Arellano University School of Law securities issued by the Government of the Philippine

Taft Avenue Corner Menlo St. Pasay City, Philippines Islands;

Syllabus for Criminal Law I 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the
(Revised Penal Code and Related Laws) introduction into these islands of the obligations and
By Judge OSCAR B. PIMENTEL (Ret.) securities mentioned in the presiding number;

Preliminaries: 4. While being public officers or employees, should

commit an offense in the exercise of their functions;
Definition and Meaning of Terms and Phrases. or

Definitions/Meaning 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national

security and the law of nations, defined in Title One
1. Criminal Law of Book Two of this Code.
2. Crimes
3. Felonies Title One
4. Offenses
5. Infraction of the Laws FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
6. Ordinances AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
7. Act
8. Omission Chapter One
9. Mala en Se FELONIES
10. Molum Prositum
11. Venue Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions
12. Jurisdiction punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
13. Continuous Crime
14. Continuing Crime Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit
15. Impossible Crime (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
Different Terms and Phrases and their Meaning:
There is deceit when the act is performed with
1. Due Process deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful
2. Ex Post Facto Law act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
3. Bill of Attainder foresight, or lack of skill.
4. Prohibition against Excessive Penalty of
Imprisonment and Fines Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall
be incurred:
Principal parts of Criminal Law under the Revised Penal
Code: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that
1. Arts. 1-20 Basic Principles Affecting Criminal
which he intended.
liability
2. By any person performing an act which would be
Article 1. Time when Act takes effect. - This Code
an offense against persons or property, were it not for
shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an
hundred and thirty-two.
account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as
provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts
application, the provisions of this Code shall be
which should be repressed but which are not covered
enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago,
by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. -
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it
maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction,
may deem proper to repress and which is not
against those who:
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision,
and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
ship or airship
court to believe that said act should be made the
subject of legislation.
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency
note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
1
statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a
strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.
Article 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted
felonies. - Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences
the commission of a felony directly or over acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.
Article 7. When light felonies are punishable. - Light
felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exception of those committed
against person or property.
Article 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony.
- Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are
punishable only in the cases in which the law
specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided
to commit a felony proposes its execution to some
other person or persons.
Article 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light
felonies. - Grave felonies are those to which the law
attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in
any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with
Art. 25 of this Code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes
with penalties which in their maximum period are
correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned
Art..
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the
commission of which a penalty of arrest menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both; is provided.
Article 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of
this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may
be punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
Chapter Two
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following
do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or
rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided
that the first and second requisites prescribed in the
next preceding circumstance are present, and the
further requisite, in case the revocation was given by
the person attacked, that the one making defense had
no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights
of a stranger, provided that the first and second
requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this
Article are present and that the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or
injury, does not act which causes damage to another,
provided that the following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that
done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order
issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
2

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from
criminal liability. - the following are exempt from
criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter
has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one
of the hospitals or asylums established for persons
thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen,
unless he has acted with discernment, in which case,
such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally
irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the
provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall
commit him to the care and custody of his family
who shall be charged with his surveillance and
education otherwise, he shall be committed to the
care of some institution or person mentioned in said
Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act
with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of
irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by
law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable
cause.
Chapter Three
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Article 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following
are mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when
all the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt
from criminal liability in the respective cases are not
attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or
over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of
the offended party immediately preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense to the one committing
the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful
as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered
himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that
he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court
prior to the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or
otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus
restricts his means of action, defense, or
communications with his fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the
exercise of the will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of the consciousness of his
acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar
nature and analogous to those above mentioned.
Chapter Four
CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH AGGRAVATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Article 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The
following are aggravating circumstances:
1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his
public position.
2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with
insult to the public authorities.
3. That the act be committed with insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if
the latter has not given provocation.
4. That the act be committed with abuse of
confidence or obvious ungratefulness.
5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the
Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public
3
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.
6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or
in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such
circumstances may facilitate the commission of the
offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall
have acted together in the commission of an offense,
it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.
7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a
conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or
other calamity or misfortune.
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed
men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title
of this Code.
10. That the offender has been previously punished
by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or
greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it
attaches a lighter penalty.
11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a
price, reward, or promise.
12. That the crime be committed by means of
inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a
vessel or international damage thereto, derailment of
a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice
involving great waste and ruin.
13. That the act be committed with evidence
premeditation.
14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed.
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or
means be employed to weaken the defense.
16. That the act be committed with treachery
(alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.
17. That means be employed or circumstances
brought about which add ignominy to the natural
effects of the act.
18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful
entry.
There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a
crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.
20. That the crime be committed with the aid of
persons under fifteen years of age or by means of
motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or
other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438).
21. That the wrong done in the commission of the
crime be deliberately augmented by causing other
wrong not necessary for its commissions.
Chapter Five
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 15. Their concept. - Alternative circumstances
are those which must be taken into consideration as
aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and
effects of the crime and the other conditions
attending its commission. They are the relationship,
intoxication and the degree of instruction and
education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be
taken into consideration when the offended party in
the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by
affinity in the same degrees of the offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into
consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the
offender has committed a felony in a state of
intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent
to the plan to commit said felony but when the
intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Title Two
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR
FELONIES
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following
are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
4
 1. Principals The Fourteen (14) Different Titles are:

2. Accomplices. 1. Arts. 114-123 – Crimes against National Security and

the law of Nations –
Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered 2. Arts. 124-133 – Crimes against the Fundamental
principals: Laws of the State
3. Articles 134-160 – Crimes against Public Order
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the 4. Articles 161-189 – Crimes against Public Interest
act; 5. Articles 190-194 – Repealed by Republic Act 6425,
7659 and 9165 as ____ - Law on Opium and
2. Those who directly force or induce others to Prohibited drugs (New Special Penal Law)
commit it; 6. Articles 195-202 – Crimes against Public Morals
7. Articles 203-245 – Crimes committed by Public
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the Officers - ___ - A, B, C and D
offense by another act without which it would not 8. Articles 246-266 – Crimes against Persons
have been accomplished. 9. Articles 267-292 – Crimes against Personal Liberty
and Security
Article 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are those 10. Articles 293-332 – Crimes against Property
persons who, not being included in Article 17, 11. Articles 333-346 – Crimes against Chastity
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous 12. Articles 347-352 – Crimes against Civil Status of
or simultaneous acts. Persons
13. Articles 353-364 – Crimes against Honor
Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those who, 14. Article 365 – Quasi offenses
having knowledge of the commission of the crime, Characteristics of Criminal Law
and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its 1. General
commission in any of the following manners: 2. Territorial
3. Prospective
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to
profit by the effects of the crime. Exception to Generality
(a) Treaty Stipulations
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime,
(b) Laws Preferential Applications
or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery. Exceptions to Territoriality

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape a) Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code
of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory 1. Rules on Philippine Vessel or Airship
acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever 2. Foreign Vessel
the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, (a) French Rule
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief (b) English Rule
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
Exception to Exception
some other crime.
(a) When the New Law is Expressly made in applicable
Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from (b) Offender is habitual Criminal
criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are The Three (3) Theories of Criminal Law
such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers 1. Classical Theory
and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same 2. Positivist Theory
degrees, with the single exception of accessories 3. Mixed or Ecclectric Theory
falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the Constitutional limitation on Power of Congress in enacting
next preceding article. Penal or Criminal Laws
Penal Laws that cannot be passed:
2. Article 21 to 113 – Provisions on Penalties including
Criminal and Civil liabilities (a) Ex Post Facto Law
(b) Bill of Attainder
3. Articles 114-365 – Felonies defined under 14 (c) Equal Protection Clause
different titles. (d) Cruel, Unlawful and Unusual Punishments
(e) Excessive fines
5
 (f) Due Process
How Penal Laws are to be construed
(1) It should be liberally construe in favor of the accused
and strictly against the state as long as:
(a) The offender must clearly fall under the term of
the law
(b) An Act or Ommission is only criminal when
provided by a statute
(2) In cases of conflict with the official translation, the
original Spanish Text is controlling over the English
translation
(3) No interpretation by Analogy
Article 1 – Effectivity of the Revised Penal Code – (Act No.
3815 as Amended)
History of the Revise Penal Code – (US vs. Tamparong, 31
Phil. 321-323)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE
TAMPARONG ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
The appellants in their own behalf.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD
INSTANCE; EXTENT OF REVIEW. — Under the Spanish
criminal procedure, appeals from justices’ courts were allowed
only to Courts of First Instance. By section 43 of General
Orders No. 58, this procedure has been so amended that
appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in such cases when
the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved. This
amendment of the procedure does not carry with it the right of
review of the facts, but is confined to the purpose stated —
that is, of determining the validity or constitutionality of the
statute or ordinance upon which the judgment was predicated.
Former cases reviewed, showing that such has uniformly been
the interpretation of section 43 by this court.
DECISION
TRENT, J. :
The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of
Baguio for having played the game of chance called "monte"
in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court
of First Instance, where they were again tried and convicted
upon the same charge. An appeal was allowed to this court
because the validity of Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in
question during the trial of the cause in the court below.
Two questions are raised by this appeal: (1) Is Ordinance No.
35 valid, and (2) is this court required under the law to
examine the evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt
or innocence of the defendants?
The first question is answered in the affirmative by this court
in the case of the United States v. Joson (26 Phil. Rep., 1). The
cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch
of the case is unnecessary.
With reference to the second question, it is said that by reason
of the defendants’ having in the lower court questioned the
legality of Ordinance No. 35, for the violation of which they
have been convicted, this case has been brought to us in all its
details of law and fact, including the evidence taken at the
trial, on which the Court of First Instance founded its
judgment touching the guilt and condemning the defendants.
While, on the other hand, it is contended that the questions of
fact, which we are [not] authorized to examine, are those
which are essential to be examined for the purpose of
determining the legality of Ordinance No. 35 and the penalties
provided for therein, and no other.
At the outset it may be well to briefly outline the criminal
procedure in force in this jurisdiction prior to the promulgation
on the 23d day of April, 1900, of General Orders No. 58.
The royal order dated December 17, 1886, directing the
execution of the royal decree of September 4, 1884, wherein it
was ordered that the Penal Code in force in the Peninsula, as
amended in accordance with the recommendations of the code
committee, be published and applied in the Philippine Islands,
as well as the Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure which
accompanied it. These two laws, having been published in the
6
Official Gazette of Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887, became
effective four months thereafter.
According to the provisions of Rule 1 of the above-mentioned
provisional law, the justices of the peace, or gobernadorcillos,
had original jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Book 3
of the Penal Code.
Rule 2 provided that "when the justice of the peace or the
gobernadorcillo receives notice that there has been committed
any one of the offenses provided for in Book 3 of the Penal
Code which can be prosecuted by the Government, he shall
issue summons for an oral trial to the complainant, if any, to
the alleged culprit, and to the witnesses who may be able to
testify as to the facts, fixing the day and hour for holding the
trial. If this (the trial) takes place at the residence of the
promotor fiscal, he shall also be summoned." Rule 3 provided
that the same procedure should be followed in those cases
which can only be prosecuted at the instance of a private
party, except that the promotor fiscal was not cited.
Neither the Provisional Law, the criminal procedural laws of
the Peninsula, nor the autos acordados prescribed any special
form for the complaint to be presented to the justice of the
peace or the gobernadorcillo. As to this point, it seems that the
Compilation of the Laws of Criminal Procedure of 1879 was
applicable. Articles 405, 406, and 412 read: "ART. 405. The
complaint made in writing must be signed by the complainant,
and if he cannot do so, by some other person at his request.
The authority or official who receives it shall rubricate and
seal every page in the presence of the person who presents it,
which also he may do himself or through another person at his
request.
"ART. 406. When the complaint is oral, it shall be reduced to
writing by the authority or official who receives it, wherein, in
the form of a declaration, shall be set forth such information as
the complainant may have regarding the act complained of and
the circumstances thereof, and both shall sign it at the bottom.
If the complainant cannot sign his name, some other person
shall do so at his request."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 412. Criminal cases that are not instituted by the
Government must begin with a complaint."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The oral trial referred to in Rule 2 was held within three days
next following the date when the justice of the peace or the
gobernadorcillo received information that the offense had been
committed (Rule 4), the procedure being that provided for in
Rule 9, which reads: "The trial shall be public, beginning with
the reading of the complaint, if any there be, followed by the
examination of the witnesses summoned and the introduction
of such other evidence as the complainant, accuser, and public
prosecutor, if he take part, may request and the justice of the
peace or the gobernadorcillo may regard as pertinent.
Immediately thereafter the accused shall be given a hearing,
the witnesses who appear in his defense shall be examined,
and such other evidence as the justice or the gobernadorcillo
may declare to be admissible shall be adduced. The parties
shall forthwith make such pleas as they think expedient in
support of their respective contentions, the first to speak being
the public prosecutor, if he take part, then the private
complainant, and finally the accused.
"The representative of the public prosecutor shall attend the
trial for misdemeanors, whenever he is cited thereto, in
accordance with Rule 2."cralaw virtua1aw library
A record of the trial was made, wherein the whole procedure
was clearly and succinctly set forth, and signed by all the
parties participating in the trial. (Rule 11.)
After trial and rendition of judgment, either of the parties
could appeal to the Court of First Instance within the first day
next following that on which notice of the rendition of
judgment was served. The appeal suspended the judgment.
After the appeal had been allowed, the justice of the peace or
the gobernadorcillo remitted to the Court of First Instance the
original record and cited the parties to appear within the
period of five days before the appellate court. This time could
be extended, if the circumstances of the case required. (Rule
14.) If the appellant appealed, a day was fixed for the trial; but
if he did not appear, the appeal was dismissed. (Rule 15.) Rule
16 provides the procedure for the trial in the second instance.
This rule reads: "The hearing at the trial shall be public, and
all the proceedings in the case shall be read therein; then the
parties or their attorneys may speak in their turn, and
thereafter the judgment shall be pronounced and
communicated to them.
"A record of the trial shall be drawn up in the same manner as
fixed by Rule 11."cralaw virtua1aw library
Rule 17 reads: "In this second instance no evidence may be
admitted other than that which, offered in the first instance,
was not taken for reasons independent of the will of the parties
who had offered it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Rule 19 provides: "The judgment of the Court of First Instance
will be executory, and there will be no recourse from the same
7
except that of responsibility before the audiencia del
territorio."cralaw virtua1aw library
The provisions of General Orders No. 58 pertinent to the
question under consideration, are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 43. From all final judgments of the Courts of First
Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in
which the law now provides for appeals from said courts an
appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter
prescribed. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgments of
justices of the peace in criminal cases to the courts of the next
superior grade, and the decisions of the latter thereon shall be
final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or
constitutionality of a statute, wherein appeal may be made to
the Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
"SEC. 54. All cases appealed from a justice’s court shall be
tried in all respects anew in the court to which the same are
appealed; but on the hearing of such appeals it shall not be
necessary, unless the appeal shall involve the constitutionality
or legality of a statute, that a written record of the proceedings
be kept; but shall be sufficient if the appellate court keeps a
docket of the proceedings in the form prescribed in the next
preceding section."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 43 has been amended by section 34 of Act No. 1627
so as to read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or
courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law
now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be
taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. The
convicted party may appeal from any final judgment of a
justice of the peace in a criminal cause to the Court of First
Instance by filing a notice of appeal with such justice within
fifteen days after the entry of judgment. Upon such notice
being so filed, the justice shall forward to the Court of First
Instance all original papers and a transcript of all docket
entries in the cause, and the provincial fiscal shall thereupon
take charge of the cause in behalf of the prosecution. The
judgment of the Court of First Instance in such appeals shall
be final and conclusive, except in cases involving the validity
or constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of a
municipal or township ordinance."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the fact that this court took the view, prior to the
passage of Act No. 1627, that the military governor and the
framers of General Orders No. 58 intended by the use of the
word "statute" found in section 43 (supra) to include
"ordinances," the amendment of this section by section 34 of
that Act does not affect the issue in the instant case. The
original section provided that "an appeal may be made to the
Supreme Court in cases involving the validity or
constitutionality of a statute," and the section, as amended,
authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court in the same class of
cases.
It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section
43 (supra), we must apply the same rule of construction that
the courts in England and the United States have ,almost
uniformly applied to the same term and thus derive an
unqualified review of both the law and the facts. This
doubtless would be a correct position in some jurisdictions in
the American Union, as there the technical civil-law meaning
of the term "appeal" is followed. The reason for so doing is set
forth in the case of Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Bunn (168
Fed. Rep., 862), wherein the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The distinction between a ’writ of error,’ which brings up the
record in an action of law for a review of questions of law
only, and an ’appeal,’ which involves a rehearing upon both
the facts and the law, is vital. These remedies have their origin
and functions in the inherent difference between courts of law
and courts of equity, differences which are recognized in the
Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress.
The ’writ of error’ is a common law writ, and searches the
record for errors of law in the final judgment of a common-
law court. If error is found, the judgment awards a venire
facias de novo. The ’appeal’ is a procedure which comes to us
from the civil law along with the fundamentals which go to
make up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its office is to
remove the entire cause, and it subjects the transcript to a
scrutiny of fact and law and is in substance a new trial."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine
Islands, both legal and equitable relief is dispensed in the same
tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts of equity as they
are known and distinguished in England and the United States.
All cases (law and equity) are presented and tried in the same
manner, including their final disposition in the Supreme Court.
Therefore, the word "appeal," as used in section 43 (supra),
does not necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one
tribunal to another in its entirety, subjecting the facts, as well
as the law, to a review or a retrial, but it is to be interpreted by
the ordinary rules of construction.
The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 i8 the
law. In order to ascertain that intention the provisions of the
order must be construed in the light of existing law and the
circumstances at the time of its promulgation.
8
At the time General Orders No. 58 went into effect, criminal
cases originating in Courts of First Instance came to the
audiencia in their entirety, subjecting both the law and the
facts to a review or retrial. But the audiencia, or Philippine
Supreme Court, could not review the judgment of a Court of
First Instance in any case tried on appeal from courts of
justices of the peace wherein the latter courts had jurisdiction.
Such judgments were final and conclusive. The aggrieved
party could go no further with the case. The only recourse he
had was that mentioned in Rule 19 (supra). The penalties for
violations of the provisions of Book 3 of the Penal Code over
which justices of the peace then had jurisdiction were
generally arreto or arresto menor and small fines. This was the
law in force at the time section 43 (supra) was framed and
these were the conditions confronting the framers of that
section at that time. What changes did the section make?
Section 43 authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court from all
final judgments of Courts of First Instance "and in all cases in
which the law now provides for appeals from said courts."
This part of the section is limited to judgments rendered in
criminal cases originating in Courts of First Instance. This is
necessarily true because the latter part of the section makes the
decisions of the "courts of next superior grade (which were
Courts of First Instance) rendered in cases appealed from
justices’ courts final and conclusive, except in cases involving
the validity or constitutionality of a statute." The result is that
the former procedure was amended by section 43 so as to also
authorize appeals to the Supreme Court in the cases mentioned
in the latter part thereof when the validity or constitutionality
of a statute was drawn in question. To this extent only was the
former procedural law changed in so far as, the question at
issue is concerned. Among the reasons which induced the
lawmakers to make this change was the fact that the
jurisdiction of justices of the peace was "extended to all
offenses which the Penal Code designates as punishable by
arresto mayor in all of its grades." (Sec. 108.)
If we had found the ordinance attacked in the case at bar to be
illegal and unconstitutional, the judgment appealed from
would necessarily have to be set aside and defendants would
have no interest in presenting to us the evidence taken at the
trial. But we have maintained the legality of that ordinance,
and in so doing have we exhausted our powers and reached the
limit of our inquiry? Section 43 does not expressly so limit our
power. Neither does it expressly authorize us to review the
testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants.
The distinction between the illegality of a penalty imposed by
a municipal corporation and the correctness of that imposed by
a justice of the peace under a municipal ordinance, and
between the illegality of the ordinance and that of the
proceedings or actions taken under it, is plain and broad. An
ordinance may, from the standpoint of the regularity of all the
proceedings leading up to and inclusive of its enactment, be
absolutely faultless and yet the ultimate act done or enacted
may be inherently or intrinsically illegal or unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the latter may be perfectly unassailable and
yet the ordinance be illegal or unconstitutional by reason of
some fact or circumstance connected with its passage. It may,
for instance, have been presented in a wrong manner, at a
wrong time, or not voted for as directed by law. It is to facts of
this class or character that section 43 refers when it says "the
latter thereon shall be final and conclusive except in cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Such appears to be the meaning and intention manifested from
the provisions of the latter part of section 43, already quoted,
especially when they are considered in the light of the former
practice above indicated. Under that practice no appeals
whatever were allowed to the Supreme Court from judgments
of Courts of First Instance in cases originating in justices’
courts. We must assume that the framers of section 43 had
knowledge of this practice and its effects. The framers desired
to amend this practice to the extent only of providing a way by
which statutory questions, which might arise in these cases,
could be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This object could be
very imperfectly obtained, if, when the court assumed
jurisdiction of such a case, it would not only determine the
statutory questions, but also inquire into and determine every
other question raised during the progress of the trial. In effect,
this would entirely destroy the former practice, because it
would render it possible to bring every case here in its
entirety. All that would be necessary would be to raise some
statutory question, whether material to the decision of the case
or not, and the right of appeal and reexamination of the whole
case would be assured. Clearly, no such result was intended,
nor is it manifest from the language employed in section 43.
But it is urged that our ruling in this matter "involves the legal
absurdity of disjoining a single case and turning over one
fragment to one court and another parcel to another court."
(Elliott on Appellate Procedure, sec. 17.) In this section the
author is speaking of appellate jurisdiction where the
distinction between law and equity is rigidly maintained. He
says: "Where a court of equity retains jurisdiction for one
purpose, it will retain it for all purposes." The same author
recognizes a difference in the two systems of appellate
jurisdiction — that is, the one where the distinction between
law and equity is maintained and, the other, where the two are
blended. (Section 24.) In this last section the author says: "In
some respects an appeal under the code system may be less
comprehensive in its scope than an appeal under the old
system," citing Judge Curtis, wherein he said that "it is evident
that an appeal under the code system does not necessarily
bring up the entire case." In view of the fact that the code
system prevails in the Philippine Islands, blending legal and
equitable rights and providing for one remedial system, our
holding in the instant case is not in conflict with Elliot on
Appellate Procedure.
9
It is also urged that the rule announced in the case of Loeb v. .
Columbia Township Trustees (179 U. S., 472), and followed
in the late case of Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co.,
Ltd. v. Boise City (230 U. S., 84), is directly opposed to our
holding in the case under consideration. These two cases went
to the Supreme Court of the United States on writs of error
directly from the circuit courts in accordance with the
provisions of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891.
This section provides "that appeals or writs of error may be
taken from the district courts, or from the existing circuit
courts, direct to the Supreme Court in the following
cases: . . ." Here Congress maintains the distinction between
"appeals" and "writs of error." In each case above cited the
Supreme Court of the United States held that it not only had
jurisdiction to review the constitutional questions, but also
every other question properly arising. The court then
proceeded to review all legal questions in those cases and not
questions of fact, for the reason that the cases were before the
court on writs of error. Even granting that the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction under the Act above mentioned to review both
questions of law and fact in cases appealed to that court, such
holding would not be antagonistic to our views in the instant
case for the reason that our power to review the facts touching
the guilt or innocence of the defendants must be found in
section 43 of General Orders No. 58. Our view is, as above
indicated, that the framers of that section did not intend to
confer upon this court that power. And all must admit that the
military governor at the time he promulgated General Orders
No. 58 had the power to limit or restrict the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to statutory questions in cases of the character
of the one under consideration.
Our ruling in the case at bar is fully supported by the
adjudicated cases of this Supreme Court.
In the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 531), the
court said: "Upon the facts stated in the complaint the plaintiff
is entitled to prosecute an appeal to this court; but upon such
appeal the only question to be considered will be that of the
validity or invalidity of the ordinance. We cannot review the
evidence nor pass upon any other question of law which may
appear in the record."cralaw virtua1aw library
In United States v. Trinidad (7 Phil. Rep., 325), the defendant
was convicted in the municipal court of the city of Manila for
violating a municipal ordinance. He appealed to the Court of
First Instance, where he was again convicted. An appeal was
allowed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the
constitutionality or validity of the ordinance was drawn in
question. On appeal the appellant insisted, among other things,
that the trial court erred in deciding the case without first
consulting with the two assessors. This court held the
ordinance valid and, after quoting with approval the language
used in the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (supra), said: "In
cases where the appeal involves the constitutionality or
validity of a statute, the disagreement of the assessors with the
judgment of the Court of First Instance on appeal does not
authorize this court to review the evidence, but its decision
shall be confined only to the question of the validity of the Act
or statute in question, as occurs in the present case."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In the case of The United States v. Espiritusanto (23 Phil.
Rep., 610), we examined the facts touching the due enactment
of the ordinance. After so doing, the ordinance was held valid,
but the facts touching the guilt or innocence of the appellant
were not gone into.
In United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), the court used
this language at page 12: "While we have discussed at length
each of the assignments of error made by the appellants,
nevertheless, the only question, in fact, presented by the
appeal under the law, in the first instance, is whether or not the
ordinance under which the defendants were sentenced is legal.
Having concluded that said ordinance is legal and within the
express powers of the Municipal Board to enact, the appeal
must be dismissed, with costs in this instance against the
appellants in equal parts."cralaw virtua1aw library
In United States v. Abendan (24 Phil. Rep., 165), the court,
after quoting the testimony of a sanitary inspector and after
holding the ordinance valid, said: "The evidence in the case,
which is undisputed, is sufficient, in our judgment, to warrant
the order complained of. It does not appear therefrom, the
defendant himself having introduced substantially no proof in
the case, that he was treated differently from other persons in
that locality, or that he was required to do a thing that the
others had not been required to do, or that he had in any way
been discriminated against in the application of this ordinance
to the facts of his case, or that its application was oppressive
or unreasonable in this particular instance.
"The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Considering this language, together with that used in the
opinion wherein the court said, "The sole question raised on
this appeal is that presented by the claim of the appellant that
the ordinance in question is unreasonable and oppressive," it is
clear that the court did not intend to hold that it had authority
to examine into the question of the guilt or innocence of the
Appellant.
In United States v. Co Chee (R. G. No. 8269, not reported) the
appellants were convicted of a violation of Ordinance No. 152
of the city of Manila and, having drawn in question the
10
validity of that ordinance, an appeal was allowed to this court. (see also Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Philippines
In disposing of this case the court said: "Precisely this 859)
question was presented in the case of the United States v. Ten
Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), just decided by this court, in which we EN BANC
held that said Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila was
valid and constitutional. That case is on all fours with the
present one, and the judgment of conviction of the Court of G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948
First Instance is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants, on the authority of that case."cralaw virtua1aw
library
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,
vs.
No attempt was made to examine or pass upon the testimony
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE
touching the guilt or innocence of the appellants.
OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA,
respondents.

In United States v. Tiu Un (R. G., No. 7804); United States v.

Gaw Kee (R. G., No. 7816); United States v. Lim Cui (R. G.,
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
No. 7815); United States v. See Kea (R. G., No. 7828); United
States v. Go Tin (R. G., No. 7481); United States v. Sia Kim Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal
(R. G., No. 7716); United States v. Lim Baey (R. G., No. Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for respondents.
7915); United States v. Li Tia (R. G., No. 7826); and United
States v. Tam Bak (R. G., No. 7814), not reported, the
appellants were convicted for a violation of Municipal
FERIA, J.:
Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in
question the validity of that ordinance, appeals were allowed
to this court. This court, upon the authority of the United
States v. Ten Yu (supra), dismissed the appeals and directed Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the
the records to be returned to the court below for execution of petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery,
the sentences. Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested
the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint
against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7,
1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court
Other cases might be cited, but we think the above are
was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest,
sufficient to show that we have followed in the instant case the
and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an
uniform holding of this court for more than ten years. In fact,
information with the proper courts justice.
the court has not, since its organization, held in any case that it
has the power to review the facts touching the guilt of an
accused person in cases of the character of the one under
consideration. This case has not been decided before this time because there
was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in
Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court
acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision.
Some discussion has arisen in regard to the language we
We have not until now an official information as to the action
should use in the final disposition of cases wherein the statute
taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by
or ordinance has been upheld. Sometimes we say, "The
the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have
judgment is affirmed," and at other times we have said "the
been the action taken by said office, if there was any, we have
appeal is dismissed," etc. The result is the same and it is of
to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the
little importance which expression we use. But, as the case
question involved herein for the information and guidance in
comes to us on appeal for the purpose of testing the legality of
the future of the officers concerned.
the statute or ordinance upon which the judgment rests and as
the judgment cannot be executed without the sanction of this
court, it is perfectly legal to "affirm" or "reverse" the judgment
as the case may be. The principal question to be determined in the present case in
order to decide whether or not the petitioners are being
illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city
fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is
provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
affirmed, with costs against the defendants. So ordered.

11
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the
penalties provided in the next proceeding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain
any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of
six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the
above quoted article, the precept of our Constitution
guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of
Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the
opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said
article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or
confinement of a person charged with having committed a
public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken
from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly in force of
these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a
judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person
upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to
the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest."
There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to
was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a
proper investigation, to order the temporary commitment or
detention of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any
other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so.
Because article 204, which complements said section 202, of
the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its
minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the
following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the
period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal
procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under
arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order
containing a statement of the grounds upon which the same is
based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old
Penal Code has not been incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can
not be construed as having been modified by the mere
omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides
that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated,
and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
the examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint
and the witness he may produce." Under this constitutional
precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by
warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause
by a judge after examination of the complainant and his
witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person
arrested by a public officers must be surrendered can not be
any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a
warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person
arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without
such warrant of commitment, the detention of the person
arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of
our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the
Rules of court, which, referring to the duty of an officer after
arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest
for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and within
the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person
arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for they
may deem proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108,
which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his
delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or
information filed against him. He shall also informed of the
substance of the testimony and evidence presented against
him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or
evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The
testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but
that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed
by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1
and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to the
provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend
any person to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not
be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise,
the writ shall be allowed and the person detained shall be
released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised
Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal of the
City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a
warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement
of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person
arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs.
Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-
1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214).
The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is
not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in
section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person
charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First
Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation
12
made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the
corresponding information against the defendant with the
proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if
the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or
secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is
provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the
preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or
malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses
triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a
proper preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a
proper preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence
of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the
peace from the municipality, town or place, are the municipal
mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of
arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with
section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The
preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct
under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in
the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the
commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila
is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance
of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or
conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint
must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who,
personally or through one of his assistants, makes the
investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the
accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary
information against the accused if the result of the
investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a
warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted
bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest should, as
abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the
person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction
to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense
(section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and
decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the
offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a
justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction, and
then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in
accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly
with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the
officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall
surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the
latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if
proper, the corresponding information within the time
prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that
the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the
temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his
assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is
materially impossible for them to do so, because the testimony
of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in
such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after
the investigation, either release the person arrested or file the
corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as
to the probability of the defendant having committed the
offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the
strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he should
release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period
than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to
making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards
the proper information against him with the court, in order to
obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the
purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer
detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as
the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time
of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make
the investigation and file in time the necessary information,
must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to
in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to
authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant
for a period longer than that permitted by law without any
process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city
fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground
for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested
and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for
days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person
without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any
other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by
law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file
a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has
not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation,
that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and
the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no
authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense
upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even
though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any
pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who
intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the
policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the
absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he
13
had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the
petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and
the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were
being actually detained when the said policeman filed a
complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the
petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and
their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by
virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So
ordered.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J.:, concurring:
Petitioners Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero were
apprehended at 11:30 in the morning of April 2, 1948, upon
complaint of Bernardino Malinao, for the crime of alleged
robbery.
The fact is alleged expressly in respondent's answer supported
by the affidavit of Benjamin Dumlao (Exhibit 1), the
patrolman who made the arrest. Therein it is also alleged that
petitioners were "finally" placed under arrest at 4:30 p.m. and
5:00 p.m. respectively, on the same day, April 2, l948.
The distinction between the two arrests, the apprehension
made at 11:00 a.m. and the "final arrest at 4:30 and 5:00 p.m.,
is purely academic or imaginary. There was but one arrest,
effected at 11:00 a.m., April 2, 1948, and continued without
interruption until the petition had been filed with us April 5,
1948, at the hearing on the next day. Until the moment we are
writing this opinion we have not heard that petitioners have
been released at any time.
Respondents allege also that on April 3, 1948, at about 8:30
a.m., a criminal complaint was filed with the fiscal's office of
Manila, and that by said filing their duty to deliver arrested
persons, within six hours from their arrest, to a proper judicial
authority has been duly complied with.
There is no dispute that no warrant of arrest has ever been
issued for the apprehension of petitioners.
Petitioners pray for their immediate release, alleging that, as
the six-hour period provided in article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code had expired, their continued detention is illegal.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty
of arresto mayor or in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal, or from 4 months and 11 days to 20 years
imprisonment, for the crime of a public officer or employee
who, after detaining a person, "shall fail to deliver such person
to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six
hours."
Both parties implying from the above provision that after six
hours of said failure, petitioners shall be entitled to be
released, discussed the question whether there is such failure
or not.
Upon the very facts alleged by respondents and supported by
documentary evidence accompanying it, there should not be
any dispute that there is such failure.
(a) Respondents have not delivered the persons of petitioners
to any authority, and much less to any judicial authority.
(b) Their filing of a complaint with the office of the fiscal of
Manila is not a delivery of the persons of petitioners. Said
persons are not a complaint. A complaint, whether oral or
written, can never be elevated to the category of the person.
No one is crazy enough to confuse or identify a person with a
complaint.
(c) Even in the false hypothesis that respondents, by filing the
complaint, intended to make a delivery of the persons of
petitioners, if not actually, constructively, the fiscal's office is
not a judicial authority.
(d) Under our Constitution and laws, judicial authorities
comprehend only courts of justice, such as the Supreme Court
and all other inferior Court, and justices and judges. The
authority possessed and exercised by judicial authorities is
judicial, and the Constitution(section 1, Article VIII) vests the
judicial power exclusively "in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law."
Respondents' pretension in making the fiscal of Manila a
judicial authority is absolutely groundless, upon the clear letter
of the fundamental law. Counsel for respondents himself had
to admit that said officer belongs to the administrative or
14
executive department. Under the tripartite system of the The code commission was created by Executive
government established by the Constitution, it is extreme Order No. 48, dated March 20, 1947, prepared the Code of
absurdity to make an administrative or executive officer, or Crimes, which has not been enacted to law which states that
any officer of the executive department or branch, a judicial criminality depends mostly on Social factors, environmental,
authority. Such will make of separation of powers a madman's education, economic conditions or inborn or hereditary
illusion. character of the criminal himself. The Classical Theory
stresses the objective standard of crime, and imposes a
proportionate punishment therefore, but the positivist school
That a fiscal is not a judicial authority has been unmistakably considers the deed as secondary and the offender as primary,
declared in the decision in Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, 43 Off. and the means of repression to protect the society from the
Gaz., 1214. The statement made therein that there was yet no actor – to fonstall the social defense because it takes the view
purpose of deciding whether a fiscal is a judicial authority or that crime is essentially a social and natural phenomena.
not, is just a rhetorical figure that is a judicial authority or not, The Code Committee
is just a rhetorical figure that should not deceive any one. All
those who can read, will that the decision has made the The Code Committee which revised the Penal Code was
declaration. It is there stated in plain language that the fiscal is created by Administration Order No. 94 of the Department of
"unlike" a judicial authority. Justice dated October 18, 1927, and was composed of Justice
Anacleto Diaz, as Chairman and as members, Messrs. Quintin
Paredes, Guillermo B. Guevarra, Alex Reyes and Mariano H.
"Unlike" means, as an elementary school student knows, not de Joya. The Committee was entrusted with the preparation of
like, dissimilar, diverse, different. a revised draft of the Penal Code, taking into consideration (1)
Penal Legislation found in our statute books, (2) the rulings
laid down by the Supreme Court and (3) the present conditions
of these Islands. Various Penal Acts which were enacted
No warrant of arrest having been issued by any competent during the early years of the American Administration were
tribunal for the apprehension of petitioners, said apprehension incorporated into the Revised Penal Code, among them are the
appears to be illegal. Malversation, Opium, Brigandage, Libel, Treason and
Sedition Laws. The Revised Penal Code was approved as Act
No. 3815, of the Philippine Legislature on December 8, 1930.
At any rate, even under the hypothesis that it was legal and It took effect on January 1, 1932.
continued to be so for six hours, this time having expired
Felonies:
seven days ago, the continued detention and confinement of
petitioners is clearly illegal, and not only illegal but criminal, a) Classification
involving an offense committed by public officers and heavily b) Criminal Liability
punished by the Revised Penal Code. c) Impossible Crimes
d) Stages of Execution
e) Conspiracies and Proposals
Regarding the question as to legality of the arrest, counsel for f) Multiple Offenders
respondents has advanced the shocking theory that police g) Complex and Special Complex Crimes
officers may arrest any person just for questioning or
Classifications:
investigation, without any warrant of arrest.
(1) Article 3 – Definition
(a) Delito
The theory is absolutely unconstitutional and could have been (1) Dolo/Desit
entertained only under the "Kempei" system implanted by the (2) Culpa/fault
brutal Japanese army occupation. Such theory represents an (b) Ommissions –
ideology incompatible with human dignity. Reason revolts
Classification of Felonies
against it.
(a) Intentional
(b) Culpable
Respondents are ordered, upon notice of the decision, to
#Accident
immediately release the two petitioners and to report to this
Court the time when the release shall have been effected. #Mistake of fact
The Code Committee that Revised the Penal Code. – US vs. Ah Chong - 15 Phil. 488 People vs. Bayambao –
52 Phil. 309
The Code Commission which Revised the Penal Code
EN BANC
15

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AH
CHONG, Defendant-Appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in
this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and
from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon
which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to
these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the
benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there
can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the
material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
substantially correct:chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at
"Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto,
deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates
some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August,
19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club.
No one slept in the house except the two servants, who
jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch
running along the side of the building, by which
communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its
entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as
a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch
on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the
door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was
but one small window, which, like the door, opened on
the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were
no other openings of any kind in the
room.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the
defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the
room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is
there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the
noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to
the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the
room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the
intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and
called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that
moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of
the chair which had been placed against the door. In the
darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the
blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the
door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in
the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was
merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening
of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common
kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps
in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to
his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not
long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of
which took place in a house in which the defendant was
employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was
because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under
his pillow for his personal
protection.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and
who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior
to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when
either returned at night, he should knock at the door and
acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left
the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with
his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest
house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk
at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at
their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino
and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning
to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally
wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back
to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who
immediately went to the aid of the wounded
man.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed
his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the
door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's
warnings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on
the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the
boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his
Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by
16
forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name
or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe
that he was being attacked by a defendant would have been wholly justified in using any
robber.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual
was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from
the effects of the wound on the following
day.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The defendant was charged with the crime of
assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of
simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that
he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a
wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-
defense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that -
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt
from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
there are the following attendant
circumstances:chanrobles virtual law library
(1) Illegal aggression.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no
doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
exception from criminal liability for the death of the
victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open
the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or
"ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one,
under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the
thief having forced open the door notwithstanding
defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his
threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his
attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of
the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with
the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
available weapon to defend himself from such an assault,
and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to
discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was
not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor
his property nor any of the property under his charge was
in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow.
That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part
of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was
repelling and resisting, and that there was no real
"necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or
his property or the property under his
charge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this
jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who,
by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for
which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the
actor had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was
not due to negligence or bad
faith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such
ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny,
animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances
demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching
criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability
for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be
different from that which he intended to commit.
(Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited;
McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs.
S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met.,
596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38
Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met.,
500.)chanrobles virtual law library
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of
discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration
is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential
element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and
17
assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code.
It has been said that since the definitions there given of
these as well as most other crimes and offense therein
defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the
acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed
with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor
may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts
set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the
penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is
exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of
exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general
rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the
definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal
Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that
malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the
crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of
the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in
some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express
provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those
touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these
exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a
wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not.
Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent"
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a
great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them
may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other.
Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the
disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by
committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less
in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the
same proportion; it is greater or less according as the
crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth.
Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the
thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be
viewed the same whether the corruption was of one
particular form or another.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and
ommissions punished by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed
to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
appear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
An person voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though
the wrongful act committed be different from that which
he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the
meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article,
say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and
intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention
(intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be
no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and
includes the words " con malicia," which were expressly
set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of
1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p.
74.)chanrobles virtual law library
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to
commit the crime can only be said to exempt from
criminal responsibility when the act which was actually
intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the
absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits
and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this
article of the code that in general without intention there
can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have
shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are
more apparent than real.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which
declared that where there is no intention there is no
crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that
under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an
act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is
no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the
supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of
May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime,
involve all the malice which is supposed from the
operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury
which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it
held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil
effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the
appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church,
there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary
element or criminal intention, which characterizes every
action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of
criminal negligence."chanrobles virtual law library
18
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30,
1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that
is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of
an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a
necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive
judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent
or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes
and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also
from an examination of the provisions of article 568,
which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act
that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime,
shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum
degrees if it shall constitute a less grave
crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a
crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall
incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum degrees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In the application of these penalties the courts shall
proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article
81.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the
penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than
those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which
case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the
degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly
substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent,"
and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the
absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and
imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the
actor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal
Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word
"willful" as used in English and American statute to
designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that
while the word "willful" sometimes means little more
than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently
understood to extent a little further and approximate the
idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies
an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was
said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without
reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And
Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means
"not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other
words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes
defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and
"malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more
purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the
difference between them is not great;" the word "malice"
not often being understood to require general malevolence
toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the
intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases
cited.)chanrobles virtual law library
But even in the absence of express words in a statute,
setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it
be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously"
"with malice aforethought," or in one of the various
modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we
think that reasoning from general principles it will always
be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine
with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely
present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more
from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies
between private parties the quo animo with which a thing
was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime
proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that -chanrobles
virtual law library
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil
mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in
philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man
should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is
therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is
of every other, that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find
this doctrine confirmed by -
Legal maxims. - The ancient wisdom of the law, equally
with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not
make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me
incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me
against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort.
In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from
civil. So also -
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing.
"By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate
others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or
misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be
what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground
19
of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him
innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this
doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when
vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around
the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason
comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he
who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend.
And -chanrobles virtual law library
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the
nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind,
destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is
made to suffer a punishment which the community deems
not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him,
it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy
itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with
the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited,
will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the
voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is,
then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself
proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal
unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things,"
an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice
result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that
Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law
excuses no man"), without which justice could not be
administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the
power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of
cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the
doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at
length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have
always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to
make the commission of certain acts criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited
in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to
be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle
that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because
"the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if
suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and
cases cited.)chanrobles virtual law library
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and
no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact
to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the
principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim
here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in
point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a
sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed.,
190.)chanrobles virtual law library
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in
every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the
mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his
part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs.
Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates
vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg.
vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207,
209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the
question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and
without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him
at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect
which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be
expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has
reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which
will justify a killing - or, in terms more nicely in accord
with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them - he is
legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the
facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with
reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in
acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault
or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus
supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him
though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no
occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English
textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where
a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on
a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or
his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at
his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed
them to be he would be innocent of the commission of
any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he
took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty
of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent,
20
and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary
ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of
homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time
the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that
the " act punished by law" was committed
"voluntarily."chanrobles virtual law library
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing
that the person slain had a felonious design against him,
and under that supposition killed him, although it should
afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will
not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or
excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution
used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to
the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418,
Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced
the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing
rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol
in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as
he advances. Having approached near enough in the same
attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the
head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and
of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded
with powder only, and that the real design of B was only
to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more
criminal that he would have been if there had been a
bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the
assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded - a
doctrine which would entirely take away the essential
right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the
jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to
judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no
danger can be supposed to flow from this principle.
(Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set
out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to
those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was
sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife,
without other light than reflected from the fire, and that
the man with his back to the door was attending to the
fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see
or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a
contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned,
seized the person and took from his the stick with which
he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown
person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards
striking him another blow on the head, leaving the
unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned
out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom
he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity,
and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral
congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who
confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant
relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during
his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the
occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal
responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without
sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists
rational necessity for the employment of the force used,
and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal
Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment,
with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the
following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by
the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his
wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and
beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they
might have executed their criminal intent, because of the
there was no other than fire light in the room, and
considering that in such a situation and when the acts
executed demonstrated that they might endanger his
existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should
have defended himself, and in doing so with the same
stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the
limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were
not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he
took from his assailant, and was capable of producing
death, and in the darkness of the house and the
consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish
whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms
which they might bear, not that which they might
accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not
find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
necessity for the means employed, and that it did not
apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred,
etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his
house, which was situated in a retired part of the city,
upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard
the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying:
"Face down, hand over you money!" because of which,
and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his
pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his
friends (who had before simulated a different voice)
saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his
assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am
ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke,
and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend
21
was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be
declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author
of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense
under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8,
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the
accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of
the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the
attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight
years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme
court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity
of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the
means employed were rational and the shooting
justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)chanrobles virtual law library
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote
spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown
against his window - at this, he puts his head out of the
window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the
delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be
burned" - because of which, and observing in an alley
adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom
addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one
the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the
same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from
criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense
with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of
the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him
from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable
necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the
accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the
homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court
acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in
firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a
remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was
acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and
family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case
at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck
the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief
that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent
peril, both of his life and of his property and of the
property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to
the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing
no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-
defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be
he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability
on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or
in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person
and his property and the property under his
charge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by
the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his
bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.
US vs. Peñalosa, et al, 1 Phil. 109
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 424. January 27, 1902. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v.
MARCOSA PEÑALOSA and ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ,
Defendants-Appellants.
Francisco Rodriguez, for Appellants.
Alfredo Chicote, for Private Prosecutor.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL MARRIAGE; INTENT;
MISTAKE OF FACT. — A minor who marries without
parental consent in the false belief that she is of age is not
criminally responsible.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL MARRIAGE;
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. — It is not criminal
negligence for a husband to rely upon his wife’s statement
of her age nor for the wife to rely upon that of her father.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
Article 475 of the prevailing Penal Code provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Any minor who shall contract marriage without the
consent of his or her parents or of the persons who for
such purpose stand in their stead shall be punished with
prision correccional in its minimum and medium
degrees."cralaw virtua1aw library
The accused were convicted in the lower court for the
violation of this article, it appearing from the evidence
adduced that the accused, Marcosa Peñalosa, was not 21
years of age on the 3d day of May, 1901, when she
married the codefendant, and that she contracted the
marriage without the consent of her father.
22

Should the judgment appealed from be affirmed if the
woman was in fact less than 21 years of age, without
taking into consideration what was her belief concerning
her age? Many instances can be called to mind in which
there may exist an error in good faith concerning this
point. A man who is about to marry and is ignorant of his
exact age seeks and obtains a certified copy of the registry
of his baptism. From this it appears that he was born
twenty-one years before the 1st day of June, let us say. He
marries on the 15th day of June. It develops later that the
person who took the copy of the registry of baptism read
July as June, and as a matter of fact the man in question
did not complete his twenty-one years until the 1st day of
July, fifteen days after his marriage. Can such a one be
convicted of a violation of article 475? It would seem that
this case is included within those of the article. he was in
fact a minor when he married, and he married without the
consent of his parents. It is true that so far as the parent is
concerned the offense has been committed, but can the
same be said with reference to the State in the absence of
a voluntary violation of the law? Article 1 of the Code
does not contain the words "with malice" that are to be
found in the Code of 1822; nevertheless Pacheco, the
eminent commentator, has said that those words are
included in the word "voluntary" (El Codigo Penal
Concordado y Comentado, Vol. I, folio 74, third edition);
and he states positively that crime can not exist without
intent.
Other commentators, without being in entire conformity
with Pacheco, nevertheless are agreed up to a certain
point. Groizard says: "Such is the general rule; so it is
ordinarily." (Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. I, folio 37.)
Viada says that "in the majority of cases, in the absence of
intent there has been no crime; but that there can exist in
some cases the latter without the former." (Vol. I, Codigo
Penal Reformade de 1870, folio 16.) Silvela says: "In
effect it suffices to remember the first article, which states
that where there is no intent there is no crime, . . . in order
to assert without fear of mistake that in our Code the
substance of a crime does not exist if there is not a deed,
an act which falls within the sphere of ethics, if there is
not a moral wrong." (Vol. 2, Derecho Penal, folio 169.)
The theory that the absence of the words "with malice" in
the prevailing Code has this effect is supported by the
provisions of article 568 which says: "He who by reckless
negligence commits an act which would constitute a grave
crime if malice were present shall be punished," etc.
The Supreme Court in several successive sentences has
followed the same doctrine: "It is indispensable that this
(action) in order to constitute a crime should carry with it
all the malice which the volition and intention to cause the
evil which may be the object of the said crime suppose."
(Judgment of May 31, 1882.)
In a cause for falsity the facts involved were that the
defendant had married "before the municipal judge of the
pueblo of Rebete without other ceremony than the simple
manifestation and expression of his wishes and those of
the woman Leonor with whom he married before said
municipal judge; that relying upon that, on account of his
ignorance and lack of instruction, on the 27th of June,
1882, and the 5th of April, 1884, in the municipal court of
the pueblo of Polopos he registered as legitimate children
his sons, Jose and Emilio, the offspring of the illicit union
of the defendant and Leonor Gonzalez." For the crime of
falsity committed by reckless negligence the Criminal
Audiencia of Albuñol condemned the said defendant to
the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor.
The Supreme Court annulled said sentence "considering
that whatever might be the civil effects of the registration
of his three sons entered by the accused in the Civil and
Parochial Registers, it can not partake of the nature of a
crime for lack of the necessary element of volition or
intent to offend, essential to every punishable act or
omission; neither did he act with negligence." (Judgment
of March 16, 1892.)
In a cause prosecuted against the Chinese Sy-Ticco and
against Don Guillermo Partier, in the court of Quiapo, for
falsification of trade-marks, the Criminal Chamber of the
Audiencia of Manila condemned the Chinaman to two
years and some months of presidio correccional, and
Partier to one year and some months of similar
imprisonment. A writ of error was sued out in the name of
Partier. The Supreme Court annulled this sentence,
"considering that the moral element of the crime, or, in
other words, existence or nonexistence of intent and
malice in the commission of an act designated and
punished by the law as criminal is essentially a question
of fact for the exclusive judgment and determination of
the trial court."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Considering that the act charged against the accused,
Guillermo Partier, of having printed in his lithographic
establishment the trade-mark of the cigarette packages of
the Insular factory by virtue of a supposed order of the
owner of said factory, to whose injury the Chinaman
Abelardo Zacarias Sy-Ticco ordered him to do the said
fraudulent printing, can not be considered (from the facts
declared proved in the final sentence of acquittal of the
Court of First Instance, accepted in its entirety and
without any addition by the Appellate Court) as
constituting intentional participation or cooperation in
deed of falsification and defraudation committed by the
former, since it does not appear in any part of the sentence
that Partier was in connivance with Sy-Ticco nor that he
had any reason to suspect the true character of him who,
styling himself the representative of Señor Santa Marina,
the owner of the La Insular factory, gave him the order to
print the trade-mark of this factory on the packages,
which were to be used to hold cigarettes." (Judgment of
December 30, 1896.)
The judgment of October 4, 1893, is of the same tenor. It
is not necessary to hold in this action that no crime
mentioned in the Code can exist without intent. It suffices
23
for the present to decide, as we do decide, that one can not
be convicted under article 475 when by reason of a
mistake of fact there does not exist the intention to
commit the crime.
It remains for us to apply this principle to the facts of the
present case. The defendant has stated that she believed
that she was born in 1879; that so her parents had given
her to understand ever since her tenderest age; that she
had not asked them concerning her age because her father
had given her to so understand since her childhood. Her
father was present in the court room as the complaining
witness. If his daughter was deviating from the truth it
would have been an easy matter for him to have testified
denying the truth of what she had stated. It is evident that
he was interested in the conviction of his daughter, and
the fact that the complaining witness did not contradict
her obliges us to accept as true the statements of the
witness. Being true, they disclose that she acted under a
mistake of fact; that there was no intention on her part to
commit the crime provided for and punished in article
475.
As for the husband, it has been proved that two days
before the marriage was celebrated he received a letter
from the woman in which she said that she was 21 years
of age. This letter the defendant showed to the clergyman
who married them. The woman when the marriage
ceremony was performed took an oath before the
clergyman, in the presence of her husband, that she was
21 years of age. The defendant testifies that he had no
suspicion that the woman was a minor. This statement has
not been contradicted and we consider that it suffices to
demonstrate that the defendant acted under a mistake of
fact, and in conformity with the principle laid down in this
opinion he has not been guilty of a violation of article 475
in connection with article 13, No. 3, nor in any other
manner.
The conviction of the defendants in accordance with
article 568, together with article 29 of General Orders,
No. 58, has not been prayed for, and even if it had been
we do not consider the evidence sufficient to sustain a
conviction in accordance with this article. Her husband
had the right to accept the sworn statement of the woman.
The only person whom she could ask for information was
her father, and he had told her age repeatedly.
For the reasons above set forth the sentence of the lower
court is reversed with reference to both defendants,
acquitting them freely with costs of suit de oficio.
It is so ordered.
US vs. Apego 23 Phil 391
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 7929. November 8, 1912. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
GENOVEVA APEGO, Defendant-Appellant.
Tirso de Irureta Goyena for Appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. HOMICIDE; ATTEMPTED RAPE; DEFENSE BY A
WOMAN AWAKENED FROM SLEEP AND
BELIEVING HERSELF ATTACKED. — When a
sleeping woman is awakened at night by some one
touching her or grasping her arm, and she, believing that
some person is attempting to abuse her asks who the
intruder is and receives no reply, attacks the said person
with a pocketknife, and the nature of the wound shoes that
she was either standing up or sitting up at the time, it is
concluded that, notwithstanding the woman’s belief in the
supposed attempt, there was not sufficient provocation to
justify her in using a deadly weapon; although she
actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt
against her, she was not warranted in making such a
deadly assault, as the injured person did not insist or
repeat any act which could be considered as an attempt
against her honor.
2. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — Under the above
circumstances, it is further concluded that she is not
entitled to complete exemption from responsibility, as
there does not enter into the act any of the requisites
contained in subdivision 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code;
but as she is shown to be an ignorant woman, devoid of
education, she should be allowed the benefit of article 11
of the Code, as amended by Act No. 2142, without any
aggravating circumstance, and the penalty, two degrees
lower as prescribed by article 86, should be imposed in
the minimum degree.
Per TRENT, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. HOMICIDE; ATTEMPTED RAPE; DEFENSE BY
WOMAN AWAKENED FROM SLEEP AND
BELIEVING HERSELF ATTACKED. — The defendant,
a single woman, twenty-five years of age, lived with her
married sister. The spouses returned to their house one
night where the defendant was sleeping, and failing to
awaken her they ascended the stairs and entered the
24
house. The husband, in groping around in the dark,
stumbled over the sleeping woman and touched her left
arm. The woman, under the impression that she was being
assaulted with intent to commit rape, stabbed her brother-
in-law with subsequent fatal results. Immediately after
delivering the blow, her sister lit a lamp and the defendant
then for the first time became aware of the identity of her
supposed assailant. Held: The mistake of the defendant
was excusable under the circumstances.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — Where the mistake of fact
is excusable, punishment, if any is due, must be
predicated upon the operative facts constituting the
mistake of the defendant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID., ATTEMPTED RAPE; SELF-DEFENSE.
— This court has already held that a would-be ravisher
takes his life in his own hands in attempting to commit
the crime of rape, and that the woman attacked is entitled
to an absolute acquittal for any defense she may make:
this in a case where the woman was physically the
superior of her assailant and a way of retreat was open to
her.
4. ID.; ID.; I.; SELF-DEFENSE; UNITED STATES v.
AH CHONG (15 Phil. Rep., 488), this court held that the
murder of the deceased by his male friend, committed
while laboring under the misapprehension that the
deceased was a robber attempting to enter the house at
night, was excusable and acquitted the defendant, even
though the evidence showed that the defendant attacked
the deceased with intent to kill. In the case at bar it is held
that a woman in practically the same situation, but
believing that the attack is made with intent to rape her, is
not justified in going so far in the exercise of her right of
self-defense as to kill her assailant, this although there is a
strong presumption from the evidence that the blow which
she struck at her assailant was fatal by the merest chance.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
This case comes to us on appeal from a judgment of
February 15, 1912, by which the Honorable Mariano Cui,
judge, sentenced the appellant to the penalty of twelve
years and one day of reclusion temporal, to the
accessories, to pay an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of
the deceased, and the costs.
At about 8 o’clock in the evening of December 24, 1911,
the spouses, Pio Bautista and Maria Apego, coming from
the municipality of Nasugbu, returned to their house,
situated in the barrio of Sampaga, pueblo of Balayan,
Batangas, and before entering the same called to
Genoveva Apego, the woman’s sister, who they knew was
therein, and, as they received no reply, went up into the
house; the husband led the way and opened the door; he
was followed by his wife who, once inside, lit a match
and then a small kerosene lamp there was in the house. In
the meantime the husband approached the place where
Genoveva was, who, startled, immediately awoke, seized
a pocketknife used in spinning hemp, which was in a box
at her side, and with it attacked and struck Bautista, who
was near her, a blow in the breast; thereupon her sister
Maria, who was not aware of the aggression, asked
Genoveva why empty tin cans and other articles were
scattered about the azotea of the house, to which
Genoveva replied by saying: "What! have you arrived
already?" and at once got up in front of the said spouses;
at this moment Maria advised her to cogitate and reflect,
but Genoveva immediately ran out of the house, asking
for help; it was then that the wife noticed that her husband
was seriously wounded, and when he was afterwards
examined by a physician it was ascertained that he bore a
downward, penetrating wound, in the shape of a T, in the
intercostal space between the second and third ribs of the
left side, that it reached one of the lungs and the heart,
was necessarily fatal, and was inflicted with a sharp-
pointed cutting instrument. A few moments after its
infliction the injured man died.
By reason of the foregoing, an information was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, on January 8,
1912, by the provincial fiscal, charging Genoveva Apego
with the crime of murder, and upon the institution of this
case the aforementioned judgment was rendered.
We accept the classification of homicide given by the trial
judge to the facts involving the violent death of Pio
Bautista, since, in the commission of the crime, it does
not appear that there was present any of the qualifying
circumstances that determine a more serious crime and
penalty.
It is unquestionable and beyond all doubt that Genoveva
Apego, an unmarried woman of about 25 years of age,
inflicted upon the deceased with a pocketknife a serious
wound of a necessarily mortal nature, for he died shortly
afterwards. This wound penetrated the left nipple,
25
extended between the second and third ribs of the same
side from an upper toward and an outward toward an
inner direction and reached the heart and one of the lungs.
The record does not show whether the deceased was able
to make any ante-mortem statement, nor does it appear to
have been ascertained what was the motive of the fatal
aggression of which the said Pio Bautista was the victim.
The following conclusions of fact are derived from a
careful study of this case: upon the arrival of Maria
Apego and her husband, Pio Bautista, at the stairs of their
house, and as Genoveva Apego did not reply to the call
made to her from the outside by her sister Maria, the said
spouses went to the upper floor of the house; Bautista led
the way and, in order to enter, opened the outside door, a
sliding door, and as there was no light inside stumbled
against Genoveva Apego, who was sleeping near the said
door, and touched her left arm; thereupon, Genoveva
awoke and believing, as she testified, that somebody was
trying to abuse her, seized the pocketknife
aforementioned, asking at the same time who was beside
her, and as she did not receive a reply immediately, she
got up and struck the person before her a blow with the
said knife; in the meanwhile Maria Apego had separated
from her husband to light a match and then a kerosene
lamp there was in the house and was not aware of the
assault made upon her husband by her sister, and only
when the light had been lit did she see her sister
Genoveva in front of Bautista, who had already been
wounded and was in an attitude indicating that he was
about to fall to the floor; thereupon Genoveva went down
out of the house, calling for help, and ran to the house of
an aunt of hers where she was arrested by the policeman,
Manuel Peinado, to whom she then and there delivered
the pocketknife with which she had assaulted her brother-
in-law.
In view of the shape and direction of the wound received
by the deceased and the part of the body where it was
inflicted, according to the detailed report of the medical
examination, it is unquestionable that the wound was
inflicted by the defendant after she had arisen from the
place where she had been sleeping, or, at least, when she
had raised up in a sitting posture or was seated on the
floor, at the time that the deceased perhaps stooped over,
in stumbling against her, touched her left arm; but in no
manner may it be presumed that she assaulted her brother-
in-law, Bautista, while she was still lying on the floor of
the house; such a presumption is precluded by a
consideration of the direction the weapon took in
penetrating the deceased breast.
Maria Apego testified that, during the two years her sister
Genoveva lived in their house, the latter had conducted
herself correctly, that they had always gotten along well
and harmoniously together and had never had the least
misunderstanding between them. The record does not
show whether there had been any trouble or there existed
any resentment between the defendant and the deceased
who, before he died and during the few moments he lived
after he was wounded, make no statement whatever
relative to this point or to the conduct observed by the
defendant with respect to the assault of which he was the
victim, and, therefore, the defendant’s testimony must be
accepted, to wit, that she struck a blow with the
pocketknife at the person beside her, and who afterwards
turned out to be her brother-in-law, Pio Bautista, without
knowing who he was and in the belief that, since he
touched her left arm, he was about to commit an attempt
against her honor.
Under this hypothesis, it can not be denied that, upon the
defendant’s awakening, startled at feeling somebody
grasp her left arm and believing that an attempt was being
made against her honor, as she received no reply whatever
to her question as to who was beside her in the darkness
of the house, she understood that there was a positive
unlawful aggression from which she had to defend herself
with the said pocketknife, and it is also undeniable that
there was no previous provocation on her part; but it is
unquestionable that, in making use of this deadly weapon,
even in the defense of her person and rights, by decidedly
wounding him who had touched her or caught her by the
arm, the defendant exceeded her right of defense, since
there was no real need of wounding with the said weapon
him who had merely caught her arm, and perhaps did so
to awake her, as she was asleep and had not replied to her
sister’s calls; and as the party who she believed was
making an attempt against her honor, because he had
caught her by the arm, performed no other act of
aggression such as might indicated a decided purpose to
commit an attempt against her honor than merely to catch
her by the arm, and although the defendant believed that it
was the commencement of such an attempt and that she
had to defend herself therefrom, it is true that, once awake
and provided with an effective weapon for her defense,
there was no just nor reasonable cause for striking a blow
therewith in the center of the body, where the principal
vital organs are seated, of the man who had not performed
any act which might be considered as an actual attempt
against her honor.
From the foregoing consideration it is concluded that in
the commission of the crime there was present the
circumstance of incomplete exemption from
responsibility, as all the three requisites specified in
subarticle 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code are not
applicable; wherefore the criminal act is not altogether
excusable, on account of the lack of the second of the said
26
requisites, although a majority of them were present, that
is, the first and the third requisites; and therefore, in
accordance with the provisions of article 86 of the code, a
penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed
by article 404 of the code, in the discretion of the court,
must be imposed upon the defendant.
In view of the fact that the accused is an ignorant woman,
wholly uneducated, and that it was not shown that, at the
time when she was assaulted the deceased, she knew that
he was her brother-in-law, account must be taken of the
circumstance prescribed by article 11 of the code, in
connection with Act No. 2142, as no aggravating
circumstance whatever was present to counteract the
effects of the said extenuating circumstance; therefore, the
penalty applicable to the defendant is the one lower by
two degrees and in the minimum period.
For the foregoing reasons it is our opinion that, with a
reversal of the judgment appealed from, the defendant,
Genoveva Apego, should be, as she is hereby, sentenced
to the penalty of two years of prision correccional, to the
accessories of article 61, to pay an indemnity of five
hundred pesos to the heirs of the deceased, and, in case of
insolvency, to subsidiary imprisonment which shall not
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to the
payment of the costs of both instances. In computing the
time of the sentence, credit shall be allowed for one-half
of the time of imprisonment suffered by the defendant
while awaiting trial. So ordered.
#Mistake in Identity/fact
People vs. Gana, 54 Phil. 603
People vs. Oanis, et al.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA,
defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney
Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson,
the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief
of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine
Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found
guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate
penalty of from one year and six months to two years and
two months of prison correccional and to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from
this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain
Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a
telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and
Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked
that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto
Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna
and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported
at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were
shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a
newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They
were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to
follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same
instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who
was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the
chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a
bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals
of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial
Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his
men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining
Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them
he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial
Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez
taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where
Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at
Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare,
who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and
upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with
her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to
her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene
and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then
went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32
and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots,
Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at
the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants
still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene
fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed
was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a
peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson,
Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of
the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to
who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and
to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was
thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon
autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot
wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were
found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
27

These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully
supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony
of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different
version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta,
when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house,
the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too
was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room
thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the
door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the
supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former
was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded,
Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and
shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened
the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if
you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still
lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted
his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis,
entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas,
who was then apparently watching and picking up
something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their
testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they
are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of
the crime, but also because they are materially
contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when
the latter was apparently watching somebody in an
attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the
other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while
the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he
was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was
rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot
Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent
from these contradictions that when each of the appellants
tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at
once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating
averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the
testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that,
according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed
when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a
certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves
in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta,
Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to
sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still
lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the
trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on
the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was
committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the
exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants.
Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony
will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not
concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her
cross-examination, even misleading questions had been
put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to
the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these
circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in
disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson
was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door,
Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously
or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but
without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as
to his identity. And the question is whether or not they
may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death
thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants
acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest
performance of their official duties, both of them
believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no
criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower
court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of
homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the
opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the
case, the crime committed by appellants is murder
through specially mitigated by circumstances to be
mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of
honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S.
v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti
excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong
case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was
awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called
out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing
that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and
called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you."
But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair
which had been placed against the door and believing that
he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and
struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to
be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent
mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a
footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a
spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his
money or life. He was killed by his friend under the
mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol
leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and
property were in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake
of fact committed without any fault or carelessness
because the accused, having no time or opportunity to
make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but
to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such
facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case,
appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found
no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then
asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and
could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
28
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the
only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow
even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were
instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him,
and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or
aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified
in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure
and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent
his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect
himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil,
738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force
or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to
dangerous means when the arrest could be effected
otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is
restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary
or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest,
and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109,
sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim
exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary
force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S.
vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo
Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive
from justice and a menace to the peace of the community,
but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing
him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or
in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep.
This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon
different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must
be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life
which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may
approve of this standard of official conduct where the
criminal offers resistance or does something which places
his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we
cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of
notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in
the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly
supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost
of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the
appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such
character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule;
otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the
shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People
vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que
se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no
haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar;
existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del
delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la
intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad
como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal
Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this
Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs.
Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is
wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended
victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of
mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime
committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of
alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of
weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised
Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person
incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
There are two requisites in order that the circumstance
may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such
right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite
is present — appellants have acted in the performance of
a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by
them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest
Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered
by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience
or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they
have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing
the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any
resistance from him and without making any previous
inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and
appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the
mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and
accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and
to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly
and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
People vs. 74 Phil 257
People vs. Monasalapa, et al 92 Phil. 639
#Mistake in the blow. – (Aberratio Ictus) – While acting
in self defense, but hit a third person is justified if the
elements of self defense are present.
29
Characteristics of a Felony accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be
examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found out
(a) There must be an act or omission from the answers of the accused to questions propounded to
(b) That is punishable by law him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not
(c) The act is done by means of dolo or culpa suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio
Requisite of Dolo/Intentional felonies Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by
medical experts who should report their findings accordingly.
(a) Freedom This was done, and, according to the report of the board of
(b) Intelligence medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the
(c) Intent National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane.
Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and
Culpable felonies Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
Requisites
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
(a) Freedom
(b) Intelligence Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since
(c) Negligence (lack of foresight) admission. There was not a single moment during his whole
(d) Imprudence (lack of skill) 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.

Article 4 – Criminal Liability
(a) Praeter Intentionem
(b) Impossible crimes
Where there is malice there is no negligence –
People vs. Guillen 85 Phil 302
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and
Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal
from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or
Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as
charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of
death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or
Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to
the charges contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of
First Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable
Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the
evidence of the prosecution and the defense, rendered
judgment as above stated.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated
above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was
checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved
not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a
delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or
symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to
be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong,
fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is
equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and
conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations and
provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an
individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction
and once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of
consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at
Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen
is his commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in
the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la
Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr.
Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers,
and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a
policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight
several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a
fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat
in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing
him deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a
weakness of censorship especially in relation to rationalization
about the consequences of his acts.

In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that
the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a
30
personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed,
Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without
psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board,
and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez,
who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the
matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be
tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he committed on the
date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted
by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their
respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement
between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential
facts which caused the filing of the present criminal case
against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y
Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political
group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential
elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful
candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of
the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became
disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to
redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him
during the presidential election campaign; and his
disappointment was aggravated when, according to him,
President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his
country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-
called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate
the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means
of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented
itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular
meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda,
Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas,
accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a
number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and
politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and
delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his
thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained by the
Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting
American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals
be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the
accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm,
which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades
which were given him by an American soldier in the early
days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of
whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing
President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or following
his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for
instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was
scheduled to speak, but having encountered many difficulties,
he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held
at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando
Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document
(Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding
in the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of
the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity"
meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case,
we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents of said
document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its
original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived
it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took
me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to
my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my
conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And
had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have hesitated
either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the
welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the
loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are millions
now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were
frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a
man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the people, he
had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them;
he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future
generations. For these reasons he should not continue any
longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the
welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give
up my life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and
I am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t matters
not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am
sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in
my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
31
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B),
made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to
him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10,
1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned,
because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de
Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two
hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained
peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a
plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to
carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he
had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he
hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just
closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador
Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the
smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of
mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway,
and towards an open space where the general thought the
grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the
President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody
should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded
in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to
the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a
panic. It was found that the fragments of the grenade had
seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on
the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the
fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva,
Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department
about two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel
Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a
person who was standing next to him hurled an object at the
platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a barber
shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda.
Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that
exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in
holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose
from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but
some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and
the author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the
meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the
Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one
Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person
with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that
he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the
previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few
moments previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and
Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence,
found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought
to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as
the same person who hurled towards the platform the object
which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was
running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily
admitted his responsibility, although at the same time he tried
to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas.
He also indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden
his so called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B,
which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at
the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police
where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade
(Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a
statement which contained his answers to question
propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police,
who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a
perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it
tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the
witness stand during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant,
several errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial
court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder
for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the
appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article
49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the
concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity
and of contempt of public authorities in the commission of
crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen
statements made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of
doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with
him two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived
plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that,
by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession
at President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not
prevent the persons who were around his main and intended
victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly
explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his
evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions
propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports
our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act
voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that
it did not make any difference to him if there were some
people around the President when he hurled that bomb,
because the killing of those who surrounded the President was
tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that
those persons, being loyal to the President being loyal to the
President, were identified with the latter. In other word,
although it was not his main intention to kill the persons
surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing
them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the
President.
32
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for
appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through
reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela
and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva,
Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he
should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the
different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not
exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most
serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to
article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of
killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore
liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in
accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55
Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be
qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor
intention to cause injury should intervene; where such
intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has
produced even though it may not have been the intention of
the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.'
(Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.)
And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.)
Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el
estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a
darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos
disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose
el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un
arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando
muertos en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion
en A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la
muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia
temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de
Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse anos
de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision
correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del
estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio,
por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte
de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado,
no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que
tambien debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor
de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo
ambas muertes producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un
solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de
asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art.
90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues,
claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros
articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de
este apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo
declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872.
(Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of
article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly
governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single
act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President
Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1)
murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2)
multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo
Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were
the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at,
supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim
of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to
kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two
persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack,
or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the
qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly
taken into the account when the person whom the defendant
proposed to kill was different from the one who became his
victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill
President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the
intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of
a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating
him "by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the
injuries caused on the four other persons already named as
merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is
abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of article
148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has
committed among others the offense of assault upon a person
in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards the
execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas
for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by
throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive
of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the
appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the commission
of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that
effect.
33
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder
committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a
hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various
aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without
any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary
to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any
event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted
requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be
applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the
accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and
circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no
alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a
unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in
accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under
authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as
the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the record
shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
US vs. Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this
case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself,
because from the very nature of these facts and from the
circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these
proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was
available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think,
however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to
the weight of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the
following statement of the material facts disclose by the record
may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at
"Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province,
and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was
employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No.
27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as
an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the
two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the
rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow
porch running along the side of the building, by which
communication was had with the other part of the house. This
porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire
length and height. The door of the room was not furnished
with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of
the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat
insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a
chair. In the room there was but one small window, which,
like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and
window, there were no other openings of any kind in the
room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the
defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room.
He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He
heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing
his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along
the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief,
leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will
kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by
the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door.
In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the
blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door
open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of
after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown
back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept
under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the
steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight.
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers
who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room
to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long
prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which
took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as
cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these
repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who
appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the
fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned
at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early
in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino
Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers'
quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino
and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on
to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party
separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance
and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them
34
ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy,
who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his
roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that
Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of
their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the
part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a
spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese
roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way
into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in
order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by
a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was
conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the
effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination,
tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide,
with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years
and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed
by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he
killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he
struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act,
in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt
from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt
that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from
criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow,
if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been
in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed
him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the
right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and
the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding
defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat
that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it
will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing
upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been
wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without
waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver
the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a
thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property
nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at
the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such
"unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as
defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that
there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend
his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this
jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he
would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state
of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this
question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold
that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability,
provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact
was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such
ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient
of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in
murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where
the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where,
under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal
liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though
it be different from that which he intended to commit.
(Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's
Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap.,
240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People,
32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth
vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of
discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or
ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as
defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other
crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and
expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense
must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions
subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it
appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other
of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats
35
of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general
rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the
definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code
rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or
criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code
clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is
an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined,
in the absence of express provisions modifying the general
rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts
negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit.
And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more
apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in
degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal,
and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal
intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and,
again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do
a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them
may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other.
Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition
to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the
harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the
guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or
less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or
less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a
corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption
was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions
punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to
be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor
shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act
committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning
of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a
voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and
roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or
criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word
"voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia,"
which were expressly set out in the definition of the word
"crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of
1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code
was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit
the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be
done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes
in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code
that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada,
vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions
insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which
declared that where there is no intention there is no crime . . .
in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall
within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2,
the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31,
1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime,
involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of
the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held
that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the
inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil
registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal
intention, which characterizes every action or ommission
punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896,
it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is,
intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an act
defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and
decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or
malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and
misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an
examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as
follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that,
if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be
punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it
shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime
through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
36
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed
according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules
prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the
penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those
contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the
courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which
they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially
equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal
intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any
criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code
would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as
used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly,
yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further
and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice;
that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In
one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another,
"without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And
Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining
crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice
aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely
technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference
between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being
understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal
justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428
and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting
out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be
committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with
malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally
construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning
from general principles it will always be found that with the
rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime
evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who
supports his position with numerous citations from the decided
cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from
civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between
private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only
from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In
other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness,
without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any
people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty
unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an
offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists.
We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally
with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has
supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus,
"an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others
of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence
differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By
reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or
ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may,
we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on
the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment
of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every
guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of
reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he
who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature
given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve
punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a
punishment which the community deems not his due, so far
from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the
seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads
the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea,
if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these
facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her
immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior
to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the
law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal
unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol.
1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an
apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result
from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without
which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and
compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts
have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a
limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the
doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is
sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that
unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission
of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer
is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so
construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and
37
77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental
principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault,
because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if
suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases
cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no
pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be
dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia
facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all
cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's
Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every
crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to
have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily
relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there
is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by
Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1
Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54
Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46
Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55
Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say,
the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and
without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at
the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to
have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise,
upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable
cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a
killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of
the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words,
and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding
some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is
misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will
not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was
really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English
textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a
man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a
lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and
with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed
by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real
one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his
life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the
slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the
commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal
liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he
took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of
the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and
(since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the
"act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination)
overcomes at the same time the presumption established in
article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was
committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that
the person slain had a felonious design against him, and under
that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but
it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide,
according to the degree of caution used and the probable
grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the
doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing
rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in
his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same
attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head
before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder
only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will
any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would
have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who
hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must,
before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the
pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away
the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered
that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to
judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no
danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's
Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court
of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full
because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case
at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting
at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without
other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with
his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly
entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck
him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder,
38
because of which he turned, seized the person and took from
his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and
gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor,
and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving
the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned
out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who
died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion
resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts,
had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law,
whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief
over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal
responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal
Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid
found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for
the employment of the force used, and in accordance with
articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to
twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and
costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the
supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering,
from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that
the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house
beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked,
struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with
which they might have executed their criminal intent, because
of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and
considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed
demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and
possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his
assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and
in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he
did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means
which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took
from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in
the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally
resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to
known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which
they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court
did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc."
(Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house,
which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at
a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a
distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you
money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he
fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the
voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and
hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the
ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I
am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and
not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a
corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt
in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as
having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances
defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only
found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said
article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means
employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the
accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The
supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of
the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances,
the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were
rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court,
March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote
spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his
window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of
his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because
of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four
individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he
fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was
found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared
exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just
self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the
accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from
criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve
months of prision correctional for the homicide committed.
Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned,
finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who
attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery
and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person,
property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p.
128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at
bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal
blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the
intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a
thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his
life and of his property and of the property committed to his
charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must
have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he
acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate
right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed
them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to
have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the
means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent
danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.
39
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the
trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of
the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond
exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So
ordered.
US vs. Bautista 11 Phil. 308
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2189 November 3, 1906
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow,
put down, and destroy by force the Government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands and the Government of the
Philippine Islands, as defined and penalized in section 4 of Act
No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years'
imprisonment, with hard labor, and $3,000 fine, and Aniceto
de Guzman and Tomas Puzon, and each of them, to three
years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and a fine of $2,000, and
all and each of the said appellants to pay their proportionate
share of the costs of the trial and to undergo subsidiary
imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay
their respective fines.
The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during
the latter part of the year 1903 a junta was organized and a
conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos, resident in
the city of Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands by
force of arms and establishing in its stead a government to be
known as the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina; that
one Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this
conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as chief of the military
forces to the organized in the Philippines in the furtherance of
the plans of the conspirators; that toward the end of December,
1903 the said Ricarte came to Manila from Hongkong in
hidding on board the steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival
in the Philippines he held a number of meetings in the city of
Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was perfected the
above-mentioned conspiracy hatched in Hongkong that at
these meetings new members were taken into the conspiracy
and plans made for the enlistment of an army of revolution
and the raising of money by national and private loans to carry
on the campaign; that to this end bonds were issued and
commissions as officers in the revolutionary army were
granted to a number of conspirators, empowering the officers
thus appointed to raise troops and take command thereof; and
that the conspirators did in fact take the field and offered
armed resistance to the constituted authorities in the
Philippines, only failing in their design of overthrowing the
Government because of their failure to combat successfully
with the officers of the law who were sent against them and of
the failure of the people to rise en masse in response to their
propaganda.
It further appears from the evidence that the appellant
Francisco Bautista, a resident of the city of Manila, was an
intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote and
notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to aid him
in his journey, Bautista forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos;
that after the arrival of Ricarte, Bautista was present, taking
part in several of the above-mentioned meetings whereat the
plans of the conspirators were discussed and perfected, and
that at one of these meetings Bautista, in answer to a question
of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparations had
been made and that he "held the people in readiness."
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with
the conspirators through the agency of one Jose R. Muñoz,
who was proven to have been a prime leader of the movement,
in the intimate confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized to
distribute bonds and nominate and appoint certain officials,
including a brigadier-general of the signal corps of the
proposed revolutionary forces; that at the time when the
conspiracy was being brought to a head in the city of Manila,
Puzon held several conferences with the said Muñoz whereat
plans were made for the coming insurrection; that at one of
these conferences Muñoz offered Puzon a commission as
brigadier-general of the signal corps and undertook to do his
part in organizing the troops; and that at a later conference he
assured the said Muñoz that he had things in readiness,
meaning thereby that he had duly organized in accordance
with the terms of his commission.
Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself
with the conspirators; that he had accepted the appointment as
brigadier-general of the signal corps of the revolutionary
forces with no intention of ever taking any further action in the
matter, and merely because he did not wish to vex his friend
Muñoz by refusing to do so, and that when Muñoz offered him
the appointment as brigadier-general he did so in "a joking
tone," and that he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in
Manila organizing the conspiracy at that time.
These statements, however (except in so far as they
corroborate the testimony of Muñoz as to the fact that he had
several interviews with Puzon at which plans were entered
into for the advancement of the cause of the conspirators), can
not be accepted as true in the light of a written statement
signed by Puzon himself at the time when he was first
arrested, part of which is as follows:
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence,
and occupation? — A. My name is Tomas Puzon; born in
Binondo in the Province of Manila; 37 years of age; married;
by profession a teacher of primary and secondary schools, and
residing in Calle Concepcion, No. 195, district of Quiapo.
40

Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? — A. Personally I do
not know him, but by name, yes.1âwphil.net
Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in
these Islands and with what object he came here? And if you
know it to be true, through whom did you get such
information? — A. In the first place I had notice of his coming
to the Islands as well as his object by reading the newspapers
of Manila, and secondly because J. R. Muñoz told me the
same on one occasion when I was in his house to visit him.
Q. Did you acquire this information through any other
person? — A. No, sir; I have no more information than that
which I have mentioned.
Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by
Ricarte? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is the employment (empleo) which you have in
this organization, and who is it who invited you to join it? —
A. J. R. Muñoz, who is general of division of this new
organization, spoke to me with much instance, asking me to
accept employment as brigadier-general, chief of signal corps,
to which I, on account of his request and in view of the fact
that the said Muñoz is a friend of mine from my youth,
acceded; nevertheless I have organized absolutely nothing in
respect to this matter.
Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give
you any commission for it? — A. Yes, sir; I accepted said
employment and although they gave me an order to organize
in my brigade I did not do it, because I had neither the
confidence nor the will.
Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor
the will to carry out what was intrusted to you, why did you
accept employment as general of the brigade? — A. I accepted
it on account of friendship and not to vex a friend, but I never
have the intention of fulfilling the obligations.
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that
he made this statement, but he attempted to explain it away by
saying that when he made it he was so exited that he did not
know just what he was saying. He does not allege that
improper means were taken to procure the confession, and it
was proven at the trial that it was freely and voluntarily made
and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or
promise of reward or leniency. The accused appears to be an
intelligent man and was for eighteen years a school-teacher
and later a telegraph operator under the Spanish Government,
and during the insurrection he held a commission as an officer
in the signal corps of the revolutionary army. His confession is
clear and intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that
he was so excited as not to know what he was saying when he
made it, and its truth and accuracy in so far it inculpates him is
sustained by other evidence of record in this case.
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an
appointment as an officer of the military forces of the
conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against him
in the light of the decisions of this court in the cases of the
United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 364),
United States vs. Silverio Nuñez et al.2 (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the
United States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et al. 3 (3 Off. Gaz.,
528), and United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off.
Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is to be distinguished from
these and like cases by the fact that the record clearly disclose
that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the
apppointment in question and in doing so assumed all the
obligations implied by such acceptance, and that the charge in
this case is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused
accepted the appointment is taken into consideration merely as
evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators. In the
first of these cases — the United States vs. De los Reyes —
the accused was charged with treason, and the court found that
the mere acceptance of a commission by the defendant,
nothing else being done either by himself or by his
companions, was not an "overt act" of treason within the
meaning of the law, but the court further expressly held that
—
That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the
playing of the game of government like children, the
secretaries, colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags and
seals and commission, all on proper, for the purpose of duping
and misleading the ignorant and the visionary . . . should not
be dignified by the name of treason.
In the second case — the United States vs. Nuñez et al. --
wherein the accused were charged with brigandage, the court
held that, aside from the possession of commissions in an
insurgent band, there was no evidence to show that it they had
committed the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared that they
had never united with any party of brigands and never had
been in any way connected with such parties unless the
physical possession of these appointments proved such
relation," and that it appeared that each one of the defendants
"were separately approached at different times by armed men
while working in the field and were virtually compelled to
accept the commissions."
In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it was
contended that de la Serna had confessed that "he was one of
the members of the pulajanes, with a commission as colonel,"
but the court was of opinion that the evidence did not sustain a
finding that such confession had in fact been made, hence the
doctrine laid down in that decision, "that the mere possession
of such an appointment, when it is not shown that the
possessor executed some external act by the virtue of the
same, does not constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of the
defendant," applies only the case of Enrique Camonas, against
whom the only evidence of record was "the fact that a so-
called appointment of sergeant was found at his house."
In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al.
there was testimony that four appointments of officials in a
revolutionary army were found in a trunk in the house of one
Valentin Colorado, and the court in said case reaffirmed the
doctrine that "the mere possession of the documents of this
41
kind is not sufficient to convict," and held, furthermore, that
there was "evidence in the case that at the time these papers
were received by the appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to
one of the assistant councilmen of the barrio in which lived, a
witness for the Government, showed him the envelope, and
stated to him he had received these papers; that he didn't know
what they were and requested this councilman to open them.
The coucilman did not wish to do that but took the envelope
and sent it to the councilman Jose Millora. We are satisfied
that this envelope contained the appointments in question and
that the appellant did not act under the appointment but
immediately reported the receipt of them to the authorities."
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might
appoint a person in no wise connected with them to some high
office in the conspiracy, in the hope that such person would
afterwards accept the commission and thus unite himself with
them, and it is even possible that such an appointment might
be forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the
possession of the person thus nominated, and that such
appointment might be found in his possession, and,
notwithstanding all this, the person in whose possession the
appointment was found might be entirely innocent of all
intention to join the conspiracy, never having authorized the
conspirators to use his name in this manner nor to send such a
commission to him. Indeed, cases are not unknown in the
annals of criminal prosecutions wherein it has been proven
that such appointments have been concealed in the baggage or
among the papers of the accused persons, so that when later
discovered by the officers of the law they might be used as
evidence against the accused. But where a genuine conspiracy
is shown to have existed as in this case, and it is proven that
the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment as an officer
in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly be
taken into consideration as evidence of his relations with the
conspirators.
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the testimony of at least two witnesses to
the same overt act, or confession in open court, to support a
conviction for the crime of treason should be applied in this
case, but this court has always held, in conformance with the
decisions of the Federal courts of the United States, that the
crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate and
distinct offense from the crime of treason, and that this
constitutional provision is not applicable in such cases. (In re
Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs. Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348.)
The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of
Aniceto de Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest substantially
upon his acceptance of a number of bonds from one of the
conspirators, such bonds having been prepared by the
conspirators for the purpose of raising funds for carrying out
the plans of the conspiracy, but it does not affirmatively
appear that he knew anything of the existence of the
conspiracy or that, when he received the bonds wrapped in a
bundle, he knew what the contents of the bundle was, nor that
ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to
these bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the
bundle and discovered the nature of the contents he destroyed
them with fire, and that he never had any dealings with the
conspirators in relation to the conspiracy or the object for
which it was organized.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence
before us, in so far as it affects the said Aniceto de Guzman,
should be reversed, with his proportionate share of the costs of
both instances de oficio, and that the said Anecito de Guzman
should be acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and
set a liberty forthwith, and that the judgment and sentence of
the trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco Bautista and
Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby, affirmed, except so
far as it imposes subsidiary imprisonment in the event of
insolvency and failure to pay their respective fines, and, there
being no authority in law of such provision, so much of the
sentence as undertakes to impose subsidiary imprisonment is
hereby reversed.
After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith,
when the record will be returned to the trial court for
execution. So ordered.
Calderon vs. People 96 Phil. 216
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-6189. November 29, 1954.]
SAMSON VILORIA CALDERON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and the THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Col. Fred Ruiz Castro, Capt. Eleuterio S. Abiad and Capt.
Juan G. Esguerra for Petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor
Jesus A. Avanceña for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS;
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY. — The judgment and discretion
of public officer, in the performance of their duties, must be
exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within
reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear legal provision to
the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a
sound discretion, and with the spirit and purpose of the law.
This is specially true in the case of members of the armed
forces, whose main duty is to defend the state, and
consequently, the people who, in a democratic society like
ours, are the repository of sovereignty. Such duty would be a
myth if a law abiding tax payer could be slain in his own home
with impunity.
2. ID.; ID.; COMPARED WITH CASE OF PEOPLE v.
OANIS. — Appellant in the case at bar, has much in common
with the defendant in People v. Oanis (74 Phil. 257). The latter
was a peace officer who had been ordered to apprehend "dead
or alive" a notorious gangster and escaped convict. Having
42
been informed that the latter was living with a taxi dance girl,
appellant proceeded to her house, where he saw a man in bed.
Thereupon, appellant shot and killed him. Although acting
under the erroneous belief that the victim was said gangster
and escaped convict, appellant was convicted, not merely of
homicide, but of murder. Obviously, the main reason behind
this conclusion was the fact that the accused had acted with
such a disregard for the life of the victim — without checking
carefully the latter’s identity — as to place himself on the
same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously.
3. ID.; HOMICIDE NOT CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE;
REASON FOR THE CONCLUSION. — "The crime
committed by appellant is not merely criminal negligence, the
killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). . . .
And . . ., a deliberate intent to do an unlawful set is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People v.
Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232; People v. Bindor, 56 Phil. 16), and
where such unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as
reckless or imprudence (People v. Gona, 54 Phil. 605) to
support a plea of mitigated liability." (People v. Oanis, 74
Phil. 256.)
4. EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS;
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING WITNESS’
CREDIBILITY. — According to the evidence for the defense,
appellant was, at the time of the occurrence, squatting upon a
ditch, whereas the deceased was, not only standing, but, also
trying to climb the fence, and consequently, at a higher level
than appellant. Yet, the former’s injury had a downward
direction, although it would have gone upward, if appellant’s
testimony were true. It is thus apparent that appellant was
neither candid nor truthful in the narration of facts, and that
the Court of Appeals was fully justified in giving no credence
to his testimony and in accepting the version of the
prosecution.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Accused of homicide, defendant Samson Viloria Calderon
was, after due trial, convicted, by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, of homicide thru reckless negligence and sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 months of arresto
mayor to 1 year and 6 months of prision correccional, to
indemnify the heirs of Eustacio Rodil, deceased, in the sum of
P3,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. On appeal taken by said
defendant, the Court of Appeals found him guilty of homicide
and imposed upon him an indeterminate penalty of not less
than 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor nor more than 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal and, in all
other respects, affirmed the decision of the court of first
instance, with costs against the defendant. The latter has
brought the case to us for review by writ of certiorari.
The pertinent facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, from which we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"En la noche del dia primero de abril de 1951, el Teniente del
ejercito, Leopoldo Regis, al mando de un peloton de soldados,
desplego doce de los mismos, entre ellos Samson Viloria
Calderon, en el lado izquierdo del area Tejeron-Berran, Santa
Ana, Manila, que se pusobajo cordon, por sospecharse que
dentro de ella estaban tres jefes de los Huks. Samson formaba
la linea del cordon paralela al cerco de ’square type wire
fence’ (t. n. t. p. 8) del solar de unos dos mil metros cuadrados
de la casa No. 227 de la calle Tejeron, Santa Ana, donde
vivian Eustacio Rodil, su esposa y sus hijos. El cerco de
alambre estaba reforzado con plantas de gumamela de trecho
en trecho. En el solar habia alguno que otro grupo de platanos
y una zahurda detras de la casa, Entre 11:00 y 12:00 de esa
noche, Benjamin Rodil, uno de los hijos de Eustacio, se
desperto por los ladridos de los perros y el ruido que luego
observo producia el paso de un hombre. Abrio la ventana y se
puso a observar, y al convencerse que habia una persona fuera
del cerco, desperto, a sus hermanas, Elisea y Virginia, y a su
sobrino, Bernardo, informoles que alguien estaba fuera del
cerco y ordeno a Elisea que abriera las dos bombillas
electricas de a cien bujias cada una, puestas detras de la casa
para alumbrar la zahurda, pues que, como hubo tentativo de
hurto de sus cercos en dos anteriores ocasiones, creia que otro
se intentaba llevar a cabo. Encendidas las luces, Benjamin y su
sobrino Bernardo bajaron al solar, recogieron piedras y
tiraronlas hacia el lugar donde se oian los pasos, hacienda al
mismo tiempo ruido para ahuyentar. Asi estuvieron por unos
quince minutos en que, a veces, no oian los pasos del
individuo que estaba fuera del cerco, hasta que Eustacio Rodil
bajo y pregunto que era lo que habia. Le contestaron que se
oian pasos fuera de cerco. Y Eustacio se dirigio hacia alli,
llevando en la mano derecha un bolo que llaman army bolo,
que solia usar para cortar la hierba del solar. Apenas se habia
alejado unos quince pies de Benjamin se oyo un tiro y
Eustacio volvio diciendo que le habian tocado palpando al
afecto la parte anterior de su hombro izquierdo, de la que
manaba sangre. Se desmayo antes de llegar a su casa y le
tuvieron que alzar y colocarle en su cama. Mientras le
quitaban la ropa para descubrir sus heridas, llegaron dos
soldados del ejercito, Samson Viloria y Ernes Lemos, y
despues el teniente Leopoldo Regis, que sugirio el traslado de
Eustacio al Hospital General, sugestion a la que se conformo
el Dr. Deogracias Rodil, uno de los hijos de Eustacio que
avisado del suceso llego poco antes que Regis, porque no tenia
a mano medios para contener la hemorragia que manaba de las
heridas de su padre. Embarcaron a Eustacio en un jeepney, y
el Dr. Deogracias y los soldados le llevaron al Hospital
General. Segun el Dr. Deogracias, el pregunto por el que
disparo a su padre y ninguno de los dos soldados le contesto,
pero, segun Samson, el le contesto que habia sido el. En el
Hospital Eustacio fallecio al dia siguiente, 2 de abril, y el
resultado de la autopsia de su cadaver, practicada por el Dr.
43
Mariano B. Lara, Chief Medical Examiner MPD, consta en el
Exh. B, . . .
x x x
Segun Benjamin, no oyo mas que que el estampido de un tiro,
y de acuerdo con el soldado Lemos, que estaba a tres metros
de distancia de Viloria, no vio a este disparar sino una sola
vez. El cadaver de Eustacio, sin embargo, presentaba tres
heridas de entrada, en la parte anterior del hombro izquierdo, y
una de salida en la espalda, en la region escapular izquierda,
heridos que tales como estan marcadas en los diseños del Exh.
B-1, la unica de salida aparece mas baja que las de entrada.
Viloria admite que fue el quien disparo el tiro, que hirio y
mato a Eustacio en la ocasion de autos, y explicando el suceso,
dijo:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. I believe that time he was a Huk to kill me, so I shot him.
Q. What made you believe that he was a Huk?
A. Because there was information to the effect that there were
many Huks in this area.
x x x
Q. Do you know the place where the civilian came from?
A. I know sir.
Q. From where?
A. From my front. Be came from the direction opposite the
place where I was at that time. (t.s.n. p. 35),.
Q. Was there any conversation between you and the civilian
before you shot him?
A. The civilian and I had a conversation.
Q. What was that conversation about?
A. I told him three times to halt and he said, if we did not clear
out of the area he would kill us.
Q. Who would kill?
A. The man.
Q. When you said to the civilian to halt did you identify
yourself.
A. Yes, sir.
x x x Q. What was the distance of the civilian when he was hacking
Q. In what way did you identify yourself?
A. I told him I am a soldier.
Q. What did the man say if there is any?
A. I identified myself to him that I was a soldier, and that I
told him not to move, but he said, that if we did not clear out
the area he would kill, and he swung his bolo to me and I
retreated.
Q. What more did he do?
A. He nevertheless continued advancing forward and he made
movement as if to put one of his legs over the fence. (t.s.n. p.
36).
Q. At the time that the civilian was going toward you, could
you see him?
A. I could see him only when he was two meters distance from
me.
Q. In that distance of two meters that was you could see him
already, do you remember if that civilian carried with him
something?
A. He has. He had an army bolo in his hand.
Q. In what hand was he carrying the bolo?
A. On the right hand.
Q. When he was at a distance of two meters, that was when he
was going toward you, what did he do?
A. He was about to hack me with his bolo.
Q. Did he hack you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times did he hack you? What did he do?
A. Three times.
Q. At the time when the civilian was hacking you, could you
demonstrate the position of the body and the weapon in his
hand?
A. (Witness demonstrate by placing the witness chair in front
of him and letting it be supposed as the fence in front of the
witness and bends forward over the top of the fence so that the
upper part of his body is bent and over the top of the fence
with his right hand raised as if to strike, the left leg being
placed on the witness chair, supposed to be the fence.)
you?
44
A. One meter.
Q. After hacking you three times, what did you do?
A. I shot him.
Q. Would you demonstrate before this Hon. Court your
position at the time when you shot the civilian?
A. (Witness demonstrated in a squatting position with his left
foot forward, his left elbow on his left knee and with left hand
a little bit raised and his right hand drawn back as if holding
the trigger part of a rifle.)
Q. At the time when you were about to shoot him, what did
you feel in your person?
x x x quiere proteger sus intereses. Pero esta conversacion, que
A. I thought he was trying to kill me.
Q. What made you believe that he was trying to kill you?
A. I thought he was a Huk.
Q. After having shot the civilian, what did you do?
A. I told my companion, Ernesto, to report the matter to Lt.
Regis." (t.s.n. p. 37).
Appellant maintains that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that late Eustacio
Rodil did not commit acts of unlawful aggression against the
petitioner-appellant;
II. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioner-
appellant fired the shot under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury;
III. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the shot fired
by the petitioner-appellant did not proceed from an innocent
mistake of fact;
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the ruling held
by this Honorable Court in People v. Oanis Et. Al. (74 Phil.
259), is applicable in the instant case.
In support of the first, second and third assignments of error, it
is urged that Eustacio Rodil gave appellant three bolo slashes,
which missed him; that he believed Rodil to be a Huk; and
that appellant fired at Rodil in self-defense and acting under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. In this connection the Court of Appeals
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Eustacio venia de su casa, se dirigia al cerco de su solar,
tendido fuera del cordon, y no estaba, por lo tanto, dentro del
area sospechosa, accorralada en esa ocasion por la fuerza
armada a que pertenecia Viloria. El solar detras de la casa de
Eustacio, a cuyo cerco este se dirigia, estaba alumbrado por
dos bombillas electricas de a cien bujias cada una. Mas aun,
antes de que Eustacio bajara de su casa y fuera al cerco, al otro
lado del cual se encontraban Viloria, a este estuvieron
Benjamin y Bernardo tirandole piedras y ahuyentandole con la
voz. Todas estas circunstancias no daban lugar a suponer que
habia Huks en el solar de la casa de Eustacio, porque ningun
Huk atacaria encendiendo primeramente las luces electricas,
para exponerse asimismo a los que estaban en la sombra, y
menos aun tiraria piedras y ahuyentaria haciendo ruido con la
voz. No se concibe, pues, como Viloria, que debe estar
entrenado contra las emboscadas de los Huks, podia creer que
Eustacio era un disidente; sobre todo porque, segun el mismo,
fue advertido que despejara aquel sitio o de otro modo seria
muerto. Esta advertencia no puede proceder de un Huk, y es
toda la advertencia de un hombre que vive dentro de la ley, y
segun Viloria two con Eustacio, no fue oida por Benjamin, ni
la confirma Lemos, quien ni siquiera corrobora a Viloria en su
afirmacion de que fue atacado tres veces por Eustacio con un
army bolo, y eso que, segun Lemos, el le vio a Viloria en el
acto de disparar a Eustacio, lo que indica que el estaba
tambien en condiciones de haber podido ver si Eustacio
hubiera atacado a Viloria. Por el hecho de que entre Viloria y
Eustacio habia de por medio el cerco de ’square type wire
fence’, no era de creer que aunque este pudiera saltarlo, cosa
dificil a su edad de 68 años y su avitaminasis que, segun el Dr.
Deogracias, lo impedia mover libremente las extremidades
inferiores, lo intentaria, sabiendo que con ello se exponia a un
ataque, sin defensa de su parte. Ademas, estando Viloria fuera
del cerco, Eustacio no era sino un espantajo dentro del cerco,
que si levantaba su bolo, lo hacia para espantar, sin colocar de
ninguna manera a aquel en situación peligrosa. Y debe ser asi,
por que de acuerdo con las heridas que el Dr. Lara localizo el
cadaver de Eustacio, la unica de salida en la espalda, en la
region clavicular, aparece mas baja que las de entrada, en la
cara anterior del hombro izquierdo, y su direccion, como se
ven en la figura B-1, es de un angulo de unos 60 grados, lo
que denota que el acusado cuando dispare su arma estaba a un
nivel mas alto que Eustacio, y no como trato de demostrarlo,
aquetandose con la pierna izquierda hacia delante y apoyando
su ccdo izquierdo en su rodilla izquierda.
No siendo exculpatoria la explicacion dada por Viloria, y
admitido por el que fue quien disparo el tiro que hirio y mato a
Eustacio, el debe responder por esta agresion criminal, sin que
pueda a su favor invocar que en esa noche estaba en su puesto
de soldado, por exigencias del deber y el servicio, publico,
porque estos, en un gobierno de orden y de ley, no immunizan
al abuso, el exceso y el crimen. El resultado de sus actos, ni
siquiera puede considerarse justificado por una falsa o erronea
identificacion de su victima, porque esta se hallaba dentro de
su solar, fuera del cordon, caminaba a la luz electrica de
doscientas bujias, le advertia, segun el, que despejara el sitio,
todo lo cual revela claramente que no era disidente, ni quiera
dañarle, y el no estaba de ningun modo en peligro para optar
por una determinacion extrema, porque se interponia entre el y
Eustacio el cerco de alambre, que este no trato de saltarlo para
agredirle, maliciosa y resueltamente."cralaw virtua1aw library
45

It is apparent from the foregoing that the Court of Appeals
found the theory of the defense unworthy of credence. Not
being subject to our review, this finding is conclusive in the
determination of the assignments of error under consideration,
Which thus turn out to be based upon false predicates and are,
accordingly, untenable. At any rate, if, when the fatal shot was
fired by appellant, as testified to by him, Rodil had just raised
his left foot and placed it — or was about to raise his left foot
and place it — on the lower portion of the wire fence, which
was slightly over one yard in height, for the purpose of
climbing it, he could not have given, at the same time, a bolo
slash, for appellant was on the other side of the fence,
squatting about a yard away therefrom, and hence, beyond his
reach. Besides, Rodil — who was weak, for, apart from being
over 68 years of age, he had avitaminosis, which impaired the
freedom of movement of his legs — could not have gone over
the fence without holding it with both hands and would have
lost his balance had he swang his bolo while he was in the
position described by appellant. Even more unbelievable is the
latter’s testimony to the effect that, when Rodil was still about
a yard from the fence, and, hence, two (2) yards away from
appellant, the former had already tried to hack him twice with
his (Rodil’s) bolo, which, in view of the distance and the fence
separating them, had no possibility of landing on appellant. It
is, likewise, interesting to note that, according to the evidence
for the defense, appellant was, at the time of the occurrence,
squatting upon a ditch, whereas Rodil was, not only standing,
but also, trying to climb the fence, and, consequently, at a
higher level than appellant. Yet, the former’s injury had a
downward direction, although it would have gone upward, if
appellant’s testimony were true. It is thus apparent, from the
record, that appellant was neither candid nor truthful in the
narration of facts; that the Court of Appeals was fully justified
in giving no credence to his testimony and in accepting the
version of the prosecution; and that the first three assignments
of error cannot be sustained.
It is contended, under the last assignment of error, that, having
acted under a mistake of fact, appellant is exempt from
criminal liability and that, at most, he is merely guilty of
homicide thru negligence. In support of this pretence, it is
urged that, in deciding the case, we should consider the
condition of emotional stress under which appellant must have
been when he fired the fatal shot, not the objective facts, as the
same appeared after the event, and that, being a peace officer,
he was entitled to act in conformity with his honest belief at
the time of the occurrence. Although generally material, the
belief and intent of the accused are not necessarily decisive in
the disposition of the case. The judgment and discretion of
public officers, in the performance of their duties, must be
exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within
reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear legal provision to
the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a
sound discretion, and with the spirit and purpose of the law.
This is specially true in the case of members of the armed
forces, whose main duty is to defend the state, and,
consequently, the people who, in a democratic society like
ours, are the repository of sovereignty. Such duty would be a
myth if a law abiding tax payer could be slain in his own home
with impunity.
The army bolo held by Rodil at the time of the occurrence
does not suffice to justify his killing for, does the fundamental
law not guarantee the inviolability of his domicile? Was it not,
accordingly, the legal obligation of appellant to respect and
even protect the same? Was Rodil not entitled, therefore, to
defend it as his own "castle" or citadel? Any other view would
create the impression that peace officers are public masters,
not public servants, thus alienating the faith and confidence of
the people in the government, and undermining the foundation
of all democratic institutions.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals did not believe that
appellant had acted under a mistake of fact. Indeed, he had no
reason to assume, or even suspect, that Rodil was a Huk, the
latter being inside his property, which was fenced, as well as
outside the area then guarded by the army. Moreover, shortly
before the shooting, members of the Rodil family had
switched on two 100-watt electric bulbs, which illuminated
their lot brightly. Then, they went to the yard and started
throwing stones in the direction of the place where appellant
and other soldiers were posted, believing them to be
marauders with evil designs. In addition, the former made
some noises in order to scare the latter away. This lasted for
about 15 minutes, after which Eustacio Rodil appeared in the
scenes holding an army bolo in his right hand, and proceeded
to the spot where the supposed marauders were posted, at the
same time bidding them to go away. As Rodil approached or
reached the fence aforementioned, he was fatally shot by
appellant. Obviously, no individual, who is a Huk, bent on
killing the appellant, would have lighted the place with said
electric bulbs. Much less would said Huk have performed or
caused to be performed the acts above referred to — the effect
of which upon appellant and his companions was to warn
them in advance — before attacking him. In other words,
appellant had absolutely no justification whatsoever to believe
— and could not have believed — either that Rodil was a Huk
or that he intended to kill said Appellant.
In the light of these facts, and considering that Rodil was shot
with the intent of killing him, it is clear that appellant does not
deserve an acquittal. The cases of People v. Lara (48 Phil.,
153), U. S. v. Mojica (42 Phil., 784), U. S. v. Ah Chong (15
Phil., 448), and People v. Bayambao (52 Phil., 311), cited by
the defense, are not in point. In the first two cases, there was
actually an unlawful agression on the part of the deceased. In
the last two cases, the defendant had reasonable grounds —
which herein appellant did not have — to believe that their
lives were in imminent danger. We have, likewise, considered
the applicability of the rule laid down in the case of People v.
Mamasalaya,* (50 Off. Gaz., 1104), involving, among others,
an officer of the Philippine Constabulary, one Lt. Cabelin, in
command of several members of said force, who, in
compliance with his instructions, had fired at some houses in
the barrio of Sapalan, Cotabato, Cotabato, thereby killing
several innocent persons. In acquitting him, this Court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
46
". . . There is no charge or claim that he acted deliberately and
criminally in killing the four innocent civilians knowing that
they were innocent. In good faith he believed that the three
houses pointed out to him by Bulalakao were being occupied
by bandits and lawless elements whom he was ordered to
disperse, capture or destroy. The question is whether he
incurred in negligence or reckless imprudence in ordering his
men to fire upon the houses. As previously stated, the
witnesses for the defense including Lt. Cabelin told the court
under oath that the patrol was first fired upon from the three
houses but in spite of this unprovoked fire he and his sergeant
shouted and called out to the inmates of the houses not to fire
because they (members of the patrol) were P. C. soldiers; and
it was only when the firing persisted that he ordered his men
to return the fire. Of course, the prosecution denies this claim.
But even assuming as claimed by the prosecution that the
patrol had not been first fired upon, and that Cabelin and his
sergeant had not shouted or called out to the inmates of the
houses to identify himself and his men, under the
circumstances, we believe that the shooting was justified for
having been done and effected under an honest mistake."
(Italics supplied)
We do not believe that appellant herein is substantially in the
same predicament as Lt. Cabelin for: (1) the former had not
been told by anybody that Eustacio Rodil was a Huk or an
outlaw, unlike Cabelin who had been advised that the
inhabitants of the houses in question were bandits and or
lawless elements; and was requested to proceed against them
as such; (2) Cabelin was in Cotabato, in a region known to be
infested by said elements, whereas Rodil was in Manila,
outside the area cordoned by the peace officers; (3) the
Mamasalaya case involved an appeal directly from a decision
of the court of first instance, whose findings of fact are not
binding upon the Supreme Court, which accepted and believed
the version of Cabelin, or most of it whereas the case at bar is
before us upon a petition for review, by writ of certiorari, of a
decision of the Court of Appeals, which found the theory of
the defense to be unworthy of credence, and this finding is
conclusive upon us; and (4) a majority of the members of this
Court — with one member writing a strong dissenting opinion
and 3 members not taking part in the decision - found that
Cabelin had acted under the "honest mistake" that the
deceased were dissidents and/or outlaws, and that he was
"justified" in ordering the shooting, unlike the case at bar in
which the court of first instance, the Court of Appeals and the
majority of this Court agree that appellant had no reason to
"mistake" Rodil for a Huk and that the former was not
justified therefore, in shooting him.
Is appellant herein guilty of homicide or, merely, of homicide
through either simple or reckless negligence? We have given
considerable thought to this question and devoted a good deal
of our time in the study of the authorities pertinent thereto, and
the conclusion reached by the majority of the members of this
Court is in favor of the first alternative, for the following
reasons, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In People v. Guillen 1 (47 Off. Gaz., 3433, 3440) it was
held that "a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence.
(People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232). Where such an unlawful act
is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended
victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People
v. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)." In People v. Castillo 2 (42 Off. Gaz.,
1914, 1921), this Court declared that there can be no frustrated
homicide through reckless negligence, for reckless negligence
implies lack of intent to kill, without which the crime of
frustrated homicide can not exist. In the case of People v.
Dumon (72 Phil., 41, 49), the court convicted of double
homicide a person who killed a couple, allegedly in the act of
copulation, in the erroneous belief that the woman was his
wife committing adultery, the theory that the offense had been
committed thru reckless negligence, having been rejected, for
the reason, among others, that "the act of firing the fatal shot
was intentional" on the part of the accused. Similarly, a peace
officer who killed a person asleep, in the mistaken belief that
he was a notorious criminal and escaped convict, whom the
authorities wanted dead or alive, was found guilty of murder
in People v. Oanis (74 Phil., 256). In disposing of the case,
this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People v. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In
the words of Viada, ’para que se califique un hecho de
imprudeucia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni
intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera
calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que
no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta
gravadad como el que se produjo.’ (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo
Penal Comentado, 5, aed., pag. 7). And, as once held by this
Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People v.
Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People v. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and
where such unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as
reckless imprudence (People v. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support
a plea of mitigated liability."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. The case of People v. Fernando (49 Phil., 75), in which the
defendant, was convicted of homicide through reckless
negligence, is substantially different from the case at bar. It
was satisfactorily established in said case that the defendant
therein was informed that the victim was an out-law, wanted
by the authorities, and the surrounding circumstances were
such that said defendant had some reason to believe the
information to be true. In the Fernando case, the language
used was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The status of the accused on the night in question was that of
an agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of the
presence of suspicious looking persons who might be the
Moro prisoners who had escaped from the Penal Colony of
San Ramon. The appearance of a man, unknown to him,
dressed in clothes similar in color to the prisoners’ uniform,
who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of
Paciencia Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the man,
47
undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown
man was one of the three persons that the owner of the house
said were prowling around the place. The suspicion became a
reality in his mind when he saw that the man continued
ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand, not heeding his
question as to who he was. In the midst of these circumstances
and believing undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to
perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the
alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him appeared to
be a wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house
who was carrying three bolos tied together. At that
psychological moment when the forces of fear and the sense
of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take full
account of the true situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to
him to be only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious character
who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a
circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man
was not only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the
house from the fact that he called ’Nong Miong,’ which
indicated that the owner of the house might be an older
relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and in not
asking Paciencia Delgado who it was that was calling her
father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary
precaution that he should have used before taking such fatal
action.
"Taking into consideration the state of mind of the accused at
the time, and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of the
unknown persons, in shooting the latter he felt that he was
performing his duty by defending the owners of the house
against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute
the crime of murder, but only that of simple homicide. He
cannot be held guilty, however, as principal, with malicious
intent, because he thought at the time that he was justified in
acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to
exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the
circumstances, he should have by investigating whether or not
the unknown man was really what he thought him to be. In
firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence,
he acted with reckless negligence.
"The crime committed by the accused, therefore, is homicide
through reckless negligence . . ." (pp. 78-79)
Upon the other hand, appellant herein had never been
informed that Rodil was a Huk. As already adverted to, the
conditions obtaining at the time of the occurrence were such
as to leave no room for doubt that Rodil could not be Huk and
did not intend to kill the herein appellant. Incidentally, the
Fernando case is clear authority against appellant’s bid for
acquittal.
3. Appellant herein has much in common with the defendant
in People v. Oanis (74 Phil., 257). The latter was a peace
officer who had been ordered to apprehend, "dead or alive" a
notorious gangster and escaped convict known as Balagtas.
Having been informed that the latter was living with a taxi
dance girl, named Irene, the accused proceeded to the house in
which she lived. As he opened the door of her room, defendant
saw a man in her bed, whereupon he (defendant) shot and
killed him. Although, acting under erroneous belief that the
victim was Balagtas, this Court convicted the accused, not
merely of homicide, but of murder. Obviously, the main
reason behind this conclusion was the fact that the accused
had acted with such a disregard for the life of the victim —
without checking carefully the latter’s identity — as to place
himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously. In shooting Rodil —
who, obviously, could neither be a Huk nor a killer —
appellant herein has acted under similar conditions.
4. The view of the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of
April 26, 1883, is substantially the same. In connection
therewith, we quote from Viada:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"El morador de un cortijo que oyendo ladrar los perros, y
temeroso de que alguien se acercase a sustraer las caballerias,
se asoma al balcon, dando el ’quien vive’, y como nadie
contestase, dispara la escopeta sobre un bulto, apareciendo al
dia siguiente en dicho sitio el cadaver de un sujeto, intimo
amigo de aquel, cuya familia no supo explicarse el motivo que
le condujera al lugar donde fue encontrado muerto, sera
responsable del delito de homicidio, o simplemente del de
imprudencia temeraria? — El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado
que la primara y mas grave calificacion es la procedente:
’Considerando que en la sentencia recurrida se declara como
hecho probado que Pedro Molina, despues de preguntar
repetidamente ’quien vive?’ y como nadie le contestase,
disparo su escopeta sobre un bulto que distinguio a distancia
de seis varas, lo cual demuestra que ejecuto este hecho
voluntaria e intencionalmente sobre una persona, porque de
una persona debio creer que era el expresado bulto, cuando le
pregunto ’quien vive?’, y por lo tanto, que cometio el delito de
homicidio por que ha sido penado: Considerando que para que
se entienda que un hecho se ha cometido por imprudencia
temeraria y puede tener aplicacion el parrafo primero del art.
581 del Codigo penal, es requisito indispensable que en la
ejecucion no haya mediado malicia, lo cual no ocurre en el
caso del recurso porque con malicia, y voluntad obro Pedro
Molina disparando un arma de fuego sobre el bulto de una
persona a la que causo la muerte, etc." (S. de 26 de abril de
1883, Gaceta de 5 de septiembre.) (Viada, Vol., 7 5th ed., p.
23.)
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold
that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be as it is
hereby affirmed. However, in view of the appellant’s youth
and considering that he had joined the Philippine Army a few
months only, prior to the occurrence, the Clerk of Court is
hereby directed to forward a copy of this decision to the
President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice,
for consideration of the propriety of extending to appellant
herein the benefits of executive clemency, after service of
such period of the sentence imposed as maybe deemed
sufficient to satisfy the demands of justice and public interest.
With costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, and Bautista
Angelo, JJ., concur.
48
 People vs. Guevarra – 23 SCRA 58
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97612 March 23, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO AMANIA and GAUDENCIO GUEVARRA,
accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Antonio S. Ramos-Uypitching, Sr. for G. Guevarra.
Public Attorney's Office for E. Amania.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Eduardo Amania and Gaudencio Guevarra
were charged before Branch XXXIV of the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City with the crime of robbery with
double homicide in an information filed in Criminal Case No.
7942 which alleges:
That on or about July 14, 1987, at 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, more or less, at Sitio Talustos, Barangay Amio, Sta.
Catalina, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation and intent to kill,
waylay and ambush, assault, attack and use physical violence
upon PRIMO OMANGAY and MACARIO OMANGAY,
with the use of bolos with which they were armed and
provided, thus inflicting multiple injuries on vital parts of (the)
victims' bodies, which injuries caused the victims' death
sometime thereafter; and in pursuance of their criminal design,
after having used violence against persons, the above-named
accused, with intent (to) gain and without the consent of the
afore-named victims, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person of
PRIMO OMANGAY the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED
PESOS (P700.00), Philippine currency, in a plastic container
and placed inside (the) victim's pocket, and one-half (1/2) sack
of corn grits; and from MACARIO OMANGAY, another one-
half (1/2) sack of corn grits, the corn grits having a total value
of TWO HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P290.00), to the
damage and prejudice of said victims in the aforestated
amounts.1
Appellants, duly assisted by counsel, both pleaded not guilty
when arraigned. After trial, the lower court found them both
guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to return to the heirs of the victims the sum
of P700.00 and one sack of corn grits, or to pay the amount of
P350.00 representing the value of the latter item; and to
respectively indemnify the heirs of Primo Omangay and
Macario Omangay in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of said
victims.2
Hence, this appellate review, appellant Amania contending
that the trial court gravely erred in disregarding appellant's
claim of self-defense and convicting him of robbery with
double homicide instead of simple homicide, "granting
without admitting that he is guilty."3 Appellant Guevarra, who
appealed as a pauper-litigant, was unable to file his brief
allegedly because of his failure to secure the complete
transcripts of stenographic notes, free of charge. Accordingly,
he manifested his desire to adopt his co-appellant Amania's
brief.4
The People's version of the case, which has been correctly
summarized by the trial court, is reproduced hereunder:
The theory of the prosecution as testified to mainly by Arsenia
Omangay and Isidra Omangay is that at around 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of July 14, 1987 while they, Arsenia and Isidra
Omangay, together with Leonides Omangay and victims
Primo Omangay and Macario Omangay were negotiating
(walking in a single file) a small trail at Sitio Talustos,
Barangay Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, accused
Eduardo Amania, sitting on a stone at the left side of the trail
suddenly stabbed with his bolo victim Primo Omangay.
Immediately after he fell down, co-accused Gaudencio
Guevarra, who was standing at the right side of the trail,
suddenly hacked several times and beheaded victim Macario
Omangay. After killing the two victims, Amania carried away
the half sack (of) corn grits earlier carried by Primo while
Gaudencio Guevarra got the P700.00 which was wrapped in
plastic and placed inside the pocket of Primo and also carried
away the other half sack of corn grits earlier carried by
Macario Omangay. Upon seeing Primo who was the husband
of Arsenia and father of the other Omangays, and Macario, the
son of Primo and Arsenia, killed, Arsenia, Isidra and Leonides
fled as the two accused also attempted to assault them as in
fact they chased them, though for a short distance. The two
accused then carried away the two victims' load and left.5
On the other hand, appellant Eduardo Amania's version, as
condensed in his brief, is of the following tenor:
On July 14, 1987 at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
accused-appellant Eduardo Amania was on his way home after
spear-fishing at the Talustos river, (in) Barangay Amio, Sta.
Catalina, Negros Oriental. Primo Omangay was on his way
home together with his son Macario, wife Arsenia and a
daughter. Primo inquired from accused-appellant if he have
(sic) plenty of catch and the latter answered he had no catch.
Primo and Macario were not carrying any bundles while
Arsenia and her daughter carried plastic bags. Macario
Omangay cut a fruit-bearing banana tree growing by the
roadside within Gaudencio Guevarra's property, thus
prompting Primo to invite Amania to their house to eat the
bananas gathered by his son. Meanwhile, Guevarra who was
gathering firewood within his farmland, heard the sound of a
falling banana tree. He rushed to the site and admonished
49
Macario saying: "So you are the one cutting down my
bananas." Macario, holding his bolo used in cutting down the
banana tree, rushed towards Guevarra and stabbed the latter.
Guevarra dropped his bundle of firewood and fled, pursued by
Macario. Arsenia and her daughter ran home. Primo told
Amania to chase Guevarra. Primo became angry and boxed
Amania on the chest when the latter refused to follow his
order. As a result, Amania stabbed Primo once on the left
abdomen. Amania ran away and proceeded to surrender to
Noe Romero, barangay captain of Barangay Marsogomayon,
Sta. Catalina.6
Appellant Gaudencio Guevarra testified that at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of July 14, 1987 he was bundling
firewood in his farm when he heard a banana tree fall,
prompting him to investigate. He saw Macario Omangay, who
at that time was with his father Primo, his mother Arsenia, his
sister Isidra and Eduardo Amania, cut down his banana tree.
He admonished Macario for cutting down his banana tree
without permission and the latter retorted, "Who are you to
admonish here?", and immediately rushed towards him.
Gaudencio ran away and was chased by Macario who was
carrying a bolo. When Gaudencio reached the river, he slipped
and was able to lean on a rock. Macario tried to hack him
thrice but he was able to evade the blows. Fearing for his life,
Gaudencio successively hacked Macario. He immediately left
Macario, who was still breathing at that time, and ran to the
house of Noe Romero, the barangay captain, to surrender.7
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, the Court would
like to reiterate some elementary but fundamental principles
which are material hereto but which have apparently been
overlooked. The decision rendered by the trial court convicted
both appellants of robbery with double homicide. Time and
again, this Court has held that there is no crime of robbery
with double homicide. The term "homicide" in paragraph 1,
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is to be understood in
its generic sense.8 The juridical concept of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide does not limit the
taking of human life to one single victim.9 In this special
complex crime, the homicides or murders and the physical
injuries, irrespective of their number, committed on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged in the single
composite crime of robbery with homicide. 10 Therefore, the
crime in this case should have been properly denominated as
robbery with homicide.
Again, in criminal cases the burden of proof is generally on
the prosecution. The prosecution must rely on the strength of
its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. Herein
appellants have raised self-defense, thereby shifting the
burden of evidence to them and the onus of which they must
satisfactorily discharge, otherwise conviction would follow
from their admission that they killed the victim.11 Further,
appellants must this time rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution,
for even if that were weak, it cannot be disbelieved after
appellants themselves admitted the killing.12
Still on the basics, paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the requisites of self-defense are
unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. For
self-defense to prosper, it must be positively shown that there
was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the
life of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict more or
less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor
reasonable means to resist said attack.13
Hence, the twin issues to be resolved in the case at bar are
whether or not appellants acted in complete self-defense in
respectively killing Primo Omangay and Macario Omangay,
as they claim, thus absolving both of them from criminal
liability; and, in the negative, what crime was actually
committed by herein appellants.
Essentially involved, in view of the conflicting submissions of
the prosecution and the defense, is the matter of the credibility
of their respective theories. While it is the rule, so well-settled
as to warrant dispensing with any citation of authorities, that
the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is generally
within the province of the trial court which is better
circumstanced because of its direct role in the reception of the
testimonial evidence, a thorough review of the evidence in the
case, particularly the testimonies reflected in the transcripts of
the stenographic notes taken at the trial, persuades us that
there are certain aspects in the respective versions of the
contending parties which do not justify our acceptance thereof
in toto. In fine, what actually happened in the criminal
offenses charged here is somewhat deducible from the
evidence for both sides, and the truth appears to be somewhere
in the middle under a situation contemplated in the so-called
dictum of veritas in medio stat.
The Court is not inclined to fully accept the thesis of the
People in light of some conflicts in the testimonies of its
principal witnesses Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, both
members of the immediate family of the victims, and by
reason of the absence of competent evidence to establish the
elements and commission of one of the component felonies for
the special complex crime imputed to appellants.
For instance, when Arsenia Omangay was queried on cross-
examination as to where appellants were situated shortly prior
to the homicidal attack, she declared that she saw appellant
Amania quietly sitting on a big stone on the side of the
pathway on which the victims and their family were walking,
while appellant Guevarra was standing on the other side of
that path.14 On the other hand, Isidra declared that both
appellants were gathering firewood at that time, which
declaration she later corrected to mean that they were
chopping wood while sitting on different stones.15
Again, although both the defense and the prosecution
apparently failed to discern the same and raised no issue
thereon, another contradiction surfaces from the testimonies of
Arsenia and Isidra with respect to the alleged relative positions
of the victims and their family members accompanying them
50
at the time of the commission of the killing. Arsenia narrated
that when the assault took place, they were all walking, in
single file, on an inclined pathway in this order — Isidra
walking ahead, followed by Leonides, Arsenia, Primo and
then Macario. When the victims were attacked by
appellants,16 the others ran forward in the direction going
uphill.17
Contrarily, Isidra avowed that although they were indeed
walking in single file, at the time of the incident they were
proceeding in the following
order — Primo being in the lead, followed by Macario, Isidra,
Leonides and Arsenia.18 Thereafter, Isidra admitted that she,
her mother Arsenia and sister Leonides ran away and "had
taken a complete about face and taken a direction opposite to
the direction when (they) were proceeding home,"19 that is,
this time by going downhill.
While the foregoing observations do not suffice to completely
discredit said witnesses, they do cast serious doubts on the
prosecution's position on the mode of commission adopted by
appellants in the killings although said crimes were admitted
by them, and also on the matter of the alleged robbery. While
the Court is inclined to be lenient in its appreciation of the
testimonies of said witnesses who are unschooled and simple
country folk, nevertheless their conflicting testimonies reveal,
if they are reflective of anything at all, that their powers of
recollection and capacity to narrate the details of what they
supposedly observed are to be evaluated with caution.
Thus, since the apparent thrust of the submission of the
prosecution which is sought to be established by the
declaration of said witnesses is that the killings were attended
by treachery in view of the alleged sudden and unexpected
attack launched by appellants, we are not persuaded to accept
the same as gospel truth. At any rate, not having been alleged
in the information, treachery cannot be considered as a
qualifying circumstance in the deaths of the two victims, and
neither can it be considered as an aggravating circumstance for
lack of evidence that the supposed treacherous mode of
commission was deliberately adopted by appellants to
specially ensure their commission of the crimes with impunity.
Aside from the foregoing flaws in the prosecution's evidence
as to how the victims were killed, that deficiency is more
pronounced with respect to the charge of robbery which is the
principal felony with which the homicides are sought to be
complexed. On this point, the settled doctrine is that to
integrate the component felonies of this complex crime, the
killing must have been directly connected with the robbery. It
is necessary that there must have been an intent on the part of
the offenders to commit robbery from the outset and, on the
occasion or by reason thereof, a killing takes place.20 The
original design must have been robbery and the homicide,
even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a
direct relation or was committed with a view to consummate
the robbery,21 and not where the taking of the property was
only an afterthought which arose subsequent to the killing.22
The records of this case do not yield the requisite quantum of
evidence on the aforesaid requisite which would produce the
special complex crime charged. In fact, we have reason to
believe that the incident was unpremeditated for when
appellant Amania went to surrender to the barangay captain
thirty minutes thereafter, he was half-naked since he had just
come from spear-fishing in the river and had merely
proceeded thereafter to the scene of the crime.23
The prosecution having thus failed to demonstrate the
commission of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, the inquiry then is whether or not the defense has,
on its part, proved that appellants can be absolved of the
homicidal acts committed by them under their invocation of
the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The records of the
case give us a negative answer.
Appellant Amania narrated the events which led to the death
of Primo Omangay in this wise:
Q When Gaudencio Guevarra r(a)n away chased by
Macario Omangay, what did you do?
A (O)n my part, I was told by the father of Macario
Omangay to run also after Gaudencio since I did not take part
in cutting the banana tree.
Q When you ma(d)e that reply, what did Primo
Omangay do, if any?
A Because I did not help chasing, he boxed me.
Q Who boxed you?
A Primo Omangay.
Q Where were you hit?
A I was hit here, (the witness pointed to his chest) but I
did not f(a)ll down.
Q Now, after Primo Omangay boxed you and hit your
chest, what did you do?
A Because he boxed me and I was hit here and since I
have (sic) also a bolo, I dr(e)w my bolo and stabbed him and
ran away.24
Even indulging appellant Amania in his asseverations, the
same nonetheless disclose that he was not justified in stabbing
Primo Omangay. Assuming that the victim did deal a fistblow
on said appellant, which may be considered as unlawful
aggression, the second requisite for self-defense is not present.
There should be a necessity in both the action taken as well as
the means used, and the latter depends on whether or not the
aggressor himself was armed, the nature and quality of the
weapon used and the physical condition and size of both the
aggressor and the person defending himself. Primo Omangay
was unarmed. Although a bit taller, Primo was of the same
size as appellant Amania.25 The means used by appellant
Amania was clearly unreasonable for, as we have held in
People vs. Montalbo, 26 "(t)hough the deceased struck him
51
with his fists, the appellant was not justified in mortally
wounding his assailant with the penknife. This was not a
reasonably necessary means of repelling the attack."
The plaint of appellant Amania could, at best, fall under the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
under paragraph 1, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
since there is also no conclusive evidence with respect to the
third requisite for self-defense. We do not believe, however,
that appellant Amania can even be granted this ordinary
mitigating circumstance since, aside from the testimonies of
witnesses Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, we entertain grave
doubts on the veracity of appellant Amania's allegation that he
was the victim of an unlawful aggression considering the
mercurial changes in his assertions. For, before giving the
aforestated reason why he killed Primo Omangay, said
appellant had earlier given another on the witness stand, as
follows: "I killed him because when we were on the way, the
son cut the banana tree of Gaudencio Guevarra."27 On the
other hand, Noe Romero, barangay captain of Marsagomayon,
Sta. Catalina, testified that when appellant Amania
surrendered to him, said appellant told him that he killed
Primo Omangay because the latter chased him.28
With respect to appellant Guevarra, his story, as earlier
narrated, is that Macario Omangay chased him with a bolo and
tried to hack him three times. Fortunately, so he claims, he
was able to evade the hacking blows, and he then hacked
Macario several times. 29 Obviously, said appellant was
emboldened in spinning this tale by his awareness of the fact
that there were no eyewitnesses present at the scene of the
alleged fight between him and the victim. However, there are
certain physical facts and indicia that belie his aforesaid
contentions which, parenthetically, also stand completely
uncorroborated.
For one, as we have earlier observed, we have the testimonies
of the mother and sister of the victim, witnesses Arsenia and
Isidra Omangay, which, although we did not fully credit the
same with respect to some attendant details, we nevertheless
accept with regard to the main substance thereof, that is, that
appellant Guevarra was the unprovoked assailant of said
victim while the latter was walking on the trail.
In view of the importance thereof to this particular aspect of
the case, we reproduce the documented counterstatement of
the facts by the Solicitor General:
Arsenia was the first to see appellant Eduardo Amania.
Appellant Amania was sitting on a rock at the side of the trail
holding an unsheathed bolo. At the opposite side of the path
stood Gaudencio Guevarra who also held a bolo. . . . (pp. 7-13,
tsn, August 10, 1988).
She was, however, startled when appellant Amania suddenly
lunged at her husband who was walking behind her. Appellant
Amania stabbed Primo on the left side of the body causing
him to fall (p. 13, tsn., August 10, 1988; p. 23, tsn., January
11, 1989).
Almost at the same time, Gaudencio Guevarra relentlessly
hacked Macario fourteen times on various parts of the body.
Not satisfied, Guevarra decapitated the then prostrate Macario
(p. 23, tsn., January 11, 1989; p. 7, tsn., June 29, 1988).
xxx xxx xxx
Both Primo and Macario Omangay died on the spot from the
wounds they sustained.30
That Macario Omangay was killed right along the side of the
trail in Sitio Talustos is not seriously disputed by the defense.
Aside from a token argument that "(i)t is quite inconceivable
to propose that the malefactors would have dared staged (sic)
such a serious felony in broad daylight in the middle of the
sitio's main path, . . . ," 31 the defense has not presented any
evidence to prove that said victim was killed elsewhere. This,
therefore, completely refutes appellant Guevarra's testimony
that he killed the victim beside the river after he was chased
there by the latter. By his own admission, the distance from
the side of the trail in question up to the side of the river where
he supposedly killed the victim in self-defense is about "50
arms length" or around sixty meters.32 In fact, he even
admitted that he did not tell the barangay captain to whom he
surrendered to get from the scene of the supposed fight the
bolo which the victim allegedly had, nor did he tell the police
in Sta. Catalina to whom he was shortly thereafter turned over
that the victim had a bolo, much less that he killed the victim
in self-defense.33
Moreover, the number of wounds inflicted on the victim, their
location on his neck, back, lap and abdomen, as well as their
depths and areas of penetration constitute ample evidence
belying self-defense. In the case at bar, Macario Omangay
sustained fourteen wounds, one of which almost completely
severed his head. As we observed in People vs. Garachico, et
al.,34 "(t)he wounds inflicted upon the victim by the two
accused who were not wounded at all, sufficiently disprove
their allegation that they acted in self-defense.
Now, although the burden of evidence had shifted to the
defense for having invoked self-defense, still the burden of
proof lies with the prosecution. Unlike the burden of evidence
which shifts from one party to the other, the burden of proof
always lies with the prosecution.35 Therefore, the elements of
the composite crime of robbery with homicide, as well as its
attendant circumstances and the fact that appellants are guilty
thereof, must still be proved by the prosecution.
While the People, as earlier explained, failed to prove said
special complex crime, the evidence fully sustains the charge
that appellants killed the victims Primo and Macario
Omangay. With respect to the unlawful taking of their lives,
appellants miserably failed in their bid for exoneration by their
allegedly having acted in self-defense. Furthermore, appellants
having admitted the homicidal acts, the Court is left with no
option but to find each of them guilty of homicide, appellant
Amania for the death of Primo Omangay and appellant
Guevarra for the death of Macario Omangay, there being no
52
qualifying circumstance attending the killing and no evidence Exempting circumstance because freedom is absent
of conspiracy between appellants having been proved.
1. Compulsion of an irresistable force (Art. 12 par. 5)
Barangay captain Noe Romero testified that at around 4:30 2. Impulse of an uncontrollable fear and equal or greater
P.M. of that fateful day, appellant Amania surrendered to him, injury (Art. 12 par. 6)
followed for the same purpose by appellant Guevarra some Art. 4 – Criminal Liability –
thirty minutes later.36 A barangay captain or chairman was
and still is considered a person in authority.37 Hence, 1. Praeter Intentionem
appellants Amania and Guevarra may be granted the 2. Impossible crimes
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any
aggravating circumstance to offset the same since the Boxing bout resulting to the death of one of the boxers is not
allegation of evident premeditation is without evidentiary unlawful.
basis, with the result that the penalty of reclusion temporal for
Liable for direct, natural and logical consequences of one’s act
homicide shall be im posed in its minimum period.
People vs. Cardenas 36 SCRA 631
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby SET People vs. Toling 62 SCRA 17
ASIDE and another is rendered finding accused-appellants People vs. Monleon 74 SCRA 263
Eduardo Amania and Gaudencio Guevarra GUILTY of the
crime of homicide, and each of them is sentenced to serve an Proximate Cause
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of Villanueva vs. Medina 102 Phil. 102 Phil. 181-86
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Said accused-appellants Vda de Bataclan, et al vs. Medina 102 Phil. 181
Eduardo Amania and Gaudencio Guevarra are hereby further People vs. Reyes 81 Phil 341
ordered to respectively INDEMNIFY the heirs of the victims People vs. Piamonte, et al – 94 Phil. 293
Primo Omangay and Macario Omangay in the amount of People vs. Lacson, et al 111 Phil 1
P50,000.00 for each victim, in line with our current People vs. Ural, 56 SCRA 138
jurisprudential policy on such civil liability ex delicto. People vs. Martin 89 Phil. 18
US vs. Valdez – 41 Phil. 497
SO ORDERED. People vs. Dominguez – 61 Phil. 617
People vs. Palalon – 49 Phil. 177
People vs. Moldez 61 Phil. 1
Dolo distinguished from Culpa US vs. Bayutas – 31 Phil. 584
People vs. Quanzon – 62 Phil. 162
People vs. de Fernando – 49 Phil. 75
People vs. Cornel – 78 Phil. 458

People vs. Aguilar and Oliveros 109 Phil 847
People vs. Lingad 103 Phil. 980
People vs. Ramirez – 46 Phil. 204
Motive –
People vs. Dorico, et al 54 SCRA 172
People vs. Herilla 51 SCRA 31
People vs. Murray 105 Phil. 591
Presumptions –
People vs. Marco 83 SCRA 338
People vs. Panasa – 47 Phil. 48
People vs. Reloj – 43 SCRA 526
Effect of Conspiracy
US vs. Bondol, et al – 3 Phil. 89
US vs. Remiego, et al – 37 Phil. 599
People vs. Tamayo 44 Phil. 38
People vs. Quirosay – 103 Phil. 1160
Impossible crime –
(a) Inherent impossibility
(b) Employment of Inadequate means
(c) Employment of ineffectual means
Only applicable to crimes against persons and property –
Employment of inadequate means not punishable.

Exempting Circumstances because of lack of intelligence. People vs. Intod - _ SCRA _

1. Mentally, unbalanced person (insane, intelcille, etc.
Article 12 par. 1)
2. Children who are 15 years old and below (par. 2
Article 12 as Amended by RA 10630)
3. Children who are over 15 but below 18 years old who
did not act 2with discernment (par. 2, Article 12)
4. Those who act under mistake of fact
Carreon vs. Flores – 64 SCRA 238
Art. 5 – Duty of the Court in connection with acts which
should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and
in cases of excessive penalties.
- Read – Republic Act 10951
53
 People vs. Limaco – 88 Phil. 35
People vs. Santos, et al 104 Phil 551
People vs. Olaes 105 Phil. 502
o See – Sec. 21 of Art. IV of 1973
Constitution
People vs. dela Cruz – 92 Phil. 906
US vs. Valera Ang Y, 26 Phil. 598
People vs. Cabral and Jaula 113 Phil 297
People vs. Monleon – 74 SCRA 263
People vs. Castañeda – 60 Phil. 604
People vs. Tia Ua 96 Phil 138
People vs. Orifon – 57 Phil. 594
People vs. Estoesta – 93 Phil. 647
Article 6 – Stages of the Commission of the Crime
Crimes of Murder, Homicide, and others
Attempted – Frustrated – Consumated
Attempted Homicide
US vs. Bien – 20 Phil. 354
People vs. David – 60 Phil. 93
People vs. Kolalo, et al – 59 Phil. 715
People vs. Borinaga – 55 Phil. 433
US vs. Lim San – 17 Phil. 273
US vs. Edrade – 36 Phil. 209
People vs. Samera, et al – 83 Phil. 548
Colinares vs. People – G.R. No. 182748
Dec. 13, 2011
Theft –
People vs. Villanueva – G.R. No. 160188
June 21, 2007
US vs. Sobrevilla – 53 Phil. 226
US vs. Adiao – 38 Phil. 754
Estafa –
US vs. Villanueva – 1 Phil. 370
US vs. Dominguez – 41 Phil. 209
Juridical Possession and Physical Possession
Arson –
People vs. Hernandez – 54 Phil. 122
US vs. Valdez – 39 Phil. 240
Rape –
US vs. Hernandez – 49 Phil. 980
People vs. Velasco – 73 SCRA 574
People vs. Pastores – 40 SCRA 498
People vs. Velasco – 73 SCRA 574
People vs. Erina – 50 Phil. 908
People vs. Campuhan
People vs. Dadulla – G.R. No. 172321 Feb.
9, 2011
People vs. Victorino Reyes – G.R. No.
170462 Feb. 5, 2014
US vs. Tayaba – 62 Phil. 559
Robbery –
US vs. Simeon – 3 Phil. 688
People vs. Lomahang – 61 Phil. 703
Art. 7 – Light Felonies when Punishable
Art. 8 – Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit a Felony
Cases to Read
People vs. Peralta – 23 SCRA 759
People vs. Yu, et al - 80 SCRA 382
People vs. Malilay – 63 SCRA 423
People vs. Pagaduan – 29 SCRA 172
People vs. Paz, et al – 11 SCRA 667
People vs. Catao, et al – 107 Phil. 861
People vs. Cruz, et al – 114 Phil. 1055
People vs. Pedro, et al – 16 SCRA 57
People vs. Cariño, et al – 55 SCRA 516 –
People vs. Indic – 10 SCRA 130
People vs. Puno – 56 SCRA 659
People vs. Bautista – 28 SCRA 239
People vs. Rosario – 68 Phil 720
People vs. Mori – 55 SCRA 382
People vs. Asaad – 55 Phil. 697
People vs. Villacorte – 55 SCRA 640
People vs. Sandiganbayan, et al – G.R. No.
158754 Aug. 10, 2007 (pp. vs. Castelo)
Preferred Home Specialists, Inc. and Edwin Yu vs. CA and
Hailey Sy – G.R. No. 163593 Dec. 16, 2005
US vs. Gloria – 4 Phil. 341
People vs. Garillo – 84 SCRA 537
People vs. Basco, et al – G.R. No. 189820
Oct. 10, 2012
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan –
Art. 9 – Grave Felonies, Less grave
- Felonies and light felonies
People vs. Yu Hai alias Hoya – 99 Phil. 775
Art. 10 – Offenses Not Subject to the Provisions of the
Revised Penal Code
People vs. Posadas – 64 Phil. 353
People vs. Carbelo – 106 Phil. 496
People vs. Respicio, et al – 107 Phil. 995
People vs. delos Reyes – G.R. No. 177457
Oct. 10, 2012
Article 11 – Justifying Circumstances
54
 1. Self defense
2. Defense of Relatives
3. Defense of Strangers
4. Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury
5. Fulfillment of a duty or Lawful exercise of a
Right or Office
6. Obedience to a Lawful Order issued for some
Lawful purpose
7. Battered Woman Syndrome
1. Self defense –
Sabang vs. People – G.R. No. 168818 March 9, 2007
People vs. Tokuelog – G.R. No. 178059, January 22, 2008
Sanchez vs. People – G.R. No. 167007 Dec. 8, 2006
People vs. Reyes – G.R. No. 153875 Aug. 16, 2006
People vs. Gonzales – G.R. No. 195534 June 13, 2012
People vs. Campos. G.R. No. 176061 July 4, 2011
Razon vs. People – G.R. No. 158053 June 21, 2007
Defense of Person or Rights – Honor
People vs. Judge et al, 62 Phil 504
People vs. dela Cruz, 61Phil. 144
People vs. Jaurique – 76 Phil 174
People vs. Perlito Abemalez – G.R. No. 167934 – Jan. 31,
2009
People vs. Ramon Regalado – G.R. No. 171483 3/31/09
Manaban vs. CA – G.R. No. 150723 – 7/11/2000
Simon Flores vs. People – G.R. No. 181354, Feb. 27, 2013
People vs. Gary Vergara et al – G.R. No. 177763 7/3/13
People vs. Antero Samez – G.R. No. 202847 Oct. 23, 2013
People vs. Bautista, et al 116 Phil 830
People vs. Balansag – 60 Phil 266
People vs. Alconga et al – 78 Phil 366
US vs. Carrero 9 Phil 544
People vs. Macaso – 64 SCRA 639
People vs. Sabio – 19 SCRA 903
People vs. Jamero 73 OG 4297
People vs. Yuman - 61 Phil. 786
US vs. Navarro 7 Phil 713
People vs. Bauden – 77 Phil 107
People vs. Gundayao 30 SCRA 226
People vs. Laurel
People vs. Boholtz – Caballero 61 SCRA 180
People vs. Encomienda - 46 SCRA 522
People vs. Roxas – 58 Phil. 733
2. Defense of Relative –
Ricardo Medina, Jr. versus People – G.R. No. 167308 –
1/15/14
People vs. Esmedia 17 Phil. 260
People vs. Cabungcal – 51 Phil. 802
US vs. Rivera, et al – 26 Phil. 138
US vs. Batongbakal 37 Phil 382
People vs. Mangantilao – 33 Phil 217
3. Defense of Stranger
US vs. Subingasubing – 31 Phil 376
People vs. Valdez – 58 Phil 31
US vs. Aviado – 38 Phil 10
People vs. Ancheta, et al - 66 Phil. 638
4. Avoidance of a Greater Evil or Injury –
People vs. Ayaya – 52 Phil 354
Tan vs. Standard Vacuum del Co., et al – 91 Phil 672
People vs. Ricohermoso, et al - 36 SCRA 411
5. Performance/Fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise
of a Right –
People vs. Oanis, et al - 74 Phil. 257
People vs. Pajenado - 69 SCRA 172
Andal vs. People – 27 SCRA 608
People vs. Delima – 46 Phil 238
Valcorza vs. People – 30 SCRA 143
People vs. Lagata 83 Phil. 150
People vs. Mamayao 78 Phil. 821
6. Obedience to an Order Issued by Superior for some
lawful purpose –
People vs. Wilson, et al – 52 Phil 919
People vs Barroga 54 Phil 247
People vs. Margeu, et al 815 Phil 839
People vs. Hufana, et al 103 Phil 304
People vs. Beronilla 96 Phil 566
People vs. Rogado, et al 106 Phil 816
7. Battered Woman Syndrome
Genosa vs. People – Read RA 9262
12. Exempting Circumstances
1. Imbecile or Insane Person
People vs. Formigones – 81 Phil 658
People vs. Renegado – 57 SCRA 275
People vs. Fausto – 113 Phil 841
People vs. Balondo - 30 SCRA – 155
US vs. Guevarra – 27 Phil. 547
People vs. Torres – 58 Phil 225
People vs. Bascos – 14 Phil 204
People vs. Lucena – 69 Phil. 350
People vs. Gimena – 55 Phil 604
Dumaquin vs. Reynaldo, et al - 92 Phil. 66
Chin Ah Foo vs. Concepcion - 54 Phil 775
2. 15 years and below under RA 9344 as amended by
10630 Repealing the Revised Penal Code
3. Over 15 years of age but below 18 years if he did not
act with discernment . Also found in RA 9344 as
amended by RA 10630 – (Read the two (2) Laws)
55
Discernment – between offender or offended party anytime and it
includes Rape
US vs. Maralit 36 Phil 153
Instigation –
People vs. Nieto 103 Phil 1133
Art. 4, par. 2 – in Relation to Art. 59 – Where the
4 Accident Impossible Crime committed thru ineffectual means
People vs. Reyes – 69 SCRA 474 is not punishable
Tugade vs. Court of Appeals – 85 SCRA 226
People vs. Carlos , 115 Phil. 704 Insanity as Exempting Circumstance
People vs. Bindoy – 56 Phil. 15
US vs. Tañedo 15 Phil. 196 People vs. Jesus Domingo - G.R. No. 184343 3/2/09
US vs. Knight – 26 Phil. 216 People vs. Rene Baron – G.R. No. 185209 June
28/2010
5. Under Compulsion of Irresistible Force People vs. Melba Espiritu, et al – G.R. No. 180919
People vs. Noel Bartolome – G.R. No. 191726, Feb.
People vs. Abanes 73 SCRA 44 6, 2013
People vs. Fernando – 33 SCRA 149 People vs. Ernesto Ventura, Sr. – G.R. No. 205230
US vs. Caballeros et al – 4 Phil. 330 March 12, 2013
People vs. Moreno 77 Phil 549
#Absolutory Cause –
6. Under the Impulse of an Uncontrollable Fear of an Rape and Marriage – the Historical
equal or greater Felony – Connection –
People vs. Semeñada, et al 103 Phil 790 People vs. Edgar Lumawan – G.R. No.
People vs. Gervacio 24 SCRA 960 187495 – April 21, 2014
People vs. Jesus Quilloy – 88 Phil. 53
US vs. Exaltacion, et al 1 Phil. 339 Article 13 – Mitigating Circumstances
US vs. Elicanal – 35 Phil. 209
Privileged Mitigating Circumstances -
People vs. Rogado, et al 106 Phil. 816
1. Incomplete Self defense
7. Prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause relative or stranger
2. When offender is above 15 but
US vs. Vicentillo - 19 Phil 118
below 18 years of age and be
People vs. Bandian - 63 Phil 530 acted with disarmed
3. When crime is not wholly
Absolutory Causes excusable because of some
conditions required in Article
a) Article 6, par. 3 – 11 and 12.
Spontaneous desistance in the attempted stage 4. When there are two (2) or
b) Article 7 – Accessories are not punishable if more mitigating circumstances
light felon is not consummated not offset by agencies
c) Accessories who are exempt from Criminal aggrevating
liability
d) Article 89 – Total Exemption from Criminal Par. 1 – Incomplete Justifying or Exempting
liability Circumstances.
e) Article 124 – Legal Ground for Arbitrary
detention People vs. Rosal – 93 Phil. 116
f) Article 247 – Infliction of less serious and slight People vs. Martin – 89 Phil 18
physical injuries to a spouse or child – under People vs. Rivera – 41 Phil 472
exceptional circumstances People vs. Alviar – 56 Phil 98
People vs. Sotelo – 55 Phil 196
Art. 280_ par. 3 – Legal excuses for trespass to People vs. Castañeda – 120 Phil 604
dwelling
Par. 2 – As to age – under 18 but above 15 -
Art. 332 – Where certain person are exempt from See Republic Act 9344 as amended by RA
criminal liability in theft, swindling or malicious 10630
mischief
Par. 3 – Lack of Intention to do so grave a
Art. 344 – Express Pardon by offended party prior to wrong as that committed
the filing of case of Seduction, Abduction, or Acts of
Lasciviousness before the Court and Marriage People vs. Ty Sui Wong – 83 SCRA 125
56
People vs. Amit – 32 SCRA 95
People vs. Boyles – 17 SCRA 88
People vs. Dacquel – 36 Phil. 781
People vs. Lumasag – 56 Phil. 79
People vs. Ural - 56 SCRA 138
People vs. Yu – 110 Phil. 793
People vs. Bautista – 28 SCRA 184
People vs. Enriquez, et al – 58 Phil 536
People vs. Pagal – 79 SCRA 570
US vs. Firmo - 37 Phil. 133
US vs. Cortez – 36 Phil 837
People vs. Dequia, et al – 88 Phil 520
People vs. delos Santos – 85 Phil 870
(par. 4 see – after par. 5)
Par. 4 – Sufficient Provocation or Threat
immediately preceded the act
People vs. Malabanan – 9 Phil. 262
People vs. Nabora - 73 Phil. 434
People vs. Tan – 73 SCRA 288
People vs. Pagal - 78 SCRA 570
US vs. Firmo – 37 Phil. 133
US vs. Cortez – 36 Phil. 837
People vs. Dequa et al - 88 Phil.
520
People vs. Marquez – 53 Phil. 260
Par. 5 – Vendication of a grave offense –
People vs. Benito – 62 SCRA 351
People vs. Ampar – 37 Phil 201
People vs. Rocel – 66 Phil. 321
People vs. Samonte, Jr. – 64 SCRA
319
People vs. Parena – 64 SCRA 319
9.
People vs. Benito – 74 SCRA 271
People vs. Lumayog – 73 SCRA
502
People vs. Diokno, et al – 63 Phil
601
US vs. Ferrer – 1 Phil. 56
People vs. Noynoy – 38 Phil. 393
People vs. Marquez – 53 Phil. 260
People vs. Yusman - 61 Phil. 786
US vs. Macalintal, et al – 2 Phil.
448
People vs. Zapata, et al – 107 Phil.
103
US vs. Hicks - 14 Phil. 217
Phil 287
Par. 6 – Passion or Obfuscation –
People vs. Alanguilang – 52 Phil
663
US vs. Esmedia, et al - 17 Phil.
260
People vs. Yaman - 61 Phil. 786
People vs. Olgado, et al – 91 Phil
908
Circumstances
People vs. Bello, 119 Phil. 558
People vs. Constantino – 20 SCRA
940
People vs. Caliso – 58 Phil. 283
8. Voluntary Surrender or Confession of Guilt –
Voluntary Surrender –
People vs. Honasan – 29 SCRA 534
People vs. Melo – 88 SCRA 22
People vs. Timbol, et al – G.R. No. 47471 –
73
Andrada vs. People – G.R. No. 135222
March 4, 2005
People vs. Zaldy Garcia – G.R. No. 174479
June 17, 2008
People vs. Concepcion – G.R. No. 169060
February 6, 2007
Reynaldo S. Mariano vs. People – G.R. No.
178145 7/7/14
Confession of Guilt or Plea of Guilty
People vs. dela Cruz – 63 Phil. 874
People vs. dela Peña – 66 Phil. 451
People vs. Lambino – 103 Phil. 504
People vs. Go Chong - 60 Phil. 293
People vs. Pardo, et al – 79 Phil 658
People vs. Noble – 77 Phil. 93
People vs. Intal – 101 Phil 306
People vs. Moro Sabedul – 89 Phil 283
People vs. Palupe – 69 Phil 705
People vs. Lacson – 55 SCRA – 589
Physical Defect
People vs. Nazario 97 Phil. 990
People vs. Formigones – 87 Phil 658
10. - Illness which diminishes will power.
People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil 694
People vs. Balweg – 79 Phil 805
People vs. Amit – 82 Phil. 820
11. Similar or Analogous Circumstances
Tal-id vs. People 78 SCRA 24
People vs. Libria - 95 Phil 389
People vs. Villamora, et al – 86
People vs. Navarea 76 SCRA
People vs. Agustin - 16 SCRA 467
People vs. Pujinio – 27 SCRA 1185
People vs. Salazar – 105 Phil. 1058
Article 14 – Aggravating Circumstances –
Kinds of Aggravating
57
1. Generic Disregard of
2. Specific respect due to rank
3. Special
4. Qualified People vs.
5. Qualifying Valeriano, et al – 90 Phil
6. Inherent (not really 15
aggravating)
In General –
Rule:
People vs. Torres, et al –
(a) Must be particularly G.R. No. L_4642 _Nov. 29, 1953
alleged in the People vs. Benito – 74
information SCRA 271
(b) If not alleged in the Disrespect due to an
information, it will Octogenarian people vs. Orbillo – 88 Phil 784
not affect the nature People vs. Casimero, et al
of the crime or the – 103 Phil. 1156
penalty but if proven People vs. Enot – 116
may affect the civil Phil. 637
liability People vs. Alcamatsu – 51
Phil. 963
1. Advantage be taken of Public People vs. Diaz, et al – 55
position SCRA 178
People vs. Brusia – 30
People vs. Ordiales - 42 SCRA SCRA 307
238 People vs. Dayag, et al –
US vs. Torrida - 25 Phil. 139 49 Phil. 423
US vs. Yumul - 34 Phil. 169 People vs. Taya – 53 Phil.
People vs. Cardeña, et al – 59 Phil. 273
393 People vs. Metran – 89
People vs. Reyes – 69 SCRA 474 Phil. 541
People vs. Pantoja – 25 SCRA 468
People vs. Teves – 44 Phil 275 Dwelling:
People vs. Donald Vasquez alias
Don – G.R. No. 200304 People vs. Mongado – 28
1/15/14 SCRA 642
People vs. Santos – 8 SCRA 113 People vs. Ambis – 68
Phil. 635
Par. 2 – Contempt or with assault to People vs. Manuel – 29
public authority SCRA 337
US vs. Tapan, et al – 20
US vs. Rodriguez, et al – Phil. 211
19 Phil 150 People vs. Alcala – 46
People vs. Siojo – 61 Phil Phil. 738
307 People vs. David – 86
People vs. Pardo – 79 SCRA 511
Phil. 568 People vs. Rodriguez, et al
People vs. Orongan, et al – 103 Phil. 1008
– 58 Phil. 426 People vs. Bautista – 79
Phil. 652
Par. 3 – Disregard of the respect People vs. Ompal – 26
due to rank, age, sex or if SCRA 750
committed in the dwelling People vs. Mendoza, et al
of the offended party – 100 Phil. 811
People vs. Apduhan, Jr. –
People vs. Mangsant – 65 24 SCRA 800
Phil. 548 People vs. Magnaye – 89
People vs. Pagal – 79 Phil. 233
SCRA 510 People vs. Baguio, et al –
14 Phil. 240

58
 People vs. Balagtas, et al –
Exception to Dwelling – Not 68 Phil. 675
Aggravating People vs. Bersamin, et al
– 88 Phil. 28
1. Dwelling party is also the
dwelling of offender Uninhabited Place –
2. Dwelling is not owned or does
not belong to the offended People vs. Arpa – 27
person SCRA 1017
3. Offended party gave People vs. Aguinaldo – 55
provocation Phil. 10
People vs. Saguing – 30
People vs. Gabiting, et al – 88 Phil. 672 SCRA 834
People vs. Pakob – 81 Phil. 426 People vs. Damaso, - 86
SCRA 370
Par. 4 – Abuse of Confidence or Obvious People vs. Ong – 62
ungratefulness. SCRA 176
People vs. Lanete, et al –
People vs. Develos – 16 SCRA 724 79 Phil. 815
People vs. Villas – 27 SCRA 947
People vs. Ong – 62 SCRA 174 By a band –
People vs. Lachico – 49 Phil. 689
People vs. Baustista, et al – 65 People vs. Pakab, et al –
SCRA 460 81 Phil. 426
US vs. Mandigoren – 1
Par. 5 – Place of the Crime – Phil. 658
Camaro vs. Valero – 51
▪ Palace of Chief Executive or SCRA 122
elsewhere the President is People vs. Atencio – 17
present – SCRA 88
▪ Offices of Public Authorities People vs. Luna – 58
▪ Churches SCRA 198
People vs. Alcaraz, et al –
US vs. Punsalan – 3 Phil. 260 101 Phil. 533
People vs. Jaurigue, et al – 76 Phil. 174 People vs. Laoto, et al -52
Phil. 401
Par. 6 – Nighttime, Uninhabited place, or by
a bond
Par. 7 – Occasion of Public
People vs. Santos, et al – 91 Phil. Calamity
320
People vs. Lao Won Sing
Nighttime – – 18 SCRA 1077
People vs. Aspa – 27
People vs. Undong – 66 SCRA 1037
SCRA 386
People vs. Fernandez – 45 Par. 8 – With Aid of Armed Men or
SCRA 535 Persons who afford impunity
People vs. Jaronilla – 55
SCRA 563 People vs. Pinca, et al –
People vs. Flores – 40 114 Phil. 498
SCRA 230 People vs. Villapa, et al –
People vs. Matbangon – 91 Phil. 189
60 Phil. 887 People vs. Piring – 63
People vs. Putian – 74 Phil. 546
SCRA 114 US vs. Abargar – 2 Phil.
People vs. Aquino – 68 417
Phil. 615 People vs. Mamayao, et al
People vs. Boyles – 11 – 78 Phil. 721
SCRA 88
People vs. Barredo, et al – Par. 9 – Recidivesione
87 Phil. 800 (Reincidencia)
59
 People vs. De Jesus – 63
Phil. 760
People vs. Ibasco – 90
Phil. 225
People vs. Calocar – 60
Phil. 878
People vs. Melendrez – 59
Phil. 154
People vs. Manalo – 99
Phil. 23
Par. 10 – Reiteration or Habituality
People vs. de Joya, et al –
98 Phil. 238
People vs. Rayron – 30
SCRA 92
People vs. Mendoza – 13
SCRA 11
Par. 11 – In consideration of Price,
Reward or Process
US vs. Flores – 28 Phil. 29
People vs. Paredes – 24
SCRA 635
People vs. Otero, et al –
31 Phil. 201
People vs. Alincastre – 40
SCRA 391
People vs. Akim – 38 Phil.
1 People vs. Molleda – 56 SCRA 667
People vs. Ty Sui Wong –
83 SCRA 125
Par. 12 – By means of Incadiation,
Fire, Poison, Explosion, Shipwreck, Derailment or involving
great waste and ruin.
People vs. Villaroya, et al
– 101 Phil. 1021
People vs. Paterno – 87
Phil. 722
People vs. Bonifacio –
105 Phil. 1283
Par. 13 – Evident Premiditation
US vs. Gil – 13 Phil. 530
People vs. Honasan – 29
SCRA 534
People vs. Diaz – 55
SCRA 128
People vs. Lim – 71
SCRA 219
People vs. Renegado – 57
SCRA 275
People vs. Yturiaga – 86
Phil. 534
People vs. Carillo – 77
Phil. 572
People vs. Sarmiento –
118Phil. 286
People vs. Bangug, et al –
27 Phil. 8
People vs. Lozada – 70
Phil. 525
People vs. Berdida, et al –
17 SCRA 320
People vs. Mendoza, et al
– 91 Phil. 58
People vs. Cadag, et al –
112 Phil. 314
People vs. Villaseñor – 35
SCRA 460
People vs. Guillen – 85
Phil. 307
People vs. Ubiña – 97
Phil. 575
People vs. Valeriano, et al
– 90 Phil. 15
Par. 14 – Craft, Fraud or Disguise
US vs. Rodriguez – 19
Phil. 150
Craft -
US vs. Gamposta – 16 Phil. 817
People vs. Alcaraz, et al – 103 Phil.
533
People vs. Barbosa – 86 SCRA 217
People vs. Daos, et al – 60 Phil.
143
People vs. Napile, et al – 85 Phil.
521
People vs. Saguing – 30 SCRA 834
Fraud –
People vs. de Leon – 50 Phil. 539
People vs. Ramotete, et al – 56
SCRA 66
Disguise –
People vs. Pring, et al – 63 Phil.
546
People vs. Ragas – 44 SCRA 152
People vs. Galamiton – 95 Phil.
955
People vs. Cunanan – 75 SCRA 15
Par. 15 – Abuse of Superior
strength or Means employed to weaken the defense
Abuse of Superior strength –
People vs. Cabiling – 74 SCRA
285
People vs. Saliling – 69 SCRA 427
60
 People vs. Elizaga, et al – 86 Phil.
364
People vs. Caoile – 61 SCRA 73
People vs. Yu – 80 SCRA 382
People vs. Glore – 87 Phil. 739
People vs. Guzman – 107 Phil.
1122
People vs. Navarra – 25 SCRA 491
People vs. Caroz, et al – 65 Phil.
521
US vs. Devila, et al – 3 Phil. 625
Weaken the Defense –
People vs. Ducusin – 53 Phil. 280
People vs. Siaotong – 100 Phil.
1103
Par. 16 – Treachery (Alevosia)
People vs. Agacer – G.R.
No. 177751 – 12-4-11
People vs. Duavis – G.R.
No. 190861 - 12-8-11
People vs. Anticamara –
G.R. No. 178771 – June 8, 2011
People vs. Aguila – G.R.
No. 171017 – Dec. 6, 2006
People vs. Rene Rosas –
G.R. No. 177825 – Oct. 24, 2008
People vs. Samonte, Jr. –
64 SCRA 319
People vs. Yadaon – 92
Phil. 160
People vs. Plateros – 83
SCRA 401
People vs. Tumaob – 83
Phil. 738
People vs. Diaz – 92 Phil.
802
People vs. Labis – 21
SCRA 825
People vs. Aleta – 72
SCRA 542
People vs. Sabijon, et al –
94 Phil. 1047
People vs. Tengyao – 113
Phil. 465
People vs. Delgado – 77
Phil. 11
People vs. Luna – 74 Phil.
101
US vs. Baluyot – 40 Phil.
385
People vs. Somera, et al –
83 Phil. 548
Par. 17 – IGNOMINY –
People vs. Jose – 17
SCRA 450
People vs. Terrifiel, et al –
45 OG 803
US vs. Iglesia, et al – 21
Phil. 55
US vs. Abelgar – 2 Phil.
417
People vs. Pantoja – 25
SCRA 468
Par. 18 – Unlawful Entry
People vs. Sunga – 43
Phil. 205
Par. 19 – Breaking of Wall roof,
Floor, etc.
US vs. Barberon – 17 Phil.
509
Par. 20 – With aid of Persons under
18 years or by means of Motor Vehicle
People vs. Laxamana, et al
– 70 Phil. 517
People vs. Espejo – 36
SCRA 400
People vs. Cuadra – 85
SCRA 576
People vs. Thadeos
Enquito – G.R. No. 128812 – Feb. 28, 2000
People vs. Punzalan –
G.R. No. 199892 – Dec. 10, 2012
People vs. Marasigan – 70
Phil. 583
Par. 21 – Cruelty –
People vs. Llamora – 51
SCRA 48
People vs. Dayug, et al –
49 Phil. 423
People vs. Luna – 58
SCRA 198
People vs. Mariquena – 84
Phil. 39
US vs. Oro – 19 Phil. 548
People vs. Clamania, et al
– 85 Phil. 350
People vs. Bersabal – 48
Phil. 439
Other Aggravating Circumstances –
1. Article 235 – Maltreatment of Prisoners
to extort confession or to obtain a
confession
2. Article 263, par. 5 – Serious Physical
Injuries committed against any persons
enumerated in Article 246 (parricide) or
61
 with the attendance of those enumerated
in Article 248.
3. Article 265, par. 2 – Less Serious
Physical Injuries with Manifest intent to
offend or insult the injured person;
4. Article 267, par. 2 – Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention committed for
purposes of extorting ransom
5. Article 276, par. 2 – Abandonment of a
minor which results in the death or
expose his life to danger only
6. Article 282 – Grave Threats made in
writing or through middleman.
7. Art. 286 – Grave Coercion for purposes
of compelling any religious act
8. Art. 296 – Robbery by a bond when any
of the arms used is an unlicensed fire
arms
9. Art. 302 – Robbery in an inhabited
place when the property taken is a small
matter or large cattle
10. Article 304 – Possession of Picklocks
by the offender who is not a locksmith
11. Article 306 – Brigandage when any of
the offender carried an unlicensed
firearms
Art. 15 – ALTERNATIVE CIRCUSTANCES –
1. Relationship –
US vs. Nesierto – 15 Phil. 358
2. Intoxication –
People vs. Apduhan, Jr. – 24 SCRA
798
People vs. Badoso – 60 SCRA 60
People vs. Tapac – 28 SCRA 191
Habitual Drunkard –
People vs. Amenamen – 37 OG
2324
People vs. Cabrera – G.R. No.
13941R – June 1, 1956
People vs. Cruz – 49 Phil. 163
People vs. Gongora – 118 Phil. 486
People vs. De Gracia – 18 SCRA
197
People vs. Dacanay – 105 Phil.
1265
3 . Degree of Mistution
People vs. Suriañada – 103 Phil.
780
People vs. vs. Ripas, et al – 95 Phil.
63
People vs. Agustin, et al – 165
SCRA 467
People vs. Limaco – 88 Phil. 35
Art. 16 – Who are criminally liable
For Grave and less Grave Felonies
1. Principals
2. Accomplices
3. Accessories
For Light Felonies
1. Principals
2. Accomplices
West Coast Life Insurance Co. vs. Hurd
– 23 Phil. 401
People vs. Arranchado, et al – 109 Phil.
410
People vs. Verzola – 80 SCRA 600
Art. 17 – Principals
1. Principal by Direct Participation
2. Principal by Inducement
3. Principal by indispensable cooperation
Principal by Direct Participation
a) People vs. Tamayo, et al – 44 Phil. 38
People vs. Abariatos – 81 Phil. 238
US vs. Zalros, et al – 40 Phil. 96
US vs. Abiog – 37 Phil. 137
People vs. Tumalip – 60 SCRA 303
People vs. Ortiz, et al – 55 Phil. 993
People vs. Maraño – 84 SCRA 87
People vs. Mitra, et al – 107 Phil. 931
b) Principal by Inducement
People vs. Gensola – 29 SCRA 483
People vs. Indanan – 24 Phil. 203
People vs. Lawas – 97 Phil. 975
People vs. Kiichi Omar – 61 Phil. 603
People vs. Asaad – 55 Phil. 697
People vs. Lao – 110 Phil. 643
People vs. Otadora, et al – 86 Phil. 244
People vs. Ulip, et al – 89 Phil. 629
People vs. Po Giok To – 96 Phil. 913
People vs. Casalme – 17 SCRA 714
People vs. del Castillo – 33 SCRA 716
People vs. Caimbre, et al – 110 Phil. 370
Par. 3 – Indispensable Cooperation –
People vs. Marco and Dulay – 108 Phil. 174
People vs. Labis – 21 SCRA 875
People vs. Agbuya, et al – 57 Phil. 248
People vs. Palencia – 71 SCRA 679
People vs. Tatlonghari – 27 SCRA 726
People vs. Manansala, Jr. – 31 SCRA 401
People vs. Jaranilla – 55 SCRA 563
PrIncipals by Conspiracy
People vs. Peralta – 25 SCRA 759
62
 People vs. Corcano – 87 SCRA 1
People vs. Ibañez – 77 Phil. 664
People vs. Remalante, 92 Phil. 48
People vs. Mangulabnan, et al – 92 Phil. 583
People vs. Verzo – 21 SCRA 1403
People vs. Monadi, Lucman – 97 Phil. 575
People vs. Odencio, et al – 75 OG 4639
People vs. Moises, et al – 404 Phil. 1054
People vs. Delgado, et al - 77 Phil. 71
People vs. Villa, et al – 81 Phil. 193
People vs. Alfaro and Hernandez – 91 Phil.
401
People vs. Tan, et al – 77 Phil. 1090
People vs. Calle – 50 Phil. 616
People vs. Villamora, et al – 86 Phil. 287
Khaw Dy and Chiam vs. People and the
Court of Appeals -109 Phil. 649
US vs. Diris, et al – 26 Phil. 133
People vs. Chua Huy – 87 Phil. 258
People vs. Roncal – 19 SCRA 509
People vs. Dueñas – 112 Phil. 152
People vs. Gensola – 29 SCRA 483
People vs. Silvestre, et al – 56 Phil. 353
Art. 18 – Accomplices
People vs. Empeinado, et al – 9 Phil. 613
People vs. Tamayo, et al – 44 Phil. 38
People vs. Custodio – 47 SCRA 289
People vs. Tumalip – 60 SCRA 303
People vs. Manansala, Jr. – 31 SCRA 401
People vs. Tatlonghari – 27 SCRA 726
People vs. Silvestre, et al – 16 Phil. 353
People vs. Azcona, et al – 59 Phil. 580
People vs. Vicente – 28 SCRA 247
People vs. Bongo, et al – 55 SCRA 547
Art. 19 – Accessories
Five Kinds of Accessories
1. Profiting himself/themselves of the
effects of the crime
2. Assisting the offender to profit from the
commission of crime
3. Concealing or destroying the body of
the crime or the effects or vestments
thereof in order to prevent its discovery
4. With abuse of his public function as a
public officer he harbor, conceal, or
assist the principal of the crime.
5. Or whenever the author of the crime is
guilty of treason, parricide, murder or
an attempt against the life of the Chief
Executive or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime and offender,
private person or public officer harbor,
conceals or assists in the escape of the
principal.
People vs. Verzola – 80 SCRA 600
1. To profit from the commission of
the crime.
People vs. Calolo – 62 Phil. 932
US vs. Galanco, et al – 11 Phil. 573
Cristobal vs. People – 84 Phil. 473
People vs. Tanchoco – 76 Phil. 463
People vs. Cunajul, et al – 111 Phil. 254
US vs. Coison – 20 Phil. 433
People vs. Verzola – 80 SCRA 600
2. Concealing the body or effects of
the crime –
People vs. Saladino, et al – 89 Phil. 807
People vs. Galleto – 78 Phil. 820
US vs. Cuison – 20 Phil. 433
People vs. Verzola – 80 SCRA 600
People vs. Bangug, et al – 52 Phil. 87
3. Harboring or assisting in the escape
of the principal –
US vs. Yacot, et al – 1 Phil. 443
People vs. Talimgdam, et al – 84 SCRA 19
US vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408
Art. 20 – Accessories who are exempt from
Criminal liability –
If crime committed against or by
their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, illegitimate
and adopted brothers and sisters or relatives by affinity within
the same degree, except accessories tailing within the
provisions of par. 1 of Article 19.
People vs. Deuda, et al – 14 Phil.
595
- Penalties –
a) Definition –
b) Juridical Conditions of Penalty
1. Juridical and legal, for it is imposed by
virtue of a judgment prescribed by law.
2. Certain or definite, for it cannot be
conditional
3. Commensurate – for the extent of the
penalty must be proportionate to the gravity
of the felony.
4. Personal, for no one should be punished for
the crime of another
5. Equal – for a penalty should apply equally to
all transgressors of the law.
Theories Justifying Penalty
1. Prevention
2. Reformation
3. Exemplary
4. Self defense
63
 5. Justice 3. Suspension from the employment or
public office during the trial or in order
Reformation of Individual offender and protection of to institute proceedings
social order. 4. Fines and other corrective measures
People vs. Ducusin – 59 Phil. 109 which in the exercise of their
administrative disciplinary powers,
Self defense and exemplarity justify the penalty of superior officers may impose to these
death subordinates.
5. Deprivation of Rights and the
People vs. Carillo, et al – 85 Phil. 611 separation which the civil law may
establish in penal form.
Death Penalty is justified as a measure of social
justified
Baking vs. Director of Prisons – 28 SCRA 850
People vs. Molo – 88 SCRA 22
Classification of Penalties
Art. 21 – Penalties that may be imposed –
Art. 25 – Penalties which may be imposed
US vs. Tam Tong Way – 21 Phil. 67
Principal Penalties
People vs. Carbello – 62 Phil. 651
Capital Punishment Death
People vs. Hon. Purisima – 69 SCRA 341
Afflictive Penalties -
Art. 22 – Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws –
Reclusion Perpetua
Lapuz vs. Court of Appeals, et al – 94 Phil.
Reclusion Temporal
710
Magtoto vs. Manguerra, et al – 63 SCRA 4 Perpetual or Temporary Absolute
People vs. Licera – 65 SCRA 270 disqualification.
People vs. Alcaraz – 56 Phil. 520
Escalante vs. Santos – 56 Phil. 483 Perpetual or temporary Special
Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons – 37 disqualification
SCRA 420
People vs. Capinlac – 64 Phil. 442 Prision Mayor
Tavera vs. Valdez – 1 Phil. 468 Correccional Penalties
Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons – 57 Phil.
247 Prision Correccional
People vs. Romualdo – 90 Phil. 739 Arresto Mayor
People vs. Mission – 81 Phil. 739 Suspension
Destierro
Art. 23 – Effects of Pardon by the offended party -
Light Penalties
People vs. Infante – 57 Phil. 138
People vs. Miranda – 57 Phil. 274 Arresto Menor
Balite vs. People – 18 SCRA 280
People vs. Madarang – 31 SCRA 148 Public Censure
Torres vs. People – 39 SCRA 28 Penalties Common to the three preceding
People vs. Benitez – 108 Phil. 920 classes
Javier vs. People – 70 Phil. 550
Fine and Bond to keep the Peace
Art. 24 – Measures of Prevention or Safety which are
not considered penalties – Accessory Penalties

1. Arrest and Temporary detention of Perpetual or Temporary Absolute Disqualification

accused persons, as well as their
Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification
detention by reason of insanity or
imboility or illness requiring their Suspension from Public office, the right to vote and
confinement in a hospital. be voted for, profession or calling
2. The commitment of a minor to any of
the institution mentioned in Art. 80, Civil Interdiction
amended by PD 603, further amended
Indemnification
by RA 9344 and RA 10630.
64
 Forefeiture or confiscation of Instruments and
proceeds of the office
Payment of Costs
Cases –
De Peralta vs. Campos, Jr. – 61 SCRA 206
People vs. Mobe – 81 Phil. 58
People vs. Bersalona – 114 Phil. 741
People vs. Pingol – 33 SCRA 73
People vs. Tuazon – 116 Phil. 556
People vs. Dorja – 55 SCRA 433
Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et al - 103
Phil. 277
Dolao vs. Geronimo – 92 Phil. 1042
People vs. Carison, Jr. et al – 101 Phil. 537
People vs. Abelleria – 69 Phil. 623
Gomez vs. Concepcion – 47 Phil. 717
Arenajo vs. Hon. Lustre, et al – 17 SCRA
601
People vs. Meneses – 74 Phil. 119
Art. 26 – Fine
People vs. Ignacio – 13 SCRA 153
Read RA 10951 - in its entirety – amending the penalties of
time and also amending the amounts involved in the criminal
offense and the corresponding penalty for the same.
People vs. Ignacio – 11 SCRA 153
People vs. Quinto – 60 Phil. 351
People vs. Crisostomo – 116 Phil. 200
People vs. Yu Hai – 99 Phil. 725
People vs. Basalo – 101 Phil. 57
Art. 27 – Reclusion Perpetua - pardon after 30 years
Read – RA 9346 –
Range: 20 years and 1 day to 40 years
Reclusion Temporal –
12 years and one day to 20 years
Prision Mayor and Temporary
Disqualification
6 years and 1 day to 12 years
Prision Correcsional, suspension and
Destierro
6 months and 1 day to 6 years except
suspension imposed as accessory
penalty, in which case its duration shall
be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto Mayor
One month and one day to six months
Arresto Menor
One day to thirty days
Bond to Keep the Peace
It shall cover the required period of time as
the court may determine.
People vs. Gonzales – 58 SCRA 56
People vs. Ortiz, et al – 103 Phil. 944
Art. 28 – Computation of penalties –
1. If in Prison from the time penalty
becomes final
2. If not in prison from the time he is
placed at the disposal of judicial
authorities
3. In other cases, from the time the
accused commences to serve his
sentence.
Boking vs. Director of Prison – 28 SCRA
850
Alvarado vs. Director of Prison – 87 Phil.
757
People vs. Enriquez, et al – 107 Phil. 201
Mabuhay Insurance and Guaranty, Inc. vs.
Court of First Instances – 32 SCRA 245
People vs. Dalisay, Sr. – 84 SCRA 46
Wagan vs. Tiangco – 12 SCRA 294
Article 29 – Period of Imprisonment deducted from
term of Imprisonment –
o Read RA 10592 – Law amending Art.
29 –
US vs. Ortencio – 38 Phil. 341
People vs. Batara, et al – 88 SCRA 184
People vs. Magonawal, et al – 63 SCRA 106
People vs. Abarca
People vs. De Lara – 98 Phil. 584
US vs. Carmen, et al – 13 Phil. 453
Art. 30 – Effects of Penalties of perpetual or
Temporary Absolute disqualification
Lacuna vs. Abes – 24 SCRA 780
Art. 31 – Effects of Penalties of Perpetual or
Temporary disqualification
People vs. Angco – 103 Phil. 33
Art. 32 – Effects of the Penalties of Perpetual or
Temporary Special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage
People vs. Corral – 62 Phil. 954
65
 Art. 33 – Effects of Penalties of suspension from any
Public Office, profession or calling or the right of suffrage –
Art. 34 – Civil Interdiction
As accessory penalty to the following:
a) Death penalty but reduced to Reclusion
Perpetua or given a pardon
b) Reclusion Perpetua
c) Reclusion Temporal
Art. 35 – Effects of Bond to Keep the Peace.
Art. 36 – Pardon its effects
Kinds of Pardon
1. Absolute Pardon
2. Simple Pardon
3. Conditional Pardon
Cristobal vs. Labrador, et al – 71 Phil. 34
Pelobello vs. Palatino – 72 Phil. 441
Lacuna vs. Abes – 24 SCRA 780
Art. 37 – Costs – What are included
1. Fees
2. Indemnities in the cause of the
Proceedings whether fixed,
unalterable amounts previously
determined by law or
regulations in force or amounts
not subject to schedule
Art. 38 – Pecuniary liabilities
1. Reparation of the damage
caused
2. Indemnification of
consequential damages
3. The fine
4. The costs of the proceedings
People vs. Corpin – 31 SCRA 354
People vs. Sibayan – 31 SCRA 216
People vs. Abboc – 53 SCRA 54
People vs. Gallardo – 120 Phil. 1041
People vs. Otto – 49 SCRA 306
People vs. Romagosa – 103 Phil. 20
People vs. Ledesma – 32 Phil. 114
People vs. Lagrimas – 29 SCRA 153
Article 39 – Subsidiary Penalty amended by RA –
US vs. Clara – 41 Phil. 828
Quemuel vs. Court of Appeals – 22 SCRA
44
People vs. Fajardo – 65 Phil. 539
Ramos vs. Gonong – 72 SCRA 559
People vs. Subido – 66 SCRA 545
People vs. Ngo Chang – 73 Phil. 418
People vs. Concepcion – 59 Phil. 518
Bugtas vs. Director of Prisons – 84 Phil. 892
People vs. Agaria – 109 Phil. 430
People vs. Doria – 55 SCRA 435
People vs. Tan - 51 Phil. 71
People vs. Arnault – 92 Phil. 252
People vs. Moreno – 60 Phil. 712
People vs. Portuquesa – 20 SCRA 901
Art. 40 – Death – Its accessory penalties
Read RA 9346
Art. 41 – Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion
Temporal – their Accessory Penalties
People vs. Astrologo – 88 Phil. 423
People vs. Abletes – 58 SCRA 241
People vs. Pelones – 84 SCRA 167
Art. 42 – Prision Mayor – Its Accesory Penalties
Lacuna vs. Abes – 24 SCRA 780
Art. 43 – Prision Correccional – Its Accessory
Penalties
Calo, Jr. vs. Tapucar – 88 SCRA 78
Art. 44 – Arresto – Its Accessory Penalties
Nassco vs. Nassco Employees and Workers
Association and CIR – 23 SCRA 552
Pendon vs. Diosnes – 91 Phil. 848
People vs. Fajardo – 49 Phil. 206
People vs. Caldito, et al – 72 Phil. 263
Art. 45 – Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds
or Instruments of the crime
The Acting Collector of Customs vs. The
Court of Tax Appeals, et al – 102 Phil. 244
US vs. Filart, et al – 30 Phil. 80
Villaruz, et al vs. Court, et al – 71 Phil. 72
US vs. Bruchez – 28 Phil. 305
People vs. Vales – 15 SCRA 26
People vs. Sanchez – 101 Phil. 745
People vs. Municipal Mayor and Chief of
Caloocan – 105 Phil. 1344
People vs. Jose – 37 SCRA 450
66