BOKO HARAM: Extremism in Northern Nigeria

Richard Lobban and Christopher Dalton

The Boko Haram movement is a relatively recent insurgency with an

unusual and alarming evolution. While not the first movement to draw arms in the
name of religion or morality, these believers torch churches, attack prisons, murder
and terrorized citizens throughout northeastern Nigeria, and now in Abuja and
Lagos. For what, and for whom, do they wield AK-47’s and unleash hidden
bombs? They are now receiving fight back from Nigerian President Goodluck
Jonathan via the police, military, armored vehicles and attack helicopters and
summary execution.
Their trail begins in West Africa’s Sahel, stretching thousands of miles
along the southern Sahara, birthplace to historic Islamic jihads of the 18th and 19th
centuries and led by Othman dan Fódio and Ahmadu Touré. These movements,
under Islam’s banner, helped build the modern Nigerian State. For northern
Nigeria, these epochs left behind five city states of the Sokoto Caliphate seen
today, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Rano Sokoto, and Zaria. England’s defeat of the
Caliphate in 1903 resulted in terrific humiliation. Post independence regional
underdevelopment and widespread youthful underemployment added to the
grievances. The Muslim Hausa and Fulani people, travelers of the Sahel, and
twelve of the regional states in northern Nigeria adopted Shari’a law, sometimes in
conflict with the federal principles and Constitution of Nigeria. Northern
perceptions that the “democratic,” secular, and corrupted Nigerian south and east
has fueled their anger.
These factors ignited the violent Hausa movement called “Boko Haram” in
2002. Adopting the Hausa ‘boko’ or “books” and the Arabic “haram” or
‘prohibited, forbidden, or sacrilegious,” Muhammad Yusuf of Maiduguri created
“boko haram” meaning that western education is sacrilegious. This anti-western
extremist movement seeks to spark a revolt to expand Muslim territories aligning,
in principle, with Salafist pro-al-Qa’eda and dedicated to radical ‘rejectionism’ as
a much needed “reform.” The operational area of Boko Haram is centered in a
broad arc between the Jos Plateau and the city of Maiduguri in northeast Nigeria
with a heavy concentration in Borno state.
Violence isn’t new to Northern Nigeria. 13,500 have died from dictatorial,
inter-communal, and even land disputes involving cattle wars between Hausa and
Fulani versus the settled animist and Christian populations.
In a syncretic mixture of economics, politics, religion and ideology but with
a Christian President, they fear the economic favoritism for the non-Islamic South.
They may also believe President Yar’Adua’s death, a northern Muslim, "wasn’t
natural" and his Christian replacement the "evil conspirator." Could Boko Haram
be nothing more than a front to settle political scores or to frighten the people into
voting Jonathan out of office? Do they believe that strict adherence to Shari’a
Law, as Sudan and Iran both favor, must be imposed? What of their newest leader,
Abubakar Shekau who aligned his movement with al-Qaeda in North Africa?A
means of credibility or a weapon of fear? There are lots of conspiratorial fears.
Hausaland leapt shockingly into the world press on 25 December 2009
when the ‘underwear” bomber Umar Farouk Abd al-Mutallab, from northern
Nigeria, tried to blow up a Detroit bound airliner. Luckily, despite his training by
al-Qa’eda and inspiration from American-born Yemeni, Anwar al-Awlaki, al-
Mutallab’s device failed to detonate. Abd al-Muttab’s father had even warned
American authorities but they failed to pursue this lead.
Flare ups in Bauchi in July and Jos in November 2009, respectively, resulted
in 700 dead. In July 2010 this inter-communal violence, driven by zealots on both
sides, escalated after Boko Haram’s founder Muhamad Yusuf was killed in police
custody. To avenge his death, armed Boko Haram activists stormed a prison in
Bauchi in September 2010 and freed some 700 supporters. The credibility of
security authorities was deeply damaged and despite the heavy repression by
federal forces, on Christmas Eve 2010, at least 30 armed militants of Boko Haram
coordinated simultaneous attacks on Christian churches in Borno and Jos that
killed at least 80 with 100 wounded. More attacks on New Year’s Eve and in
Gombe state have opened 2011.
This problem magnifies the significance of Presidential elections slated for
April. In practice the Presidency of Nigeria rotates between the Muslim north and
Christian south. The battles of Boko Haram and the broad problems of corruption
in Nigeria do not help. Clearly much is at stake and Boko Haram, once very
obscure, has moved onto the world stage.
Their trail of death and destruction resembles a violent tantrum of using
multiple means to achieve their nebulous goals: killing innocent civilians on
Christmas Eve (religious), police officers (enforcers of civil law), and soldiers
(protectors of the state). Yet, these attacks have not sparked economic unrest;
political change; or an end to injustice.
For Boko Haram to be strategically contained, Nigeria may need to call on
support from the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union,
and the United Nations, to help magnify the political will of the people in Nigeria.
Failing to mobilize such political bodies, the President has the military assets to cut
off their logistical supplies from Chad and Niger and to arrest the Nigerian
financier al-Haji Bunu Waki. Assuming Jonathan wins the next election he will
have the authority and mandate to bring economic benefits to the communities via
grants and redistribute oil wealth as a civilian based counter-insurgency strategy to
isolate Boko Haram and arrest its leaders.
Nigerian authorities have been remarkably heavy handed. Extra-judicial
measures against Boko Haram have been common including summary execution.
Human rights concerns are urgently expressed fearing that these measures will
only fuel more violence as well as undermine the legitimacy of due process in the
federal state. As long as Nigeria can keep on the track of civil society and
democracy, Boko Haram can be defeated. There is a danger that in trying to snuff
out Boko Haram, the weak Nigerian rule of constitutional law and procedure may
also be at risk. The story of Boko Haram is not over yet.
*****
Dr. Richard Lobban is Adjunct Professor of African Studies, US Naval War
College. Lt. Col. Christopher Dalton is a US Marine Corps supply officer. These
are their thoughts and not necessarily those of any US Government Agency.