EMINENT DOMAIN

61.

62. Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone, 349 SCRA 240, G.R. No. 137285
January 16, 2001

Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.—The Court of Appeals did not err in
entertaining the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of The Rules of Court. A petition for certiorari is the
proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave
abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not
the same as “grave abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the
issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically.

Same; Same; Same; Certiorari has been deemed to be justified in order to prevent irreparable damage
and injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or
where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be
inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.—As a general
rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy thereto such as when an error
of judgment as well as of procedure are involved. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does
not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount
to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special
civil action of certiorari. However, in certain exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule
will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are
technical rules may be relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in order to
prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary
appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment
complained of.

Same; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Two Phases of Expropriation
Proceedings; Appeal is the remedy from the final orders issued in either the first or second phase of the
expropriation proceedings.—Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase ends
either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose
to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one
since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the determination of just compensation
to be ascertained by three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the
defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this order finally disposes of the second
stage. To both orders the remedy therefrom is an appeal.

Same; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; The remedies of certiorari and appeal are not
mutually exclusive remedies in certain exceptional cases, such as when there is grave abuse of
discretion, or when public welfare so requires; A final and executory order can only be annulled by a
petition to annul the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or a petition for relief
from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.—We affirm the appellate court’s
reliance on the cases of Aguilar v. Tan and Bautista v. Sarmiento wherein it was ruled that the remedies
of certiorari and appeal are not mutually exclusive remedies in certain exceptional cases, such as when
there is grave abuse of discretion, or when public welfare so requires. The trial court gravely abused its
discretion by setting aside the order of expropriation which has long become final and executory and by
ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its action was clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it
cannot modify a final and executory order. A final and executory order can only be annulled by a
petition to annul the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or a petition for relief
from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to that effect
was filed. Hence, though an order completely and finally disposes of the case, if appeal is not a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at law or the interest of substantial justice requires, a petition for
certiorari may be availed of upon showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The interpretation of the rule, that a petition for certiorari can be availed of
despite the fact that the proper remedy is an appeal only applies in cases where the petition is filed
within the reglementary period for appeal is too restrictive—it is not a condition sine qua non that the
filing of a petition for certiorari be within the fifteen (15) day period to appeal.—According to petitioner
the rule that a petition for certiorari can be availed of despite the fact that the proper remedy is an
appeal only applies in cases where the petition is filed within the reglementary period for appeal.
Inasmuch as the petition in the case at bar was filed after the fifteen (15) day regulatory period to
appeal, said exceptional rule as enshrined in the cases of Aguilar v. Tan and Bautista v. Sarmiento is not
applicable. We find this interpretation too restrictive. The said cases do not set as a condition sine qua
non the filing of a petition for certiorari within the fifteen (15) day period to appeal in order for the said
petition to be entertained by the court. To espouse petitioner’s contention would render inutile the sixty
(60) day period to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, which also
involved an expropriation case where the parties entered into a compromise agreement on just
compensation, this Court entertained the petition for certiorari despite the existence of an appeal and
despite its being filed after the lapse of the fifteen (15) day period to appeal the same. We ruled that the
Court has not too infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari, even when the proper
remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and compelling considerations would warrant such a
recourse. If compelled to return the subject parcel of land, the respondent would divert its budget
already allocated for economic development in order to pay petitioner the rental payments from the
lessee banks. Re-adjusting its budget would hamper and disrupt the operation of the economic zone.
We believe that the grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court and the consequent
disruption in the operation of the economic zone constitutes valid and compelling reasons to entertain
the petition.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is not phrased to make the instances
mentioned therein the sole grounds for a petition for certiorari.—Petitioner next argues that the
instances cited under Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court whereby an appeal is not allowed are
exclusive grounds for a petition for certiorari. Inasmuch as the August 4, 1997 Order rescinding the
compromise agreement does not fall under any of the instances enumerated therein, a petition for
certiorari will not prosper. This reasoning is severely flawed. The said section is not phrased to make the
instances mentioned therein the sole grounds for a petition for certiorari. It only states that Rule 65 may
be availed of under the grounds mentioned therein, but it never intended said enumeration to be
exclusive. It must be remembered that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in
certiorari proceedings.

Expropriation; Eminent Domain; An expropriation case involves two (2) orders—an expropriation order
and an order fixing just compensation—and once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is
taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned.— Petitioner cites
cases which provide that upon the failure to pay by the lessee, the lessor can ask for the return of the lot
and the ejectment of the former, this being the lessor’s original demand in the complaint. We find said
cases to be inapplicable to this instant case for the reason that the case at bar is not a simple ejectment
case. This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an expropriation order and an order
fixing just compensation. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned.

Same; Same; Public Use; Words and Phrases; The “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.—This
Court holds that respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the
same was for a valid public purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero, this Court has ruled that, the “public use”
requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept
influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been
summarized as follows: this Court has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for public use. There
was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise
expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play . . . It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. [Heirs of
Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-235 quoting E. Fernando, the Constitution of the
Philippines 523-4 (2nd Ed. 1977) The term “public use” has acquired a more comprehensive coverage.
To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
Same; Same; Same; The authority given to the PEZA to expropriate “for the construction . . . of terminal
facilities, structures and approaches thereto” is broad enough to give it substantial leeway in deciding
for what public use the expropriated property would be utilized.—-Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was
expropriated “for the construction . . . of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto.” The
authority is broad enough to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the
expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, respondent leased a portion
of the lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes
were even reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending respondent PEZA’s original charter.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term “necessary” in condemnation proceedings does not
mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated
purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise; PEZA cannot attain a selfsustaining and viable
ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are hampered by the mere
refusal of the private landowners to part with their properties—the purpose of creating an ECOZONE
and other facilities is better served if PEZA directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.—
In Manila Railroad Co. v. Mitchel, this Court has ruled that in the exercise of eminent domain, only as
much land can be taken as is necessary for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term
“necessary,” in this connection, does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable
necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The
respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in
the surrounding areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their
properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better served if respondent
directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.

Same; Same; Same; The expropriation of a lot for the purpose of being leased to banks and for the
construction of a terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation facilities easily
accessible to the persons working at the industries located in PEZA, and the expropriation of adjacent
areas therefore comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the purpose of the law.—The contention
of petitioner that the leasing of the subject lot to banks and building terminals was not expressly
mentioned in the original charter of respondent PEZA and that it was only after PEZA devoted the lot to
said purpose that Republic Act No. 7916 took effect, is not impressed with merit. It should be pointed
out that Presidential Decree No. 66 created the respondent PEZA to be a viable commercial, industrial
and investment area. According to the comprehensive wording of Presidential Decree No. 66, the said
decree did not intend to limit respondent PEZA to the establishment of an export processing zone but it
was also bestowed with authority to expropriate parcels of land “for the construction . . . of terminal
facilities, structures and approaches thereto.” Republic Act No. 7916 simply particularized the broad
language employed by Presidential Decree No. 66 by specifying the purposes for which PEZA shall
devote the condemned lots, that is, for the construction and operation of an industrial estate, an export
processing zone, free trade zones, and the like. The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being
leased to banks and for the construction of a terminal has the purpose of making banking and
transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons working at the industries located in PEZA. The
expropriation of adjacent areas therefore comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the purpose of
the law. In such a manner, PEZA’s goal of being a major force in the economic development of the
country would be realized.

Same; Same; Same; Courts; Separation of Powers; The Legislature may directly determine the necessity
for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the
exact location of the improvement; In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character.—Furthermore, this Court has already ruled that: . .
.(T)he Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such
a case, it is wellsettled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public
necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected,
are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere
or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people. In the absence of some
constitutional on statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the
right of eminent domain, are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character.

Same; Same; Same; PEZA can vary the purpose for which a condemned lot will be devoted to, provided
that the same is for public use.— Petitioner contends that respondent is bound lay the representations
of its Chief Civil Engineer when the latter testified before the trial court that the lot was to be devoted
for the construction of government offices. Anent this issue, suffice it to say that PEZA can vary the
purpose for which a condemned lot will be devoted to, provided that the same is for public use.
Petitioner cannot impose or dictate on the respondent what facilities to establish for as long as the same
are for public purpose.

Same; Same; Just Compensation; The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking-—-payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of
right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued.—We have ruled that the concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of
the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer
the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Payment of just
compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued.
Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the delay to constitute a violation of
due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be deliberately done by a party in order to
defeat the ends of justice.

63. Manosca vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412, G.R. No. 106440 January 29, 1996
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Words and Phrases; “Eminent Domain,” Explained; The
constitutional qualification that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation” is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the
individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.—Eminent domain, also often
referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist;
instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant,
the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as “the highest and most exact idea
of property remaining in the government” that may be acquired for some public purpose through a
method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over
property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of
governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct
constitutional qualification is that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.” This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to
protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.

Same; Same; The power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only to
the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.—The court, in Guido, merely passed upon
the issue of the extent of the President’s power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically,
acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or
occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that the Court had made the pronouncement.
The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of
eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast
tracts of land and landed estates.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Public Use,” Explained; The term “public use” must be considered in
its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency.—The term “public use,” not having
been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a
public need or a public exigency. Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the
term; thus: “Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by
eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, ‘public use’ is one which confers some benefit or
advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of
public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of public, a ‘public advantage’ or ‘public benefit’ accrues
sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional
purposes is beyond question—it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be
restricted to such traditional uses.—The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should
thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases
of “use by the public” has long been discarded.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A historical research discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one
of constant growth.—It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that: “x x x A
historical research discloses the meaning of the term ‘public use’ to be one of constant growth. As
society advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to which the
resources of the individual may be devoted. x x x for ‘whatever is beneficially employed for the
community is a public use.’ ”

Same; Same; Separation of Church and State; Freedom of Religion; An attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal
objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power.—
Petitioners ask: But “(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo’s)
birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain” when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal
objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The
purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of
the Iglesia ni Cristo.

Same; Same; Same; That only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.—The practical reality that greater benefit
may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a
peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few
would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and
character of public use.

Same; Same; Just Compensation; Due Process; There is no denial of due process where the records of
the case are replete with pleadings that could have dealt with the provisional value of the property—
what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard.—Petitioners contend that they have been
denied due process in the fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be
reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard; contrary to petitioners’
argument, the records of this case are replete with pleadings that could have dealt, directly or indirectly,
with the provisional value of the property.

64. Guido vs. Rural Progress Admlnistration, 84 Phil. 847, No. L-2089 October 31, 1949

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DEMOCRACY AS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION, FREEDOMS EMBRACED

IN.—Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components
freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with
these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds
and under proper control.

2.ID. ; POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION, EXTENT AND
SCOPE.—In paving the way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trusts in perpetuity, feudalism,
and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine property rights,
or to advocate equal distribution of wealth, or to authorize the taking of what is in excess of one's
personal needs and the giving of it to another.

3.ID.; CONSTITUTION ALLOWS AND PROTECTS OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY IN REASONABLE QUANTITIES.

—The Constitution realizes the indispensable role which property, owned in reasonable quantities and
used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a solid
social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive
and happy country.

4.ID. ; PROMOTION OP SOCIAL JUSTICE AS ORDAINED BY THE CONSTITUTION, ITS NATURE, EXTENT AND
SCOPE.—The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis
for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other
government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of
economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of
political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received, and equitable
sharing of the social and material goods on the basis of efforts exerted in their production.

5.ID.; EXPROPRIATION OF LARGE ESTATES, TRUSTS IN PERPETUITY; INTENTION AS ORDAINED BY THE

CONSTITUTION.—Expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole
town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land
expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform
secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The
expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, endless conflicts
between landlords and tenants, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and
public peace and order.

6.ID. ; EMINENT DOMAIN ; PUBLIC USE.—Some courts go so far as to hold that public use is synonymous
with public benefit, public utility, or public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of
eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., espcially where the interests involved are of
considerable magnitude.

7.ID. ; ID. ; CONDEMNATION OF A SMALL PROPERTY IN BEHALF OF FEW PERSONS DOES NOT INURE TO
BENEFIT OF PUBLIC USE.—The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and
their families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public
character.

65. Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October 26, 1983

Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; The State’s power of eminent domain extends to the
expropriation of land for tourism purposes although this specific objective is not expressed in the
Constitution.—The petitioners look for the word “tourism” in the Constitution. Understandably the
search would be in vain. The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only in general terms
such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the national patrimony, public
interest, and general welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to
time and according to place. To freeze specific programs like tourism into express constitutional
provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a
prescience beyond Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform
and the transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the
magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not preclude nor limit
the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and other development
programs.

Same; Same; Requisites of eminent domain.—The constitutional restraints are public use and just
compensation.

Same; Same; The restrictive view of the term “public use” cannot be adopted in the Philippines which
does not have big and correctly located public lands and which has never been a laissez-faire State.—
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of
government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands
that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the
Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of
sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.

Same; Same; Judiciary has to defer liberally to legislative discretion in the review of programs for
economic development and social progress.—Certain aspects of parliamentary government were
introduced by the 1973 amendments to the Constitution with further modifications in the 1976 and
1981 amendments. Insofar as the executive and legislative departments are concerned, the traditional
concept of checks and balances in a presidential form was considerably modified to remove some
roadblocks in the expeditious implementation of national policies. There was no such change for the
judiciary. We remain as a checking and balancing department even as all strive to maintain respect for
constitutional boundaries. At the same time, the philosophy of coordination in the pursuit of
developmental goals implicit in the amendments also constrains the judiciary to defer to legislative
discretion in the judicial review of programs for economic development and social progress unless a
clear case of constitutional infirmity is established. We cannot stop the legitimate exercise of power on
an invocation of grounds better left interred in a bygone age and time.** As we review the efforts of the
political departments to bring about self-sufficiency, if not eventual abundance, we continue to maintain
the liberal approach because the primary responsibility and the discretion belong to them.

Same; Same; “Public use” does not mean “use by the public” in expropriation cases.—However, the
concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that “public use”
is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has been discarded.

Same; Same; Expropriation of several barangays for provocation of tourism and construction of sports
and hotel complex constitutes expropriation for “public use.”—The petitioners’ contention that the
promotion of tourism is not “public use” because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain
various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with
even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses
using public streets and highways do not diminish in the least bit the public-character of expropriations
for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does
not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and
shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and
urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private
homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.

Same; Same; Petitioners failed to show that area being expropriated is a land reform area. Only 8,970
square meters of 283 hectares affected is part of Operation Land Transfer.—The records show that the
area being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all of which is
not affected by the land reform program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and
unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly survive.
And of the 282 disputed hectares, only 8,970 square meters—less than one hectare—is affected by
Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only two have emancipation patents for the less than
one hectare of land affected. And this 8,970 square meters parcel of land is not even within the sports
complex proper but forms part of the 32 hectares resettlement area where the petitioners and others
similarly situated would be provided with proper housing, subsidiary employment, community centers,
schools, and essential services like water and electricity—which are non-existent in the expropriated
lands. We see no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether one public purpose is superior
or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interests. The petitioners
have also failed to overcome the showing that the taking of the 8,970 square meters covered by
Operation Land Transfer forms a necessary part of an inseparable transaction involving the development
of the 808 hectares tourism complex. And certainly, the human settlement needs of the many
beneficiaries of the 32 hectares resettlement area should prevail over the property rights of two of their
compatriots.

Same; Same; Contract clause cannot bar exercise of police power.—The invocation of the contracts
clause has no merit. The non-impairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of police power
and likewise eminent domain. As stated in Manigault v. Springs (199 U.S. 473) “parties by entering into
contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good.”

Same; Same; Government may take immediate possession of land subject to expropriation proceedings
upon deposit of 10% of its value.—Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1533, the government, its agency or instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is
authorized to take immediate possession, control and disposition of the property and the
improvements, with power of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the court,
upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the
property expropriated.

Same; Same; Agrarian Law; Pres. Decree No. 583 which penalizes forcible ejectment of agricultural
tenants has nothing to do with and does not cover expropriation cases instituted by the government.—
In their last argument, the petitioners claim that a consequence of the expropriation proceedings would
be their forcible ejectment. They contend that such forcible ejectment is a criminal act under
Presidential Decree No. 583. This contention is not valid. Presidential Decree No. 583 prohibits the
taking cognizance or implementation of orders designed to obstruct the land reform program. It refers
to the harassment of tenant-farmers who try to enforce emancipation rights. It has nothing to do with
the expropriation by the State of lands needed for public purposes. As a matter of fact, the expropriated
area does not appear in the master lists of the Ministry of Agrarian Reforms as a tenanted area. The
petitioners’ bare allegations have not been supported with particulars pointing to specific parcels which
are subject of tenancy contracts. The petitioners may be owner-tillers or may have some form of
possessory or ownership rights but there has been no showing of their being tenants on the disputed
lands.

66. Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173, G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

Political Law; Local Government; Eminent Domain; The expropriation of property intended for the
establishment of a pilot development center and housing project of the Province of Camarines Sur held
valid in consonance with the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.—The expropriation of the
property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of
Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of
the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public
purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, “Housing is a
basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly
affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare.”

Same; Same; Same; Although local governments possess merely delegated, not inherent, power of
eminent domain, limitations in the exercise thereof must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.—It is true that local government units have no inherent
power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of
Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 S Ct. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise
thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684).
While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete witnin its limits. Moreover, the
limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.

Same; Same; Same; Neither the Local Government Code nor the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
requires a local government unit to secure approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform as a
condition precedent to institute the necessary expropriation proceedings.—Resolution No. 129, Series of
1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, xxx Section 9
of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the approval
of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use,
before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by
local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Same; Same; Same; The exclusive authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to reclassify
agricultural lands is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or
tenant beneficiaries and does not include the determination of the “public purpose” requirement of the
expropriating authority.—The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it
would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian
Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted
by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

Same; Same; Same; Local government units can expropriate agricultural lands without prior authority
from the Department of Agrarian Reform as the determination of the public use of the property subject
for expropriation is considered an expression of legislative policy.—To sustain the Court of Appeals
would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the
construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of
the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve
a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize
whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of
the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be
expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy.

Same; Same; Same; The fixing of just compensation in expropriation proceedings shall be made in
accordance with Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and not on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax
declaration of the subject property by the owner or assessor which has been declared unconstitutional.
—The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax
declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the
Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the
condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA
528 [1990], the rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just
compensation for their property.

67. Sumulong vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, No. L-48685 September 30, 1987

Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Public use requirement for a valid exercise of power
of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influence by changing conditions. Whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.—The "public
use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept
influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been
summarized as follows: The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must
be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It
is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes
into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is
public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

Same; Same; Same; The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing
projects cannot be occupied by all—Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of
state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum,
the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing
projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning
has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once.

Same; Same; Same; The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and
has to yield to the demands of the common good.—The State acting through the NHA is vested with
broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing
purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or
gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight
to and leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. The property owner
may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been
more suitable, or just as suitable, for the purpose. The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of
private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. The
Constitutional provisions on the subject are clear: The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development. (Art. II, sec. 10). The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,
use and disposition of property and its increments. (Art. XIII, sec. 1)

Same; Same; Same; The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decree were declared
unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Tax values can serve as guides but
cannot be absolute substitute for just compensation.—The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily
apparent. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair
and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. Various factors can come into
play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial
assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with
the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is
based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often
land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only
two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct.
Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. To say that the
owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to
protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of landowners accept unquestioningly what is found in the
tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at,
much less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is
made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.

Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of
property without notice and hearing is violative of due process.—It is violative of due process to deny to
the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is
repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or
clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners
have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and
after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously
evaluated. (p. 13) On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession, the ruling in the Ignacio case is
reiterated, thus: [I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation
proceedings., the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not
legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be
complied with. (p. 14). This Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as
amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation.
However, as previously held by this Court, the provisions of such decrees on just compensation are
unconstitutional; and in the instant case the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary
provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due
process.

68. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Lozada, Sr., 613 SCRA 618, G.R. No. 176625
February 25, 2010

Eminent Domain; Requisites; Legal Research; Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, 42 Phil. 28 (1921), was
not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.—Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly
held constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. It is well-settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of
eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose;
and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the
nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the
property expropriated.

Same; With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another
petition for the new purpose, and if not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same; The Court now expressly holds
that the taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent
domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose
for which it was taken—corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the
reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received.—With
respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to
the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for
the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation
suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power
of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would
violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity. In light of these premises, we now
expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power
of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public
purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the
reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a
case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual
justification.

Contracts; Statute of Frauds; The Statute of Frauds operates only with respect to executory contracts,
and does not apply to contracts which have been completely or partially performed—if a contract has
been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith,
for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from the transaction in
litigation, and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or
contracted by him thereby.—As regards the position of petitioners that respondents’ testimonial
evidence violates the Statute of Frauds, suffice it to state that the Statute of Frauds operates only with
respect to executory contracts, and does not apply to contracts which have been completely or partially
performed, the rationale thereof being as follows: In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud
because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting
parties. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud. However, if a contract has been totally
or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would
enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from the transaction in litigation,
and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him
thereby.

Same; Repurchase Price; Duties of the Parties.—On the matter of the repurchase price, while petitioners
are obliged to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents, the latter must return to the former what they
received as just compensation for the expropriation of the property, plus legal interest to be computed
from default, which in this case runs from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to
respondents. Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the necessary expenses they may have
incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88, as well as the monetary value of their services in managing it to the
extent that respondents were benefited thereby. Following Article 1187 of the Civil Code, petitioners
may keep whatever income or fruits they may have obtained from Lot No. 88, and respondents need
not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in
the meantime. In accordance with Article 1190 of the Civil Code vis-à-vis Article 1189, which provides
that “(i)f a thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the
creditor x x x,” respondents, as creditors, do not have to pay, as part of the process of restitution, the
appreciation in value of Lot No. 88, which is a natural consequence of nature and time.

69.

GENUINE NECESSITY

70. De la Paz Masikip vs. Judge Legaspi (G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006)

Eminent Domain; The motion to dismiss contemplated in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court clearly
constitutes a responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation.
—Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for expropriation on April 25, 1995. It was denied
by the trial court on May 7, 1996. At that time, the rule on expropriation was governed by Section 3,
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: “SEC. 3. Defenses and objections.—Within the
time specified in the summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion to
dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take
his property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so
presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiff’s attorney of record and filed
with the court with proof of service.” The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly
constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for
expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
defendant’s property for the use specified in the complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the
said motion be served on plaintiff’s attorney of record. It is the court that at its convenience will set the
case for trial after the filing of the said pleading.

Same; Pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the motion is a responsive pleading joining the issues;
What the trial court should have done was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine
whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for taking of the property, instead of summarily making a
finding that the taking is for public use and appointing commissioners to fix the compensation.—The
Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically
admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, “specifically that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner’s property for public use.” Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion is a responsive
pleading joining the issues. What the trial court should have done was to set the case for the reception
of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property,
instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is for public use and appointing commissioners to
fix just compensation. This is especially so considering that the purpose of the expropriation was
squarely challenged and put in issue by petitioner in her motion to dismiss. Significantly, the above Rule
allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was
amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now
expressly mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant must be
set forth in an answer.

Same; Local Government Units; The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the
government which has the authority to delegate the exercise thereof to local government units, other
public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations.—The power of
eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof
to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to
Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may
exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local
government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise. Judicial review of the exercise of
eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b)
the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.

Same; Same; Question of Necessity; The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily
originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity.—The right to take
private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be
limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of
a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not
follow, the taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that “necessity within
the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute
but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public
with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent
with such benefit.”
Same; Same; Same; There is a failure to establish that there is genuine necessity when the basis for
passing the ordinance authorizing the expropriation indicates that the intended beneficiary is a private,
non-profit organization, and not residents of the locality—the purpose therefore is clearly not public.—
We hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the
Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s.
1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be
gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground
and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore,
not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there
exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the
Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

Same; Same; Same; The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men;
The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.—
The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is so fundamental
that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the
requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one’s property is clearly established, it shall be
the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. Important as the
power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the
property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be
specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown
to exist. Masikip vs. City of Pasig, 479 SCRA 391, G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006

71. De Knecht vs. Bautista [100 SCRA 660 (1980)]

Constitutional Law; Expropriation; Right of the government to expropriate property upon payment of
just compensation; Right should not be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily.—There is no question as to
the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public use upon the payment of
just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: “Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” It is recognized, however that the
government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken.

Executive Department; Ministry of Public Highways; Extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard project;
Extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to pass thru Fernando Rein—Del Pan Sts. Instead of along Cuneta
Avenue, is arbitrary; Reasons; Grave abuse of discretion of judge in allowing the government to take
immediate possession of the properties to be expropriated along affected streets.—It is doubtful
whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the ground so social impact.
The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the extension are mostly
motels. Even granting, arguendo, that more people will be affected, the Human Settlements Commission
has suggested coordinative efforts of said Commission with the National Housing Authority and other
government agencies in the relocation and resettlement of those adversely affected. x x x From all the
foregoing, the facts of record and recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission, it is clear
that the choice of Fernando Rein—Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to
take immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated. De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100
SCRA 660, No. L-51078 October 30, 1980

72. Republic vs. De Knecht (G.R. 87351, February 12, 1990)

Political Law; Eminent Domain; B.P. 340; Expropriation of lands by the government may be undertaken
not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners, but also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation. B.P. 340 superseded the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court in De Knecht vs.
Bautista.—There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30, 1980 in De Knecht
vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-51078, this Court held that the “choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets as
the line through which the EDSA should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not
receive judicial approval. It is based on the recommendation of the Human Settlements Commission that
the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the extension will minimize the social impact factor as the
buildings and improvement therein are mostly motels. x x x While it is true that said final judgment of
this Court on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the
right of the petitioner to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be
undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking
appropriate court action or by legislation. When on February 17, 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed
B.P. Blg. 340 expropriating the very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the same
purpose, it appears that it was based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of this
Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan
Streets. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary
had disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of
the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed. Only private respondent remains
as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but
also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area. x x x The Court finds justification in proceeding with the
said expropriation proceedings through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets from EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard due to the aforestated supervening events after the rendition of the decision of this Court in
De Knecht. B.P Blg. 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of
this Court. And the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending
before it on the ground of the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340. Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to
the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter (over two years later in this case) making its own
independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the
expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it
did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting B.P. Blg. 340. Thus the
anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.

Political Law; Eminent Domain; Courts; Decisions; Legislations; B.P. 340 is not a legislative reversal of the
ruling of the Supreme Court in De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660.—While the ponencia is plain
enough, I wish to make it even plainer that B.P. Blg. 340 is not a legislative reversal of our finding in De
Knecht v. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660, that the expropriation of the petitioner’s property was arbitrary. As
Justice Gancayco clearly points out, supervening events have changed the factual basis of that decision
to justify the subsequent enactment of the statute. If we are sustaining that legislation, it is not because
we concede that the lawmakers can nullify the findings of the Court in the exercise of its discretion. It is
simply because we ourselves have found that under the changed situation, the present expropriation is
no longer arbitrary. I must add that this decision is not a reversal either of the original De Knecht case,
which was decided under a different set of facts. Republic vs. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142, G.R. No. 87335
February 12, 1990

73. Mun. of Meycayauan vs. IAC [157 SCRA 640 (1988)]

Appeals; Jurisdiction of Supreme Court is limited to review of errors of law; Exceptions to the finality of
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.—The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to us from the
Court of Appeals is limited to the review of errors of law (Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15,
24), factual issues not being proper in certiorari proceedings (See Ygay, et al. v. Hon. Escareal, et al., 135
SCRA 78, 82). This Court reviews and rectifies the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals only under
certain established exceptions such as: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd and
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts: and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee (Moran, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88).

Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise
of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is genuine necessity therefor.—As early
as City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349) this Court held that the foundation of
the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there
is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the
legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity therefor (Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictos de Filipinas, 1 SCRA 646; J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413).

Same; Same; Same; Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.—
In the recent case of De Knecht v. Bautista, (100 SCRA 660) this court further ruled that the government
may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. Citing the case of J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration (supra), the Court held: “x x x With due recognition then of the
power of Congress to designate the particular properly to be taken and how much thereof may be
condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the
exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That
the equal protection clause will not allow.” Mun. of Meycauayan, Bulacan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640, No. L-
72126 January 29, 1988

GOVERNMENT WITHDRAWAL

74. NHA vs. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo (G.R. No. 154411, June 19, 2003)

Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Actions; Eminent Domain; The right of the plaintiff to dismiss an
action with the consent of the court is universally recognized with certain well-defined exceptions.—The
right of the plaintiff to dismiss an action with the consent of the court is universally recognized with
certain well-defined exceptions. If the plaintiff discovers that the action which he commenced was
brought for the purpose of enforcing a right or a benefit, the advisability or necessity of which he later
discovers no longer exists, or that the result of the action would be different from what he had
intended, then he should be permitted to withdraw his action, subject to the approval of the court. The
plaintiff should not be required to continue the action, subject to some well-defined exceptions, when it
is not to his advantage to do so. Litigation should be discouraged and not encouraged. Courts should not
require parties to litigate when they no longer desire to do so. Courts, in granting permission to dismiss
an action, of course, should always take into consideration the effect which said dismissal would have
upon the rights of the defendant.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The very moment it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the
expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed.—It is not
denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for a public use. The
fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of
eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the
proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be
dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is
for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal of at any other stage of
the proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the duty and the
obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the appeal, if it
should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the expropriation is not for
public use, then it would become the duty and the obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Stages; There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation.—There are
two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.” An order of dismissal, if
this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves
nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final
one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, “no objection
to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.” The
second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of “the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously,
one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence
or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order
by taking an appeal therefrom.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Finality; An order of condemnation or dismissal is final.—An order of
condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly
and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal
thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened.—A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter
how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be
corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Socialized Housing; Socialized housing falls within the confines of “public
use.”—Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly
and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The
public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be
occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it
is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once. x x x x x x x x x. In the light of the
foregoing, this Court is satisfied that “socialized housing” falls with the confines of “public use.” x x x x x
x x x x. Provisions on economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum
clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the
project.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to go through
expropriation proceedings and then refuse to pay.—It is arbitrary and capricious for a government
agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person’s property, allow the judgment of the court
to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations
for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the
cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such a despotic and irresponsible stance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Garnishment; Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law.—The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action “only
up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception; If the funds belong to a public corporation or a
government-owned and controlled corporation with a personality of its own, then its funds are not
exempt from garnishment.— If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or
controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of
the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the
government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other corporation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The funds of People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation are not
exempt from garnishment.—Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government,
the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although
considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment. This doctrine was applied to suits filed
against the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PNB vs. Pabalan, et al., 83 SCRA 695); the
National Shipyard & Steel Corporation (NASSCO vs. CIR, 118 Phil. 782); the Manila Hotel Company
(Manila Hotel Employees Asso. vs. Manila Hotel Co., 73 Phil. 374); and the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PNB vs. CIR, 81 SCRA 314). National Housing Authority vs. Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo, 404 SCRA 389, G.R. No. 154411 June 19, 2003

75. NPC & Pobre vs. CA (G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004)

Constitutional Law; State; Powers; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Expropriation is the procedure for
enforcing the right of eminent domain.—Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as
sovereign, to take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment
of just compensation. The power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to the local governments,
other public entities and public utilities such as NPC. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the
right of eminent domain. “Eminent Domain” was the former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on 1 July 1997, the prescribed method of
expropriation is still found in Rule 67, but its title is now “Expropriation.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Dismissal; In expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the
motion to dismiss took the place of the answer.—In lieu of an answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the
defendant to file a single motion to dismiss where he should present all of his objections and defenses
to the taking of his property for the purpose specified in the complaint. In short, in expropriation cases
under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion to dismiss took the place of the answer.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s
matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered
damages at the start of the taking.—In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff ’s
matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered
damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff ’s right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint
has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions. The exceptional right that Section
1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only
to other civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry
because private rights may have suffered in the meantime.—The power of eminent domain is subject to
limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until expropriation proceedings
are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of
just compensation and there is due process of law. If the propriety of the taking of private property
through eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass
judicial inquiry because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or
abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the
expropriation is not for some public use, then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action.
However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the
dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant’s right to have his damages ascertained either
in the same case or in a separate action.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the
expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in the same action.—
Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be
made either in a separate or in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of the
expropriation case. The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain conditions, such as the
reservation of the defendant’s right to recover damages either in the same or in another action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation; When possession of the land is neither
convenient nor feasible anymore, the aggrieved landowner may demand payment of just compensation.
—Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the
landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is
neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner
is to demand payment of just compensation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.—In this jurisdiction,
the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the
property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just
compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation. National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
436 SCRA 195, G.R. No. 106804 August 12, 2004

76. Republic vs. Heirs of Borbon (G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015)

Constitutional Law; Right of Eminent Domain; The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the
territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.”—The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the
territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.” But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two
mandatory requirements should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the
property owner. These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be complied
with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.

Same; Same; Public Use; Words and Phrases; Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the
public.” However, the concept has expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit
of the public.—Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.” However, the concept
has expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. In Asia’s
Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and Communications, 552 SCRA 59
(2008), Justice Corona, in his dissenting opinion said that: To be valid, the taking must be for public use.
The meaning of the term “public use” has evolved over time in response to changing public needs and
exigencies. Public use which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual “use by the public”
has already been abandoned. “Public use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,”
“public benefit,” and “public convenience.”
Same; Same; Same; It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained
throughout the proceedings for expropriation.—It is essential that the element of public use of the
property be maintained throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the
public purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., 613 SCRA
618 (2010), to wit: More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the
expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable
element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose
for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due
process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness and
equity.

Same; Same; Same; To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the
public purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the
expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.—Here, NAPOCOR seeks to
discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the transmission lines constructed on the
respondents’ property had already been retired. Considering that the Court has consistently upheld the
primordial importance of public use in expropriation proceedings, NAPOCOR’s reliance on Metropolitan
Water District v. De los Angeles, 55 Phil. 776 (1931), was apt and correct. Verily, the retirement of the
transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To
continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the
project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the
absence of the essential element of public use.

Same; Same; Just Compensation; The Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and its entities
to pay just compensation before depriving any person of his or her property for public use.—We must
point out that NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent and without paying just
compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to its
entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and its entities to pay just compensation
before depriving any person of his or her property for public use. Considering that in the process of
installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, and the
installation of the transmission lines went through the middle of the land as to divide the property into
three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair
for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from
the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession of the property. There should be no
question about the taking.

Same; Same; Disturbance Compensation; Actual Damages; In view of the discontinuance of the
proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no need to pay “just
compensation” to them because their property would not be taken by National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR). Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the
respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the
time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.—In
view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the
respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them because their property would not be
taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should
compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry in
March 1993 until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other
compensatory damages. This conforms with the following pronouncement in Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr.: In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of
private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was
taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise
of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
Republic vs. Heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon, 745 SCRA 40, G.R. No. 165354 January 12, 2015

RECOVERY OF EXPROPRIATED LAND

77. ATO vs. Gopuco ( G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005)

Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; When land has been acquired for public use in fee
simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner
retains no rights in the land.—When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. (Fort
Wayne vs. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L.R.A., 367.)

Same; Same; Same; Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced
purchase by the State; It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public
use or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most
primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty.—Eminent domain is generally described as “the
highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may be acquired for some
public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to
as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and taxation, an
inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead,
provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the
exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public
use or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most
primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. In fact, “all separate interests of individuals in
property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding
the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in
the government, or in the aggregate body of people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right
to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.”

Same; Same; Same; Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the
condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property.—The ubiquitous
character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation
proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required
to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title
or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for
the taking.

Civil Law; Compromise Agreements; A compromise agreement when not contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties; Anyone
who is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot be bound by its terms and cannot be affected by it.
—As to respondent’s first and second arguments, we have time and again ruled that a compromise
agreement, when not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid
contract which is the law between the parties. It is a contract perfected by mere consent, whereby the
parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It has
the force of law and is conclusive between the parties, and courts will not relieve parties from
obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be unwise. Note that
respondent has not shown that any of the compromise agreements were in any way tainted with
illegality, irregularity or imprudence. Indeed, anyone who is not a party to a contract or agreement
cannot be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it. Since Gopuco was not a party to the
compromise agreements, he cannot legally invoke the same. Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Gopuco,
Jr., 462 SCRA 544, G.R. No. 158563 June 30, 2005

78. Republic vs. Lim (G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005)

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions for Reconsideration; A second motion for reconsideration is
prohibited.—While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the present case, we
reiterate that its urgent motion for clarification filed on July 7, 2004 is actually a second motion for
reconsideration. This motion is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, which provides: “Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration.—No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.” Consequently,
as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the motion since petitioners’ petition was already
denied with finality.

Eminent Domain; Due Process; One of the basic principles in our Constitution is that no person shall be
deprived of his private property without due process of law, and in expropriation cases, an essential
element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for
public use; Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair.—One
of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private
property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is
that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Accordingly,
Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: “Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.” The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and
refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The
length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-
handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case
No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the
landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed
payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is accompanied by
bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest
were given a “run around” by the Republic’s officials and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived
from the use of the two lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite the payment, failed in granting relief
to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed willingness
to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened.

Same; Same; Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the owners of the land but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.—
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as “just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of
the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered ‘just.’ ” In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to
the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the
compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

Same; Same; Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power and should
therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the
property owner.—Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the
philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment
of the individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted
against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.

Same; Same; Failure of the Republic to pay the landowner and his predecessors-in-interest for a period
of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.—In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia this
Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit: “x x x The first is concerned
with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint” x x x. The
second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled
that, “the process is not completed until payment of just compensation.” Thus, here, the failure of the
Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
expropriation process incomplete.

Same; Same; The Republic’s failure to pay just compensation for 57 years cannot but be construed as a
deliberate refusal to pay which makes the recovery of possession in order.—The Republic now argues
that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand
payment of its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that “non-payment of just
compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of the expropriated lots.” This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority. However, the facts of the present
case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice,the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-
seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic’s failure to pay just
compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in
order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property
has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent
domain or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation
which has been assessed or agreed upon; or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and
paid.

Same; Same; It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public
convenience.—The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being used by the
military, as in this case, public interest demands that the present suit should not be sustained. It must be
emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public convenience. In
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we ruled: “One
of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned,
the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary
that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not
excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individual’s rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III
of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that
right. The right covers the person’s life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which
reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.”

Same; Same; The special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle the landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.—We thus rule that the special circumstances
prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the
Republic. Unless this form of swift and effective relief is granted to him, the grave injustice committed
against his predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. Let
this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain, necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the Constitutional limitations.
This Court, as the guardian of the people’s right, will not stand still in the face of the Republic’s
oppressive and confiscatory taking of private property, as in this case.

Same; Real Estate Mortgages; Any person who deals with a property subject of an expropriation does so
at his own risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of losing the property in favor of the
government; Until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the
property being expropriated remains with the registered owner who can exercise all rights pertaining to
an owner, including the right to dispose of his property subject to the power of the State ultimately to
acquire it through expropriation.—Assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the annotation,
still nothing would have prevented him from entering into a mortgage contract involving Lot 932 while
the expropriation proceeding was pending. Any person who deals with a property subject of an
expropriation does so at his own risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of losing the property
in favor of the government. Here, the annotation merely served as a caveat that the Republic had a
preferential right to acquire Lot 932 upon its payment of a “reasonable market value.” It did not
proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising their rights of ownership including their right to
mortgage or even to dispose of their property. In Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation, we
recognized the owner’s absolute right over his property pending completion of the expropriation
proceeding, thus: “It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property
passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and
terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner.
Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of
his property subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.”

Same; Same; A mortgage is merely an accessory contract intended to secure the performance of the
principal obligation, and one of its characteristics is that it is inseparable from the property.—For
respondent’s part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the contract of mortgage with
Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of the extent of his right as a mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an
accessory contract intended to secure the performance of the principal obligation. One of its
characteristics is that it is inseparable from the property. It adheres to the property regardless of who its
owner may subsequently be. Respondent must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately
expropriated by the Republic, still, his right as a mortgagee is protected. In this regard, Article 2127 of
the Civil Code provides: “Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the
improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes
due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the
property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the declarations, amplifications,
and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor or it
passes in the hands of a third person.”

Same; While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the
private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, in cases where the government failed
to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owner concerned shall have the right to recover possession of his property.—In
summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,” however, in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in
the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to
pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the
payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of
the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
“just.” Republic vs. Lim, 462 SCRA 265, G.R. No. 161656 June 29, 2005

JUST COMPENSATION

79. Ansaldo vs. Tantuico (188 SCRA 300)

Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Elements of "taking" present in the case at bar.—In the context of
the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is actually deprived
or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material material impairment
of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof, There is a "taking" in this
sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more
permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after all, "is nothing
without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the owner is deprived of the
ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is
taking within the Constitutional sense." Under these norms, there was undoubtedly a taking of the
Ansaldo's property when the Government obtained possession thereof and converted it into a part of a
thoroughfare for public use.

Same; Same; Same; Rule on determination of just compensation; Reason for the rule.—lt is as of the
time of such a taking, to repeat, that the just compensation for the property is to be established. As
stated in Republic v. Philippine National Bank, "x x (W)hen plaintiff takes possession before the
institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of
said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the latter should be the basis for the determination of
the value, when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the
commencement of the proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing
that compensation 'be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint' would never be
operative. As intimated in Republic v. Lara (supra), said provision contemplates 'normal circumstances/
under which 'the complaint coincides or even precedes the taking of the property by the plaintiff/ " The
reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that—"x x (W)here property is taken ahead of
the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose
for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value
thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the
complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend
beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is
taken. This the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., 'just not only to the
individual whose property is taken,' 'but to the public, which is to pay for it.'" Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Jr.,
188 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 50147 August 3, 1990

80. Manila Railway Co. Vs. Velasquez (32 Phil 286)

EMINENT DOMAIN; VIEW BY THE COMMISSIONERS; ITS PURPOSE AND EFFECT.—The view of the
premises made by the commissioners is for the purpose of better enabling them to determine upon the
weight of conflicting evidence. Being disinterested landowners, selected for their ability to arrive at a
judicious decision in the assessment of damages, and being allowed to view the property, their report is
entitled to greater weight than that of an ordinary trier of facts.

2.ID.; COMPENSATION; ESTIMATE OF VALUE CONFINED TO EVIDENCE OF RECORD.—Notwithstanding

the respect due the report of the commissioners, their valuation of the property must be supported by
competent evidence of record, and in those cases where the evidence as to value and damages is
conflicting, they should always set forth in full their reasons for accepting certain evidence, especially in
those cases where a view of the premises has been made.

3.ID.; ID.; REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS; POWER OF COURT TO SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN ESTIMATE OF
VALUE.—A Court of First Instance or, on appeal under sections 496 and 497 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the Supreme Court may substitute its own estimate of value as gathered from the record
submitted to it, in cases where the only error of the commissioners is that they have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them; or that they have disregarded a clear preponderance of
the evidence; or that they have used an improper rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of the
award; provided always that the evidence be clear and convincing and the amount allowed by the
commissioners is grossly inadequate or excessive.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Adjudicated cases of this Supreme Court and of courts of other jurisdictions having
similar procedure reviewed and found to support the power of the court to thus modify the report of
the commissioners.

5.ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE OF SALES OF NEARBY LAND; WHEN ADMISSIBLE.— Evidence of bona fide sales of
other nearby parcels is competent if the character of such parcels, as sites for business purposes,
dwellings, or for whatever use which enhances the pecuniary value of the condemned land, is
sufficiently similar to the latter that it may be reasonably assumed that the price of the condemned land
would be approximately near the price paid for the parcels sold. But to be admissible, the property thus
sold must be in the immediate neighborhood, that is, in the zone of commercial activity with which the
condemned property is identified. The sales must also be sufficiently near in point of time with the date
of the condemnation proceedings to exclude general increases or decreases in property values due to
changed commercial conditions in the vicinity, and must be made by one who is desirous but not
obliged to sell, and to one who is desirous but not obliged to buy.
6.ID,; JUST COMPENSATION.—"Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the land taken.
Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than compensation. The word "just" is
used merely to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation."

7.ID.; ID.; MARKET VALUE.—The market value of the condemned land is all that the owner is entitled to.
Evidence that the locality may become a business or choice residential district, when its history over a
period of years shows that there are large tracts of agricultural land in the vicinity, including the
condemned land, which have never been appropriated for any of those purposes, does not justify
appraising such land at figures which it would be worth if such development were an actual fact. Such
evidence amounts to a mere expectancy, the market value of which is comparatively insignificant.

8.ID.; IMPROVEMENTS UNDERTAKEN WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS ARE

CONTEMPLATED.—The owner of property cannot. be divested of his title until compensation is made or
security given. Act No. 1258 as amended affords a method whereby a railroad company may, by the
exercise of due diligence, protect itself from the payment of damages for such improvements; and until
it takes a decisive step towards expropriating the land, the owner cannot be estopped from claiming
damages for such improvements. Manila Railroad Co. vs. Velasquez., 32 Phil. 286, No. 10278 November
23, 1915

DEFINITION

81. Eslaban vs. De Onorio ( G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001)

Actions; Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; The requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping

applies to the filing of petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals.—By
reason of Rule 45, §4 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, in relation to Rule 42, §2 thereof, the
requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping applies to the filing of petitions for review on
certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals, such as the one filed by petitioner.

Same; Same; The requirement in Rule 7, §5 that the certification should be executed by the plaintiff or
the principal means that counsel cannot sign the certificate against forum-shopping.—The requirement
in Rule 7, §5 that the certification should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal means that counsel
cannot sign the certificate against forum-shopping. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal
knows better than anyone else whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or
substantially the same issues. Hence, a certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes
a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.

Same; Same; Corporation Law; Where the real party-in-interest is a body corporate, neither the
administrator of the agency or a project manager could sign the certificate against forum-shopping
without being duly authorized by resolution of the board of the corporation.—In this case, the petition
for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban, Jr., in his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the
verification and certification against forum-shopping were signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the
administrator of the agency. The real party-in-interest is the NIA, which is a body corporate. Without
being duly authorized by resolution of the board of the corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor
Cesar E. Gonzales could sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanying the petition for
review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed. Eminent Domain; Expropriation;
Land Registration; Easements; Where the easement of a public highway, way, private way established by
law, or any government canal or lateral thereof is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after
the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should
be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof.—As this provision says, however,
the only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is
the easement of a “public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal or
lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-
determined.” This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of
the land in order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the
easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under
the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid
to the registered owner thereof.

Same; Same; The rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to some public use, the
first thing obviously that the government should do is to offer to buy it.—Indeed, the rule is that where
private property is needed for conversion to some public use, the first thing obviously that the
government should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the
price and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction can then be concluded and the
transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power
of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order to
devote it to public use.

Same; Same; Just Compensation; With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned
property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or
“that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.”—With respect to the
compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled
that it is the market value which should be paid or “that sum of money which a person, desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and received therefor.” Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” for then the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade
or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as noted in
Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property
prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of
taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.

Same; Same; Same; The value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of
the property or the filing of the complaint, “whichever comes first.”—Thus, the value of the property
must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
“whichever came first.” Even before the new rule, however, it was already held in Commissioner of
Public Highways v. Burgos that the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the passage
of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court
of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the
filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was
allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint. In
the case of Burgos it was also the property owner who brought the action for compensation against the
government after 25 years since the taking of his property for the construction of a road. Eslaban, Jr. vs.
Vda. de Onorio, 360 SCRA 230, G.R. No. 146062 June 28, 2001

82. Republic vs. IAC, et al. (G.R. No. 71176, May 21, 1990)

Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; The report of commissioners is merely
advisory and recommendatory in character as far as the court is concerned.—The issue of the
disqualification of Aquino as commissioner deserves scant attention. Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, the court may take the following actions on the report submitted by commissioners: it
may “accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may
recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts, or it may set aside the report and
appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; x x x.” In other
words, the report of commissioners is merely advisory and recommendatory in character as far as the
court is concerned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The participation of an allegedly biased commissioner may not result in the
total disregard of an appraisal report in the absence of proof that the two commissioners were unduly
influenced by their allegedly partial colleague.—Hence, it hardly matters that one of the three
commissioners had a preconceived and biased valuation of the condemned property. The veracity or
exactitude of the estimate arrived at by the commissioners may not be adversely affected thereby. In
fact, the report of only two commissioners may suffice if the third commissioner dissents from the
former’s valuation. Indeed, the participation of an allegedly biased commissioner may not result in the
total disregard of an appraisal report in the absence of proof that the two other commissioners were
unduly influenced by their allegedly partial colleague.
Same; Same; Same; Determination of just compensation for a condemned property is basically a judicial
function.—The determination of just compensation for a condemned property is basically a judicial
function. As the court is not bound by the commissioners’ report, it may make such order or render such
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of its right of
condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated. For that matter,
this Court may even substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record. Hence,
although the determination of just compensation appears to be a factual matter which is ordinarily
outside the ambit of its jurisdiction, this Court may disturb the lower court’s factual finding on appeal
when there is clear error or grave abuse of discretion.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While the court may accept the commissioners’ report and render judgment
in accordance therewith, it may not do so without considering whether the report is supported by
evidence.—In the first place, the just compensation prescribed herein is based on the commissioners’
recommendation which in turn is founded on the “audited” statements of Amerex that the property is
worth P2,258,018.57. As earlier pointed out, while the court may accept the commissioners’ report and
render judgment in accordance therewith, it may not do so without considering whether the report is
supported by evidence. The court is also duty-bound to determine whether the commissioners had
discharged the trust reposed in them according to well-established rules and formed their judgment
upon correct legal principles for they are not supposed to act ad libitum.

Same; Same; Same; PD No. 794 declared unconstitutional; Just compensation should be determined
either at the time of the actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment of the Court,
whichever comes first.—This Court having declared as unconstitutional the mode of fixing just
compensation under P.D. No. 794, just compensation should be determined either at the time of the
actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment of the court, whichever comes first.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Appraisal made by Ampil Realty and Appraisal Co., Inc. on June 5, 1975 which
date is nearest to that of the actual taking of the property should be the basis for the determination of
just compensation.—In this case, the issuance of the condemnation order and the actual taking of the
property both occurred in October, 1975. Accordingly, the appraisal made by Ampil Realty and Appraisal
Co., Inc. on June 5, 1975, which date is nearest to that of the actual taking of the property, should be the
basis for the determination of just compensation the record being bereft of any indications of anomaly
appertaining thereto. It should be added that Wenceslao Ampil, the president of said appraisal firm,
testified at the trial and therefore petitioner had the opportunity to confront him and to question his
report. Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 572, G.R. No. 71176 May 21, 1990

83. Sec. of DPWH vs. Spouses Tecson (G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013 and April 21, 2015)
Civil Law; Laches; Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right
when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice.—Laches is principally a
doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation or in an injustice. This doctrine finds no application in this case, since there is
nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents’ claim. Both equity and the law direct that a
property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public use. Neither shall prescription
bar respondents’ claim following the long-standing rule “that where private property is taken by the
Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or
negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.”

Same; Expropriation; Just Compensation; The owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or,
if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the land taken. For
failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they
are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the government to
expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised.—When a property is taken by the
government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available to a landowner.
The owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may
demand payment of just compensation for the land taken. For failure of respondents to question the
lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are
estopped from assailing the power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the
power was exercised. What is left to respondents is the right of compensation. The trial and appellate
courts found that respondents are entitled to compensation. The only issue left for determination is the
propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Just compensation is “the fair value of the property as between
one who receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.”—Just compensation is “the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and
one who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.” This rule holds
true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property
owner who brings the action for compensation.

Same; Same; Same; Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public
which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.—Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair
market value of the subject property in 1940 was P0.70/sq m. Hence, it should, therefore, be used in
determining the amount due respondents instead of the higher value which is P1,500.00. While disparity
in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents as they would be receiving
such outdated valuation after a very long period, it is equally true that they too are remiss in guarding
against the cruel effects of belated claim. The concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to
the property owner alone. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the
public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways vs. Tecson, 700 SCRA 243, G.R. No. 179334 July 1, 2013

DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION

84.

85.

86.

87.

88.

89.

WHEN DETERMINED

90.

91.

92.

93.

94.

MANNER OF PAYMENT

95.

96.

97.

TRIAL WITH COMMISSIONERS

98.

99.

100.

101.

102.
LEGAL INTEREST FOR EXPROPRIATION CASES

103.

104.

105.

WRIT OF POSSESSION

106.

107.

ART XII, Sec. 18

108.

Art. XIII, Sec. 4

109.

110.

111.

112.

Art. XIII, Sec. 9

113.

114.