EMPLOYER- EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

MAFINCO TRADING CORPORATION vs. OPLE 1976 March 25 2nd

Divisions G.R. No. L-37790 Independent Contractor, Employer-
Employee Relationship
NOVEMBER 2, 2017

FACTS:

A labor union called FOITAF (in behalf of Repomanta and Moralde)

lodged a complaint against Mafinco Trading, alleging that Mafinco unlawfully
dismissed both individuals. Repomanta and Mafinco executed a peddling
contract whereby Repomanta agreed to “buy and sell” Cosmos soft drinks.
Rey Moralde entered into a similar contract. The contracts were to remain in
force for one year unless sooner terminated by either party upon five days’
notice to the other. Based on this stipulation, Mafinco terminated its contracts
with Repomanta and Moralde.
Mafinco argued that Repomanta and Moralde were not its employees
but were independent contractors and employers in their own right. The old
NLRC ruled in favor of Mafinco, but Labor Sec. Ople reversed the decision,
asserting that both Repomanta and Moralde are employees of Mafinco.
Ople’s decision highlighted that these peddling contracts were pseudo
contracts devised to evade coverage under the labor laws. According to
Mafinco, the relationship between them is not of employee-employer, but that
of buyer and seller.

ISSUE:
Are Repomanta and Moralde employees of Mafinco?

RULING:
Repomanta and Moralde voluntarily executed with Mafinco formal
peddling contracts which indicate the manner in which they would sell
Cosmos softdrinks. Such signifies that they were acting as independent
businessmen. Using the contract itself as the sole criterion, the termination
should be characterized as simply the exercise of a right freely stipulated
upon by the parties.
 MARSMAN & COMPANY, INC vs. RODIL C. STA. RITA
G.R. No. 194765, 23 April 2018
FACTS:
Marsman is engaged in the business of distribution/sale of
pharmaceutical and consumer products. Marsman purchased Metro Drug
Distribution, which is now named Consumer Products Distribution Services
Inc. (CPDSI). The transition from Marsman to CPDSI brought confusion as to
who the employer of Rodil at the time of his dismissal.
Marsman hired Rodil (under a contract) as a warehouse helper in
1993. After his contract expired in 1994, Marsman rehired him on a
probationary status, and he eventually became a regular employee. Rodil
joined Marsman Employees Union. In 1995, Marsman purchased Metro Drug
Distribution, which is engaged in the same business. This led to the
integration of their employees as formalized in a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) dated June 1996. Marsman became the holding company while Metro
Drug became the operating company. In 1997, Metro Drug changed its
corporate name to CPDSI. CPDSI entered into a contract with EAC wherein
the former would provide warehousemen to the latter in its Libis Warehouse.
Marsman appointed Rodil as one of the warehousemen for EAC-Libis
Warehouse stating that the transfer is part of its cross-training Program.
EAC’s use of the Libis Warehouse is dependent on its lease contract with
Valiant Distribution (Valiant). When Valiant terminated EAC’s lease contract,
CPDSI likewise terminated the employees assigned at EAC-Libis Warehouse,
including Rodil on the ground of redundancy. Rodil filed an illegal dismissal
complaint against Marsman. The Labor Arbiter found Marsman guilty of
illegally dismissal. On appeal, Marsman argued that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction over the complaint alleging that there is no employer-employee
relationship (E-ER) between it and Rodil. The NLRC ruled that there is no E-
ER between Marsman and Rodil. In a petition for certiorari, the Court of
Appeals reversed the NLRC Decision

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between Marsman
and Rodil at the time of his dismissal

RULING:
NO, Rodil was not able to prove that there is an E-ER between him and
Marsman.
In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove
that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a
case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an E-ER must first be established. It is
incumbent upon Rodil as the complainant to prove the E-ER by substantial
evidence, which he failed to do.
RA 9262 AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMAN AND THEIR
CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA v. PEOPLE,

GR No. 214497, April 18, 2017

FACTS:
AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the incident, is the oldest among
the children of XXX and YYY. XXX worked as a household helper in Batangas
while YYY was a Barangay Tanod who derived income from selling
vegetables. AAA and her siblings, BBB and CCC, were then staying with YYY
in Palapas, Ligao City.
On the other hand, Quimvel, at that time, was the caretaker of the ducks of
AAA's grandfather. He lived with AAA's grandparents whose house was just a
few meters away from YYY's house.
At around 8 o'clock in the evening of [July 18,] 2007, YYY went out of the
house to buy kerosene since there was no electricity. While YYY was away,
Quimvel arrived bringing a vegetable viand from AAA's grandfather. AAA
requested Quimvel to stay with them as she and her siblings were afraid. He
agreed and accompanied them. AAA and her siblings then went to sleep.
However, she was awakened when she felt Quimvel's right leg on top of her
body. She likewise sensed Quimvel inserting his right hand inside her panty.
In a trice, she felt Quimvel caressing her private part. She removed his hand.
Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he was
doing in his house. Quimvel replied that he was just accompanying the
children. After he left, YYY and his children went back to sleep.
On [July 29,] 2007, XXX arrived from Batangas. Later in the evening while
XXX was lying down with her children, she asked them what they were doing
while she was away. BBB told her that Quimvel touched her Ate. When XXX
asked AAA what Quimvel did to her, she recounted that Quimvel laid down
beside her and touched her vagina.Upon hearing this, XXX and YYY went to
the Office of the Barangay Tanod and thereafter to the police station to report
the incident. Afterwards, they brought AAA to a doctor for medical
examination.As expected, Quimvel denied the imputation hurled against him.
He maintained that he brought the ducks of AAA's grandmother to the river at
7 o'clock in the morning, fetched it and brought it back at AAA's grandmother's
place at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of [July 18,] 2007. After that, he rested. He
said that he never went to AAA's house that evening. When YYY confronted
and accused him of touching AAA, he was totally surprised. Even if he denied
committing the crime, he was still detained at the Barangay Hall. He was then
brought to the police station for interrogation. Eventually, he was allowed to
go home. He did not return to the house of AAA's grandmother to avoid any
untoward incidents.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11 in Ligao City, Albay, on January
23, 2013, rendered its Judgment[9] finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

ISSUES:
Petitioner contends that, granting without admitting that he is guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness, he should only be held liable for the crime as penalized under
the RPC and not under RA 7610.

RULING:
Petitioner contends that, granting without admitting that he is guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness, he should only be held liable for the crime as penalized under
the RPC and not under RA 7610. According to him, to be held liable under the
latter law, it is necessary that the victim is involved in or subjected to
prostitution or other sexual abuse, and that the failure to allege such element
constituted a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and the cause of accusation against him.

His argument fails to persuade. The acts constituting the offense must be
alleged in the Information It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions,
every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information
before an accused can be convicted of the crime charged. This is to apprise
the accused of the nature of the accusation against him, which is part and
parcel of the rights accorded to an accused enshrined in Article III, Section
14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.[13] Sections 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
in turn, pertinently provides: Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.
- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused,
the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed. (Emphasis added) Jurisprudence has already set the
standard on how the requirement is to be satisfied. Case law dictates that the
allegations in the Information must be in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The Information
must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. The
facts and circumstances necessary to be included therein are determined by
reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes.
 MELGAR VS. PEOPLE

SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018 CELSO M.F.L.
MELGAR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5
of RA 9262, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial support,
with deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of economic abuse
against one, and her minor son, (12 years old), by depriving them of financial
support, which caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation, to AAA and her son.

After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against
him, he and AAA entered into a compromise agreement on the civil aspect of
the case. After the RTC’s approval of the compromise agreement on June 24,
2010, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed with
Melgar’s conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on June 24, 2011, the
prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive the
criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the property, which was
supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son,
BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement.
Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed
the prosecution to present its evidence.

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with
Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely
acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the latter’s Certificate of
Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing Melgar with BBB.
However, AAA’s relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter had an
affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one (1) year old,
Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a case for support,
which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to
give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the instant
criminal case against Melgar.

To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide
support of P8, 000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle with his
family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled in. On the
other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at and she spends the amount of
P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which she asked Melgar for P8,000.00
as support.

For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence
due to his repeated failure to appear during trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar’s conviction for violation of

Section 5 € of RA 9262.

RULING:

The petition is bereft of merit.

Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and

criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in, inter alia, economic abuse.
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation
of Section 5 € of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar
and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB’s birth; (b) Melgar
freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide
BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not
supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his
property which was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-
arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to
assess and detennine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties and, hence, due deference should be accorded to the same.