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Conflicts of Law
JD-3B Case
Digests
FACTS:
May 10, 1993: Litonjuas filed a complaint to the RTC Pasig claiming
that during its operations and the foreclosure sale, BA as trutees failed to
fully render an account of the income. They lost all their 6 vessels and 10%
of their personal funds and they still have an unpaid balance of their loans.
BA NT&SA, and BA international filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action against them.
ISSUES:
HELD:
This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the
trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do
so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance; and that the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of
defense.
FACTS:
This case is an offshoot of a service contract entered into by a Filipino
construction firm with the Iraqi Government for the construction of the
Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical. The State Organization of Buildings,
awarded the construction to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company.
Respondent spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, in behalf of respondent
3-Plex International, Inc., entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal
wherein the former undertook the execution of the entire Project, while the
latter would be entitled to a commission of 4% of the contract price.
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, Northwest sued C.F.
in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales,
with claim for damages.
The CA sustained the RTC. The Court agrees that if the C.F. in a
foreign court is a resident in the court of that foreign court such court could
acquire jurisdiction over the person of C.F. but it must be served in the
territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the
government official designated by law, to wit:
The service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code.
FACTS:
When she was about to board her flight back to the Philippines, she
was forbidden by the authorities, was escorted back to court, interrogated
and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes due to
violation of Islamic laws on dancing and socializing with men.
She sought help from the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah. To earn her
upkeep, she worked on domestic flights of SAUDIA while Thamer and
Allah continued to serve in international flights.
Thus, Morada filed a case for damages against SAUDIA and its
country manager.
(2) That the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and
ISSUES:
HELD:
1. Yes. There is a foreign element in this case, hence, it involves a
conflict of laws question.
Here, the foreign element comes from the fact that the plaintiff,
Morada was a resident Philippine National while SAUDIA is a resident
foreign corporation. Moreover, through Morada’s employment as a flight
stewardess of SAUDIA, the occurrences surrounding the case transpired
while she was on her travels, which was across national borders. This caused
a “conflicts” situation to arise.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court found it best to
hear the case in the Philippines. If it refused to take cognizance of the case, it
would be forcing Morada to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Similarly, the trial court has also acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties in this case. By filing her Complaint and Amended
Complaint with the trial court, Morada has voluntary submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, SAUDIA has filed several motions
asking the court for relief. This indicates that SAUDIA indeed has submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some
of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and
(2) To what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual
situation, event, or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is
the indication of a “test” or “connecting factor” or “point of contact”.
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact,
such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
The place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the
place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed
or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts
and torts.
FACTS:
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file
their answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions
for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default for
failure to file their answers.
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint.
At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said
date within which to submit their respective position papers. On February
24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988,
AIBC and BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply,” POEA Adminitartor rendered
his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324
complainants. Claimants submitted their “Appeal Memorandum For Partial
Appeal” from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or
appeal in addition to the “Notice of Appeal” filed earlier.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most
of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa,
Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176,
otherwise known as the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the
provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the
complainants-appellants are as follows:
“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour
equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-
five percent thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum off fifty percent thereof for hours worked during the night
which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the evening until
seven o’clock in the morning.”
“Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous
service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a
period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not
less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in
respect of the proportion of his service in that year.”
ISSUE:
HELD:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in
evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
(Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for
greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts
of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country
are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the
observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts
in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of
the complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976.
The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that
the libellant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy
us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically
aimed against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The
Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives.” The American
court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the
Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the
Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being
considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to
the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48
cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in
this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign
claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims
in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.”
“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action across:
FACTS:
Nippon’s contention is that the ICA had been perfected in Japan &
executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has
no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA
could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the
principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle
of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in
the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held
that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE:
HELD:
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC
is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy
for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of
pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.
What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are
the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of
the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of
these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony”
or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction,
and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to
ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the
contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile,
place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes
into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to
deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion
to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it
as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the
basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular
case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the
RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case
based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts
principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine court can acquire jurisdiction over the
case notwithstanding the stipulation that the same shall be governed by a
foreign law.
HELD:
Yes. That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest
that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-
laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the
most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner averred foreign elements present in
this case which include (1) BRII and RUST are foreign corporations and
respondent Rouzie is an American citizen, and (2) The evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines. The Court held that these are
not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the
parties involved.
FACTS:
They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were
pregnant. As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their
respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to
process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but
later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents
to file their resignation letters. Respondents were told that if they did not
resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat of termination
entailed the loss of benefits; such as separation pay and ticket discount
entitlements. The respondents were required to report to the office one
month into their maternity leave.
ISSUES:
HELD:
2. Yes, the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the case. Saudia asserts
that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application
of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these
stipulations calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in
turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis
pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel
litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata
are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address parallel
litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions. On the matter of pleading forum
non conveniens, the court state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must
not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as
such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed
waived.
The court do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present
physical limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions
associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height
of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable
that it must entail the termination of one’s employment. It is clear that any
individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the
performance of functions. However, they fail to appreciate how pregnancy
could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but
the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a
living. Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi
law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take
maternity leaves;
Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and
practicable (i.e., “to make an intelligent decision”), Philippine tribunals may
apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning
to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents’
citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the
laws of Saudi Arabia.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
10. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO, G.R. NO. L-68470, OCT 8, 1985
FACTS:
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no
community property” as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in
the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial
is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD:
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during
the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations.
11. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA, G.R. NO. 80116, JUNE 30, 1989
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. While the State, as parens patriae, was
added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to
initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness,
in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action
therefor.
12. QUITA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 124862, DEC 22, 1998
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir
of the decedent?
HELD:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs
of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases. No dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan
children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares. Arturo
was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the
divorce they obtained. The implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have
prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the
aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.
The trial court did not grant private respondent’s prayer for a hearing
but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and
Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines.” It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. The question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner
to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent’s claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void
from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.
13. REPUBLIC VS. LABRADOR, G.R. NO. 132980, MAR 25, 1999
FACTS:
ISSUES:
1. Can Rule 108 of the Rules of Court be used to change the entry
in a birth certificate regarding the filiation of a child?
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage
in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with the irrespective nation allows.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the
ground of bigamy.
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva
were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and
after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does
not apply to the instant case.
16. REPUBLIC VS. IYOY, G.R. NO. 152577, SEP. 21, 2005
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They
begot five children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.”
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime
in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she
had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the
Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage
on March 25, 1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent
Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a
divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and
void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00
she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely
null and void ab ignition on the ground of psychological incapacity. One
factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the
United States of America and married another man and has established
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he
is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Court’s
decision. Basing from the facts, Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and
acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying Micklus a year after. This means that
paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a way that, Fely is not
yet considered an alien at the time the divorce was acquired and therefore
she does not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is still considered
as subsisting. The Civil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard
to family laws and status are governed by Philippine laws regardless of
where they are. Fely, being a Filipino Citizen then, is not permitted by our
laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized in the
Philippines.
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
FACTS:
Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.
ISSUE:
Whether one who is not a spouse may bring an action for nullity
of marriage.
HELD:
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare
the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage? No. The absence of a provision in the
Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a
nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
18. CORPUZ VS. SANTO TOMAS, G.R. NO. 186571, AUG 11, 2010
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right established is in favor of the Filipino spouse. As held in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139
and Pilapil v. Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 74 SCRA 653:
The provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. The
capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the
foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so. Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce
as a mode of severing the marital bond; (Art. 17, NCC) Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void. However, factual and equity
considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for
the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside
of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213
and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody
proceedings – the best interest of the child. As the question of custody is
already before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing the
Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest
of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take
advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial
arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court render
judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in
child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best
interest.
20. FUJIKI VS. GALELA, G.R. NO. 196049, JUN 26, 2013
FACTS:
Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied upon
consideration that Fujiki as a “third person” in the proceeding because he is
not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family
Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized.
The OSG agreed with the petitioner that the RTC’s decision be set
aside.
ISSUES:
HELD:
21. REPUBLIC VS. ALBIOS, G.R. NO. 198780, OCT 16, 2013
FACTS:
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-
trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that
the parties married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship and that in consideration thereof; she agreed to pay him the sum
of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter
never processed her petition for citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling, which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE:
HELD:
22. ANDO VS. DFA, G.R. NO. 195432, AUG 27, 2014
FACTS:
ISSUE:
No. In Garcia v. Recio, the court ruled that a divorce obtained abroad
by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other
fact.10 While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry
filed before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,
the court was still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the
RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record
of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity
of the divorce decree under that national law. Hence, any declaration as to
the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission
of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien
spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.
23. MEDINA VS. KOIKE, G.R. NO. 215723, JULY 27, 2016
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.
Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter
are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented
before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question
of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding
subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken
from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.