Greenstone Value Opportunity Fund, LP 

 
 
December 2010 
Dear Partner,

Greenstone’s estimated, unaudited performance through December 31, 2010 is presented below:
2008 2009 2010
Month Quarter Year Last Cumulative
January + 2.81% + 0.54% Ending to to 12 Since
February - 2.93% + 0.22% 12/31/2010 Date Date Months Inception
March + 9.04% + 6.20%
April + 5.36% + 4.00% Greenstone VOF* + 2.41% + 8.07% + 15.58% + 15.58% + 63.43%
May + 4.03% - 5.25%
June + 0.42% - 6.38% S & P 500 + 6.68% + 10.75% + 15.06% + 15.06% + 12.97%
July - 0.12% + 4.24%
August + 5.96% + 0.30% Nasdaq Composite + 6.29% + 12.34% + 18.15% + 18.15% + 29.58%
September + 2.18% + 3.17%
October + 1.47% - 1.35% + 2.81% Russell 2000 + 7.94% + 16.25% + 26.85% + 26.85% + 19.19%
November + 1.87% + 1.00% + 2.59%
December - 0.87% + 4.88% + 2.41% Greenstone S&P 500
YTD + 2.46% + 36.46% + 15.58% Standard Deviation 3.40% 6.81%
Sharpe Ratio (0.50%) 1.98 0.34
*Returns are net of all fees and expenses for the fund as a w hole. Individual returns may vary due to timing and other differences. Inception date is October 1, 2008.  
The broad U.S. stock market indices staged generous rallies at year-end, and more specifically in the
month of December. During the last month of 2010 the S&P was up +6.68%, the NASDAQ was up
+6.29%, and the Russell was up a staggering +7.94%. It is a fairly rare event when the S&P enjoys
almost half of its total return for the entire year in the month of December alone. The Russell and
NASDAQ were not far behind, achieving a third of their return for the year in the month of
December. Considering that all the major indices were negative on the year as of the end of August,
it was truly an historic second half rally. Johnny Carson would call it “Wild Wacky Stuff,” and might
even suggest we join “The Ben Burr-Nank” in Jackson Hole this summer to hear what he has planned
for 2011. Greenstone finished December with a +2.41% return, and the fund was up +15.58% for
2010 (both figures are net of all fees and expenses). The fund ended the year with a Sharpe ratio of
1.98 versus the S&P at 0.34, and an ongoing standard deviation of 3.40% versus the S&P at 6.81%.
In our opinion, this shows that our investment decisions resulted in similar returns with substantially
lower risk and volatility than the overall market in 2010. It is these risk adjusted returns that we hope
our investors find most compelling.

If we had been approached at the start of 2010 with an offer to lock in a +15% return for the year, we
probably would have gladly accepted. While we are pleased with our actual result for the year, this
business requires continuous analysis and self-evaluation; we are seldom content with our
performance, constantly trying to be better at what we do. This is why, when we look back in
hindsight at the returns we gave back in the second quarter, we are disappointed in the fund’s
apparent correlation with the overall stock market. While we should expect the fund to have
individual losses and the occasional negative month, especially given our concentrated portfolio, we
have made every effort to see where we went wrong then so that we may perform better in the future.
Our mantra is to preserve capital, provide downside protection when the market corrects, and
3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219
participate to the upside when stocks move higher. When we performed a sort of “forensic analysis”
from the May-June 2010 timeframe, we found some solace in the fact that the vast majority of the
portfolio did what we thought it would do, while a handful of events conspired to cause the fund’s
apparent market correlation (please see the “2010 Year-End Review” below).

Looking forward, we’ll endeavor to do in 2011 what we’ve done since our inception: maintain a
strictly disciplined approach to value investing, with 80% of the long portfolio invested in classic
deep value securities, and the other 20% in special situation longs that have considerable upside, but
perhaps don’t fit the typical valuation criteria. The valuation criteria we are primarily concerned with
have not changed: low multiples of free cash flow and/or EBITDA across the business cycle. When
we say low multiples, we are looking for companies trading at less than 3-5x these multiples. In
elevated markets we find that we have to search harder to find the multiples we are comfortable with,
or we have to be more patient in letting the market come to us. However, our process continues to
uncover promising situations, and we have even recently managed to find some compelling
valuations in what we believe are mispriced securities. Given 1) our current outlook for the market,
and 2) the statistics we uncovered in our year-end analysis, we envision that we will continue to focus
on owning a smaller number of positions going forward than in 2010, but with a larger percentage of
our positions constituting “core” positions (i.e. 3.5-5% of AUM). It is our goal to generate high
returns on a risk adjusted basis for our limited partners, and it is our belief that this approach will
continue to accomplish this goal over the long-term.

Over the near-term, it does seem to us as though we may be due for a correction, as numerous
technical and sentiment indicators suggest equities may be short-term overbought. From a technical
perspective, the sheer price appreciation over the last four months from the end of August (S&P
+19.9%) calls for a short-term breather. In addition, the 1,300 level for the S&P and the 12,000 level
for the DOW could be important technical barriers, and the market might struggle to surpass these
levels without some effort. In terms of sentiment, virtually all the indicators (professional and retail
sentiment, margin debt balances, etc) are at levels not seen since the market top in 2007. Within the
fund, we have been consistently trimming back our winners on the long side, while adding to our
short exposure in an effort to lower the overall net long exposure as the markets have trudged higher.
We are also sitting on a fairly healthy cash position. However, we’re very conscious of the fact that
we can’t sit still praying for any particular bearish or bullish move to play out just because our
portfolio is positioned to such a thesis. It is our job to continue to search for value no matter where
the indices are trading, and to decide how much we wish to expose ourselves to an elevated market.
We will continue to selectively add to our long book as we uncover mispriced opportunities, but it’s
not our game to be climbing into bed just because everyone else is piling in. If the market continues
unabated on its current move to the upside, then we will not participate to the fullest extent. Our hope
is that this strategy will provide significant protection on the downside if a correction does occur, as
well as leave us in a position to deploy capital when prices become more favorable (read: lower).

3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219

2010 Year-End Review

The following are some observations that resulted from our year-end review. We think it’s important
to review our performance in an effort to see how we can perform better as managers in the future.

• Our average net long exposure was approximately 51% during 2010. Our returns were a result of
+24.7% gross attribution from our long positions, and -4.6% gross attribution from our short
positions.
• Of the 67 long equity positions we initiated in 2010, 45 (or 67%) were winners.
o 26 (or 39%) had a greater than +20% return, and 19 (or 28%) had a greater than +50%
return.
o Conversely 7 (or less than 10%) lost greater than -50%.
• Of the 38 short equity positions we initiated in 2010, 16 (or 42%) were winners
o 10 (or 26%) had a greater than +10% return, and 5 (or 13%) had a greater than +20%
return.
o Conversely 5 (or less than 32%) lost greater than -20%.
• What is clearly evident in our 2010 review: when we have the confidence to take larger positions,
we’re more often right than wrong. Our larger “core” long positions were winners at a rate in
excess of the overall 67% success rate, while smaller ‘trading’ positions (on both the long and
short side) were responsible for a majority of the losers.
• In cases where we have significant unrealized gains of +200% or more, we need to adjust our
underlying thesis to reflect current conditions. We left too much profit on the table last year that
eventually got eroded by gluttonous behavior.
• Largest Gainers – CCCL, TRXBQ, BSQR, XIDE, LYC, WEDC, WTI, SUP, AHT, SHS, DHT,
HA, RJET
• Largest long losers – VNDA, BBI, GNK, CEMJQ, BP, NE, DF
• Largest short losers – MINI, MTN, IMAX, HOG

We also took a look at what happened during May and June, when the market corrected from the
April highs so violently. We understand completely that the following analysis is theoretical at best,
and disingenuous at worst, but we feel it is instructive nevertheless. It turns out that two separate
events, which were uncorrelated both to the market in general or to each other, conspired to cause a
large percentage of the damage in our portfolio during this time frame. These were: 1) the explosion
of the Deepwater Horizon and 2) an adverse ruling by an ill-advised bankruptcy judge. The fund’s
exposure to these two events from a total of 4 positions generated -53% and -45% of the fund’s gross
losses in May and June, respectively. While the fund (-11.7%) did outperform the S&P (-14.4%)
during this two month period, it would have performed significantly better if we exclude these
positions: GVOF at -6.0% vs the S&P at -14.4%. Instead of excluding these positions (which would
be nice but impossible), if we simply assume these positions generated a market return, the fund still
dramatically outperformed: GVOF at -7.7% vs the S&P at -14.4%. This tells us that the balance of
the portfolio partially did what we thought it would do, which is to provide downside protection and
preservation of capital in declining markets.

3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219

Portfolio Review

Large and mid cap companies make up roughly 34% of our long portfolio. We currently have 29
long positions, with 15 greater than 1% of AUM. Only three sectors are larger than 8% (Technology
at 17.1%, Industrial at 11.4%, and Energy at 8.2%). Our top 10 positions are all greater than 2.5% of
AUM and together comprise roughly 70% of our long portfolio. We prefer companies to earn a
reasonable percentage of their revenues in international markets, and as we’ve mentioned before over
50% of the revenue generated by our top ten holdings is from outside the United States. However,
along with being GAAP reporting companies, we prefer for them to be listed on major U.S.
exchanges like the NASDAQ and NYSE. Currently 74% of our companies are listed on either the
NYSE or NASDAQ, with the remaining 26% either American Stock exchange or foreign listed. As
usual our goal is to have a relatively small number of core positions (15-25) with relatively high
concentrations. GVOF has not used leverage since our inception, instead believing the deep value
style we employ provides the underlying ‘levered like’ returns.

Thoughts for 2011

The following are investment themes or areas that we will be focusing on this year.

• We still like equities, particularly in the U.S. While they currently seem short-term overbought,
and a technical correction is possible, we still see the most value in this area, especially when we
consider the alternatives.
• In reviewing our letters from early last year, we talked about 2010 being the “Year of the Yield
Chaser” in the credit space. We cut the majority of our credit exposure in Q1 and Q2 of 2010
because of what we thought was limited further upside appreciation potential. We can see 2011
being the “Year of the Dividend Chaser”.
• Offshore deepwater drilling is the last bastion for hydrocarbon discovery. We think a lot of “first
time” emerging market demand characteristics and higher oil prices will lead to increased
deepwater programs by the IOCs and NOCs. We have a handful of positions that give us
exposure to this area.
• We would consider shorting natural gas companies because of the supply/demand dynamics and
high valuations. We could see a scenario where the contrarian call is to go long physical natural
gas because 1) it’s unloved and 2) the historical ratio between gas and oil prices is creating the
perception that gas might be a buy. However, even with increasing demand for natural gas
expected in the U.S. this year, we still have a tremendous overabundance of supply. We’re
keeping an eye on high multiple natural gas companies and MLP’s that derive a generous amount
of “other income” from hedging programs that are set to roll off.
• The M&A space is one that, for various reasons, we see doing well going forward. This primarily
derives from the cash reserves on S&P 500 company balance sheets, which are at the highest level
in ten years (currently over $1.2 trillion). This is almost 50% more than the $825 billion held in
cash in September 2008. Information technology is the leading sector with cash reserves. With a
near 0% interest rate environment, how long can companies hold so much cash? VC’s and
Private Equity have not had a genuine chance to monetize their portfolios for 2-3 years now, and
we believe they will search out the cash rich/public company exit option. We currently have 5+
names in the portfolio that we believe could benefit from such a trend.
3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219
• This year could finally be the year where companies have the ability to pass through their
increased input costs to consumers. This would result in inflation showing up in the U.S., despite
what the CPI is saying.
• Along with middle of the road valuations, allocation shifts could be a boom for the equity market
in 2011. It is interesting to hear people like Byron Wein say that “Institutional portfolios have to
have more of their money invested in places like China, India, and Latin America,” essentially
saying that developing countries are generating a majority of the world’s growth, and institutional
portfolios should have exposure to these markets. Mr. Wein recommends large conventional
institutions substantially increase their allocations to hedge funds and emerging markets.
• European and municipal debt issues will once again provide buying opportunities when the
markets turns south on these worries. With municipal budgets due in early June, expect more
movement in and around this time frame. We have taken advantage of market gyrations that these
events have previously offered, and would look to do so again.
• The dramatic equity rally from the lows at the end of June occurred almost entirely with net
outflows from domestic equity funds, and net inflows into domestic fixed income funds. Late in
the fourth quarter, this dynamic switched for the first time in a long while, with inflows into
equities and outflows from bond funds. If this trend continues, which it appears that it might,
even more fuel could be added to the recent stock market rally.
• Even in light of the money flows just mentioned, we don’t expect John Q. Public will come
charging back into the market any time soon. We are wary, however, about the potential shift of
pensions and endowments (who manage John Q. Public’s money) into equity markets.
Essentially, there are way too many underperforming endowments (relative to their liabilities),
and they may be forced to chase returns in order to meet their obligations.
• In contrast to the Byron Wein bullet point above, Elroy Dimson of the London Business School
has decades of compelling data from 50+ countries to support the view that high economic
growth in emerging markets doesn’t ensure high stock returns. His book, ‘Triumph of the
Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns’, along with several other studies, have
underlying evidence that economies with the highest growth produce the lowest stock returns by
an immense margin (yes, you read that right). In fact, stocks in countries with the highest
economic growth have earned an annual average return of 6%; those in the slowest-growing
nations have gained an average of 12% annually (source: Credit Suisse Global Returns
Yearbook). This could be especially true in 2011, where equity investors in emerging markets are
fighting policymakers (who are trying to cool off overheated economies with monetary policy,
etc), while developed markets are receiving tailwinds from policymakers (who are aggressively
trying to lift the prices for risk assets). While many are clamoring for additional exposure to
emerging markets, we believe the best risk/reward is to continue to find value in developed
markets like the United States.

3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219

Largest Positions

Our 5 largest positions at December 31st, as measured by absolute value of capital deployed at
market, are presented in the following table:

Security Ticker % of NAV Comment

Chinese manufacturer of ceramic tiles for Tier II & III housing. Stock trades
China Ceramics Co. Ltd. CCCL 7.55% for < 2X FCF and EV/EBITDA, and around 1X earnings. 20%+ growth
potential.
Parent of Hawaiian Airlines. Trading at < 2X Ebitda & 3.7X FCF. Company
Hawaiian Holdings, Inc. HA 5.17% has net cash, and a reasonable fuel hedging program. Recently implement-
ed a stock buyback program. Expanding destinations to Asia/Pacific.
World's largest software company trades at attractive valuation with 2.5%
Microsoft Corporation MSFT 4.93% dividend yield. Benefiting from growth in cloud computing and Windows 7
implementation. Premiere company trading at 5.4x EV/Ebitda.
Company operates a fleet of double hull crude tankers. Stock trades at
DHT Holdings Inc. DHT 3.74% less than tangible book value. Significant cash position, and will use FCF
to enhance balance sheet or make acquisitions. 10% dividend yield.
Provider of software and engineering services for smart devices. Company
Bsquare Corporation BSQR 3.52% manages implementation of Windows mobile and Android applications
for internet connected devices. Clean balance sheet, large growth potential.

Credits

We currently have no credits, distressed or otherwise in the portfolio. As of mid January we are
looking at one post emerging equity. While the valuation fits our criteria, finding a seller is proving
difficult. We are always looking at the opportunity to invest higher in the cap structure when the
upside/downside opportunity is compelling, and when we can emulate the same deep value focus on
low multiples of free cash flow and tangible assets that we use in selecting long equities.

Equities

During the fourth quarter of 2010, the U.S. equity markets enjoyed a tremendous run, with the major
market indices generating returns of 10-15%. What is even more impressive than the returns
themselves is the fact that the quarter represented anywhere from 60-70% of the return for the entire
year. As we have mentioned previously, we are wary of the equity markets at current levels and
valuations. Even if the market is set to move higher, whether as a result of QE2, earnings beats, a
sector rotation out of fixed income, optimism about the economic recovery, or some other currently
unforeseen reason, we believe a short-term pullback would be healthy after the recent performance
in the last several months. Because of this sentiment, and as a result of our constant mantra to hold
on to profits and protect against downside market moves, we found ourselves continually trimming
back winning long positions as they appreciated during the quarter.

Having said that, we find that the fund ended the quarter in approximately the same net long position
as it started, which we believe is a testament to our investment process and our ability to find
attractive opportunities in any market environment. Since we have spent quite a bit of time detailing
many of our core positions in previous letters, we thought it might be instructive to provide some
insight into two of our “special situation” names. These are ideas that, for one reason or another, do

3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219

not qualify to become a core position, but have tremendous upside potential. The following
discussion should demonstrate that even small positions can have a significant impact on the returns
of the fund if the upside potential is high enough.

Bsquare Corporation (BSQR) is a very small software and engineering company that we had been
peripherally following for over a year. The company provides software, engineering, design, testing
and support services for makers of smart phones and other embedded devices, with particular
expertise in Windows CE and Android systems. With more and more devices (cars, phones,
appliances, etc) requiring connectivity and embedded software capability, the long-term prospects for
the company are potentially very explosive. When we began buying it at under $3 per share late in
the third quarter, the company had a clean balance sheet, net cash of around $2 per share, and an
enterprise value that was just over 2x normalized Ebitda. However, it was very small (EV of $14
million) and illiquid (average daily volume of around 20,000 shares). In fact, on the first day we tried
to buy it, we only managed to acquire 402 shares. Because of these size and liquidity constraints, we
were only comfortable building it into a little over a 1% position, and because we were patient even
that took us around three weeks to accomplish. Over the course of the fourth quarter, the stock
appreciated dramatically, closing out the year at $8.75, which was a 200% return from our cost basis.
This 1% special situation investment generated a return for the overall fund during the fourth quarter
of more than 3%.

We find the recent discussion and attention to Rare Earths in the financial press rather amusing, given
that we have owned and written about an Australian rare earth mining company practically since
inception. With the success of Molycorp’s (MCP) IPO in late summer, and the resulting price
appreciation in the shares of Rare Element Resources (REE), excitement from Wall Street
participants about this space has been incredible. In fact, with almost non-stop television coverage of
a large empty hole in the ground in Mountain View, CA, one of our limited partners now calls CNBC
the “Rare Earth Channel”. Lynas Corp (ASX:LYC) is a company we have followed for years and
owned since 2009. Because of its tiny size at the time of our purchase, relative illiquidity, lack of
current operations and profits, and the fact that it is located and trades in Australia, we were never
comfortable making it greater than a 1% position. We always felt we knew the potential for this
company, given the dynamics of the rare earth industry, and were rewarded with price appreciation of
over 400% from our purchase price as of the end of 2010. Again, this tiny position has generated
over 2% of returns for the overall fund.

Shorts

As always, our short book is comprised of a mix of market and sector ETFs, which provide broad
hedges to our long book and reduce the fund’s overall exposure, and individual stocks, which we
expect will decline in value and result in a profit. In general, we short individual stocks in the fund
when there is some temporary, manipulated, or misunderstood phenomenon that has caused the stock
to rise to an egregious valuation. Along with excessive valuation or inappropriate valuation
techniques, we prefer some sort of relatively near-term catalyst, such as a flawed business model or
top line revenue issues. We work very hard in this area, and it is a constant struggle for us to
maintain the same perseverance with our shorts as we do our longs. For example, the education
stocks we were short in early 2009 finally had the corrections we expected in late 2010.
Unfortunately, we were not able to maintain our level of conviction, and were squeezed out well

3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219

before this occurred. In an effort to help our investors understand how we think, the following is a
discussion of several of the stocks we shorted during the fourth quarter.

Conceptus Inc. (CPTS) is a name we have discussed before, and has been a successful short both
during the quarter and on the year. The company recently announced preliminary sales for the fourth
quarter in a range of flat to down on a year over year basis, and in our opinion the thesis on the
company’s business being eroded by a valid competitor is playing out. We think the stock still has
further downside potential as the market adjusts down to more conservative multiples that reflect the
current and future business. It is worth noting, however, the very real risk that management might
give up the ghost and sell the company to a JNJ-type bidder.

We successfully shorted Netflix (NFLX), the best performing stock in the S&P in 2010 at +219%, for
realized gains in both October and December. With more than a bit of tongue in cheek, we
sometimes feel the only person who has traded the name better is their CEO. Although that’s clearly
not the case, in hindsight we should have just invested all our money long in shares of NFLX,
sleeping comfortably in the knowledge that our money was in the fine hands of Fortune’s 2010
Business Person of the Year: Reed “frequent stock seller into the company’s buyback program”
Hastings. With plenty of discussion on this name in the media over the course of the fourth quarter,
from both attackers and defenders of its valuation, the stock is a particularly dangerous short with
continually moving sell-side price targets, and momentum and growth players in the name. Because
the company is not broken, and little old ladies stuffing DVDs into envelopes is actually a nice
profitable business, we have elected to be more trading oriented in the name as opposed to
maintaining a position. With the stock currently trading at 16x EBITDA and 51x 2011 earnings
estimates, we will continue to short the shares on aggressive spikes in price and short covering.

Ski season is here, and the excessively promotional CEO of Vail Resorts Inc. (MTN) is all over the
TV again promoting the North American ski market, which only grows at around 1% per year. This
is a short position we have discussed before that went against us significantly during the fourth
quarter, and for risk control and tax reasons we covered the position during December. However, at
12x EV/Ebitda (based on a 3 year average Ebitda), almost 2x tangible book value, and with
significant issues in its real estate portfolio, we would look to initiate this position again in the future
on price spikes. The recent IPO of Whistler Blackcomb (WB.CN) provides an opportunity to
compare and contrast another publicly traded ski resort company. WB was spun out of Fortress
Group late last year, and along with MTN we think it is also overvalued. While the two stocks trade
at roughly the same valuation, WB has significant advantages over MTN: a longer ski season, more
skiable terrain, more vertical ski feet, higher average snowfall, and greater ability to increase ticket
prices. All of this results in a higher Ebitda margin (WB at around 37% and MTN at around 20%),
and WB pays a 7-8% dividend (while MTN pays none). We are puzzled why either of these
companies garners a valuation multiple that is much higher than other, similar leisure business, such
as cruise lines. Afterall, both businesses have high capital requirements, similar CapEx and
depreciation ratios, and are in the discretionary leisure space. But why MTN doesn’t trade at a
discount to WB, its only true comp, is a serious mystery. We plan to continue monitoring the
company going forward, and will look for opportunities to profit from our thesis in the future.

3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219

Housekeeping

In late March and early April we will be speaking at the annual Cleary Wealth Management
Investment Forum in Sydney Australia. The event is hosted by one of our offshore institutional
investors, and we are looking forward to the opportunity to meet new potential investors from Down
Under. We will be visiting both Australia and New Zealand during this period to meet with existing
and potential investors, so please let us know if you have an interest.

We also like to remind anyone who will listen that virtually all of the manager’s liquid net worth is
invested in the fund, side-by-side with our investors, and due to the structure of the partnership we
will only make money over the long-haul if our investors continue to make money. We would not
have it any other way; it keeps us honest, focused, and aligned with our partners.

As we’ve mentioned in the past, referrals from limited partners are the most valuable form of
introduction. If you feel comfortable with us as managers, we would welcome any introductions that
you could send our way.

Once again we thank you for the trust your investment in Greenstone represents. If you have any
questions, comments, or ideas you’d like us to look at, please feel free to call Tim Stobaugh at 214-
780-0975, or Chris White at 214-780-0986.

Greenstone Value Opportunity Fund, LP is a long-biased, deep value fund that focuses on bottom-up
fundamental research across capitalizations and asset classes. Our goal is to acquire securities trading
at very low multiples of tangible assets or visible free cash flow.

3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219

Disclosure
This report is provided to you on a confidential basis for informational purposes only. This report is
not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any interest in any fund sponsored
by Greenstone Capital Management Partners, LP, including Greenstone Value Opportunity Fund, LP
(the “Fund”). Such offer could only be made pursuant to the terms of a Confidential Private
Placement Memorandum describing such offer.

Interests in the Fund have not been filed or registered with, or approved or disapproved by, the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The interests will be offered pursuant to an exemption from
the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Act”), and applicable
state securities laws for non-public offerings.

Offerings and sales of interests in the Fund will be made solely to “accredited investors” as that term
is defined in the Act. An investment in the Fund involves substantial risks and is suitable only for
those persons who can bear the economic risk of the loss of their entire investment and who have
limited need for liquidity in their entire investment. There can be no assurance that the Fund will
achieve its investment objective.

Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. This presentation is incomplete and does not
include all of the information necessary for a decision to invest in the Fund. Historical performance
and statistical information contained within this presentation is obtained and/or derived from sources
thought to be accurate, but not guaranteed as to accuracy.

Performance numbers are estimated based on a theoretical investment in Greenstone Value

Opportunity Fund, LP. The return on the investment is calculated from the first day of each
respective period until the last day of the respective period. All returns are compounded and include
reinvestment of dividends and all other earnings.

The S&P 500 Index is a basket of 500 stocks that are considered to be widely held. It is weighted by
market value, and its performance is thought to be representative of the stock market as a whole. The
index selects its companies based upon their market size, liquidity, and sector. The index can not
invest in short positions.

The Nasdaq Composite is a stock market index of all of the common stocks and similar securities
(e.g. ADRs, tracking stocks, limited partnership interests) listed on the NASDAQ stock market,
meaning that it has over 3,000 components. It is highly followed in the U.S. as an indicator of the
performance of stocks of technology companies and growth companies. Since both U.S. and non-U.S.
companies are listed on the NASDAQ stock market, the index is not an exclusively U.S. index.

The Russell 2000 Index is an index that measures the performance of the 2,000 smallest companies in
the Russell 3000 Index. The Russell 2000 Index offers investors access to the small-cap segment of
the U.S. equity universe. The index can not invest in short positions.

The returns and volatility of the indices displayed may be materially different than those of the Fund,
and the Fund’s holdings may differ significantly from the securities that comprise the indices. The
indices are disclosed to allow for comparisons to well-known and widely recognized indices, and may
or may not be appropriate for performance comparisons. Investors cannot invest directly in indices.

3949 Maple Avenue, Suite 480, Dallas, Texas 75219