Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No.

115455 October 30, 1995 Freedom of the Press

FACTS:

These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now
it is contended by the Philippine Press Institute (PPI) that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT
while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even
nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.”

ISSUE:

Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious and press freedom?

RULING:

No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its
imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence,
although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious
groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, in connection with the latter’s sale of religious books and pamphlets, is
unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, “it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon.”

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is
not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general
regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Case: REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC v. CIR and CTA (14 SCRA 202)
Date: June 16, 1965
Ponente: J. Paredes

Facts:
In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. in Bacolod City donated P10,000 in case to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the then
parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental and the predecessor of Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the construction
of a new Catholic Church. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.

On March 1958, M.B. Estate filed a donor’s gift tax return. Subsequently, on April 1960, the CIR issued an
assessment for donee’s gift tax in the amount of P1,370 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from May
1958 to June 1960 and the compromise for the late filing of the return against the Catholic Parish of Victorias,
Negros Occidental of which Lladoc was a priest.

Lladoc protested and moved to reconsider but it was denied. He then appealed to the CTA, in his petition
for review, he claimed that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest, thus, he is not liable. Moreover,
he asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid, for
such would be a clear violation of the Constitution. The CTA ruled in favor of the CIR. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: WON donee’s gift tax should be paid

Held: Yes.

Ratio:
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation
cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements
used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such
properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes.

In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the
properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the
properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. Manifestly, gift tax is not within the
exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on
the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious
purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.

As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the
Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear,
positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of Lladoc, the exemption herein must be denied.

However, the Court noted the merit of Lladoc’s claim, and held as liable the Head of Deocese for being the
real party in interest instead of Lladoc who was held to be not personally liable; the former manifested that it was
submitting himself to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court and he presented Lladoc’s brief, by reference, as his
own and for all purposes.
Punsalan vs City of Manila (1954)

Punsalan v City of Manila GR No L-4817, May 26, 1954

FACTS:
Ordinance 3398 was enacted pursuant to paragraph 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, imposing a
municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city. Various professionals filed suit to
annul the ordinance and the provision of law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance and to call for the refund
collected taxes under the ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause

RULING:
No. The legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupation shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that
discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the other untaxed. Manila, as the seat
of the National Government and with a population and volume of trade many times that of any other Philippine
City or municipality, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it is but fair that the
professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces.

The ordinance imposes the tax upon every person “exercising” or “pursuing” any of the occupation named in the
ordinance, and does not make any distinction between professionals having offices in Manila and outsiders who
practice their profession therein. What constitutes exercise or pursuit of a profession in the city is a matter of
judicial determination.

Thus, the ordinance does not violate the equal protection clause.
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS AQUINO

JUNE 15 1988

PARAS, J.

FACTS:
Abra Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with
the SEC filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure” and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and
building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties. Paterno Millare filed
through counsel a motion to dismiss the complaint. The provincial fiscal filed a memorandum for the government
wherein they opined hat based on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school
building and the school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College are exempted from payment of
taxes. Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of the said
school for residential purpose. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes?

HELD:
NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the
phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” as provided for in the Article VI, Section 22, Paragraph 3 of the
1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose. Otherwise stated,
the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence.
Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the
Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the
main or primary purpose – educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the rial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as
well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the
director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial
purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed
tax be return to the school involved.
 CIR V DLSU G.R. 196596 Nov. 9 2016

Facts
In 2004, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a letter authorizing it’s revenue officers to examine the book
of accounts of and records for the year 2003 De La Salle University (DLSU) and later on issued a demand letter to
demand payment of tax deficiencies for:

1. Income tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and bookstores operating within the campus;
2. Value-added tax (VAT) on business income; and
3. Documentary stamp tax (DST) on loans and lease contracts for the years 2001,2002, and 2003, amounting
to  P17,303,001.12.

DLSU protested the assessment that was however not acted upon, and later on filed a petition for review with the
Court of Tax Appeals(CTA). DLSU argues that as a non-stock, non-profit educational institution, it is exempt from
paying taxes according to Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution (All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxes and duties.) The CTA only granted the removal of assessment on the load transactions. Both CIR and
DLSU moved for reconsideration, the motion of the CIR was denied. The CIR appealed to the CTA en banc arguing
that DLSU’s use of its revenues and assets for non-educational or commercial purposes removed these items from
the exemption, that a tax-exempt organization like DLSU is exempt only from property tax but not from income tax
on the rentals earned from property. Thus, DLSU’s income from the leases of its real properties is not exempt from
taxation even if the income would be used for educational purposes.
DLSU on the other hand offered supplemental pieces of documentary evidence to prove that its rental income was
used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes and no objection was made by the CIR.

Thereafter, DLSU filed a separate petition for review with the CTA En Banc on the following grounds:

1. The entire assessment should have been cancelled because it was based on an invalid LOA;
2. Assuming the LOA was valid, the CTA Division should still have cancelled the entire assessment because DLSU
submitted evidence similar to those submitted by Ateneo De Manila University (Ateneo) in a separate case where
the CTA cancelled Ateneo’s tax assessment; and
3. The CTA Division erred in finding that a portion of DLSU’s rental income was not proved to have been used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.
4. That under RMO No.43-90, LOA should cover only 1 year, the LOA issued by CIR is invalid for covering the
years 2001-2003

The CTA en banc ruled that the case of Ateneo is not applicable because it involved different parties, factual
settings, bases of assessments, sets of evidence, and defenses, it however further reduced the liability of DLSU to
P2,554,825.47. CIR argued that the rental income is taxable regardless of how such income is derived, used or
disposed of. DLSU’s operations of canteens and bookstores within its campus even though exclusively serving the
university community do not negate income tax liability. Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution must be
harmonized with Section 30 (H) of the Tax Code, which states among others, that the income of whatever kind and
character of [a non-stock and non-profit educational institution] from any of [its] properties, real or personal, or
from any of (its] activities conducted for profit regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject
to tax imposed by this Code.
that a tax-exempt organization like DLSU is exempt only from property tax but not from income tax on the rentals
earned from property. Thus, DLSU’s income from the leases of its real properties is not exempt from taxation even
if the income would be used for educational purposes.
 DLSU argued that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution is clear that all assets and revenues of non-stock,
non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt
from taxes and duties. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, which renders any subsequent law that is
contrary to the Constitution void and without any force and effect. Section 30 (H) of the 1997 Tax Code insofar as it
subjects to tax the income of whatever kind and character of a non-stock and non-profit educational institution
from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any of its activities conducted for profit  regardless of the
disposition made of such income, should be declared without force and effect in view of the constitutionally
granted tax exemption on “all revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes.“
that it complied with the requirements for the application of Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution.

Issue:

1. Whether DLSU is taxable as a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose income have been used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.
2. Whether the entire assessment should be void because of the defective LOA

Held:

1. First issue:
1. A plain reading of the Constitution would show that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that
the revenues and income must have also been sourced from educational activities or activities related to the
purposes of an educational institution. The phrase all revenues is unqualified by any reference to the source of
revenues. Thus, so long as the revenues and income are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes, then said revenues and income shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
2. Revenues consist of the amounts earned by a person or entity from the conduct of business
operations. It may refer to the sale of goods, rendition of services, or the return of an investment. Revenue is a
component of the tax base in income tax, VAT, and local business tax (LBT). Assets, on the other hand, are the
tangible and intangible properties owned by a person or entity. It may refer to real estate, cash deposit in a
bank, investment in the stocks of a corporation, inventory of goods, or any property from which the person or
entity may derive income or use to generate the same. In Philippine taxation, the fair market value of real
property is a component of the tax base in real property tax (RPT). Also, the landed cost of imported goods is a
component of the tax base in VAT on importation and tariff duties. Thus, when a non-stock, non-profit
educational institution proves that it uses its revenues actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes, it shall be exempted from income tax, VAT, and LBT. On the other hand, when it also shows that it
uses its assets in the form of real property for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from RPT.
3. The last paragraph of Section 30 of the Tax Code without force and effect for being contrary to the
Constitution insofar as it subjects to tax the income and revenues of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purpose. We make this declaration in the
exercise of and consistent with our duty to uphold the primacy of the Constitution.
2. Second Issue:
1. No.“A Letter of Authority LOA should cover a taxable period not exceeding one taxable year. The
practice of issuing LOAs covering audit of unverified prior years is hereby prohibited. If the audit of a taxpayer
shall include more than one taxable period, the other periods or years shall be specifically indicated in the
LOA.”
2. The requirement to specify the taxable period covered by the LOA is simply to inform the taxpayer
of the extent of the audit and the scope of the revenue officer’s authority. Without this rule, a revenue officer
can unduly burden the taxpayer by demanding random accounting records from random unverified years,
which may include documents from as far back as ten years in cases of fraud audit.
3. The assessment for taxable year 2003 is valid because this taxable period is specified in the LOA.
DLSU was fully apprised that it was being audited for taxable year 2003. While the assessments for taxable
years 2001 and 2002 are void for having been unspecified on separate LOAs as required under RMO No. 43-90.
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS
as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-23794. February 17, 1968. 20
SCRA 739.

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, imposing "on any and all productions of sugar milled
at petitioner's, municipal tax of 1% per export sale. Petitioner paid but were under protest.

Petitioner filed before the CFI contending that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being in violation of the equal
protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section
2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax
which Ormoc City its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, or the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to
impose; that it also violates RA 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid.

RULING:

NO. The SC held that it violates the equal protection clause for it taxes only sugar produced and exported by
petitioner and none other. Even though petitioner, at the time of the enactment of the ordinance, was the only
sugar central in Ormoc, the classification should have been in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of
the same class as petitioner, for the coverage of the tax.

Though, petitioner can be refunded, they are not entitled to interest because the taxes were not arbitrarily
collected as the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed
constitutional until declared otherwise.
Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS:

In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no carabao and carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by
the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.

On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ for
replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and
declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed
by the IAC. Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not police power is properly enforced

HELD:

NO. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State
to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. As long as the activity or the property has
some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. In the
case at bar, E.O. 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribio case)
but NOT the same lawful method. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. 
Ichong vs Hernandez
Conflict with fundamental law; Police power
 
 
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995             May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
 
 
 
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business.
 
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance,
Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
 
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
 
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
 
 
 
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does
not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class,
if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
 
TAÑADA V. TUVERA
No. L-63915
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

Facts: In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was sought by Tañ ada, Sarmiento, and Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc (MABINI) seeking a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. There is a need for Publication of Laws to strengthen its
binding force and effect: giving access to legislative records, giving awareness to the public of the law
promulgated. The Official Gazette, however, does not contain publications of administrative and executive
orders that affect only a particular class of persons. The Official Gazette, as mandated by law, presents all
presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability.” Also, Article 2 of the Civil Code
expressly recognized that the rule as to laws takes effect after 15 days unless it is otherwise (for some do
specify the date of effectivity) following the completion of the publication in the Official Gazette. However,
the decree has been misread by many; for it has no juridical force, but a mere legislative enactment of RA
386.

Issue: WON to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from the Official Gazette, as it would be essential
to the effectivity of the said legislative or executive act that regulates the acts and conduct of people as
citizens.

Held: Respondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished issuances in the Official Gazette, serving as a
response to the maxim “ignorance as an excuse for noncompliance.” The effectivity of laws shall follow the
notice to parties concerned, for such is a public right. There will be no retroactive effect for laws with dates
which applied the 15-day rule of publication in the Official Gazette.
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law,
or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the
court over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that
while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner,
in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco
Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning
again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-
resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the
summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause
proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by
public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the
court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the
order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the
authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may
refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and
thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may
grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of
legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized
and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may
never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in
attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of
its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction
over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land.
Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person
claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the
petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and
is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to
certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the
circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole
object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other
form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action
becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference
to the principles governing actions in rem.
Alonte vs. Savellano - GR No. 131652, March 9, 1998
BAYANI M. ALONTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process

Facts:

Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñ an, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan with
accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonte’s house. The case was brought before the Regional Trial Court of Biň an. The counsel and the prosecutor
later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie
executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done
notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila Regional Trial Court under J Savellano.
Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the
prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media
pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and
Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due
process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape
and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity
between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires
that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed
as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not
shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the
lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Case Brief: Javier v COMELEC

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81  September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when
several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects,
including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and
the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon
came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers
of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before this Court, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of
the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second
Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the
elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said
decision on the basis that it should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.
The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and
in broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and academic.

Issues:
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being dead and the respondent
missing.
2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision of July
23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?

Held:
1. No.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for
dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms
that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case
has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The
citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are
times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged
right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
2. No.
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by
divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.
Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their
submission for decision.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the
Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all
matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration
of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the
proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-
proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates, which has resulted in the
frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent’s theory
would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily
decided by only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been
observed by the Commission en banc.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally
rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on
Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.
A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR WHO HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO PROSECUTE A CASE AND WAS LATER APPOINTED AS
JUDGE MAY NOT HEAR AND DECIDE ON THE SAME, EVEN IF THE ASSIGNMENT AS PROSECUTOR OCCURRED
AFTER THE PROSECUTION HAS ALREADY RESTED ITS CASE. TO DO SO WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.

Nelson Lai Y Bilbao v People

G.R. No. 175999, July 1, 2015
Bersamin, J:

Nelson Lai Y Bilbao was convicted of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for
allegedly killing Enrico Villanueva Jr. during a benefit dance that was being held in PurokAzucena, Barangay 6,
Bacolod City. Judge Fernando Elumbra heard and decided on the case.

However, on Motion for Reconsideration, the defense argued that Elumbra should be disqualified from hearing and
deciding on the case, because he had prosecuted the same case prior to his appointment as Judge. The Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied, the issue, among others, was raised before the Court of Appeals.

CA affirmed the judgement of the RTC, and ruled against the disqualification case on the ground that 1) Judge
Elumbra was only assigned as public prosecutor after the prosecution has already rested its case, and 2) a petition
to disqualify a judge should have been filed before the rendition of judgement. The accused asks for relief before
the Supreme Court, arguing that his right to due process has been violated because the case was not decided by an
impartial judge.

Issue:

Is a decision rendered by a trial court judge who previously prosecuted the same invalid for violating the due
process clause of the Constitution?

Held:

Yes, a judge cannot claim impartiality when he, regardless of extent of participation, had previously prosecuted the
case. “To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive, or that he entered
his appearance as the public prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the petitioner did not
really matter.”

Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges who had
served as counsel in a case to inhibit themselves. “As such, the mere appearance of his name as the public
prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No. 17446 sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting on and
deciding the case.” The Constitutional right to due process assures parties a decision of a cold, neutral judge. Such
is absent in the case at bar.

Furthermore, the rule that a petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before rendition of judgement applies only
when the supposed disqualification of the judge is premised on bias as perceived by a party. It does not apply in
cases where there is a mandatory basis for disqualification, such as what happened in the case at bar.

The decision must be set aside and is remanded to the lower court.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940

G.R. NO. L-46496             FEBRUARY 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND 
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS. 
 THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies

Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to
alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor
Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members
of NLU while  no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims
that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the
Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court
agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD: 

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to
their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise
of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly
obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible
but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must
also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be
complied with by observing the following:

 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing
to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Title : HON. ARMAND FABELLA vs THE COURT OF APPEALS
Citation : G.R. No. 110379
November 28, 1997
Ponente : PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts :
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who
had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The
mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in
Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of
Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be
punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started
on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due
process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation
and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their
innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated
Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative
proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their
immediate dismissal.

Issue :
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

Held :
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670
known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings
involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman,
a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the
division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against
private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed
to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not
provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a
teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the
essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are
members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective
teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as
contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate
its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate
cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant
case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating
committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee.
Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous
specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.
G.R. No. 187854               November 12, 2013

RAY PETER O. VIVO, Petitioner, 

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Respondent

FACTS:

By petition for review on certiorari the petitioner seeks the review and reversal of the decision, whereby the Court
of Appeals CA) reversed and set aside the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)

The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), and was
PAGCOR’s Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal from office. 5 .He received a letter
from the Senior Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources Department, advising that he was being
administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
company, and loss of trust and confidence; 6 that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he
was at the same time being placed under preventive suspension. 7

Petitioner’s counsel assailed the propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the
petitioner under preventive suspension.

Petitioner received the summons to attend an administrative inquiry, requiring him to appear before PAGCOR’s
Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU). 8 At the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his
residence. He was furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated
the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. The memorandum of charges was based on the statements
of PAGCOR personnel who had personal knowledge of the accusations against him. However, when his counsel
requested to be furnished copies of the statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he had already
been afforded the sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges against him during the
administrative inquiry.

The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear in order to address questions regarding his case.
His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the meeting because he would not be available on said date, but the
Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the
proceedings.

PAGCOR dismissed the petitioner from the service. 11A motion for reconsideration was filed, however, denied.
Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the CSC which ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner’s right to due
process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service. In fine, the Commission finds that the right of
Vivo to due process was violated when he was ousted from his office without the corresponding Board Resolution
that should have set out the collegial decision of the PAGCOR Board of Directors.

PAGCOR elevated the case to the CA. CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the
CSC upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process. The CA remanded the case to
the CSC for the determination of the appeal of the petitioner on the merits, specifically the issue of whether the
dismissal had been for cause.

ISSUE:

1. WON the petitioner’s right to due process was violated.

2. WON CA’s decision was contrary to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and settled
jurisprudence.

HELD:
1. No..

The Court ruled that the petitioner was not denied due process of law, for he was afforded the fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side. That was sufficient to meet the requirements of due process. 29 In Casimiro v.
Tandog,30 the Court pronounced:

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
"To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.

The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR. In
contrast, the petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process by PAGCOR as set forth herein.
It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due process where the opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded.19

2. No.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that P AGCOR had properly observed the requirements of
due process in its administrative proceedings against the petitioner.

Therefore, the petition for review on certiorari was denied.

JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015

FACTS:

          

Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints
for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their
counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made
“[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not
have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

HELD:

NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II
of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his
constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent
with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen.
Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to
furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the
order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and
his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent.
Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-
respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the
complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27
March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand
the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by
procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief”
as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists
prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by
the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the
accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as
laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish
the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence
which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause,
the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because
such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However,
in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial
evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as
substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include
hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability
of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co-
respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions
for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint
Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the
existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required.
Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to
preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can
abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process as
prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply
and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not
adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a
decision against the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or
probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change
the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed
by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against
him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial
and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the
same public officer may be the investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and
hearing officer may be under the control and supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or
Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary
investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential
requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for
violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now
pending in all courts throughout the country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates
a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences
by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional due
process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.
G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S. J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO,
JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS
HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA. petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST
MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR., MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:

This is a case in which the right of a University to refuse admittance to its students is challenged. An initiation rites,
as a requisite to membership of a certain fraternity organization in the Ateneo Law School, Aquila Legis, caused the
death of one Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, inflicting serious physical injuries and the hospitalization of Beinvenido
Marques, all freshmen students of the petitioner university. Then thru notices, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo
created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee tasked to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the death and subsequently a Disciplinary Board to ascertain if the respondent students violated Rule
3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled Discipline. After evaluation of the circumstances, the written statements and
answers and testimonies, the Board found the respondent students guilty of violating the said Rule, specifically
guilty of hazing, either by active participation or by acquiescence (part and parcel of the integral process of
hazing). However, 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and
left to the President of the University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not. Consequently,petitioner
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board,
thus imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students (principle that "where two or more persons act
together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole.,
offense of the respondents can be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education
and contrary to civilized behavior.")

In a resolution, however, Abas and Mendoza, respondent students, were excluded from the coverage since neither
had submitted their case to the Board, and an investigation of the two will be set. In response, the respondent
students filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the second semester of school
year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from taking their
examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal. On the same
day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent
students and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident. A day after the lapsing
of the TRO, petitioner Dean del Castillo created Special Board tasked to investigate the charges of hazing against
respondent students Abas and Mendoza.Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental
Petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to the original
petition. The respondent Judge granted their prayer. Respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate
respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the
final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status
quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the
instant case. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge

ISSUE:

1) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT STUDENTS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS?

HELD:1) NO. Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is AngTibay case 25 and
not the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the
requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals specifically
with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions,
such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
26

- Requirements are met. Respondent students were notified and required to submit written statements, and such
notices and letters were addressed individually to them. Such notices and letters clearly show that respondent
students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled
against them. The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the
Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in
its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating
respondents students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas
S. J., then President of Ateneo de Manila University dated March 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the
Special Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby
AFFIRMED
COMMISSIONER DOMINGO VS. SCHEER 

FACTS:

Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a German, was given permanent status to reside in the Philippines on July 18, 1986.
He married a Filipina and have 3 children. He also opened a restaurant in Puerto Prinsesa.

One day, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received information that Scheer was wanted by the
German Federal Police that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him.

The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation against Scheer.

In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from the German Vice-Consul on its speculation
that it was unlikely that the German Embassy will issue a new passport to the respondent; on the warrant of arrest
issued by the District Court of Germany against the respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal
activities of the respondent in Palawan. The BOC concluded that the respondent was not only an undocumented
but an undesirable alien as well.

When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he forthwith aired his side to then BID Commissioner
Leandro T. Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in the Philippines, giving the latter time
to secure a clearance and a new passport from the German Embassy.

Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not resolve the respondent's motion. The respondent was neither
arrested nor deported.

Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision dismissing the criminal case
against the respondent for physical injuries. The German Embassy in Manila, thereafter, issued a temporary
passport to the respondent.

In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed Commissioner Verceles that his passport had been
renewed following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his request for the cancellation of the
Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1995, and the restoration of his permanent resident status.[19]
Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the German Embassy issued to the respondent a regular passport, to expire on
March 11, 2006.

The BOC still failed to resolve the respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Commissioner Verceles did not
respond to the respondents March 1, 1996, Letter.

The respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan. On March 20, 1997, the
Department of Labor and Employment approved his application for Alien Employment Registration Certificate as
manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in Puerto Princesa City.

In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office. She wrote the German
Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police. On April 12, 2002, the German Embassy
replied that the respondent was not so wanted.

At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the respondent in his residence
on orders of the petitioner. He was whisked to the BID Manila Office and there held in custody while awaiting his
deportation. Despite entreaties from the respondent's wife and his employees, the petitioner refused to release the
respondent.

Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly communicated with his lawyer. The latter filed
with the BID a motion for bail to secure the respondent's temporary liberty.
On June 11, 2002, the respondent's counsel filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with a prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the
petitioner from proceeding with the respondent's deportation.

The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest and detention were premature, unjust,
wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. He asserted that there was no speedy remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law and
that his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been
resolved despite the lapse of more than six years.

The respondent averred that he was a fully documented alien, a permanent resident and a law-abiding citizen.

CA issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond of P100,000.00.

BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution dated June 14, 2002, pendente lite denying the respondents Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, Motion for Bail/Recognizance.

On August 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent  granting his petition for
certiorari and prohibition and permanently enjoining the petitioner from deporting the respondent.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Board of Commissioners is an indispensable party.

2. WON the the Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party is a Ground for the Dismissal of the Petition
3. WON The CA had Jurisdiction Over the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus

HELD:

2. YES. The BOC is an Indispensable Party. We agree with the petitioner's contention that the BOC was an
indispensable party to the respondents' petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Court of Appeals.
The respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The
petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the said Deportation Order. The respondent, in his
Memorandum, prayed that the CA annul not only the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC but also the latter's
Omnibus Resolution, and, thus, order the respondents immediate release. The respondent also prayed that the CA
issue a writ of mandamus for the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The said motion
had to be resolved by the BOC as the order sought to be resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and not by the
petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may not be exercised by the individual members of the
Commission.

2. NO. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs
or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to
the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment
rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void. Lack of authority to act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of
impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.

However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be
added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such
times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court,
the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.The remedy is
to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the CA did not require the respondent
(petitioner therein) to implead the BOC as respondent but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in Vivo v. Arca,
and Vivo v. Cloribel. The CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in
the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a
necessary nor even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases.

3. YES. The settled rule is that the authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting international relation is
vested in the political department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by an act of Congress, and
to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except in so far as the judicial
department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution to intervene. The judicial
department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom or the justice of the measures executed by
Congress in the exercise of the power conferred on it, by statute or as required by the Constitution. Congress may,
by statute, allow the decision or order of the Immigration Commissioner or the BOC to be reviewed by the
President of the Philippines or by the courts, on the grounds and in the manner prescribed by law.

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested judicial power in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such
as the Court of Appeals, as established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters
over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government
and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the
Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of
discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department violates the law or the Constitution. In Harvy
Bridges v. I.F. Wixon, the United States Federal Supreme Court reversed an Order of Deportation made by the
Attorney General for insufficiency of evidence and for improper admission of evidence. In Nging v. Nagh,the United
States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit Court) held that conclusions of administrative offices on the issues of facts are
invulnerable in courts unless when they are not rendered by fair-minded men; hence, are arbitrary. In Toon v.
Stump, the Court ruled that courts may supervise the actions of the administrative offices authorized to deport
aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain them. When acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the Court of Appeals as provided
by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.

In this case, the respondent alleges that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, contrary to law and with grave abuse of
discretion in causing his arrest and detention at a time when his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the BOCs
Summary Deportation Order had yet to be resolved. There was no factual or legal basis for his deportation
considering that he was a documented alien and a law-abiding citizen; the respondent, thus, prayed for a writ of
mandamus to compel the petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC, to resolve the said motion. The petition before the
CA did not involve the act or power of the President of the Philippines to deport or exclude an alien from the
country. This being so, the petition necessarily did not call for a substitution of the Presidents discretion on the
matter of the deportation of the respondent with that of the judgment of the CA.
NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ v. PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB, GR No. 188213, 2016-01-11
Facts:
Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz (Cruz) was Punong Barangay or Chairperson of Barangay 848, Zone 92, City of
Manila... d along Central Street, Pandacan, Manila, within the vicinity of her... barangay, she allegedly confronted
persons playing basketball... destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw... iling of a Complaint (for
Malicious Mischief, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse o.f
Authority... basketball court's owners, herein respondents... a non-stock, non-profit civic organizatio
P2,000.00. It was supported by the affidavits of ten (10) members of PHC who allegedly witnessed the destruction.
In answer to the complaint, Cruz... affected the peace in the barangay and was the subject of many complaints...
playing court blocked jeepneys from passing through and was the site of... rampant bettings and fights i... caused
lack of sleep among some residents and that the place's frequent visitors used the community's fences as places to
urinate
The destruction was allegedly also a response to the ongoing clamor of residents to stop the basketball games... a
"certification" and letters of barangay residents... he Office of the Ombudsman rendered its Decision[11] dated
April 26, 2007 dismissing the complaint filed by Ilao, et al... performing their sworn duty, as defined in the Local
Government Code.
the cutting of the ring was "drastic," it was done by the barangay officials within their lawful duties, as the act was
only the result of the unauthorized removal of and failure to return the steel bar and padlock that were earlier
placed... complainants Ilao, et al. filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals praying for the latter court
to nullify the Ombudsman's decision.[... petition's thesis was that any actions in furtherance of the community's
welfare must be approved by ordinance and that unless a thing is a nuisance per se, such a thing may not be abated
via an ordinance and extrajudicially... reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
appellate court found petitioner Natividad C. Cruz liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
a... erformed an abatement of what they thought was a public nuisance but did the same without following the
proper legal procedure, thus making them liable for said acts... without the power to declare a thing a nuisance
unless it is a nuisance per se.
basketball ring as not such a nuisance and, thus, not subject to summary abatemen... even if the same was to be
considered a nuisance per accidens, the only way to establish it as such is after a hearing conducted for that
purpose... administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service is committed when the
questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of the officer's public office; the conduct need not be related
or connected to the public officer's... official functions for the said officer to be meted the corresponding penalty
Issues:
at she merely abated a public... nuisance which she claimed was within her power as barangay chief executive to
perform and was part of her duty to maintain peace and order
Ruling:
Administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service is committed when the questioned
conduct tarnished the image and integrity of the officer's public office; the conduct need not be related or
connected to the public officer's... official functions for the said officer to be meted the corresponding penalt
Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,... respect
the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest.
etitioners indeed cut or sawed in half the subject basketball ring, which resulted in the destruction of the said
equipment and rendered it completely unusable.
so moved instantaneously and did not... deliberate nor consult with the Sangguniang Barangay prior to committing
the subject acts; neither did they involve any police or law enforcement agent i... ven if it is assumed, ex gratia
argumenti, that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but without posing any immediate harm or threat that
required instantaneous action, the destruction or abatement performed by petitioners failed to observe the
proper... procedure
Principles:
no public official is above the law.[31] The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that although petitioners claim to have
merely performed an... abatement of a public nuisance, the same was done summarily while failing to follow the
proper procedure therefor and for which, petitioners must be held administratively liable.
u... nless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated.[32]... when there is "any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property.
urisprudence recognizes that the term "nuisance" is so... comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways
which have interfered with the rights of the citizen... classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or
(2) according to its susceptibility to summary abatement.
(a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which "affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance, danger or... damage upon individuals may be unequal"; or (b) a private
nuisance, or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition"... nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate
safety of persons and property, which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of... necessity;[36] or, (b)
a nuisance per accidens, which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a
question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such
a... thing does in law constitute a nuisance;"[37] it may only be so proven in a hearing... ost, as a mere nuisance per
accidens, for... it does not pose an immediate effect upon the safety of persons and property, the definition of a
nuisance per... unlike a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed "on sight because of the immediate... danger it
poses to the safety an.d lives of the people; nor is it like pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs... nor is it similar to a filthy restaurant
A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation.
Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community... and, thus, it
may not be abated as a nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing
Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one without judicial proceedings, of a public nuisance
is the responsibility of the district health officer.
he district health officer is also the official who shall determine whether... or not abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against & public nuisanc... t... two articles do not mention that the chief executive of
the local government,... petitioners could cite no... barangay nor city ordinance that would have justified their
summary abatement through the exercise of police powers found in the said clause. No barangay nor city
ordinance was violated; neither was there one which specifically declared the said basketball ring as a nuisance...
per se that may be summarily abated. Though it has been held that a nuisance per se may be abated via an
ordinance, without judicial proceedings,[41] We add that, in the case at bar, petitioners were required to justify
their abatement via... such an ordinance because the power they claim to have exercised - the police power under
the general welfare clause - is a power exercised by the government mainly through its legislative, and not the
executive, branch... in their capacities as public officials, thus, they are held administratively liable for their acts.
And even in their capacities as private individuals who may have abated a public nuisance, petitioners come... up
short of the legal requirements. They do not claim to have complied with any of the requisites laid down in Article
704 of the Civil Code, to wit:
People vs. Cayat

FACTS:

The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province was sentenced by the justice of the peace of
court of Baguio for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3)

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe
within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-
called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make
prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police
officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to
seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-
Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a
term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

At the trial, cayat admitted all the facts alleged in the information that on or about the January 25, 1937, in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-
Christian tribes, did receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A
gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for
the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of
the crime charged and sentenced him,

The case was appealed and the accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following ground:

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

Issue:

Whether or not there is discriminatory and denial of equal protection of the laws

Held:

The Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to
facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that
the Act must be understood and applied.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable,

(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law;
 (3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage, but upon the degree of civilization and
culture.

"The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart
from settled communities."

The Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of
certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers,
cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
passage of this Act.

It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of
the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-
Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to
raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for
all times as long as those conditions exist

The Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go
measures of protection and security.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: 

Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed
a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing OrdinanceNo. 532
by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receiptbe in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed
showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments.
The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of
class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in
similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that
the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is
an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues: 

(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The
police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of
the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes themunicipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval of the mayor of the city: 

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx. 

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and
their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe
English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that theordinance invades no fundamental right, and
impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal
property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all
public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality.
All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The
obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as
that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to
properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person
or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of
the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied,
with
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,

vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila Mayor Antonio
Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City
of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on
04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it
makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit,
which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe’ any standard to guide and/or
limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers.
Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537.

HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power.

Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.
The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part
time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he can be
employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that
the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC. vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
G.R. No. L-23794 | February 17, 1968 / BENGZON, J.P., J.
SUBJECT: Tax; sugar; Equal Protection
FACTS:
Ordinance 4 (1964) – passed by Ormoc Municipal Board imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to (1%) per export
sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. – paid under protest P12,087.50

Ormoc contentions:
1. Ordinance 4 is unconstitutional:
a. Violative of equal protection clause
b. Violative of Rule of uniformity of taxation
c. Forbidden to impose export tax (Sec. 2287 Revised Administrative Code)
d. Tax is neither a production nor a license tax – which Ormoc City is authorized to impose (Local
Autonomy Act + Ormoc Charter)
e. Tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge - violation of RA 2264 for tax is on both the sale and
export of sugar

Treasurer contentions:
1. Tax ordinance within city's power to enact (Local Autonomy Act)
2. No violation of the constitutional limitations

CFI - ordinance 4 is constitutional and taxing power of Ormoc City broadened by Local Autonomy Act to include
all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

HELD:

1. The only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc is exported.
2. Section 2287 (municipal council no power to impose import or export tax) vs. Sec. 2 RA 2264 (chartered
cities authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees)
a. Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas - RA 2264 repealed Section 2287
3. Ordinance 4 violated Equal protection clause:
a. Applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation
b. Reasonable classification:
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
4. Failed to meet requisites of reasonable classification:
a. Ordinance 4 - taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and none other.
b. It does not apply to future conditions - the taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as
to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, from the coverage of the tax.
c. Even if later a similar company is set up - it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
5. Ordinance 4 is unconstitutional
6. Refund - P12,087.50
Lim v. Pacquing
G.R. No. 115044 - 240 SCRA 649 - January 27, 1995

To be discussed below are two consolidated cases bearing GR No. 115044 and GR No. 117263. Petitioner
and respondent for the first are Mayor Alfredo Lim and Judge Pacquing respectively. Petitioners for the second case
are TeofistoGuingona, Jr. and Dominador R. Cepeda while the respondents are Judge Vetino Reyes and Associated
Development Corporation.

FACTS:
Judge Pacquing issued an order directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue a permit/license to operate
a jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC). Due to the mayor’s noncompliance, the judge
issued an order directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. Another order was then
sent afterwards reiterating the order to grant license/permit to ADC.
Mayor Lim filed petition in GR No. 115044 but the same was dismissed. An order to immediately release
the permit/license was then passed.

Executive Secretary Guingona issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board
(GAB), Francisco R. Sumulong, Jr. to hold the grant of the license. This prompted ADC to file a case for prohibition,
mandamus, and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which were
granted by the RTC Judge Reyes.
Thus, Guingona and Sumulong filed a petition assailing the orders of the judge.

The Court analyzed the pertinent laws on the subject:

In 1951, Executive Order No. 392transferred the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to
the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
In 1953, Republic Act No. 954 was passed, entitled "An Act to Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota
Games (Jai-Alai), …" The law stated that for a person to operate a basque pelota(jai-alai) game, he must have been
granted a legislative franchise.
In 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance
Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And
Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila…."
In 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issuedentitled "Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local
Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On … Jai-Alai
Or Basque Pelota, …", and Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local
governments.
Subsequently,Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act granting The Philippine Jai-Alai And
Amusement Corporation A Franchise To Operate, Construct And Maintain A Fronton For Basque …" was
promulgated.
However, in 1987, then President Aquinoissued Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and
revoking and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.

ISSUE:
Whether ADC possessed a valid franchise to maintain and operate a jai-alai.
Whether PD No. 771 was in violation of the equal protection clause and non-impairment clause.

HELD:
ADC did not possess a valid franchise.

Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" the jai-alai, but retained for itself
such power "to franchise". It is still necessary for a person to seek a franchise from the national government to
operate.The authority to grant franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory
function is vested in the GAB. Such regulatory functions include the power to license, permit, or regulate.
 Thus, since ADC did not obtain a franchise from Congress, it was not allowed to operate a jai-alai.

PD No. 771 was not in violation of the non-impairment clause.

“[A] franchise is…a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to
regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to
the exercise of police power for the public welfare.”
“[j]ai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple gambling.”It cannot be analogous to the operation of a
public utility for it is a mere privilege.

PD No. 771 was not in violation of the equal protection clause.

“There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all
franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception.”
“ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked.”

**Constitutional rights are not absolute. The inherent police power of the state may at all times be invoked in order
to preserve the interests of the common good over the individual.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. DRILON
G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988
Digested by: RL Lagundino

Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a recruitment firm for overseas
placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS.” In this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, PASEI, challenges the validity of Department Order No. 1 (deployment ban) of the DOLE on the
following grounds: 1) it is discriminatory as it only applies to female workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. The respondents invoke the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING:
Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." It
constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. However, police power is not without its own limitations. It
may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
DO No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. “Equality before the law" admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. It is the avowed objective of DO No. 1 to
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is justified.
Police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be
lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in
his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as
the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.,

G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate
25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in
the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE
which favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of
work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18,
Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate
the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that
these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-
hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with
local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.
Jose Jesus M. Disini, JR., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, JR.,
Petitioners

vs

The Secretary of Justice, The Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local government, The
Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office, The Chief of the Philippine
National Police, and The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Respondents.

(The Disini Case) GR No. 203335 11 February 2014

Facts:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of a
current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since
it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs
and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or
bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communication from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or
defrauding him through false representations.

The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless
children who have access to the internet.

For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening
and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013, the Court extended
the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining
respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.

ISSUES:

The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that
interfere with the fundamental rights of the people. Is Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional?

 Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while is seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
these guaranteed freedoms.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not being
narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take
the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution.

Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year old is
not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be.

Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications?

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section4(c)(4) of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who wilfully abets or
aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from
overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.

Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher constitutional?

Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA 10175 constitutional?

Is Section 8 valid and constitutional?

Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and constitutional?

Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and constitutional?

Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and constitutional?

Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data valid and constitutional?

Is Section 17 on destruction of computer data valid and constitutional?

Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data valid and constitutional?

Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional?

Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) valid and constitutional?

Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and constitutional?

Ruling:

No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls
for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a
universally condemnable act.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may
not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. Ergo,
there is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. All penal laws, like the
cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect, or the fear of possible prosecution
that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to
prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instil such kind of fear is to render the state
powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.

No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is reasonable in penalizing the act
of acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-
motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. It is the evil purpose for which one uses the name
that the law condemns.

No. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation
has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The law punishes those who acquire or use identifying
information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail to show how government effort to curb
computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process.
There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal right. The Court has defined intent to gain as an
internal act which can be established through overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive
taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of
the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in the quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to
fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.

The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only
to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The law makes the penalty higher by one
degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of
penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for such higher penalty.

Yes, because to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which us not
accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Thus, unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court
recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement
where the offended party is a public figure. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence
of malice.There is actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the
knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard standard
used here required a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross
or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. The defense of absence of actual malice,
even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public
figure. But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of actual
malice. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if
it was in fact true.

A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of cyberspace communication technology to protect a
person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading
the area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister
predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement
officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting”
constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts,
comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on
the cyberspace is a nullity.

Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and
communication technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question,
the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm.

The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of
the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, with the exception of the
crimes of:

Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act
10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same
proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.

Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a
legislative prerogative.

Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the
contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient. Thus, the authority that
Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint.

Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he
was so minded. There was no undue deprivation of property since the data that service providers preserve on
orders of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to users by reasons of the issuance of such orders.

Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court
warrant. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that
would ensure proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue
of a court warrant.
Valid and constitutional, because it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider
to have that copy of data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system.

Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes any judicial intervention but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.

Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the
Court.

and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to
formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. The law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow
when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION 2010, G. R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST

TOPIC: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, respondent.

G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B.
FUA, SR., petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
respondent.

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said
PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render
awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and
make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It
cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that. 

 It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation;
 The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President
to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office
was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
 The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power
duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
 It violates the equal protection clause 

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to
create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of
the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all
executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had
the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts:            

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against
her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She
claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation
of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO,
private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified
TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified.   After the
given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an
“axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue
of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues:

WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of
the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic
social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue
delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision:    

     1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue
of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may
not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence
and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant
of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing
mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case
or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the
laws.  The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.  The same
holds true with the issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent
with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.