SOUTH

EAST
EUROPE
REVIEW
FOR LABOUR
AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS

SEER QUARTERLY OF THE

HANS-BÖCKLER-FOUNDATION

Hans Böckler
Stiftung

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
Baden-Baden
QUARTERLY OF THE HANS-BÖCKLER-FOUNDATION

SEER
South-East Europe Review
for Labour and Social Affairs

Volume 2 · Number 3 · October 1999

3/99 South-East Europe Review 1

What is the Hans-Böckler-Foundation?
The Hans-Böckler-Foundation is the DGB (German Trade Union Confederation) or-
ganisation for employee codetermination, research and study promotion. In all its
fields of activity it is committed to codetermination as a principle for designing a
democratic society. It promotes this idea, supports all representatives in the codeter-
mination area and advocates the broadening and extension of codetermination rights.
If you want to know more about the Hans-Böckler-Foundation please write to the ed-
itor or see the home page under: http://www.boeckler.de

Aims and Objectives

of the South-East Europe Review
for Labour and Social Affairs
The SEER tries to stimulate the exchange of information among researchers, trade un-
ionists and people who have a special interest in the political, social and economic de-
velopment of the region of south-east Europe.
The SEER tries to draw attention to new research results and the latest analysis about
the ongoing process of political and social changes in the south-east of Europe.
The SEER tries to create more understanding for the importance of the elaboration of
democratic structures in industrial relations.
The SEER tries to combine contributions from different disciplines and “political
schools” into an information package of interest for policy makers, researchers, aca-
demics and trade unionists from various backgrounds.

The editors would like to point out that it is the authors who are responsible for the
content of their own articles and that neither the editors nor the publisher, the Hans-
Böckler-Foundation, necessarily share the opinions of the authors whose work is fea-
tured in the SEER.

The SEER is published by the Hans-Böckler-Foundation, Düsseldorf

Editor Associate Editor
Peter Scherrer Calvin Allen
Hans-Böckler-Foundation Society of Telecom Executives
Bertha-von-Suttner Platz 1 30, St. George’s Road
D-40227 Düsseldorf Wimbledon
Tel. ++ 49-211-77780 London SW 19 4BD
Fax ++ 49-211-77784223 Tel. ++ 44-181 971 6025
eMail : Peter-Scherrer@boeckler.de Fax ++ 44-181 971 6002
eMail: calvina@stenet.org.uk
Production: Nomos Verlag
ISSN 1435-2869

2 South-East Europe Review 3/99

Florian Bieber

Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for

Democratisation in Bosnia?1 The Case of Belgium
as a Possible Example
Introduction
Today, Bosnia Herzegovina is divided into two entities; both have become largely
mono-ethnic areas, while at the same time belonging to a weak multi-ethnic state. The
political system established in Dayton in 1995 and by the Washington Agreement be-
tween Croats and Bosniacs the previous year seeks to strike a balance between recog-
nising the realities on the ground, i.e. the division of previously co-existing nations,
and creating a system of co-operation and an eventual return of refugees, potentially
enabling their co-existence on the same territory. The political system institutional-
ised in Dayton, through a constitution decreed by the international community and the
United States in particular, resembles in many ways the brief experience with democ-
racy in 1990-1991, while at the same time recognising the territorial division of the
country. The schizophrenic nature of Bosnia is already reflected in the preamble of its
Constitution, which defines the people of the country as:

Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina.2

Bosnian national diversity is clearly unique, but at the same time it is an oft-re-
peated truism that 90 per cent of the countries in the world are multiethnic. Thus, nu-
merous theories and concepts seeking to explore and facilitate such a diversity within
one country have been elaborated. Most Western European countries also have minor-
ities and have consequently developed a range of methods for integrating them into
the state. These techniques range from assimilation, as in France, to far-ranging terri-
torial autonomy, as granted to the Swedish minority on the Finnish Åland Islands.3
Here two countries, Belgium and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had and have sys-
tems of governance which could be described as consociational democracies, will be
compared.4 In the case of Bosnia, the focus will rest on the brief period of consocia-

1 The original version of this article was presented at the conference “Democracy and Hu-
man Rights in Multi-Ethnic Societies,” held in Konjic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 5-10,
1998.
2 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), preamble. On the ambiguity of this defi-
nition see Várady, T: On the Chances of Ethnocultural Justice in Central-Eastern Europe
– with Comments on the Dayton Agreement, mimeo.
3 For a theoretical evaluation of different means of regulating ethnic conflict, see McGarry,
J and O’Leary, B. (1993): “Introduction: the macro-political regulation of ethnic con-
flict,” in McGarry, J and O’Leary, B (eds.): The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation:
Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflict, London: Routledge, pp. 1-40.

3/99 South-East Europe Review S. 79 - 94 79

 Florian Bieber

tional democracy prior to the war in 1990 and 1991. However, the primary focus of
the article is to examine the implications of a consociational political system for Bos-
nia in the future. This concept has been largely developed by Arend Lijphart, a Dutch
political scientist, in an attempt to analyse plural societies, which are divided by reli-
gion, language, ethnicity or even political ideologies. At the centre of his concept
stands co-operation between the elites representing their respective constituencies:

The first and most important element is government by grand coalition of the political leaders
of all significant segments of the plural society. This can take several different forms, such as
a grand coalition cabinet in a parliamentary system, a “grand” council or committee with im-
portant advisory functions, or a grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders in a
presidential system. The other three basic elements of consociational democracy are (1) the
mutual veto or “concurrent majority” rule, which serves as an additional protection of vital
minority interests; (2) proportionality as the principal standard of political representation,
civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; and (3) a high degree of autonomy
for each segment to run its own internal affairs.5

Belgium is one of these countries and has struggled for the last thirty years with
the problem of accommodating different linguistic/national groups. The example of
Belgium, and its most recent constitutional reforms in 1993, are of particular interest
for Bosnia for two reasons. Firstly, Belgium has established a far-reaching devolution
of power and institutional reform in recent years, a necessity for national accommoda-
tion in Bosnia. Secondly, Belgium has been one of the few countries separating cul-
tural and personal autonomy from territorial autonomy. This approach offers alterna-
tives to the general territorial fallacy of modern nationalism and can provide for a
successful tool for democratisation in Bosnia.
The purpose of this article is to examine the applicability of the model of a conso-
ciational democracy to Bosnia. In order to achieve this, we shall examine Belgium as
a “role model” of a plural democracy and point to elements of consociational exist-
ence in pre-war and post-Dayton Bosnia.

1. The two cases

1.1. Belgium
In Belgium, the period following World War 2 was shaped by the increasing linguis-
tic and national awareness of the Flemish community, caused by its economic rise and
the decline of heavy industry in Walloonia. This triggered the national consciousness
of the French-speaking community in Belgium and has lead to numerous constitu-

4 I developed some of the ideas presented in this paper while comparing Bosnia with Leba-
non – Bieber, F. (1999): Bosnien-Herzegowina und Libanon im Vergleich, Die historische
Entwicklung und das politische System vor Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges [Bosnia-Herze-
govina and Lebanon in Comparison. Historical Development and the Political System
Prior to the Civil War]. Sinzheim: Pro Universitate Verlag.
5 Lijphart, Arend (1977): Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration. New
Haven-London: Yale University Press, p. 25.

80 South-East Europe Review 3/99

 Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia?

tional and legal reforms which have granted increasing powers to the Dutch, French
and German-speaking communities. These reforms have culminated in the far-reach-
ing revision of the Constitution in 1993, transforming Belgium into a federal state.
This reform further developed the two tracks of autonomy in Belgium. Some of the
central powers were devolved to its three regions of Flanders, Walloonia and Brus-
sels. This territorial federalisation is complemented by the cultural autonomy granted
to the three linguistic communities.6
The reforms changed the institutions, transferred powers and regulated the financ-
ing of the regions and the protection of minorities. It was, despite the pressures from
below, a federalisation from above, designed by the Belgian national elites, with the
delegation of the powers of the state – in line with the principle of subsidiarity – to
smaller units. The three regions were granted far-reaching competencies in the fields
of economic policy, agriculture, environment and energy. Furthermore, the provinces
were allowed to conduct foreign relations and sign international treaties in these
fields.
Each region also set up its own council (parliament) and executive. The parliament
of Brussels is divided into Flemish and French speakers; in Walloonia, the council has
representatives of the French community and Germans living along the eastern border
of the country; while the members of the Flemish parliament come from Flanders and
Brussels. The latter is a merger of the regional (Flemish) and communal (Dutch-
speaking) parliaments.
Independently from the regions, the three communities have received self-govern-
ment in the fields of culture, education, media and individual welfare. Like their re-
gional counterparts, they can conduct international and regional co-operation in these
fields. Only the German community cannot fully determine the usage of its language,
due to its small size and the high number of French-speakers in German language ar-
eas. All three communities possess their own parliaments: The Conseil de la Commu-
nauté Francophone combines French-speakers from Walloonia and Brussels; the Ned-
erlandstalige Gemeenschapsraad has merged, as mentioned above, with the Flemish
parliament; while the German Rat holds deputies from Walloonia.
The main competencies remaining with the Federal State are foreign affairs, de-
fence, home affairs and social welfare. In addition, the Federal State remains the main
tax collector and, in consequence, the lower units are financed by the Federal State,
not vice-versa. The lower House of Parliament is elected by the whole country ac-
cording to proportional representation, while approximately one-third of the Senate
receives its mandate from the communal assemblies, with the majority being directly
elected. The reform also strengthened the 10 provinces and the municipalities.

6 For a history of the development of Flemish identity and the first reforms see Covell, M.
(1993): “Belgium: The variability of ethnic relations,” in McGarry, J. and O’Leary B.
(eds.), op. cit., pp. 275-295; Vos, L. (1996): “Nationalism, Democracy and the Belgian
State” in Caplan, R. and Feffer, J. (eds.): Europe’s New Nationalism: States and Minori-
ties in Conflict, New York-London: Oxford University Press, pp. 85-100.

3/99 South-East Europe Review 81

 Florian Bieber

The institutional network of Belgium has thus devolved considerable powers to

different bodies. Consequently, there are six parliaments (not counting both chambers
in the federal system) and executives in Belgium.7

1.2. Bosnia
The political system in Bosnia, as in Yugoslavia as a whole before 1990, could hardly
be described as democracy, but it did possess several elements of consociationalism.
The key, according to which jobs were distributed in the civil service and the govern-
ment, can be seen as a forerunner of a consociational democracy. The division was
1:1:1, which favoured Croats, who contributed less than 20 per cent of the population,
and disadvantaged Muslims, who had over 40 per cent. In reality, Croats remained
under-represented in many fields, in particular in the police and the army. The na-
tional key was a deliberate attempt at what one would today call “affirmative action”
with the aim of evening out inequalities. Some Muslims compared this system with
the national pact in Lebanon, fearing the institutionalisation of their under-representa-
tion.8
The elements of consociationalism in pre-war Bosnia can be seen at the informal
level as well as in the institutions which came into existence with the elections in No-
vember and December 1990. After the first free elections, the three national parties,
winning an overwhelming majority, formed a grand coalition. The President of the
presidency was given to the Muslim SDA, while the Prime Minister was a Croat and a
Serb became the President of Parliament – both unlike in Lebanon. The division of
power was institutionally set by the presidency, modelled on the Yugoslav equivalent,
consisting of two Muslims, two Serbs and two Croats, as well as a member of other
nations. For the latter category, a member of the SDA, Ejup Ganić, was elected as a
“Yugoslav.” Finally, all three nations were represented in the cabinet.
The new Bosnian Parliament had two chambers, instead of the previous three: the
chamber of citizens (Vijece Gradanstvo, 130 deputies); and the chamber of communes
(Vijece Opeina, 110 deputies). In the period following the elections, the Parliament
was largely deprived of its power as the three ruling parties bypassed it, negotiating
and taking decisions outside of it.
As the coalition could not agree on a new Constitution, the old socialist one re-
mained in force.9 Already before the elections, the first article of the Constitution de-
termined Bosnia to be:

7 Delpérée, F (1995): “Le fédéralisme sauvera-t-il la nation belge?” in Rupnik, J. (ed.): Le

Déchirement des Nations, Paris: Editions du Seuil, pp. 123-137; Roessingh, M (1996):
Ethnonationalism and Political Systems in Europe: A State of Tension, Amsterdam: Am-
sterdam University Press, pp. 184-186.
8 Reuter, J (1992): “Die politische Entwicklung in Bosnien-Herzegowina,” in Südosteur-
opa 41, No. 11-12, p. 670.
9 On the coalition and institutional arrangement see Burg, Steve L (1997): “Bosnia Herze-
govina; a case of failed democratization,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.):
Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe, Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 122-141.

82 South-East Europe Review 3/99

 Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia?

A democratic sovereign state of equal citizens, the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Mus-
lims, Serbs, Croats, and the members of other nations and nationalities living within it.10

Despite the consociational features of Bosnia, the state institution functioned

properly for only a brief period of time before the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)
withdrew from the coalition, established the Republika Srpska and engaged in con-
quering and the ethnic cleansing of large parts of Bosnia, followed soon after by the
Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), with its establishment of Herceg-Bosna in
Herzegovina. The central state authorities collapsed as a consequence and became
largely dominated by the SDA.
It was only the Dayton Accords that re-established Bosnia, as a state exercising
control over its whole territory, albeit with very limited competencies. The new Bos-
nian state also incorporates elements of consociational democracy. The tradition of
the presidency is continued under the Dayton Constitution, consisting as it does of
three members, one Serb from the Republika Srpska, and one Bosniac and one Croat
from the Federation.11 Thus, not only are other minorities excluded from running for
the highest office of the country, but Serb, Bosniacs and Croats from the “wrong” –
i.e. from the non-majoritarian – entity are not able to be elected to the presidency. One
of the two chambers of Parliament, the House of Peoples, with 5 members of each of
the three constituent nations, functions along the same lines. The other chamber, the
House of Representatives, is, together with the constitutional court, the only organ of
the common Bosnian state which does not predetermine both the ethnicity of its mem-
bers and their entity.12 Thus, the bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the attribute “Re-
public” has been cancelled in the Dayton Accords), are based on ethnic representation
and co-operation between the political representatives of the three constituent nations.
In order to avoid the exclusion of one nation, the 1995 Constitution has also insti-
tuted a complex system of minority veto. The two Houses of Parliament have to en-
sure the support of at least one-third of each ethnic group in every decision taken. Ad-
ditionally, each nation can effectively block decisions which are “destructive of a vital
interest.” The instruments of consociational democracy, which existed previously
largely through informal checks, have now been institutionalised to a high degree.

2. Theoretical concepts of consociational democracy

The Belgian case clearly shows that, even in democratic systems, special and very
complex mechanisms of minority protection have to be implemented. As Donald
Horowitz points out:

Much of what passes for usual democratic rules either does nothing about ethnic exclusion or
actually fosters it.13

10 Quoted from Hayden, R (1996): “Constitutional Nationalism and the Logic of the Wars in
Yugoslavia,” in: Problems of Post-Communism 43, No. 5, 27.
11 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Article V.
12 ibid, Article IV.

3/99 South-East Europe Review 83

 Florian Bieber

Thus the need arises to offer a concept which ensures minority representation as
part of the democratic structure. The most convincing model so far conceptionalised
is that by Arend Lijphart, based on the case of Belgium and other country studies.
In his book Democracies, Lijphart describes key elements of a consociational de-
mocracy, based on empirical studies. Consociational, or consensus, democracy is a
system of government attempting to bridge different groups in states with strong
cleavages. These cleavages can be of a political nature, as in inter-war Austria (Social-
ists-Christian Democrats), of a religious nature, as in the Netherlands until the 1970s,
or, as in most cases, of a national nature. National differences tend to be more stable
and cannot be altered in the way others can, so they require more than other cleavages
a particular political system. Consociational democracies are based on societies where
the elites of the different groups co-operate and seek coalitions beyond the numeric
minimum necessary for gaining power. The two most frequently-quoted cases for rel-
atively successful consensus democracies are Belgium and Switzerland.14
Lijphart mentions several demographic factors which facilitate consociational de-
mocracy. First of all, it is beneficial to possess a balance between the cleavage groups
in which none has an absolute majority and the groups are of comparable size. He de-
velops a list of stable and unstable constellations. Belgium, according to him, is stable
since the Flemish/Walloon division is supplemented by other cleavages, such as the
spiritual families and the Bruxellesois. This creates a whole matrix of different groups
which have comparable sizes with none of them holding an absolute majority.
In Bosnia, no nation possesses an outright majority, but the absence, or rather the
weakness, of other cleavages which would cut across national lines exacerbates the
national divisions, making a consociational system more difficult to succeed. Thus the
outset is much less favourable for Bosnia than it is for Belgium. However, the other
factor in terms of population which Lijphart mentions partly points in Bosnia’s favour.
He points out that consociational systems tend to be more successful in small coun-
tries, since they are easier to govern and possess less complex decision-making struc-
tures. He also points to the greater danger of external threats for small countries,
which might have a unifying effect.15 The latter point holds true for both Belgium and
Bosnia, but the external threat has not helped to unify Bosnia but has rather been the
key divisive factor between the nations. Altogether, the demographic starting point for
Bosnia is less favourable for the establishment of a consensus democracy than in Bel-
gium, but this should not exclude the applicability of the concept in principle.16

13 Horowitz D (1993): “The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict. Democracy in Divided Socie-

ties,” in Journal of Democracy 4, No. 4 , p. 28.
14 For the eight criteria of consociational democracy see Lijphart, A. (1984): Democracies:
Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Ha-
ven-London: Yale University Press, pp. 23-32.
15 Lijphart, A (1977), op. cit., pp. 60-61, 65.
16 Switzerland also has a much stronger majority, the German-speaking population, but,
over time, alternative cleavages developed to compensate for them.

84 South-East Europe Review 3/99

 Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia?

2.1. Executive powersharing

The concept of sharing power is at the heart of Lijphart’s concept. It signifies govern-
ments encompassing broad coalitions of several parties representing a majority of the
cleavage groups. Such power-sharing can be institutionalised or it can be part of a tra-
dition. In the case of Belgium, this power-sharing takes two dimensions. On the one
side, there is the constitutional regulation of the equal number of Flemish and Wal-
loons in Government while, on the other, the structure of the party system (see below)
require coalitions which necessarily also encompass the different “spiritual families.”
The formal division between positions in government and in Parliament further
heightens the inflexibility of the system. In addition, it reinforces national divisions
and places national identity over competence. In the case of Bosnia, it automatically
excludes members of smaller minorities from being elected to high office. The Bos-
nian system, by prescribing the nationality of the members of the presidency, elimi-
nates the option for Bosniacs, for example, to elect a Serb, or vice-versa. This may
seem unrealistic at the moment, but it does prevent voting across national lines in the
future.17
Lijphart instead suggests an informal means of power-sharing between the differ-
ent groups, which would facilitate adjustment over time and, hopefully, the elimina-
tion of such divisions at some point in the future.18 This is not to underestimate the
dangers of such an informal division of power which could be observed in Bosnia be-
fore the war. The three national parties divided power between themselves in the name
of their respective nation, which could hardly be seen as a stabilising development as
it sidelined other, more moderate, forces.

2.2. Formal or informal separation of powers

Lijphart points out that a successful inclusion of different cleavage groups requires a
separation of powers within the state, especially between the executive and legisla-
ture. This level of independence works both ways. The government should be able to
take decisions contrary to parliamentary opinion; likewise Parliament has to be able
not only to endorse government decisions, but also act independently. The need to
form coalitions makes the government more dependent on the parliament; at the same
time, the government is more separate from the parliament as in, for example, Great
Britain. Belgium has an informal semi-separation of powers, as do the other Benelux
countries, Germany and Scandinavia. This assures sufficient independence for both
institutions.
In Bosnia, this is not the case. Due to the lack of parliamentary traditions in the
country, the powers and independence of Parliament are limited and it is frequently
abused by the very powerful executive as a body purely to endorse governmental deci-
sions. Thus, even if the parliamentary representation of minorities improved, the lack

17 Várady, T: op. cit.

18 Lijphart, A (1977), op. cit., pp. 147-150; Lijphart, A (1991): “The Power-Sharing Ap-
proach,” in Joseph V. Montville (ed.): Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies,
New York: Lexington Books, pp. 507ff.

3/99 South-East Europe Review 85

 Florian Bieber

of power possessed by Parliament would not truly grant them access to the decision-
making processes.

2.3. Balanced bi-cameralism and minority representation

A successful integration of minorities and different national groups requires special
provisions in the parliamentary structure. The way generally recommended by Li-
jphart and other authors is a system of two houses of parliament and a guaranteed mi-
nority representation within these chambers. Generally, one chamber should be based
on the proportional representation of the whole country, while the other should focus
more on the representation of regions, communities or other means of the guaranteed
inclusion of different groups. This bi-cameral system also implies that both houses
have substantial powers, at least over the topics of concern for the cleavage groups. In
Belgium, the chambers are the Senate and the Chambre des Deputes. Both have
nearly equal powers, but the Senate cannot initiate laws. The Senate has some mem-
bers nominated by the assemblies of the three linguistic communities, thus ensuring
minority representation.
The new Bosnian institutional structure established a bi-cameral system within the
whole state and at the level of the Bosniac-Croat Federation. The Republika Srpska,
on the other hand, only possesses a uni-cameral parliament. This system does ensure
the representation of all three nations, but it pays little attention to the members of the
minority nation within each of the two entities. At the institutional level, both entities
can be seen as largely ignoring the rights of the other – non-dominant – nations.

2.4. Multi-party system

It is better to have several parties, rather than just two. A two-party system does not
require coalition building and thus endangers the principal idea of including as large a
number of groups as possible. Belgium has 3 large parties (Christian Democrats, Lib-
erals and Socialists). Due to their internal divisions according to language groups,
they are actually six large parties, while there are at least two regional parties, making
Belgium an eight-party system. Also important is that these parties together constitute
a balance. If one or two dominate and the others are more or less splinter parties, this
would not necessarily ensure minority representation.
Bosnia clearly possesses several parties, but the predominance of the three large
national parties has, until recently, prevented effective coalition building between the
different partners. Within the entities, the national parties have largely monopolised
political life and established themselves as state parties, frequently without a clear di-
vision between state and party structures. The split in the Serbian Democratic Party in
1997, and the recent split with the Croatian HDZ, are indicators of the development of
a true multi-party system.

2.5. Multi-dimensional party system

Of even greater importance than the number of parties in one system is their pro-
grammes. Lijphart rightfully sees a necessity for parties to possess different cleav-
ages, thus preventing a party system where one cleavage (nation, language) is pre-

86 South-East Europe Review 3/99

 Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia?

dominant. A one-level system tends to increase confrontation and, in the case of

ethnic minorities, to degrade elections into a population census (as in Bosnia). Purely
national or ethnic divisions tend to render co-operation and coalitions more difficult
than if other cleavages continued to exit. In Belgium, the division into the three main
traditional parties – Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals – has defused many
linguistic confrontations. As a result, not all issues of parliamentary debate have be-
come determined by the interests of Flaams and Walloons, but other groups (class, re-
ligiosity) could co-operate outside linguistic distinction.
This could obviously also develop in Bosnia, where non-national cleavages are
largely absent at the moment. The difference in Belgium is that the trans-communal
parties developed first and then accommodated the different communities. In Bosnia,
as elsewhere in former Yugoslavia, the traditional parties defined themselves primarily
by national criteria. The broadening of a party from one nation to several is much
more difficult than the history of the development in Belgium. The notable exception
in Bosnia has been the Social Democratic parties, which have made links across na-
tional and entity lines to pursue an agenda of social justice and common policy to-
wards multi-nationals. The experience of war has rendered this attempt very difficult.
The success of a pluralist party system in Bosnia will require the further development
of parties cutting across national cleavages, basing their programmes on a different
agenda.19

2.6. Other elements

The voting system is of great relevance to successful consensus democracy. Only pro-
portional voting allows for the just representation of minorities. Majority voting, on
the other hand, diminishes the powers of minorities and prevents coalition-building.
In Belgium, a system of proportional voting is in place, like in Bosnia. Besides the
system itself, the threshold for small parties has to be low, allowing small minority
parties to enter parliament.
As discussed above, autonomy for minorities in areas of their interest is a key es-
sence in a functioning consociational democracy. Lijphart adds a general need for de-
centralisation. Bosnia has been decentralised towards the entities, but while the Re-
publika Srpska remains highly centralised, the Federation, on the other hand, has been
divided into ten cantons. Thus, the creation of local and regional institutions has to co-
incide with a devolution of power and the implementation of subsidiarity as a govern-
ing principle.
A written constitution is necessary to guarantee minority rights and also allow ad-
justments according to new negotiations. Here Lijphart mainly refers to Britain,
which still does not have a written constitution. This could also be applied to Bosnia,
which does have one. Lijphart, when discussing written constitutions, primarily sees a

19 On the problem of the elections after the Dayton Accords and the continuing lack of over-
arching, non-national cleavages see Shoup, P (1997): “The Elections in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: The End of an Illusion,” in Problems of Post-Communism 44, No. 1, pp. 3-
15.

3/99 South-East Europe Review 87

 Florian Bieber

necessity for constitutionally-enshrined rights and the rule of law. In the case of Bos-
nia, the Constitution of the Federal State, as well as the Constitutions of the Federa-
tion and the Republika Srpska, contain many contradictions and frequently do not re-
flect political practice. The lack of a rule of law and adequate minority protection in
the Constitution could be interpreted as the absence of a written constitution. Thus in
Bosnia, reforms leading to consensus democracy would first of all necessitate a con-
stitutional system which is adhered to and which is consistent with itself.
Another key feature of consensus democracy is the minority veto over issues of its
concern. This usually covers competencies directly affecting the groups, as well as
constitutional changes. In Belgium, all the relevant competencies already lie with the
groups themselves while, even in the Federal structure, their votes count in the Senate.
Furthermore, constitutional changes require a 2/3 majority, as well as the consent of
the communities.

3. Problems of consociational democracy

3.1. Bureaucratisation
A frequently-raised objection to the creation of consensus democracy and its institu-
tions – several parliaments, executives and administrative units – is inefficiency and
over-bureaucratisation. These phenomena certainly create grave problems. The prob-
lems are partly financial as they present additional costs to the taxpayers. In addition,
the great fragmentation of the competencies between different bodies also leave cer-
tain fields in the hands of different and, at times, competing bodies.20 An American
author, highly critical of bilingualism, describes Brussels consequently as a ‘mess’:

Mail can take more than three days to reach one side of the city from the other. Mayors fight
with regional councils, which fight with federal officials, who fight with everyone. On one
block in the city you'll receive only Flemish cable TV. Around the corner, you'd better speak
French. The costs of maintaining this bilingual artifice are daunting. But when I asked repre-
sentatives of the Flemish, Francophone, and Federalist parties if they were concerned about
the country's debt, more than 140 per cent of GDP, the replies boiled down to: ‘Translators are
cheaper than guns.’21

His acknowledgement of the costs of federalism being preferable to conflict stands

in contradiction to his previous critique, probably because the use of ‘guns’ seems un-
likely to him. During periods of great tension in Belgium this did not sound quite so
absurd.22 When examining Belgium as a case study for countries in south-eastern Eu-
rope, this seems, even more, a price one should be willing to pay.
By taking just the Belgium example to conclude that consociational democracy is
inefficient would be short-sighted. The problems Belgium is facing – corruption,
debts and an inefficient judiciary – might, in fact, have other roots than the increase in

20 “Belgium fights the demon,” Economist, 17.4.1993, p. 51; “Belgium: fading away,”
Economist, 31.10.1992, p. 52.
21 Mosier, J: “Equal but Separate,” National Review, 19.12.94, pp. 22-23.
22 One has only to bear in mind Northern Ireland before the recent peace accord.

88 South-East Europe Review 3/99

 Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia?

the number of institutions resulting from the constitutional reforms of the last dec-
ades. A comparative empirical study of economic performance in consociational sys-
tems and less embracing governments has actually shown that the first system is more
successful:

The inclusive and accommodative nature of consensual constitutional structures tends to pro-
duce more peaceful industrial relations than exclusive and majoritarian systems. Overall, this
article provides evidence that macroeconomic outcomes and industrial disputes vary system-
atically with the type of consensual and majoritarian type of democracy.23

Therefore, the frequently-voiced argument that the problems of the political sys-
tem in Belgium are directly related to its decentralisation cannot be maintained.
In a country like Bosnia, which has been struggling with inefficient administration
for decades, consensus democracy certainly poses a particular challenge. Neverthe-
less, in the case of Bosnia a devolution of powers could actually render the bureauc-
racy more efficient. In Western Europe, the popularity of the term “subsidiarity” re-
flects the recognition that decision-making is more efficient at the lower levels of
administration. If this succeeds, there is no reason why consensus democracy, coupled
with a devolution of powers in Bosnia, should not make administration more efficient
and co-operative for all its citizens.

3.2. Segregation
The territorial and cultural division of the different communities has not only reduced
tensions between the groups, but has also greatly diminished the contact between the
Flemish and Walloons. A significant example is the case of the bilingual University
of Leuven. The Flemish students resented what they considered the privileged treat-
ment of French at this prestigious university in the Flemish city of Leuven. Further-
more, they feared an increasing influence of the French language in Flanders. This led
to violent protests in 1968 against the French-speaking students and faculty at the
University. The consequence was a division of the University and the move of the
French University to Louvain-La-Neuve, a newly created university town close to
Brussels. Not only the division of the library – every second book went to the new
university – reflects the extremes of the divisions.
The rights of each group might be better protected through separation, but it also
segregates both sides and decreases interactions, between academics for example. The
crisis surrounding Louvain also caused the split of the Socialist, Liberal and Christian
Social parties in the subsequent decade.24

23 Crepaz, M (1996): “Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy, Political Institutions and

Their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance and Industrial Disputes,” in Comparative
Political Studies 29, No. 1, pp. 4-25.
24 James, B: “In Belgium, Leuven-Louvain Split Speaks Loud,” International Herald Trib-
une, 11.11.1997, p. 6; Covell, M (1993), op. cit., p. 286; Roessingh, M (1996), op. cit.,
pp. 170-171.

3/99 South-East Europe Review 89

 Florian Bieber

For different reasons, both groups – Walloons and Flemish – preferred the estab-
lishment of uni-lingual regions rather than enforced bilingualism in the whole coun-
try, as was the case in Flanders before the 1930s and as it is in the federal government
and Brussels. The Flemish in particular saw bilingualism as an instrument of French
language dominance. This argument may hold true, but the lack of trans-community
communication has eliminated many contacts and made it increasingly difficult for
those attempting to cross linguistic/national borders.
The separation of institutions can lead to a similar development as in Bosnia,
where the governmental devolution of power to the communities has greatly reduced
the influence of those whose prime identification lies with the state and not with the
communities. Even the elaborate separation of communities and regions in Belgium
could not avoid that French speakers in Flanders and Dutch speakers in Walloonia are
discriminated against by the administration and have to learn the language of the other
group in order to communicate with the branches of local government. By separating
regions and communities more clearly, i.e. by allowing the official usage of the other
language in the whole country, this could have been avoided. When drawing the les-
sons of Belgium for other countries, this problem has to be borne in mind. Any at-
tempt to grant any community far-reaching rights should not lead to the voluntary seg-
regation of the population, except for those who attempt the most to bridge the
differences.

3.3. Blocked reform and decision-making

Lijphart concedes that consociationalism is not necessarily successful:

...[T]he Lebanese case shows that consociational devices at best do not have a great deal of
potency in building legitimacy and stability. At worst, they may actually have exacerbated di-
visions and hastened the collapse.25

As consociational democracies have to be more highly regulated than regular de-

mocracies, there is a danger of rendering the system immobile and inflexible. New
elites are easily prevented from entering the political system and reforms are delayed.
As all groups possess a veto over key issues, the system can also be deadlocked
and the unity of the state endangered.26 In Bosnia, this was the case with the referen-
dum for independence from Yugoslavia, which was boycotted by the SDS, leading to
a majority of Serbs not participating in the vote. A mutual veto is only acceptable
when the state possesses institutions to seek compromises and to avoid situations in
which such a veto can effectively block the functioning of the state. Such a system can
be achieved only when all groups and their representatives are fundamentally ready to
seek compromise.

25 Lijphart, A (1977), op. cit., p. 233.

26 ibid, p. 227.

90 South-East Europe Review 3/99

 Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia?

4. Territorial versus cultural autonomy

The key element of the Belgian reforms is the dual tracks of cultural and territorial au-
tonomy which supplement simple power-sharing at the federal level. Belgium had
cultural autonomy before federalism. The constitutional reform of 1970 initiated cul-
tural councils made up in accordance with the membership of the two Houses of Par-
liament. Their power extended to culture and education. Before the reforms of 1993,
Belgium was characterised as a “communal state.” Belgium is a particular case since
the communal and territorial institutions overlap greatly and the need for such a divi-
sion is not obvious at first sight. It is a reflection of a long tradition of cultural auton-
omy and the utilisation of diverse concepts of autonomy as a means to problem-solv-
ing, thus diffusing complex issues such as Brussels.
It is also a reflection of the different concepts of nationhood in Belgium. Belgium
was founded by popular uprising against the Netherlands, thus providing for a rudi-
mentary national movement prior to the establishment of a nation state, like in Ger-
many or in most central and east European countries. On the other hand, the great
powers set the borders and gave the current state its shape. Within these borders, na-
tionhood truly developed. This evolution of nation compares rather to the West Euro-
pean model, as in France, England or the United States. Differences between the
Flemish and Walloons have been present since the outset, but Belgium has managed
to create a feeling of separateness of Walloons from France and the Flaams from the
Netherlands. It is doubtful whether Belgium created one Belgian nation; instead, it at
least managed to create two separate nations: Walloons and Flemish. There are hopes
for a civic bilingual nationalism developing in Brussels, based on the European and
metropolitan character of the city.27
Cultural autonomy was used as a conflict-solving tool in Belgium before territo-
rial autonomy was implemented. There are several advantages to cultural autonomy: it
reduces the fears of the dominant groups (the Walloons in the Belgian case) of separa-
tism, since cultural autonomy cannot lead to secession as easily as territorial auton-
omy. Furthermore, a cultural autonomy of the different groups ensures co-existence
on the same territory, which manages to achieve an accommodation of communities
in areas of high mixture, such as Brussels. Finally, it can offer rights to groups in areas
where it would be highly unlikely for them ever to be able to achieve territorial auton-
omy.
These factors particularly apply to Bosnia. The principle of territorial autonomy
was misused during the war to expel the population of other national groups, but cul-
tural autonomy might serve as a tool to ensure the rights of the national groups, while
at the same time preserving co-existence in the same city or village. Cultural auton-
omy has been neglected in the Dayton Agreement as a tool for ensuring inter-ethnic
co-operation. The Constitution guarantees a wide range of human and individual
rights, but it makes no mention of the contentious rights in Bosnia: the cultural and
political rights of groups. The solution of the Dayton arrangement presupposes ethnic

27 Roessingh, M (1996), op. cit., pp. 144-147, 187-190.

3/99 South-East Europe Review 91

 Florian Bieber

predominance (or even ethnic homogeneity) within each entity, thus rendering unnec-
essary additional rights for the groups. This choice, a reflection of the political and
military realities at the time the agreement was negotiated, assures no rights beyond
their individual human rights to refugees seeking to return to their respective homes in
entities in which they are not in the majority. Furthermore, other groups in Bosnia,
such as Roma or Jews, are deprived of any group rights and cannot even seek repre-
sentation of their interests within either of the two ethnically-defined entities.28
Cultural autonomy has been most successfully implemented in non-east European
countries (Belgium, Finland and Switzerland), but the concept was developed during
the Hapsburg Monarchy by predominantly socialist intellectuals, such as Karl Renner
and Otto Bauer. This non-territorial autonomy also draws heavily on the Millet system
of the Ottoman Empire. In this region of Europe, national diversity was much higher
and less geographically delimited as in other parts of the continent, making non-terri-
torial considerations highly desirable. Consequently, this concept is in no way alien to
Bosnia.29
The non-territorial approach to autonomy can be better targeted towards minori-
ties in Bosnia, but minorities in times of mistreatment primarily opt out of territorial
autonomy to protect their rights. Tibor Várady sees territorial autonomy as essential:

Territorial autonomy is also an indispensable prerequisite if one wants to give minorities at

least some control over their own lives and destinies. The idea of “cantonisation” has been
present since the very beginnings of the Yugoslav crisis, it poses no threat to state sovereignty,
yet it allows a more just and efficient allocation of decision-making competencies. 30

Thus even when cultural autonomy might be potentially a more successful ap-
proach, territorial autonomy remains a powerful tool at a time of low inter-communal
trust.

5. Belgium as an example for Bosnia?

The previous sections have shown that Belgium has established a unique system of
accommodating different national/linguistic groups into its system. It fits into the con-
ceptual framework of consociational democracy, which provides a theoretical frame-
work enabling the transfer of this system to other countries. Despite the problems to
be encountered in Belgium, the system has generally been successful enough to envis-

28 Várady, T, op. cit.

29 Hanf, T (1991): “Konfliktminderung durch Kulturautonomie. Karl Renners Beitrag zur
Frage der Konflikt-regelung in multi-ethnischen Staaten,” in Erich Fröschl, Maria Mesner
and Uri Ra’anan (eds.): Staat und Nation in multi-ethnischen Gesellschaften, Wien: Pas-
sagen Verlag, p. 63-68; Coakley, J (1994): “Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Con-
flict: The Strategy of Non-territorial Autonomy,” in International Political Science Re-
view 15, No. 3, pp. 298-302.
30 Várady, T (1994): “Vojvodina – The Predicament of Minorities and Possible Solutions,”
paper submitted to the Helsinki Commission, 27.4.1994.

92 South-East Europe Review 3/99

 Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia?

age its “export” to Bosnia. Despite the internal criticism of the Belgian model, it has
been consulted already by outsiders:

When I asked a professor from the Federalist party, which takes a middle-of-the-road posi-
tion, if he thought Belgium's method for dealing with the different ethnic/linguistic groups
should be used as a model for a new united Europe, he nearly choked to death on his cr-
oissant. But he noted that Israel has asked the Belgian government for help in managing di-
versity on the West Bank.31

Arend Lijphart also examines the possibility of exporting the Belgian model and
mentions a few possible problems. His analysis was made in 1977, long before the
current reforms, but his conclusions still stand today. His main point lies in the fact
that a large segment of the co-operation between the communal elites is extra-consti-
tutional and takes place outside existing institutions. This co-operation is not the re-
sult of constitutional arrangements but is instead the product of the long-lasting tradi-
tion of co-operation and democracy in Belgium. This phenomenon can be studied and
attempted elsewhere, but it cannot be implemented from above, it takes time to de-
velop and is largely beyond the reach of institution-building. There is even a danger in
attempting to institutionalise such an informal network elsewhere. The threat lies in
the fact that the characteristics of the Belgian system developed as a result of a multi-
tude of factors which cannot necessarily be found elsewhere. Such an institutionalisa-
tion could possibly reduce the amount of elite co-operation, since it does not respect
the local prerequisites.
Lijphart mentions a different problem when exporting the Belgian system of gov-
ernment. The monarch holds more constitutional powers than he traditionally uses.
He can, for example, dismiss the Prime Minister, a right he is expected not to use.
This, again, reflects the close combination of tradition and institutions. If a similar po-
sition is granted to a monarch or president elsewhere, as was done in the former Bel-
gian colonies (Congo, Burundi), this institution lends itself to autocratic rule.32 This
shows that consociational institutions can only be meaningful if they stand in connec-
tion with the heritage of the country.
The current problems with minority rights in Bosnia and the general distrust be-
tween the nations living within the country makes the Belgian model and the concept
of consociational democracy seem hard to implement, but it is nevertheless important
to emphasise the culture of co-operation that does exist in Bosnia.
When applying the Belgium system to Bosnia, one has to separate the institutional
features of this system from the informal Belgian agreements and traditions, which
would need to be fostered at the same time as new institutions are being built in Bos-
nia. The key institutional element, to recall, is the combination of cultural and territo-
rial autonomy. Cultural autonomy was based on groups, while the federal structures
are purely regional and not exclusive to one group. The federal government, at the

31 Mosier, J (1994): “Equal but Separate,” National Review, 19.12.94, pp. 22-23.
32 Lijphart, A (1977), op. cit., pp. 209-210.

3/99 South-East Europe Review 93

 Florian Bieber

same time, is also required to incorporate the groups’ interests. This establishes a sys-
tem of checks and balances, prohibiting any single group from imposing its pro-
gramme on others. For Bosnia, this would mean the creation of communal councils of
all the minorities with competencies in cultural and educational matters.
As for the informal elements of the Belgian experience, which are much more dif-
ficult to transplant to Bosnia, three points stand out. First of all, the actors have to at-
tempt to enter the political process and to articulate their programmes within the exist-
ing institutional framework. The willingness to integrate a minority discourse into the
mainstream does not only require a readiness amongst the minority, but also amongst
the majority to allow the minority voice be heard in the existing institutions. In Bel-
gium, the autonomist movement, by virtue of the democratic system and proportional
voting, encountered no difficulties in entering the political areas. Instead, the danger
lay in these groups refusing to act within the institutions. In Bosnia, that danger is the
reverse: of the majority not allowing minorities to enter the institutions, thus forcing
them to seek external means of expressing their programmes.
Closely combined with this point is the integration of national programmes with
other mainstream political issues. The fall of regional parties in Belgium was a conse-
quence of the “Big Three” taking up an issue and making it their own. This is obvi-
ously feasible in cases such as Belgium, where the other cleavages have remained
strong. In Bosnia, the parties have to develop programmes which focus less on na-
tional differences and rather on alternative approaches to the economy, social affairs,
education and other matters.
Finally, in Belgium regionalisation and autonomy have, rather by default than by
virtue, taken the path of a process and not of the attempt to achieve a single compre-
hensive solution. Even after the most far-reaching reforms so far, in 1993, new negoti-
ations are planned for 1999. The definition of minority and its inherent interests are
ever-changing. Just as much as nation-building is never finished, the relationship be-
tween the state and its citizens, especially members of minorities, has to change and
evolve over time. It would be misleading to strive for a solution which aimed at set-
tling an issue once and for all. Instead, mechanisms have to be developed which allow
for permanent evolution and constant adjustment.
Altogether autonomy, especially non-territorial self-government, in combination
with consociational democracy, offers the most promising perspectives for transform-
ing Bosnia into a country in which the three nations can peacefully live together. To
recall Horowitz, hoping that democratisation in Bosnia can alone provide for suffi-
cient rights for minorities is short-sighted.33 But, just as democracy cannot suffice,
limiting one’s scope to national rights alone, without democracy and the rule of law,
will hardly deliver results that are satisfactory. Only the institutional combination of
both elements will ensure the co-existence of the three nations in Bosnia.

33 Horowitz, D (1993), op. cit., pp. 28-31.

94 South-East Europe Review 3/99