Yes, sir.
xxx
q:…[W]here there other persons in the household?
a: Only my brother but he was sent for an errand.
xxx
q: After your father asked your brother to leave the
house, do you remember what happened next?
a: He forcibly removed my panty, sir.
q: What did you do when your father removed your
panty?
a: He laid me down, sir.
xxx
q: After your father pulled you down, what
happened next?
a: He [undressed] himself, sir.
q: How about you[,] what were you doing when your
father was undressing himself?
a: I was begging to him not to repeat what he did to
me in the past, sir.
xxx
q: What did your father tell you, if any?
a: “If you do not follow, I will kill you.”
q: What did you do when your father [told you]
those words?
a: Because I did not want the same thing to happen
to me again[,] I kicked him.
xxx
q: What did he do when you kicked him?
a: He stood up, sir.
 AAA’s and BBB’s testimonies in the trial court were
telling. There is no question respondent indeed
committed the crimes charged. His contention that the
lower courts erred in giving full credence to his
daughters’ testimonies deserves no merit.
Testimonies of victims of tender age are credible,
more so if they are without any motive to falsely testify
against their offender. Their revelations that they were
raped, coupled with their willingness to undergo public
trial where they could be compelled to describe the
details of the assault on their dignity by their own
father, cannot be easily dismissed as concoctions. It
would be the height of moral and psychological
depravity if they were to fabricate sordid tales of
sexual defloration (which could put him behind bars
for the rest of his life) if they were not true.
Respondent’s alibi that he could not have
committed the crimes in the presence of his wife was
utterly lame. It was disproven by the categorical and
positive identification by his daughters that he was
their rapist. Besides, there is no rule that rape can
only be committed in seclusion.
Respondent’s contention that he was allegedly in
his neighbor’s house during the October 7, 1996 rape
incident was likewise untenable. For this defense of
alibi to prosper, respondent should have proven that
he was in some place where it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis during
the commission of the crimes. In this case, even
assuming that respondent was in his neighbor’s
place, he was nevertheless still near his house and
his daughters.
Similarly, not even the testimonies of respondent’s
wife and youngest daughter sufficed to negate the
overwhelming evidence pointing to respondent as the
sole perpetrator of the crimes.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (1)
by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and (3)
when the woman is under 12 years of age. The third
instance is “statutory rape” or carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old.
On the applicable penalties, we affirm the
imposition of reclusion perpetua in Crim. Case Nos.
97-0007 and 97-0007-A (for simple rape). In Crim.
Case No. 96-0460, however, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead
be imposed pursuant to RA 9346 which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty.
In Crim. Case No. 96-0461, we agree with the CA
that the proper penalty for attempted rape is the
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony.
In the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the RPC,
the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion
temporal. However, with the abolition of the death
penalty by RA 9346, the highest remaining penalty is
reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the penalty lower
by two degrees than reclusion perpetua is prision
mayor, from which the maximum penalty for
attempted rape shall now be taken. As the CA
correctly imposed, “absent any modifying
circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
prision mayor or from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years;
while the minimum term is one degree lower than
prision mayor, i.e., prision correccional, from 6
months and 1 day to 6 years.”
On damages, we see no error in the CA’s award of
civil indemnity and moral damages in Crim. Case
Nos. 97-0007 and 97-0007-A. However, in Crim.
Case No. 96-0460, since the death penalty was
originally imposed on respondent, the award of civil
indemnity should be increased to P75,000 and moral
damages to P75,000. Exemplary damages of
P30,000 must also be awarded in these cases to
deter others with perverse tendencies from sexually
abusing young girls of their own flesh and blood.
Moreover, in the light of recent jurisprudence, the
award of civil indemnity in Crim. Case No. 96-0461
should be increased to P30,000. Exemplary damages
of P10,000 are likewise in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00097 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Court finds
respondent Agustin Abellera y Camana GUILTY of:
(1)statutory rape in Crim. Case No. 97-0007 for
which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA
P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral
damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages;
(2)simple rape in Crim. Case No. 97-0007-A for
which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA
P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral
damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages;
(3)simple rape in Crim. Case No. 96-0460 for which
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered to
pay BBB P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as
moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages;
 (4)attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 96-0461 for
which he is sentenced to suffer the minimum
penalty of 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor
as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay BBB
P30,000 as civil indemnity, P25,000 as moral
damages and P10,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168728
SAMUEL BARREDO, Petitioner, -v e r s u s-
HON. VICENTE VINARAO, respondent
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.Petitioner Samuel Barredo y Golani
prays for his release from the maximum security
compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa
City on the ground that he has already served the
sentence imposed on him in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
92-38559 and Q-92-38560.
Criminal Case No. Q-92-38559 was for carnapping
while Criminal Case No. Q-92-38560 was for illegal
possession of firearms. Both cases were filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
103.
The cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court
rendered a joint decision finding petitioner guilty of
both charges. Relevant parts of the dispositive portion
read:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in
Q-92-38559 finding Samuel Barredo, xxx GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt xxx of the crime of
Carnapping aggravated and qualified by the
frustrated killing of Ciriaco Rosales and [he is]
hereby sentenced to undergo an imprisonment term
of THIRTY (30) YEARS;
xxxxxxxxx
In Q-92-38560, Samuel Barredo is hereby found
GUILTY as principal beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of violation of P.D. 1866 and he is hereby
sentenced to an imprisonment term of EIGHTEEN
(18) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion
Temporal.
xxxxxxxxx
SO ORDERED.
No appeal was made, hence, the decision became
final and executory.
Petitioner was committed to the custody of the
Quezon City Jail (as detention prisoner) on March 15,
1993. After conviction, he was transferred to and
confined at the maximum security compound of the
New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on July 23, 1994
where he is now still detained.
According to petitioner, as of August 2, 2004, he
already served a total of 18 years. He claims that, on
October 9, 2001, the Board of Pardons and Parole
passed a resolution recommending the commutation
of his sentence to a period of from 15 to 20 years. He
further points out that, based on the Bureau of
Corrections revised computation table for determining
the time to be credited prisoners for good conduct
while serving sentence, he should only serve 14
years, 9 months and 18 days. Thus, this petition.
Is petitioner entitled to the writ of habeas corpus?
No.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILL NOT ISSUE IF
DETENTION IS BY VIRTUE OF VALID JUDGMENT
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of
illegal confinement, detention or deprivation of liberty.
It was devised as a speedy and effective remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint. More
specifically, it is a remedy to obtain immediate relief
for those who may have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver
them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of
inquiry intended to test the circumstances under
which a person is detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in
custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a
valid judgment. However, the writ may be allowed as
a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings
leading to the conviction were attended by any of the
following exceptional circumstances:
(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person;
(2)the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence or
(3)the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding
the sentence as to such excess
The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed. Thus, Section 4, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
 and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was detained pursuant to a final
judgment of the Quezon City RTC convicting him for
the crimes of carnapping and illegal possession of
firearms. He is therefore not entitled to the writ of
habeas corpus.
SENTENCE IS VOID INSOFAR AS IT FAILED TO
IMPOSE AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
however, the trial court erred in imposing a straight
penalty of imprisonment for 30 years in the
carnapping case. The sentence imposed by the trial
court deprived petitioner of the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, it was void
insofar as it failed to impose an indeterminate
sentence.
Since the crime was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, the
imposable penalty under the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972 was imprisonment for not less than 17 years
and 4 months and not more than 30 years.
Furthermore, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the court should have imposed an indeterminate
sentence with a maximum term not exceeding the
maximum fixed by the special penal law and a
minimum term not less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same law. Therefore, the proper
imposable penalty is imprisonment not for 30 years
but for an indeterminate sentence of 17 years and 4
months as minimum to 30 years as maximum.
REDUCTION OF PENALTY UNDER AMENDATORY
LAW SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
Petitioner is likewise entitled to a reduction of the
penalty imposed upon him in the illegal possession of
firearms case in view of the passage of RA 8294. The
law reduced the penalty for simple illegal possession
of firearms to prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than P15,000. Being
favorable to petitioner, RA 8294 should be applied
retroactively to benefit him. Further applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper imposable
penalty is imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1
day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.
PETITIONER HAS NOT YET SERVED THE
PENALTIES IMPOSED ON HIM
Petitioner has to serve the penalties imposed on
him successively in the order of their severity. Hence,
he has to first serve the more severe penalty, i.e., that
imposed in the carnapping case: imprisonment for 17
years and 4 months as minimum to 30 years as
maximum. Only after he has served this will he
commence serving the less severe penalty imposed
in the illegal possession of firearms case:
imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as
minimum to 6 years as maximum.
Per the certification issued by the Bureau of
Corrections, as of April 3, 2007, petitioner has served
a total of 18 years, 4 months and 26 days, inclusive of
his good conduct time allowance and preventive
imprisonment. Thus, while he has already served the
minimum penalty in the carnapping case, he has not
yet served the minimum penalty in the illegal
possession of firearms case. Consequently, petitioner
is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Neither is he eligible for parole because only
prisoners who have served the minimum penalty
imposed on them may be released on parole on such
terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the
Board of Pardons and Parole.
Petitioners claim that the Board of Pardons and
Parole passed a resolution recommending the
commutation of his sentence does not justify the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Commutation
of sentence is a prerogative of the Chief Executive.
Hence, even if petitioners claim were true, the
recommendation of the Bureau of Pardons and Parole
was just that, a mere recommendation. Until and
unless approved by the President, there is no
commutation to speak of.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173797 August 31, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
-versus- EMMANUEL ROCHA alias Nopoy and
RUEL RAMOS alias Aweng, Accused- Appellants
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 12 May 1994, an Information was filed against
herein accused-appellants Emmanuel Rocha y Yeban
alias Nopoy (Rocha) and Ruel Ramos y Alcober alias
Aweng (Ramos), along with Romeo Trumpeta y
Aguaviva (Trumpeta), in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215.Another accused,
Eustaquio Cenita y Omas-As (Cenita), was impleaded
in the Amended Information.The Amended
Information alleged a crime committed as follows:
th
That on or about the 28 day of September, 1993,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with several
others, whose true identities, whereabouts and
personal circumstances have not as yet been
ascertained and mutually helping one another, all
armed with high power (sic) guns, with intent to
gain and by means of violence and intimidation
against person (sic), did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) represented by ALEX
BABASA, JR. in the following manner, to wit: on the
date and place aforementioned, while Alex Babasa,
Jr. was placing the money contained in two (2)
duffle bags inside the vault of the armored van, with
the two (2) security guards on the watch, the said
accused pursuant to their conspiracy and with
intent to kill, opened fire at them hitting S/G
ROGER TARROQUIN and S/G TITO HOMERES,
thereby inflicting upon them serious and mortal
wounds which were the immediate cause of their
death and thereafter, accused took, robbed and
carried away the said two (2) duffle bags containing
P1.5 million pesos, Philippine Currency, and the 12
gauge shotgun with SN 1048245 worth P11,000.00
issued to S/G Roger Tarroquin and the cal. 38
revolver with SN 23238 worth P6,500.00 issued to
S/G Tito Henares and owned by Eaglestar Security
Services, Incorporated to the damage and prejudice
of the offended parties in the amount
aforementioned and to the heirs of the said victims.
On 6 February 1996, the RTC promulgated its
Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49474 finding
Trumpeta, Cenita and herein accused-appellants
Rocha and Ramos guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, and imposing upon them the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.The RTC disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused ROMEO TRUMPETA
y AGUAVIVA, EMMANUEL RIOCHA y YEBAN,
RUEL RAMOS y ALCOBER and EUSTAQUIO
CENITA y OMAS-AS, are found GUILTY of the
crime of Robbery With Homicide as charged, the
prosecution having proven their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.In accordance with Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 1 thereof, all of
the above-named accused are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory penalties attendant thereto. They could
have been sentenced to death but for the fact that
the death penalty was suspended, then the crime
was committed.
In addition, all the accused are jointly and severally
ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Roger
Tarroquin and Tito Henares P50,000.00 each,
respectively.Further, all the accused are jointly and
severally ordered to indemnify the Bank of the
Philippine Islands the sum of P1,600,000.With
costs against the accused.
Trumpeta, Cenita and accused-appellants appealed
to this Court. On 13 September 1999, however,
Trumpeta filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,
which was granted by this Court on 11 October 1999.
On 29 May 2001, Cenita filed his own Urgent Motion
to Withdraw Appeal, which was granted by this Court
on 15 August 2001.
On 25 August 2004, pursuant to the Decision of this
Court in People v. Mateo, we transferred the case to
the Court of Appeals.
On 31 March 2006, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
01765 affirming with clarification the Decision of the
RTC, thus:
Wherefore, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED
with CLARIFICATION. Appellants Emmanuel
Rocha @ Nopoy and Ruel Ramos @ Aweng are
found guilty as co-principals in the crime of Robbery
with Homicide and each is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.Each one of
them is ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount
of [Fifty Thousand Pesos] (P50,000.00) each to the
heirs of Roger Tarroquin and Tito Homeres.All
other aspects of the appealed Decision are
MAINTAINED.
 On 18 April 2006, accused-appellants Rocha and
Ramos, through the Public Attorneys Office (PAO),
appealed the Decision of the Court of Appeals to this
Court.
On 13 September 2006, this Court required the
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs.
On 14 November 2006, accused-appellant Rocha,
having been detained for more than seventeen years,
filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal, stating that he
intends to apply for parole.He also manifested that his
co-accused on this case, Romeo Trumpeta and
Estaquio Cenita, had already withdrawn their appeal.
On 14 February 2007, plaintiff-appellee People of
the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a
Comment opposing accused-appellant Rochas
Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
On 28 February 2007, accused-appellant Ramos
followed suit and filed his own Manifestation with
Motion to Withdraw Appeal.He likewise manifested
that he had already served fourteen years in prison
and that all his other co-accused had already
withdrawn their appeal, and applied for executive
clemency to avail himself of parole.
We are therefore determining herein whether or not
the Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-
appellants Rocha and Ramos should be granted.
According to the plaintiff-appellee,
8. It is well-settled that in cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, appeal in criminal
cases to this Honorable Court is a matter of right.A
review of the trial courts judgment of conviction is
automatic and does not depend on the whims of the
convicted felon.It is mandatory and leaves the
reviewing court without any option.
9. In U.S. v. Laguna [17 Phil. 533 (1910)], this
Honorable Court first enunciated the rationale
behind the Courts power of automatic review.The
High Court ratiocinated:
The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon
a case in which capital punishment has been
imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one
having for its object simply and solely the protection
of the accused. Having received the highest penalty
which the law imposes, he is entitled under that law
to have the sentence and all the facts and
circumstances upon which it is founded placed
before the highest tribunal of the land to the end
that its justice and legality may be clearly and
conclusively determined.Such procedure is
merciful.It gives a second chance of life.Neither the
courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive
provision of the law that brooks no interference and
tolerates no evasions.(emphasis supplied)
10. No less than this Honorable Court recognizes
the value of human life that it provided an
intermediate appeal or review in favor of the
accused.In People vs. Mateo, this Honorable Court
held:
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory
review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however has it
proscribed an intermediate review.If only to ensure
utmost circumspection before the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed,
the court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court.Where life and liberty are at stake, all
possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no
care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be
undone.A prior determination by the court of
Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error in judgment.If
the court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it
could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate
the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court
for its final disposition.
11. Appellants motion to withdraw appeal,
therefore, contravenes this Honorable Courts power
to automatically review a decision imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.Neither appellant nor this Honorable
Court can waive by mere motion to withdraw
appeal, the Courts power to review the instant
case.
12.Based on the above disquisition, the review by
this Honorable court of appellants conviction is
mandatory and the withdrawal of his appeal can not
be granted as it will contravene the applicable rules
and jurisprudence.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Plaintiff-appellee also claims that accused-appellant
Rochas motion is actually a scheme to evade the
supreme penalty of reclusion perpetua and that it is
obviously merely an afterthought designed to trifle not
only with our procedural law, but more importantly,
our judicial system.Plaintiff-appellee continues that if
indeed, appellant Emmanuel Rocha was acting in
good faith, he should have withdrawn his appeal at
the first opportunity.Instead, he waited for the
intermediate review of the RTC Decision to be first
resolved and after an unfavorable decision thereon
that he now decides to withdraw his appeal.
We resolve to grant the Motions of accused-
appellants Rocha and Ramos.
The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem
from the effects of the Decision of this Court in
People v. Mateo. In Mateo, as quoted by plaintiff-
appellee, it was stated that [w]hile the Fundamental
Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme
Court of cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate
review.A closer study of Mateo, however, reveals that
the inclusion in the foregoing statement of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua and
life imprisonment was only for the purpose of
including these cases within the ambit of the
intermediate review of the Court of Appeals: [this]
Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in
these cases [cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death] review
by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to
the Supreme Court.
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that
cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the
mandatory review of this Court.In Mateo, these cases
were grouped together with death penalty cases
because, prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had
jurisdiction to directly review reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment and death penalty cases alike.The
mode of review, however, was different.Reclusion
perpetua and life imprisonment cases were brought
before this Court via a notice of appeal, while death
penalty cases were reviewed by this Court on
automatic review.Thus, the erstwhile Rule 122,
Sections 3 and 10, provided as follows:
SEC.3.How appeal taken.
(a)The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the
Court of Appeals incasesdecidedby theRegional
TrialCourt in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed fromand byserving acopy thereof uponthe
adverse party.
(b)The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review under Rule 42.
(c)The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where
the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a
lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed,
shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d)No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where
the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial
Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by
the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this
Rule.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death
penalty. In all cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review and judgment within five (5) days after the
fifteenth (15) day following the promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing
thereof by the stenographic reporter.
After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 June 2004,
this Court promptly caused the amendment of the
foregoing provisions, but retained the distinction of
requiring a notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua and
life imprisonment cases and automatically reviewing
death penalty cases. Thus, Rule 122, Sections 3 and
10, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (which took
effect on 15 October 2004), now provides:
SEC.3.How appeal taken.
(a)The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the
Court of Appeals incasesdecidedby theRegional
TrialCourt in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed fromand byserving acopy thereof uponthe
adverse party.
(b)The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review under Rule 42.
(c)The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed
by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is
imposed but for offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be
 by notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph
(a) of this Rule.
(d)No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where
the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty.
The Court of Appeals automatically review the
Judgment provided in section 10 of this Rule.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death
penalty. In all cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic
review and judgment within twenty days but not
earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of
the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing
thereof by the stenographic reporter.
Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory
review by this Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.The constitutional provision quoted in
Mateo merely gives this Court jurisdiction over such
cases:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the
direct appellate review over all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving
offenses committed on the same occasion or
arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to
the more serious offense for which the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed).The practice finds justification in the 1987
Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5.The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
x x x cralawx x xx x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher
For a clear understanding of this provision, the full
text thereof provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to
other stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
In this provision, only paragraphs (1) and (2) speak
of jurisdiction over cases.However, this Constitutional
provision does not enumerate cases involving
mandatory review.Indeed, it would almost be silly to
claim that this Court is mandatorily required to review
all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is
in issue. Instead, the significance of the enumeration
of this Courts jurisdiction in paragraphs (1) and (2) is
that while Section 2 of the same Article VIII of the
Constitution gives to Congress the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts, it denies to Congress the power to deprive this
Court of jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section
5.
Since the case of accused-appellants is not subject
to the mandatory review of this Court, the rule that
neither the accused nor the courts can waive a
mandatory review is not applicable.Consequently,
accused-appellants separate motions to withdraw
appeal may be validly granted.
The granting of a Motion to Withdraw Appeal,
however, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court.After a case has been submitted to the court for
decision, the appellant cannot, at his election,
withdraw the appeal.In People v. Casido, we denied
the accused-appelants Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal therein:
It is then clear that the conditional pardons
separately extended to the accused-appellants
were issued during the pendency of their instant
appeal.
In the resolution of 31 January 1995 in People vs.
Hinlo, this Court categorically declared the practice
of processing applications for pardon or parole
despite pending appeals to be in clear violation of
law.
Earlier, in our resolution of 21 March 1991 in
People vs. Sepada, this Court signified in no
uncertain terms the necessity of a final judgment
before parole or pardon could be extended.
Having observed that the pronouncements in the
aforementioned cases remained unheeded, either
through deliberate disregard or erroneous
applications of the obiter dictum in Monsanto vs.
Factoran or the ruling in People vs. Crisola, this
Court, in its resolution of 4 December 1995 in
People vs. Salle, explicitly declared:
We now declare that the conviction by final
judgment limitation under Section 19, Article VII of
the present Constitution prohibits the grant of
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his
conviction by the trial court.Any application therefor,
if one is made, should not be acted upon or the
process toward its grant should not be begun
unless the appeal is withdrawn.Accordingly, the
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government
concerned must require proof from the accused that
he has not appealed from his conviction or that he
has withdrawn his appeal.Such proof may be in the
form of a certification issued by the trial court or the
appellate court, as the case may be.The
acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the
release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,
commutation of sentence, or parole before the
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively
liable.Accordingly, those in custody of the accused
must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the
release of the accused from confinement.
xxxx
This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31
January 1995 during the pendency of the grantees
appeal.(Italics supplied)
It follows then that the conditional pardons granted
in this case to accused-appellants William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been
extended on 19 January 1996 during the pendency
of their instant appeal.
In the case at bar, however, we see no reason to
deny accused-appellants Motions to Withdraw
Appeal.There is no showing that accused-appellants
had already applied for parole at the time of the filing
of their Motions to Withdraw Appeal.On the contrary,
they stated in their motions that they merely intend to
apply for the same.
Plaintiff-appellee claims that the present Motion to
Withdraw Appeal is actually a scheme to evade the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and is meant to trifle
with our judicial system.Plaintiff-appellee, however,
does not explain how the withdrawal of appeal can be
used by accused-appellants for these purposes.It
seems that plaintiff-appellee is expecting that the
granting of the Motions to Withdraw Appeal would
nullify the Court of Appeals Decision, on the
understanding that the Court of Appeals cannot enter
judgments on cases remanded to them pursuant to
Mateo.Such conclusion, however, is applicable only
where the death penalty is imposed.Rule 124, Section
13 of the Rules of Court, which was likewise amended
in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC pursuant to Mateo, provides:
Section 13.Certification or appeal of case to the
Supreme Court. (a) Whenever the Court of Appeals
finds that the penalty of death should be imposed,
the court shall render judgment but refrain from
making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify
the case and elevate its entire record to the
Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser
penalty for offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more severe
offense for which the penalty of death is imposed,
and the accused appeals, the appeal should be
included in the case certified for review to the
Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser
penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing
such penalty.The judgment may be appealed to the
 Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the
Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff-appellee must have likewise observed that
accused-appellants intend to apply not only for parole,
but also for executive clemency.This is shown by the
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Appeal of
accused-appellant Ramos, where he affirmed that he
intends to follow his co-accused who had already
applied for executive clemency to avail of parole.
It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants
could not avail themselves of parole if their appeal is
dismissed, unless they also apply for executive
clemency and ask for the commutation of their
reclusion perpetua sentences.Republic Act No. 4108,
as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, does not apply to persons convicted of
offenses punishable with death penalty or life
imprisonment.In several cases, we have considered
the penalty of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to
life imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not apply
to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the
said penalty.As further discussed by Associate
Justice Dante Tinga in his Concurring Opinion in
People v. Tubongbanua:
Parole is extended only to those convicted of
divisible penalties.Reclusion perpetua is an
indivisible penalty, with no minimum or maximum
period.Under section 5 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, it is after any prisoner shall have
served the minimum penalty imposed on him, that
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may consider
whether such prisoner may be granted
parole.There being no minimum penalty imposable
on those convicted to reclusion perpetua, it follows
that even prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. appellants Motion to Withdraw Appeal.Plaintiff-
9346, persons sentenced by final judgment to appellees allegation that the Motion was for the
reclusion perpetua could not have availed of parole purpose of evading the penalty of reclusion perpetua
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. and trifling with our judicial system is unsubstantiated,
This Court cannot review, much less preempt, the as the Court of Appeals imposition of reclusion
exercise of executive clemency under the pretext of perpetua, unlike an imposition of the death penalty,
preventing the accused from evading the penalty of may be entered by said appellate court even without
reclusion perpetua or from trifling with our judicial another review by this Court.Neither should we deny
system.Clemency is not a function of the judiciary; it is the Motions just because of accused-appellants
an executive function.Thus, it is the President, not the intention to apply for executive clemency, since the
judiciary, who should exercise caution and utmost granting of such executive clemency is within the
circumspection in the exercise of executive clemency prerogative of the Executive Department, and not of
in order to prevent a derision of the criminal justice this Court.
system.We cannot and shall not deny accused- IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the respective
appellants Motions to Withdraw Appeal just because Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-appellants
of their intention of applying for executive Emmanuel Rocha and Ruel Ramos are GRANTED,
clemency.With the Constitution bestowing upon the and theCourt of Appeals Decision dated 31 March
Executive the power to grant clemency, it behooves 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01765 is hereby
the Court to pass the ball to the President and let her deemed FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
determine the fate of accused-appellants. SO ORDERED.
In sum, the mandatory review by this Court is only
required for cases where the penalty imposed is
death.Where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a review of the trial
court decision is conducted only when the accused
files a notice of appeal.Neither the Decision of this
Court in Mateo nor the abolition of the death penalty
has changed this.As the penalty imposed by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals in the case at bar is
reclusion perpetua, the review by this Court is not
mandatory and, therefore, the accused-appellants can
validly withdraw their appeal.
The granting of a Motion to Withdraw Appeal is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.In the
case at bar, we see no reason to deny accused-
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173793 December 4, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. CONRADO M. GLINO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
BEWARE of drunk passengers. They pose danger
to life and limb. Merely talking to them or telling them
to sit properly can be fatal, as what happened to one
of two victims in the case at bar.
The present law prohibits and punishes only drunk
1
driving. There is no law banning a drunk person from
riding a public vehicle, or the latter's driver from
allowing a person who appears to be drunk to board a
2
public conveyance.
A drunk passenger or one under the influence of
liquor or drug poses a veritable peril to the other
passengers. He is prone to react irrationally and
violently, due to lack or diminution of self-control.
Senseless loss of lives and physical harm can be
avoided, and the riding public duly protected, if the
potential danger posed by drunk passengers can be
addressed properly.
It is the duty of the court, whenever it has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, to report
to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe
that said act should be made the subject of
legislation.3 We leave it to the authorities concerned
to do the needful as they see fit.
MAG-INGAT sa mga lasing na pasahero. Sila'y
mapanganib. Ang kausapin o sabihan lamang sila
na umupo nang maayos ay maaari mong ikasawi.
Ganito ang sinapit ng isa sa dalawang biktima sa
kasong ito.
Ang kasalukuyang batas ay nagbabawal
nagpaparusa lamang sa pagmamaneho ng lasing.
Walang batas na nagbabawal sa taong lasing na
sumakay sa pampublikong sasakyan, o sa drayber
na payagan ang taong sa kilos ay lasing na
sumakay sa pampublikong sasakyan.
Ang pasaherong lasing o sino man na nasa
impluwensya ng alak o droga ay may dalang
panganib sa ibang pasahero. Malamang na sila ay
kumilos nang walang katwiran o manakit dahil sa
kabawasan ng pagwawari o pagpipigil sa sarili.
Maiiwasan ang walang kabuluhang pagkitil ng
buhay at pagkapinsala, at ang mga namamasahe
ay mapangangalagaan laban sa panganib, kung
ito'y mabibigyan ng karampatang lunas.
Tungkulin ng hukuman, kung alam nito na ang
isang gawa ay marapat supilin at hindi pa
ipinagbabawal ng batas, na ipagbigay-alam sa
Pangulo, sa pamamagitan ng Kagawaran ng
Katarungan, ang mga dahilan na pinaniniwalaan ng
hukuman kung bakit ang nasabing gawa ay dapat
maging layon ng pagsasabatas. Ipinapaubaya
namin sa kinauukulang maykapangyarihan kung
ano ang dapat gawin.
Before the Court is an appeal under Rule 124,
4
Section 13(c) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC,
from the Judgment5 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
6
affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila,
convicting accused-appellant Conrado Glino of
murder and attempted murder for the senseless killing
of Domingo Boji and the stabbing of his wife, Virginia
Boji.
The Facts
at On November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 p.m., in
Moonwalk, Las Piñas City, husband and wife
Domingo and Virginia Boji hailed a passenger
jeepney bound for Alabang-Zapote Road. The couple
sat on the two remaining vacant seats on opposing
rows of the jeepney. Virginia seated herself on the
vehicle's left side while Domingo occupied the vacant
seat at the right row.7
Moments later, the woman seated next to Virginia
alighted. Accused-appellant Conrado Glino took her
place. He was reeking of liquor. As the jeepney ran its
normal route, Virginia noticed accused-appellant
inching closer to her. His head eventually found its
way on Virginia's shoulder. Irked, Virginia sought
accused-appellant's attention and asked him to sit
properly, citing adequate space. Accused-appellant
angrily replied, "Oh, kung ayaw mong may katabi,
bumaba ka, at magtaxi ka!" Virginia decided to ignore
his snide remarks. She then turned her back on him.8
Accused-appellant, however, persisted in violating
Virginia's personal space, leaning on the latter's
shoulders. It was at this point that Domingo decided
to tell Glino to sit properly. Accused-appellant
arrogantly retorted, "Anong pakialam mo?" Domingo
reasoned out that he is Virginia's husband. Domingo
further said, "Kasi lalasing-lasing ka, hindi mo naman
kaya!"9
Marvin Baloes, who, it turned out, was Glino's
equally drunk companion, cursed Domingo. Baloes
then provokingly asked the latter, "Anong gusto mo?"
Domingo replied, "Wala akong sinabing masama."10
After the heated verbal tussle, accused-appellant and
Baloes appeared to have calmed down, confining
11
themselves to whispering to one another.
When the jeepney approached Casimiro Village,
Baloes turned to the driver and told him that he and
Glino were about to alight. As the jeepney ground to a
halt, Baloes unexpectedly drew an improvised knife
12
and stabbed Domingo in the chest. Accused-
appellant then unfolded a 29-inch Batangas knife
(balisong) and joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo.
Surprised and shocked at the sudden attack,
Domingo failed to offer any form of resistance to the
duo's vicious assault. In all, Domingo sustained nine
13
stab wounds throughout his body.
Virginia tried vainly to shield Domingo from his
assailants. She tightly embraced Domingo. Virginia's
efforts, however, all went for naught as accused-
appellant Glino and Baloes were unrelenting. When
the senseless assault ceased, Virginia found herself
bloodied from incised wounds in her fingers.14
The other passengers of the jeepney scampered for
the nearest exit immediately after the first blow was
struck. Some of them had to resort to jumping from
15
the vehicle's window to avoid harm's way.
Accused-appellant Glino and Baloes attempted to
flee the scene of the crime and ran towards Camella
Center. Baloes, however, fell down to the ground due
to intoxication. Glino, unmindful of his companion,
was able to run a distance of 45 meters before he
was apprehended by traffic enforcers Alvin Cristobal
and Ruben Ramirez. The two traffic aides, who were
the first to respond to the crime scene, caught sight of
the slow-moving jeepney and of the passengers
jumping off it. With the help of a concerned motorist,
they were able to pin Baloes and Glino to the ground.
They later turned the two suspects over to the police,
who arrived shortly thereafter.16
Subsequently, Virginia and Domingo were brought
to the University of Perpetual Help, Rizal Medical
Center in Las Piñas City. Domingo was, however,
pronounced dead after a few minutes. Domingo's
17
chest wound proved mortal.
On November 18, 1998, accused-appellant Glino
18
and Baloes were indicted for murder for the death of
Domingo Boji and attempted murder19 for the stabbing
of Virginia Boji. The accusatory part of the Information
for murder reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-1310:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1998, in
the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and
aiding each other, with intent to kill by means of
treachery and evident premeditation and without
any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with bladed weapons one Domingo Boji y Daza,
suddenly and without warning hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal stab wounds which directly
caused his death.
20
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The indictment for attempted murder bears the
following accusation:
Criminal Case No. 98-1311:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1998, in
the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, acting in common accord and mutually
helping and aiding each other, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, and
without any justifiable cause, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
and stab with bladed weapons one Virginia Boji y
Revillas, suddenly and without warning, thereby
commencing the commission of murder directly by
overt acts but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of murder
as a consequence by reason of some cause or
accident other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, because the injury inflicted to
Virginia Boji y Revillas was not sufficient to cause
her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.21
On June 15, 1999, accused Marvin Baloes
succumbed to cardio-pulmonary arrest while on
detention.22 Consequently, his name was dropped
from the information. Pre-trial commenced with
respect only to accused-appellant Glino. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
The People's evidence, which essayed the
foregoing facts, was principally supplied by Enrique
Villaruel, Virginia Boji, SPO2 Wilfredo
Dalawangbayan and Alvin Cristobal.
Villaruel testified that he was a co-passenger of the
spouses Boji in the jeepney where the gruesome
stabbing incident took place. Villaruel was then on his
way home to Anabu I, Cavite. He witnessed the crime
as it unfolded. According to him, accused-appellant
Glino and Baloes both stabbed Domingo; that
accused-appellant was armed with a Batangas knife
while Baloes used an improvised knife; that the
improvised knife was left on the floor of the jeepney
as accused-appellant and Baloes fled the scene of
the crime.23
Virginia narrated that she distinctly saw Baloes stab
Domingo in the chest area. Glino was blocking her
path, preventing her from giving aid to her husband.
When Domingo was about to fall down from where he
was seated, she embraced him. As she was holding
Domingo, a knife was thrusted into her, wounding her
24
in the hands.
On cross-examination, she disclosed she did not
see who between accused-appellant and Baloes
caused her wounds; that she saw accused-appellant
Glino stab her husband; that they met accused-
25
appellant and Baloes only in the jeepney.
SPO2 Dalawangbayan testified that he was the
investigator assigned to handle the case involving
accused-appellant and Baloes. The two suspects
were turned over to him by traffic aides Cristobal and
Ramirez. Likewise turned over to him was a bladed
weapon, a 12-inch improvised knife, confiscated from
26
the person of Baloes.
At the hospital, he found Domingo in critical
condition. He later learned that the victim expired
shortly after his visit. Virginia suffered from incised
27
wounds in her right hand. After concluding his
investigation, he prepared a report.28
Cristobal narrated that he is a traffic aide assigned
at the Casimiro and BF Resort intersection in Las
Piñas City. On the night in question, he noticed a
slow-moving passenger jeepney creeping onto the
sidewalk. Moments later, the jeepney's passengers
29
were jumping out of its windows.
Suspecting a robbery, he and his partner Ramirez
immediately gave chase. A man with bloodied
clothes, later identified as Baloes, ran away from the
vehicle but fell to the ground shortly after. Another
man, accused-appellant Glino, was able to run for
more than five minutes before they caught up with
30
him. He and Ramirez later executed a Pinagsamang
31
Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Upon the other hand, the trial court summed up
accused-appellant's defense, anchored on plain
denial, in the following tenor:
The evidence for the defense consists mainly of the
lone testimony of accused Conrado Glino, who
testified that he is the same accused in this case for
murder. He did not know the other accused Marvin
Baloes prior to November 15, 1998 whom he knew
only at the UI for the first time. On November 15,
1998, at around 7:20 in the evening, he was inside
the passenger jeepney which he boarded at
Equitable, Las Piñas City near Moonwalk to go
home at Imus, Cavite. He did not have any
companion. He rode on a passenger jeep bound to
Zapote. He could not recall the number of people
inside the jeepney because the seats were all
occupied. He occupied the right side seat of the
driver at the middle of the seat on the right side.
Then he saw the victim was stabbed by accused
Baloes. He knew the name of Baloes while they
were detained at the UI. He did not know who was
stabbed. The stabbing took place between the
areas of Casimiro and Uniwide. The person
stabbed died. He was there watching while the
person was being stabbed by Baloes who was
seated also at the right side inside the jeep but
seated at the rear most portion of the jeep. The
person stabbed seated at the left seat inside the
jeep and seating also at the rear portion of the jeep.
Baloes stabbed the person in his body, started at
the chest, stomach and other parts of the body. He
did not know how many times Baloes stabbed the
victim. There was an argument between Baloes
and the wife of the victim prior to the stabbing
incident. They had an argument for a short period
of time which he did not know what it was about.
They were at the vicinity near Uniwide when the
argument started. He would not know how long the
argument lasted and would not recall the
statements of the lady. He said they were having an
argument because the lady seating beside Baloes
and after that lady was only a passenger away from
him. Victim said to Baloes while pointing his finger
"Tumigil ka dyan, susuntukin kita." Then Baloes
suddenly drew a bladed weapon and stabbed him.
Together with other passengers, they alighted from
the vehicle because he was afraid. He waited for
another passenger jeep so he could go home. He
was not able to go home because he was arrested
by the police. He could not estimate how many
minutes lapsed after he was able to go down that
jeep when he was arrested as he had no wrist
watch, but that was for a short period of time.
Ramirez, the not so tall police officer, arrested them
and they were brought to the UI after he and Baloes
were immediately handcuffed using only 1
handcuff. Baloes hurriedly went down and ran away
after the incident, going back towards Moonwalk.
He was not arrested at the same place where
Baloes was arrested. He denied the testimony of
Mrs. Boji that he and Baloes had an argument
inside the jeepney they were riding regarding some
space and requested that he move a bit which
caused the commotion resulting to this incident.
While they were having an argument, he was
seated inside the jeep and he just looked at them.
He denied having argued with Mrs. Boji and said
that none argued with him. He knows that Baloes
died already (TSN, 1 September 2004).
On cross-examination, he declared that his
complete name is Conrado Montes Glino. Her
mother's name is Juliana Montes Glino. He denied
knowing the middle name of co-accused Marvin,
Montes Baloes. Shown a copy of the Information
where it appeared that the middle name of Marvin
Baloes is also Montes, he agreed that the middle
name is Montes. His place of residence is
Malagasan 1st, Imus, Cavite. Baloes did not tell him
while they were under the custody of the police that
he is also a resident of Malagasan 1st, Imus,
Cavite. He did not ask Baloes where he was from
while they were together at the UI. But he admitted
that on November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 in the
evening, he and Baloes were on board one and the
same jeepney bound for Zapote; that while the jeep
was near Uniwide Metro Mall, there was an
untoward incident that took place inside the jeep;
that in that incident, a certain Domingo Boji was
stabbed to death. He did not know that Virginia Boji
was also stabbed and wounded. He would not
know how many the passengers were in that
jeepney as he failed to count, but there were many
passengers. Both seats at the back were occupied
by passengers, but he did not notice if the seat in
front of the jeepney was also occupied. There was
a commotion when Domingo was stabbed. He
immediately alighted the vehicle because he was
afraid and waited for another jeepney to transfer to
another bound to Zapote.
He admitted that among the passengers, only he
and Baloes were arrested by the police officers
because he was pointed to by the witness as the
assailant of Domingo Boji. Until the time of hearing,
no one among the jeepney passengers were
arrested for the death of Domingo and injury
inflicted to Virginia Boji. His co-accused, in this
case, Marvin Baloes is already dead. He has no
other co-accused except Baloes. He came to know
her before she took the witness stand and positively
identified him as the assailant. When he was
arrested by the police officers, he shouted why they
arrested him and the police said that he had to go
with them and just explain at the police precinct. He
did not resist when the police officers arrested him.
He was forced to go with them because they
handcuffed him. He was waiting for a ride as he
would transfer to another jeepney in going home. It
was PO Ramirez who arrested him. He did not file a
case against Ramirez for arresting him without a
valid reason because he was at the detention cell
nor seek for help in filing a case against Ramirez
because he did not know how as that was the first
time he had a case. He had plan to file the case
against Ramirez who brought him at the UI before
PO1 Dalawangbayan. They were not investigated
nor interrogated. He stayed at the UI for one week,
then he was transferred at the Las Piñas City jail.
He told the police investigator, PO1
Dalawangbayan, that it was Baloes who stabbed
and killed Domingo Boji but that was not included in
the incident. PO1 Dalawangbayan did not do
anything when he told him that he was not included
in the stabbing incident because the one who was
talking only was Virginia Boji. He did not ask PO1
Dalawangbayan to enter his statement in the
blotter. Before he was transferred to the city jail of
Las Piñas City, he was brought to the City
Prosecutor's Office for inquest (TSN, 22 September
2004).32
RTC and CA Dispositions
On November 22, 2004, the RTC handed down a
judgment of conviction, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused
Conrado M. Glino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Murder and Attempted Murder and hereby
sentenced as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-1310, to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and its accessory
penalty and indemnify the heirs of Domingo Boji y
Daza the sum of P50,000.00;
2. Criminal Case No. 98-1311, to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional medium as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor medium as
maximum and to suffer the accessory penalty
provided for by law and pay Virginia Boji y Revillas
the sum of P101,549.00 actual damages and the
sum of P100,000.00 moral damages;
3. And to pay the costs in both cases.
SO ORDERED.33
Accused-appellant elevated his conviction to the
CA by way of an intermediate review, conformably
with the ruling in People v. Mateo.34 On May 26, 2006,
the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in full. The fallo of
the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
decision dated November 22, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City in Criminal
 Cases Nos. 98-1310 and 98-1311 is hereby Accused-appellant makes capital of Virginia's Q: And then, what else happened after that, if you
AFFIRMED. identification of Baloes as the person who stabbed remember?
SO ORDERED.35 her husband, Domingo. According to him, the trial A: When we are already traveled a short distance,
Issues court gravely erred in rejecting his defense that he one of the passenger alighted, sitted (sic) on the left
Undaunted, accused-appellant interposed the was an innocent bystander. He insists he was not side.
present recourse. acquainted with Baloes. They met each other only Q: And, what happened next, after you are able to
On September 13, 2006, We resolved to require the when they were both tagged by the police as the take a sit inside the passenger jeepney. After one
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, persons responsible for the melee. of the passenger alighted?
if they so desired, within thirty (30) days from notice. We are unconvinced. The witnesses for the People A: After a while, another passenger alighted on the
In a Manifestation dated November 13, 2006, the were consistent in the identification of accused- right seat of the jeepney.
Office of the Solicitor General, for plaintiff-appellee, appellant as one of two assailants who mortally Q: What else happened after another passenger
opted to dispense with the filing of a supplemental stabbed Domingo. Villaruel, a key eyewitness for the alighted from the said jeepney?
brief. Accused-appellant, through the Public prosecution, testified thus: A: And then, that is the time that I noticed that the
Attorney's Office, hoists the same lone error he raised Q: Mr. Witness, at about seven-twenty in the two male persons moved closely to the woman,
before the appellate court, viz.: evening of November 15, 1998, do you remember who is sitted in front of me.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN where you were then? Q: And then, what happened next, after you noticed
RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION A: Yes, Sir. two men moved closely to a woman, in front of
DESPITE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S Q: Where were you at that time? yours?
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT A: I was at the corner of Angela Village in Alabang, A: One of the male passengers, who moved closely
DID NOT STAB HER HUSBAND AND THAT SHE Zapote Road waiting for a ride. to the woman, little bit lay down his head on the
DID NOT SEE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT Q: While you are waiting there, waiting for a ride at shoulder of the woman.
36
STABBED HER. the said place, do you remember what happened Q: And, what the woman do after this male
In his supplemental brief, accused-appellant next, if any? passenger lay down his head on the shoulder of the
contends that the identity of the assailant was not A: So when I was able to take a ride a jeepney in woman?
firmly established. The evidence, he argues, points to the road going to Baclaran, that is the time that I A: I saw that the woman is avoiding the male
Baloes, who died even before the trial began, as the witness the incident. passenger, and one of my seatmates on my right
perpetrator of Domingo's killing and Virginia's Q: And then, by the way, where were you going at side spoke and asked the male passenger to sit
stabbing. In the alternative, accused-appellant that time, Mr. Witness? properly.
submits that he is guilty of homicide and attempted A: I was on my way going on at Anabu I, Cavite. Q: And what did this male passenger do after the
homicide only, not murder and attempted murder, due Q: Mr. Witness, after you took a ride in a passenger man sitted before you told him to sit properly?
to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of jeepney going to on your way home, do you A: He answered and said "ANONG PAKIALAM
37
treachery. remember what happened next, if any? MO!"
Our Ruling A: When I boarded the jeepney, the jeepney has no Q: And what was the reaction of the man sitted
We first tackle the conviction for murder. vacancy, so I just hang-on at the back of the beside you, when the male passenger said
Positive Identification jeepney. "ANONG PAKIALAM MO!"?
 A: And that, and he answered that because that
woman were you lying is my wife.
Q: And what did the male passenger do after the
said man introduced himself as the husband of the
female passenger?
A: "NAGMURA PO."
Q: What else happened after the male passenger
coursed him?
A: And then the other male passenger who moved
closely to the woman told that "KASI, LALASING-
LASING KA HINDI MO NAMAN KAYA."
Q: And what else happened after that?
A: The man sitted beside me thought that it was
already okay, but it is not, because the two male
persons, who moved closely to the woman, were
companions, were together and one of them asked
to alight from the vehicle.
Q: And what happened next after one of the two
male persons, who moved closely to the woman,
told to alight?
A: Now, we thought that they are going to alight
from the vehicle but when they stood up, they
talked to one another and suddenly stabbed the
male passenger, sitted beside me.
Q: Who among these two male passengers
stabbed the man sitted beside you?
A: The one who stabbed is the one who pacified the
incident that happened before and the second
stabbed was made by the other male passenger.
Q: How many times did these two male passengers
stabbed the man, who was sitted beside you?
A: I cannot count but I know it is many times.38
Villaruel's account of the incident dovetails
significantly with that of Virginia:
Q: Madam Witness, at about seven-twenty in the
evening of November 15, 1998, do you remember
where you were then?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where were you at that time?
A: We were at Moonwalk.
Q: You said we, who are your companions at that
time?
A: My husband, Sir.
Q: Who is your husband?
A: Domingo Boji, Sir.
Q: Why were you there at the said place during that
particular date and time with your husband?
A: We bought fish.
Q: And, after you bought fish, do you remember
what happened next, if any?
A: And then after that my husband stopped a
jeepney bound to Alabang Zapote.
Q: What happened next, after your husband
stopped a passenger jeepney bound for Zapote?
A: Then we boarded a jeepney, with one vacant
seat on the right and one on the left.
Q: And where did you seat when you boarded a
passenger jeepney?
A: On the left side, Sir.
Q: And how about your husband, where did he
seat?
A: On the right side, Sir.
Q: And then, while you were then on board of the
said passenger jeepney, at that time, do you
remember what happened next, if any?
A: While we are on board of the jeepney and the
jeepney is on motion, seated on my right side is a
lady.
Q: And how about on your left side, do you know
who was sitting?
A: A lady also, Sir.
Q: And what else happened after that?
A: And then, after a while, the lady on my right side
alighted.
Q: And then, what happened next, after the lady
sitting on your right side alighted from the jeepney?
A: Suddenly, who is drunk get near to me.
Q: And how did you come to know that this man,
who went near beside you, was drunk?
A: Because he smells liquor.
Q: And then what happened next after this man,
you claimed drunk, seated beside you?
A: And then he leaned on my shoulder.
Q: And what did you do after this man on your
shoulder?
A: I asked him to move away, considering that there
is still a space.
Q: And what was the reaction of this man?
A: He got mad at me and he said "OH, KUNG
AYAW MONG MAY KATABI, BUMABA KA, AT
MAG-TAXI KA."
Q: And what did you do after this man got mad at
you and ordered you to alight from the said
jeepney?
A: So I turned my back to him.
Q: And what happened next after you turned your
back to him?
A: And again he leaned on my shoulder.
Q: What happened next after this man leaned again
on your shoulder?
A: And he was accosted by my husband.
Q: How did your husband accosted this man?
A: My husband asked him to sit properly, and he
said that I am his wife.
Q: And what was the reaction of this man?
A: His companion got mad.
Q: Where was the companion of the drunk man
seated, who got angry?
A: Beside the man, who is drunk.
Q: And then what else happened?
Court:
This man, who was leaning on your shoulder, and
the man, who got mad, was seated side by side?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What did this companion of the man, seated
beside you, tell you, if any?
A: He answered my husband and asked "what do
you want."
Q: And what was the reply of your husband?
A: My husband answered "I did not say anything
wrong."
Q: What was the reply of this companion of the man
seated beside you?
A: None, Sir.
Q: What else happened, while you were there on
board of the said passenger jeepney?
A: While we are still on board on the jeepney
approaching the place of Casimiro Village, and the
jeepney moves slowly, the companion of this drunk
man asked the driver to stop because they will
alight.
Q: And then what happened after that, after the
companion of this drunk man ordered the driver to
stop?
A: When this man asked his companion, the drunk
man, to alight from the vehicle, and I am seated,
while I am looking down and I noticed, I looked to
them they are going to alight the vehicle I noticed
that they suddenly stabbed my husband. And the
two persons announced "HOLDAP ITO." And when
I look to them, I saw that they stabbed my husband.
Court Interpreter:
As the witness demonstrating while it seems that
she was stabbed on the downward thrust and the
husband was stabbed on the chest.
Q: Who are these man, you are referring to, who
stabbed your husband?
A: The one who died already, Marvin.
Q: Who was this Marvin, the one seated beside you
or the companion of the drunk man?
A: The other man, Sir.
Q: Did you notice how many times Marvin stabbed
your husband?
A: When I look again, I noticed that only once
because the knife is still on the chest of my
husband.
Court:
Where was your husband seated in relation to your
seat?
A: In front of me, Your Honor, on the other side.
Q: And what did you do when you saw Marvin
stabbed your husband?
A: None, Sir, I am just looking to nothing.
Q: And after Marvin stabbed your husband, do you
remember what happened next, if any?
A: Because Conrado is blocking me, he is in front of
me, it seems that they are gambling to a knife to
one another.
Q: And then, what else happened after that?
A: And then, when I looked at them again, I saw
that my husband seems to fall from where he was
seated, so I embraced, then another stab came in
hit my hands.39
As this Court has reiterated often enough, the
matter of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses is best left to the discretion of the trial
judge.40 In People v. Quijada,41 the Court aptly held:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial
court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial
court has the advantage of observing the witnesses
through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or
the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the
forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance,
the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the
sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat,
the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or
lack of it, the scant or full realization of the
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.
The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in
the ponencia of now Chief Justice Reynato Puno in
People v. Ave:42
x x x It is an established rule that when it comes to
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally
do not overturn the findings of trial courts. The latter
are in a best position to ascertain and measure the
sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their
actual observation of the witnesses' manner of
testifying, demeanor, and behavior in court. x x x
Verily, compared to appellate magistrates who
merely deal and contend with the cold and inanimate
pages of the transcript of stenographic notes and the
original records brought before them, the trial judge
confronts the victim or his heirs, the accused and their
respective witnesses. He personally observes their
conduct, demeanor and deportment while responding
to the questions propounded by both the prosecutor
and defense counsel. Moreover, it is also the trial
judge who has the opportunity to pose clarificatory
questions to the parties. Elsewise stated, when a trial
judge makes his findings as to the issue of credibility,
such findings, especially if affirmed by the CA, bear
great weight, at times even finality, on the Court.43 We
see no cogent reason to depart from these settled
doctrines.
Conspiracy
Even assuming, for the nonce, that it was Marvin
Baloes who inflicted the fatal stab, accused-appellant
cannot escape culpability. Their obvious conspiracy is
borne by the records. There is conspiracy when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct
evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of
accused indicating a common understanding among
44
them with respect to the commission of the offense.
It is not necessary to show that two or more persons
met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the
details by which an illegal objective is to be carried
out. Proof that accused acted in concert, each of them
doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the
45
victim will suffice to support a conviction. In
conspiracy, it matters not who among the accused
actually killed the victim. The act of one is the act of
all; hence, it is not necessary that all the participants
deliver the fatal blow. Tersely put, each of the
accused will be deemed equally guilty of the crime
committed.46
The acts of accused-appellant Glino and Baloes
before, during and after the killing of Domingo are
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiment. In her testimony before the
trial court, Virginia categorically narrated that while
Baloes was stabbing Domingo, accused-appellant
Glino was blocking her path, effectively preventing her
47
from rendering aid to her husband. Accused-
appellant later joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo
48
with a Batangas knife.
Lame Denial
Too, we sustain the RTC and the CA's rejection of
accused-appellant's defense founded on denial. Time
and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the
weakest of all defenses. It easily crumbles in the face
of positive identification by accused as the perpetrator
49
of the crime. Here, no less than two eyewitnesses in
Villaruel and victim Virginia positively and
categorically named Glino as one of the Boji couple's
assailants. Their identification of accused-appellant
was unwavering, made in a simple and
straightforward manner. Corollarily, they had no ill
50
motive to testify falsely against Glino. Upon the other
hand, other than his bare denial, no corroborating
evidence was put forth to substantiate accused-
appellant's disparate account of the incident.
Treachery
Accused-appellant next argues that he should be
made liable for homicide only. He claims treachery did
not attend the killing of Domingo.
That treachery or alevosia was present is
incontrovertible. The essence of this qualifying
circumstance is the sudden and unexpected attack by
the assailant on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any real chance to defend himself.51 It is
employed to ensure the commission of the crime
without the concomitant risk to the aggressor. The
rule is well-settled in this jurisdiction that treachery
may still be appreciated even though the victim was
forewarned of danger to his person.52 What is decisive
is that the attack was executed in a manner that the
victim was rendered defenseless and unable to
retaliate.53
Concededly, victim Domingo was caught unaware
that an attack was forthcoming. Although he had a
verbal exchange with accused-appellant and Baloes,
the assault was sudden, swift and unexpected. All of
the passengers inside the jeepney, including
Domingo, thought all along that the tension had
ceased and that Glino and Baloes were about to
alight. Domingo was overpowered by accused-
appellant Glino and Baloes, who took turns in
stabbing the hapless victim. By all indications,
Domingo was without opportunity to evade the knife
thrusts, defend himself, or retaliate. In sum, the
finding of treachery stands on solid legal footing.
No Attempted Murder But Less Serious Physical
Injuries
We now proceed to calibrate accused-appellant's
liability for the incised wounds sustained by Virginia.
Both the trial court and the appellate court found Glino
liable for attempted murder. The RTC and the CA are
in agreement that there was intent to kill Virginia as
well.
An essential element of murder and homicide,
whether in their consummated, frustrated or
attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the
victim immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent
which the prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent
is presumed from the commission of a felony by
dolo.54
55
In People v. Delim, the Court had occasion to
explain the rudiments of proving intent to kill in crimes
against persons. It may consist in: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed;
and (5) the motives of accused. If the victim dies as a
result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to
56
kill is presumed.
In the case under review, intent to kill Virginia is
betrayed by the conduct of accused-appellant and his
co-assailant Baloes before, at the time of, and
immediately after the commission of the crime. In her
testimony before the trial court, Virginia disclosed that
she was shocked and was initially unable to come to
Domingo's succor as the first blow was struck; that as
Domingo was about to fall down from where he was
seated, she embraced him; that she tried to shield
him from further attacks; that when the assault
57
ceased, her finger was gushing with blood.
If the assailants also intended to kill her, they could
have easily stabbed her in any vital part of her body.
They did not. The nature and location of her wound
militates against the finding of their intent to kill.
According to the physician who examined her
immediately after the incident, Virginia suffered from
an incised wound measuring 2.5 centimeters by 0.2
58
centimeter in her fifth digit, right hand.
Gleaned from the foregoing, it is crystal-clear that
the wound on Virginia was inflicted during her attempt
to shield Domingo from accused-appellant's and
Baloes' knife thrusts. It bears stressing that Virginia
embraced Domingo while the assault upon him was at
its peak. Evidently, the wound was inflicted while she
was in that position.
The wound required medical attendance, and
rendered Virginia incapable of labor, for a period of
59
ten (10) to thirty (30) days. Clearly, accused-
appellant Glino should be held liable for less serious
physical injuries only, and not attempted murder.
Although the indictment was for attempted murder,
a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious
physical injuries is tenable, considering that the latter
60
offense is necessarily included in the former.
The essential ingredients of physical injuries
constitute and form part of those constituting the
61
felony of murder. Simply put, an accused may be
convicted of slight, less serious or serious physical
injuries in a prosecution for homicide or murder,
inasmuch as the infliction of physical injuries could
lead to any of the latter offenses when carried out to
its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential
requisite of the crime of homicide or murder – intent to
kill – is not required in a prosecution for physical
62
injuries.
Penalties
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, penalizes murder in this wise:
Article 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling
within the provision of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of Murder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity;
There being no averment of mitigating nor
63
aggravating circumstance that attended the killing of
Domingo, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the RPC.
On the other hand, Article 265 of the Revised Penal
Code defines and penalizes less serious physical
injuries in the following manner:
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries. – Any
person who shall inflict upon another physical
injuries not described in the preceding articles but
which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
for ten days or more, or shall require medical
attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of
less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor.
Again, absent any appreciable mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the penalty of arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) should be
imposed in its medium period (between 2 months and
1 day to 4 months).64
The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no
application in both cases. The rule is well-entrenched
in this jurisdiction that the law is not applicable when
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. Likewise, the law does not apply to
those whose maximum term of imprisonment is less
than one year.65
Damages
We have arrived at the award of damages. When
death results due to a crime, the heirs of the victim
are entitled to the following damages: (1) civil
indemnity; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3)
moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
66
temperate damages.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the
heirs of the murder victim without need of further
67
proof. Under current jurisprudence, the award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto is in order.
We sustain the award of actual damages in the
amount of P101,549.00. The heirs of the victim
Domingo were able to prove during the trial, with
proper receipts, that they incurred the said expense.
The trial court and the CA, however, blundered a bit
in awarding P100,000.00 as moral damages.
Prevailing jurisprudence dictates that in murder, an
award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
68
is sufficient. For the less serious physical injuries
inflicted on Virginia Boji, moral damages in the sum of
69
P10,000.00 is warranted.
The heirs of the victim Domingo Boji are likewise
entitled to an additional award of P25,000.00 by way
of exemplary damages since the People clearly
established treachery in the prosecution for murder.
Exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00
should also be awarded to Virginia Boji in the
separate conviction for less serious physical injuries.
When a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of
72
the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment
MODIFIED in that, in Criminal Case No. 98-1310,
accused-appellant Conrado Glino is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder for the killing of
Domingo Boji and is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua with its accessory penalties. He is ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P101,549.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 98-1311, accused-appellant is
likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Less Serious Physical Injuries for wounding Virginia
Boji and he is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty
of four (4) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the
victim the sums of P10,000.00 as moral damages and
another P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168650 October 26, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee
-versus – JOSE TUAZON, Appellant
70
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
AAA is the daughter of BBB by her first marriage.
71
After the death of AAAs father, BBB contracted
marriage with the appellant, Jose Tuazon; they then
lived together as husband and wife, together with the
formers children.
Instead of guarding his stepchildren/children
is against wrongful acts of strangers, the appellant
committed lustful acts against one of them, by
repeatedly abusing AAA.The first of this series of acts
was committed in 1995 while AAA was still in Grade
V.She was at that time 11 years old, having been
born on November 14, 1984 as shown in her
certificate of live birth.
One night sometime in 1995, AAA was inside their
and house with the appellant, together with her younger
brothers and sisters, while BBB was out as she went
to harvest coffee at Calakkad, Tabuk.Appellant then
went inside the room where all of the children were
sleeping; approached the place where AAA was lying
down; removed her panty; kissed her; brought out his
male organ; placed his penis inside her vagina; then
made the push and pull movement, after which AAA
felt that there was liquid coming out of his penis.She
was then in pain and her private part bled.She could
not offer resistance at that time because the appellant
threatened to kill her if she would report the
incident.Immediately after satisfying his lustful desire,
appellant put on AAAs panty.Unsatisfied, he repeated
the incident several times, always when BBB was
out.The last incident took place on May 27, 1997.
AAA did not reveal her gruesome experience to
anybody not even to her mother BBB, because of her
fear that the appellant would make good his promise
of killing her if she would report the incident.
Sometime in May 1997, AAAs grandmother CCC,
invited her to sleep in the latters house but she was
prevented by the appellant.The next day, CCC went
to the house of the appellant and inquired why AAA
did not sleep at her house.Instead of answering CCC,
AAA started crying.When CCC asked why, she
answered that she was raped.It was then that she
revealed her ordeal at the hands of the appellant.
CCC thereafter reported the matter to AAAs uncle
who, in turn, reported it to BBBs brothers. Together,
they reported the incident to the Municipal Hall of
XXX, Isabela.
On May 29, 1997, AAA submitted herself to medical
examination by Dr. Alpha Dulig (Dr. Dulig), Rural
Health Physician of XXX, Isabela, who subsequently force, intimidation and with lewd designs, did then PERPETUA for each count of rape and to pay the
issued a medical certificate, the pertinent portion of and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lay sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as
which reads: with and have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a damages for each offense and additional Seventy-
GENITALIA girl of 12 years of age, against her will and consent. five (sic) (P75,000.00) Pesos as civil damages or a
Pubic hairs:few(,) fine, short hair CONTRARY TO LAW. total of One Hundred Twenty-five Thousand
Labia Majora:reddish and swollen That on or about the year 1995, in in (sic) the (P25,000.00) Pesos for each count following
Labia Minora:reddish and swollen municipality of XXX, province of Isabela, prevailing jurisprudence, with all the necessary
Fourchete:healed laceration, not coaptated Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.
Vestibules:reddish Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of SO ORDERED.
Hymen:absent force, intimidation and with lewd design, did then
Orifice:Accepts 2 finger (sic) withease (sic) and and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lay The records of this case were originally forwarded
without with and have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a to this Court by the RTC in view of the notice of
pain girl below 12 years of age, against her will and appeal filed by the appellant. After the parties
Vagina: consent. submitted their respective briefs, conformably with our
Walls: reddish, CONTRARY TO LAW. Decision in People v. Mateo, we transferred this case
Rugosities: rough Appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. and its records to the Court of Appeals (CA) in a
Uteros (sic):palpable; small Accordingly, joint trial ensued. Resolution dated August 30, 2004 for appropriate
Cervix:soft close, reddish For his part, appellant denied the charges imputed action and disposition.
Discharge:none against him.He testified that they were fabricated by In his Brief, appellant raised the following as errors
Thereafter, AAA and CCC executed their respective AAAs paternal grandmother, CCC, who was angry at of the RTC:
sworn statements before the XXX police. him because of his marriage to BBB. I.
Subsequently, AAA filed a complaint dated May 30, The defense likewise presented BBB who testified THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
th
1997, with the 12 Municipal Circuit Trial Court that she did not know of anyone who opposed her GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
(MCTC) of XXX, Province of Isabela. relationship with the accused but she did not answer UNBELIEVABLE AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY
After the requisite preliminary investigation, on when asked if her in-laws opposed such OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, AAA.
January 28, 1998, two separate Informations for rape marriage.She likewise testified that she did not have II
were filed against the appellant before the Regional personal knowledge that the appellant abused her THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A
Trial Court of Roxas (RTC).The cases were docketed daughter AAA. REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING
as Criminal Cases Nos. 23-829 and 23-830.The After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision dated ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
respective accusatory portions of the foregoing December 6, 2000, finding the appellant guilty of the RAPE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.23-829.
informations are as follows: offenses charged.The fallo reads: III
th
That on or about the 27 day of May, 1997, in the WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
municipality of XXX, province of Isabela, any iota of doubt, of the offenses as charged in FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this both informations above-quoted, the court hereby APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 23(-)830
Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of sentences the accused to RECLUSION
 HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE Sometime in 1995 Q:After you have feel (sic) that there was a liquid
DOUBT. (Criminal Case No. 23-830) coming out from his penis, what else happened?
On April 21, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Q:If that is the case tell all what happened to you A:After he finished, sir, he put on my panty.
Decision: that first night? 2nd Incident of Rape
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is A: That night he went to our room, he make (sic) May 27, 1997
hereby DENIED.The assailed decision of the me naked then he raped me, sir. (Criminal Case No. 23-829)
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela Q:Did he kiss you? Q:On May 27, 1997, will you describe how he raped
dated December 6, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. A:Yes, sir. you for the last time?What did he do?
SO ORDERED. Q:When he kissed you, did he bring (sic) his male A:He went again in our room where we were lying
Hence, the present appeal. organ? down, then he made me naked, and told me that if I
The Court stresses that conviction or acquittal in a A: Yes, sir. will report the matter he will kill me, sir.
rape case more often than not depends almost xxxx Q:After removing your clothes, and you were
entirely on the credibility of the complainants Q:When he brought out his penis, what did he do? already naked, what did he do?
testimony because of the very nature of this crime.It is A:He had sexual intercourse with me, sir. A:He abused me again, sir.
usually the victim who alone can testify as to its Q:Did he place his penis into your vagina? Q:How did he abuse you?
occurrence.In rape cases, the accused may be A:Yes, sir. A:When I was already naked he had sexual
convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the Q:Will you tell the Court if his penis penetrated in intercourse with me, sir.
victim, provided that such testimony is credible, your private parts? Q:Did he go on top of you after he made you
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature A:Yes, sir. naked?
and the normal course of things.The credibility given Q: After the insertion of his penis into your vagina, A:Yes, sir.
by the trial court to the rape victim is an important what did he do? Q:Did he kiss you before he place (sic) his penis
aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on A:He told me that whenever I will report the matter inside your vagina?
because of its unique opportunity to observe the he would kill me, sir. A:Yes, sir.
witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and Q:When his penis was inside your vagina, did you Q:Did he kiss your breast?
attitude during direct and cross-examination by ever feel any liquid coming out from his penis? A:No, sir.
counsel.Absent any showing that the trial judge Atty. Lamorena: Objection, Your Honor. Q:When his penis entered into your private parts,
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts A:There was, sir. did you feel anything?
and circumstances of weight which would affect the xxxx A:There was, sir.
result of the case, his assessment of credibility Q:Did you notice if he made the push and pull Q:Did you still feel pain while according to you you
deserves the appellate courts highest respect. movement? had so many sexual intercourse with him?
We agree with the conclusion of the RTC, as A:Yes, sir. A:Yes, sir, I felt pain because it was long time ago
affirmed by the CA, that the testimony of AAA was Q:And did he kiss you while he was making that already.We went to Dagupan to earn for a living
direct, unequivocal and consistent, and thus deserves movement? there for harvesting palay then Jose Tuazon came
full faith and credit.She testified: A:Yes, sir. and fetched me, sir.
1st Incident of Rape
 Q:And you did not protest when he placed his penis
inside your vagina?
A:No, sir, because he told me that he will kill me,
sir.
Q:And did he make the same movement as he
made before?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:Did he go on top of you?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:Did he spread your legs?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:He did not put pillow under your buttocks?
A:No, sir.
xxxx
Q:How about Jose Tuazon whenever he commits
or makes sexual intercourse with you, did he also
remove his clothes?
A:He removed only his brief, sir.
Q:Can you tell the Honorable Court how long did
Jose Tuazon make that sexual intercourse with
you?
A:A little bit long, sir.
Q:Around three (3) minutes or five (5) minutes?
A:Around five (5) minutes, sir.
The above testimony of AAA says
everything.Jurisprudence has recognized the inbred
modesty of a Filipina, especially a young child, who
would be unwilling to allow examination of her private
parts, suffer the humiliation of a public trial, endure
the ordeal of recounting the details of an assault on
her dignity unless her purpose is to bring the
perpetrator to the bar of justice and avenge her
honor.Testimonies of rape victims who are young and
immature demand full credence.
Moreover, the testimony of AAA was corroborated
by Dr. Duligs medical report and testimony that when
she conducted the medical examination on the person
of AAA, her orifice accepted two fingers with ease and
without pain which means that there had been
multiple penetration on the vaginal orifice.She
likewise claimed that there was no more hymen at the
time she conducted the examination.She further
testified that the labia minora in AAAs vagina were
still swollen which means that she was sexually
abused one or two days prior to the examination.The
Court held that when the testimony of a rape victim is
consistent with the medical findings, sufficient basis
exists to warrant a conclusion that the essential
requisite of carnal knowledge has thereby been
established.
We now come to the specific defenses set forth by
appellant in his brief in his attempt to seek the
reversal of his conviction.
First, he avers that rape could not have been
committed inside a room where AAA and her younger
brothers and sisters were sleeping, otherwise, it
would have aroused their attention.
We do not agree.
We have held in a number of cases that lust is no
respecter of time and place.Rape can be committed
even in places where people congregate, in parks
along the roadsides, in school premises, in a house
where there are other occupants, in the same room
where other members of the family are also sleeping,
and even in places which to many, would appear
unlikely and high risk venues for its
commission.Besides, there is no rule that rape can be
committed only in seclusion.This is especially true in
the present case as the brothers and sisters of AAA
who were with them inside the room were even
younger than her.They did not have the slightest idea
of what was happening nor even had a suspicion that
appellant was committing a crime against their sister
because of their innocence brought about by their
young age.
Second, appellant claims that the evidence for the
prosecution failed to show that the room where the
rape was committed was properly illuminated
considering that the incident took place at
nighttime.Otherwise, it would have been impossible
for AAA to properly identify the assailant.
During rape incidents, the offender and the victim
are as close to each other as is physically possible.In
truth, a man and a woman cannot be physically closer
to each other than during a sexual act.Moreover, per
testimony of AAA, while appellant was performing the
lustful act, he threatened to kill her.As such, she
heard the voice of her assailant.Identification of an
accused by his voice has also been accepted
particularly in cases where, such as in this case, the
witnesses have known the malefactor personally for
so long and so intimately.Considering that appellant
and AAA lived together in one house, and the former
repeatedly abused her, she is undoubtedly familiar
not only with his physical features but also with his
voice.Not surprisingly therefore, she readily and
positively identified appellant in court during the trial
as the man who raped her.
Third, appellant questions the act of AAA in
belatedly reporting the incident.He goes on by saying
that the period from 1995 until 1997 is so long such
that she had the chance to report it as there were
times when appellant was not by her side.He likewise
questions the failure of AAA to report the incident to
her mother.He avers that it is contrary to human
experience that an adolescent could actually keep to
herself such a traumatic experience for a long time.
The Court has acknowledged in several cases that
the hesitance of the victim in reporting the crime to
the authorities is not necessarily an indication of a
fabricated charge.This is especially true where the
delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled
by the threats of bodily harm made by a person who
exercises moral ascendancy over the victim.Neither
can appellant find refuge in AAAs failure to promptly
report the sexual assault to her relatives especially
her mother.This applies with greater force in the
present case where the offended party was barely 11
years old at the time of the first rape incident and
more or less 13 years old at the time of the last
incident, and was therefore susceptible to intimidation
and threats to physical harm.
Fourth, appellant insists that he should be acquitted
because the prosecution failed to prove that he
employed force in fulfilling his lustful act and because
of the admission made by AAA that she did not resist
the sexual assault.
Physical resistance need not be established in rape
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim who
submits against her will to the rapists lust because of
fear for her life or personal safety.The force, violence
or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending
not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties
but also on their relationship with each other.A
woman of such young age like AAAcan only cower in
fear and yield into submission.Rape is nothing more
than a conscious process of intimidation by which a
man keeps a woman in a state of fear and
humiliation.Thus, it is not impossible for a victim of
rape not to make an outcry against an unarmed penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape
assailant.Because of AAAs youthfulness, coupled pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
with the fact that the assailant is her stepfather, it was amended by Section 11, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659
easy for her to believe that appellant would make which provides:
good his threat to kill her should she resist. Article 335.When and how rape is committed. Rape
Lastly, in his attempt to impute ill motive on the part is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
of AAA, appellant claims that the case was filed due woman under any of the following circumstances:
to the malicious instruction of her grandmother CCC 1. By using force or intimidation;
who strongly opposed his marriage to BBB. 2. xxx
It is unnatural for a parent (or grandparent) to use 3. When the woman is under 12 years of age or is
her offspring as an instrument of malice, especially if demented.
it will subject a daughter (or granddaughter) to The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
embarrassment and even stigma.It is highly perpetua.
inconceivable that a mother (grandmother) would Moreover, appellant shall not be eligible for parole
willfully and deliberately corrupt the innocent mind of pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.Section
her young daughter (granddaughter) and put into her 2 thereof provides that the law shall not apply to
lips the lewd description of a carnal act to justify a persons convicted of offenses punished with death
personal grudge or anger against the appellant.This penalty or life imprisonment.Although the law makes
Court cannot give weight to the bare assertion of no reference to persons convicted to suffer the
appellant without sufficient evidence to prove the penalty of reclusion perpetua such as the appellant
same. herein, the Court has consistently held that the
In view of the foregoing, we find appellants defense Indeterminate Sentence Law likewise does not apply
of denial to be unavailing in the face of the positive to persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
and credible testimony of the prosecution As to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the
witnesses.His guilt has been proved beyond same.The RTC awarded P50,000.00 as damages and
reasonable doubt. P75,000.00 as civil damages.This Court affirms the
The trial court correctly convicted appellant of award of P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral
statutory rape for the crime committed in 1995 and damages instead of damages, and reduces the
simple rape for that committed on May amount of P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each count
27,1997.Private complainant was born on November as civil indemnity instead of civil damages.This is
14, 1984.She was, accordingly, eleven years old in pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in the
1995 when the first incident of rape took cases of People v. Bascugin, People v. Tolentino,
place.However, in 1997, she was already more than People v.Espinosa, and People v. Rote.Furthermore,
12 years old, thus appellant is liable for simple as held in People v. Malones, this is not the first time
rape.Appellant was, therefore, correctly meted the that a child has been snatched from the cradle of
innocence by some beast to sate its deviant sexual
appetite.To curb this disturbing trend, appellant
should, likewise, be made to pay exemplary damages
which is pegged at P25,000.00 for each count of rape.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 21, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00002, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.The
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua for each count of rape without
eligibility for parole.He is likewise ordered to pay
private complainant P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 172693 November 21, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee
- Versus-
RICARDO SOLANGON, Appellant
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 7, 2000, an Information was filed
against appellant Ricardo Solangon, Apolonio Haniel
and other John Does, the accusatory portion of which
reads as follows:
That on or about March 26, 1992 at around 4:30
oclock in the afternoon, more or less, in Sitio
Calamintao, Barangay Alacaak, Sta. Cruz,
Occidental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, in band, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped
for ransom one Libertador F. Vidal @ Ador, while
the latter was in the aforesaid place and was
forcibly taken away to Sitio Tuoyan, Barangay
Balao, Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro where the
said accused with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, killed the said victim Libertador F. Vidal
resulting to his untimely death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only appellant Solangon was arrested while the
rest of the accused remain at large.During
arraignment, Solangon pleaded not guilty.
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court
of Appeals are as follows:
During the 1992 local elections, Libertador F. Vidal
alias Ador was a mayoralty candidate for the
municipality of Sta. Cruz, Occ. Mindoro.On March
26, 1992, he was in the company of his sister Eden
Vidal and other candidates for board members in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.They were on their
way home aboard four (4) vehicles from a
campaign trail at Sitio Calamintao, Alakaac, Sta.
Cruz, Occ. Mindoro.When they reached Balao river,
they were blocked by seven (7) armed men,
including appellant alias Ka Ramil, who introduced
themselves allegedly as members of New Peoples
Army (NPA).The latter ordered the campaigners to
alight from their vehicles down to the river and
commanded them to fall in line.While the alleged
rebels aimed their guns at Adors group, one Ka
Emil asked who is Ador Vidal?When Ador identified
himself, appellant immediately tied his hands
behind his back with a nylon rope.The appellants
group then demanded campaign permit fee of
P50,000.00 and for the release of Ador.Apparently
failing in the negotiation, appellants group forcibly
abducted Ador and took him to a mountain.
After a week, or on April 4, 1992, heeding the
earlier instruction of the bandits, Marilou Vidal,
Adors wife, with Rodrigo Alcantara and Lando
Mendoza, delivered the ransom money to
appellants group at a far place in Brgy.
Kurtinganan, Sta. Cruz, Occ. Mindoro.When they
asked the whereabouts of Ador, the appellant said
that Ador would be home the following
night.However, appellants group did not honor their
promise.Since then, Adors relatives had never seen
him alive.
On July 9, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., appellant
was arrested by the PNP Mobile Group, Mamburao,
Occ. Mindoro while inside a bus going to San Jose,
Occ. Mindoro.According to prosecution witness
SPO2 Nelson Soquilon, he first met appellant on
July 26, 1999 at the police barracks in Mamburao,
Occ. Mindoro.There, appellant was investigated by
P/Insp. Edilberto Ama.P/Insp. Ama instructed
Soquilon and 13 other policemen to accompany
appellant to a remote place where Adors skeleton
could be found, as earlier pointed by appellant.At
the mountainous area of Brgy. Balao, Abra de Ilog,
Occ. Mindoro, at which the policemen were
unaware of the exact whereabouts of Ador,
appellant dug about two (2) feet.A cadaver,
including maong jacket and shorts believed to be
that of Ador were found and retrieved.
Thereafter, Adors relatives requested Dr. Edison
Tan, Municipal Health Officer of Mamburao, Occ.
Mindoro to arrange the skeleton.Adors relatives
were certain that the remains belonged to Ador,
 after recognizing his forehead, chin and lower
dentures.The exact cause of death could not be
determined.On July 28, 1999, the relatives of the
victim brought the latters skeleton to the house of
Eden Vidal.On July 30, 1999, Adors body was
finally laid to rest.
Appellants defense is alibi.He also denied being
a member of the NPA.He claims that on March 26,
1992, he was in Sitio Langka, Abra de Ilog, Occ.
Mindoro planting coconut trees; that in the years
1992 and 1993, he was just farming in their place
and sometimes went to his sister who previously
stayed in San Jose then transferred to Sablayan;
that he is tagalog but his wife belongs to the
minority; that on July 9, 1999 at about 3:00 p.m., as
he was on board a bus from Abra de Ilog, at Stop
Over restaurant in Brgy. 9, Mamburao, Occ.
Mindoro, some soldiers boarded the bus with their
long firearms pointed to him; that he was surprised
as he just wanted to go to Sablayan to borrow palay
seedlings; and that he was suddenly arrested and
brought to the barracks.
On August 31, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 44, rendered
a Decision finding appellant guilty of the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder.The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the guilt of the
accused, Ricardo Solangon, in the commission of
offense in the information, has been established
with proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is hereby
imposes upon him the mandatory penalty of death,
and ordered him to pay the heirs of Libertador Vidal
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and costs of the suit.
With the findings of guilt on Ricardo Solangon
and the imposition of sentence upon him, the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by him, thru Public
Attorneys Office which seeks to reconsider the
Order of this Court dated June 17, 2004 denying his
release on recognizance is hereby DENIED for
being moot and academic.
Since Ricardo Solangon has been classified or
recognized as political offender under the Oslo
Agreement entered into between the Negotiating
Panel of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GNP) and the Negotiating Panel of the
National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(NDFP), the Court opines that the executive branch
of the government that should now grant him a
pardon or executive clemency in compliance with
its commitment toward Peace Progress.
In view of the imposition of the death penalty
upon Ricardo Solangon @ Ka Ramil, let the original
folio of this case, together with the evidence, oral
and documentary, be forthwith elevated to the
Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals
contending that, granting arguendo that he
participated in the abduction of Libertador, such act
will not constitute the crime of kidnapping because it
is absorbed in the crime of rebellion penalized under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code.He alleged that
the skeletal remains were not properly identified as
Libertadors for failure of the prosecution to subject the
skeletal remains to DNA or dental analysis.He also
alleged that his confession could not be used against
him as it was made during custodial investigation and
under duress.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the
trial court that appellant committed the complex crime
of kidnapping for ransom with murder with the
modification that appellant could not be considered a
political offender.The appellate court held that the
kidnapping of Libertador, a mere mayoralty candidate,
without evidence to indicate public uprising or taking
arms against the government, and without any
evidence of removing allegiance therefrom, does not
constitute rebellion.It found that the kidnapping was
done for the purpose of coercing the victim and his
relatives to pay campaign money.It also noted that the
acts of killing and burying the victim were incidental
and could have been used only as means to compel
the payment of the ransom money and to avoid the
discovery of the crime.The appellate court likewise
held that DNA examination was no longer necessary
as the relatives of the victim had identified the same
as Libertadors; and that appellants act of voluntarily
leading the police in retrieving the victims body was
not a confession but a strong indicium of guilt.
Hence, this petition.
The abduction and killing of Libertador happened on
March 26, 1992 or prior to the date of effectivity of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 or The Death Penalty
Law on December 31, 1993.As held in People v.
Ramos:
Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of
RA No. 7659, the rule was that where the
kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his
abductor, the crime committed would either be a
complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art.
48 of The Revised Penal Code, or two (2) separate
 crimes of kidnapping and murder.Thus, where the
accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of
killing him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor,
the crime committed was the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The
Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of the
victim was a necessary means of committing the
murder. On the other hand, where the victim was
kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was
subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2)
separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were
committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the applicable rule when the abduction and
killing happened before December 31, 1993, as in the
present case, is:
a)Where the accused kidnapped the victim for the
purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by
his abductor, the crime committed was the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, as kidnapping of the
victim was a necessary means of committing the
murder.
b)Where the victim was kidnapped not for the
purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain as
an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of
kidnapping and murder were committed.
The trial court found that the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim.Similarly, the Court of Appeals noted that
the obvious purpose of Libertadors abduction was to
coerce him to pay campaign money and that the acts
of killing and burying him were incidental and could
have been used only as a means absolutely to
compel the payment of the ransom money, and to
avoid the discovery of the crime.However, both courts
found that the crime committed was the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder.
We do not agree.We find that two separate crimes
of kidnapping for ransom and murder
committed.
The present case falls under paragraph (b) of the
foregoing rule that where the victim was kidnapped
not for the purpose of killing him but
subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2)
separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were
committed.
In the instant case, the records clearly show the
elements of kidnapping, to wit:On March 26, 1992,
appellant together with six (6) other armed men
abducted Libertador for the purpose of extorting
ransom money.They blocked Libertadors convoy and
demanded payment of campaign fee.However, when
the payment was not forthcoming right away, they
hogtied Libertador and brought him to
mountains.On April 4, 1992, Libertadors relatives paid
the ransom money of P50,000.00 to appellants group
at Brgy. Kurtingan, Sta. Cruz, Occidental Mindoro, but
the latter reneged on its promise to release Libertador
and killed him instead.
As regards the crime of murder, it is true that there
is no direct evidence of the actual killing of the
victim.Nevertheless, direct evidence of
commission of the crime is not the only matrix
whereby the trial court may draw its conclusions and
findings of guilt.It is settled that conviction may be
based on circumstantial evidence provided that the
following requisites must concur: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is of a nature identically the
same with direct evidence.It is equally direct evidence
were of minor facts of such a nature that the mind is led
intuitively or by a conscious process of reasoning to
the conviction that from them some other fact may be
inferred.No greater degree of certainty is required
was when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is
direct.In either case, what is required is that there be
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was
committed and that the accused committed the crime.
The evidence is replete with details to prove that
appellant and his at-large co-accused were
responsible for the abduction and death of the
victim.These are:
a)On March 26, 1992, appellant together with six
(6) other armed men, introducing themselves to be
members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), blocked
the the convoy of the victim and demanded payment of
a campaign fee of P50,000.00;
b)When the amount was not produced right away,
they hogtied the victim with a nylon rope and
brought him to the mountains;
c)Despite payment of the ransom money, the victim
was not released and was never seen alive again;
d)After his arrest, appellant disclosed to the
the authorities the place where they buried the victim at
Brgy. Balao, Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, and
thereat they recovered the skeleton of Libertador
from a shallow grave; and
e)The victims relatives were certain that the
remains belonged to Libertador.
While the combination of said circumstances is
insufficient to establish the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, considering the absence of eyewitness to
the actual killing of the victim; however, it is enough to
sustain the guilt of appellant for the crime of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, which was
alleged in the information and proved during trial.This
qualifying circumstance is present where there is
proof of gross physical disparity between the
protagonists or when the force used by the assailant
is out of proportion to the means available to the
victim.
In the case at bar, there was superiority not only in
strength but in number as well.The lone victim was
unarmed and was hogtied by seven (7) armed men
who demonstrably abused their excessive force which
was out of proportion to the defenses available to the
deceased.
Evident premeditation cannot be considered in the
instant case.The careful selection of an ideal site
wherein to block the convoy of vehicles may have
been premeditated so that the kidnapping of the
victim would be carried out successfully; but the same
cannot be said as regards the killing.It is not enough
that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised,
but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious
outward acts evincing determination to commit the
crime.In order to be considered an aggravation of the
offense, the circumstance must not merely be
premeditation; it must be evident premeditation.
The penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is
death.However, the imposition of the death penalty
has been prohibited in view of the passage of R.A.
No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the
Death Penalty in the Philippines.Thus, in lieu thereof,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed predicated on the fact that the victims suffered serious
on appellant, without eligibility for parole. anxiety and fright when they were kidnapped.
On the other hand, as the crime was committed Thus, for the crime of kidnapping for ransom,
prior to the amendment of Article 248 of the Revised appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Penal Code by R.A. No. 7659, the appropriate penalty reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
for Murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum pursuant to R.A. No. 9346 and to pay the heirs of
period, to death.Under Article 64 (1) of the Revised Libertador Vidal the amounts of P50,000.00 as actual
Penal Code, in cases in which the penalties damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be P50,000.00 as moral damages; and for the crime of
a single divisible penalty or composed of three murder, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
different penalties, and there are neither aggravating reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim
nor mitigating circumstances that attended the the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
commission of the crime, the penalty prescribed by P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with prevailing
law in its medium period shall be imposed, which in jurisprudence.
this case is reclusion perpetua.The Indeterminate WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Sentence Law is not applicable when the penalty Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
actually imposed is reclusion perpetua. modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
Actual damages may be awarded representing the of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 44, finding
amount of ransom paid.In People v. Morales and appellant guilty of the complex crime of kidnapping
People v. Ejandra, the Court awarded actual with murder is MODIFIED.Appellant Ricardo
damages representing the amounts of the ransom Solangon is hereby found GUILTY beyond
paid.In the instant case, the heirs of the victim are reasonable doubt of two separate crimes of
entitled to the award of P50,000.00 as actual kidnapping for ransom and murder.
damages, which is equivalent to the amount of the For the crime of kidnapping for ransom, appellant is
ransom paid.The heirs of the victim are also entitled sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.In without eligibility for parole pursuant to R.A. No. 9346
People v. Yambot, the Court awarded civil indemnity and to pay the heirs of Libertador Vidal the amounts
of P50,000.00 after finding the accused guilty of the of P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil
crime of kidnapping for ransom aside from ordering indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
the return of the amount of the ransom.In addition, the For the crime of murder, appellant is sentenced to
heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of suffer the indeterminate penalty of reclusion perpetua
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.In and to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of
People v. Baldogo and People v. Garcia, the Court P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
affirmed the awards of moral damages in the amounts moral damages.
of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively, SO ORDERED.