Article

Journal for the Study of

The Concept of διαθήκη

the New Testament
2020, Vol. 43(2) 248­–265
© The Author(s) 2020
in Hebrews 9.16-17 Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0142064X20961281
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journals.sagepub.com/home/jnt

Kyu Seop Kim

Asia United Theological University, Korea

Abstract
Many exegetes assume that wills were of immediate effect when they were written and
that it was common in Graeco-Roman society to transfer the unrestricted ownership
of property to heirs regardless of the testators’ death. However, these assumptions are
not sustainable when we explore actual testamentary practices in ancient society. In
documentary papyri, the transfer of patrimonum rarely took place during the lifetime of
the testator, and the death of the testator was conditio sine qua non for the efficacy of
the testament. These aspects lead the reader to a new understanding of Christ’s death
in Heb. 9.16-17.1

Keywords
Hebrews, covenant, testament, inheritance, ancient papyri

Introduction
The meaning of διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 has been one of the key areas of dispute
in Hebrews scholarship. Traditionally, interpreters render the term διαθήκη in
Heb. 9.16-17 in the sense of last will or testament,2 but a challenging view has
been emerging since Brooke F. Westcott: i.e., the author of Hebrews employs

1. All translations in this article are mine, unless otherwise noted. This work was supported by
the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government
(MEST) (No. 2019S1A5A8036378).
2. E.g., Deißmann 1908: 286; Lohmeyer 1913: 147; Backhaus 1996: 194-98; Courthial 1976:
36-43; Weiß 1991: 478; Frey 1997: 288; Koester 2001: 364; Spicq 1952–53: 262-63;
Ellingworth 1993: 462-64; Johnson 2006: 240; Montefiore 1964: 156-57.

Corresponding author:
Kyu Seop Kim, Asia United Theological University, Gyeonggang-ro 1276, Okchen-myeon, Yangpyeong-gun,
Gyeonggi-do 12508, Republic of Korea.
Email: kyuseopkim77@acts.ac.kr
Kim 249

the Septuagint term διαθήκη3 as an equivalent for ‫‘( ברית‬covenant’) without the
sense of last will in Heb. 9.16-17 (Westcott 1889: 300-302). This interpreta-
tion has recently gathered widespread support.4 For instance, James Swetnam
asserts, ‘There is no evidence in Classical or papyrological sources to substanti-
ate the claim that a testament was valid only when the testator died’ (Swetnam
2016: 198). He views διαθήκη in 9.16-17 as the Sinai covenant and contends
that, according to 9.16-17, Christ removed the curse of the covenant through his
crucifixion (Swetnam 1965: 380).5 John J. Hughes also argues that ‘It is simply
untrue and completely lacking in classical and papyrological support to main-
tain that … a will or testament was only legally valid when the testator died’
(Hughes 1979: 61). He maintains that, in the Graeco-Roman era, ‘They [wills]
were of immediate effect, transferring unrestricted ownership during the lifetime
of the parents’ (Hughes 1979: 62) and that in 9.16, the concept of διαθήκη on the
condition of the death of the testator cannot refer to ‘last will’ (Hughes 1979:
59-66). Scott W. Hahn writes that 9.11-14, 9.15, 9.16-17 and 9.18-22 constitute
a logically progressing argument and that it is inappropriate that a different sense
from the adjacent usage be imposed upon the concept of διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17
(Hahn 2004: 419-21). He maintains that διαθήκη in 9.16-17 refers to the Sinai
covenant, and he interprets ‘death’ in 9.16 as curse-bearing death according to
the Sinai covenant.6
However, I believe that these scholars misunderstood some important charac-
teristics of ancient wills. The most significant question regarding this issue can
be summarized as follows: did a testament immediately take effect when it was
written regardless of the testator’s death? In this study, I will attempt to answer
this query through the lens of ancient papyri, which remains unexplored by NT
scholars. Recent papyrologists concur that Graeco-Egyptian papyri do not merely
reflect Egyptian indigenous customs but contain legal rules and social practices
which were prevalent in other provinces of the Graeco-Roman world.7 In this
vein, as Peter Arzt-Grabner writes, ‘Due to the work of papyrologists, the long

3. For the concept of διαθήκη in the Septuagint, see Schenker 2000: 175-85; Gräßer 1985: 3-4;
Kutsch 1978: 49-87; Lohmeyer 1913: 78-102.
4. E.g., Westcott 1889: 300-302; Carr 1909: 347-52; Nairne 1913: 364-66; da Fonseca 1927:
31-50; Gardiner 1885: 8-19; Swetnam 1965: 373-90; Kilpatrick 1977: 263-65; Lane 1991:
231; Guthrie 1998: 313; Hahn 2009: 314-17; Hughes 1979: 27-96; Cockerill 2012: 404-406;
Dyer 2017: 97-98; Moret 2014: 49-51; Jamieson 2019: 116-18.
5. See also Lane 1991: 231. William Lane also views the concept of διαθήκη as the covenant and
writes that ancient testaments were immediately in force after they were written.
6. Most recently, R.B. Jamieson also notes, ‘I take διαθήκη in 9:16-17 also to mean “covenant”,
and to refer specifically to the broken Mosaic covenant’. See Jamieson 2019: 117.
7. For instance, Bagnall 1995: 5: ‘Some historians have dealt with a bad conscience brought on
by ignoring the papyri through rationalizations that Egypt was a world apart and can be left
out of account. We shall see repeatedly that this view is bankrupt.’ See also Rathbone 1989:
159-76.
250 Journal for the Study of the New Testament 43(2)

lasting theory of a “Sonderfall Ägypten” is a matter of the past and no longer

valid’ (Arzt-Grabner 2010: 21-32). As the problem lies in the historical usage of
διαθήκη, we will explore the uses of διαθήκη in tandem with Graeco-Egyptian
documentary papyri (inter alia, testament papyri) written in the period spanning
300 bce to 300 ce as well as Jewish sources. In particular, we will focus on the
association of a testator’s death with the efficacy of διαθήκη in the next section.

The Death of a Testator and the Efficacy of the

Testament8
The term διαθήκη (‘will or testament’) can be defined as a sort of inheritance
contract, which appoints heirs and apportions estates. For example, in P.Mich.
8.475 (100–125 ce): γνῶθι οὖν τίς αὐτοῦ κληρονόμος ἐστὶ καὶ πότε ἡ διαθήκη
αὐτοῦ ἀνύγεται (‘So, know who his heir is, when the testament is opened’), the
term διαθήκη refers to a legal declaration with regard to inheritance.9
In Classical Athens, it was common for parents to allot their properties to their
heirs before their sixtieth birthdays (Huebner 2013: 131). However, in contrast
to some NT scholars’ opinion, recent classicists observe that Graeco-Roman
inheritance practices differed from Attic customs. For instance, as Sabine
Huebner writes, ‘Property transmission to the next generation during one’s life-
time took place in Roman Egypt only rarely’ (Huebner 2013: 132). Transfer of
patrimony during the lifetime of a testator is seldom found in census returns and
tax lists, once in Ptolemaic Egypt and once in Roman Egypt (in total twice),
respectively.10 Thus, ownership transmission was generally practised after the
testator’s death in Ptolemaic and Graeco-Roman Egypt, and we can find the
specific examples from testament papyri, as follows.11
Firstly, in donatio mortis causa (testament in contemplation of death),
a testament clearly comes into force after the death of the testator, as fol-
lows (P.Mich. 18.785a (47 or 61 ce)):

ἔτους ὀγδόου Τιβερίου Κλαυδίου Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ Γερμανικοῦ Αὐτοκράτορος … ἐν

Πτολεμαίδι Εὐεργέτιδι τοῦ Ἀρσινοίτου νομοῦ. ὁμολογεῖ Τιθουῆς πρεσβ̣ ύτερος Πεταῦτος ὡς
ἐτῶν τεσσεράκοντα τριῶν οὐλὴ ἀντικνημίωι δεξιῶι μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν
τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τέκνοις Πεταῦτι καὶ Θαήσι καὶ Ταμύσθᾳ τοῖς τρισὶ γεγονόσι αὐτῶι …

8. In classical literature, the Greek διαθήκη usually refers to a will (e.g., Demosthenes 45, 27;
Isaeus 2.1; 6.9; Josephus, Ant. 17.13).
9. See also P.Cair, Masp, 2.67151 (testament papyrus): ἐνίστημι κληρονόμους τοὺς προσφιλεστάτους
μου υἱοὺς καὶ διαδοχοις τῆς ἐμῆς κληρονομίας … (‘I appoint my most beloved sons as heirs and
successors of my inheritance’).
10. Huebner 2013: 131-32: ‘We have only one instance in the Ptolemaic tax lists, and only one in
the Roman census returns for a transfer of the patrimony during a father’s lifetime’. See also
Clarysse and Thompson 2006: 296.
11. Yet, it was possible to transfer the right of ownership through deed of gift. In ancient society,
deed of gift was strictly distinguished from inheritance. E.g., see Schwartz 2010: 127-28.
Kim 251

Emperor Tiberius Claudius Caesar Sebastus Germanicus eighth year … To Ptolemais

Euergetis of Arsinoitos village. Titoues the elder, son of Petaus, approximately 43
years old declares that it is valid to divide [his property] after his death (μετὰ τὴν
ἑαυτοῦ τελευτήν) to his three children, Petaus, Taesis and Tamusta whom he has
begotten …

In the sentences above, division of property takes place after the death of the
testator (δεξιῶι μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτήν).12 Thus, according to this
papyrus, ownership transmission was not possible until the testator’s death. A
similar case is found in the following papyrus (P. Mich. 5.321 (42 ce)).

ἔτους τρίτου Τιβερίου Κλαυδίου Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ Γερμανικοῦ Αὐτοκράτορος μηνὸς

Ἰουλιέως Χοιὰχ πέμπτηι ἐν Τεβτύνι τῆς Πολέμωνος μερίδος τοῦ Ἀρσινοείτου νομοῦ.
ὁμολογεῖ Ὀρσεῦς ὃς καὶ Ἡρώδης Νεστνήφιος ὡς ἐτῶν ἑξήκοντα πέντε … δεξιῶι …
μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν τοῖς γεγωινώσι αὐτῶι ἐξ ἧς σύνεστιν γυναικὸς
Ταορσεῦτος τῆς Πάτρωνος ὑειοῖς Νεστνήφι τῷ καὶ Ἰσχυρίωνι καὶ Παποντῶτι καὶ Ἐσούρι
καὶ Τααπολλῶτι τοῖς τεσσαρεσι …

Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus Emperor third year. Ioulios, Koiach
month, fifth day in Tebtunis of Polemon district of Arsinoitos village. Orseos, Herodes,
son of Nestnefios, about 65 years old … that it is valid … to divide [his property] after
his death (μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν) to his four sons, Ischurion and Papontos and
Esouris and Taapollos, whom his wife Taorseus, daughter of Patron, gave birth to …

The papyrus above is also donatio mortis causa, in which Orseos, the testator,
declares that the transfer of his property is deserved only after his death (ὁμολογεῖ
… δεξιῶι … μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν).13 Thus, in donatio mortis
causa, transfer of estates did not take place as long as the testators were alive.
The testament was not in force before their death, and the estates could be appor-
tioned to heirs after the testators’ death.
Secondly, the efficacy of ownership transmission accrued after the death of a
testator in the case of donatio inter vivos (testament during the testator’s life-
time). For example, in P.Oxy. 3.492 (130 ce):

τάδε διέθετο νοοῦσα καὶ φρονοῦσα … ἐφʼ ὃν μὲν περίειμι χρόνον ἔχειν με τὴν τῶν ἰδίων
ἐξουσίαν πᾶν ὃ ἐὰν βούλωμαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ μεταδιατίθεσθαι καὶ πρὸς
ἀκύρωσιν ἄγειν τήνδε τὴν διαθήκην ὃ δʼ ἂν ἐπιτελέσω κύριον ὑπάρχειν. ἐὰν δὲ ἐπὶ
ταύτῃ τῇ διαθήκῃ τελευτήσω μηδὲν ἐπιτελέσασα καταλείπω κληρονόμους Πτολλίωνα
Θέωνος τοῦ Πτολλίωνος μητρὸς Ἰσαρεῦτος τῆς Θέωνος καὶ τὸν τούτου ὁμομήτριον

12. For specific information about donatio mortis causa, see Kreller 1919: 215-23.
13. For the formula ἀπομεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν’ (‘to divide after his death’), see
BGU 3.993 (127 bce); P.Mich. 2.121 (42 ce); P.Mich 5.322a (46 ce); P.Ups.Frid 1 (47 ce); SB
22.15705 (90 ce); P.Mich. 5.343 (54 ce); P.Mil.Vogl. 1.25 (127 ce); SB 10.10572 (126 ce) etc.
252 Journal for the Study of the New Testament 43(2)

ἀδελφὸν Θέωνα Θέωνος τοῦ Θέωνος τοῦ καὶ Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Θέωνος ἀμφοτέρους ἀπʼ
Ὀξυρύγχων πόλεως κατὰ φιλοστοργίαν κοινῶς ἐξ ἴσου ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐὰν ζῇ, εἰ δὲ μή,
τὰ τούτου τέκνα, τῆς ὑπαρχούσης μοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ Ὀξυρύγχων πόλει ἐπʼ ἀμφόδου Ἱππέων
Παρενβολῆς οἰκίας καὶ αἰθρίου καὶ αὐλῆς καὶ χρηστηρίων καὶ ὧν ἐὰν ἀπολίπω δούλων
σωμάτων καὶ ἄλλων καθʼ ὁνδηποτοῦν τρόπον παντοίων πάντων …

Here I made a testament when I am in sound mind … So long as I am alive, I have

power over my property, to make any further provisions or new dispositions I choose
and to revoke this will (πρὸς ἀκύρωσιν), and any such provisions shall be valid. But if I
die with this will unaltered and no further provisions made I leave on account of their
affection towards me Ptollion son of Theon son of Ptollion, his mother being Isareus
daughter of Theon, and his brother on the mother’s side, Theon son of Theon, Son of
Theon also called Apollonius son of Theon, both Oxyrhynchus, if they live, and if not,
their children, as joint and equal heirs of the house, court, yard and fixtures belonging
to me at Oxyrhynchus in the Knight’s camp quarter, and any slaves which I may leave
and all other property of any kind whatever.

In this papyrus, when the testator is healthy and can think properly (τάδε διέθετο
νοοῦσα καὶ φρονοῦσα), he makes a will, in which proprietorship of his property is
still possessed by him (ἐφʼ ὃν μὲν περίειμι χρόνον ἔχειν με τὴν τῶν ἰδίων ἐξουσίαν
πᾶν ὃ ἐὰν βούλωμαι περὶ αὐτῶν). In other words, the provisions of the testament
do not become operative and the ownership is not conveyed to his heirs until the
testator dies (ἐὰν δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ διαθήκῃ τελευτήσω μηδὲν ἐπιτελέσασα καταλείπω
κληρονόμους). Thus, in this case, the death of the testator is a significant prereq-
uisite for the implementation of the will.
A similar formula (donatio inter vivos) is attested in various testament papyri,
as follows:14

SB 18.13308 (82–96 ce): εἴη μέν μοι ὑγιαίνοντι τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ κύριον εἶναι πωλεῖν καὶ
ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ μεταδιατίθεσθαι καὶ οἰκονομεῖν τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς ἐὰν αἱρῶμαι … ἐὰν δὲ
τελευτήσω καταλείψομαι κληρονόμους τοὺς γεναμένους μοι ἐκ Θερμούθεως υἱοὺς δύο …

If I am healthy, I have the right to sell, to mortgage, to cede, to manage my own

whatever I choose … But if I die, I leave inheritance to two sons as heirs, begotten to
me from Hermoutheos.

14. For similar cases, see P.Oxy. 42.3015 (approximately 117 ce); SB 24.16256 (117–118 ce); SB
14.11642 (178–179 ce); SB 12.10859 (220 bce); CPR 6.1 (125 ce); CPR 6.72 (first century
ce); P.Dryton 1 (164 bce); P.Dryton 3 (126 bce); P.Dryton 4 (126 bce); P.Dura 16 (76–100
ce); P.Petr 2.1 (238–237 bce); P.Petr 2.3 (238–237 bce); P.Petr 2.4 (238–237 bce); P.Petr 2.6
(238–237 bce); SB 14.11642 (178–179 ce); Stud.Pal. 20.35 (235 ce) etc.
Kim 253

CPR 6.1 (125 ce): εἴη μέν μοι ὑγιαίνοντι τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ κύριον εἶναι πωλοῦντα ὑπότιθέμενον
μ̣ εταδιατιθέμενον οἰκονομοῦντα τὰ ἐμ̣ αυτοῦ ὡς ἐὰν αἱρῶμαι. ἐὰν δὲ τελευτήσω … τὰ
τέκνα μ̣ ου ἐκ τῆς … γυναικὸς Ἀφροδειτοῦτος τῆς Νείλου

If I am healthy, I have the power to sell, to cede, to mortgage and to manage my

own whatever I choose. But if I die, [I leave] … to my children from … my wife,
Aprodeitoute, daughter of Neilos.

P.Petr. 2.22 (235–234 bce): εἴη μέν μοι ὑγιαίνοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ οἰκονομεῖν. ἐὰν δέ
τι ἀνθρώπινον πάθω, καταλείπω τὰ ὑπάρχοντά μου πάντα καὶ ὃν ἔχω σταθμὸν ἐκ
βασιλικοῦ ...

If I am healthy, I will manage my own. But if I suffer something human, I leave all my
property and a portion from the royal yard.

P.Oxy. 3.489 (117 ce): ἐφʼ ὃν μὲν περίειμι χρόνον τῶν ἰδίων κύριον εἶναι καὶ χρᾶσθαι
καὶ οἰκονομεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μεταδιατίθεσθαι καθʼ ὃν ἐὰν αἱρῶμαι τρόπον. μετὰ δὲ
τελευτὴν μου συνχωρῶ ἔχειν τὴν συνοῦσάν μοι γυναῖκα Διογενίδα Πτολεμαίου ἀπὸ τῆς
αὐτῆς πόλεως

As far as I am present, I have the power to use, and to manage about them and
to mortgage according to whichever way I choose. But after my death, I give my
belongings to my wife Diogenes, daughter of Ptolemaios from the same city.

As shown in the variations above, we observe the uses of the formula of donatio
inter vivos (‘If I am alive, I have the right over my property. But if I die, I will
leave it to …’), which denote that the proprietorship of the estate is retained by
the testator as long as he/she is alive and is transferred to heirs only after his/her
death. By donatio inter vivos, the testators assigned only the usufruct (usus fruc-
tus; a legal right to use and to derive profit from someone else’s property), not
the whole proprietorship, as long as they are alive (Huebner 2013: 133).
Thirdly, similar inheritance patterns are found in ancient Jewish society. There
are similarities and dissimilarities between Jewish and Graeco-Egyptian inherit-
ance practices. For an example of dissimilarities, primogeniture was rarely prac-
tised in Graeco-Egyptian society, but, in Jewish society, the firstborn son of the
father (‫ לנחלה‬‎ ‫( בכור‬the firstborn son with respect to inheritance)) was given a
double share from the father’s estate according to Deut. 21.15-17, and Jews gen-
erally complied with this ordinance in the Graeco-Roman and the Talmudic era.15

15. For the evidence, see Philo, Spec. Leg. 2.133-34; Josephus, Ant. 4.249-50; Bekoroth 46a;
B.Bathra 126b; B.Bathra 130b etc. For the concept of ‘deed of gift’ in Jewish inheritance, see
Yaron 1992: 34.
254 Journal for the Study of the New Testament 43(2)

Nevertheless, as in Graeco-Roman society, some testamentary conventions

were similarly practised in Jewish society. For example, under the Talmudic law,
the transfer of patrimony is categorized into two kinds, as in Graeco-
Roman society: (1) ‫ בריא‬‎ ‫( מתנת‬donatio inter vivos) (Yaron 1960: 46-60); and
(2) ‫ מרע שכיב‬‎ ‫ מתנת‬‎ (donatio mortis causa), as follows (Yaron 1960: 61-78):

Baba Batra chapter 8 mishnah 9: One who writes his properties over to his sons must
write: ‘from today and after my death’, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Joseph said, it
is unnecessary. If one writes his properties over to his son for the time after his death,
the father cannot sell them because they are written over to the son; the son cannot
sell because they are in the father’s possession. If the father sold, they are sold until he
dies. If the son sold, the buyer has no claim until the father dies. The father harvests
and feeds anybody he pleases; what becomes part of his estate belongs to the heirs.16

The contradictory adverbial phrase ‘from today and after my death’ in the above
quotation means that the heir acquires the usufruct ‘from today’ but will gain the
full ownership to sell the property ‘after the death of the testator’. As long as the
testator is alive, the proprietorship over the estate still belongs to him. We detect
similar inheritance patterns in the Babatha archive discovered in the Judean
desert (P.Yadin 7; 120 ce), and here the full ownership is also transferred after the
father’s death through the testament:17

Lines 4-5: All that I possess in Mahoza ... whatever else I possess that is not described,
together with all that I may acquire and will become my possession from this time – I
have given to you as a gift forever.

Ostensibly, it seems that the patrimony is immediately conveyed to the heirs

‘from this time’ (i.e., from now on), but, in lines 14 and 17-18, it is declared that
the full ownership is still retained by the testator until his death.

Line 14: I have given to you, Miryam, my wife, as a gift forever, on the binding
agreement that I may enjoy the usufruct, and retain possession, and remit possession,
and remit payment of their property taxes; And reside and install (others) as residents,
in the courtyards and houses, all the days of my life. And when I go to my eternal
home, you shall become the rightful possessor of the sites of this gift, or of what [I
shall] leave of them behind ...

Lines 17-18: I will possess from this time forth [and forever]. That is described in this
document of gift, to buy and to sell, and to inherit and to bequeath, and to pledge (as
security) and to grant as gift, and to sow and to plant, and to build, and to remit their
payments, and to do with them all that you wish; You and your sons and your heirs,

16. The translation adapted from Guggenheimer 2008: 683-84.

17. The translation adapted from Yadin et al. 2002: 81-85. For a similar case, see P. Yadin 19.
Kim 255

and whoever may gain possession from your hand from the day on which I will go to
my eternal home and forever.

In the sentences above, it is apparent that the right for the property is assigned to
heirs ‘when I go to my eternal home’ (i.e., ‘when I die’),18 and what is bestowed
upon the heirs ‘from this time’ is only the usufructuary right, not the proprietor-
ship which includes the right to sell and to manage.19 We should note that the
deed of gift is strictly distinguished from property transmission according to a
testament in Jewish society (Yaron 1960: 53). Thus, in this papyrus, property
transmission took place after the death of the testator as observed in other papyri.
Therefore, these testamentary phenomena in the Babatha archive and some
Talmudic sources show that our evidence is not confined to Graeco-Egyptian
papyri, but our argument can also be substantiated from Jewish sources.20
In brief, the term διαθήκη (‘testament’) can be defined as an inheritance con-
tract to identify heirs or a legal declaration in respect of inheritance, and the
declaration of property transmission took effect after the testator’s death. In
Graeco-Roman and Jewish society, the transfer of the patrimony during the life-
time of a testator was something of a rarity. In donatio mortis causa, the heredi-
tary estate was allotted after the death of the testator. In donatio inter vivos, the
usufruct could be conveyed to the heirs, but the proprietorship was retained by
the testator as long as he lived. Therefore, a testator’s death intrinsically has a
close association with the effectiveness of the testament, contrary to many schol-
ars’ assumptions.

The Concept of διαθήκη in Hebrews 9.16-17

In this section, we will consider that the author of Hebrews adopts the secular
sense of διαθήκη as testament in Heb. 9.16-17 in order to elucidate the mean-
ing of covenant for the audience who lived in the Graeco-Roman world.21 The
concept of διαθήκη in the sense of testament in Heb. 9.16-17 fits well with the
context of Hebrews, as explained below.
Firstly, the term διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 is juxtaposed with κληρονομία in
Heb. 9.15. If so, we can interpret διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 in light of κληρονομία.
The conjunction γάρ in Heb. 9.16 indicates a close connection between 9.15 and
9.16-17. In terms of the contents, 9.16-17 is also coherent with Heb. 9.15

18. Yaron 1960: 83. For similar patterns in Elephantine papyri, see Porten 1996: 237-41.
19. Cf. Lim 2004: 364.
20. Cf. Cotton 1997: 179. For testamentary gifts, see Jub. 45.14-15; T. Job 46.4; Jos. Asen. 29.9,
11; Jdt. 16.24; Sir. 33.19-21 etc.
21. In Hebrews, the term διαθήκη is often used in the sense of ‘covenant’ as an equivalent for ‫ְּב ִרית‬
(‘covenant’). For the uses of διαθήκη in Hebrews, see Heb. 7.22; 8.6, 8, 9, 10; 9.4, 15, 16, 17,
20; 10.26, 29; 12.24, 13.20.
256 Journal for the Study of the New Testament 43(2)

(κληρονομία, θάνατος in Heb. 9.15 and διαθήκη, διαθέμενος, θάνατος (and also
νεκρός) in Heb. 9.16-17). Furthermore, it is probable that Heb. 9.16-17 functions
as a parenthesis,22 which explains what ‘obtaining κληρονομία through διαθήκη’
means in Heb. 9.15.23 In Heb. 9.15b, the author of Hebrews states that the death
of Christ results in the accomplishment of the promise for the eternal inheritance,
and so the author may have felt the need to give an additional account of this
aspect through inserting a parenthesis. Thus, the concept of διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-
17 can be considered within the context of the terms κληρονομία and θάνατος in
Heb. 9.15, and this leads us to translate διαθήκη as ‘testament’, i.e., a legal dec-
laration with regard to inheritance which takes effect at the death of the
testator.24
Secondly, the term βεβαία in Heb. 9.17 can be interpreted as contract lan-
guage (a legal term), which indicates the effectiveness of the testator’s testa-
ment.25 For instance:

P.Yadin 19 (128 ce): ὥστε ἔχειν τὴν προγεγρ̣αμ̣ μένην Σελαμψιοῦς ... τὸ ἄλλο ἥμισυ
μετὰ τὲ τελευτῆσαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰούδα κυρίως καὶ βεβ̣ αίως ...

So, aforesaid Selampsion will possess … the other half will be secure and valid
(κυρίως καὶ βεβ̣ αίως) after the death of Judah his father (μετὰ τὲ τελευτῆσαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ
Ἰούδα) ...

In this papyrus, discovered in the Judean desert, Judah, Babatha’s husband,

grants his estate in Ein Gedi to Selampsion, his daughter, in the form of testa-
ment (διέθετο Ἰούδας; line 11), and the ownership of the property would be valid
after Judah’s death. Similar patterns are also detected in Graeco-Egyptian papyri
(e.g., P.Mich. 5.321; P.Mich. 18.785a): δεξιῶι μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
τελευτὴν (‘The division [of the property] is valid after his death’). In these

22. It seems that Heb. 9.18 (ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἡ πρώτη χωρὶς αἵματος ἐγκεκαίνισται) is more congruous
with Heb. 9.14-15a than with Heb. 9.16-17 from a lexical viewpoint: particularly, the first
covenant (τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ (9.15); ἡ πρώτη (9.18)) and blood (αἷμα (9.14); αἵματος (9.18)).
In terms of the contents, the notion of the effect of Christ’s blood in Heb. 9.11-15a also runs
parallel with the significance of blood in the first covenant in Heb. 9.18-22. It is also probable
that the conjunction ὅθεν (hence) in Heb. 9.18 indicates the inference from Heb. 9.14-15a, and
Heb. 9.18 picks up the argument of Heb. 9.14-15a. In this context, it seems clear that Heb.
9.18 is more coherent with Heb. 9.14-15a, and Heb. 9.16-17 pertains to Heb. 9.15.
23. Contra Westcott 1889: 300.
24. For the connection between διαθήκη and κληρονομίᾳ, see, e.g., LXX Sir. 44.23: εὐλογίαν
πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ διαθήκην κατέπαυσεν ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν Ιακωβ ἐπέγνω αὐτὸν ἐν εὐλογίαις
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ ἐν κληρονομίᾳ.
25. In the non-contractual context, the adjective βέβαιος is used in the sense of ‘secure’ or ‘firm’
(e.g., 2 Cor. 1.7; 2 Pet. 1.19, etc.).
Kim 257

patterns, the implementation of property transmission is directly linked with the

death of the testator. For instance:

P.Hamb. 1.73 (second century ce): εἰ δέ τι ἐγὼ μετὰ ταῦτα γεγραμμένον καταλείπω τῇ
ἐμῇ χιρὶ γραφόμενον οἵῳ δήποτε τρόπῳ, βέβαιόν μοι εἶναι θέλω …

And if I leave some writing [i.e., testament] by my hand after these in any manner, I
wish that it will be valid (βέβαιόν) to me.

PSI 13.1325 (176–180 ce): εἰ δέ τι ἐγὼ μετὰ ταῦτα γεγραμμένον καταλείπω τῇ ἐμῇ
χειρὶ γεγραμμένον οἵῳ δήποτε τρόπῳ, βέβαιον ... ἐμοὶ εἶναι θέλω.

And if I leave some writing [i.e., testament] by my hand after these in any manner, I
wish that it will be … valid (βέβαιον) to me.

In these papyri, the effectiveness of the testaments accrues after a testator’s

death or funeral. The testators’ wish is that their funerals be held in prudence
and piety by their heirs (ἐκκομισθῆναι ἐμ̣ αυτὴν θέλω τῇ φροντίδι καὶ εὐσεβείᾳ τῶν
κληρονόμων μου), and their testaments will come into force (βέβαιον) after their
funerals (μετὰ ταῦτα).
In Chr.Mitt. 316 (189 or 194 ce), the same term βέβαια is also observed. Gaius
Longinus Castor, a retired Roman soldier, apportions his estate in the Arsinoite
Nome through his testament. This testament was opened after Castor’s death
(ἠνύγησαν καὶ ἀνεγνώσθησαν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν ᾗ καὶ ἡ διαθήκη ἐλύθη). Castor
makes his will as follows: εἰ δέ τι περισσὰ γράμματα τῇ χειρί μου γεγραμμένα
καταλίπω βέβαια εἶναι θέλω (‘If I leave some writing [his will] by my hand, I
wish that it will be valid (βέβαια)’). Thus, his will is operative (βέβαια) after
their death, specifically after their burial service. Similarly, the sentence διαθήκη
γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία in Heb. 9.17 can be interpreted as follows: διαθήκη takes
effect (βέβαια) when the testator dies.
Thirdly, the terms διαθέμενος and διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 can reflect a testa-
ment formula (διατίθημι διαθήκην).26 Hughes contends that διαθέμενος in Heb.
9.16 refers to a ratifier and διατίθημι διαθήκην could be meant as ‘ratify a com-
pact’ (Hughes 1979: 39-40). Yet Hughes does not provide evidence that when the
verb διατίθημι is used with κληρονομία it conveys a sense of ‘ratify a compact’.
We should also notice that the phrase διατίθημι διαθήκην generally refers to
‘make a will’ (e.g., κατὰ διαθήκην ἣν διέθετο ἡ μήτηρ (P.Col. 10.275; 201–225
27
ce)). The aorist verb διέθετο is also a typical testament formula in

26. Pace Kilpatrick, who states, ‘There are others, διατίθεσθαι is not used elsewhere in the NT for
making a will’. See Kilpatrick 1977: 265.
27. For further examples, see BGU 7.1654 (133 ce); CPR 6.1 (125 ce); P.Oxy 3.489 (116–117 ce);
P.Petr. 2.4 (238–237 bce); SB 18.13168 (123 bce); P.Wisc 1.13 (101–125 ce); P.Yadin 19 (128
ce), etc.
258 Journal for the Study of the New Testament 43(2)

Graeco-Roman society.28 As Friedrich Preisigke observes, διαθήκη refers only to

a testament or a will in Ptolemaic and Roman-Egyptian papyri.29 Thus, the phrase
διατίθημι διαθήκην should be rendered in the sense of ‘make a will’ as a testament
formula, not ‘ratify a compact’, if it is used with the term κληρονομία.
Fourthly, as for the phrase μεσίτης διαθήκης in Heb. 9.15, Hughes asserts, ‘The
office of μεσίτης is unknown in connection with wills and testaments’ (Hughes
1979: 64). Jörg Frey writes that it is a ‘logische Inkonsistenz’ to regard Jesus
Christ as μεσίτης (‘mediator’) and testator simultaneously.30 However, μεσίτης
(‘arbitrator or mediator’) could play a certain role with regard to testament, and
the testator could also be μεσίτης. The following papyrus (P.Diog. 11 (213 ce))
may be potentially significant in understanding Heb. 9.15-17:

Ἰσιδώρα Πτολεμαίου … μεσιτίας μου γεναμένης καὶ διέταξα τῷ υἱῷ μου Ἰσιδώρῳ πρὸ
μιᾶς ἡμέρας μου τοῦ θανάτου εἴ τί μ̣ οι ὑπάρχει ἀγρῶν τε καὶ οἰκοπέδων καὶ χρυσία καὶ
ἱμάτια καὶ … ετωε … ὅσα ἔχω κατὰ συνγραφὴν πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα μου Λουκρήτιον Διογένην
χωρὶς τῶν παιδαρείων μου δύο καὶ ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς φεντακοσίας … καὶ Αὐρηλίω
Ἰγνατίω Ἀπολιναρίω καὶ ὁ προγεγραμενος μου κυριος καὶ ἀνὴρ Λουκρητίου Διογένους
καὶ Μάρκου Αὐρηλίου Σερ̣ήνου. κυρία ἡ μεσιτία Ἰσιδώρα Πτολεμαίου διέταξα τῷ υἱῷ
μου τὰ προκίμενα διὰ τῶν προκιμένων μεσιτῶν ὡς πρ̣όκιται.

Isidora, daughter of Ptolemaios, after becoming my mediator (μεσιτίας μου

γεναμένης), appointed (διέταξα) my son, Isidoros one day before my death if I have
some estates and buildings, gold and clothes … As long as I have according to the
contract towards my husband Loukretios, besides two of my young slaves and 500
silver drachmas … Aurelios Ignatios Apolinarios and aforesaid my lord and husband
Loukretios Diogenes and Markos Aurelios Serenos. The lady of the house Isidora,
daughter of Ptolemaios, the mediator (ἡ μεσιτία), appointed my son for the aforesaid
things through the aforesaid mediator as already written.

This is Isidora’s testament (donatio mortis causa), written by her husband for
the sake of Isidora who was illiterate (ἔγραψα ὑπὲρ τῆς γυναικός μου Ἰσιδώρας
ἀγραμμάτου), in which Isidora allots her property to her husband and son,
Isidoros, and calls herself μεσιτία (‘testator’) (= μεσιτεία; ‘arbitrator or media-
tor’). This testament was written in an idiosyncratic form, and it seems that it

28. E.g., BGU 6.1285 (110 bce); BGU 7.1654 (133 ce); CPR 6.1 (125 ce); P.Dryton 1 (164 bce);
P. Dura 16 (76–100 ce); P.Eleph. 2 (284 bce); P.Oxy. 3.495; P.Oxy. 66.4533; P.Petr. 2.1-4
(238–237 bce); P.Sijp. 43 (119–120 ce).
29. Preisigke 1915: 52. Norton contends that διαθήκη could be used in the sense of treaty, but he
finds his evidence only in Isaeus (fourth-century bce orator). Norton does not provide evi-
dence that διαθήκη was meant as a compact in the Graeco-Roman era. Norton 1908: 31-38.
30. Frey 1997: 288. Similarly, Kilpatrick notes, ‘Here was one of the weaknesses of the testament
interpretation. It was difficult to see how the mediator fitted in’. See Kilpatrick 1977: 265.
Kim 259

was not composed by an official secretary (i.e., grapheion office).31 This idiosyn-
cratic format implies that Isidora may have had some urgent reasons to make her
will in a rush, but at least this testament signals that a testator could be legally a
mediator or an arbitrator for himself/herself.
A similar pattern is also substantiated in P.Strasb. 4.284 (176–180 ce):
μεσιτεύουσαν παραχωροῦσαν μεταδιατιθεμένην οἰκονομοῦσαν τὰ κατʼ ἐμαυτὴν
ὡς ἀνῄρωμαι ἐὰν δὲ τελευτήσω … (‘If I die, the right to arbitrate, to mortgage,
to allot and to manage my property …’). This sentence also indicates that the
right to arbitrate the estate belonged to the testator in this case. These examples
(P.Diog. 11 and P.Strasb. 4.284) may connote that, in some situations, a testator
could arbitrate his/her hereditary estates for himself/herself. Accordingly, it is
not inconsistent that the testator is simultaneously a μεσίτης in Heb. 9.15-17.32
Fifthly, some scholars read the Greek νεκρός in Heb. 9.17 in the sense of a cul-
tic sacrifice or a dead body, not as the testator’s death.33 However, if the author
of Hebrews intended to convey a sense of ‘a sacrifice’, he would have chosen the
term θυσία34 or αἷμα35 for this meaning. Furthermore, νεκρός is an inappropriate
term to express the sense of cultic sacrifice. David Moffitt writes that the concept
of cultic sacrifice refers to life, not merely to death, in Leviticus36 and Jewish lit-
erature.37 For example, ‘For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given
it to you for making atonement for your lives on the altar; for, as life, it is the
blood that makes atonement’ (NRSV) in Lev. 17.11. Thus, offering a sacrifice
can mean offering life, not merely offering death, and so it is highly likely that
the term νεκρός in Heb. 9.17 does not refer to a cultic sacrifice.38

31. Cf. Rowlandson 1998: 200.

32. In these verses, Jesus is understood as a testator, and this may imply that the author of Hebrews
imposes a functional equivalence upon Jesus Christ with God, the ratifier of the covenant. See
Heb. 3.3-4, where Christ is identified with God.
33. E.g., Kilpatrick 1977: 265.
34. In Hebrews, the term θυσία frequently refers to a sacrifice: e.g., Heb. 5.1; 7.27; 8.3; 9.9, 23,
26; 10.1, 5, 8, 11, 12, 26.
35. The term αἷμα (‘blood’) also refers to a sacrifice in Hebrews: Heb. 9.7, 12, 20-25; 12.24 etc.;
in particular, τὸ αἷμα τῆς διαθήκης in 9.20. See also ‘but only the high priest goes into the sec-
ond, and he but once a year, and not without taking the blood that he offers for himself and for
the sins committed unintentionally by the people’ (NRSV). In the adjacent context of 9.16-17,
the term αἷμα refers to a sacrifice.
36. E.g., Lev. 17.14: ‘For the life of every creature – its blood is its life; therefore I have said to
the people of Israel …’
37. As Moffitt observes, ‘This blood did not represent or bear the victim’s death; rather, the blood
is identified as the life of the victim’. See Moffitt 2011: 219.
38. The most natural translation for ἐπὶ νεκροῖς can be ‘at death’ or ‘on the condition of death’.
Cf. P.Sijp 44. The plural νεκροῖς can be the plural of ‘generalization’ or of ‘abstract’. For an
example of the plural of ‘generalization’, see Jn 1.9: οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων. Cf. Smyth 1956: §§
1000-1003; BDF § 270. The plural in the phrase ἐπὶ νεκροῖς, then, can refer to general situa-
tions of testaments.
260 Journal for the Study of the New Testament 43(2)

Sixthly, the mentions of inheritance (κληρονομία) in Heb. 9.15 and testament

(διαθήκη) in Heb. 9.16 match well with the whole context of Hebrews. The sig-
nificance of wilderness and pilgrimage motifs in Hebrews has already been noted
by interpreters.39 In Hebrews, the situation of the readers is likened to Israel’s
wilderness experience before entering the promised land (e.g., 4.1). The readers
are also exhorted not to forsake the promise given to them, but to hold onto it
(e.g., 3.14; 10.36; 12.16, etc). Likewise, the motif of inheritance is also prevalent
in Hebrews. For instance:40

Heb. 1.2: ὃν ἔθηκεν κληρονόμον πάντων ...

Heb. 1.14: ἀποστελλόμενα διὰ τοὺς μέλλοντας κληρονομεῖν σωτηρίαν …

Heb. 6.12: ἵνα μὴ νωθροὶ γένησθε, μιμηταὶ δὲ τῶν διὰ πίστεως καὶ μακροθυμίας
κληρονομούντων τὰς ἐπαγγελίας.

Heb. 12.17: μετέπειτα θέλων κληρονομῆσαι τὴν εὐλογίαν ...

The motif of inheritance symbolizes ‘entering the promised land’ in Hebrews.41

The author of Hebrews evokes that the readers have the promise of inheritance
(i.e., entering the promised land).42 In the rhetorical climax of Hebrews, the peo-
ple of God in Heavenly Zion are receiving a kingdom that cannot be shaken (Διὸ
βασιλείαν ἀσάλευτον παραλαμβάνοντες ἔχωμεν χάριν (12.28)), which may remind
the readers of the inheritance motif. As discussed above, διαθήκη refers to a kind
of inheritance contract, and this notion of διαθήκη in 9.16-17 fits with the whole
context of Hebrews with regard to inheritance.
Lastly, the death of Christ in Heb. 9.11-15 can be understood as the event
through which the people of God are enabled to take part in the inheritance
promised according to διαθήκη. The significance of Christ’s death is one of the
major issues in Hebrews. One may maintain that the death of Jesus is merely a
preparatory act for the atonement in the heavenly temple, and it does not have a
significance other than as the prerequisite for the atoning offering in heaven.43

39. E.g., Johnson 1978: 239-51.

40. Cf. Käsemann 1984: 31.
41. In the Septuagint, the motif of ‘entering the promised land’ (eisodus) is also often linked with
the concept of inheritance. E.g., LXX Deut. 3.20; LXX Deut. 12.9; LXX Isa. 18.28; 19.1. See
LXX Deut. 12.9: οὐ γὰρ ἥκατε ἕως τοῦ νῦν εἰς τὴν κατάπαυσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν κληρονομίαν ἣν κύριος
ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν δίδωσιν ὑμῖν. For examples in Qumran literature, see 1QapGen ar IV 21; XVI 12;
XXI 12; XXII 33; 4Q171 IV 12; 4Q179 1 i 12; 4Q269 2 14; 4Q285 1; 4Q365 23. Cf. 1 En.
5.7; Jub. 32.18-19; 1Q34+1Q34bis 3 ii 1-3; Josephus, Ant. 1.282; 4.114-16.
42. For the uses of ἐπαγγελία in Hebrews, see Heb. 4.1; 6.12, 15, 17; 7.6; 8.6; 9.15; 10.36; 11.9,
13, 17, 33, 39.
43. For instance, see Moffitt 2011: 295; cf. Gäbel 2006: 478.
Kim 261

Whilst I would agree that the atonement in Hebrews includes some multi-stage
act, I also propose that Christ’s death is more than a preparatory act for his heav-
enly offering of atonement; the inheritance takes effect for the believers due to
the death of Christ, because the death of the testator is a premise for the efficacy
of the testament.44 In Heb. 9.16-17, the author of Hebrews conveys that, through
his atoning death, Christ brings the effectiveness of the promise, and ultimately
accomplished the promise of the inheritance.45 Thus, the death of Christ is causa
sine qua non for participation in the promised inheritance according to διαθήκη,
and the death of Christ as well as his resurrection opened a new and living way
through which his people can have access to the heavenly inheritance (cf. 10.19-
20). As a result, the process of the inheritance can also be sequential: the testa-
ment (διαθήκη) was made effective through the crucifixion of Christ (9.16-17),
and then Christ was resurrected and entered the heavenly promised land (i.e., his
eternal inheritance; cf. εἰσαγάγῃ τὸν πρωτότοκον εἰς τὴν οἰκουμένην in Heb 1.6).46
To sum up, Heb. 9.16-17 serves as a parenthesis, which explains how the people
of God are enabled to participate in ‘the promised eternal inheritance’ in 9.15.
Christ is simultaneously a μεσίτης (9.15) and a testator (9.16), and this can be
explained by examining Graeco-Roman social conventions, as seen above.
Hebrews 9.16-17 is not isolated from the adjacent context but can be located within
the whole context with regard to the eschatological inheritance and the pilgrimage
to the promised land. Thus, when the author of Hebrews says in Heb. 9.17, ‘a will
is valid only at death, since it is not in force as long as the one who made it is alive’,
it exactly reflects the contemporaneous notion of διαθήκη as testament.

Conclusion
I began this work with a survey of testaments in Graeco-Roman documentary
papyri. Many exegetes assume that διαθήκη was immediately effective when
it was written and that it was common to transfer the unrestricted ownership
of property to heirs regardless of the testators’ death in Graeco-Roman society.

44. Cf. Loader 2018: 235-83.

45. In Col. 1.12, the concept of receiving inheritance (εἰς τὴν μερίδα τοῦ κλήρου τῶν ἁγίων) is
connected to the notion of Christ’s death (ἀπολύτρωσις; Col. 1.14), and this pattern recalls
Heb. 9.15-17 (ὅπως θανάτου γενομένου εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων
τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν λάβωσιν οἱ κεκλημένοι τῆς αἰωνίου κληρονομίας). Thus, it is likely that early
Christians had a shared tradition that the death of Christ enabled believers to participate in the
inheritance promised to the people of God, and this tradition is also reflected in Heb. 9.15-17.
Perhaps early Christians confessed that the death of Christ accomplished the eschatological
hope for the land.
46. The concept of οἰκουμένη in Heb. 1.6 should be read in the sense of ‘the coming heavenly
world’ as in Heb. 2.5. For this interpretation, see Moffitt 2011: 69-78; Andriessen 1976: 293-
94; Vanhoye 1964: 248-53. Cf. κληρονόμος πάντων in Heb. 1.2.
262 Journal for the Study of the New Testament 43(2)

However, these assumptions are not sustainable when we explore actual testa-
mentary practices in ancient society. In documentary papyri, whereas it was pos-
sible for testators to assign a usufructuary right to their children in their lifetime
(i.e., donatio inter vivos), transfer of patrimonum rarely took place during the
lifetime of the testator, and the death of the testator was conditio sine qua non for
the efficacy of the testament. That is, διαθήκη takes effect after the death of the
testator. In this context, the term διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 should be construed as
‘testament’. Thus, in 9.16-17, the author of Hebrews suggests that, through his
crucifixion, Christ realized the promise of the inheritance and enabled believers
to participate in ‘the promised eternal inheritance’ according to διαθήκη.

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