Florian Bieber*

Serbia: Minorities in a Reluctant State

I.  Introduction

Over the past few years, Serbia’s quest for greater stability has been largely unsuccessful.
As an unconsolidated democracy with a large anti-democratic and anti-reform opposi-
tion and a number of open status and territorial issues, reforms and majority–minority
relations have been rocky. The assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić is often
viewed as a watershed between the more optimistic and reformist Serbia of the first
post-Milošević years and the cautious and conservative Serbia since, epitomized by
Vojislav Koštunica, who was elected prime minister in early 2004. While such a dichot-
omy might oversimplify the complexities of the transition process in Serbia, recent
years have been shaped by a high level of support for the Serb Radical Party (Srpska
radikalna stranka, SRS), a rise of attacks by extremist groups against minorities and
political opponents and the dominance of the Kosovo issue on the political agenda.
Minorities in Serbia today find themselves in a ‘reluctant state’.
Although the authorities have engaged in state-building in recent years, from sym-
bolic acts such as adopting a new flag and hymn to the new constitution, the key open
status questions for Serbia appear to be imposed from outside, be it the referendum
on independence for Montenegro or the status of Kosovo. The Serbia that is emerging
from this process, without a union with Montenegro and probably without Kosovo, is
not the Serbia that the ‘state-builders’ had aimed for.
The status of minorities in Serbia over recent years has thus been characterized by
three parallel trends.
First, minorities have been suffering from general political neglect since the end
of the Milošević era. In spite of some symbolic steps, such as the passing of a Federal
Minority Law in 2002 and the selection of József Kasza, head of the Alliance of Vojvodina
Hungarians (Savez Vojvodjanskih madjara, SVM/Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség, VMS),
as deputy prime minister (2001-04), substantial improvement of the status of minori-
ties has not been a priority of any Serbian government since 2000. Whereas the post-

* The author is Lecturer of East European Politics at the University of Kent.

European Yearbook of Minority Issues Vol 5, 2005/6, isbn 978 9004 xxxxx x, 243-250.
©  2007  Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
Florian Bieber

Milošević governments generally took a more positive view of minorities than before,
this has either failed to be translated into policy or the policies have been largely ad
hoc and reactive. Thus, there has been little implementation of the framework set
out by both the Federal Minority Law and the Framework Convention on National
Minorities (FCNM) of the Council of Europe (CoE), to which the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia has committed itself. An example of the reactive nature of minority politics
in Serbia has been the lifting of the 5% threshold for minority parties and coalitions
after no minority party managed to enter parliament independently in the December
2003 elections.
Second, minorities have suffered from the strong nationalist and isolationist social
climate that continues to shape Serbia to a large extent. Consequently, minorities have
become frequent targets of organized and individual attacks by extremists in Serbia.
As will be discussed below, some of the attacks were aimed at Roma, generally the
most vulnerable minority throughout central, eastern and southeastern Europe, whereas
others chose Muslims and Albanians, linked to the larger political questions in Serbia.
Finally, other minorities, such as Hungarians and Slovaks, have become targets, a reflec-
tion of the legacy of the Milošević era and the continued instrumentalization of nation-
alism by parts of the political elite.
Third, European integration processes have promoted minority policies in Serbia,
although in an unsystematic and often superficial way. The OSCE, the CoE and the
EU have actively promoted a variety of activities to advance the status of minorities in
Serbia, ranging from legal reform initiatives, direct assistance to minorities and the use
of conditionality to induce Serbian authorities to advance the treatment of minorities.
The status of minorities in Serbia today can thus not be assessed in simple terms
but is to be understood in light of these three, sometimes reinforcing, sometimes con-
tradictory, trends. In this chapter, the status of minorities in Serbia will be discussed in
three respects. First, the chapter will explore the reasons for and impact of anti-minority
violence in recent years. Subsequently, the chapter will examine the consequence of the
dissolution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on minority rights and, finally,
it will turn to the new Serbian constitution as a mechanism of minority protection.
Minorities in Serbia today amount officially to approximately 16.1% of the popula-
tion (excluding Kosovo). Of the 24 minorities in Serbia, only Roma (1.4%), Hungarians
(3.9%), Bosniaks/Muslims (1.8/0.3%), Croats (0.9%), Montenegrins (0.9%) and
Albanians (0.8%) account for around 1% or more of the population. With the exception
of Roma, ethnic diversity is a regional, not a state-wide, phenomenon in Serbia. These
regions are primarily at Serbia’s border and link minorities to kin or neighbouring states
(Bulgarians in southeastern Serbia, Albanians in southern Serbia, Bosniaks/Muslims in
the Sandžak region and Hungarians in northern Vojvodina). Minority–majority rela-
tions in Serbia are thus only characteristic in these regions, whereas large parts of Serbia
are relatively homogenous and many members of the majority will have little to no
experience of minorities, except for Roma. The largest minority in Serbia are Roma,

 Republički zavod za statistiku, “Konaćni resultati popisa 2002 [Final Results of the Census
2002]”, 52(295) Saopštenje (2002), 24 December. As the number of Roma is considerably
higher than official numbers suggest, the total share of the minority population is likely to
be close to 20%.

244
 Serbia: Minorities in a Reluctant State

who live throughout the country but particularly in the poorer south, accounting for
approximately 350,000 people, more than three times the official figure. Considering
the differences between the various minorities, the problems and challenges that the
communities and its members are confronted with vary greatly. Whereas some com-
munities, such as Hungarians, enjoy advanced protection in Vojvodina, combined
with relative prosperity and the strong support of a kin state, Roma lack support and
economic prospects. Despite these variations, minorities share the experience of anti-
minority violence, as well as various mechanisms of minority protection to be discussed
subsequently.

II.  Violence Against Minorities

The 1990s saw the drastic worsening of interethnic relations in Serbia. The nationalist
mobilization of the majority and hostility towards minorities was met among some
minorities by self-isolation and increased nationalism. As a consequence, not only did
the political and social space for cooperation decrease, the interpersonal ties between
majority and minority citizens also worsened. Although interethnic relations improved
after 2000—a consequence of the end of the wars, a more supportive set of authori-
ties and the general political environment—these improvements have not been steady,
suggesting that ethnic distance is not exclusively a function of the Milošević era.
Among many Serbs, distance towards other nations remains high, in particular towards
Albanians and Muslims/Bosniaks. The fact that this distance is not decreasing among
younger population groups suggests the risk that interethnic tensions might be more
enduring than often hoped for.
This social distance has expressed itself repeatedly in violence over recent years.
The most notable outbreak of anti-minority violence took place in response to the
widespread anti-Serb riots in Kosovo in March 2004. In attacks throughout Serbia,
two mosques were set on fire and numerous shops and homes of Albanians, Muslims
and, most frequently, Ashkali (Albanian-speaking Roma refugees from Kosovo) were
targeted in mob violence. A more enduring and low-key set of anti-minority attacks
took place in Vojvodina, mostly throughout 2004. Targeting religious minorities, as
well as Hungarians, Slovaks and other established minorities, these attacks were largely
confined to damage to buildings and cemeteries and a number of pub brawls. Finally,
throughout the post-Milošević era there have been numerous incidents involving

 Number based on research by the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights, Centre for
Ethnicity Research, “Romany Settlements, Living Conditions and Possibilities of Integra-
tion of the Roma in Serbia”, Report of the Centre for Ethnicity Research, Belgrade 2002.
 Bora Kuzmanović, “Social Distance Towards Individual Nations”, in Mladen Lazić et al.
(eds), Society in Crisis (Filip Višnjić, Belgrade, 1995), 239–260.
 UNDP, The Strength of Diversity, Human Development Report (UNDP, Belgrade, 2005), at
35.
 Ibid., at 34.
 See Florian Bieber and Jenni Winterhagen, “Ethnic Violence in Vojvodina: Glitch or Har-
binger of Conflicts to Come?”, ECMI Working Paper 27, April 2006, at <http://www.ecmi.
de>.

245
Florian Bieber

extremist groups. These have manifested themselves in attacks against either minorities
(Roma, gays and lesbians) or political opponents. Such incidents reflect regional trends
of similar incidents, although, in light of the legacy of the wars of the 1990s, these inci-
dents often held a more problematic edge than elsewhere.
The key concerns for minority–majority relations in light of these different forms
of anti-minority violence have been twofold. First, the passivity of the state authorities
in condemning these incidents and, in particular, of the police in arresting perpetrators
has appeared to deprive minorities of necessary protection by the state. However, since
late 2004, there have been arrests of members of extremist groups, resulting not only in
a decline in such attacks but also in increased public condemnation. The second level
of significance is the fact that most perpetrators are young. Socialization in Milošević’s
Serbia might explain the profile of the attackers but the continuing intolerance in the
political climate in parts of the political spectrum and in the media elevates the risk that
the social environment that enabled the anti-minority attacks may be perpetuated.

III.  The End of the State Union

Far removed from the everyday tensions of minority–majority relations, the State Union
of Serbia and Montenegro briefly appeared to offer an exemplary degree of minority
rights. Since its creation in 2002, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was seen
as a temporary solution to accommodate Montenegro’s quest for independence and
Serbia’s desire to maintain a joint state. The State Union was formed on the basis of the
“Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations Between Serbia and Montenegro”,
negotiated in March 2002 between the Yugoslav authorities, represented by Federal
President Vojislav Koštunica, and the Serbian and Montenegrin governments under the
auspices of the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana.
Only a year later, the state itself was formed on the eve of the assassination of Serbian
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić. The State Union was a minimalist state, which had
few competences besides foreign affairs and defence, whereby even here Montenegro
maintained its Foreign Ministry and conducted an often divergent foreign policy from
Serbia and the State Union. The State Union had three discreet functions: a) to act as a
single partner for the EU and other international organizations; b) to not force the final
status of Kosovo onto the agenda, as the relevant UN Security Council Resolution 1244
linked Kosovo to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, not Serbia; and c) to prevent any
crisis in Montenegro or between the two republics over future status. It can hardly be
claimed that in its three years of existence the State Union performed any of these func-
tions. The constitutional charter that defined the joint state was broken repeatedly by
both member states, the status of Kosovo came onto the agenda in 2005/2006, irrespec-
tive of the State Union, and, in 2004, the EU established the twin-track approach that

 During a number of football games, for example, fans of Serbian clubs glorified the Sre-
brenica massacre and indicted war criminals Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. See Igor
Jovanovic, “Racist Incidents Rattle Serbia”, Southeast European Times, 1 November 2006.
 On this, see Florian Bieber, “Serbien und Montenegro: Provisorium oder Modell des
minimalistischen Föderalismus?”, in Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung
Tübingen (ed.), Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2004 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2004), 322–338.

246
 Serbia: Minorities in a Reluctant State

instituted separate negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro in regard to key aspects
of relations with the EU.
In regard to minority rights, however, the State Union appeared to establish
high standards of protection. The former Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic
Communities was transformed into the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights with
a broad mandate to both monitor the implementation of these rights within Serbia
and Montenegro and communicate on these matters with all relevant international
organizations. As one of only five ministries at the State Union level, the very existence
of the ministry appeared to give human rights great weight. In addition, the creation
of the State Union gave rise to the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil
Liberties, also know as the ‘small charter’. This charter provided for a set of very advanced
human and minority rights and outlined the mechanism to safeguard these rights. As a
consequence, the CoE’s Venice Commission commended the charter, noting that “[i]t
is not only fully in line with international standards but goes beyond them in certain
respects ... [V]ery few Council of Europe member states will be able to claim that they
have a text of the same quality.”
The reality of the state, the ministry and the charter was, however, different from
the apparent exemplary attention given to human rights. The State Union never func-
tioned effectively in Montenegro, where neither the Ministry for Human and Minority
Rights nor the Constitutional Charter had much effect. As Montenegro maintained and
developed its parallel legal and institutional infrastructure, the State Union appeared
highly provisional. Nor could the State Union develop its own profile in Serbia. The
Ministry for Human and Minority Rights had few direct competences in regard to
the protection of minority rights and lacked the means and regulatory framework to
substantially advance these rights. The fact that all minority rights protection appeared
to be concentrated at the level of the least political power prevented major advances in
the field of minority rights while the State Union lasted.
With the success of the referendum for independence in Montenegro in May
2006, the joint state rapidly disappeared. The transition to two separate states turned
out to be a rapid, hasty and slightly chaotic process in which many former State Union
institutions were left in the dark over their fate for weeks. Of the five ministries at the
Union level, only two were fully transferred to the Serbian level: the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Human and Minority Rights
suffered the same fate as the Ministry for International Economic Relations and the
Ministry for Internal Economic Relations, namely its dissolution. The ministry had
been dysfunctional in some aspects, largely due to an unruly mixture of eclectic compe-
tences inherited from ministries that had been abolished when Serbia and Montenegro
replaced the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as a lack of commitment from the
member states in terms of personnel and budget. The ministry was eventually replaced
by the Human and Minority Rights Service of the Serbian government, which took
over key competences in the field of minority rights. The Human Rights Charter of the
State Union left even less of a trace, disappearing entirely with the state dissolution. The

 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, “Comments on the Draft Charter on
Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties of Serbia and Montenegro”, Opinion No.
234/2003, CDL (2003) 10fin, 2 April 2003.

247
Florian Bieber

status of the only minority law, namely the 2002 Federal Law on National Minorities,
was also left open in the dissolution of the State Union.
The creation of the service for human and minority rights, as well as the new consti-
tution, filled the gaps that had been left as a result of the state dissolution. Nevertheless,
uncertainties remain that suggest that the dissolution of the State Union did lead to a
worsening of minority rights in Serbia. At the same time, the simplification of respon-
sibility might provide for better minority protection in the long term, wherein only one
government holds full responsibility, rather than two competing authorities, as was the
case in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the State Union.

IV.  The New Constitution

The adoption of a new constitution by the Serbian parliament on 30 September 2006
and the subsequent two-day referendum on 28-29 October 2006 that secured the nec-
essary majority for the new constitution to come into effect fulfilled a key election
promise of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia from 2000. The 1990 constitution has
not only been closely identified with the semi-authoritarian rule of Slobodan Milošević
but contained deficiencies beyond the symbolic level. In addition to attributing consid-
erable power to the president and a high degree of decentralization, the constitution
was vague in its commitments to human rights and dated by its references to the faded
Yugoslav and self-management framework. The post-2000 period has seen an appar-
ently broad political commitment to replacing the constitution and a series of draft con-
stitutions.10 Nevertheless, these tentative constitutional debates have led nowhere. Key
political actors appeared insufficiently committed to constitutional change, possibly
benefiting from the status quo and distracted by more pressing issues. Both the govern-
ment and the president had issued draft constitutions in 2004/2005 but a constitutional
debate never took place in the proper sense before the new constitution was adopted by
parliament in September 2006. Constitutional talks had taken place throughout 2006
between key party officials but minority representatives repeatedly noted their exclusion
during these talks. After the final draft was negotiated between the key parliamentary
parties, it was almost immediately submitted to parliament for vote and adopted the
same day—only the heads of parliament groups were allowed to comment and, by their
own admission, even key members of government had not seen the final draft before
it was voted upon. The haste with which the constitution was adopted raised concerns
over the procedure and the lack of both public consultation and consultation with key
stakeholders.
In the absence of a formal consultation process during the drafting of the consti-
tution, minority representatives were not included either during the drafting stage or
in consultations before a vote took place.11 The only degree of involvement of minor-
ity representatives was the presentation of the final draft the day before parliamentary

10 A book edited by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation contains these drafts, the most relevant
proposals having come from the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia, as
well as the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. Zoran Lutovac (ed.), Prilozi za novi ustav
Srbije (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Belgrade, 2004).
11 “Manjine nisu pitane za Ustav”, B92 Vesti, 7 September 2006.

248
 Serbia: Minorities in a Reluctant State

adoption to the Republican Council for National Minorities. At this stage, there was
apparently no room for changes; the meeting was rather there to present the draft to
minority representatives.12 The exclusion of minority representatives from key decisions
is not a new phenomenon and does not allow conclusions on the substance, as even
the Constitutional Charter and the Charter for Human and Minority Rights of the
State Union failed sufficiently to incorporate minority voices. In fact, the exclusion of
minorities reflects the broader deficiencies of public debate and deliberation on a key
document such as the constitution, rather than the deliberate exclusion of minorities.
The substantive level of minority rights protection in the constitution, however,
appears to confirm the neglect and insufficient consultation of minorities in the drafting
process. Whereas the legal framework of the State Union had lived up to high interna-
tional standards, the new Serbian constitution was neither drafted in consultation with
the Venice Commission nor were other key international organizations involved. The
protection of human and minority rights in the constitution, while having advanced
substantially since the previous constitution in 1990, was a step back from the protec-
tion offered by the State Union. In general terms, the preamble and the first article of
the constitution define Serbia as the state “of the Serbian nation and all citizens who
live in it”.13 In fact, the preamble specifically mentions the equality of all ethnic groups
(etničke zajednice), a term not used later in the constitution. The fact that the preamble
contains only two paragraphs, one exclusively devoted to Kosovo, suggests the political
expediency of the document.14
The Human and Minority Rights section of the constitution contains greater
detail than the 1990 constitution but remains often declaratory. In addition to stand-
ard minority rights, such as a ban on discrimination and assimilation, the constitu-
tion clearly emphasizes the fact that minority rights can be enjoyed individually and
collectively (Article 75). In particular, the constitution acknowledges the right to self-
government of minorities in the fields of education, culture, media and the use of lan-
guage, mentioning in particular the national minority councils (Article 75). However,
the national minority councils find themselves in legal limbo. Established under the
Federal Minority Law, they lack any anchor in Serbian legislation today besides the
passing mention in the constitution. Their election procedure was merely a decree of the
now defunct Federal Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, throwing the nature
of selecting new councils into doubt at a time when the mandate of some councils are
due to expire.15 The constitution furthermore mentions the need for participation of
minorities in public life and consideration of the national composition for employment
at all levels of the public administration (Article 77). This commitment extends beyond

12 “Manjine upoznate sa nacrtom ustava”, Fonet, 29 September 2006.

13 Article 1, Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, at <http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/con-
tent/eng/akta/ustav/ustav_1.asp>.
14 It might be argued that while the 2003 Constitutional Charter was driven by the desire to
satisfy the EU and other international actors, the constitution was designed to satisfy the
domestic audience over the issue of Kosovo.
15 Minority Rights in Practice in South Eastern Europe, “The Situation of Minority Rights in
Serbia”, Memo to the European Commission, 9 October 2006. A new law on the national
councils, which would also address some of the other current legal gaps, is in preparation.

249
Florian Bieber

earlier minority protection and sets a clear signal to overcome the underrepresentation
of minorities in numerous government and local institutions.16 The substantive rights
in the classic domains of minority rights, such as education and the use of language,
however, are not discussed in much detail and are confined to only one article (Article
79). As a result, the constitution offers little protection to minorities without adequate
legislation to specify the rights of minorities. It is exactly these rights that have been
lacking in Serbia. Despite or because of the 2002 Federal “Law on the Protection of
the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities”,17 there has been little movement
towards a comprehensive legal protection of minorities in Serbia. Many of the current
mechanisms derive either from regulations of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina
or from other scattered legal references. Due to the fact that the new constitution was
not passed as part of a clear commitment to a general legal overhaul, there is little reason
to believe that new laws will soon specify the ambiguities of the constitution. Thus, the
weaknesses in the procedural aspects of the constitution are reflected in the text itself.

V.  Conclusions

The status of minorities has progressed dramatically since the 1990s when the general
state of human and minority rights weighed heavily both on minorities and on many
citizens from the majority. Despite the change, the transformation has been incomplete.
Minority rights remain insufficiently legally defined and many ambitious institutions,
such as the minority councils, lack clear competences and firm legal foundations for
their work. Similarly, the political inclusion of minorities remains tentative and minor-
ity communities tend to be insufficiently consulted in key matters. As no single minor-
ity is sufficiently numerous to easily play the role of kingmaker, as has been the case in
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, minorities have had less weight in parliament
and government.
As Serbia has been battling with status questions, often placed on the public
agenda for self-serving purposes by political elites, less space has been available for
constructive minority policies. Furthermore, tensions over large, state-defining issues,
such as relations with Montenegro and Kosovo, have largely had a detrimental impact
on minorities.

16 See Humanitarian Law Centre, “Shadow Report on the Implementation of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo”,
Belgrade, 2003, at <http://www.hlc.org.yu>.
17 See <http://www.humanrights.gov.yu/files/doc/Zakon_Engleski.doc>.

250