Politics, Fans, and Teams Threatening to Leave the

Community: A Cross Cultural Examination

Final Draft
Coen de Heus

for
Sports in Society
Dr. Staurowsky
Table of Contents
Politics, Fans, and Teams Threatening to Leave the Community: A Cross Cultural Examination......1
Introduction.................................................................................................................................3
Socio Economic Role of the Professional Team.........................................................................6
Sport and Cultural History........................................................................................................11
Spectator Motivations...............................................................................................................18
Leagues.....................................................................................................................................22
Recommendations.....................................................................................................................24
References.................................................................................................................................26
Introduction

While professional sports is considered a private enterprise in most nations, it is undeniable that

public funds are counted upon by professional sports clubs to sustain their businesses. Whether it is

by loans, stadium funding, or other subsidies, the willingness of governments to spend public funds

is ever present (Baade, 2003). By spending funds on teams and professional athletes, these public

funds are not spent towards other public causes. Governments thus decided that investing in sport

will do more benefit to the community than investing such money would do in, for example,

educational or health projects (Coates & Humphreys, 2000).

Often these projects are sold to the public as revenue generating projects. Tax payer money will be

invested into the stadium, and a long-term lease will ensure the city, region, or state with a constant

stream of revenue. In reality it is questionable whether these projects deliver upon its promises

(Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000), even worse it might even decrease income for the community

(Coates & Humphreys, 2000). The question thus arises why are governments still participating in

such investments?

Recently arguments for public finance have shifted away from economic benefits to social (non-

economic) benefits (Eckstein & Delaney, 2002). Partially these non-economic benefits are argued to

have an indirect impact on the local economy. The non-economic benefits can be categorized as

community self-esteem and community collective conscience. Eckstein & Delaney (2002) have

found that these non-economic constructs are relatively unaffected by public funding of stadiums.

The threatened effect of a government not participating in the funding of a team or stadium is

relatively clear. The team will disappear from the community. Teams either go bankrupt, as in the

European model (Solberg & Haugen, 2010), or franchises relocate, as in the North American model

(Eckstein & Delaney, 2002). The franchise relocation of the Seattle SuperSonics is one of the most

recent examples where owners moved a franchise, directly related to the state government's

unwillingness to invest public funds. In contrast Real Madrid was able to sell their stadium ground
for €480 million without much trouble to the local government (Solberg & Haugen, 2010),

effectively helping the club retain its position in the apex of European football competitions.

Similar events have occurred throughout Europe, which leads Solberg & Haugen (2010) to suggest

that clubs might become too dependent on government support.

It is very interesting to see the difference in interaction of the government, team, and fan triangle

between North America and Europe. When the Seattle SuperSonics fans rallied around their team

fairly late in the process, the effort was considered too little too late (Reid, 2009). In Europe similar

last second efforts are consistently effective (Schaerlaekens, 2010). In no doubt there is a major

difference in the financial structures of professional sport clubs in Europe and North America

(Solberg & Haugen, 2010), there are still lessons to be learned on both sides of the Atlantic on how

the social interactions work between government, teams, and local individuals (amongst them the

fans). Governments can learn from each other to see how clubs and fans apply pressure, and what

are effective ways to deal with them. Teams can learn how pressures are applied, and specifically

how they can keep government and individual interest at such a level that necessary funding are

ensured in the future. Individuals can learn how other fans have managed to keep their teams within

the community and what organizational efforts have failed.

In addition, one can suggest that leagues and sports governing bodies should be considered. I

suggest that these bodies have an indirect effect on the paradigm, as they influence all parts of the

governments, teams, and individuals triangle. I suggest that the influence of leagues is indirect, as

they will only take action if one of the other three parties forces them. The three main parties are

more likely to act autonomously. Danielson (2001) agrees in his extensive book on teams and their

relation to their host communities, he states: “Leagues generally react to team initiatives,

informally as an owner sounds out relocation possibilities and reviews the bidding, and formally

when approval is sought under league rules” (Danielson, 2001 p.146). An exploration of the

different organizational structures, and thus the influence upon the sports triangle will be done at the

end of this paper. I Finally I will explore why the effect of these institutions is significant, even
though it is an indirect influence.

For this paper a few expert opinions were sought. The initial paper idea evolved through the

suggestions of a columnist working in North America, but with European heritage. This idea led to

the structure of this paper, while the original idea for this structure came from that author, it is very

similar to Fort's (2000) and thus seems a legitimate way to analyze paradigmatic difference between

Europe and North America. This paper has a slightly different focus, specifically the focus on teams

asking for government subsidies differs. Therefore in this paper I will focus on governments, and,

as explained previously, I will not focus on governing bodies.

I will proceed with the socio economic role of a professional team, then sports and cultural history

will be considered, and the evaluation of the main paradigm will conclude with a consideration of

spectators and their motivation to attend sports events. A following section will consider the role of

sports governing bodies on the core paradigm. Finally a conclusion with recommendations for those

involved with teams threatening the community and recommendations for future research will be

made.
Socio Economic Role of the Professional Team

European professional sports have their origins often in communal groups, organized for the joy

and socialization of that specific group. Interviewee A suggested: “These groups have a broad

range of origins, for example religious, ethnic, socio-economic, and work-affiliated groups, and

many more, and often a combination of these. When these groups grew, and a single sports entity

did not satisfy the demand anymore, multiple teams were formed, which became the core of the

European club structure.” As club affiliation grew, so did competitiveness, and fan support. Almost

all professional European sports are still a club in its operations, including an extensive farming

system (Barros, Ibrahímo, & Szymanski, 2002). In many European countries, club structures are a

separate legal entity, based on the premises of organizing the community and providing a non-profit

service to that community. What this means to the cultural history of teams will be explained in a

following section, it is important though to realize that by definition many professional sports clubs

are non-profit entities (Solberg & Haugen, 2010). For their organizing role in the community many

European clubs were founded with public funds, and their roles in difficult periods of time were

ensured by governmental support (Oppenhuisen & Van Zoonen, 2006).

Even though previous statements make it seem like European clubs can attain public funds easily

this is not the case, at least not anymore (Oppenhuisen & Van Zoonen, 2006). The European Union

has eliminated the direct access of professional sports organizations to governmental subsidies.

Since European teams tend to work with budgets around the 'break-even' (no profit, no loss) point,

clubs with an exceptionally negative year should be expected to go bankrupt. While exceptionally

negative does not seem logical in normal industries, the yearly strive for improved performances by

any club in sports leagues and the inherent zero-sum game (if someone wins, someone must lose),

makes the exception a yearly occurrence (International Association of Sports Economists, 2006;

Solberg & Haugen, 2010). This in effect leads to European teams needing new governmental grants,

loans, or other financial vehicles on a yearly basis (Oppenhuisen & Van Zoonen, 2006; Solberg &
Haugen, 2010). European professional sports teams can thus be seen as win maximizers, rather than

profit maximizers (International Association of Sports Economists, 2006).

This system of operating is kept intact by a construct which can be referred to by the expression

'The One Nut Theory' (Bayless, 2000; Baade, 2003). While not a scientific theory on its, this theory

does seem to have a lot of practical value (Baade 2003). Even more so, the tendency by teams to

overspend has been documented (Dietl, Franck & Lang, 2008). It poses that whenever a sports

organization decides not to overspend, another sports organization will anyway. Later this will be

linked to the North American paradigm, as it is originally an American expression. In Europe this

means that clubs are artificially forced to their break-even budgets. If they decide not to spend their

cash on players or other assets, another team will be willing to spend this money. With a globalizing

economy and less restrictions on player movement in recent years, competition to spend the last

Euro or Pound has only increased (Baade, 2003; Solberg & Haugen 2010). The biggest force

driving this dangerous, yet prevalent break-even strategy is fan support. Fans will not accept

decreased performance so that the club can build financial buffers. In their opinion a year not spent

is a year lost. As this pressure builds on any club, for a professional sports team to remain

competitive it must thus overinvest on occasion as a signal that the club intends to remain

competitive (Dietl et al., 2008). Empirical evidence does seem to point in this direction, though

future research is needed in this area (Dietl et al., 2008).

North American professional sports organizations work from an entirely different paradigm (Barros

et al., 2002). Sports organizations are by definition franchises of a larger for profit organization. It

can be argued that in comparison the North American sports paradigm is one of free trade, whereas

the European paradigm combines capitalist and socialist perspectives (Danielson, 2001). North

American sports put this free trade perspective into practice by employing the franchise model for

sports leagues. The franchise model poses that each individual franchisee maximizes profit with the

model put forth by the franchisor (Leeds & Von Allmen, 2004). While sports are not necessarily a

profit generating industry, the team is neither socially nor legally forced to lose money on its
business. Each team, in effect franchise, is a separate businesses entity. The management of a team

is legally required to maximize gains for the owner, in effect franchisee.

New owners need to buy a franchise license, either by buying out an existing franchise or by paying

all existing owners to grant a new franchise (Fort, 2000). It thus takes considerable financial

backing to own a team, and to sustain owning such a situation. As a result when a team gets into

financial difficulty it will result in the owner, or part of the ownership group, to sell equity shares.

Yet not only financial trouble motivates selling a franchise, currently ownership is as much part of a

business decision as the owner's other for-profit entities (Quirk & Fort, 1997). The only sustainable

way to grow business value of sports teams over the last half century has been the growth in team

value (Humphreys & Mondello, 2008). In order to ensure team value growth, ownership of any

team has to show a willingness to maximize rents, which could mean leaving the team's current

location (Fort & Quirk, 1995). Interestingly franchise values are not related to facility age and

winning at all, rather factors such as market size and regional competition influence the value

(Humphreys & Mondello, 2008). The legal economic status of teams thus forces ownership to act in

a way that may not always be preferable to fans of a city.

This where governmental relations come in. While no significant economic gain on cities can be

found by the availability, it is suggested that cities benefit by attracting big business near their

sports teams (Danielson, 2001). Local governments often present this idea of big business growth to

the local citizens as a reason to use public finance on sports facilities (Mondello, Schwester &

Humphreys, 2009) . Governmental connections in North American sports tend to happen at another

level than European sports. Where in Europe the connection tends to happen at a more direct level,

by loans and subsidies, the North American system appears to prefer indirect support, by financing

stadiums and providing tax breaks (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2001; Crompton, 2004).

Though other forms are taken up as well, such as providing safety and maintenance to the facilities

(Crompton, 2004). The use of public funds tends to center on two arguments, namely economical

benefits and quality of life benefits (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2001; Crompton, 2004).
The risk of this public financing is that often a bulk of money is invested at once, whereas as the

subsidy and loan structure is often, though not always, spread out in smaller installments. While

from an economic perspective this probably has little effect, it could well be that citizens,

temporarily, get tired of these large investments (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2001). This

leads to governments to deciding not to invest into stadiums any more, such as was the case for the

Seattle SuperSonics (Reid, 2009). Paradoxically various cities that lost their teams in the 1980s and

90s spent much more to get a new team years later, than it would have to keep the original team

(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2001).

Financial prudence in the professional sports environment seems not to be an important factor in

personnel decisions, as teams at times even operate close to bankruptcy (Whitney, 1993). The

previously mentioned 'One Nut Theory' (Bayless, 2000) is in play here, and was actually originally

projected on North American sports. It bears direct relevance to the socio economic status of teams

and public funds. Baade (2003) argues that a single 'nut' will create a precedent for a series of

decisions. Thus if one team overpays for a player, a similar player will demand a similar overpay.

Yet this also counts for stadiums, where an owner sees the amount one local government is willing

to invest, the owner will demand a similar package from the team's local or regional government

(Fort & Quirk, 1995). In an interview with a documentary producer and fan from a recently

disappointed community this phenomenon was described as follows:

“Team owners need regular movement as a way improve the value of their franchise. Other

owners are often supportive of a team leaving the community as it helps them the next time they

want to pressure governments into increased funding of their stadiums. Now these owners can

come to the negotiation table and threaten community leaders with departing the team.”

Interviewee B

This seems to reflect a consensus opinion in the academic community (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000;

Danielson, 2001). Directly this is also the reason why North American governments tend to fund

stadiums over direct team subsidies. Even though economic gains are not proven this way, it does
ensure that the teams will remain in the community. Stadium leases are often long term deals, that

commit the teams to the community for at least 20 years (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000). But also to

deter similar sized businesses to ask for similar subsidies. So why is this still the form of

subsidizing in Europe? A good case can be made that subsidizing, counter intuitively is less

frequent in Europe, thus when a team needs a bailout governments are more open to giving these

direct subsidies (Baade, 2003). Above all European governments have been using these instances to

launch community development programs, recognizing the impact that sports teams have on society

(Cromption, 2004). Thus since the nature of subsidies is different, so is the way of delivering these

subsidies, and thus the North American choice for stadium subsidies.

Governments are often forced to a fragile balance, taxpayers are generally opposed to paying extra

taxes for sports stadiums (National Taxpayers Union and NTU Foundation, 2001). Yet as Federal

Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2001) describe citizens may only realize what they miss out on,

when the team has left the region. This can be seen in Baltimore where it took a team to leave the

community before the community decided to pay for a new stadium after all. This process of

overspending, limited financial prudence and governmental pressure is interesting in its own

respect. It is important for all parties to realize the nature of professional sports as a private business

model, as it might leave the participants with little choice in how to act under the circumstances

(Whitney, 1993). Indeed while some parties might hope and expect professional organizations to act

differently, yet the expectation of winning upon an organization forces that this current structure

will remain in place, at least until paradigmatic changes occur over time (Whitney, 1993).
Sport and Cultural History

In a world where globalization is decreasing the mental distance between cultures, sports is one of

the few societal areas where the different continents still have a limited convergence (Danielson,

2001). While it is heavily debated where the difference in sports paradigms come from, at least part

can be explained by the historical developments on both continents (Schafer, 1991). Both continents

have their own preferred sports, and those sports played on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean have

significantly different rules and or playing styles, as the sports developed in relative isolation

(Brown, 2005). It thus seems an acceptable notion that culture and history play an important role in

the paradigmatic differences between North American and European Sports.

Government is one of the core aspects of a culture and reflects how historically a country's citizens

intended organize itself. “American government is constructed around an idea of independence

coupled with a thorough mistrust of authority” (Brown, 2005 p1111). It is interesting that this idea

of independence and mistrust of authority is not reflected in the organization of sports. Professional

sport leagues tend to be centered around a strong authoritative organization, and interdependent

teams (Fort & Quirk, 1995). This monopolistic environment does not only lead to strong authorities,

but has also led to strong unions in the form of player associations (Drewes, 2005). These previous

assertions have a few important implications. First, leagues have entry and exit barriers. This means

that any single team cannot move from a community as easily, however as movement within North

American sports show, its is a definite possibility (Fort & Quirk, 1995). Due to these barriers sports

teams have become relatively engrained in communities, and community ties has often been

leveraged as a marketing strategy (Danielson, 2001). Second, leagues have entry and exit barriers

for players. This may be a serious harm to the fans, as it is known that player identification is one of

the most important factors of fan loyalty (Greenwood, Kanters & Casper, 2006). When considering

teams leaving the community this is an important factor. At any given period fans may not be

attracted to the team events due to a lack of player identification, however this does not mean that

the locals will lose identification with the team (Zirin, 2010).

Two examples of team relocation come to mind to underscore this statement. First the Baltimore

and Cleveland NFL teams. In 1984 the owner of the colts, Robert Irsay, in a controversial move

relocated the Baltimore Colts to Indianapolis. Eleven years later the Cleveland Browns organization

decided to fill the gap left behind in Baltimore becoming the Baltimore Ravens. This move was one

of the first of its kind to leave behind the team name, logo, and history (Danielson, 2001; Zirin,

2010). Second is the Seattle SuperSonics franchise, which relocated to Oklahoma City in 2008. In a

similar highly controversial move as the previous described NFL relocations, the franchise was

forced by the NBA to leave behind the logo, colors, and its history in Seattle. If a new team will

move to Seattle in the future, it has the right to use these for the new team (Zirin, 2010). What is
common in both of these examples is the controversy surrounding a team leaving the community.

This controversy stems from fans demanding the team to stay, yet the greater community wishes not

to pay for the ownership's demands.

As mentioned before American society is fairly independent, yet within the sports realm this is not

the prevalent model. This brings an interesting duality in governmental relations with national

government. At a local and regional level teams are consistently in relations with the government

(Danielson, 2001). Not only is funding an issue, security, community relations, and local

infrastructures are often in the conversation between teams and governments. Yet at the national

level intervention into professional sports is minimal. As interviewee A described: “The public only

knows of governmental intervention into sports when its about steroids or championship teams

visiting the White House”. Fan growth since the 1960s indicates that it is an issue of national

interest (Danielson, 2001). Professional sport leagues have grown from 46 teams in 1950, primarily

located on the North American East coast, to 113 in 1996, spread across the continent (Danielson,

2001). The national governments in North America have given no indication of intervening with the

professional leagues anymore than existing laws and steroid investigations.

A major reason that involvement of national government has not been prevalent, yet regional

government has, lies in the structures of the professional leagues. A professional league office tends

to take the role of a governmental institution for the members of the league. This means that each

individual within the league has to adhere to rules, but also gains from the benefits provided by

membership to the league. As long as national government does not get involved with these leagues

it gives owners an important weapon in economical gains, competition (Coates & Humphreys,

2008). This monopoly and the previously described barriers to entry (Danielson, 2001) thus enables

leagues to force local and regional governments to compete with one another for team location

(Coates & Humphreys, 2008). Not all should be seen as bad though. In the early beginnings of

professional sports leagues this model was absolutely needed to ensure survival and growth of the

leagues (Danielson, 2001; Zirin, 2010). A strong institution was needed to coordinate and structure
professional teams. The coordinated leagues ensured a stability and recognition that audiences

needed to become known with the product, as well as a competitive balance to making for more

interesting games to the fans (Quirk & Fort, 1992). In later sections it will be shown that this is a

major difference between North American and European professional organizations.

The integration of teams within the local cultures has been an interesting aspect of North American

sports culture. While the professional teams did not grow into the community organically as is often

the case in non-North American cultures, this did not keep teams from marketing themselves as

public good since its inception (Danielson, 2001). Team took names derived from the local

communities, fostered existing inter city rivalries, and built communal support. Even more so,

historically sport stadiums have been perceived as communal entities (Coates & Humphreys, 2008).

These stadiums were privately owned but opened to the public on many occasions. This was not

just out of altruistic beliefs, as these events of civic pride created a direct link with the sports team

operating from the same stadium. However since teams have begun to move in and out of their

communities, the loyalty ties have been somewhat harmed (Danielson, 2001). Fans see other

examples in which similar communities are affected and the local team leaves the community. As a

result fans that feel that their team is in a similar situation lose some loyalty to their local team

(Danielson, 2001). A side effect is that the teams that are perceived to be 'safe', retain even stronger

ties to the community. Loyalty can directly be related to attendance (Humphreys & Mondello,

2008), which still is a core driver of revenue. Not only through gate revenues but also through in-

stadium consumption, merchandise sales, and advertisement revenue. It is thus essential for the

profitability of a team that fans attend games (Humphreys & Mondello, 2008). A core driver of

attendance is performance (Zirin, 2010), however management usually has limited control over

performance. Therefore we can accept that it is important for teams to portray civic loyalty, even in

times when this may not be the case. Without judging actions by owners and teams, Zirin (2010)

shows examples of this assertion, where owners have portrayed some sort of civic loyalty right up

until the public announcement of a team leaving the community.

As shown in these sections the North American sports culture entails complex connections between

fans and teams. This is not to say that the European culture is less complex. It appears that

especially league structures are a significant influence in this relation. European sports leagues have

developed differently than the North American leagues. Whereas North American leagues

developed as profit seeking entities, European leagues often appeared through national

aristocracies. By definition these leagues where thus not accessible to every athlete. For a long time

these leagues were amateur entities.

England is often seen as the birthplace of the modern sports. Many of the sports that arose to

prominence in 19th century England are still played today, such as football (soccer), rugby, and

cricket. But the biggest influence of the English culture can probably found in the spread of their

morals to other sports around the globe. The premier sports event of our time is probably the

Olympics. Founder of the Olympic movement was Pierre de Coubertin, who admittedly was heavily

influenced by the British morale (Renson 2009). This British system placed a premium on

amateurism. According to their rationale amateurism ensured a certain purity of the game (Renson,

2009). This was accepted as a truth by De Coubertin, and therefore integrated in the Olympics. The

effect of this focus can still be seen today. For instance FIBA is the acronym for Federation

Internationale de Basketball Amateuriste (International Federation of Amateur Basketball), even

though in current documents Amateuriste is officially dropped. While football (soccer) became a

professional sport as early 1885 in England, most European countries, as well as governing body

FIFA did not allow professionalism until the mid 1950s and early 1960s (Dobson & Goddard,

2001). Olympic sports chose to become professional even later, after the 1988 Olympic games

(Guttman, 2002). It is true that one can argue that professionalism entered Europe much earlier than

this date (Houlihan & Green, 2008; Renson, 2009), however this paper is not to consider the effect

of amateur status on individual participants, but rather on league structures and fans. The effect of

Europe's aversion to professionalism cannot be understated, as it is the root of Europe's professional

league structures as it is today. Amateurism meant that teams were formed within a community, e.g.
educational institutions (Renson, 2009), laborer groups (Noll 2003), and geographically arranged

groups (Drewes, 2005; Renson, 2009). Almost all of the professional clubs in Europe's professional

leagues still have their origins in these community based groups (Noll, 2003). It can thus be said

that historically European fans have a different connection to their teams than their North American

peers.

Another part of Europe's peculiar system of sports is the promotion and relegation system between

different levels of competition (Noll, 2003). Whereas in North America a closed system tends to be

the primary mode of competition (Szymanski & Valletti, 2005). This leads to an entirely different

set of entrance and exit barriers to the top leagues. Herein lies one of the interesting anomalies of

the European system. As previously described, governments tend to subsidize teams in financial

distress, thus signaling that losing a high level team due to financial difficulties is unacceptable.

However when a team is in danger of relegating the effect is similar to the community, it loses a

premier level team, but the governmental reaction is different (Fort, 2000). Indeed the European

mindset of relegation and promotion is widespread, and reflects a certain belief of fairness within

this system (Baade, 2003; Szymanski & Valletti, 2005). It could even be argued that governmental

investments can be more effective before the professional sports organization goes into financial

distress. Signaling theory in business suggests that in the talent attraction process financial signals

influence the willingness of talent to apply for a company (Joo & Mclean, 2006). Thus clubs that

appear financially risky, may not be able to attract the necessary talent to compete. As the costs of

competing may not go down, but the revenues generated by a lack of competitiveness are

decreasing (Fort, 2000), this may endure the financial distress of the club. The inherent structure of

European leagues and their position within society already forces different governmental reactions

as compared to their North American counterparts.

This analysis has already reached an important discrepancy that has not been explained yet. Where

American culture can be viewed as independent, with a mistrust of authority inherent in society,

Europe tends to be more governmental focused. A reflection of this discrepancy can be seen in
politics where the United States is the only industrialized country without a consistent labor

oriented political party (Brown, 2005). Furthermore the European government balances of power

are also structured in such a way that governments are able to influence the daily activities of its

countrymen quicker and more direct than it is possible for the government of the United States

(Brown, 2005). Since the formation of the European (Monetary) Union the amount of governmental

subsidies has steadily decreased throughout Europe (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000; Oppenhuisen &

Van Zoonen, 2006). However the expectations by local fans for governmental support to their

community's professional has not changed, in fact many professional organizations in Europe

regularly use government as a core of their financial structures (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000). The

risk in this strategy, specifically for government, is the precedence each separate case creates.

With the promotion and relegation system fans expect their teams to have an equal playing field, but

they also expect the right to have a professional team in their community (Szymanski, 2003). Thus

if one team is saved from bankruptcy this does not mean that fans expect equal subsidies to their

team, however if their team is in distress fans demand from their governments to act just as they did

for the other team (Andreff & Staudohar, 2002). An example of this effect is the FC Barcelona

restructured loan in the summer of 2010. As one of the premier teams in the world, and Spain as

newly crowned world champions, losing this team to bankruptcy would have been a massive blow

to the Spanish league and federation. FC Barcelona restructured a very favorable loan with the

Spanish government (Schaerlaeckens, 2010), which might not be in accordance to European Union.

It is arguable that after bailing out arch rival Real Madrid a few years earlier, the government had

little choice than to help Barcelona with this deal.

Spectator Motivations

As many differences in the European and North American paradigms have been touched upon

already, a key part of any professional sports paradigm has not been touched yet, the end customer.

Obviously this party is an element of the previous sections as well, no government subsidies would

be invested in sports projects without any interest of the public. Without considering any scientific

factors one can already see the difference in geography and demographics between Europe and

Northern America. Furthermore, North American sports can arguably divided in the big four sports

and the other professional sports, whereas Europe has football at the apex, and a group of

professional sports behind it competing for second place (Fort, 2000). In this section I will explore

fans from both continents, first looking at the way they organize themselves and how this is

influenced by the teams, second at the choices they make on game attendance, and finally how they

are affected by a team's threat to leave the community.

Before we get to those analyses on differences in fandom it is important to realize what a fan

exactly is. Often we feel that we know a fan when we see one (Crawford, 2004). Either you are a

fan, or you are not one. And if you are not one, you better have a good reason for it (Fiske, 1992).

From the early days of formalized sports, the term 'fan' comes from 'fanatics', which should be seen

as a derogatory term. In effect fanatic meant someone lacking the sportsmanship to remain neutral

(Crawford, 2004). In both societies fandom can be seen as a way to express culture and to give

meaning to one's generic traits. For instance fans are known to use their fandom to give meaning to

their gender role, their geographic location, and their socio economic status. By using the concept of

fandom it can even be argued that one's self-esteem is raised in the process (Fiske, 1992). Above all

this grouping of like-minded sports spectators gives one a feeling of power, as power structures

such as those in one's daily life have little effect on the fan group (Crawford, 2004).

Throughout Europe fans have shown a tendency to organize themselves both formally and

informally (Giulianotti, 2002). It seems that this informal branch is relatively similar in both
continents. Fans gather a certain period of time before the game starts, and discuss informally, yet

passionately about their teams (Crawford, 2004). It would be naïve to overlook these fans as an

organization. In most known gatherings of fans, an informal set of do's and don'ts is known by all

members. Furthermore often a hierarchy is known, based on seniority and character traits

(Crawford, 2004).

What appears to set European fans apart is their ability to organize formally and gain access to their

related teams policies (Crichter, 1979; Brown, 1998). Since the early days of the membership

structure of the clubs, fans have identified themselves as members. Which was often acknowledged

by clubs one way or another (Crichter, 1979). Indeed the leaders of these fan organizations have

been able to enter supervisory boards of professional sports organizations in Europe. In some

organizations the mere membership of a formal fan organization gives one voting power in

assemblies of general members (Guiliranotti, 2002). Most fan organizations gain access to the

professional organizations through single representatives of the fan group. Though precisely

because of these developments, it appears that these positions have become too prestigious to be

occupied by most fans. Thus these supervisory board members who represent the fans have become

part of an elite in which most fans do not find themselves represented (Brown, 1998). In direct

effect it seems that the informal fan engagements have grown since these fan groups have gained

some formal power. It is argued that the original reasons of creating a self-identity has been

overlooked by the formal fan groups, and thus spawned an increase in informal fan activity

(Burstyn, 1999; Giulianotti, 2002). It is important to recognize the link between these informal and

formal groups.

While often these informal groups will not recognize their formal peers (Fiske, 1992), it does give

them a direct access to the team. Which can be invaluable during those times of crisis of a sports

organization. However not all is well for the European fan group, due to legislation changes and

market forces have the structures of European clubs increasingly represented a true private model

(Giulianotti, 2002). In the future this is a trend which should be monitored closely. Private model
entities generally do not have fan base opinions into their organizations (Giulianotti, 2002). Since

an organization's focus will be on revenues and profitability, it is thus likely that the fan influence is

decreasing. Organizations will now consider a fan's voice to be one's cash flowing into the club

(Giulianotti, 2002). If a fan decides not to spend money anymore on the team, the organization loses

its financial viability and thus it becomes more likely that a team may leave the community.

This is precisely where one can expect the North American sport spectator to be. This should not be

seen as a reflection of one's closeness to the club (Giulianotti, 2002), rather it is about one's ability

to influence the sports organization. The North American sport spectator does have opportunities to

organize, even formally, which has only expanded since the rise of internet. The recognition by

professional organizations of these groups is very limited (Zirin, 2010). In the course of destructive

managerial decisions, the sport spectator, or fan, seems to have no voice besides the monetary

exchange between team and professional organization (Whitney, 1993).

Though it was explained before that Europe tends to have more 'social' ideals in its political system,

it can be argued that this is not the core in the distinction between American and European fan

organizations. In each culture a definite reflection of sport could be seen. The American ideal was

built upon meritocracy, whereas Europe adhered to a more aristocratic structure (Markovits, 2010).

In effect the European system is one where it is acceptable for a small group of fans to act on behalf

of a larger group. American fans tend to act separately, more individualistically (Giulianotti, 2002;

Markovits, 2010). Yet that does not mean that they cannot group together, yet they specifically

remain in less organized, informal groups. Again referring back to the Seattle SuperSonics, one can

see how the fan groups rallied a huge crowd, yet the central organizers, Save Our Sonics, not often

grow larger than a few dedicated members (Reid, 2009). However insider positions into the

organization's structure remain the highest exception. Thus considering the consensus negative

effect for fan's without organizational influence (Giulianotti, 2002), this is something that should be

considered in future situations where teams threaten to leave the community.

One final aspect in the fan and team relations that has to be considered is the amount of consumer
options the fan has. European communities tend to have one major sport in occupying their time

and money space, which is football association (Fort, 2000; Markovits, 2010). The American

consumer often has more entertainment options, at least the four major sports, but often one gets to

engage in college sports as well (Markovits, 2010). This should be seen as an expression of culture

already. Not every American community is the same. If you look at the relocations in the last wave

of professional sports, one can see a tendency that teams move to locations where there is less

competition for fan bases (Danielson, 2001; Zirin, 2010). Indeed it appears that one of the stronger

community based teams face less competition in the sports space (Zirin, 2010).

Fort (2000) argues that in general the fan's expectations are the same on both continents, thus fans

are the same. While I agree that fandom has similar expectations you can hardly argue that fan

behavior is the same. The contrast between these two continents creates both positive and negative

images on either side. While it can be argued that the current system deliberately enables fans to be

more involved with clubs in Europe, it is also hard to deny that their might be some relation to

hooliganist behavior. Their involvement, and league rules, ensures that the team will stay in the

community. Thus providing an avenue for aggression to turn into violence, due to the lack of

negative impacts on their teams (Giulianotti, 2002).

In relation to teams threatening the community, this does explain fan behavior. As football is often

the only widespread professional sport organization in the community, the local fans need to protect

themselves from negative externalities. It is important for fan groups on both sides of the Atlantic to

realize how their peers are organized. ESPN.com columnist Bill Simmons has often argued that

every professional team needs a fan advocate of common sense (Simmons, 2008). While obviously

mentioned in comedic use, many fans probably wish upon some fan influence into professional

sports organizations, other than their money. One has to realize the repercussions for such a

decision, it might alienate some parts of the fanbase, and it might result in other negative effects

such as organizational inertia. Furthermore no single team, neither in Europe, nor in America, has

accepted fans in such positions without some external pressure. Fans are thus in a precarious
position, their desire for organizational change might be unified, but the inherent structures of a

team remain hard to penetrate. Finally it seems dubious that any fan group will have any influence

once a team is in the process of leaving the community. Fans should thus be focused on creating

enduring relations to their professional sports organizations as well, as last minute efforts might be

too little too late.

Leagues

League structures in Europe and North America are different, however their effect can be regarded

as relatively similar. They organize competitions, overview league wide marketing efforts, and

award championships (Fort, 2000). It is interesting that in Fort's review of European and North

American leagues the allocation of teams to cities is left out of the comparison. And in fact

throughout this paper, examples are shown on how leagues are different in structure, and thus have

to react differently to a team's threat of leaving the community. Fort (2000) argues that the

promotion relegation system is in fact the measure where one should compare teams threatening to

leave the community in Europe and North America. Should we thus accept that leagues are the

same, and that fans and communities can thus expect the same from these leagues?
An important difference at the league level though is that European leagues have no direct control

over which teams earn promotion or relegation. In North America the ownership structure, which

means that the leagues are actually a collection of owners of the current teams, who have an interest

in which teams operate in their league, more specifically, which teams operate in their territory

(Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000; Danielson, 2001). This leads to an important source of power to

North American leagues, pressure. Leagues would not have this pressure source if there were rival

leagues, however since the big professional North American leagues are monopolies, they can use

their power to pressure communities and fans (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000). While playing

exhibition games in different cities seems a noble cause, to ensure that other spectators get to see

matches as well, it also serves as a reminder to the involved authorities that a team can move to

another community if owner and league wish. (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000).

While league officers are often used in pressuring communities for government support and

spending (Reid, 2009), their role has to be remembered. As agents of the other teams in the league,

the best interest for the other teams is the cause for the behavior of league officers (Danielson,

2001). This can be seen with expansion and relocation issues that have forced new entrants to pay

expansion fees, especially when the new team enters a market where another team is already present

(Fort, 2000; Danielson, 2001). Even if thus a franchise seems to be pressured to move in a new

direction, this should be seen as a move by the various owners to seek improved profits. With this

mandate leagues can thus even pressure potential host communities into providing the right

facilities (Mondello et al., 2009).

In sharp contrast the European model is more restricted. Leagues tend not to have central figures

representing the league's marketing interests. Often a league does have a centralized decision

making mechanism, organized in a similar way to the club structure (Barros et al., 2002). Some

marketing decisions are made in unison, however that is often limited to television contracts, and

other activities where cooperation is necessary (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000). Other activities thus

remain a matter to each individual club. Thus the league, often organized by the national federation,
does not have the authority, nor the mandate to act. Furthermore the promotion and relegation

system can even lead to unanticipated effects, particularly harmful to the league itself. For example,

one of Italy's primary teams, Juventus was relegated a few years ago, due to unlawful behavior by

the club. As a consequence the Serie A (Italian Premier League) fan base decreased, as the replacing

team was nowhere near the size of Juventus' fan base. Fort's (2000) assertion that relegation is the

result of a community's unwillingness to invest in the team, can at least be contested by the

mechanisms of competition and other influences over which the fans have little to no influence. In

comparison, when the New England Patriots were caught cheating this did not leave to the team

leaving the community (ESPN.com, 2007). Finally, international rules forbid teams changing

countries. As European clubs are community based, changing countries seem unlikely, this

international limitation thus minimizes the amount of pressure leagues can put on governments.

In conclusion, it should be argued that fans are also just indirectly influenced by the leagues, when

it comes to team relocation. Fans are affected by their teams, and the government's willingness to

subsidize the local team. However it is very hard to argue that fans are directly related to the league

(Reid, 2009; Zirin,2010).

Recommendations

Though Fort (2000) suggested that there is very little difference between the North American and

European sports paradigm, by analyzing the phenomenon of teams leaving the community I suggest

otherwise. Throughout this paper it is shown how the separate entities of the paradigm have to act in

their respective ways, as well as the subtle differences. In a way Markovits (2010) may be right,

when referring to the these differences as nominal, specifically when compared on a global scale.

Yet these subtle differences offer great opportunities for learning for all the parties involved. In this

section recommendations will be made for each of the involved parties, considering the strong

points for each side of the Atlantic.

Communal governments should recognize the specific emotional value teams have in their
community. As Crompton (2004) argued, it is not just a pure economic effect that a community can

get from having a team in their middle. European communities have chosen to fund their teams at

the last possible moment, often through direct subsidies or loan restructuring. The major problem is

that often this moment may be late, and thus more costly than helping earlier in the process.

European governments can learn from their North American counterparts that some early

investments, especially in financially sound investments. Though they have to be careful that their

investments do not become structural, as the North American paradigm has shown. Structural

investments work as precedents, if teams recognize that governments are willing to pay structurally,

they might become dependent upon this type of financing. Furthermore both paradigm need the

governments to provide the right facilities for the fans. The more distractions for the fan possible,

the more difficult it is for the team to keep the connection to the team. If governments wish to keep

a team in the community, as a vehicle for community development, it thus needs to realize that

teams thrive with a loyal fan base, and thus the fan needs to be facilitated properly. Finally

governments should monitor the status of the leagues. Cartel laws are in place everywhere, while a

league is by definition a cartel, in the interest of fans, governments should minimize the powers

these cartels have.

Teams are often the enforcers in the paradigm, when it comes to teams leaving the community.

Though it is important to recognize that staying put is often more valuable to the team. In both

paradigms significant costs are part of leaving the community, such as court costs and breaking

current contracts. European teams should recognize that by law structural subsidies to professional

sports organizations are often forbidden, however the North American stadium example is a way of

subsidizing barely used in Europe so far. Early indications are that teams will move this way,

though as always the more symbolic teams will probably have more success than the smaller teams

(Schaerlaeckens, 2010). American teams should recognize that their position in the city is not as

monopolized as teams in Europe. By maintaining strong ties to the community, and growing

grassroots community ties, the teams can grow their fans' loyalties, thus strengthening their own
positions. But as in Europe it should not end there, for governmental subsidies support from the

entire community is needed, thus fans might be the start, but an entire community needs to feel ties

to the teams.

While not found everywhere, fans have been able to gain access to the power structures of some

professional organizations (Giulianotti, 2002; Zirin, 2010). Fans are thus not completely without

power. The current North American league structures forbid public funding of teams, even though

this was proven to be a successful way of running a professional team (Zirin, 2010). European clubs

have been particularly successful in showing governments how they can unite behind a team. Fan

associations have become formal. This formalization process has taken years to develop, however

upon formalization these have become a recognized part of the sports paradigm. In North America

these are recognized as well, but often as a part of the team's marketing effort. It is thus important

for fan bases to grow their role from marketing channel to active participant in team activities.

While this process may take long, and is in no way easy, it might strengthen the local ties enough to

limit the potential of teams leaving the community.

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