OPOSA vs factoran

President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,   Section 4 of which
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expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the
primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public
domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by
law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of
policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure
the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true
value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,  specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
15

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.  18
He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read
Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other
form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not
a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry,   this Court held:
25

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and

is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:  26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.  27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler 
Corp.   this Court stated:
28

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation
aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words,
the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,   quoted in Philippine American
29

Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,  to wit:

30

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide
range of topics:

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be
a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
Tano v. Socrates, GR No. 110249, August 21, 1997

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by

local government units) enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality.15 To overthrow this presumption, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with
the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.16 Where
doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.17 chanrobles

While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category
of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception
of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the
first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when
all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come - generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative

duty to refrain from impairing the environment...
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes,
and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of
private ownership and not comprised within the national parks,
public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but
also marine waters included between two lines drawn
perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the
boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide
and a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen
kilometers from it.31 Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included
in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the
general coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third
parallel line.

Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of

Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by
the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought
would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR)
of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters
has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:

(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends
Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 70445 insofar that they are inconsistent with
the provisions of the LGC.

(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local
government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests
municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters,
and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate
ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances,
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to
prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the
provisions of applicable fishing laws.46 Finally, it imposes upon
the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang
panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other
activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers
and lakes or of ecological imbalance.47chanr
 1. Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary, GR No. 79538, October 18, 1990

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview
of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the
affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule
of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting
within their exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA
72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do
that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either
abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is
that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may,
depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who
are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt)
[See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)]. 

vWhile there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's
immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos
of their survival in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from the
government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is
expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides: 

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of
the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department
officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use
and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred
individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to
a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the
part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public
policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of
judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].
 1. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan GR 186739, April 17, 2013

The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport
permits with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to the local
government of General Nakar.9 To the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits
constitutes usurpation of the official functions of the DENR.

The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of Ruzol for
usurpation revolves around the validity of the subject permits to transport, which in turn
resolves itself into the question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.

SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing
of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.

xxxx

SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the
following functions:

xxxx

(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposal lands, and
mineral resources and in the process of exercising such control the Department shall impose
appropriate payments, fees, charges, rentals and any such revenues for the exploration,
development, utilization or gathering of such resources.

xxxx

(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s
forest, land and mineral resources;

(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, conservation,

licensing and regulation as provided for by law, where applicable, of all natural resources;
the regulation and monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permittees for
the extraction, exploration, development and utilization of natural resources products; the
implementation of programs and measures with the end in view of promoting close
collaboration between the government and the private sector; the effective and efficient
classification and sub-classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of
natural resources laws, rules and regulations;

(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-production, joint
venture or production sharing agreements, licenses, permits, concessions, leases and such
other privileges and arrangement concerning the development, exploration and utilization of
the country’s natural resources and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our
 natural resources; to cancel or cause to cancel such privileges and arrangement upon
failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulations, orders, and for all other causes
which are furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national
interests;

xxxx

(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the processing of forest
products, grading and inspection of lumber and other forest products and monitoring of the
movement of timber and other forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)

Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which mandates that the
permittee should secure the necessary transport and other related documents before the retrieved
wood materials are sold to the buyers/users and/or wood processing plants. 10 DAO 2000-78 obliges
the entity or person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit––a "permit issued by the DENR
to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs, drifted logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and
typhoon damaged tress, tree stumps, tops and branches." 11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only
be allowed to gather or recover logs or timber which had already been marked and inventoried by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer.12 To the Sandiganbayan, this
mandatory requirement for Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested
with the authority to regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products.
1âwphi1

(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)

According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved functions of the
DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1) the implementation of community-based forestry products;
(2) management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; and (3) establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development
projects.13 It also referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992 (DAO 1992-30),
which enumerates the forest management functions, programs and projects of the DENR which had
been devolved to the LGUs, as follows:14

Section 3.1 Forest Management

a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:

i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of regular appropriations,

except at least one project per province that shall serve as research and training
laboratory, as identified by the DENR, and those areas located in protected areas
and critical watersheds;

ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those areas located in
protected areas and critical watersheds;

iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation projects, subject to

policies and procedures prescribed by the DENR;
 iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with DENR Administrative
Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and other guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and

v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of financing institution(s), if

foreign assisted.

b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers or five thousand (5,000) hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that
the concerned LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into community forestry projects;

c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed areas which

are sources of local water supply as identified or to be identified by the DENR; and

d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project areas, small watershed

areas and communal forests, as defined in Section 2 above, such as but not limited to:

i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;

ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;

iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;

iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling of natural

resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn
farming and other unlawful activities; and

v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances, equipment and other

implements used in the commission of offenses penalized under P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987 and other forestry laws, rules and regulations.

Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the devolved areas above
mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was not
included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport
permits remains with the DENR15and, thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.

While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of
promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of natural
resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law
has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the
intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function.
Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous
with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that
the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other
government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.

On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the
principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution 16 in relation to the general welfare
clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
(Emphasis Ours.)

he significant role of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint Memorandum
Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU Partnership on
Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the DILG and
the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:

Section 1. Basic Policies

Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR Administrative
Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-
DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and other forest management functions:

1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, protection, proper use
and sustainable development of the country’s environment and natural resources.

1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable management and
development of the forest resources within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the
DENR and the LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership in
forest management.

1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools in the holistic and
efficient management of forest resources. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs
together with other government agencies shall undertake forest land use planning as an
integral activity of comprehensive land use planning to determine the optimum and balanced
use of natural resources to support local, regional and national growth and development.

1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in the sustainable
management of forest land resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance
the capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of forest management. Initially, the DENR
shall coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the management of the devolved functions. As
the LGUs’ capacity in forest management is enhanced, the primary tasks in the management
of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR becomes
assistive and coordinative.

1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with the LGUs shall
devolved [sic] additional functions and responsibilities to the local government units, or enter
into agreements with them for enlarged forest management and other ENR-related functions.

1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve community
empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the partnership and cooperation of the LGUs and
other concerned sectors in seeking and strengthening the participation of local communities
 for forest management including enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
(Emphasis Ours.)

To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation
of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement
DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.

This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against
another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the
government."21 Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes,
rules or regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to
immediately uphold one and annul the other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible.22 Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not
necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause,
complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged
forest products.

Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of transport fees levied
by the municipality for the use of public roads.23 In this regard, he argues that he has been conferred
by law the right to issue subject permits as an incident to the LGU’s power to create its own sources
of revenue pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:

Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units may impose and collect such
reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.

xxxx

Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may exercise
the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically
enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That
the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public
hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis Ours.)

Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as
Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law:

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions
upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;

xxxx

vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other
resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the
municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality. (Emphasis
Ours.)

Needless to say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local revenue
is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance." 25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority of the municipal
mayor to issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the
Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by law to enact
ordinances against acts which endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs
and other natural resources.26

It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following
requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of potential communal forest areas within
the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall
indicate, among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the
DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an
administrative order issued by DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest.

Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:

Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived
of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of
innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt
proving the innocence of petitioner. (Emphasis added.)

Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion,
so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. 39 As
explained by this Court in People v. Berroya:40

The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a criminal prosecution, the
State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands;
with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded
as public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty
often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for
liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to
be no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."

Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove
that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of usurpation of official
functions of the DENR.

It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, 42 this Court enunciated that good faith is a
defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. 43 The term "good faith" is
ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law,
together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction
unconscientious."44 Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something internal, it
can be ascertained by relying not on one’s self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of
his conduct and outward acts.45
 1. Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, GR 211356, September 29, 2014

Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition of his
hotel establishment.
In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the company from
complying with the Ordinance and Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096), otherwise
known as the National Building Code of the Philippines. Respondents also argued that
the demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the express
power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
constructed buildings.
To contrast, a party is said to be exercising a judicial function where he has the power
to determine what the law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties,
whereas quasi-judicial function  is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” 8
cralawlawlibrary

To contrast, a party is said to be exercising a judicial function where he has the power

to determine what the law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties,
whereas quasi-judicial function  is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” 8
cralawlawlibrary

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines “nuisance” as any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the
health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of
property.12cralawlawlibrary

In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a
determination that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the
local council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No build zones
are intended for the protection of the public because the stability of the ground’s
foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of water. The ever present threat
of high rising storm surges also justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the
shoreline. Indeed, the area’s exposure to potential geo-hazards cannot be ignored and
ample protection to the residents of Malay, Aklan should be afforded.

As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and

nuisance per accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all
circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and,
for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The
second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its
existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a
tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance. 14 cralawlawlibrary

In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since
this type of nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which
is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or
surrounding.15 Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident––its location––and not
its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been
constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary
permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per
se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance  per se.16 So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties
Corp:17cralawlawlibrary

We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is
empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms
of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have
the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such
thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature,
situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in
the ordinary courts of law. If a thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang
Bayan. (emphasis supplied)

Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still

find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general
welfare clause,18 property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.19 cralawlawlibrary

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders.
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its
function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority
to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective
order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits, to wit:chanR
SECTION 9. – Permits and Clearances.

(a)  No building or structure shall be allowed to start construction unless a

Building Permit therefore has been duly issued by the Office of the
Municipal Engineer. Once issued, the building owner or any person in charge of
the construction shall display on the lot or on the building undergoing construction
a placard containing the Building Permit Number and the date of its issue. The
office of the Municipal Engineer shall not issue any building permit unless: 
1. The proposed construction has been duly issued a Zoning Clearance
by the Office of the Municipal Zoning Officer;
2. The proposed construction has been duly endorsed by the Sangguniang
Bayan through a Letter of Endorsement.

(b)  Only buildings/structures which has complied with all the requirements for its
construction as verified to by the Building Inspector and the Sangguniang Bayan
shall be issued a Certificate of Occupancy by the Office of the Municipal Engineer.
(c) No Business or Mayor’s Permit shall be issued to businesses being
undertaken on buildings or structures which were not issued a certificate
of Occupancy beginning January 2001 and thereafter.
SECTION 10. – Penalties.

xxxx

(e) Any building, structure, or contraption erected in any public place within the
Municipality of Malay such as but not limited to streets, thoroughfares, sidewalks,
plazas, beaches or in any other public place are hereby declared as nuisance and illegal
structure. Such building structure or contraption shall be demolished by the
owner thereof or any of his authorized representative within ten (10) days
from receipt of the notice to demolish. Failure or refusal on the part of the
owner or any of his authorized representative to demolish the illegal structure
within the period herein above specified shall automatically authorize the
government of the Municipality of Malay to demolish the same, gather and
keep the construction materials of the demolished structure. 
Instead of taking the law into his own hands, petitioner could have filed, as an
alternative, a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent mayor to exercise
discretion and resolve the controversy pending before his office. There is indeed an
exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the
reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those
matters, when refused. Whether or not the decision would be for or against petitioner
would be for the respondent mayor to decide, for while mandamus may be invoked to
compel the exercise of discretion, it cannot compel such discretion to be exercised in a
particular way.21 What would have been important was for the respondent mayor to
immediately resolve the case for petitioner to be able to go through the motions that
the zoning clearance application process entailed.
Alas, petitioner opted to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling. He consciously chose to
violate not only the Ordinance but also Sec. 301 of PD 1096, laying down the
requirement of building permits, which provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 301. Building Permits. No person, firm or corporation, including any agency or
instrumentality of the government shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or
demolish any building or structure or cause the same to be done without first obtaining
a building permit therefor from the Building Official assigned in the place where the
subject building is located or the building work is to be done.

This twin violation of law and ordinance warranted the LGU’s invocation of Sec. 444 (b)
(3)(vi) of the LGC, which power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily
abate nuisances per se. Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned,
the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their
closure and demolition.
Given the presence of the requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, whether
the building constituted a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens becomes
immaterial. The hotel was demolished not exactly because it is a nuisance but because
it failed to comply with the legal requirements prior to construction. It just so happened
that, in the case at bar, the hotel’s incident that qualified it as a nuisance per
accidens––its being constructed within the no build zone––further resulted in the non-
issuance of the necessary permits and clearances, which is a ground for demolition
under the LGC. Under the premises, a court order that is required under normal
circumstances is hereby dispensed with.
 The FLAgT cannot prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096

Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse petitioner from complying with PD 1096. As
correctly pointed out by respondents, the agreement cannot and will not amend or
change the law because a legislative act cannot be altered by mere contractual
agreement. Hence, petitioner has no valid reason for its failure to secure a building
permit pursuant to Sec. 301 of the National Building Code

Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to
order the closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC, as
earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under
Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact
that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the
administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly
speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural
resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the
structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus should not be
diverted from the root cause of this debacle––compliance.

1. SunvilleTimberProducts,Inc.v.Abad,206SCRA

482 (1992)

 the correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in
lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The
deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may
then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon
the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a
chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually
questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed
only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be
added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of
avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.  9

As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the
doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal;   2) when the administrative body
10

is in estoppel;   3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;   4) when there is urgent need for
11 12

judicial intervention;   5) when the claim involved is small;   6) when irreparable damage will be
13 14

suffered;   7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;   8) when strong public
15 16

interest is involved;   9) when the subject of the controversy is private land;   and 10) in quo
17 18

warranto proceedings.  19

The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because
forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action;
the question they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and
irreparable damage; and public interest is involved.

We rule for the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative
remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its
observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of
pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition,
extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the
"management and disposition of all lands of the public domain,"   and in the Forest Management
20

Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the
forestry laws aid regulations   here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment
21

clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any
controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to
declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality
must be avoided where the case can be decided on some other available ground,   as we have 25

done in the case before us. The resolution of this same question must await another case, where all
the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily
established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to make the hammer fall, and heavily," in
the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is warranted.

1. Paatv.CourtofAppeals,266SCRA167(1997)

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action

for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is
called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,  (2) when the issue involved is
13

purely a legal question,  (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
14

excess of jurisdiction,  (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
15

concerned,  (5) when there is irreparable injury,  (6) when the respondent is a department secretary
16 17

whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter,  (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,  (8) when
18 19

it would amount to a nullification of a claim,  (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
20

case proceedings,  (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
21

(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 22

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute
lack of notice or hearing.

private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the
administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law.
They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of
P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:

Sec. 68. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of

the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief, and secure the benefits intended.

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.
— Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands,
or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license
or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before
its amendment by E.O. 277)

Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended

to read as follows:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest

products without license. — Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section
68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a
distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated
the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there
is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.3

Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return
of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent
prior to one's recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents'
right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the
defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.  "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in
39

custody,"  and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling
40

with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or
right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.  Under the Rules of Court, it is
41

indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is
entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant,
alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized
under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual
value of the property.  Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful
42

detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized
by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the
DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the
petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful
detention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705,
as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to
review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:

Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to
review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to
the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The
Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through
a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

1. pekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. CTA and CIR

GR L-15430, September 30, 1963

jUDGMENTS; RES JUDICATA; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES.

EXTENSION TO ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES WITH JUDICIAL POWERS. — The doctrine of

res judicata does not apply exclusively to courts but may be extended to decisions of
bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.

 ID.; ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION NOT MADE DIFFERENT BY MERELY CHANGING THE
FORM OF ACTION. — Where the alleged cause of action in both cases is the same, i.e.
appellant’s claim to non-liability for compensating taxes, appellant cannot, by merely
changing the form of his action, plead the non-application of the rule of bar by former
judgment.

1. The conclusiveness of judgments being a universal principle of jurisprudence, it

"does not, and from its very nature cannot, depend upon the particular court whose
judicial action has been invoked, so long as its jurisdiction is competent and its
judgment final. It applies wherever the parties have so submitted their claims to a final
decision by a court of competent jurisdiction, whether that court be inferior or superior,
of law or of equity, domestic or foreign." But in order that an adjudication may operate
strictly as res judicata it must, of course, be the act of a judicial tribunal in the exercise
of its lawful powers. . . The doctrine of res judicata is applicable only to adjudications
which are in their nature judgments, or, in other words, to the final determinations of
some body exercising strictly judicial functions. . . . Nevertheless, the principle of the
conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of
what are ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon whom judicial
powers have been conferred. Whenever any board, tribunal or person is by law vested
with authority to judicially determine a question, such a determination, when it has
become final, is as conclusive as though the adjudication had been made by a court of
general jurisdiction. 2 Freeman on Judgments 1333- 1335.

The general rule is that the doctrine of res judicata may not be predicated upon
administrative or legislative action. For the operation of the doctrine, there must be a
judgment rendered by a body exercising judicial functions. There are, however, cases in
which the doctrine of res judicata has been held applicable to judicial acts of public
executive, or administrative officers and boards. In this connection, it has been
declared that whenever a final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on
the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ
of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata. 30 Am.
Jur. 372.

2. It is settled that notwithstanding the difference in the form of the two actions, the
doctrine of res judicata will apply where it appears that the parties are in effect
litigating for the same thing. A party cannot, by varying the form of his action, escape
the effects of res judicata, Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, L-12645, Sept. 15, 1960;
and Lewin v. Galang, L-15253, Oct. 31, 1960.

1. Merida v. People, GR 158182, June 12, 2008

affirmed the conviction of petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section
68,3 Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705),4

Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]"
a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over
which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership. 6

1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and

2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint
filed by specified individuals,18 non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying
such cases.19 However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity 20 and
not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not
prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts: 
 SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in

this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the
deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest
officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall
thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint. 

If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating
forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized
by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information
in Court. (Emphasis supplied)

We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80 refers to
"reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other
forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized
officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence." 22

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but
Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez
cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to
support the complaint or report."23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section
80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for
petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court
correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original
jurisdiction

Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private

Property Without Permit

Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of
timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority;26 and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. 27 Petitioner stands charged of
having "cut, gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private
land28 without x x x the necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for
"cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber," under the second category. Further, the
prosecution evidence showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or
removing" but only the act of "cutting" a lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of
whether petitioner "cut x x xtimber" in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit. 29

We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes "timber"
under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define "timber," only "forest product"
(which circuitously includes "timber.") 31 Does the narra tree in question constitute "timber" under
Section 68? The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide
that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32 In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by
compliance with specified dimensions33 or certain "stand age" or "rotation age." 34 In Mustang Lumber,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in
Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under
that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or
common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber," thus:

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which
reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine

used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly,
the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright
edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as
"timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or
timber. 

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases
used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
And in so far as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned,
Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw and procesed
timber. Neither should we.36 x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)

We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its
common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or
joinery."37 Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling,
beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber. 38

1. Momonganv.JudgeOmipon,AMNo.MTJ-93-

874, March 14, 1995

 apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut
lumber.
Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources filed the instant complaint against the respondent Judge alleging that
his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut forest products
violated Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive order No. 277, Section 68
and 68-A 1 and Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. 2 Complaint claims that
respondent Judge has no authority to order the release of the truck despite the non-
inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for
appropriate disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office.
In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary
investigation, he found that Golpe, the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the
hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of hollow blocks. On his way home after
delivering hollow blocks in Barangay Sto. Niño II, he met his friend Cabig who
requested him to load sliced lumber and deliver the same at Brgy. Lungsod-daan,
Hinundayan to be used for the construction of a barangay high school building. They
were apprehended when the truck had a flat tire. After changing the tire, both the
lumber and the truck were ordered deposited at the police station of Hinunangan.  nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"We find the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. While he is authorized to

conduct preliminary investigation in all cases of violations of P.D. 705, as amended,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, Sec. 68-A thereof
provides that it is the Department Head or his duly authorized representative who may
order the confiscation and disposition of the forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water
or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very penalty imposed
for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the
crime and the instrument or tools with which it was committed." However, this cannot
be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person
not liable for the offense." In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally
cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be
convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. hence,
there was no justification for respondent Judge not to release the truck. 

Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A
and Adm. Order No. 59, the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representative has
the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products and all
conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws. However, as complainant himself like wise pointed out,
this power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.

1. Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Hon. Demetrio

Batario, GR 92285, March 28, 1994

PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged

in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro
which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In
consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial
tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like
PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and
"wood-derivated" products
Petitioner anchors his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec.
36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this incentive is a ban
against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which is to be
enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code, the
exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases 13 and, in fact, it is the
duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations.
14 

The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry
Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of
petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to
enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. To allow the regular court to direct the
Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner would, is clearly an
interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and
forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be
based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence,
an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of Customs 15 as
well as the prayer for injunction against importation of matches by private respondent
AJIC 16 may not be granted without the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

. under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the

courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining
Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).

In Rosales v. Court of Appeals, we categorized a similar case for damages as premature

since" (t)he finality of the administrative case which gives life to petitioners’ cause of
action has not yet been reached." 22 The pendency of petitioner’s request to the
Bureau of Customs for the implementation of the ban against the importation of
matches under the Forestry Code is impliedly admitted; in fact, it is apparent from the
correspondence of counsel for petitioner that the Bureau is inclined to sustain the
validity of the importations. 23 Hence, as in Rosales, the order of the trial court
granting the dismissal of the civil case must be upheld. chanrobles.com : virtual law lib

Sec. 602 (g), of the Tariff and Customs Code provides: "The general duties, powers and
jurisdiction of the bureau shall include. . . . Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
seizure and forfeiture cases under the tariff and customs laws." cralaw virtua1aw library

14. Sec. 1207, of the Tariff and Customs Code provides: "Where articles are of
prohibited importation or subject to importation only upon conditions prescribed by law,
it shall be the duty of the Collector to exercise such jurisdiction in respect thereto as
will prevent importation or otherwise secure compliance with all legal requirements." cralaw virtua1aw library

15.." . . A temporary restraining injunction/writ of preliminary injunction be issued

against . . . (d)efendant Commissioner of Customs, command and ordering said
defendant from allowing the importation of matches and other derivated products, or if
such importations have been made and are in his custody, from releasing the same, as
such importations is prohibited by law, i. e., Forestry Code, Section 36. . . . After
hearing, that said injunction be made permanent. . . . That defendant Commissioner of
Customs be ordered to impound the shipments complained of. . . ." (Complaint, pp. 5-
6, Rollo, pp. 34-35.)

16.." . . A temporary restraining injunction/writ of preliminary injunction be issued

against . . . (d)efendant A. J. International Corporation, commanding and/or ordering
said defendant to cease and desist from importing matches and/or wood derivated
products in violation of the Forestry Code. . . . After hearing, that said injunction be
made permanent. . . ." (Complaint, pp. 5-6, Rollo, pp. 34-35.)

17. Sec. 608, Tariff and Customs Code.

18. 2 Am Jur 2d §340, pp. 155-156, citing Douglas County v. State Bd. of Equalization
and Assessment, 158 Neb 325, 63 NW 2d 449; State ex rel. York v. Walla Walla
County, 28 Wash 2d 891, 184 P 2d 577, 172 ALR 1001.

19. Annex "A", Memorandum for Private Respondent, Rollo, p. 138-139. In part the
letter of Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako in behalf of PTFI to the Bureau of
Customs, Collection District II-B, dated 10 January 1990 reads: "We refer to your letter
December 7, 1989, which is in reply to our letter of November 4, 1989 requesting for
the implementation of Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code., i.e., prohibition on
importation of safety matches. With due respect to the opinion rendered by your office
that ‘. . . there is no law or regulation prohibiting the importation of matches,’ we wish
to reiterate that Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code clearly prohibits the importation of
‘wood, wood products or wood derivated products.’ . . . With respect to your opinion
that ‘what is being protected is the matchwood timber industry, not the match
industry,’ we wish to emphasize that the survival of the local match industry the
existence of which is gravely threatened by the importation of matches . . ." cralaw virtua1a

1. People v. CFI of Quezon City Branch VII, GR L-

46772, February 13, 1992

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished
under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines, in an information which read:

On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and
the opinion of the trial court, the information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of
qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the
information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the consent of
the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather,
take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority
under a license agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ."
Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest
resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the logs was
"without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging
that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus,
the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was
sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.

Anent the second issue raised, Section 80 of Presidential Decree 705, provides:

Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. — A forest officer or employee of the

Bureau shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also
seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the
offender in the process of committing the offense. The arresting forest officer or
employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and
seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to,
and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to
conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court.

If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the authorities designated
by law to conduct preliminary investigations, the delivery to, and filing of the
complaint with, the latter shall be done within a reasonable time sufficient for ordinary
travel from the place of arrest to the place of delivery. The seized products, materials
and equipment shall be immediately disposed of in accordance with forestry
administrative orders promulgated by the Department Head.

The Department Head may deputize any member or unit of the Philippine
Constabulary, police agency, barangay or barrio official, or any qualified person to
protect the forest and exercise the power or authority provided for in the preceding
paragraph.

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in
this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any
of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest
officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall
thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.

If there is a prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating

forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized
by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information
in Court.

The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may
commence a prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a
warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the
offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described
in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the
commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however,
the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary
informations in court.

The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80
of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither
was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private
land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal.

1. Lagua v. Cusi GR L-44649, April 15, 1988

The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau of Forest Development
has the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to determine whether their
use is in violation of laws. Since the damages claimed to have been sustained by the
plaintiffs arose from the alleged illegal closure of a logging road — in the language of the
defendants on page 3 of their motion to dismiss. The simple fact is there was an illegal
closure of the national highway affecting the private rights of the plaintiffs who sustained
damages and losses as a consequence thereof — the question whether or not the road was
illegally closed must first be determined by the Bureau of Forest Development. If the said
Bureau finds that the road was legally closed, an action for damages may be filed in Court.
Otherwise, no civil action would prosper, for there would be no tortious act. (Rollo, pp. 58-
69).

P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the
Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or
illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be
maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be
established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents.
This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and
authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way,
much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside
a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development. As we have held
in Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110):

Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial court's ruling
that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and were suing in their own
behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for damages. They are not the real parties in interest.
However, the complaint can still be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in
interest, Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only the
dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.

1. Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 126

SCRA 69 (1983)

CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT
HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL
PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLE DO NOT APPLY.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. — This Court
ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that
the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part
of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.

ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. — This Court
ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that
the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part
of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition
to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp
which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.

The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in
their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is,
whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the
names of the private applicants.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest
land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding
that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance
with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big
trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found
on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a
mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property
had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said
land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than
for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.
 1. Republic v. Naguiat, 479 SCRA 585 (2006)

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act
of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. 5 As to these assets, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 6 Given this postulate, the
principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in
question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the Constitution8 classifying lands of
the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do
not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth
of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9- 

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of
land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out
of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx 

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, 10 which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State – the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively
belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the
prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or
mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government
and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence,
the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or
disposable rests with the applicant.15

respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. 18 Aside from tax receipts,
respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court
has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 19

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious
practice resorted to in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a point to
stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and
their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the
government.21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest
have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of
little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.

1. De Ocampo v. Arlos, 343 SCRA 716 (2000)

This case stems from a complaint for recovery of possession filed by respondent Carlos
Urbina (Urbina) against the petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (RTC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 53483. 

In his complaint, Urbina alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land situated at Lower
Bicutan, Taguig, designated as Lot 56, PLS 272. According to Urbina, the Modestos, through
stealth, scheme, and machination, were able to occupy a portion of this property, designated
as Lot 356, PLS 272. 

Urbina’s claim of ownership over Lot 56 is based primarily on his Miscellaneous Sales Application
No. (III-1) 460 (Miscellaneous Sales Application), 

The Modestos mainly argued that at the time Urbina filed his MSA and acquired tax declarations
over the subject property, the property was still government property, being part of a military
reservation. The property was thus not alienable and disposable, and could not legally be possessed
by a private individual.

An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title.9 Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the
cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when
possession has been lost for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. The objective of a plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership.10

Moreover, the factual findings of the CA, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive
and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of
the following recognized exceptions: 

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; 

 (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 11

Jurisdiction of the Court 

The authority of the courts to resolve and settle questions relating to the possession of property has
long been settled.12 This authority continues, even when the land in question is public land. As we
explained in Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 13

We hold that the power and authority given to the Director of Lands to alienate and dispose of public
lands does not divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by
occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective possessions and occupations.
While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands [now the Land Management Bureau] is confined to the
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve
disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or
occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts.

The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands.
Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its
power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over
possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards.  The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of
1avvphi1

possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to
extend protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest.

Prefatorily, we observe that the subject property has not yet been titled, nor has it been the subject
of a validly issued patent by the LMB. Therefore, the land remains part of the public domain, and
neither Urbina nor the Modestos can legally claim ownership over it. This does not mean, however,
that neither of the parties have the right to possess the property. 

Urbina alleged that he is the rightful possessor of the property since he has a pending Miscellaneous
Sales Application, as well as tax declarations over the property. He also relied, to support his claim
of a better right to possess the property, on the admission on the part of the Modestos that they
negotiated with him for the sale of the lot in question.

On the other hand, the Modestos anchored their right to possess the same on their actual
possession of the property. They also questioned the legality of Urbina’s Miscellaneous Sales
Application, and his tax declarations over the property, arguing that since these were obtained when
the land was still not alienable and disposable, they could not be the source of any legal rights.
The Miscellaneous Sales Application filed by Carlos Urbina is not appropriate because Lot 356 had
ceased to be public land as it had become part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, and hence,
no one can claim possessory rights over the said property since it is within said Military Reservation.
The subject area which is located in Lower Bicutan, Taguig, only became alienable and disposable
upon the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 172 and its implementing guidelines
Memorandum Order No. 119 on October 16, 1987.

he subject property, which is Proclamation No. 172 and its implementing guidelines. Under its
implementing guidelines, Memorandum No. 119, the following are the qualifications for an applicant
to be qualified to apply for and acquire a lot under Proclamation No. 172, among others, to wit:

(1) He/She must be a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas. To be considered a bona
fide resident, the applicant must have the following qualifications:

a) A Filipino citizen of legal age and/or a head of the family;

b) Must have constructed a house in the area proclaimed for disposition on or before
January 6, 1986 and actually residing therein;

c) Must not own any other residential or commercial lot in Metro Manila;

d) Must not have been a registered awardee of any lot under the administration of the NHA,
MHS, or any other government agency, nor the AFP Officer’s village; 

e) Must not be a professional squatter. A professional squatter, for purposes of this Order, is
one who engages in selling lots in the areas proclaimed for disposition; and

f) Has filed the proper application to purchase.

Possession prior to October 16, 1987 

Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the
State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain, 18 and its occupation in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. 19 It is only
after the property has been declared alienable and disposable that private persons can legally claim
possessory rights over it. 

Accordingly, even if we recognize that Urbina had been in possession of the property as early as
July 21, 1966, when he filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application, his occupation was unlawful and
could not be the basis of possessory rights, in keeping with Section 88 of the Public Land Act, that
states:

Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be
non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until
again declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President.
The same holds true for Urbina’s tax declarations. Absent any proof that the property in question had
already been declared alienable at the time that Urbina declared it for tax purposes, his tax
declarations over the subject property cannot be used to support his claim of possession. 

Similarly, while the Modestos claim to have been in possession of Lot 356 for almost 33 years, 20 this
occupation could not give rise to possessory rights while the property being occupied remain
government land that had not yet been declared alienable and disposable.

Possession after October 16, 1987

In any case, even if we consider this certification as sufficient proof that Urbina declared the subject
property for tax declaration purposes, it must be stressed that the mere declaration of land for
taxation purposes does not constitute possession thereof nor is it proof of ownership in the absence
of the claimant’s actual possession.26 And in light of our categorical finding that the Modestos
actually occupied the property in question from the time that it was declared alienable and
disposable until the present time, the tax declaration fails to convince us that Urbina has a right to
legally possess it.
For these reasons, we find that Urbina utterly failed to prove that he has a better right to possess the
property. Thus, we cannot sustain his complaint for ejectment against the Modestos and, perforce,
must dismiss the same for lack of merit.

Lastly, we find the CA’s reliance on the principle of estoppel against the Modestos to be misplaced. 

Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it. 27 This doctrine is based on the
grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak
against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were
directed and who reasonably relied on it.28 It bears noting, however, that no estoppel arises where
the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon
an innocent mistake.29

1. Director of Forestry v. Villareal, 170 SCRA 598

(1989)

The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares,
as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.

It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the
land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is
the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore
not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before
us is legal, not factual. 

For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the
earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or
forest lands. 
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated.   Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No.
5

141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first
reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.

n the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government,   promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps
6

or manglareswere defined by the Court as: 

... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also,
to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon.
Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot
be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains. 

x x x 

Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom
had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of
sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster. 

Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.

Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus: 

Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.

No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and
Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry,   with
9

Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision
even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that: 

... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees
are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of
commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are
not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.

n C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of
making periodic classifications of public lands, thus: 
 Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:

(a) Alienable or disposable, 

(b) Lumber, and

(c) Mineral lands, 

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition. 

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or

disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act. 

With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides: 

For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes
to which such lands are destined, as follows: 

(a) Agricultural; 

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; 

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses. 

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class
to another. 

As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows: 

Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department
Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public
lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and
the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered,
sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest. 

The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify
the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such
proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become
part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made. 
 Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be
declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.

With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public

forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative
Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify
its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory
definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by
the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our
judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected.
We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps
as forest lands is descriptive of its  legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so
we shall.

It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove
swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of
the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of
his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827
of the Revised Administrative Code.

The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director
of Lands,   to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence
16

of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands
was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who
has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than
forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership. 

Thus we held in the Yngson case: 

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the
Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing
or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp

lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other
purposes. 
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus: 

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can
be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private
property.' 

We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the
fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown
that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that
the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty
years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law.   These matters are not presumed but must be
17

established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case. 

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis
used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor
of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18

1. Republic v. CA and Marcelo, GR L-46048,

November 29, 1988

The Director of Lands did not adduce evidence to show that the land is part of the
public domain and left to the applicant the burden of proving that in the absence of any
form of grant from the state, he acquired an imperfect or incomplete title thereto, and
has all the the qualifications and perfumed (sic) all the conditions prescribed by law to
justify the registration of the land in his name.

either the order setting aside the said portion as timber land by the Director of Forestry
nor the original plan nor a certified copy thereof showing the segregation from which
the sketch (Exhibit 22-government) has been traced or copied, was introduced. Without
these proofs, the testimony alone of a forester will not be considered sufficient and
convincing for the Court to adjudge the area in question as timber land (Director of
Lands v. Abaldonado, CA-G.R. No. 177-R; 450. G. 2128). It has been held that this will
not convert ipso facto the land into a forest land. (Vigor v. Director of Lands, CA-G.R.
No. 24582-R, October 21, 196_; 57 O.G. 5888) . . ." 6 
For instance, section 1820 of the administrative Code of 1917 provides: ‘For the
purpose of this chapter, 1 public forest’ includes, except as otherwise specially
indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all
forest reserves of whatever character. This definition of ‘public forest’, it will be noted,
is merely ‘for the purpose of this chapter’. A little further on, section 1827 provides:
‘Lands in public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the
Director of Forest that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural
than forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest,
shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands’ . . .

Regarding the contention that the controverted lot has been the subject of a fishpond
lease agreement between the Bureau of Fisheries and one of the private respondents
and is, therefore, incapable of registration, even under considerations of only the res
inter alios rule the act of that party cannot bind the applicant in the land registration
proceeding. Furthermore, the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer or
dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming a part of the public domain until
such lands have been released for fishery or other purposes. 15 

1. Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture, GR L-36847,

July 20, 1983

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN;

HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL RELEASED AS DISPOSABLE OR ALIENABLE. — It is
elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until
timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, cell, or otherwise
dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for granting or other
purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has
no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or
timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY; CHARGED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION AND

ENFORCEMENT OF A PROVISION OF A STATUTE; CONSTRUCTION GIVEN
CONTROLLING WEIGHT. — The Office of the President holds the view that the only
purpose of the provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature application and
to consider it filed as of the date the area was released and not to grant a premature
application a better right over another of the same category

REMEDIAL LAW; CONTEMPT OF COURT; ABSENCE IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The

petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct
disturbance in the proper administration of justice and processes of the law which
constitutes contempt of court

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
which upheld the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Office of the President regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into
fishponds. 
Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands
for development into fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting
and applying their own rules? This is the only issue in this case.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application. —In determining the priority of application or
right to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied
and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.

x          x           x

"‘(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the
Director of Fisheries by reason of the fact that the area covered thereby has been
certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL NOT
LOSE his right as a PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area applied for is
certified by the Director of Forestry as available for fishpond purposes, provided that
not more than one (1) year has expired since the rejection or cancellation of his
application, in which case, his fishpond application which was rejected or cancelled
before, shall be reinstated and given due course, and all other fishpond applications
filed for the same area shall be rejected.’" 

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public

domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and
alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has
authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases, and other modes of utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil.
175; Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de
Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1184).

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of

swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for
fishery or other purposes.

The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in
question is to redeem a rejected premature application and to consider it filed as of the
date the area was released and not to grant a premature application a better right over
another of the same category. We find such an interpretation as an exercise of sound
discretion which should not be disturbed. In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA
722) we reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with
implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given controlling
weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in the absence of a
clear showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be
respected. The records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present
case.
Republic v. CA and Carantes, GR L-56984,

September 30, 1987

The petitioner states that since the land in question is indubitably part of the public
forest and has not been reclassified or released from the forest zone, the same can not
be the subject of registration either under Act 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, or under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act. The petitioner points out that lands within the forest zone
or within a duly established reservation do not form part of the disposable portion of
the public domain nor can the same be alienated as said lands are not capable of
private appropriation or ownership and possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert that same into private property. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

It is further argued by the petitioner that the private respondents or their predecessors-
in-interest, Salming Piraso, had not acquired ownership over the land prior to its
classification as part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve because there is no evidence on
record that Salming Piraso had possessed the property for any appreciable period prior
to 1929 when the and became part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve.

We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled rule that forest lands or
forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property (Vano v. Government of
Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director
of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of
Lands v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701)
unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the
Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of the land by the applicants prior to the
reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the
thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands
v. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no showing of reclassification by the
Director of Forestry that the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter
which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.

A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of
that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The
Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
 1. Aquino v. People, GR 165448, July 27, 2009

The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and 
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.13

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the
implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine
trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees
because the lumber was used by Teachers’ Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be
convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the
charges against them. 

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting
trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could
have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make
petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD
705.

1. Mustang Lumber Inc. v. CA, GR 104988, June 18,

1996

Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
mandate   that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge
34

after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (3) search as
an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4)
consented warrantless search.  35
 1. Tan v. People, GR 115507, May 19, 1998

In denying this petition, the Court reiterates that the

gathering, collection and/or possession, without license,
of lumber,  which is considered timber or forest product, are
prohibited and penalized under the Forestry Reform Code, as
amended.

ne of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the

constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination.21 As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed
out, petitioners were not charged with the [unlawful] possession of
firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the
associated water or fish; thus, the inclusion of any of these
enumerated items in EO 277 is absolutely of no concern to
petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are
entitled to a judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did
not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said
provision.22 A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and
one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must
convincingly prove its invalidity.23
 Under PD 705 and EO 277, Is Lumber Considered Timber or Forest Product?

The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68

of PD 705, as amended, has been settled in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals,24 in which this Court expressly ruled that lumber is included in
the term timber.25 We quote at length the Courts discussion:

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.

While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of Processing plant, which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of

machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Websters Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being
prepared for the market. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words

and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither do
we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. 26 cräläwvirtualibräry

Mustang was recently reiterated in Lalican vs. Vergara,27 where we also said

that [t]o exclude possession of lumber from the acts penalized in Sec. 68
would certainly emasculate the law itself. x x x After all, the phrase forest
products is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is
manufactured timber. Indeed, to mention lumber in the aforesaid section
would simply result in tautology.

In addition, under American jurisprudence, lumber has been legally accepted

as a term referring to the manufactured product of logs28 or to timber sawed
or split into marketable form, especially for use in buildings. 29 cräläwvirtualibräry

Consistent with Mustang, we find no error in the holding of both lower

courts. Clearly, petitioners are liable for violation of Section 68 of the
Forestry Reform Code, as amended.

Petitioners unlawful possession of the subject lumber occurred in October

1989. EO 277, which specifically included possession of timber and other
forest products within the contemplation of PD 705, had already been issued
and in effect more than two years previous thereto. Nothing will prevent the
indictment of petitioners for violation of EO 277 at the time they were
caught by the forest guards in flagrante delicto. The prohibited act is
a malum prohibitum, and absence of malice or criminal intent will not save
the day for them.31 cräläwvirtualibräry
 1. DENRv.Daraman,377SCRA39(2002)

Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly

Section 68-A, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may
order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among
others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses
punishable by the said Code.

Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of

the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to
have conspired with any other persons who committed the violation
of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in
violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the
evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused
Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already
declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused
Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the
decision has not been appealed.10
cräläwvirtualibrä

Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.13 A comparison of the provisions

of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the
jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest
products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the
DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to
stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68
reads:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or

Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: x x x.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. 14 cräläwvirtualibräry

Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:

SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly

Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations
of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head
or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any
forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned,
and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter. 15 cräläwvirtualibräry

If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in

its literal meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the
presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts
may not construe it differently.16cräläwvirtualibräry

Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the

industrial arts;17equipment covers physical facilities available for production,
including buildings, machineries and tools; 18 and implements pertains to
whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or
utensil.19 These terms do not include conveyances that are specifically
covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A
define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle,
craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a
combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement of any
forest product.20

Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of

all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission
of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary
or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has
supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations. 21

To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO)

No. 54-93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90.
AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and
disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations.
Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for
the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed
against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar
its forfeiture.

In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that
Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of
the vehicle violated this law or conspired with other persons who violated it
or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents
Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their
acquittals were not appealed.

We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the
criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is
the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal
documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not
possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a
ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD
705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.

5. Momonganv.Omipon,AMNo.MTJ-93-974March 14, 1995

Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A and
Adm. Order No. 59, the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representative has the power
to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products and all conveyances used in
the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws.
However, as complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in relation to the
administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.

Taopa v. People, GR 184098, November 25, 2008

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes
seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was
covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner
Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as
qualified theft.8 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products
without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.
 5. Monge v. People, GR 170308, March 7, 2008

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and
separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations. 19 DENR
Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the
transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 thereof materially requires that the
transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly issued by the
DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by
the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting,
gathering, collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere
possession of forest products without the requisite documents consummates the crime. 20

It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany
lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken
together, has already given rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
particularly the second act punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of
Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension
well establishes petitioner’s liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership
over the pieces of lumber found in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely
solicited by Potencio to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No.
705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in
prosecutions under its provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses
because the offense is complete and criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are
committed.21In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. 22 It would therefore
make no difference at all whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the
subject pieces of lumber.

Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in possession
of, processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR. Petitioner has
never denied this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate himself from liability, he claims that it
was Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who requested his assistance in hauling the log
down from the mountain and in transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The
contention is unavailing.

 Indeed, the only instance where the testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is when
he deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance with his commitment, 30 as provided for
in Section 18, Rule 119. Potencio lived up to his commitment and for that reason, petitioner’s
challenge against his discharge must be dismissed.

5. Tigoy v. CA, GR 144640, June 26, 2006

 In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a
special law such as in the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime
itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the
special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously.14
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove
conspiracy.15 Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence. 16 It may be deduced
from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest.17 It is not even required that the participants have an agreement
for an appreciable period to commence it.18

5. Perfecto Pallada v. People of the Philippines, G.R.

No. 131270 March 17, 2000

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming
petitioner’s conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation of §68 2 of the Revised
Forestry Code 3 (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the
Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in
establishing the legality of the company’s possession of the lumber. 13 In support of his
contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
14 

The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely
processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in
answer to the lower court’s ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other
forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and
forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those
who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is
whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed,
different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest
products. 15 As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83
expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is
required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . .
. and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."  chanrobles.com : virtual law library

1. Dagudagv.Paderanga,A.M.No.RTJ-06-2017,

June 19, 2008

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of

law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have
been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum. (Emphasis ours) 
 Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free
hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within
its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed
by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of
the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. (Emphasis ours)

Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.
There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in
accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court held that properties lawfully seized by
the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized] were validly deemed
in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property
lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not
otherwise. 

1. ProsecutorLeoC.Tabaov.JudgeFriscoT.

Lilagan and Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651 (Formerly A.M. No.
98-551-RTJ) September 4, 2001

for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of judicial authority, and willful disobedience to settle
jurisprudence

for gross irregularity in the performance of official duties, giving unwarranted benefits to a private
individual, violation of Section 1 (b) and (c) of P.D. No. 1829, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

nder Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized
representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances used in the commission of the offense. 

In this regard, we declared in Paat v. Court of Appeals: 

"...the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development
and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the
DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of
the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the
 domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
xxx"19

Respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates
ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity , and
independence. To measure up to this standard, judges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and
prevailing jurisprudence.20 Judges are duty bound to have more than just a cursory acquaintance
with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of
the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. 21

1. Calub v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000

2. Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All

conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or
gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents,
found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D.
No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of
in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the
matter.

3. Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or

his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or
natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR
are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and
guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials
of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products
and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and
turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action and
disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field
officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest
CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for safekeeping
wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]

4. Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported

without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to
possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved
vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the
Revised Forestry Code.
 5. Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued
without its consent..22 And a suit against a public officer for his
official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose
is to hold the State ultimately liable..23 However, the protection
afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies
only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.24 In the
present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being
called to account were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in
nature.25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89
of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out,
petitioners were performing their duties and functions as
officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their
authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part.
Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR
is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States
consent

6. Factoran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93540 December 13, 1999

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for

reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. 35 As to the
application of this doctrine in cases involving violations of P.D. No. 705, our
ruling in Paat v. Court of Appeals, is apropos:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. 39

When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. 40 Otherwise, there would be
interference with the possession before the function of law had been performed as to
the process under which the property was taken. 41 So basic is this doctrine that it
found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, Sec. 2(c), Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

1. Basilio P. Mamanteo, et al. v. Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-
1264, July 28, 1999
 What should the sheriff do when he is informed by the defendant in a replevin
that the property to be seized is in custodia legis and in fact already forfeited in
favor of the government by order of another government agency?
Deputy Sheriff Magumun should not have insisted on seizing the property subject of the
warrant of seizure. 8 The appropriate action should have been for respondent to inform
his judge of the situation by way of partial Sheriff’s Return and wait for instructions on
the proper procedure to be observed. 9 For such ignorance of proper procedure the
OCA recommended that Sheriff Magumun be penalized in the amount of P5,000.00 at
the very least. 10 

We agree. Respondent was placed in a difficult situation where the vehicle subject of
the warrant of seizure had already been confiscated by another government agency and
forfeited in favor of the government. However, the novelty of his predicament did not
call for him to use his discretion and justify his insistence on taking the property subject
of the warrant without waiting for instructions from his judge. A sheriff’s prerogative
does not give him the liberty to determine who among the parties is entitled to the
possession of the attached property, 11 much less does he have any discretion to
decide which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at hand.

When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any
instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to
execute it according to its mandate. 12 However, the prompt implementation of a
warrant of seizure is called for only in instances where there is no question regarding
the right of the plaintiff to the property. Where the plaintiff has shown by his own
affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of the property; that the property is
wrongfully detained by the defendant; that the same has not been taken for tax
assessment or seized under execution or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt
from such seizure, 13 then the executing officer has no other recourse but to execute
the warrant or writ expeditiously.

In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Magumun has been informed that the property had
been impounded due to violation of forestry laws and an order for its forfeiture had
already been issued by the DENR. Moreover, he was advised that the proper remedy for
SMC, owner of the vehicle, was to appeal the order of forfeiture to the Secretary of the
DENR. 14 The prudent recourse then for respondent was to desist from executing the
warrant and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff. Instead, Deputy
Sheriff Magumun carried out the implementation of the warrant of seizure with undue
haste as evidenced by the mere 6-day lapse from the time he first served the warrant
of seizure on the DENR officials to the time of his precipitate seizure of the van. A
warrant could be returned within a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than
sixty (60) days after its receipt by the executing officer. 15 Within this time frame,
Deputy Sheriff Magumun should have conferred with his judge and thereafter execute
the warrant judiciously and with more certainty. chanrobles law library : red

True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs
promptly and expeditiously, but equally true is the principle that sheriffs by the nature
of their functions must at all times conduct themselves with propriety and decorum and
act above suspicion. 16 There must be no room for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs
and deputy sheriffs as officers of the court have conspired with any of the parties to a
case to obtain a favorable judgment or immediate execution. The sheriff is the front line
representative of the judiciary and by his act he may build or destroy the institution.
Hence, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs, as agents of the law, are called upon to discharge
their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the court’s writs and
processes and implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice. 18 chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

1. Paat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107, January 10, 1997

2. Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action

for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines?

Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

 it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of
the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court
to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.  In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy
25

Executive Secretary,  which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS
26

vs. Vasquez,  this Court held:

27

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training
of such agencies.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck
because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts
under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section
68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:

Sec. 68. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of

the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not
only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" that
can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and
inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized

Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis
ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating
the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad
enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is
that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In
the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected
in the statute.  Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
33

mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not
only "conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products
by the "court" in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents
insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section
68, then Section 68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have
provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.

What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the
commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no
case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in
the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O.
277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:

. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended by

Executive Order No. 277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance
used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents.
She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in
question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is
therefor liable. . .
37

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority
constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive
Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words
"shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 38

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings
in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of
cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should
have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the
case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies
in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and
more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be
waylaid by the lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the
defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.  "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in
39

custody,"  and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling
40

with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or
right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.
41

 Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by
his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully
detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax
assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such
seizure, and the actual value of the property.
Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject
truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners
because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest
contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as
amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of
DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of
forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for
administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the
case at bar.

1. Alvarez v. PICOP, G.R. No. 162243, November

29, 2006

The contention does not hold water. In its petition for mandamus, [PICOP] asserted that "DENR
Secretary Alvarez acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction in refusing to
perform his ministerial duty to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and to issue the
corresponding IFMA number to it." The cited jurisdiction of the DENR on licencing regulation and
management of our environment and natural resources is not disputed. In fact, the petition seeks to
compel it to properly perform its said functions in relation to [PICOP]. What is at stake is not the
scope of the DENR jurisdiction but the manner by which it exercises or refuses to exercise that
jurisdiction.
The courts have the duty and power to strike down any official act or omission tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The 1987 Constitution is explicit in providing that judicial power
includes not only the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government

We agree with the DENR Secretary. Republic Act No. 8975 was not intended to set out in full all
laws concerning the prohibition against temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and
preliminary mandatory injunctions. Republic Act No. 8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing such
orders in connection with the implementation of government infrastructure projects, while
Presidential Decree No. 605 prohibits the issuance of the same, in any case involving licenses,
concessions and the like, in connection with the natural resources of the Philippines. This can be
further seen from the respective titles of these two laws, which, of course, should express the
subjects thereof:75

DAO No. 99-53 enumerates the requirements for the grant of the IFMA conversion:

Sec. 9. Qualifications of Applicants. The applicants for IFMA shall be:

(a) A Filipino citizen of legal age; or

(b) Partnership, cooperative or corporation whether public or private, duly registered under
Philippine laws.

Section 59 of RA 8371, which requires prior certification from the NCIP that the areas affected do not
overlap with any ancestral domain before any IFMA can be entered into by the government, should
be read in conjunction with Sections 3 (a) and 56 of the same law.

Section 3 (a) of RA 8371 describes ancestral domains as "areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present xxx." On the other
hand, Section 56 of the same law provides:

"Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. – Property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected."

SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. – All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease,
or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued
after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department,
government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation may issue new concession,
license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT:
Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this
Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.
The issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title is merely a formal recognition of the
ICCs/IPs’ rights of possession and ownership over their ancestral domain identified and delineated
in accordance with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,104 and therefore, cannot be considered a
condition precedent for the need for an NCIP certification. In the first place, it is manifestly absurd to
claim that the subject lands must first be proven to be part of ancestral domains before a certification
that they are not part of ancestral domains can be required. In Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, 105 where
no single member of the Court penned a majority opinion (since the petition to declare Republic Act
No. 8371 unconstitutional was dismissed for the reason that the votes were equally divided), Mr.
Justice Reynato Puno, who voted to dismiss the petition, wrote in his separate opinion:

As its subtitle suggests, [Section 59 of R.A. No. 8371] requires as a precondition for the issuance of
any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the
NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie with any ancestral domain. The provision
does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to
grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to
ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has
been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not
necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains,
Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.

Another requirement determined by the Court of Appeals to have been complied with by PICOP,
albeit impliedly this time by not mentioning it at all, is the requirement posed by Sections 26 and 27
of the Local Government Code:

SEC. 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. – It shall
be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or
involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution,
climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover,
and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives
of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental
or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse
effects thereof.

SEC. 27. Prior Consultation Required. – No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied
with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas
where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites
have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

These provisions are clear: the prior approval of local government units affected by the proposed
conversion of a TLA into an IFMA is necessary before any project or program can be implemented
by the government authorities that may cause "depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop
land, rangeland or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species."

1. IntegratedWoodProducts,Inc.,v.Courtof

Appeals G.R. No. 98310, October 24, 1996

It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct from
that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the
persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its
stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. Conversely, a stockholder cannot
be made to answer for any of its financial obligations even if he should be its president.
37 But when the juridical personality of the corporation is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the corporation shall be
considered as a mere association of persons (Koppel, Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil 496, Palay,
Inc. v. Clave, G. R. No. 56076, September 21, 1983, 124 SCRA 638), and its
responsible officers and/or stockholders shall be individually liable (Namarco v.
Associated Finance Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-20886, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 962). For the
same reasons, a corporation shall be liable for the obligations of a stockholder (Palacio
v. Fely Transportation Co., G.R. No. L-15121, August 31, 1963, 5 SCRA 1011), or a
corporation and its successor-in-interest shall be considered as one and the liability of
the former shall attach to the latter. 38

It is the general rule that the protective mantle of a corporation’s separate and distinct
personality could only be pierced and liability attached directly to its officers and/or
members — stockholders, when the same is used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal
purpose. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the Association entered into the
transaction with the private respondent for the purpose of defrauding the latter of his
goods or the payment thereof. . . . Therefore, the general rule on corporate liability, not
the exception, should be applied in resolving this case. (G.R. No. 49834, June 22,
1989)

Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and intent of the legislature that
is important. When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal
import of its words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the
spirit and reason, disregarding if necessary the letter of the law. 45 

In construing statutes, the terms used therein are generally to be given their ordinary
meaning, that is, such meaning which is ascribed to them when they are commonly
used, to the end that absurdity in the law must be avoided. 46 The term "obligations"
as used in the final clause of the second paragraph of Section 61 of P.D. 705 is
construed to mean those obligations incurred by the transferor in the ordinary course of
business. It cannot be construed to mean those obligations or liabilities incurred by the
transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal obligations of
the transferor, and could not have been included in the term "obligations absent any
modifying provision to that effect.

1. Dy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121587, March

9, 1999

The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort
to the courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may
be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed himself of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. Hence,
if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before a court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of a court’s intervention is fatal
to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case
is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. 
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private
respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper
cause of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the
remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s
recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents’
right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court. 15 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, GR 180771,

April 21, 2015

They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.  as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international
2

and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour
autrui. As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they
3

have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as to
protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to do its
duty under the doctrine of public trust.
4

Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court
will have the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary
jurisdiction."5

The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to continue
to define environmental rights in the context of actual cases is commendable. However, the space
for legal creativity usually required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is not so unlimited
that it should be allowed to undermine the other values protected by current substantive and
procedural laws. Even rules of procedure as currently formulated set the balance between
competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules when the necessity is not clearly and
convincingly presented.

The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural rights for
animals through their allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the
premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait; (b) they were
chosen by a representative group of all the species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were
able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their animal principals that
they would wish to use human legal institutions to pursue their interests. 

ule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:

SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be
authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action.

Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:

ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts
with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:

ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified 'in the
following article.

Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:

ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the
law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner
or member.

A representative may be a trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a

party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract
involves things belonging to the principal.(3a) 9

The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not bound to directly or
actually benefit or suffer from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an identified real
party in interest.  The representative is an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the rule provides
10

a list of who may be considered as "representatives." It is not an exhaustive list, but the rule limits
the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court. 11

When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly
situated as individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive
disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very
nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states, and others).

A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He or
she who invokes the court's jurisdiction must be the "owner of the right sought to be enforced." In
other words, he or she must have a cause of action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of
lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is not the real party in interest.  The term
24

"interest" under the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is not merely a curiosity
about or an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be present and substantial. It is not
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent interest.

A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as
representative of a .real party in interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a
representative, that representative is not and does not become the real party in interest. The person
represented is deemed the real party in interest. The representative remains to be a third party to the
action instituted on behalf of another.

....

To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of an
identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the
representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim."

The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under
this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on
behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons
who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.

The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet
unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity
of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding generations
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation's access to
and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its
potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real
party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial
pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an
actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At
best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right
and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives
have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded
arguments"  on behalf of those they represent.
26

I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and
use of natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones. This is the
clear import of the words "either financial or technical assistance agreements." This is also

the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973 and
1935 Constitution:

1973 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
association at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang
Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter
into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any
foreign person or entity for the exploitation, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, the technical,
management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)

1935 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-
five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.

The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer interpretation
from the Constitutional Commission deliberations. The constitutional texts are the product of a full
sovereign act: deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on recorded
discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand, may result in dependence on
incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens judicial review to further subjectivity from those who spoke
during the Constitutional Commission deliberations who may not have predicted how their words will
be used. It is safer that we use the words already in the Constitution. The Constitution was their
product. Its words were read by those who ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies upon
even at present.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources. 

1. Agnes v. Republic, GR 156022, July 6, 2015

2. To be precise, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8371 recognizes that the rights to ancestral
domains carry with it the rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains, which shall include the following:
3. Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. - The rights of ownership and possession of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall
include:

4. a. Rights of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water

traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

5. b. Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. – Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to
manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities
for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the
natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they
may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government
to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;

6. c. Right to Stay in the Territories - The right to stay in the territory and not to be
removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed
consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. Where relocation is
considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place
only with the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned and whenever
possible, they shall be guaranteed the right to return to their ancestral domains, as
soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. When such return is not possible,
as determined by agreement or through appropriate procedures, ICCs/IPs shall be
provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to
that of the land previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present
needs and future development. Persons thus relocated shall likewise be fully
compensated for any resulting loss or injury;

7. d. Right in Case of Displacement. - In case displacement occurs as a result of natural

catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas
where they can have temporary life support systems: Provided, That the displaced ICCs/IPs
shall have the right to return to their abandoned lands until such time that the normalcy and
safety of such lands shall be determined: Provided, further, That should their ancestral
domain cease to exist and normalcy and safety of the previous settlements are not possible,
displaced ICCs/IPs shall enjoy security of tenure over lands to which they have been
resettled: Provided, furthermore, That basic services and livelihood shall be provided to them
to ensure that their needs are adequately addressed;

8. e. Right to Regulate Entry of Migrants. - Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into the domains;

9. f. Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. - For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access
to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;
10. g. Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. - The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for
common and public welfare and service; and

11. h. Right to Resolve Conflict. - Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary
laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be
submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary.
(Emphasis supplied.)
12. Cham v. Pizarro, AC 5499, August 16, 2005
13. Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson Po Cham
(complainant) against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro (respondent) for commission of falsehood
and misrepresentations in violation of a lawyer’s oath

14. Republic v. Naguiat, GR 134209, January 24,

15. 2006