Clemente, Marie Immaculate L.

Conflicts of Law
JD-3B Case
Digests

1. BANK OF AMERICA VS. CA G.R. NO. 120135 MAR 31, 2003

FACTS:

Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua were engaged in the

shipping business owning 2 vessels: Don Aurelio and El Champion. Because
their business where doing well, Bank of America offered them to take a
loan for them to increase their ships. BA acquired through them as
borrowers four more ships: (a) El Carrier; (b) El General; (c) El Challenger;
and (d) El Conqueror. The registration, operation, income, funds, possession
of the vessel belonged to the corporation.

May 10, 1993: Litonjuas filed a complaint to the RTC Pasig claiming
that during its operations and the foreclosure sale, BA as trutees failed to
fully render an account of the income. They lost all their 6 vessels and 10%
of their personal funds and they still have an unpaid balance of their loans.
BA NT&SA, and BA international filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action against them.

The RTC and CA both dismissed the case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there are grounds of forum non conveniens.

2. Whether or not there is litis pendentia.

HELD:

1. No. The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning ‘the

forum is inconvenient’, emerged in private international law to deter the
practice of global forum shopping. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts
of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the
most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere. Whether a suit should be entertained or
dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to

do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:
(1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;
(2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and,
(3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision.

This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the
trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do
so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance; and that the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of
defense.

2. No. Litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action there

must be:
(a) Identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same
interest in both actions
(b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same acts
(c) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
which may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
other

It merely mentioned that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and

England.

2. PHIL. EXPORT & FOREIGN LAW VS. VP EUSEBIO,

G.R. NO. 140047, JULY 13, 2004

FACTS:
 This case is an offshoot of a service contract entered into by a Filipino
construction firm with the Iraqi Government for the construction of the
Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical. The State Organization of Buildings,
awarded the construction to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company.
Respondent spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, in behalf of respondent
3-Plex International, Inc., entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal
wherein the former undertook the execution of the entire Project, while the
latter would be entitled to a commission of 4% of the contract price.

Later, respondent 3-Plex, not being accredited by or registered with

the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, assigned and transferred all its
rights and interests under the joint venture agreement to VPECI, a
construction and engineering firm duly registered with the POCB. However,
on 2 May 1981, 3-Plex and VPECI entered into an agreement that the
execution of the Project would be under their joint management.

To comply with the requirements of performance bond and advance

payment bond, 3-Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee
with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue
guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance of
approved service contracts abroad. Subsequently, letters of guarantee were
issued by Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of
Kuwait was, therefore, engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain
Bank, but it required a similar counter-guarantee in its favor from the
Philguarantee SOB and the joint venture VPECI and Ajyal executed the
service contract for the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy

Medical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq. It

commenced only on the last week of August 1981 instead of the June 2 1981
Prior to the deadline, upon foreseeing the impossibility to meet it, the surety
bond was also and the Advance Payment Guarantee was extended three
times more until it was cancelled for reimbursement Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait
sent a telex call to the petitioner demanding full payment of its performance
bond counter-guarantee VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic
Development Minister Mohammad Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex call on
the performance guarantee for being a drastic action in contravention of its
mutual agreement that (1) the imposition of penalty would be held in
abeyance until the completion of the project; and (2) the time extension
would be open, depending on the developments on the negotiations for a
foreign loan to finance the completion of the project. VPECI advised the
Philguarantee not to pay yet Al Ahli Bank because efforts were being
exerted for the amicable settlement of the Project VPECI received another
telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that it had already paid to Rafidain
Bank the sum of US$876,564 under its letter of guarantee, and demanding
reimbursement by Philguarantee VPECI requested the Central Bank to hold
in abeyance the payment by the Philguarantee to allow the diplomatic
machinery to take its course, for otherwise, the Philippine government ,
through the Philguarantee and the Central Bank, would become instruments
of the Iraqi Government in consummating a clear act of injustice and
inequity committed against a Filipino contractor, Central Bank authorized
the remittance to Al Ahli Bank Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would
remit US$876,564 to Al Ahli Bank, and reiterated the joint and solidary
obligation of the respondents to reimburse the Philguarantee for the
advances made on its counter-guarantee but they failed to pay so a case was
filed in the RTC RTC and CA: Against Philguarantee since no cause of
action since it was expired because VPECI. Inequity to allow the
Philguarantee to pass on its losses to the Filipino contractor VPECI which
had sternly warned against paying the Al Ahli Bank and constantly apprised
it of the developments in the Project implementation.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine laws should be applied in determining

VPECI’s default in the performance of its obligations under the service
contract.

HELD:

Yes. No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly

provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems, however,
is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by the lex
contractus or “proper law of the contract.” This is the law voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis). In this case, the laws
of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties
is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the
issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be
determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not
properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity,
otherwise known as the processual presumption, comes into play. Where
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption
is that foreign law is the same as ours In the United States and Europe, the
two rules that now seem to have emerged as “kings of the hill” are (1) the
parties may choose the governing law; and (2) in the absence of such a
choice, the applicable law is that of the State that has the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties. Another authority proposed
that all matters relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and
valid excuses for non-performance are determined by the law of the place of
performance or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is undoubtedly
always connected to the contract in a significant way. In this case, however,
the petitioner has clearly waived these rights and remedies by making the
payment of an obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully due the
creditor and demandable of the principal debtor.

3. NORTHWEST AIRLINES VS. CA, G.R. NO. 112573, FEB 9,

1995

FACTS:

Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp & Company (C.F.),

through its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales
Agency Agreement, whereby the Northwest authorized the C.F. to sell its air
transportation tickets.

Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, Northwest sued C.F.
in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales,
with claim for damages.

Writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo

District Court of Japan. The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful
because Mr. Dinozo was in Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980. In
April 24, 1980, Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F. Office to serve the summons
but he refused to receive claiming that he no longer an employee. After the 2
attempts of service were unsuccessful, Supreme Court of Japan sent the
summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, Japanese Embassy in Manila, Ministry (now Department)
of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila who ordered Deputy Sheriff
Rolando Balingit to C.F. Main Office.
 C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of
summons but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. The Tokyo Court
rendered judgment ordering the C.F. to pay 83,158,195 Yen and damages for
delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until
payment is completed. C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of
the judgment. C.F. did not appeal so it became final and executor.

Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment a RTC. C.F.

averred that the Japanese Court sought to be enforced is null and void and
unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and
proper notice and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of
law and fact. The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this
action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant considering that this is an action in personam. The process of the
Court in Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction
cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in the case before the Japanese
Court of the case at bar.

The CA sustained the RTC. The Court agrees that if the C.F. in a
foreign court is a resident in the court of that foreign court such court could
acquire jurisdiction over the person of C.F. but it must be served in the
territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F.

HELD:

Yes. Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign judgment has

the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Accordingly, the
presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the
decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand. Applying it,
the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine
law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business
in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if
the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines,
service may be made:
 (1) On its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose, or,

(2) If there is no such resident agent, on the government official

designated by law to that effect; or

(3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive

summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without
force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him.

Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the
government official designated by law, to wit:

(a) The Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance

company

(b) The Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking

corporation

(c) The Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other

foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines. Whenever service of process is so
made, the government office or official served shall
transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal process
to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending
of such copy is a necessary part of the service.

The service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code.

Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign

corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic
corporations. We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy
should we make a discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the
petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment
when it has complied not only with every requirement of law made specially
of foreign corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made
of domestic corporations. In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing
business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time the
collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual
presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was
amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have
assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process.

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the

Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption but also
because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

4. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINE VS. CA, G.R. NO. 122191,

OCT 8, 1998

FACTS:

Milagros Morada was hired as a flight attendant of SAUDIA and was

based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. During a lay-over in Indonesia, Morada,
together with other crew members - Thamer and Allah went disco dancing.
The three of them returned to their hotels when it was almost morning and
agreed to have breakfast in the room of Thamer. However, Thamer
attempted to rape Morada. Hotel personnels rescued Morada while Thamer
and Allah were both arrested by the Indonesian police.

Upon Morada’s return to Jeddah, she was interrogated by SAUDIA

officials regarding the incident. They even requested for her to help arrange
the release of the two in Indonesia - to which she refused to do so. Later, she
learned that after two weeks of imprisonment, Thamer and Allah were
allowed to be deported through the help of the Saudi Arabian government.
Eventually, the two were again in service at SAUDIA while Morada was
transferred to the Philippines. When Morada was requested by her superiors,
her passport was taken from her and was pressured to drop the case or her
passport will not be returned. She eventually agreed to such request just to
get her passport back.
 Years later, Morada was once again summoned by SAUDIA to
Jeddah for further investigation. Morada agreed when she received
assurance from SAUDIA’s Manila Manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her. She was once
again interrogated by the judge about the incident.

When she was about to board her flight back to the Philippines, she
was forbidden by the authorities, was escorted back to court, interrogated
and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes due to
violation of Islamic laws on dancing and socializing with men.

She sought help from the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah. To earn her
upkeep, she worked on domestic flights of SAUDIA while Thamer and
Allah continued to serve in international flights.

Since Morada was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah

dismissed the case and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. However, shortly
before her return to Manila, her services were terminated by SAUDIA,
without being informed of the cause.

Thus, Morada filed a case for damages against SAUDIA and its
country manager.

SAUDIA field a motion to dismiss contending that:

(1) The Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia;

(2) That the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and

(3) The trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the case involves conflict of laws.

2. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
1. Yes. There is a foreign element in this case, hence, it involves a
conflict of laws question.

Foreign elements may appear in different forms. It may simply consist

of the fact that one of the parties to the contract is an alien or has a foreign
domicile or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a
complex form.

Here, the foreign element comes from the fact that the plaintiff,
Morada was a resident Philippine National while SAUDIA is a resident
foreign corporation. Moreover, through Morada’s employment as a flight
stewardess of SAUDIA, the occurrences surrounding the case transpired
while she was on her travels, which was across national borders. This caused
a “conflicts” situation to arise.

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court found it best to
hear the case in the Philippines. If it refused to take cognizance of the case, it
would be forcing Morada to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary

difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The
choice of forum of the Morada should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court has also acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties in this case. By filing her Complaint and Amended
Complaint with the trial court, Morada has voluntary submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, SAUDIA has filed several motions
asking the court for relief. This indicates that SAUDIA indeed has submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law

problems seek to answer two important questions:

(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some
of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and
 (2) To what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation.

Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal

system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law
theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the
problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed.

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under

what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
“characterization”, or the “doctrine of qualification”. It is the “process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a
conflicts rule.” The purpose of “characterization” is to enable the forum to
select the proper law.

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual
situation, event, or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is
the indication of a “test” or “connecting factor” or “point of contact”.
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact,
such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.

The place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the
place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed
or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts
and torts.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving

torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or
places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying
the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be
said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took
place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly
deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.

According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in

the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with
justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner
failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury
allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what
is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the
alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the
situs of the alleged tort.

5. CADALIN VS. POEA, G.R. NO. 104776, DEC 5, 1994

FACTS:

On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf

and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an
“Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from their
recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
(AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC
(BRI) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas,
and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation
licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino
workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.

The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion

of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and
Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary
differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not
remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR;
penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of
the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII.

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to

Strike Out of the Records” filed by AIBC but required the claimants to
correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.

AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file
their answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.
 On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions
for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default for
failure to file their answers.

On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order

directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt
of the order.

On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint.
At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said
date within which to submit their respective position papers. On February
24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988,
AIBC and BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply,” POEA Adminitartor rendered
his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324
complainants. Claimants submitted their “Appeal Memorandum For Partial
Appeal” from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or
appeal in addition to the “Notice of Appeal” filed earlier.

NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the

POEA. The resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the
claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the
claimants and by AlBC and BRII.

The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most
of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa,
Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176,
otherwise known as the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the
provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the
complainants-appellants are as follows:

“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour
equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-
five percent thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum off fifty percent thereof for hours worked during the night
which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the evening until
seven o’clock in the morning.”

“Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full

pay.
 If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x
x x.”

“Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work

on any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to
150% of his normal wage.”

“Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous
service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a
period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not
less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in
respect of the proportion of his service in that year.”

“Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite

duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the
other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of
monthly paid workers and fifteen days’ notice in respect of other
workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice
shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of
wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the
unexpired portion thereof.”
“Art. III: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each
year of the first three years of service and of one month’s wages for each
year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of
leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of
his service completed within a year.”

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the foreign law should govern or the contract of

the parties.

2. Whether or not the Bahrain Law should apply in the case.

HELD:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in
evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
(Labour Law for the Private Sector).

NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for
greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts
of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country
are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the
observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts
in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC

and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became
applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable
than those stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment
contract which provides that the compensation of the employee may be
“adjusted downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable
benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation” therein agree,’ another part
of the same provision categorically states “that total remuneration and
benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom.”

Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be

interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377
of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall

not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”

Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where

there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the
employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave it.” The
presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other
and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced
their bargaining power.
 We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting
the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In
such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations
of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract,
the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth.
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just
agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference to the
provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign
contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as
a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties.

Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties’ own
choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some
relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with
the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.

2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of
the complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable
after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the Contract”.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the

forum (local court), Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder
of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the
laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in

the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic
Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the
applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New
York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed
under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New
York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was
procedural as it was not “specifically intended to be substantive,” hence, the
prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The Court
observed: “. . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign
country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to
limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country
concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think
that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is
the most satisfactory one.

The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that
the libellant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy
us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically
aimed against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The
Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives.” The American
court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the
Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the
Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being
considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to
the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.

However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or

substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local
Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing
statute” directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While
there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an
action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced
in the forum even though the local statute was not run against it.

Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If

by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action
is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48
cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in
this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign
claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims
in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987

Constitution emphasized that: “The state shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development” (Sec. 10).

“The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall

protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987

Constitution provides:

“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.”

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the

filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as
provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action across:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment”

 In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on
the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period
provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.

6. HASEGAWA VS. NIPPON ENGINEERING, G.R. NO. 149177,

NOV. 23, 2007

FACTS:

Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy

firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure
projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement
provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a
year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the
Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project
was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon,
this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the
Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named
as the project manger in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division,

informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically
renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up
to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon

insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired.
Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa
City. Nippon filed a MTD.

Nippon’s contention is that the ICA had been perfected in Japan &
executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has
no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA
could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the
principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle
of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in
the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held
that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in

civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts executed
outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of
lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant
relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.

HELD:

No. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive

phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is
fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically
give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction
and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the “minimum contacts”
for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the
other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a
transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction,

however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to
adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the
plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter,
over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or
the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's
jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is

conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court.
It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed
in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal
cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to
adjudicate the claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC
is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy
for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of
pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.
What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are
the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of
the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of
these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony”
or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction,
and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to
ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the
contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile,
place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes
into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law

applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of
law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the
substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in
this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable
but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is

exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between
the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1st
there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the
conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law
must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign

element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3
alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either
because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the
case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the
forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases
and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it
may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by
foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in
matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to
deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion
to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it
as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the
basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular
case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the
RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case
based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts
principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

7. RAYTHEON VS. STOCKTON, G.R. NO. 162894, FEB 26, 2008

FACTS:

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a foreign corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a
contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate
the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. Then, respondent secured
a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI.

After 4 years, respondent filed before the Arbitration branch of the

NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST) for alleged
nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment
contract. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay
respondent’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the case to the SC but
was dismissed.

After that, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an

action for damages before the RTC of La Union. The Complaint named as
defendants here in petitioner as well as BMSI and RUST, the two
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially
reiterated the allegations in the labor case that respondent was not paid for
his services. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as
petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.

In its Answer, petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it

was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and
denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter
any sum of money. Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which
disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and
RUST, denominated as “Special Sales Representative Agreement,” the
rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens. It
was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine court can acquire jurisdiction over the
case notwithstanding the stipulation that the same shall be governed by a
foreign law.

HELD:

Yes. That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest
that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action.
 Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-
laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the
most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner averred foreign elements present in
this case which include (1) BRII and RUST are foreign corporations and
respondent Rouzie is an American citizen, and (2) The evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines. The Court held that these are
not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the
parties involved.

8. SAUDIA VS. REBESENCIO, G.R. NO. 198587, JAN 14, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation

established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Flight Attendants
with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Respondents continued their employment with
Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates in 2006. The
respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal.

They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were
pregnant. As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their
respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to
process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but
later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents
to file their resignation letters. Respondents were told that if they did not
resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat of termination
entailed the loss of benefits; such as separation pay and ticket discount
entitlements. The respondents were required to report to the office one
month into their maternity leave.

Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents’ maternity leaves and

demand for their resignation on its “Unified Employment Contract for
Female Cabin Attendants” (Unified Contract) which provides that if the Air
Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this
shall render her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due
to lack of medical fitness. The respondents averred that the Unified Contract
took effect after the approval of their maternity leaves. Rather than comply
and tender resignation letters, respondents filed separate appeal letters that
were all rejected. Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their
benefits, respondents executed handwritten resignation letters.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondents voluntarily resigned or were

illegally terminated.

2. Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the

case.

HELD:

1. Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed. The petitioner Saudia

themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of
employment of women who take maternity leaves Under the Labor Laws of
Saudi Arabia and the Philippines, it is illegal and unlawful to terminate the
employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia
is even more harsh and strict in that no employer can terminate the
employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on
Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is
hereto quoted as follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment
of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on maternity
leave.” (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal
Decree No. M/51.)

2. Yes, the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the case. Saudia asserts
that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application
of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these
stipulations calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in
turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis
pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel
litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata
are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address parallel
litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions. On the matter of pleading forum
non conveniens, the court state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must
not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as
such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed
waived.

It further stated that Forum non conveniens finds no application and

does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require
the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to
supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that
require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.

As argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of

employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating
the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women.
Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no
other consideration but sex.

The court do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present
physical limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions
associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height
of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable
that it must entail the termination of one’s employment. It is clear that any
individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the
performance of functions. However, they fail to appreciate how pregnancy
could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but
the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a
living. Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi
law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take
maternity leaves;

Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and
practicable (i.e., “to make an intelligent decision”), Philippine tribunals may
apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning
to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents’
citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the
laws of Saudi Arabia.

9. LLORENTE VS. CA, G.R. NO. 124371, NOV 23, 2000

FACTS:

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937

in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy.
Soon after, he left for the US, where through naturalization, he became a US
Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living
with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate
but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in
California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived
together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and
testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage.
He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special
administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated,
Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate.
The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An
appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the
judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever
properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of
cohabitation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

HELD:

Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced

Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his
will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus
the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is
not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted
after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law
allowed divorce.

The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

10. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO, G.R. NO. L-68470, OCT 8, 1985
FACTS:

Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private

respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in
Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating

that Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties,
and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no
community property” as of June 11, 1982.

The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in
the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial
is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE:

What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?

HELD:

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether

the property relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were
upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during
the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of

the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an

Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper
to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of

incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the

Court.

3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by

the court.

xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in

any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that
the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15

of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
 Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

11. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA, G.R. NO. 80116, JUNE 30, 1989

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private

respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar
of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of
Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named
Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner
then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the

ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was
granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery

before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda,
latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of

adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of
divorce was already issued.

HELD:
 No. The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. While the State, as parens patriae, was
added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to
initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness,
in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action
therefor.

Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between

a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the

offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as
he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.

12. QUITA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 124862, DEC 22, 1998

FACTS:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the

Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children.
Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued
Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married
a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in
a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972,

Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan
(also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of
Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage
between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972,
that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly
void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir
of the decedent?

HELD:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs
of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases. No dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan
children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares. Arturo
was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the
divorce they obtained. The implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have
prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the
aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.

The trial court did not grant private respondent’s prayer for a hearing
but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and
Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines.” It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. The question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner
to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent’s claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void
from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.

13. REPUBLIC VS. LABRADOR, G.R. NO. 132980, MAR 25, 1999

FACTS:

Sarah Zita Erasmo is the niece of Gladys C. Labrador, the respondent.

Sarah is the daughter of Maria Rosario Caon, the sister of Gladys, and was
born from a common law relationship with a certain Degoberto Erasmo.
During the registration of Sarah Zita’s birth, Maria Rosario allegedly told
the Local Civil Registrar that she was not married to Degoberto, however,
the Local Civil Registrar still entered the name of Sarah Zita as SARAH
ZITA C. ERASMO, instead of SARAH ZITA CAON. Gladys was the one
who had reported the birth of Sarah to the local civil registrar, to whom she
had given “Rosemarie” as the first name of the child’s mother, instead of
“Maria Rosario”.

In order to correct the name of Sarah Zita C. Erasmo to Sarah Zita

Caon and the name of her mother from Rosemarie Caon to Maria Rosario
Caon, Gladys was constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court a
Petition for the Correction of Entries in the Record of Birth of Sarah. The
trial court granted the petition and ordered the local civil registrar to correct
the erroneous entries in the birth certificate of Sarah Zita. The Solicitor
General, in disagreeing with the order, stated that the summary proceedings
under Rule 108 of the Rules of court and Article 412 of the Civil Code may
be used only to correct or change clerical or innocuous errors. It argues that
Rule 108 “cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights,
such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, which
respondent desires to do. The change sought will result not only in
substantial correction in the child’s record of birth but also in the child’s
rights which cannot be effected in a summary action.”

ISSUES:
 1. Can Rule 108 of the Rules of Court be used to change the entry
in a birth certificate regarding the filiation of a child?

2. Whether or not corrections involving the nationality or

citizenship of a person were substantial and could not be effected
except in adversarial proceedings.

HELD:

1. No. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or corrected

under Rule 108 are typographical or clerical errors, not material or
substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A clerical error is
one, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made
by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing; or some harmless
and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled
or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Thus, where the effect
of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a
person from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” as in Sarah Zita’s case, the same
cannot be granted in summary proceedings. In the present case, the changes
sought by Respondent Labrador were undoubtedly substantial: first, she
sought to have the name appearing on the birth certificate changed from
“Sarah Zita Erasmo” to “Sarah Zita Caon,” thereby transforming the filiation
of the child from legitimate to illegitimate. Second, she likewise sought to
have the name of Sarah Zita’s mother, which appeared as “Rosemarie” in the
child’s birth record, changed to “Maria Rosario.”

2. Yes. In Sarah Zita’s case, it cannot be granted in summary

proceedings.

In Republic v. Valencia, 12 we likewise held that corrections

involving the nationality or citizenship of a person were substantial could
not be effected except in adversarial proceedings.

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is

not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving the nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to
the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

What is meant by “appropriate adversary proceeding?” Black’s

Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as follows:

One having opposing parties, contested, as distinguished

from an ex parte application, one [in] which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party,
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes
an adoption proceeding. (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716,
718, 110 Was, 39)

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, it requires that a petition for a substantial correction or change

of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar,
as well as all other person who have or claim to have any interest that would
be affected thereby. It further mandates that a full hearing, not merely a
summary proceeding, be conducted.

14. GARCIA VS. RECIO, G.R. NO. 138322, OCT 3, 2001

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an

Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree
of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha.
 Recio married Grace J. Garcia at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church,
Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.

Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the

ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in
November 1997 of Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE:

Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Recio is admissible as

evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of
bigamy.

HELD:

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage
in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with the irrespective nation allows.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and

proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the

divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the
respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though
the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign
document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not
authenticated by the consul/embassy of the country where it will be used.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the
ground of bigamy.

15. REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO, G.R. NO. 154380, OCT 5, 2005

FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva
were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and
after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who

was living with his wife in the States – that his wife had remarried after
obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to
remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of

Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him
to remarry.

The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In

view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of
the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent can remarry under the article 26 of the

family code of the Philippines.

HELD:

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit

competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American
wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the
Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET
ASIDE.

“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.”

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does
not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and

rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art.
26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature,
it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far
as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to
case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirits or intent.

16. REPUBLIC VS. IYOY, G.R. NO. 152577, SEP. 21, 2005

FACTS:

Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They
begot five children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.”
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime
in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she
had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the
Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage
on March 25, 1997.

On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent
Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a
divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and
void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00
she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely
null and void ab ignition on the ground of psychological incapacity. One
factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the
United States of America and married another man and has established
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he
is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the

United States is valid and recognized in the Philippines.

HELD:

The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Court’s
decision. Basing from the facts, Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and
acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying Micklus a year after. This means that
paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a way that, Fely is not
yet considered an alien at the time the divorce was acquired and therefore
she does not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is still considered
as subsisting. The Civil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard
to family laws and status are governed by Philippine laws regardless of
where they are. Fely, being a Filipino Citizen then, is not permitted by our
laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized in the
Philippines.

“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND

A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.”

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
 Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity

of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

17. DE DIOS CARLOS VS. SANDOVAL, G.R. NO. 179922,

DEC 16, 2008

FACTS:

Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.

Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and

their son. Upon Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 (registered in the name of
Teofilo) were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action against respondents

for the declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner asserted that the
marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a
nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over

the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before
the trial court. But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Petitioner opposed the motion
for summary judgment and lodged his own motion for summary judgment.

RTC denied defendants’ (respondents) Motion for Summary

Judgment. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows: Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite
marriage license.
 On the appeal, respondents argued that the trial court acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.

ISSUE:

Whether one who is not a spouse may bring an action for nullity
of marriage.

HELD:

Yes, if the marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the

Family code and the plaintiff is a real party-in-interest. A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses [Sec. 2(a)].
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of
the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving
spouse.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration

of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases

already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved
is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule,
which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent

Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the
time of its celebration.

But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare
the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage? No. The absence of a provision in the
Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a
nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.

18. CORPUZ VS. SANTO TOMAS, G.R. NO. 186571, AUG 11, 2010

FACTS:

A former Filipino citizen got married to a Filipina. Due to work and

other personal commitments, the man returned to Canada after the wedding.
He returned to the Philippines to surprise his wife, but he was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. He filed a
petition for divorce in Canada, which was granted. Wanting to marry his
girlfriend, he registered the Canadian divorce with the Civil Registry of
Pasig but despite the registration of the same, the Local Civil Registrar
refused to issue a license for him to remarry. He filed a petition for judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment, which was denied by the RTC, holding
that he was not the proper party to file the petition as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only Filipinos can avail of the remedy under
the second paragraph of Article 26, Family Code and in accordance with the
legislative intent as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III, 472
SCRA 114 (2005), to “avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code

extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right established is in favor of the Filipino spouse. As held in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139
and Pilapil v. Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 74 SCRA 653:

“To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]

has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a
wife’s obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.”

The provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. The
capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the
foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so. Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce
as a mode of severing the marital bond; (Art. 17, NCC) Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

19. DACASIN VS. DACASIN, G.R. NO. 168785, FEB 5, 2010

FACTS:

On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the

Philippines. The following year, respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a
baby girl whom they named Stephanie. In June of 1999respondent sought
and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against petitioner. In
its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage and awarded to the
respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case
for enforcement purposes. On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and
respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody
of Stephanie. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional
TrialCourt of Makati City. Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised sole
custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint
due to lack of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in
enforcing the divorce decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of

petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the
parties’ child.

HELD:

The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void. However, factual and equity
considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for
the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner

filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of
actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.

Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside
of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213
and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody
proceedings – the best interest of the child. As the question of custody is
already before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing the
Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest
of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take
advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial
arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court render
judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in
child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best
interest.

20. FUJIKI VS. GALELA, G.R. NO. 196049, JUN 26, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married

respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).

Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
 Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

RTC dismissed the petition for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign

Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)” based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied upon
consideration that Fujiki as a “third person” in the proceeding because he is
not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family
Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized.

The OSG agreed with the petitioner that the RTC’s decision be set
aside.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02- 11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a

petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a

proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.

2. Yes. The prior spouse has a personal and material interest in

maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.

3. Yes. The Philippine court can recognize the effectivity of a foreign

judgment, which presupposes a case, which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. However, the
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution
for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are

incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under
foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the
status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to
the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.

21. REPUBLIC VS. ALBIOS, G.R. NO. 198780, OCT 16, 2013

FACTS:

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were

married, as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006,
Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had
any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations.

Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-
trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that
the parties married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship and that in consideration thereof; she agreed to pay him the sum
of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter
never processed her petition for citizenship

The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling, which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring

American citizenship is void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.

HELD:

No. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it

must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A freely given consent requires that the contracting parties willingly
and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding
the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act.
 Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent, as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage
so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.

22. ANDO VS. DFA, G.R. NO. 195432, AUG 27, 2014

FACTS:

On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a

Japanese National, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga.
On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was
validly granted under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage
with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the
Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Manila. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with
the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. Believing in good faith that said
divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she reverted to her single
status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a
civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. In the meantime, Yuichiro
Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005. Recently, petitioner
applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname
with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of
Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by
competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi
Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the first marriage is lawfully annulled by virtue of a

divorce decree making the second marriage valid.
HELD:

No. In Garcia v. Recio, the court ruled that a divorce obtained abroad
by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other
fact.10 While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry
filed before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,
the court was still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the
RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record
of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity
of the divorce decree under that national law. Hence, any declaration as to
the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission
of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien
spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

23. MEDINA VS. KOIKE, G.R. NO. 215723, JULY 27, 2016

FACTS:

Medina was married to Koike on on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,

Philippines. Their union bore two children. On June 14, 2012, Medina and
Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor
of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even
date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded
in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike. Seeking to have the said
Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry. At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.
Medina presented several foreign documents, namely, “Certificate of
Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce” and “Family Register of
Michiyuki Koike” etc.
 The RTC denied Medina’s petition, ruling that the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to
obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the
divorce documents presented were successfully proven to be public or
official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national
law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce.

Medina’s testimony neither was insufficient since she failed to present

a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have one.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documents presented by Medina would suffice to

grant the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

HELD:

The SC rendered a decision referring the case to the CA for

appropriate action to determine the pertinent factual issues in the case.
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Medina and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter
are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented
before the RTC. Under Art. 26 of the Family Code, the law confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage. The SC cited the case of Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas, where the Court had the occasion to rule that: The starting point in
any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.”

This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.

The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for

the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense. Moreover, in Garcia v. Recio, it
was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven.

Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter
are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented
before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question
of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding
subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken
from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.