1. MARSHALL DOCTRINE: (The power to tax is the power to destroy.

McCulloch vs. Maryland

Facts. Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States. Branches were
established in many states, including one in Baltimore, Maryland. In response, the
Maryland legislature adopted an Act imposing a tax on all banks in the state not
chartered by the state legislature. James McCulloch, a cashier for the Baltimore branch
of the United States Bank, was sued for violating this Act. McCulloch admitted he was
not complying with the Maryland law. McCulloch lost in the Baltimore County Court and
that court’s decision was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The case was
then taken by writ of error to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court).

Issue. Does Congress have the authority to establish a Bank of the United States
under the Constitution?

Held. Yes. Judgment reversed.

Counsel for the state of Maryland claimed that because the Constitution was enacted
by the independent states, it should be exercised in subordination to the states.
However, the states ratified the Constitution by a two-thirds vote of their citizens, not by
a decision of the state legislature. Therefore, although limited in its powers, the
Constitution is supreme over the laws of the states.

There is no enumerated power within the Constitution allowing for the creation of a
bank. But, Congress is granted the power of making “all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.” The Supreme Court
determines through Constitutional construction that “necessary” is not a limitation, but
rather applies to any means with a legitimate end within the scope of the Constitution.

Because the Constitution is supreme over state laws, the states cannot apply taxes,
which would in effect destroy federal legislative law. Therefore, Maryland’s state tax on
the United States Bank is unconstitutional.

Discussion. This Supreme Court decision establishes the Constitution as the supreme

law of the land, taking precedent over any state law incongruent with it.

Brief Fact Summary. The state of Maryland enacted a tax that would force the United
States Bank in Maryland to pay taxes to the state. McCulloch, a cashier for the
Baltimore, Maryland Bank, was sued for not complying with the Maryland state tax.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress may enact laws that are necessary and proper to
carry out their enumerated powers. The United States Constitution (Constitution) is the
supreme law of the land and state laws cannot interfere with federal laws enacted
within the scope of the Constitution.
ANTONIO ROXAS, ET. AL., petitioners, vs. CTA and CIR, respondents.
G.R. No. L-25043
April 26, 1968

FACTS:
Antonio, Eduardo and Jose Roxas, brothers and at the same time partners of the Roxas y
Compania, inherited from their grandparents several properties which included farmlands. The
tenants expressed their desire to purchase the farmland. The tenants, however, did not have
enough funds, so the Roxases agreed to a purchase by installment. Subsequently, the CIR
demanded from the brothers the payment of deficiency income taxes resulting from the sale,
100% of the profits derived therefrom was taxed. The brothers protested the assessment but the
same was denied. On appeal, the Court of Tax Appeals sustained the assessment. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
WON the Roxases is liable.

RULING:
NO.
The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore, it should
be exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be
exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the “hen that lays the golden
egg”.
It should be borne in mind that the sale of the farmlands to the very farmers who tilled
them for generations was not only in consonance with, but more in obedience to the request and
pursuant to the policy of our Government to allocate lands to the landless. The act of
subdividing a farm land and selling them to the farmers-occupants on installment in response to
the Government’s policy to allocate lands to the landless is not subject to real estate dealer’s
tax. The business activity of the landowner in selling the land involves an isolated transaction
with its peculiar circumstances and not to be considered as an act of a dealer even though there
were hundreds of vendees.
In order to maintain the general public’s trust and confidence in the Government this
power must be used justly and not treacherously. It does not conform with the sense of justice
for the Government to persuade the taxpayer to lend it a helping hand and later on penalize him
for duly answering the urgent call.
In fine, Roxas cannot be considered a real estate dealer and is not liable for 100% of the
sale. Pursuant to Section 34 of the Tax Code, the lands sold to the farmers are capital assets and
the gain derived from the sale thereof is capital gain, taxable only to the extent of 50%.
2. TAX LAWS CONSTRUED

PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC., petitioner, vs. CIR, respondent.

G.R. No. 167330
June 12, 2008

FACTS:
The petitioner is a prepaid health-care organization offering benefits to its members.
The CIR found that the organization had a deficiency in the payment of the Documentary
Stamp Tax (DST) under Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code which stipulated its implementation:
“On all policies of insurance or bonds or obligations of the nature of indemnity for loss,
damage, or liability made or renewed by any person, association or company or
corporation transacting the business of accident, fidelity, employer's liability, plate,
glass, steam boiler, burglar, elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other branch of insurance
(except life, marine, inland, and fire insurance).”
The CIR sent a demand for the payment of deficiency taxes, including surcharges and
interest, for 1996-1997 in the total amount of P224,702,641.18.
The petitioner protested to the CIR, but it didn’t act on the appeal. Hence, the company
had to go to the CTA. The latter declared judgment against them and reduced the taxes. It
ordered them to pay 22 million pesos for deficiency VAT for 1997 and 31 million deficiency
VAT for 1996.
CA denied the company’s appeal and increased taxes to 55 and 68 million for 1996 to
1997.

ISSUE:
WON a health care agreement in the nature of an insurance contract is subject to the DST
imposed under Section 185 of Republic Act 8424 (Tax Code of 1997).

RULING:
YES.
The DST is levied on the exercise by persons of certain privileges conferred by law for
the creation, revision, or termination of specific legal relationships through the execution of
specific instruments. It is an excise upon the privilege, opportunity, or facility offered at
exchanges for the transaction of the business. In particular, the DST under Section 185 of the
1997 Tax Code is imposed on the privilege of making or renewing any policy of insurance
(except life, marine, inland and fire insurance), bond or obligation in the nature of indemnity for
loss, damage, or liability.
A health care agreement is in the nature of a non-life insurance policy. Under the law, a
contract of insurance is an agreement whereby one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify
another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. The
event insured against must be designated in the contract and must either be unknown or
contingent. Petitioner’s health care agreement is primarily a contract of indemnity. And in the
recent case of Blue Cross Healthcare, Inc. v. Olivares, 544 SCRA 580 (2008), this Court ruled
that a health care agreement is in the nature of a non-life insurance policy.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, its health care agreement is not a contract for the provision
of medical services. Petitioner does not actually provide medical or hospital services but merely
arranges for the same and pays for them up to the stipulated maximum amount of coverage. It is
also incorrect to say that the health care agreement is not based on loss or damage because,
under the said agreement, petitioner assumes the liability and indemnifies its member for
hospital, medical and related expenses (such as professional fees of physicians). The term “loss
or damage” is broad enough to cover the monetary expense or liability a member will incur in
case of illness or injury.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by The Hon. Secretary of Finance, et.

al., petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA, et. al., respondents.
G.R. No. 168584
October 15, 2007

FACTS:
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which created the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SBF)
and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Section 12 of R.A No. 7227 of the law
provides that no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic
Zone. Pursuant to the law, Indigo Distribution Corporation, et al., which are all
domestic corporations doing business at the SBF, applied for and were granted Certificates
of Registration and Tax Exemption by the SBMA.
Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, which provides that all applicable taxes,
duties, charges, including excise taxes due thereon shall be applied to cigars and cigarettes,
distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines brought directly into the duly chartered or
legislated freeports of the Subic Economic Freeport Zone. On the basis of Section 6 of R.A. No.
9334, SBMA issued a Memorandum declaring that, all importations of cigars, cigarettes,
distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the SBF, shall be treated as ordinary
importations subject to all applicable taxes, duties and charges, including excise taxes.
Upon its implementation, Indigo et al., sought for a reconsideration of the directives on
the imposition of duties and taxes, particularly excise taxes by the Collector of Customs and the
SBMA Administrator. Their request was subsequently denied prompting them to file with the
RTC of Olongapo City a special civil action for declaratory relief to have certain provisions of
R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional. They prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory
injunction. The same was subsequently granted by Judge Ramon Caguioa. The injunction bond
was approved at One Million pesos (P1,000,000).

ISSUE:
WON the writ of preliminary injunction and TRO issued by the Respondent Judge is
proper considering the effectivity of R.A. No. 9334.

RULING:
NO.
It is beyond cavil that R.A. No. 7227 granted private respondents exemption from local
and national taxes, including excise taxes, on their importations of general merchandise, for
which reason they enjoyed tax-exempt status until the effectivity of R.A. No. 9334.
By subsequently enacting R.A. No. 9334, however, Congress expressed its intention to
withdraw private respondents’ tax exemption privilege on their importations of cigars,
cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines.
Every presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
The burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a law rests on the party assailing the law. In
passing upon the validity of an act of a co- equal and coordinate branch of the government,
courts must ever be mindful of the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid.
 There is no vested right in a tax exemption, more so when the latest expression of
legislative intent renders its continuance doubtful. Being a mere statutory privilege, a tax
exemption may be modified or withdrawn at will by the granting authority. To state otherwise is
to limit the taxing power of the State, which is unlimited, plenary, comprehensive and supreme.
The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, it is
subject only to restrictions which rest on the discretion of the authority exercising it.
As a general rule, tax exemptions are construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. The burden of proof rests upon the
party claiming exemption to prove that it is in fact covered by the exemption so claimed. In case
of doubt, non- exemption is favored.
3. SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATIVE TAXING POWER

CIR and COMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioners, vs. HON. APOLINARIO B.

SANTOS of RTC-Pasig, ANTONIO MARCO, JEWELRY BY MARCO & CO., INC., and
GUILD OF PHILIPPINE JEWELLERS, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 119252
August 18, 1997

FACTS:
Petitioner in this case, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Commissioner of
Customs jointly seek the reversal of the Decision of herein public respondent, Hon. Apolinario
B. Santos, Presiding Judge of RTC Pasig City, declaring Section 150(a) of Executive Order No.
273 inoperative and without force and effect insofar as petitioners are concerned. This EO
subjected jewelry to a 20% excise tax in addition to a 10% value-added tax under the old law.
Private respondent Guild of Philippine Jewelers, Inc., is an association of Filipino
jewelers engaged in the manufacture of jewelries and allied undertakings, with private
respondent Antonio M. Marco is the President of the Guild.
Some of the members of the Guild of Philippine Jewelers were given a Mission Order not
to sell the jewelries and other articles displayed in their respective establishments until it can be
proven that the necessary taxes thereon have been paid. In response, Private Respondent prayed
that Regional Trial Court declare Sections 126, 127(a) and (b) and 150(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code and Hdg. No. 71.01, 71.02, 71.03, and 71.04, Chapter 71 of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines unconstitutional and void, and that the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and Customs be prevented or enjoined from issuing mission orders and other
orders of similar nature.

ISSUE:
WON the law subjecting the jewelry industry to said taxes is valid, considering the
Respondents’ contention that such tax rates are oppressive and confiscatory.

RULING:
YES, valid.
It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation,
and it has been repeatedly held that “inequalities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation.
The respondents presented an exhaustive study on the tax rates on jewelry levied by
different Asian countries. This is meant to convince us that compared to other countries, the tax
rates imposed on said industry in the Philippines is oppressive and confiscatory. This Court,
however, cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of other countries should be used as a
yardstick in determining what may be the proper subjects of taxation in our own country. It
should be pointed out that in imposing the aforementioned taxes and duties, the State, acting
through the legislative and executive branches, is exercising its sovereign prerogative. It is
inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
been repeatedly held that “inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class
for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation.”
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., petitioner, vs. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, City
Council of Quezon City, City Treasurer of Quezon City, and City Assessor of Quezon
City, respondents.
G.R. No. 210551
June 30, 2015

DOCTRINE:
The enactment by the Quezon City Council of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or
the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City was done in the exercise of its legislative, not
judicial or quasi-judicial function. Under R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code of
1991, local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the
city. Said law likewise is specific in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or
charge, or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the local
government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance.

FACTS:
Respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance, Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City, which will collect 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of Php
100,000.00. This shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City
Government. The special assessment shall go to the General Fund under a special account to be
established for the purpose. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235 and S-2013 was enacted
collecting garbage fees on residential properties which shall be deposited solely and exclusively
in an earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage
collections. Petitioner, a Quezon City property owner, questions the validity of the said
ordinances.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Socialized Housing Tax is valid.
2. WON the Ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on double taxation.

RULING:
1. YES, the SHT is valid. The tax is within the power of Quezon City Government to impose.
LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there is a
lawful subject and a lawful method. Herein, the tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or
merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with
public interest. On the question of inequality, the disparities between a real property owner and
an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length.
The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not
discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may
legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor
one over another. Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It
is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA
actually allows. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit.

2. NO. Pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers
under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local
legislative bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. In this regard, the LGUs shall share
with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of
ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction. The Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act of 2000, affirms this authority as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of its provisions. Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily
sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services rendered. The
fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the
regulation of an activity as provided by the same. As opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the
garbage fee is not a tax. Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under
Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
 LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be
delegated to them either by the basic law or by the statute. The fundamental law did not
intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective
obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units (LGUs) are being
strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the
taxpayer will not be overburdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable
impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources;
(c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local
taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.
 Subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) and consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy, every Local Government Unit (LGU) is now empowered
and authorized to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
which shall accrue exclusively to the LGU as well as to apply its resources and assets for
productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their
governmental or proprietary powers and functions.

1.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA and
BENITO R. BALAZO, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Laguna, respondents.
G.R. No. 131359
May 5, 1999

FACTS:
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) was granted franchise by certain municipalities o
f the Province of Laguna and the National Electrification Administration for the supply of electr
ic light, heat and power within their concerned areas.
Upon enactment of the Local Government Code, the province enacted an ordinance impo
sing a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. MERALCO paid under protest and later claimed f
or refund as it contravened Sec 1 of PD 551 imposing a franchise tax of 2% of gross receipts not
withstanding any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary.

ISSUE:
WON the withdrawal of tax exemption to Meralco by the local government unit (province)
violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution?

RULING:
NO.
The Local Government Code of 1991 has incorporated and adopted, by and large, the
provisions of the now repealed Local Tax Code (PD 231 pursuant to Section 2, Article XI, 1973
Constitution; in effect since 1 July 1973). The 1991 Code explicitly authorizes provincial
governments, notwithstanding “any exemption granted by any law or other special law to
impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise (Section 137).
Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional mandate of vesting
broad tax powers to local government units, the Local Government Code has effectively
withdrawn tax exemptions or incentives theretofore enjoyed by certain entities (Section 193).
While tax exemptions contained in special franchises are in the nature of contracts and a part of
the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless are far from being
strictly contractual in nature. 
Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the
taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures,
lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private
capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly, tax
exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the obligations of contracts.
These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax
exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is
beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII,
Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except under the condition that such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress as and when the common good so requires. Indeed, Article XII, Section 11,
of the 1987 Constitution is explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except under the condition that such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration
or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so requires.
BATANGAS POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BATANGAS CITY and
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 152675
April 28, 2004

FACTS:
4. POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO IMPOSE TAXES

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CEMENT

MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, DTI SECRETARY, DOF
SECRETARY, and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

FACTS:
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et. al., petitioners, vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et. al.,
G.R. No. 168056
September 1, 2005

FACTS:
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). 
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon

recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1,
2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI
Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the
Constitution.

RULING:
1. NO, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate
was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill
when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.

2. NO, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently
the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a
delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

3. NO, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the
purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent
a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
5. EXTENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES’ POWER TO TAX

CIR, petitioner, vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.

G.R. Nos. 167274-75
July 21, 2008

FACTS:
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. 7654, cigarette brands Hope Luxury, Premium More
and Champion were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of
20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993 or two (2) days before R.A. 7654 took effect,
petitioner CIR issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying “Hope, More and Champion being
manufactured by the Fortne Tobacco Corporation. . . B (as) locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes.” A
copy of RMC 37-93 was sent to Fortune Tobacco via telefax, but it was addressed to no
one in particular.
On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified Xerox
copy of RMC 37-93.
Respondent corporation sought a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93
but was forthwith denied by the Appellate Division of the BIR. As a consequence, on
July 30, 1993, private respondent was assessed an ad valorem tax deficiency. Respondent
corporation went to the CTA on a petition for review.
The CTA held that petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue failed to observe
due process of law in issuing RMC 37-93 as there was no prior notice and hearing.

ISSUE:
WON the CTA is correct in ruling that the CIR failed to observe due process of
law.

RULING:
YES.
The Supreme Court upheld the CTA, holding that when an administrative rule is
merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than the bare
issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed.
When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing
for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the
law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, as in the case at
bar, it behooves the agency to accord at least those directly affected chance to be heard,
and thereafter to be duly informed before that new issuance is given the force and effect
of law.