First United States Manned Three-Pass Orbital Mission Mercury-Atlas 6, Spacecraft 13 Part 1 - Description and Performance Analysis

NASA T E C H N I CAL NASA TM X - 5 6 3 - I
MEMORANDUM
CV>
CUSSIFKiiTtiia
J>eciasslfled by authority of HASA

Classification Change Notices
Dated •
FIRST UNITED STATES MANNED

THREE -PASS ORBITAL MISSION
(MERCURY-ATLAS 6, SPACECRAFT 13)
PART I - DESCRIPTION AND
PERFORMANCE ANALYSI%
Edited by John H. Boynto n
Manned Spacecraft Center

Houston, Texas
NATIONAL A E R O N A U T I C S AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION • WASH|NGTO||t C. • MARCH 1964

TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM X-563-1
FIRST UNITED STATES MANNED THREE-PASS ORBITAL MISSION
PART I - DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Edited by John H. Boynton

Houston, Texas
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

FOREWORD
The first United States manned orbital flight constitutes a significant

milestone in a national program of continued space exploration. The success
of this flight was largely dependent on -the realization of objectives estab-
lished for the two manned suborbital missions and the numerous unmanned
development flights which have been completed as a part of Project.Mercury.
General acknowledgement is made of the extensive effort on the part of

the entire Mercury team. This team, consisting of many organizations that
are external to the Manned Spacecraft Center, notably includes the Department
of Defense, the spacecraft contractor and its subcontractors, the NASA.
Goddard Space Flight Center for the Mercury Worldwide Network, the launch
vehicle contractors and their subcontractors, and in general the many orga-
nizations and government agencies which directly or indirectly made possible
the success of this historic flight. ~-~-—
The contents of this volume represent the contributions of an assigned

flight evaluation team, comprising system specialists and operations personnel
from throughout the Manned Spacecraft Center, without whose analytical and
documentary efforts a report of this technical completeness would not have
been possible.
CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD ........ ...................... i

LIST OF TABLES ........................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................ .. ix
SUMMARY. .............................. 1
INTRODUCTION ............................ 2
SPACE-VEHICLE DESCRIPTION ^ ................ ..... 6
SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTION ...................... 6

Spacecraft Control System ................... 6
Environmental Control System .................. 7
Communications Systems ............. ........ 10
Electrical and Sequential Systems ....... .. ....... 10
Electrical power system ................... 10
Sequential system ...................... 1.1
Heat Protection System ..................... 11
Ablation shield ....................... 11
Afterbody .......................... 11
Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems ............... 11
Separation devices ...................... 12
Rocket motors ........................ 13
Landing system ........................ 1^
Internal spacecraft structure .......... ...... 1^
Instrumentation System ..................... 15
Spacecraft Modifications .................... 15
LAUNCH- VEHICLE DESCRIPTION .................... j8

Airframe ............................ 3&
Propulsion System ....................... 38
Guidance System ... ...................... 38
Abort Sensing and Implementation System ............ 39
Aerodynamic Load Criteria . . . . . . . . . .......... 39
Launch-Vehicle Modifications .................. 39
MISSION OPERATIONS
PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS ....................... Ul

Astronaut Training and Preparation ............... ^1
Academics .......................... ^1
Static training devices ................... ^2
Environmental familiarization ................ ^2
Dynamic training devices ................... ^2
Egress and survival training ................. ^3
ii
CONTENTS - Continued
Page
Specific mission preparation ^3

Spacecraft Prelaunch Preparation ^3
Time utilization ^3
Design changes ^
Systems tests ^
Simulated flights ^6
Launch pad operations (prior to countdown) ^6
Spacecraft History t ^7 .
Reaction control system .' ^7
Environmental control system ^7
Communications ^8
Electrical system ^8
Launch-Vehicle Prelaunch Preparation ^9
Flight Safety Reviews 50
First series of reviews 50
Second series of reviews 51
LAUNCH OPERATIONS 56
Launch Procedure 56
Weather Conditions 57
Photographic Coverage 57
FLIGHT-CONTROL OPERATIONS 6l
RECOVERY OPERATIONS 62
Recovery Plans • • • • 62
Recovery Procedure 62
Recovery Aids 63
MISSION PERFORMANCE 68
SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE 69
Spacecraft Control System 69
System description 69
Flight description and analysis 69
Powered flight and turnaround 69
Orbital phase 70
Retrofire 71
Reentry 71
Reaction control system 72
Prelaunch activities 72
Flight performance 72
Hydrogen peroxide feed-line temperatures in flight 73
Postflight inspection 73
Environmental Control System ?**•
iii
>•••••••••••• •» • %
CONTENTS - Continued
Page
System description 7^
Countdown 7^
Launch phase . . 7^
Orbital phase 74
Reentry and postlanding 75
Postflight investigation 75
Communications Systems 76
Voice system 76
Radar system j6
Command system j6
Recovery system j6
Electrical and Sequential Systems 76
Electrical system 16
Sequential system 77
Instrumentation 77
Telemetry 78
Data quality 78
Photographic 78
Onboard timing : 78
Respiration sensor 78
Fuel-quantity indicators 79
Heat Protection System 79
Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems 79
Parachutes 79
Rockets and pyrotechnics 8l
Explosive-actuated hatch 8l
Landing-shock attenuation system 8l
Postflight Inspection 8l
Structure 8l
Ablation shield 8l
Heat-shield-deployment instrumentation 82
Landing bag 82
AEROMEDICAL ANALYSIS ."' 108
Clinical Studies 108
Physiological Studies 110
Data sources 110
Bioinstrumentation . Ill
Preflight . Ill
Flight 112
Pilot inflight observations 114
ASTRONAUT FLIGHT ACTIVITIES 133
Preflight Training Summary 133
Spacecraft checkout activities 133
iv
•••
CONTEHTS - Continued
Page
Training activities ..................... 133

Flight preparedness ..................... 133
Chronology of Pilot's Activities During Flight ........ 133
Attitude Control .......................
Control systems check ..... ...............
The 60° right-yav maneuver .................
Three l80° right-yaw maneuvers ...............
Use of a constellation as a reference ............
Gyro caging .........................
Retrofire control .......... ............ 135
Reentry pitch maneuver ................ ... 135
Reentry damping ..... .................. 135
Pilot's use of external reference .............. 135
Communication Activities ................ ... 136
Scientific Observations ....... . ............ 136
Celestial observations ................... 136
Meteorological observations ....... .......... 137
Terrestrial observations .................. 137
Color photographs .................... . . 138
Sensation and Orientation During Weightlessness ...... . . 138
General sensations ..................... 138
Orientation ................ ..... .... 138
Personal Equipment .................... . . 139
Daylight color camera .................... 139
Ultra-violet spectrograph .................. 139
Photometer ......................... 139
Airglow filter ....................... 139
Night adaptation eye patch ................. 139
Flight-plan cards ......................
Food tube ................. .........
Food tablets .............. ..........
PILOT'S FLIGHT REPORT ......... ............. 156

Preparation and Countdown ................... 156
Powered Flight ....... ................. 156
Orbital Insertion ....................... 157
Orbit . ............................ 158
k
Thruster problem .................. .. . . 158
Attitude reference ..................... 158
Weightlessness ....................... 159
Color, light, and visibility ................ 160
Space particles .......... . ............ 163
Other planned observations ................. 163
Reentry ............................ 164
Landing and Recovery ....... ... ....... .... 166
Concluding Remarks ...................... 166
CONTENTS - Concluded
Page
LAUNCH-VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 168

Abort Sensing and Implementation System (ASIS) 168
Engine Cutoff 168
Orbit Lifetime . 168
Guidance 168
Aerodynamic Loads 169
TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS 169

Sequence of Flight Events 169
Flight Trajectory 169
Launch phase 169
Orbital phase 170
Reentry phase 170
MERCURY NETWORK PERFORMANCE 195

Tracking 195
Data Transmission 195
Trajectory Computation 196
Telemetry 197
Air-Ground Voice 197
Command System 198
Ground system 198
Airborne system 198
Ground Communications 199
CONCLUDING REMARKS 22k
REFERENCES 226
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
I. SPACECRAFT CONTROL SYSTEM REDUNDANCY AND ELECTRICAL
POWER REQUIREMENTS .................... 18
II. SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATIONS AND INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM . . . . 19
III. AMR OPTICAL COVERAGE OF LAUNCH AND REENTRY PHASES ...... 58
IV. FUEL CONSUMPTION ...... ................ 83
V. RESULTS .OF POSTFLIGHT EXAMINATION OF THRUST CHAMBERS .... 8^
VT. INSTRUMENTED PARAMETERS FOR MA-6
(a) Commutated quantities .............. . 87

("b) Continuous quantities ................ 90
(c) Onboard tape recorder track assignments ....... 90
VII. TELEMETRY SIGNAL STRENGTH ................. 91
VIII. AEROMEDICAL EVENTS PRIOR TO LAUNCH ..... ........ 115
IX. XYLOSE ABSORPTION STUDY .................. 116
X. URINE SUMMARY ............. .......... 117
XI. PREFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE

ASTRONAUT . . ...................... 118
XII. PERIPHERAL BLOOD ...... ... ............. 119
XIII. BLOOD SUMMARY ... .................... 120
XIV. PLASMA ENZYMES SUMMARY ................... 121
XV. TIME EXPENDED IN ASTRONAUT PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES ......
XVI. TRAINING SUMMARY FOR PILOT IN CAPE CANAVERAL

PROCEDURES TRAINER ....................
XVII. CONTROL MODE AND ATTITUDE MANEUVERS DURING MA-6 MISSION
XVTII. NUMBER OF COMMUNICATIONS TO AND FROM SPACECRAFT
XIX. FIIM EXPOSURES
vii
LIST OF TABLES - Concluded
Table Page
XX. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 172
XXI. COMPARISON .OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS ... 17J
XXII. ORBITAL INSERTION CONDITIONS .DISPLAYED AT MCC 200
XXIII. SUMMARY OF LOW-SPEED TRACKING DATA 201
XXIV. SUMMARY OF LANDING-POINT PREDICTIONS BASED ON RADAR

TRACKING 202
XXV. TELEMETRY RECEPTION SUMMARY
(a) First orbital pass 203

(b) Second orbital pass 20k
(c) Third orbital pass 205
XXVI. COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY . 206
XXVII. COMMAND FUNCTION SUMMARY 207
viii
UST OF FIGURES --
Figure Page
1. MA-6 astronaut prior to the mission 3
2. MA-6 astronaut in the spacecraft prior to hatch closure . . U
3. Ground track for the MA-6 orbital mission 5
4. Space-vehicle configuration 20
5» Spacecraft axis system 21
6. The MA-6 Mercury spacecraft and launch-vehicle adapter . . 22
7. Reaction control system
(a) System A 23
(b) System B 2U
8. Environmental control system 25
:9- Location of communication systems 26

10. Spacecraft antenna schematic diagram .. 27
11. Voice system schematic diagram 28
12. Sequence of major events 29
13- Master sequential diagram
(a) Launch and orbit 30
(b) Retrograde and reentry 31
(c) Landing and recovery 32
lU. Heat protection system 33
15. Rocket motor ignition circuitry 3^
16. Instrumentation system diagram 35
17. Instrumentation sensor locations 36
18. Instrument panel 37
19. Time analysis of the spacecraft prelaunch operations ... 52
20. Launch complex testing of the MA-6 spacecraft ........ 53
ix
LIST OF FIGURES - Continued
Figure Page
21. Launch complex modifications 5^
22. Emergency egress tower 55
2J. Wind profile at the launch site 59
2k. AMR engineering sequential tracking camera coverage .... 60
25- Recovery areas and ship locations 64
26. Contingency recovery support forces 65
27. Details of primary landing area 66
28. Spacecraft prior to" retrieval 67

29. Example of the l80° yaw maneuver 92
30. Fuel consumption during reentry (within 0.5 lb) 93
31. Postflight photograph showing 1-pound yaw thruster hardware
(a) Fuel metering orifice 94

(b) Fuel distribution screen . 94
32. Variation of suit-inlet, cabin, and inverter temperatures

with time
(a) Suit-inlet and cabin temperature 95

(b) Inverter temperatures 95
33- Variation of primary and secondary oxygen pressures with

time
(a) Prelaunch 96
(b) During flight 96
34. Reentry-heating time history for MA.-5
(a) Cylindrical section 97

(b) Conical section, no. 1 98
(c) Conical section, no. 2 99
(d) Conical section, no. 3 100
(e) Conical section, no. 4 101
(f) Conical section, no. 5 102
(g) Conical section, no. 6 103
Figure Page
(h) Conical section, no. 7 104
35. Postflight photograph of MA-6, left-hand limit
svitch shaft 105
36. Postflight photograph of spacecraft 106
37. Postflight photograph of a"blation shield 107
38. Respiration rate, pulse rate, body temperature, suit-inlet
temperature, and "blood pressure measured during
countdown
(a) Countdown, 06:00 to 08:00 e.s.t. . . . . . . ... . 122
Ob) Countdown, 08:00 to 09:47 e.s.t. (lift-off) . . . . . 123
39' Sample of MA.-6 blockhouse countdown recorded at the time
of astronaut insertion (T-220 min). Recorder speed,
25 mm/sec 124
40. Record of MA-6 blockhouse preflight blood pressure taken
before lift-off (T-50 sec). Recorder speed, 25 mm/sec . . 125
41. Respiration rate, pulse rate, body temperature, and
blood pressure during flight
(a) Ground elapsed time, 00:00 to 02:30 126
(b) Ground elapsed time, 02:30 to 05:00 127
42. Sample of physiological record received at Bermuda tracking
station during powered phase of flight at approximately
4 minutes after lift-off. (Recorder speed, 25 mm/sec) . . 128
^3. Physiological data after 2 hours and 50 minutes of
weightlessness, including inflight blood-pressure
trace (value, 134/64 mm Hg).
(a) Sample of onboard record (recorder speed, 10 mm/sec). 129
(b) Sample of telemetered data received at Hawaii .... 130
44. Sample of onboard record of physiological data at drogue
parachute deployment, approximately 4 hours 49 minutes
after lift-off. (Recorder speed, 25 mm/sec) . . . . . . . 131
45. Inflight exercise device .......... 132
xi
Figure Page
k6. Chronology of pilot activities
(a) First orbital pass .

(b) Second orbital pass
(c) Third orbital pass
Vf. One 60° right-yav maneuver using the periscope and

fly-by-wire .......... ............. 150
^8. Three l80° right -yaw maneuvers using the window
reference and manual proportional or fly-by-wire .... 150
49. Control of vehicle attitudes using the constellation Orion

through the window as a night reference system and
fly-by-wire control mode .... ............ 151
50. Reentry maneuver using the manual proportional control
mode and instrument reference ... ........... 151
51. Onboard, record of the two high oscillation periods

during reentry;
(a) Maximum reentry oscillation periods during reentry . 152
(b) Second oscillation period ............. ' 153
52. Personal equipment

(a) Color camera
(b) Ultra-violet spectrograph
(c) Photometer
(d) Airglow filter ................... 15U
, (e) Night adaption eye patch .............. 155
(f) Food tubes ..................... 155
(g) Food tablet dispenser . ..... ........ . 155
53. Comparison of MA.-5 and MA.-6 spacecraft pitch rates
during launch ...................... 175
5^. Inertial velocity and flight-path angle in the region
of cutoff using launch-vehicle guidance-system data
(a) Inertial velocity ................. 176
(b) Inertial flight-path angle . . . . . . ....... 177
55. Inertial velocity and flight-path angle in the region of
cutoff using I. P. 7090 data.
xii
• •«
• •«
• »i
Figure Page
(a) Inertial velocity . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
(b) Inertial flight-path angle 179
56. Inertial flight-path angle plotted against inertial
velocity in the region of cutoff l80
57- Calculated values for oq. for the MA-6 launch l8l
58. Altitude plotted against longitude profile . . 182
59« Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-6
mission launch phase .
(a) Altitude and range plotted against time l8j
(b) Inertial velocity and flight-path angle plotted
against time .......... l8U
(c) Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle plotted
against time 185
(d) Dynamic pressure and Mach number plotted against
time .. 186
(e) Longitudinal acceleration along the spacecraft . -
.Z-axis plotted against time . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
60. Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-6
mission orbit phase
(a) Latitude, longitude, and altitude plotted against
time 188
against time . 189
61. Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-6
mission reentry phase
(a) Latitude, longitude, and altitude plotted against
time 190
against time 191
(c) Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle plotted
against time 192
xiii
UST OF FIGURES - Continued
Figure
(d) Dynamic pressure and Mach number plotted against
time 193
(e) Longitudinal deceleration along spacecraft Z-axis
plotted against time
62. S-"band radar coverage

b

(b) Second orbital pass 209
63. C-band radar coverage
(c) Third orbital pass 213 ~
64. Telemetry reception coverage
'a) First orbital pass 2lk

b) Second orbital pass 215
c) Third orbital pass 2l6
65. Fuel quantity, automatic and manual systems 217
66. HF and UHF voice coverage
67. Recorder command functions during ionization blackout . 221
xiv
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM X-56}
FIRST UNITED STATES MANNED THREE-PASS-ORBITAL MISSION

Part I - DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS*
Edited by John H. Boynton
SUMMARY
The Mercury-Atlas mission 6 was. the first United States manned orbital
flight. A detailed discussion of the mission, including the preflight
operations, and a comprehensive postlaunch evaluation are presented. Only
data vhich significantly amplify the context are included.
All prescribed mission objectives were successfully accomplished and a

comparison of the planned and actual trajectory data indicates that pertinent
mission parameters nearly coincide with expected values. The spacecraft,
launch vehicle, and Mercury Worldwide Network functioned satisfactorily
throughout the mission.
A number of minor discrepancies occurred but they did not compromise

the success of the mission. Early in the flight, a telemetry signal was
received by ground stations which indicated the heat-shield release mechanism
had been actuated. A postflight investigation revealed that a faulty limit
switch had caused the misleading telemetry signal. During the second orbital
pass, the periodic loss of automatic spacecraft stabilization because of a
failure of the 1-pound yaw thrusters required the astronaut to control the
spacecraft manually. Oscillations of the spacecraft in pitch and yaw during
reentry increased to unexpected levels and were subsequently eliminated
through deployment of the drogue stabilization parachute. Drogue parachute
deployment did, however, occur earlier than had been planned. Despite these
and other minor anomalies, the mission was completed successfully, and recovery
was effected in the prescribed area within 20 minutes after landing.
The astronaut satisfactorily monitored and controlled the operation of

spacecraft systems, performed planned attitude maneuvers, and observed
terrestrial phenomena. Throughout the flight, the astronaut's physiological
and psychological responses to the orbital space environment were within normal
ranges, and his health following the flight has remained excellent.
Title, Unclassified.
> »• « •• ft
HWRODUCTION
The first manned orbital flight of the Mercury program was successfully
performed on February 20, 1962. Astronaut John H. Glenn, Jr., shown in
figures 1 and 2, was the assigned pilot for this mission. Figure 1 depicts
the astronaut in his full-pressure suit with the portable cooling unit. As
well as being the third orbital flight of a Mercury spacecraft, Mercury-Atlas
mission 6 (MA-6) marked the sixth of a series of flights utilizing specification
Mercury spacecraft and Atlas launch vehicles. The MA-6 space vehicle was
launched from the Cape Canaveral Missile Test Annex in Florida.
The MA-6 mission was planned for three orbital passes, with the ground
track illustrated in figure 3, and was the culmination of a program to develop
the Mercury spacecraft for manned orbital flight. The objectives of the
flight were to evaluate the performance of the man-spacecraft system in a
three-pass mission, to evaluate the effects of space flight on the astronaut,
and to obtain the astronaut's evaluation of the operational suitability of
the spacecraft and supporting systems for manned orbital missions.
All data telemetered and recorded during the flight have been thoroughly
analyzed by system specialists, and this report presents these results and
their analyses. Brief descriptions of the spacecraft, the launch vehicle,
and the operations necessary to the mission precede the performance analysis
and supporting data. All significant events of the MA-6 mission, beginning
with delivery of the spacecraft to the launch site and concluding with the
recovery and postflight examinations, are documented.
Lift-off for the MA-6 mission occurred at 9 hours, ^7 minutes, and
39 seconds a.m. e.s.t. All times throughout this report are given as ground
elapsed time (g.e.t.) from lift-off, unless otherwise noted.
Although the graphical information presented in this part of the report
sufficiently supports the text, part II of this report contains a complete
presentation, without analysis, of all MA-6 time-history data.
•• • <
• • •
Figure 1. - MA-6 astronaut prior to the MA-6 mission.

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SPACE-VEHICLE DESCRIPTION
The lift-off configuration for Mercury-Atlas mission 6 consists of the

Mercury spacecraft and the Atlas D launch vehicle. (See fig. 4.) A general
description of these vehicles is presented subsequently, along with a listing
of significant spacecraft modifications since the previous Mercury-Atlas
mission (MA-5), which was an unmanned orbital flight with a chimpanzee on-
board. The descriptions in this paper are presented merely for the purpose
of familiarizing the reader with the systems whose performance during the
mission is discussed in subsequent sections; however, a more thorough de-
scription of the spacecraft is presented in references 1 to 3 and papers
2 and 3 of reference k.
SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTION
The Mercury spacecraft is designed to provide a safe and habitable

environment for the pilot in space, as well as protection during the criti-
cal flight phases of launch and reentry. The spacecraft also serves as an
orbiting laboratory where the pilot can conduct limited scientific experi-
ments concerning the space environment. The axis system for the Mercury
spacecraft is depicted in figure 5- The MA.-6 spacecraft (no. 13), shown
just prior to launch in figure 6, was nearly identical to the spacecraft
utilized for the previous orbital missions. The many systems which the
spacecraft comprises may be generally grouped into those of spacecraft
control, environmental control, communications, mechanical and pyrotechnic,
electrical and sequential, heat protection, and the onboard instrumentation.
Spacecraft Control System
The spacecraft control system provides the capability to achieve and

maintain closely precise attitude during the orbital, retrofire, and reentry
phases of the flight. Because the retrofire maneuver is so critical to the
mission, the control system has been designed so that it can perform its
function in the event of multiple system malfunctions.
Table I lists the four control arrangements that are available in the
spacecraft. For the reaction control system (RCS), there are two completely
independent fuel-supply, plumbing, and thruster systems, and the locations
of these components are indicated in figure 7- Each uses 90-percent hydrogen
peroxide to provide selected impulse as desired. There are two means of con-
trolling the outputs of each of these systems; that is, on system A the astro-
naut has a choice of using either the automatic stabilization and control
system (ASCS) or the fly-by-wire (FEW) system. The ASCS is automatic to the
extent that it can provide the necessary attitude control, including fixed
orbital precession to maintain a constant angle with respect to the local
vertical, throughout a complete mission without any action on the part of
the astronaut. The ASCS derives its attitude reference from the spacecraft
gyros, which are in turn slaved to the horizon scanners to eliminate gyro
precession errors. The FEW system is operated by movement of the astronaut's
control stick which is linked electrically to the solenoid control valves
of system A.
For system B, the astronaut has the choice of using either the manual
proportional (MP) or the rate stabilization control system (RSCS) modes,
both of which are operated through the astronaut's control stick. In the
MP system, linkages transmit the control stick movement to proportional
control valves which regulate the flow of fuel to the thrusters. The RSCS
uses the combination of control stick inputs and the computing components
of the automatic control system to provide rate control.
The desired control mode can be easily selected by positioning the

proper switches and valves mounted on the instrument panel. Certain com-
binations of these control modes can be selected to operate simultaneously,
such as ASCS and MP, or FEW and MP, in order to provide double authority
control, so that even with certain malfunctions in each mode adequate control
can be maintained.
The thruster impulse is directed by the four basic control modes through
18 individual thrusters - 12 on system A (automatic-fuel system) and 6 on
system B (manual-fuel system). Schematic diagrams of system A and B are
presented in figure 7- Metered quantities of hydrogen peroxide are decomposed
in silver-plated catalyst beds in each of the thruster chambers to provide
the desired impulse. Twelve of the thrusters used on the Mercury spacecraft
are sized to provide adequate control during the critical retromaneuver.
These RCS thruster ratings are as follows:
Axis System A, Ib System B, Ib
Pitch 24 4 to 24
Yaw 2k 4 to 24
Roll 6 1 to 6
The remaining six thrusters are in system A and each has a thrust rating of
1 pound. Under orbital conditions, these thrusters provide fine attitude
control as required.
Environmental Control System
The Mercury environmental control system (ECS) provides a livable

environment for the astronaut in which total pressure, gaseous composition,
and temperature are maintained and a breathing oxygen supply is provided.
To meet these requirements, a closed-type environmental control system was
developed.
•
I
••
The environmental control system shown in figure 8 is located in the

lower portion of the spacecraft under the astronaut support couch. The
astronaut is clothed in a full-pressure suit to provide protection in the
event of a cabin decompression.
The pressures in the cabin and pressure suit are maintained at 5.1 psia
in normal flight with a 100-percent oxygen atmosphere. The system is designed
to control automatically the environmental conditions within the suit and
cabin throughout the flight. Manual controls are provided to enable system
operation in the event of an automatic system malfunction. The ECS can be
considered as two subsystems: the pressure-suit control system and the cabin
system. Both of these ystems operate simultaneously from common coolant-water
and electrical supplies. The coolant water is stored in a tank with a
pressurized bladder system to facilitate the flow of water into the heat
exchangers. Electrical power is supplied from an onboard power supply.
Oxygen is supplied at an initial pressure of 7>500 psi from two spherical
steel tanks.
The pressure-suit control system provides breathing oxygen, maintains

suit pressurization, removes metabolic products, and maintains, through
positive ventilation, gas temperatures.
As shown in figure 8, the pressure suit is attached to the system by

two connections, the gas inlet connection at the waj.st and the gas exhaust
at the helmet. Oxygen is forced into the suit distribution ducts, carried
to the body extremities, and permitted to flow freely back over the body to
facilitate body cooling. The oxygen then passes into the helmet where the
metabolic oxygen, carbon dioxide, and water vapors are exchanged. The gas
mixture leaves the suit and passes through a debris trap where particulate
matter is removed. Next, the gas is scrubbed of odors and carbon dioxide
in a chemical canister of activated charcoal and lithium hydroxide. The
gas then is cooled by a water-evaporative type of heat exchanger which
utilizes the vacuum of space to cause the coolant water to boil at approx-
imately 35° F- The heat-exchanger exit gas temperature is regulated through
manual control of the coolant-water flow valve. The resulting steam is
exhausted overboard.
The steam exit temperature on the overboard duct is monitored by a

thermal switch which actuates a warning light when the duct temperature
drops below 47° F.
The light is on the instrument panel and provides a visual indication

of excessive water flow into the heat exchanger. Proper monitoring of the
light and correction of the water flow rate will prevent the heat exchanger
from freezing.
In the gas side of the heat exchanger, water vapors picked up in the suit
are condensed into water droplets and are carried by the gas flow into a
mechanical water-separation device. The water separator is a sponge device
which is squeezed periodically to remove the metabolic water from the system.
This water is collected in a small tank. The constant flow rate of the
atmosphere is maintained by a compressor.
8
In the MA-6 spacecraft, a constant bleed orifice was provided between
the oxygen supply and the pressure-suit control system. This constant oxygen
flow was in excess of astronaut metabolic needs and thus provided a continuous
flushing of the pressure suit to insure adequate oxygen partial pressure. In
normal operation, suit pressure levels were maintained slightly above cabin
pressure by metering this excess oxygen flow through an exhaust port in the
demand regulator. In the event of a cabin decompression, the demand regu-
lator would have automatically established a referenced pressure of h.6 psia
for the exhaust port of the regulator, and suit pressure would have been
maintained at this level. The addition of the oxygen bleed orifice was the
major ECS change prior to the MA-6 flight.
An additional mode of operation is provided by the emergency rate valve.

This valve provides an open-type pressure-suit operation similar to aircraft
pressure-suit systems. A fixed flow of oxygen is directed through the suit
for ventilation and metabolic needs. The remainder is vented into the cabin.
This system is used in the event the pressure-suit control system fails and
also during the final stages of descent. The other components of the suit
system are closed off during this mode of operation.
Oxygen is supplied from two tanks, each containing oxygen sufficient for
more than 19 hours. The tanks are equipped with pressure transducers to pro-
vide data on the supply pressure and are connected in such a way that depletion
of the primary supply automatically provides for supply from the secondary
bottle.
The cabin circuit of the ECS controls cabin pressure and temperature.
A cabin relief valve controls the upper limit of cabin pressure. This valve
permits cabin pressure to decrease with ambient pressure during launch until
a level of 5-5 psi has been reached. This valve then seals the cabin at
5-5 psia. In addition, a manual decompression feature is incorporated in
this valve to permit the astronaut to reduce the cabin pressure rapidly if
a fire or accumulation of toxic gases occurs.
A cabin-pressure regulator meters oxygen into the cabin to maintain the

lower limit of pressurization at 5.1 psia. A manual recompression feature
is incorporated in the regulator for cabin repressurization after the cabin
has been decompressed. Cabin temperature is maintained by a fan and heat
exchanger of the same type as that described for the pressure-suit system.
Postlanding ventilation is provided through a snorkel system. Following

reentry, at an altitude of 20,000 feet, the snorkel valves open and ambient air
is drawn by the suit compressor through the inlet valve. The gas ventilates
the suit and is released from the spacecraft through the outlet valve.
The astronaut support couch, which is constructed as a glass fiber

laminate, provides normal in-flight support and protects the pilot during
peak acceleration periods. Each couch is individually tailored to the flight
astronaut and is supported on the large pressure bulkhead by crushable aluminum
honeycomb to absorb landing loads. For a description of the pressure suit and
the astronaut's personal survival equipment, see paper 3 of reference k.
•••••
Communications Systems
The spacecraft communications systems consist of radar beacons and voice,

command, and recovery links. Each system has main and backup (or parallel)
equipment for redundancy, with manual selection of the desired system provided
through switches mounted on the instrument panel. Table II is a list of
these systems., and figure 9 shows the physical location of the communications
equipment in the spacecraft. A simplified schematic diagram showing the
various communications systems and their respective antenna systems is shown
in figure 10.
Three separate voice systems were available to the astronaut - HP, UHF
main, and UHF backup - as shown in figure 11. A redundant ground-to-air
voice link is also available through the command receiver channel. An
additional air-to-ground communication link is available to the astronaut
by keying the high-frequency telemeter carrier. It should be noted that all
of these links use the main bicone antenna through the use of a multiplexer.
The radar system consists of C- and S-band beacons onboard the spacecraft.
Either or both beacons may be interrogated when within range of the appropriate
ground station.
The command system provides a means of commanding an abort, retrofire,

spacecraft-clock change, or instrumentation calibration from the ground.
The onboard command system consists of two identical receivers and decoders,
each capable of performing any required functions.
The recovery system comprises an HF transceiver (l watt), one recovery

package containing the CW SEASAVE beacon (l watt), a pulse modulated SARAH
beacon (7-5 watts), and a pulse modulated Super-SARAH beacon (91 watts).
The antenna systems used by the recovery system are shown in figure 10.
Electrical and Sequential Systems
Electrical power system.- The electrical power system comprises three

main batteries, two standby batteries, and one isolated battery. The first
type has 3,000 watt-hour capacity, while the last two types have a
1,500 watt-hour rating; all three power sources are silver-zinc batteries.
The standby batteries have taps which power the 6-, 12-, and l8-volt busses.
Nominal discharge rate for these batteries is k.^> amperes, although each
battery is capable of discharging up to ^2 amperes for brief periods.
The two standby batteries are operated simultaneously and in parallel with the
main batteries throughout the flight. The isolated battery is held in reserve.
All electrical power sources may be manually switch-operated by the astronaut.
The three inverters installed in the spacecraft, one for the ASCS, one
for the ECS fans, and the third as a standby unit, provide 115-volt, UOO-cycle,
single-phase alternating current. One of the two primary inverters has a
150 volt-ampere rating, and the other has a 250 volt-ampere rating. The
standby inverter also has a 250 volt-ampere rating. All power circuits,
except the manual standby inverter circuit, are properly fused, and the
10
majority of these circuits may be enabled by the astronaut.
Sequential system.- The spacecraft sequential system automatically

initiates flight events and sequences, with a manual override capability
provided the astronaut and a backup provision included for certain critical
events through an air-ground radio link. Figure 12 shows the sequence of
major events for the MA-6 mission, and figure 13 displays the master sequential
system for the spacecraft. The astronaut does not have the capability to
initiate sequences during powered flight regarding the launch vehicle, with
the exception of engine cutoff, which is accomplished through the manual
abort circuit.
Heat Protection System
During flight through the atmosphere at launch and reentry, the high
velocities generate excessive heat from which the crew and equipment must
be protected. The spacecraft must also be capable of withstanding the heat
pulse associated with the ignition of the launch escape rocket. To provide
this protection, the spacecraft afterbody is composed of a double-wall
structure with thermal insulation between the two walls, and the forebody
or blunt end of the spacecraft is fitted with an ablation-type heat shield.
Ablation shield.- The material for the ablation shield is a mixture of

glass fibers and resin in such proportions that, while the resin ablates,
the fibers provide the necessary structural integrity for the shield. The
energy required in the fusion and vaporization processes of the resin is
extracted from the boundary layer, which in turn reduces the temperature of
the gaseous flow about the heat shield and thereby keeps the interior tem-
perature of the spacecraft at a tolerable level. The heat shield has been
designed to withstand a much greater heat flux than that expected for a
normal orbital reentry, where less than half of the heat-shield material
is boiled away.
Afterbody.- The spacecraft afterbody, including the conical and cylin-

drical sections and the antenna canister, protects the interior of the
spacecraft from excessive heating through a construction of high-temperature
metallic shingles. The conical afterbody shingles and the inner walls of the
pressure vessel form a double-wall structure, with insulation material placed
between the walls. This construction is exhibited in figure lU. The cylin-
drical section is fitted with beryllium shingles which employ the heat-sink
principle for heating protection. These shingles are mounted such that they
are free to expand and contract without affecting the major load-carrying
portions of the spacecraft structure. The conical section and antenna
canister utilize Rene' ij-1, which is a high-temperature alloy. The spacecraft
window, constructed of four thicknesses of high-temperature glass, is designed
to withstand the temperature levels during both exit and reentry.
Mechanical and lyrotechnic Systems
The mechanical and pyrotechnic system group consists of the separation

devices, the rocket motors, the landing system, and the internal spacecraft
11
•" •* M
•• •• fr\
structure. The landing system includes the drogue stabilization, main and
reserve parachutes, and a landing shock -attenuation system.
Separation devices.- Separation devices generally use explosive charges

to effect separation or disconnection of spacecraft components. The major
separation points are at the interfaces between the spacecraft and launch
vehicle, between the spacecraft and the escape tower, at the heat shield,
and around the spacecraft hatch.
The spacecraft -adapter clamp ring attaches the spacecraft to the

launch vehicle adapter. The clamp ring secures the spacecraft to the adapter
throughout the powered phase of the flight until spacecraft separation by
means of explosive bolts. The clamp ring consists of shaped segments which
mate with the fiber-glass attach ring of the spacecraft forebody and with
the upper support ring of the adapter. Three explosive bolts, with dual
ignition provisions, connect the three clamp-ring segments in tension. A
metal striker bracket is bolted every 120e to the inside of the clamp ring.
When the clamp ring is installed, the striker brackets depress the spacecraft
ring separation -sens ing switches located in the outer periphery of the
spacecraft forebody. The exterior of the clamp ring is covered with a heat
shield that protects the explosive bolts from excessive heating. The seg-
mented fairing assemblies are bolted to the adapter clamp ring. Six cable
straps protect the spacecraft and the launch vehicle from damage by retaining
the clamp ring to the adapter when the explosive bolts are ignited.
The escape -tower-spacecraft clamp ring consists of three segments that

clamp the escape -tower attach ring to the recovery compartment (cylindrical
section) flange. Three explosive bolts, with dual ignition capability,
connect the ring segments in tension. The escape -tower-spacecraft clamp
ring is basically the same in design as the spacecraft -adapter clamp ring,
but it is considerably smaller in size. The clamp ring retains the escape
tower to the spacecraft until the clamp-ring explosive bolts are ignited.
Only one bolt must ignite to effect separation. An aerodynamic -stability
wedge attached to the clamp ring aids in stabilizing the spacecraft during
atmospheric aborts . Six cable straps , bolted to the escape tower and the
clamp-ring stability wedge, prevent structural damage to the spacecraft by
retaining the clamp-ring segments of the escape tower when the explosive
bolts are ignited.
The ignition of two squib valves allows nitrogen pressure of 3>000

to operate the two heat-shield release mechanism actuators. This action
releases the heat shield from the spacecraft. As the heat shield is released,
two limit switches sense heat-shield motion and close to energize the landing-
bag extension-signal relay. When the actuator piston reaches full travel,
it is locked by a spring-loaded pin. The landing-bag circuit is deenergized
while the spacecraft is in orbit. Placing the landing -bag switch in the
"automatic" position during spacecraft reentry permits normal operation of
the entire landing system.
An entrance hatch is located on the right side of the conical section

as viewed from the crew member station. A primer cord placed between hatch
12
I •
>••
>••
and spacecraft sill, is provided to release the hatch quickly and enable the
astronaut to egress rapidly. The primer cord igniter, located in a corner
of the hatch, is linked to an internal release control initiator. Prior to
launch, the hatch is bolted and sealed into position with bolts, and two
corrugated shingles are installed over the hatch. The bolts are inserted
into threaded holes in the spacecraft sill. A magnesium gasket, with inlaid
rubber, forms the hatch seal when the hatch is bolted into position. These two
shingles are attached to the hatch stringers, but not to the spacecraft
shingles. Following landing, the astronaut may remove the cap from the
initiator and the safety pin from the initiator plunger. By depressing the
initiator plunger, two spring-loaded firing pins strike the percussion caps
and detonate the explosive charge which separates the hatch from the space-
craft. An exterior hatch-release control is also provided to enable ground
personnel to release the hatch.
Rocket motors.- The rocket motor assemblies used in the Mercury space-
craft employ solid-propellant fuel and are listed in the following table
with their nominal performance characteristics.
Number Thrust Approximate burning

Rocket motor of each, time for each,
motors Ib sec
Escape 1 52,000 1
Tower jettison 1 800 1.5

Posigrade 3 ^4-00 l
Retrograde 3 1,000 10
The escape rocket motor is mounted at the top of the escape tower and
incorporates three exit nozzles which are canted 19° to direct the exhaust
gases away from the spacecraft. The system is optically alined prior to
launch.
The tower-jettison rocket motor also has a three-nozzle assembly, with

each nozzle canted 30°, and is attached to the bottom of the escape
rocket-motor case. Its function is primarily to jettison the expended escape
motor case and tower following an abort during launch.
The three posigrade and three retrograde rocket motors are assembled
in a package which is located at the center of the heat shield and held to the
spacecraft at the edge of the heat shield by three straps. The posigrade
rockets are ignited simultaneously to separate the spacecraft from the
launch vehicle. The retrograde rocket motors are sequentially ignited
(5-second delays between motor ignitions) and provide the velocity decrement
necessary to effect reentry.
•• • •
• • ••
All rocket motors have dual ignition systems with independent electrical
power sources. In addition, each ignition system has dual squibs to insure
ignition. As a typical example, the rocket motor ignition circuitry for the
retrograde system is shown in figure 15-
Landing system.- The landing system includes the drogue (stabilization)

parachute, the main and reserve parachutes, and the landing shock-attenuation
system (landing bag). The latter system attenuates the force of landing by
providing a cushion of air through the deployment of the landing bag and
heat-shield structure, which is supported by straps and cables. The landing
system is armed when the escape tower is jettisoned during exit flight;
however, it is not actuated until the spacecraft returns to the denser part
of the atmosphere, normally at an altitude of about 21,000 feet. The system
can be actuated manually by the pilot or automatically.
A dual barostat, which consists of two pressure-sensing devices in parallel,

is used to initiate the landing-system deployment sequence automatically. In
this sequence, the drogue parachute is deployed at an altitude of approximately
21,000 feet to decelerate and stabilize the spacecraft. At about 10,000 feet,
the antenna section and drogue parachute are jettisoned by signals from
another dual barostat. When the antenna canister is released, it deploys
the main parachute simultaneously into a reefed condition at about 12 percent
of the maximum diameter for approximately h seconds to minimize the opening
shock. The reserve parachute may be deployed manually by the astronaut in
the event that the main parachute has malfunctioned. Immediately following
main parachute deployment, the landing bag is extended to attenuate landing
loads. After landing, the main parachute is disconnected automatically, and
the reserve parachute is ejected from the recovery compartment.
The drogue parachute has a ribbon-type canopy with a 6-foot diameter,

and it is deployed on a 30-foot-long riser. The main and reserve parachutes
are essentially identical, with diameters of 63 feet, and either one will
provide a sinking velocity of 30 fps. The canopies of these parachutes are of
the ringsail type and are constructed of a special nylon fabric.
The landing bag is a rubberized cloth assembly about U feet in length.

Prior to deployment, the heat shield is securely attached to the spacecraft
by a multiple-contact, mechanical latching system, and the landing bag is
folded and stored in the space between the heat shield and the large pressure
bulkhead of the spacecraft. After release, the landing bag reduces landing
accelerations, and after landing, the bag fills with water to provide dynamic
stability for the spacecraft.
Internal spacecraft structure.- For convenience, any spacecraft structural

assemblies not a part of the heat protection system or directly related to
an operating spacecraft system are classified as internal spacecraft structure.
This structure notably includes the large and small pressure bulkheads, con-
structed of titanium and aluminum, respectively, as well as internal bracketry.
The pressure vessel which houses the astronaut and spacecraft equipment is
composed of these two bulkheads and the internal skin of the conical section
wall.
• •• ^^^^^^^r i . . -. . .. . •• •
• * » « BB« • • ••• •• • '
••• '., ... .« .-• I • • • • • • • • ••• ••
Instrumentation System
The instrumentation system senses information pertinent to over 100 items

throughout the spacecraft. The pilot's biological parameters, consisting of
electrocardiogram (ECG) traces, respiration rate and depth, body temperature,
and blood pressure, are of primary concern to flight-control personnel. In
addition, many operational aspects of the spacecraft systems are monitored.
These aspects include significant sequential events, control system operation,
attitudes and angular rates, electrical parameters, ECS pressures and temper-
atures, accelerations along all three axes, and temperatures of systems through-
out the spacecraft. These quantities are both transmitted to Mercury Network
stations and recorded on board the spacecraft. Most of the transmitted
data are commutated through 90 segments, while the remaining data, primarily
aeromedical information, are transmitted continuously. A schematic diagram
for the instrumentation system is shown in figure 16, and the locations of
primary sensors throughout the spacecraft are depicted in figure 17- Also
included in the instrumentation system is a 1.6-vsm. motion picture camera
which photographs the astronaut from the instrument panel. Since the film
capacity is limited, the frame speed is dependent on the mission phase. A
higher frame speed (360 frames per minute) is programed for the more critical
flight phases, such as launch and reentry, and a speed of 5 frames per
minute is provided during the orbital phase, with short periodic "bursts of
the higher speed. Many of the instrumented parameters have a direct readout
on the spacecraft instrument panel (fig. 18) for monitoring by the astronaut.
Periodic reports of displayed quantities to ground personnel offer important
verification of the telemetered data during the flight.
Spacecraft Modifications
Although essentially identical to spacecraft used in previous Mercury

missions, the MA-6 spacecraft differs from that used in the MA-5 mission, the
orbital flight of a chimpanzee, in the following minor aspects:
1. An astronaut's couch was installed.
2. A personal-equipment container was installed.
3- Filters were provided for the window.
k. An indicator was added to the instrument panel which displayed

the temperature of the suit-circuit steam vent.
5. The suit-circuit oxygen supply incorporated a constant-bleed

orifice (750 cc/min).
6. The suit-inlet snorkel door was located on the conical after-

body.
7. Cooling plates of a new design were installed under the primary

inverters, and stainless steel check valves were installed in
the coolant line in lieu of aluminum valves.
15
8. Improved heat-conduction paths and heat sinks were installed
near the thrusters for temperature control of the roll-thruster
fuel lines.
9- Indicating lights were added to the instrument panel to show

which inverters were operative.
10. For the electrical inverter circuit, manual control switches

without fuses were incorporated, since fuse protection is provided
elsewhere.
11. The maximum-altitude sensor was provided with a separate

battery.
12. One-ohm fuses were installed, in all squib circuits.
IJ. An integrating accelerometer was installed.
Ik. An Ultra-SARAH beacon was incorporated in the astronaut's

survival kit.
15- A reserve parachute was installed.
16. A switch was installed to allow manual override of heat-shield

deployment.
17. The escape-tower legs were of heavier construction.
18. A manually actuated blood-pressure measuring system was

incorporated.
16
••
••
•• •• • •
The weight and balance parameters for spacecraft 13 are shown in the
following table:
Missioii phase
Parameter Beginning of
Lift-off first orbital Beginning of Flotation
pass reentry (a)
k
Weight Ib ,265 26 2 986 78 2 698 98 P kpl 7Q
C^ ,-TC-L. ( y
Center-of -gravity
station, measured
from an arbitrary
station along the
Z-axis below the
spacecraft on the
launch vehicle, in.
z 167.96 121 . 18 IPk £p 1 T Q ft-
-L-L^. 7k
x 0.31 -0 Ok -0 07 _n -Z.-Z.
**"'JJ
-0 08 o 07 o m O -t f.
Moments of inertia,
slug -ft
I
z 384 0 28l 6 P7i n OÂ lJ.
d.j\j,
I 7 76l 621 6 cjLL. £ XR^ k

JJJ>^
X
I 71 ) 767
1 5
fi?Q
ucy, -*>
y SS9 P j5py.
^RQ R
p
y 1w
• S JJ'-'C-
Values represent the spacecraft in the dry condition, landing bag and
antenna deployed.
IT
TABLE I.- SPACECRAFT CONTROL SYSTEM REDUNDANCY
AND ELECTRICAL POWER REQUIREMENTS
Control system Corresponding fuel Electrical pover

modes system (fuel supply, required
plumbing, and thrusters)
ASCS A d-c and a-c
FEW A d-c
MP B None
RSCS B d-c and a-c
ASCS - Automatic stabilization and control system
FEW - Fly-by-wire mode Controlled by pilot
MP - Manual proportional mode \ actuation of control
RSCS - Rate stabilization control system stick
18
TABLE II.- SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATIONS AND
INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
Component Capability
Voice communication
UKF transceiver 2 watts
UHF transceiver 0.5 watts
HF transceiver 5 watts
Radar
CVband beacon 400-watt transponder
S-band beacon 1,000-watt transponder
Command
2 command receivers 10 channels each
Recovery
HF D/F beacon SEASAVE I watt
UHF D/F beacon SARAH 7-5 watts
UHF D/F beacon Super SARAH .... 91 watts
HF transceiver 1 watt
19
Aercxiynamic spike
Escape rocket motor
Escape tower
Spacecraft
Spacecraft—launch-vehicle adapter
Liquid oxygen tank

pressurization line
10' dia
\
V Equipment
E pod
s Liquid oxygen line

Stub pod
/ v Vernier fairing
^Sustainer engine
Booster
engine -
Figure 4.- Space-vehicle configuration
20
: :
Roll
Pitch
Pitch Yaw
Pitch is defined as the rotation of the spacecraft Yaw is defined as rotation of the spacecraft about
about its X-axis. The pitch angle is O° when the its Y-axis. Clockwise rotation of the spacecraft,
Z-axis lies in a horizontal plane. Using the when viewed from above the astronaut, is called
astronaut's right side as reference, positive right yaw and is defined as positive.
pitch is achieved by counterclockwise rotation
from the O° plane. The rate of this rotation is Yaw angle is considered O when the spacecraft
the spacecraft pitch rate and is positive in the is in normal orbital position (blunt end of
direction shown. spacecraft facing line of flight). When the
positive Z-axis of the spacecraft is directed
Roll along the orbital flight path (small end of
spacecraft facing line of flight) , the yaw angle
Roll is defined as the rotation of the spacecraft is 180°.
about its Z-axis. Clockwise rotation of the
spacecraft, as viewed from behind the astronaut, Accelerometer Polarity
is called right roll and is defined as positive.
When the X-axis of the spacecraft lies in a With the spacecraft in the launch position the
horizontal plane, the roll angle is O . Z-axis will be perpendicular to the earth's surface
and the Z-axis accelerometer will read +lg.
Figure 5.- Spacecraft axis system.
21
Figure 6.- The MA-6 Mercury spacecraft and launch-vehicle adapter,
22
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27
Main bicone
antenna
T/M keying
tone generator
Command
R receiver & decoder
I "B"
I
Command function
Abort
i n i t i a t e retro seq
Reset clock
Telemetry keying
| Telemetry
I transmi tter
hi freq
Instrumentat i on
system (ref.) Telemetry
| transmitter;
I lo freq
Low frequency
Figure 11.- Voice system schematic diagram.
28
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29
I Firing signal |
I
| Lift-off |
Booster- sustainer
powered flight
G E. guidance
booster cutoff
[Booster separation]
| Booster sep sensor]
20- sec time delay

tower ring bolt f i r e
I
Tower ring sep |
I
I Permissive relays |
I
[ Escape rocket fire |
Tower separation
~
[ Tower sep sensor
Sustainer
powered flight
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LAUNCH-VEHICLE DESCRIPTION
The launch vehicle employed to accelerate the Mercury spacecraft into

an orbital trajectory is an Atlas Series D missile modified for the Mercury
mission. The Atlas is a 1—-stage liquid-propellant launch vehicle, and
derives the greater portion of its 360,000 pounds of thrust from one sustainer
and two booster engines. In addition, two small vernier engines are included
to provide precise control of launch-vehicle attitude and angular rates. The
integral propellent tanks which contain the RP-1 fuel and liquid oxygen, in
addition to providing structural rigidity through pressurization, are divided
by a pressure bulkhead. Guidance during powered flight is provided by a combi-
nation of ground-generated radio commands and spaceborne inertial reference
systems. All launch-vehicle parameters which are critical to its operation
during launch are monitored by an abort sensing and implementation system
(ASK) which initiates the escape sequence in case of an impending disaster.
Airframe
The major divisions of the airframe are the tank section and the
booster-engine fairing section. The tank section is a monocoque structure
fabricated from thin stainless steel and is closed at the forward end by a
domed bulkhead and at the aft end by a truncated-cone bulkhead. The interme-
diate bulkhead is a hemispherical structure insulated below on the fuel tank
side by a layer of plastic. The insulation bulkhead retains the insulation
below the intermediate bulkhead. The booster section structure essentially
comprises a cylindrical shell, nacelles, fairing, and heat shield within
which are supported ths subassetnblies of the booster-stage propulsion,
pneumatic, electrical, and hydraulic systems. The booster section is
jettisoned during inflight staging.
Propulsion System
The Atlas propulsion system is designed as a fixed thrust, bipropellant

engine cluster, and the system includes thrust-chamber gimbaling to provide
launch-vehicle attitude control. Each of the two booster engines develops
a sea-level thrust of 15^,000 pounds, and the sustainer engine generates a
vacuum thrust of 57,000 pounds. Each of two diametrically opposed engines,
located just above the booster-stage separation plane, supplies up to
1,000 pounds of thrust to provide vernier control of launch-vehicle attitudes
and rates. Centrifugal-type turbopumps feed fuel and liquid oxygen into the
sustainer and booster engines.
Guidance System
In the early portion of powered flight, the launch vehicle is guided

by a programed autopilot; and soon after the tracking facilities associated
with the General Electric MOD III radio guidance system acquire the vehicle, it
is guided by transmitted ground commands. Tracking data are processed through
38
ri •': :." :*• • •'• •'• •" : :•• : :•• :-,
- :- :•: .-• ..* : i i :..
••• .II I * • • • • » • • • • • 4
a Burroughs computer at Cape Canaveral, and the real-time computations form

the basis of discrete error signals transmitted to the launch vehicle for
subsequent trajectory corrections. A tracking complex designed by General
Dynamics Corporation arid referred to as Azusa provides a backup to the
General Electric-Burroughs system. Each tracking system employs the passive
technique, in which both a rate and a pulse beacon are located in the launch
vehicle for interrogation. A decoder installed in the launch vehicle receives
pulse messages and verifies and converts them into control commands which
are sent to the flight programer.
Abort Sensing and Implementation System
An automatic abort sensing system to initiate rapid spacecraft sep-

aration from the launch vehicle is located within the launch vehicle to
detect malfunction of the launch-vehicle systems. The ASIS monitors critical
parameters in the operation of the launch vehicle in the following areas:
flight control system, tank pressurization system, electrical system, pro-
pulsion system, and sustainer hydraulic pressure. In the flight control
system, rates about all axes are instrumented, and in the electrical system,
the spacecraft—launch-vehicle interface and 400-cycle voltage are monitored.
The fuel injection manifold pressure is sensed in the propulsion system.
Aerodynamic Load Criteria
The maximum wind velocity allowable for the launch of a manned Mercury
spacecraft on the Atlas launch vehicle is 18 knots. The design criteria for
the spacecraft—launch-vehicle combination up to booster staging include loads
imposed by the launch-vehicle acceleration and wind gusts. These design
criteria are listed below:
Dynamic pressure, q, Ib/sq ft 1,000

desr— lb
Angle of attack times q, oq, —=--77 7,500
sq it
Normal load factor, g 0.5
Axial load factor, g 8

Gusts:
Equivalent airspeed at altitudes below Uo,000 feet,

ft/sec 30
True airspeed at altitudes above ^0,000 feet,
ft/sec 60
Launch-Vehicle Modifications
The MA-6 launch vehicle, Atlas no. 109-D, was modified for the mission
as on previous Mercury-Atlas flights. It differed from the MA-5 Mercury-Atlas
launch vehicle (93-D) in one major respect. The insulation and its retaining
bulkhead between the lox and fuel tank dome was removed prior to launch when
39
It was discovered that fuel had leaked into this insulation. The original
requirement for this insulation and retainer had been deleted earlier in
the Atlas development program as being nonessential. The following minor
modifications were incorporated into the Atlas 109-D for the MA-6 mission:
1. The gyro canister was modified to include specially selected

transistors of an earlier design that displayed good thermal characteristics.
This change decreases the possibility of thermal run-away in the gyro torquer
and signal amplifier.
2. The launch-vehicle lox-tank pressure parameter for the abort sensing

and implementation system was changed from 21.5 ± 1-0 psi to 19-5 ^ 1-0 psi
to protect against an inadvertent abort resulting from lox-tank ullage-pressure
transients which occur at lift-off.
MISSION OPERATIONS
The various ground operations required to support a Mercury orbital

mission successfully may be grouped according to appropriate mission phases:
prelaunch, launch, flight, and recovery. The prelaunch operations include
the preparations necessary to bring the spacecraft, launch vehicle, astronaut,
and ground support personnel up to flight-ready status. The launch operations
begin with the countdown, where all flight systems and flight-control stations
are checked for readiness, and concludes with insertion of the spacecraft into
its orbital trajectory. The orbital portion of the flight entails the flight
monitoring and data acquisition operations of personnel stationed along the
Mercury Worldwide Network. The recovery operations begin when a landing point
is predicted by appropriate network stations and involve the combined efforts
of thousands of Department of Defense personnel stationed at the various pre-
scribed landing locations along the orbital ground track. For a brief back-
ground regarding Mercury mission operations, see reference 5-
PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS
The prelaunch operations consist of the training of the astronaut for

a specific flight, preparations conducted at the launch site for the spacecraft
and the launch vehicle, and flight safety reviews. Although each astronaut
has received training since his introduction into the Mercury program, he must
be specially trained for the mission involved. This training primarily involves
participation in a series of mission simulations which present realistic oper-
ational situations to be assessed and acted upon. These simulations are often
conducted in conjunction with the detailed checkout operations completed for the
spacecraft, launch vehicle, and the Mercury Network. Program management
personnel attend scheduled review meetings to evaluate the status of prelaunch
preparations for the spacecraft and launch vehicle and to initiate remedial
action as necessary in order to insure the safety of the astronaut throughout
the mission. The following paragraphs outline the operations required in
preparation for launch, beginning with the arrival of the spacecraft at the
launch site.
Astronaut Training and Preparation
The astronaut training program for Project Mercury can be broken down into
six basic categories which are essentially dependent on the training devices
used. These categories are academics, static training, environmental familiar-
ization, dynamic training, egress and survival training, and specific mission
training. For a more complete description >and history of Mercury astronaut
training, see references 6 and 7 and paper 10 of reference k.
Academics.- In addition to a series of lectures on basic astronautics early

in the program, detailed systems briefings were given by contractor engineers
concerned with the design of the various systems. Also, NASA engineers con-
cerned with the monitoring of these design tasks presented detailed briefings
on their specific spacecraft system and current changes involved. As a
in
supplement for classroom lectures, a number of field trips were made to con-
tractor plants where flight hardware was developed. Each of the astronauts
was assigned a specialty area associated with a phase of Mercury; and in the
capacity of consultant for their particular area, the astronauts participated
in and contributed to design reviews from an operations standpoint.
Static training devices.- Soon after the beginning of the astronaut

training program, a series of training devices were designed and made avail-
able. Initially, rudimentary attitude-control trainers were employed. These
simulators were soon replaced by the more sophisticated procedures trainers.
At present, one of the two procedures trainers is located at Manned Spacecraft
Center, and the other is installed at the Mercury Control Center, Cape Canaveral.
These simulators provide valuable training in all mission phases, and many of
the possible failure modes may be simulated and the resulting performance of
the astronaut may be evaluated. In addition to providing valuable training
for the flight astronauts during critical mission phases, these static training
devices have allowed accurate assessments of system changes affecting pilot pro-
cedures which have been incorporated into the trainers.
Environmental familiarization.- A basic phase of preparing the astro-

nauts for flight is their familiarization with the extreme environmental con-
ditions which might occur during a Mercury mission. Two examples of specific
environmental training are the thermal chamber and the carbon dioxide room.
The thermal chamber provided exposure to maximum expected heat stresses during
a simulated reentry. The carbon dioxide room merely offered some familiarity
with the effects of above normal concentrations of this gas in order to make
this condition more easily recognizable. In addition, the pilots have been
conditioned to the normal spacecraft environment through their participation
in altitude chamber tests as a part of the prelaunch preparation of the
spacecraft.
Dynamic training devices.- The training units which can be classified

as dynamic in nature include the zero-gravity trainers, the centrifuges, the
air-lubricated free-attitude (ALFA) trainer, the multiaxis spin-test inertia
facility (MASTIF), and various high-performance jet aircraft. The zero-gravity
trainers are primarily high-speed transport aircraft, which can provide up to
30 seconds of weightlessness by flying a parabolic arc. In addition, valuable
training in this regard was also achieved through hydrostatic test facilities
and scuba diving. The Aeromedical Acceleration Laboratory (AMAL) located at
Johnsville, Pennsylvania, includes a centrifuge which permits simulations in
mission phases, such as launch, reentry, and abort, during which the acceler-
ation levels are particularly high. A mock-up of the spacecraft interior is
installed in the gondola of the Johnsville centrifuge, and after depressur-
ization to nominal cabin pressure for a Mercury flight, the simulated missions
in this trainer are exceptionally realistic. A major dynamic trainer is the
ALFA trainer. A completely enclosed couch is mounted on an air bearing; and
with the Mercury hand controller which actuates compressed-air jets, the
trainer attitudes can be controlled about all three axes. Simulation of the
retrorockets has been provided by additional compressed-air jets, and the
difficult manual retrofire maneuver can be effectively practiced. The MASTIF
trainer is similar in function to the ALFA trainer, but it is mounted so that
•*•
rapid rates about all three axes can be generated for a glmbaled contour seat
and hand-controlled configuration. Practice in recovering from violent space-
craft maneuvers is effectively conducted. And finally, each astronaut has
maintained proficiency in operating high-performance aircraft, primarily a
supersonic jet airplane assigned to the program.
Egress and survival training.- Since the primary recovery area for
Mercury is in the water, many hours have been spent in practicing egress
from the floating spacecraft. The primary mode of egress is through the
small pressure bulkhead and the recovery section. In most cases, maximum
utilization has been made of actual recovery conditions and vehicles, such
as helicopters. Survival training was provided in various degrees of hard-
ship, including -~ day in a liferaft and 3 days in the desert.
Specific mission preparation.- Although the training activities for the

astronauts have been reasonably concentrated during the 3 years of initial
preparation, specific assignments immediately prior to a flight for the chosen
pilot are especially demanding. For the MA.-6 astronaut, these assignments
included complete familiarization with spacecraft 13, physiological examina-
tions (discussed in the Aeromedical Analysis section), flight simulations
(discussed in the Astronaut Flight Activities section) using the actual flight
plan, physical conditioning, and familiarization with special equipment to be
included and used during the flight. In addition, more specific tasks in the
training devices described previously were completed. The flight and backup
astronauts also actively participate in the many spacecraft and launch-vehicle
systems reviews in the days immediately prior to launch. The pace of activity
with regard to precise astronaut training steadily increased throughout the
program as new knowledge was gained and operational demands became more severe,
and the MA.-6 flight was the culmination of these efforts.
Spacecraft Prelaunch Preparation
The detailed checkout of the spacecraft is conducted primarily at Cape

Canaveral during the prelaunch preparation period. The activities during
this period are additionally described in reference 8 and paper 5 of reference
The detailed examination involves functional testing of the spacecraft systems,
observing in detail the performance of the individual systems. These tests,
which duplicate as nearly as possible the different flight environments and
modes, are repeated as necessary. During these tests, all discrepancies, no
matter how trivial, are scrutinized for their significance. Design changes
indicated by these tests and the previous Mercury flights are incorporated as
rapidly as possible so that the optimum spacecraft configuration may be flown.
Astronaut participation in all system checkouts and design reviews at Cape
Canaveral is very important to the mission. This participation provides the
pilot with intimate familiarization with the flight spacecraft and its systems.
Time utilization.- The checkout phase for spacecraft 13 was conducted in

Hangar S, assigned to the NASA, at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and lasted approxi-
mately 133 days as shown in figure 19- This checkout is followed by launch
complex operations in which the launch vehicle and spacecraft are mated and
• • •
• • ••
••• •
• •••
tested together. This testing is conducted to assure that the launch vehicle
and spacecraft are mechanically, electrically, and radio-frequency compatible
and is followed by final assembly and launch preparations.
The time spent in the hangar can be initially broken into two parts:
(1) Work performed on the spacecraft, such as spacecraft assembly and

servicing and incorporation of design changes. For MA-6, this work
took approximately 63 of the 133 days spent in the hangar.
(2) Systems testing, troubleshooting, and replacement of components as

a result of this testing. Seventy days were spent in this phase of
the operation.
The launch-complex operations required 33 days to complete.
Design changes. - The MA-6 spacecraft had a total of 255 minor design
changes incorporated at Cape Canaveral, a portion of which resulted from the
experience gained during the orbital mission of spacecraft 9 (MA-5). These
changes involved the following systems: the reaction control system, the
electrical system, the ECS, the ASCS, and items of a miscellaneous nature.
The major changes are presented in the Spacecraft History sections.
Systems tests.- Checkout operations at Hangar S consist of individual

systems tests followed by a simulated flight test with all systems operating
in a manner approaching flight conditions. The following system tests were
performed on spacecraft 13:
(1) Electrical power

(2) Instrumentation
(3) Sequential
(U) Environmental control
(5) Communications
(6) Reaction control
(7) Communications radiation tower test
(8) Automatic stabilization and control
(9) Altitude chamber tests
The electrical power system test was the initial test performed on the
MA-6 spacecraft. This test determines if power can be safely applied to the
control and power distribution system of the spacecraft. The test also checks
automatic and manual a-c inverter switching. Power surges on the d-c bus were
experienced when the 150 v-amp main inverter was switched on the line. Because
an excessive number of power surges occurred, the inverter was replaced.
The instrumentation system was thoroughly tested and calibrated on the

bench prior to its installation in the spacecraft. The system was tested again
after it had been installed in the spacecraft. The primary purpose of the
latter test is fourfold: (l) to determine the error, if any, between the
hardline signal normally used to transmit data to the blockhouse or other test
equipment in the hangar and the signal radiated through the telemetry trans-
mitter* (2) to determine possible interference within the instrumentation
system and "betveen it and other systems operating in the spacecraft; (3) to
make a single-point check of the complete calibration made on the "bench; and
(4) to insure that the system is satisfactory to support other spacecraft
tests. No major system discrepancies were uncovered during this testing.
The sequential system test provides for the checkout of the automatic and
manual sequential system. The sequential system testing may "be divided into
the following four major parts: launch, orbit, escape, and reentry. Con-
trolled inputs are fed to the sequential system and the system outputs are
monitored. The maximum-altitude sensor actuates the jettisoning of the escape
tower. Although called a maximum-altitude sensor, it is actually a variable
timer whose time delay depends on the existence of an abort signal and the time
from lift-off at which the abort signal occurs. During the abort phase in the
simulated flight of spacecraft 13, it was determined that this sensor actuated
prematurely. The sensor was replaced and the abort runs were repeated suc-
cessfully.
The environmental control system (ECS) checkout, which is conducted prior
to the altitude-chamber test, determines the functional operation of the
separate components of the ECS system. The oxygen bottles are serviced to
operating pressure at this time and maintained at this level for the altitude-
chamber test.
As the result of this testing, the following major ECS discrepancies were
uncovered:
(1) Excessive leakage of the high-pressure oxygen shutoff valve was

noted.
(2) The high-pressure oxygen regulator showed an external leak. The

valve body was found to be defective.
(3) An aluminum check valve for the Freon coolant supply had stuck in
the open position and all valves of this type were replaced with
stainless-steel valves.
The communications systems tests are conducted in two parts, the bench
tests and the radiation tower tests. The primary purpose of the bench tests
is to determine the electrical characteristics of the individual components
that make up the onboard communications system. For the radiation tower tests,
the flight configuration is simulated as closely as possible. These tests
evaluate the transmission quality of the HF bicone antenna; other communications
system components are tested at the same time. No significant discrepancies
were revealed during the systems tests for the MA-6 spacecraft.
The reaction control system (RCS) checkout procedure determines the

condition and operation of the RCS. These tests are conducted in a special
test cell, and several gas checks are employed to determine the overall gas
integrity of the RCS, as well as functional tests of the entire system. The
final test of this series involves the static firing of the pressurized RCS.
The system performed well during the testing of spacecraft 13.
' '•
The automatic stabilization and control system (ASCS) checkout is divided

into two parts, a static and a dynamic test. The dynamic test is conducted
with the spacecraft in a fixture which is rotated at a constant rate in pitch
and roll. For MA-6, the static test was completed without incident, hut the
dynamic portion of the test was interrupted by a failure of the yaw-repeater
loop. A shorted capacitor was discovered in the repeater motor circuitry. A
new autopilot passed both the static and dynamic tests with no discrepancies.
The altitude-chamber tests are used to determine the peculiar operating

characteristics of the overall environmental control system (ECS) for the
flight. The astronaut is suited and connected into the ECS for the first time
during these tests. The chamber is pumped down to a simulated altitude of
about 125,000 feet, and a simulated flight is initiated. MA-6 teat data indi-
cated that the 150 v-amp inverter overheated during the first three runs, and
the water-flow orifice to the cooling plates was increased in size. Further
testing revealed that the sealant used in the construction of the cooling
plates had penetrated into the flow passages and clogged them. The passages
were cleaned and the original orifices were installed. Flow tests on the final
installation showed that the system was clean.
Simulated flights.- Following the systems tests, a series of simulated

missions is begun. The simulated flight test for spacecraft 13 began in
Hangar S on November 25 and was completed on December 12, 1961. When the
launch was rescheduled for January 19^2, another hangar simulated flight was
initiated on December 19 and was successfully completed on December 21, 1961.
At this time, the spacecraft was considered functionally ready for launch pad
operations. For greater detail regarding the technical objectives of the
simulated flights and their results, see pages 6l and 62 of reference 4.
Launch pad operations (prior to countdown).- The launch pad operations

prior to countdown are scheduled for completion in-13 days; however, because
of delays caused by changes in the MA-6 spacecraft and launch vehicle after
mating, changes prompted by trouble encountered during tests, and adverse
weather conditions, the actual time the spacecraft spent on the launch pad
was somewhat longer than this, as shown in figure 20. The launch pad oper-
ations prior to countdown are listed below in the order in which they are
normally performed:
(l) Launch complex checkout

2) Interface inspection
3) Mechanical mating
h) Spacecraft systems test
5) Electrical interface and aborts
6) Flight acceptance composite tests
(7) Flight configuration sequence and aborts
(8) Launch simulation, including RCS static firings
(9) Simulated flight
(10) lyrotechnic check
(11) Spacecraft servicing
(12) Precount
• ••
••
Each of these operations, together with the troubles encountered, subse-

quent delays, and repairs made, is discussed in greater detail in reference 4
(pages 62 to 66).
It is apparent that the detailed preflight testing is a time-consuming
program; however, this testing has revealed a number of system malfunctions
or weaknesses which might have prevented the completion of a successful mis-
sion, not only for MA-6, but for previous flight tests as well. Although this
policy of detailed testing and checkout has led to lengthy preparation periods,
inflight failures would cause even longer delays in the overall program.
Spacecraft History
Spacecraft no. 13 was delivered to Hangar S at Cape Canaveral, Florida,
on August 27, 1961. Upon arrival, the spacecraft entered a brief period of
final installation, during which the individual systems checks were completed
satisfactorily prior to preparing the spacecraft for the altitude chamber tests.
Reaction control system.- The following items represent major changes to

the reaction control system during testing at Cape Canaveral prior to launch:
(1) Roll thrust-chamber heat sinks were added.
(2) Existing flare seals were removed from the automatic system inlet
and outlet connections of the thrust-chamber solenoid valves to
reduce the possibility of leakage in the area of the thruster. Sub-
sequently, all applicable seals were replaced with an improved seal.
(3) Nine solenoid valves were replaced with aluminum valves because of
the inferior quality of the plastic seals at high-temperature levels.
(4) The clockwise automatic roll-thruster assembly was replaced.
Environmental control system.- During the testing performed at Cape

Canaveral, the following changes in the environmental control system were made:
(1) Water-type heat exchangers of an advanced design were installed

under the 150- and 250-v-amp main inverters.
(2) Screens with 0.06-inch diameter holes were installed in the cabin
fan inlet ducts.
(3) The aluminum check valves in the cooling system for the inverters
were replaced with stainless steel valves.
The high-pressure 0 reducer was replaced because of a leak prior

to-the altitude—chamber runs.
(5) The primary-0 -system shutoff-valve stem was removed, reworked, and
reinstalled because of leaking 0-rings.
^^^M__
CONFIDENTIAL
• •
t ••
(6) A manual "blood-pressure system vas installed.

(7) During the first run of an entire simulated mission, the no. 1 suit
fan was "below specification performance and was replaced.
(8) An indicator was installed on the instrument panel to provide a
readout of suit-circuit steam-vent exhaust temperature.
(9) The CO absorber vas replaced after the spacecraft was moved to the
launching complex.
(lO) The suit-circuit demand regulator was replaced.
Communications.- No major problems were experienced with the communica-

tion equipment after the spacecraft arrived at Hangar S. Readouts from the
range on the C-band radar beacon showed jitter and varying signal strength.
These problems disappeared, as expected, when the service tower was removed.
Electrical system.- The following changes were made to the electrical
system at Cape Canaveral:
(1) Flight batteries were activated on November 8, 1961. These batteries,
which were near their normal activated lifetime, were replaced on
February 10, 19&2, when one cell lost voltage and another had a short
circuit.
(2) The mercury-cell auxiliary battery units used for the integrating
accelerometer and the maximum-attitude sensor were replaced with
new units on January 13, 19^2.
(3) Inverter switching circuitry was modified to provide a nonfused
circuit to the standby inverter in the manual mode.
(k) The original 150 v-amp inverter malfunctioned during a hangar test
and was replaced.
(5) The suit-fan toggle switch was replaced.
(6) The removable half of all fuse-block holders was reinforced.
(7) The telelight panel was removed, reworked, and reinstalled.
(8) The retrorocket relay panel was replaced.
(9) Because of an internal malfunction, the thrust-cutoff sensor was

replaced.
(10) During a hangar check, the maximum altitude sensor actuated pre-
maturely and was replaced.
(11) The satellite clock was replaced on two separate occasions because
of malfunctions.
.••
(12) Indicator lights shoving which inverter was operative were added to
the instrument panel.
Launch-Vehicle Prelaunch Preparation
In order to support Mercury-Atlas missions, "both the launch complex and

the launch vehicle required modification. Figure 21 shows the major modifica-
tions made to the launch complex. In the service tower, a room was built to
enclose the spacecraft. This room, commonly called the "white room," is lo-
cated near the top of the service tower. The environment in this white room
is controlled to minimize the effects of humidity, dust, and so forth, on the
spacecraft components. An emergency egress tower is shown in figure 22. The
figure depicts the egress platform in the extended position, such that the
end of the platform is adjacent to the hatch of the spacecraft. When retracted,
the platform arm is rotated in the vertical plane so that the launch vehicle
will not strike the platform when it is launched. Special rescue and fire-
fighting vehicles are stationed just outside the complex to transport the
egress crew to the tower and/or to meet the astronaut at the tower and trans-
port him away from the complex. A special firefighting system including four
nozzles is also installed and is remotely controlled from the blockhouse in
such a manner that water or fire-smothering foam could be directed to any area
inside the complex. A radio command link is provided in the blockhouse. This
capability provides a ground-command means of firing the spacecraft escape
rockets and aborting the spacecraft prior to launch and is the primary means
for providing an abort during the first 10 seconds of flight.
Upon arrival at Cape Canaveral, the launch vehicle is inspected and pre-
pared for erection in approximately 48 hours. The launch vehicle is trans-
ported to the complex on a dolly-type vehicle, backed into the launcher, alined,
and attached to the launcher. A hoist cable is then attached to the front end
of the dolly (top end of the launch vehicle) and the dolly and launch vehicle
are hoisted to the vertical position. The launcher is then rotated back to
its original horizontal position.
For MA-6, it was learned after erection that the launcher mechanism could
not be adjusted sufficiently to aline the launch vehicle properly. Therefore,
the launch vehicle was taken down, the launcher mechanism was replaced, and
the launch vehicle was reerected.
All systems on the complex and the launch vehicle are then tested indi-
vidually. Complete tanking tests are conducted in which the fuel and liquid
oxygen tanks are loaded and pressurized to flight pressure. This test is
performed to determine if any leaks are in the systems and also to check out
the controls related to each system. During this test on the MA-6 launch
vehicle no major leaks were evident; however, some minor leaks were discovered
and subsequently corrected.
The autopilot system is also completely tested; however, before autopilot

tests are conducted on the launch complex, the gyro packages are calibrated
in a laboratory at Cape Canaveral with special testing equipment. These
packages are also electrically mated to the abort-sensing control package
49
• • .••j •? * •' •' :.: :' i •••
:"• -5:5••
•• ^ •• • ^^
CONFIDEHTIAL
which is part of the ASIS previously discussed. During these laboratory and
systems tests, various anomalies vere uncovered in the gyro package and the
ASIB control package. These packages vere replaced and systems tests were
completed satisfactorily on the launch vehicle.
All launch-vehicle systems are then tested simultaneously in a critical
test commonly knovn as the flight acceptance composite test (FACT). This
test is conducted to determine that all launch-vehicle systems are compatible.
The FACT must be successfully accomplished before the spacecraft is elec-
trically mated to the launch vehicle. After electrical mating, the launch
vehicle and spacecraft participate jointly in all tests. For a more complete
description of the launch complex and the preparation for the launch vehicle,
see paper k- of reference k.
The first attempt to launch MA-6 was on January 27, 1962. The launch
vehicle was loaded with fuel on January 2^. However, the mission was canceled
because of excessive cloud cover in the launch area and was rescheduled for
February 1. The fuel tank was drained, and on January JO, it was again loaded;
however, normal inspection procedures disclosed that the insulation-retaining
bulkhead in the fuel tanks was leaking. The leak was in the lower retainer
and had allowed fuel to soak into the insulation and become trapped. After
a careful study of the possible resultant effects, it was decided that suffi-
cient flight experience had been obtained to justify removing the retainer
and the insulation. After the retainer and insulation were removed and all
systems were reconnected, a complete test program was rerun on every system
disturbed by the modification. The simulated flight test was rerun on
February l6, 1962, and the launch vehicle was again loaded with fuel in prep-
aration for launch on February 20.
Flight Safety Reviews
Two series of meetings were held by the MA-6 Flight Safety Review Board
because of the launch postponements.
First series of reviews.- The meetings were conducted in anticipation of
launch on January 24 and again on January 27, 19^2. The launch was rescheduled
from January 2^ to January 27 when an oxygen leak in the spacecraft environ-
mental control system was discovered on January 20. The countdown on January 27
was conducted until 20 minutes before launch, at which time the weather caused
postponement of the launch attempt.
The first spacecraft review meeting was held on January 18. The space-
craft history at AMR and the present status of all the spacecraft systems were
reviewed, after which the spacecraft was approved as ready for flight. A
second review meeting, scheduled after the oxygen leak had been repaired, was
held on January 2^. During this meeting, the status of the spacecraft systems
was discussed, and all systems, including the ECS, were again approved as
ready for flight.
The first Booster Review meeting was held on January 19. All launch-
vehicle and supporting systems were approved as ready for flight. The
50
• ••
• ••
••
Mission Review meeting vas held at 1:00 p.m. on January 25, and all elements
for the flight were found to be in readiness.
When the Flight Safety Board convened at 9:30 a.m. on January 26, it
was reported that the launch vehicle was not in a flight status because of
broken wires and damaged pins in a separation plug. This plug, which is
disconnected at booster staging, carries booster engine autopilot commands,
rough combustion cutoff circuitry, and engine instrumentation signals. The
plug was repaired, and, when the Flight Safety Board met again at 1:00 p.m.
on January 26, the launch vehicle was ready to be committed to flight. Weather
problems caused the launch attempt of January 27 to be postponed.
Second series of reviews.- On January 30 fuel was discovered in the in-
sulation between the structural bulkhead and the insulation bulkhead separating
the launch-vehicle fuel and oxidizer tanks. Fuel had leaked into this area
around a flange bolt. The decision was made to remove the insulation and
insulation bulkhead, and this work period caused the launch to be rescheduled
for February 13. Adverse weather forced three more postponements to
February lk, 15, and finally 20. No separate spacecraft or launch-vehicle
review meetings were held during this period. The second Mission Review
meeting was held on February 12. Satisfactory removal of the insulation and
retaining bulkhead had been made, and all systems were found to be ready for
flight. Launch-vehicle status meetings were held on February 13 and 19, and
the Flight Safety Board recommended that the mission proceed since all systems
were in readiness.
CONFIDENnAL 51
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LAUNCH OPERATIONS
Launch Procedure
The spacecraft launch operations were planned incorporating a 6lO-minute

split countdown with a 17^-hour built-in hold at T-390 minutes for spacecraft
peroxide servicing. In order to provide additional assurance that the time
of lift-off would not be later than the preestablished maximum time of
10:00 a.m. on February 20, 1962, a 90-minute hold was scheduled at T-120 minutes.
The second half of the split count was picked up at 11:30 p.m., e.s.t.,
on February 19, 1962. Launch was at 9:^7 a.m., e.s.t., on February 20, 1962,
after 2 hours and 17 minutes of unplanned holds. The following is a sequence
of important events, including holds, which occurred in the countdown:
T-J90 min Count was resumed.
T-120 min Built-in 90-minute hold. Because of a sudden drop in
the automatic gain control of the launch-vehicle rate
beacon, the first backup beacon was substituted for
the original during this 90-minute scheduled hold
period. The hold was extended an additional ^5 minutes
to complete installation and revalidate the beacon.
An additional 10-minute hold was required to replace
a broken microphone bracket in the astronaut's helmet.
T-120 min The count was resumed.
T-117 min Completed second launch-vehicle guidance loop test.
T-87 min Hatch installation began.
T-60 min A ^0-minute hold was required to replace a broken
hatch bolt. A third launch-vehicle guidance loop
test was performed during this hold.
T-^5 min A 15-minute hold was required to add approximately
10 gallons of fuel to the launch vehicle.
T-22 min A 25-minute hold resulted from a malfunction of the
main lox fill pump outlet valve. The final 20 percent
of lox tanking was accomplished by using a smaller
pump via a 6- inch line, resulting in a slower operation.
T-6 min JO sec A 2-minute hold was required by the Mercury flight
director to investigate a loss of power to the Bermuda
computer.
Weather Conditions
The weather conditions in the launch area at lift-off were as follows:

p
Cloud cover ........................ ^n" alto-cumulus
Visibility, miles ................... .- ...... 10
Surface winds, knots ............... North at l8 (gusts to 25)
56
•• I
• •
A plot of the launch area vlnd direction and speed is shown in figure 23
for altitudes up to 60,000 feet.
Landing area weather conditions at lift-off were as follows:
Cloud cover
Visibility, miles ........................... 10
Surface winds, knots ..................... ESE at Ik
Waves, feet .............................. 2
Photographic Coverage
Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) optical coverage, including the quantity of
instrumentation committed and data obtained during the launch phase, is given
in table III. AMR optical tracking from lift-off or first acquisition to the
limit of visibility is shown in figure 2^.
Metric film were reduced and the results were tabulated by AMR, but these
data were not required for evaluation by MSC since the powered- flight phase
was normal .
Engineering sequential coverage at AMR station 1 during the launch phase
was satisfactory. Thirteen 16 mm and 35 nun films from three fixed and ten
tracking cameras were reviewed. The quality of fixed camera coverage was
excellent and indicated normal umbilical ejection, periscope retraction, launch-
vehicle ignition, and lift-off. The quality of tracking camera coverage was
good during all phases, with the exception of the early portion of powered
flight because of ground haze conditions at lift-off. All tracking cameras
indicated normal launch-vehicle staging and escape-tower separation. Docu-
mentary coverage used for engineering evaluation of the mission was satisfac-
tory, and film quality was average. Seven motion picture films and numerous
still photographs were available for review. Two motion picture films pre-
sented a portion of the prelaunch activities, including astronaut preparation
at Hangar S, insertion of the astronaut into the spacecraft, closing of the
hatch and securing for launch, and portions of the operational activity at
the Mercury Control Center during the mission. Coverage and quality of these
two films were good. Ibur motion picture films presented portions of the
recovery operation, including aerial and shipboard coverage of spacecraft re-
trieval from the water, removal of the hatch, astronaut egress, transfer from
the recovery ship, and the physical examination aboard the carrier. One film
included views of the astronaut at Grand Turk Island and the spacecraft being
loaded aboard the aircraft for removal to Cape Canaveral. Photographic coverage
in single-frame exposures included views similar to those documented by motion
pictures, with the exeption of hatch removal onboard the recovery ship.
Numerous engineering still photographs were available showing close-up views
of the spacecraft after recovery and during postflight inspection at Hangar S.
57
• •• •
• •• • •
I
• •••• ••• •
TABLE III. - AMR OPTICAL COVERAGE OF LAUNCH AND REENTRY PHASES
Film type No. of items Wo. of items Lost Reason for loss
committed obtained items
Metric 15 15 0 Not applicable
a
Engineering sequential, 1*7 k6 i No reentry data
station 1
a
Engineering sequential, 1 0 l No reentry data
station 3
a
Engineering sequential, l 0 l No reentry data
station 5
Documentary 88 88 0 Not applicable
rlanned for reentry coverage.
58
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60
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.'..•
FLIGHT-CONTROL OPERATIONS
Real-time monitoring of spacecraft systems operation, medical status of

the astronaut, and critical mission events is provided by specially trained
flight-control personnel located throughout the Mercury Worldwide Network.
In turn, the flight controllers in the Mercury Control Center at Cape Canaveral
monitor the activities of corresponding persons around the network once the
spacecraft has passed over a given station. The Mercury Control Center, there-
fore, is the focal point of all flight-control operations, and all major
decisions made during the flight are either initiated or approved by the
Operations Director or the Flight Director at this site. The following para-
graphs summarize the flight-control activities during the MA-6 mission. Paper 6
of reference U briefly describes the flight-control philosophy and presents,
in greater detail, the real-time monitoring during the flight.
The orbital launch and insertion parameters very closely approximated

nominal conditions. The pilot's performance throughout the flight was
excellent, and he was able to cope with the unusual situations which arose.
Several problems developed in the spacecraft automatic control system. The
ASCS was unable to maintain the spacecraft within the preset attitude limits
about the yaw axis after approximately one orbital pass because of the lack
of thrust from the 1-pound yaw thrusters. This same malfunction was reflected
in the system's operation when the astronaut selected the fly-by-wire mode;
however, he was able to maintain satisfactory attitude control about the yaw
axis by using the larger thrusters. The horizon scanner and gyro reference
system appeared to be in error mainly in the roll axis while the spacecraft
was on the dark side of the earth.
The manual-proportional control system worked well throughout the flight.

The effectiveness of the main inverter cooling system was less than expected
as indicated by the increasing temperatures of these units throughout the
flight. Inverter temperatures reached values as high as 220° F; however,
no inverter malfunction occurred.
On the first pass over Cape Canaveral, segment 51 of the commutator

showed a signal which, if correct, indicated that the spacecraft heat shield
had been released. Considerable analysis and discussion followed, and a con-
clusion was first made that the signal, although a correct telemetry output,
was the result of a faulty switch and that the normal sequence of events should
be followed. Further discussion, however, indicated that the safest approach
would be to allow the retropackaga to remain attached. The retropackage
straps would then hold the heat shield in place until sufficient dynamic
force was exerted to maintain its position throughout reentry heating. The
opinion was that the heat effects of the retropackage on the spacecraft heat
shield and afterbody would not be damaging. Therefore, the pilot was advised
by the California station to keep the retrojettison switch in the disarm
position during the retrofire maneuver. The remainder of the flight was normal,
and no other major system malfunctions occurred.
61
It must be strongly emphasized that without a pilot in the spacecraft to
make decisions and take corrective action, the malfunctions which occurred
would have made the successful completion of the flight extremely difficult,
if not impossible.
RECOVERY OPERATIONS
Recovery Plans
Figure 25 shows the Atlantic Ocean recovery areas where ships and air-
craft were positioned at the time of launch. Areas 1 through 6 were available
in the event that it became necessary to abort the mission during powered
flight. Recovery forces were distributed so as to provide for recovery within
a maximum of 3 hours after landing in areas 1 and U, and a maximum of 6 hours
in areas 2, 3, 5> and 6. Areas 7, 8, and 9 were available for landing at the
end of orbital passes 1, 2, and 3> respectively, and recovery forces were
distributed to provide for recovery within a maximum of 3 hours. A total of
2k ships and 15 aircraft were on station in these Atlantic recovery areas at
launch time. In addition, helicopters, amphibious surface vehicles, and small
boats were positioned for recovery support near the launch site. Figure 26
shows the positions of contingency recovery aircraft that were on alert at
various staging bases in the event that a landing occurred any place along
the orbital ground track. These aircraft were equipped to locate the space-
craft and to provide local emergency assistance if required. See paper 7 of
reference h for a more detailed description of the MA-6 recovery plans.
Recovery Procedure
All recovery forces were on station at the planned launch time. Weather
conditions were favorable for location and retrieval in all primary recovery
areas and in the contingency areas. Recovery communications were good through-
out the entire operation, and the recovery forces were informed of mission
status during the launch, orbital, and reentry phases. During the third orbital
pass, recovery units in area 9, shown in figure 27, were alerted to expect a
landing in their area, and at 0^:^2:00 (13 minutes prior to landing) these
units were informed that the landing was calculated to occur at 21°29' North
latitude and 68°^8' West longitude. This information was transmitted to the
recovery forces as CAL REP 1 (calculated landing position report), as shown
in figure 27- Continued radar tracking made little change in this prediction,
and at OU:U6:00 (9 minutes prior to landing), the recovery forces were directed
to orient their search about this position. This information was transmitted
as DATUM REP 1 (datum report) indicating that this was the best landing
position information available at that time. In the meantime, lookouts on the
destroyer U.S.S. Noa, which had been stationed in the DDl6 recovery position
(see fig. 27) heard a noise like an explosion, and approximately 20 seconds
later, the main parachute and spacecraft were sighted at an estimated slant
range of 5 miles and elevation angle of 35°• The noise was described as
having been similar to that produced by the shock wave of an aircraft travel-
ing at supersonic speeds.
62
" ..-
•• ••" ::."
;' :•:
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•
The U. S.S. Noa established communication with the astronaut, and at
05:07: CO (12 minutes after landing), it was alongside the spacecraft. The
astronaut remained in the spacecraft during the retrieval operation. A
photograph of the spacecraft prior to retrieval is shown in figure 28. A
"shepherd's crook" was used to attach a lifting line to the spacecraft, which
was hoisted clear of the water at 05:12:00 and secured on the recovery ship
at 05:15:00 (20 minutes after landing).
The astronaut first decided to egress from the spacecraft through the
parachute compartment, whereupon he initiated the standard procedure of re-
moving the right-hand instrument panel. However, considering the time and
effort normally associated with this egress route and the fact that he was un-
comfortably hot, he elected to egress more rapidly through the side hatch.
He actuated the hatch explosive mechanism from inside the spacecraft and was
clear of the spacecraft at 05:3^:00 (39 minutes after landing).
The following retrieval information was reported by the recovery ship:
Position of retrieval:
North latitude 21°25.6'
West longitude 68°36.5'
Wind velocity, knots 18 (119° from true north)
Wave height, feet 2
Water temperature, °F 81
Air temperature, °F 75
Recovery Aids
All spacecraft recovery aids functioned normally. Search aircraft re-
ported making contact with both SARAH recovery beacons and with the UHF
transceiver. These aircraft were proceeding towards the calculated landing
position at this time and were well within the available range of these sys-
tems. The dye marker and flashing light were reported to be functioning
normally. A fix, based upon the SOFAR bomb signal, was available at the re-
covery center about 1 hour after landing. This fix was approximately k miles
from the spacecraft retrieval position, as shown in figure 27- The SEASAVE
beacon fixes, as reported by the HF/DF networks of the Navy and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), are also shown in figure 27. The SEASAVE
first fix was made available to the recovery center at 05:20:00 and a later
fix was available at 05:27:00. Both fixes were about 25 nautical miles from
the retrieval point.
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67
MISSION PERFORMANCE
The technical results of the MA-6 mission are presented and accom-
panied by an analysis of the flight data. Performance analyses are grouped
into the following seven major areas: spacecraft, aeromedical analysis,
astronaut flight activities, astronaut's flight report, launch vehicle,
trajectory and mission events, and the Mercury Worldwide Network. The
spacecraft performance section treats each major system within the Mercury
vehicle and presents the flight results and postflight analyses. In the
sections regarding the MA-6 astronaut and his performance during the mission,
a comprehensive medical investigation, a detailed analysis of his flight
activities, and a personal narrative account of the orbital flight experi-
ence are documented. The section which presents launch-vehicle performance
is a very brief synopsis of Atlas systems' operation. The trajectory and
mission events section consists largely of a graphical presentation of
major trajectory parameters and mission event times. The Mercury Network is
analyzed in the areas of tracking, communications, and computation, and the
results of the Network performance are compared with those of previous
orbital flights.
68
SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE
The spacecraft as an entity performed adequately. Some malfunctions

were experienced, and analyses of these are presented in the following
paragraphs. Also discussed, from an overall mission viewpoint, are the
spacecraft systems' general performance. Flight data and measurements are
generally not shown, other than those which clarify an analysis or present
measurements of particular interest. Complete time histories of spacecraft
data, without analysis, are presented in part II of this report.
Spacecraft Control System
With the single exception of "both 1-pound yaw thrusters failing, the
spacecraft control system functioned normally throughout the flight. Dis-
crepancies reported by the astronaut between the attitude indicators and
the visual reference resulting from procedural problems are discussed, and
a detailed analysis of the thruster malfunction is presented in the Reaction
Control System section.
System description.- The spacecraft is capable of the following
control modes:
1. Automatic stabilization control system (ASCS), with orbit mode,

orientation mode, and auxiliary damping mode.
2. Fly-by-wire (FB¥) manual,
3. Manual proportional (MP).
4. Rate stabilization control system (RSCS).

Modes 1 and 2 employ the automatic reaction control system (RCS)
while modes 3 and k use the manual RCS. Each reaction control system is
independent of the other. Combinations of modes 1 and 3, 2 and 3, or 2
and k may be used simultaneously. The amplifier-calibrator (Amp Cal) in-
corporated a new single-pulse, orbit-mode logic, thus eliminating the
multiple pulses that have been experienced previously in the orbit mode
because of dirty repeater sectors. In addition, the horizon scanner refer-
ence levels were set at approximately 25 percent to lessen cold cloud
effects, and scanner slaving was programed for 8.5 minutes in each 30-minute
period.
Flight description and analysis. -
Powered flight and turnaround: The control system operation was normal
during the launch phase, but the 5 seconds of separation rate damping was
delayed 2. 5 seconds by the sequence circuitry associated with the 0. 20g
switch; thus a fairly large initial roll error was produced at the start of
turnaround. The source of this error was the preclusion of rate damping as
a result of reopening the 0. 20g relay when posigrade thrust acceleration was
sensed. Turnaround was managed adequately, although the time required
69
••
I •
(38 seconds) to settle into orbit mode was longer than normal because of the
initial roll error. Spacecraft attitudes and rates near insertion are
listed in the following table:
Roll Pitch Yaw
Event Attitude, Rate, Attitude, Rate, Attitude, Rate,

deg deg /sec deg deg /sec deg deg /sec
Separation 0 -1 -8 0.4 180 -0.3

Separation -12 -6 2 5-5 170 -3.0
plus 2.5 sec
(start of
damping)
Separation -22 0 4 0 160 0

plus 7 sec
(end of
damping and
start of
turnaround )
Orbital phase: Except for the thruster malfunction, the control

system during the orbital phase functioned essentially as designed. Con-
trol system exercises and usage modes are discussed in a later section. With
the initiation of the first yaw maneuver, attitude indicators began to dis-
agree with true spacecraft attitudes. Such disagreements are inherent in
the system and occur whenever the yaw or roll attitudes deviate from 0° for
an extended period of time, which can be demonstrated both mathematically
and with operational hardware. Values differ, depending upon the presence
of either scanner slaving or fixed-pitch orbital precession, but the effects
are similar. Each disagreement has been examined and can be explained for
each system design.
The following hypothetical maneuver can best illustrate this point:
Assume that the spacecraft and gyros are properly erected in the normal
orbit attitude. The spacecraft is then yawed 90° and maintained in this yaw
heading for r- of an orbital period (11.25 minutes or 45° orbital travel),
during which time the astronaut maintains local vertical using the window
reference. During this •& pass, the fixed-pitch precession signal (about
k°/min) will drive the vertical gyro spin axis in a direction 90° from the
orbital plane, and at the end of this period the pitch attitude indicator
will disagree with the spacecraft true attitude by 45°. At the same time,
the astronaut will have rolled the spacecraft ^5° to maintain his vertical
position with respect to the local horizon. If the spacecraft is then
70
•• ... . J 99 9^
restored to the normal orbit attitude, the gyro spin axis will maintain its
position in space. This results in permanent attitude errors in both axes,
unless corrected by slaving.
The 180° yaw maneuver, initiated at QJilk-.QQ is offered as the best

example of the preceding hypothetical maneuver (see fig. 29). Indicated
attitude errors, produced by spacecraft maneuvering, can be avoided by
leaving the gyros caged during such maneuvers. New gyro references can
best be restored by continuous scanner slaving, combined with uncaging the
gyros at approximately 0° pitch and then permitting the spacecraft to remain
at orbit attitude (-3^° pitch) for approximately 5 minutes.
Three gyro cagings were executed by the astronaut during the orbital
phase of the mission. In each instance the spacecraft was alined by pitching
down to -15° to bring the horizon into view through the window. During the
first caging the spacecraft roll attitude was -19° •
Horizon scanner operation was as expected, with short roll scanner

"ignore" periods occurring just prior to sunset because of saturation of the
sensors. All ignore signals produced by the pitch scanner can be correlated
with maneuvers. Eight programed cycles of horizon scanner slaving were com-
pleted which promptly removed all maneuvers and caging errors.
Retrofire: Retrofire began at 0^:33:08 and was completed by 0^:33:33.

The astronaut provided backup to the ASCS by using manual proportional control
and maintained slightly better attitudes than were experienced on the MA-5
mission. Pitch and roll attitudes were held to within 1°, and the yaw devia-
tion did not exceed 2°.
Reentry: The pitch -up maneuver to reentry attitude was initiated by the
astronaut at OU:39:39> an<i the 0.05g relay was actuated manually at OU:U3:31-
The planned roll rate for reentry was manually initiated at 04:^4:41, and this
rate reached a value of -ll°/sec within 2 seconds. Spacecraft oscillations,
with a period of 1-5 seconds, were evident about the pitch and yaw axes by
Ok:k6:J>0. An attempt was made by the astronaut to damp these oscillations.
By 0^:^7:17, the rate of oscillation in pitch had increased to greater than
10°/sec, with a period of 1.1 seconds. The angular rate about the yaw axis
remained within 6° /sec at about the same period until 0^:^7-20, when 10°/sec
was also exceeded. Depletion of the fuel in the manual control system occurred
at approximately Oh:hj:0k. Correlation of the control -stick deflections with
the spacecraft angular rates indicates that at least 50 percent of the control
inputs opposed the oscillatory motion and that about 25 percent were approxi-
mately 90° out of phase, thereby producing no net effect. The remaining
25 percent apparently augmented the motion. Extrapolation beyond ±lO°/sec and
integration of the rate traces yields a maximum swing of ±5° for this period.
At 0^:^7:39, the astronaut switched to the auxiliary damping system.

Pitch and yaw oscillation rates decreased to within 2°/sec in a ^-second
period, while the roll rate decreased from -20e/sec to a nominal -ll°/sec.
The depletion of automatic system fuel is estimated to have occurred at
approximately OU:48:30. At OU:48:32, the oscillations again began to increase
71
in pitch and yav. By 04:48:40 rates were as high as ±10°/sec, with a period
of 5.5 seconds per cycle, while the roll rate showed an irregular decrease.
At approximately 04:49:17, the drogue parachute was deployed; the antenna
fairing was released and the parachute was deployed at 04:50:11.
Behavior during the second period of oscillation was similar to esti-

mates of spacecraft motions for reentry without control. Estimates of
spacecraft swing in the order of ±25° in pitch and at least ±40° in yaw were
derived from incomplete flight data. (The pilot estimated amplitudes of up
to 90°.) It was not possible at this point in the flight to determine
attitudes by direct measurement, since the spacecraft attitude gyros had
been deenergized as planned at 0.05g (beginning of reentry).
Reaction control system.- The reaction control system (RCS) was of

the standard configuration in both the automatic and manual subsystems.
Heat-sink modifications to reduce temperatures in the hydrogen peroxide
feed line to the automatic and manual roll thrust assemblies were incorpo-
rated at the launch complex.
Prelaunch activities: Prelaunch servicing of the manual and auto-

matic subsystems was normal, with all components functioning properly during
system servicing operations and thrust chamber static firings. A high de-
composition rate from the automatic subsystem was noted during surveillance.
The actual surveillance rate evolved was 99 percent of the system allowable
maximum; however, because the decomposition rate is linear with time and
since the system was within limits, it was considered normal and therefore
flightworthy.
Flight performance: Prior to 01:29:24, both the automatic and manual

RCS subsystems functioned properly and delivered the expected thrust levels
about all axes. At 01:29:24 (during the first orbital pass), when the ASCS
called for operation of the 1-pound, yaw-left automatic thrust chamber, no
rate response was received for five consecutive orbit-mode pulse signals.
Immediately after this malfunction, the astronaut selected the manual pro-
portional control mode and returned the spacecraft to proper yaw attitude.
Repeated signals to the thrusters in both ASCS and fly-by-wire control modes
substantiated that the 1-pound, yaw-left chamber was not functioning properly.
This condition persisted until 01:48:22 when in the fly-by-wire mode, this
thruster began to function as indicated by the proper rate response. Except
for a few isolated pulses of possible low thrust values, the 1-pound, yaw-
left thruster operated properly for the remainder of the flight.
Within 1 minute and 18 seconds after return to proper operation by the

1-pound, yaw-left thrust chamber, the 1-pound, yaw-right chamber ceased to
respond (01:49:40) in both the ASCS and fly-by-wire control modes. This
chamber remained inoperative for the duration of the flight, except for
apparent intermittent operation in the period between 04:30:00 and 04:34:00.
The intermittent operation of the low automatic yaw thrusters was

determined to have been caused by failure at times of the associated 1-pound
72
• ••
••
solenoid valves. However, these valves were thoroughly inspected and tested
after the flight, and no abnormal characteristics were disclosed. These
valves operated properly during tests in air and a vacuum, and a conclusive
explanation for the thruster failure cannot be given.
With the exception of the 1-pound yaw thrust chambers, all remaining
chambers in both the automatic and manual subsystems functioned properly
throughout the flight.
The fuel consumption for the orbital phase of the MA-6 mission is
listed in table IV, and the fuel consumption for the reentry phase is shown
in figure 30.
The manual proportional control system exhibited proper operation at

all times, with the possible exception of an instance in which it appeared
that the control handle may have retained a slight deflection from neutral
following a control maneuver. This condition appeared to have been cor-
rected by the astronaut with no difficulty.
Hydrogen peroxide feed-line temperatures in flight: Temperatures of

the hydrogen peroxide feed lines of both the automatic-system 1-pound roll
and the manual-system roll thrust chambers were measured during flight.
The feed-line temperatures of the manual-system roll thrusters increased
approximately 30° F from the prelaunch ambient temperature as a result of
aerodynamic heating during powered flight. At the completion of spacecraft
turnaround, the temperature of the feed lines to the manual-system roll
thrusters was stable at approximately 106° F.
Temperatures of the feed lines to the automatic-system 1-pound thrusters

were only slightly affected by the powered-flight phase, and instrumentation
indicated a total increase of less that 10° F from the prelaunch ambient
temperature from those at the completion of spacecraft turnaround. Maximum
temperature in orbit was approximately 120° F for the roll-thruster feel
lines of the automatic system and approximately 106° F for the roll-thruster
feed lines of the manual system. The effect of solar radiation on feed-
line temperatures was evident from data taken during the second and third
passes. During sunlight periods, slightly increasing temperature trends
were noted but did not continue in periods of darkness.
The reentry heating effect on all instrumented feed lines was very pro-
nounced: The temperatures of the feed lines leading to the roll-thrusters of
the automatic and manual systems reached maximums of approximately 1^5° F and
200° F, respectively.
Postflight inspection: All thrust-chamber assemblies in spacecraft 13

were disassembled 6 days after the flight for the purpose of visual examin-
ation and photography. This inspection revealed loose foreign particles
upstream of the fuel-metering orifices of both 1-pound yaw thrusters. These
particles may have contributed to the intermittent malfunction of these
thrusters. These foreign particles have been visually identified as
portions of fuel-distribution (Dutch weave) screens located downstream of the
73
•. •. ;•:
• •...: ..'
fuel-metering orifices. The time and method by which these particles went
upstream of the fuel orifice is unknown. Examination results are listed in
table V, and typical postflight photographs are shown in figure 31-
Environmental Control System
The environmental control system (ECS) provided adequate environmental

conditions for the astronaut throughout the flight. The astronaut reported
uncomfortably warm conditions after landing, and these conditions are discussed
subsequently.
System description. - The primary change in the ECS from spacecraft 9

(MA-5) was the addition of a constant -bleed orifice to the suit circuit.
This orifice intentionally provided a continuous oxygen flow of 750 cc/min,
which was greater than the astronaut's anticipated metabolic requirement.
The excess gas was exhausted into the spacecraft cabin.
Countdown. - The temperature of the main inverters increased to higher

than expected levels during the countdown. These increased temperatures
indicated that the Preon flow to the inverter cold plates , though adequate
during precount checks, was inadequate during the final count. Temperatures
of the 150 v-amp and 250 v-amp inverters at lift-off were l62° F and 120° F,
respectively.
Launch phase. - The launch phase was normal. The cabin and suit pressures
were maintained at a differential pressure of 5-5 psi above ambient during
ascent and were held at 5-7 and 5.8 psia, respectively.
Orbital phase. - Cabin and suit pressures were maintained at 5-7

5.8 psia, respectively, throughout the orbital flight. The decay in these
pressures that had been observed in previous flights was absent for three
primary reasons :
1. The low cabin leakage (less than 500 cc/min)
2. Excess oxygen exhausted into the cabin from the suit-circuit

constant-bleed orifice
3. A small amount of leakage from the secondary oxygen supply
The oxygen partial pressure agreed with suit pressure to within 0.5 psia
although it was consistently lower. A partial cause of this difference is
the presence of water vapor in the suit circuit, which added a partial pressure
of approximately 0.3 psi that is not included in the oxygen partial pressure
measurement. A more careful calibration than those made for previous flights
has resulted in the more satisfactory performance of this instrument.
The cabin air temperature, after the initial heating period, fluctuated
as expected when the spacecraft passed through the alternate periods of
•
••
• ••
••
• •••
darkness and sunlight. The astronaut reported that at least five attempts
to reduce cabin air temperature by increasing water flow to the cabin heat
exchanger resulted in illumination of the. excess water light. This light
indicated that the cabin heat exchanger was operating near its maximum ca-
pacity for the existing conditions. Nevertheless, the mean cabin air temper-
ature was steadily reduced after the first hour in oribt.
The suit-inlet temperature (fig. 32(a)) varied between 65° and 75° F
during the orbital phase. The astronaut reported a coolant flow of
1.7 pound/hour to the suit heat exchanger, and a steam exhaust temperature
of 60° F. These values are both higher than anticipated and contradict each
other, since freezing of the exchanger would be expected at this flow rate.
The reported flow rate was validated by postflight tests, and the logical ex-
planation for the high steam-exhaust temperature is that there was an error
in instrumentation.
The 150- and 250-v-amp inverter temperatures (fig. 32(b)) increased

steadily from the launch values of 162° F and 120° F, to maximum values of
212° F and about 200° F, respectively. Postflight testing revealed that the
check valve between the coolant supply and cold plates was stuck in the closed
position and would not permit the coolant to flow to the cold plates in orbit.
The coolant tank was charged with 25 pounds of water before the flight. The
coolant quantity indicating system showed a usage of 7-2 pounds. Postflight
weighing indicated a usage of 11.8 pounds. The difference in calibration and
final system temperatures can account for about 3-8 pounds of the U.6-pound
discrepancy, while the remaining 0.8 pound is considered to be instrument
error.
Reentry and postlanding.- The maximum cabin temperature during the re-
entry and postlanding period was 103° F, which is undesirable but satisfactory.
The suit-inlet temperature increased to 87° F during the postlanding phase.
This value is reasonable since the air temperature in the landing area was
76° F, and the suit compressor raises the temperature in the suit circuit by
approximately 10° F.
Postflight investigation.- Examination of the flight data and post-

flight checks of the environmental control system have revealed several
anomalies. As shown in figure 33 > "the secondary oxygen supply exhibited
an unexpected decay in pressure, which was first noted at approximately
01:50:00. However, it is not known when this decay began, since the
secondary oxygen bottle was serviced to about 8,000 psig before flight,
and the pressure transducer had a maximum indicating value of only
7,500 psig. For an unknown reason, the decay rate of the secondary supply
was essentially zero during the last three quarters of an hour in orbit.
Postflight tests indicate a damaged "0"-ring seal as the cause of the
pressure decay in the secondary oxygen supply. In contrast, the decay
rate of the primary supply was much lower than expected during the final
portion of the mission.
75
-.. :•: ..: ••£
Communications Systems
The communications system group includes the two ultra-high frequency

(UHF) voice transceivers, the high frequency (HF) voice transceiver, two
radar beacons, two command receivers, and recovery communications equipment.
The recovery equipment comprises two UHF direction-finding (DF) beacons, an
HF (DF) beacon, and an HF transceiver. Since a more accurate measurement
of the performance of these systems can be made from ground-based stations,
their performance is discussed and appropriate signal strength and coverage
data presented in the Mercury Network Performance section. For this reason,
only a brief discussion of their effectiveness for the MA-6 mission is given
in the following paragraphs.
Voice system.- The voice system, used for two-way voice conversations
between the ground and spacecraft, is made up of HF and UHF transceiver units.
From previous orbital experience and ground tests, it was known that the
HF system had somewhat poorer voice fidelity but longer range than the UHF
system. The UHF system, because of its slightly better voice quality, was
considered to be the primary system. From previous experience, it was knovn
that the range of the UHF system was approximately equal to the line-of-sight
range and was entirely adequate for a normal mission. The main voice traffic
was therefore conducted on the UHF system, with a small amount of traffic
conducted on the HF system to verify system operation. Performance of the
voice system during the MA-6 mission was satisfactory.
Radar system.- Performance of the radar system, including the ground

tracking and computing complex, was satisfactory and was such that the space-
craft orbital trajectory was well defined by the end of the first orbital
pass. The system's continued tracking during the remaining passes resulted
in only minor changes to the orbital parameters already established.
Command system.- The onboard command system was exercised by trans-

mission of 10 instrumentation-calibration signals from the ground during the
mission for calibration of onboard sensors and to obtain additional data on
the command-system inflight performance.
Recovery system.- Performance of the recovery system was entirely

satisfactory.
Electrical and Sequential Systems
Electrical system.- The spacecraft electrical system was of a specifi-

cation configuration. One-ohm fuse resistors were installed in all squib
firing circuits. Inverter monitor lights, which indicated to the astronaut
when the 150-v-amp and 250-v-amp inverters were operating, were installed.
Main bus voltage and d-c current were as expected throughout the mission.
Fans and ASCS a-c bus voltages were also normal.
The inverter temperatures were about 162° F on the 150-v-amp inverter

and 120° F on the 250-v-amp inverter at lift-off and increased gradually
throughout the mission to 212° F and about 200° F, respectively. This
76
increase indicated that the inverters received little or no inflight cooling.
Inverter cooling is also discussed briefly in the Environmental Control
System section.
Sequential system.- The sequential system performed as was expected

during the flight, with the following minor exceptions:
1. Spacecraft separation, periscope extend, and damping command to the

ASCS were received 3 seconds after the launch-vehicle telemetry in-
dicated spacecraft separation. The time discrepancy is attributed
to the spacecraft adapter not having electrically latched bolt-fire
relays to keep the spacecraft separation circuitry armed during
posigrade ignition.
2. The heat-shield-deployed signal was prematurely indicated by

telemetry (segment 51), and it then cycled on and off several times
during the flight. This signal was caused by a defective left-hand
limit switch. In addition to the mechanical failure of the limit
switch, the circuit design did not provide for optimum reliability
with the two redundant switches installed.
3. Because reentry was performed with the retropackage attached, the

0.05g sequential event was prevented from occurring automatically.
The 0.05g event had to be initiated by the astronaut. Retropackage
separation indications did not occur, since the electrical signal to
initiate the retropack separation was never given. Manual initiation
of 0.05g also resulted in the cameras remaining on high speed from
retroattitude command until power was removed after landing.
k. The drogue parachute was deployed prematurely at about 2J,000 feet.

The 21,000-foot barostats were removed after the flight, subjected
to a preinstallation acceptance test, and found to be functioning
properly. Further tests of the static system were performed and
are discussed in the Mechanical Systems section of this report.
Instrumentation
The instrumentation system flown on the MA-6 mission was essentially

the same as in the MA-5. Small changes between the two spacecraft were re-
quired to accommodate those parameters associated with a manned mission.
Other changes are as follows:
1. Heat shield temperatures for MA-6 were measured by means of a

chromel-alumel thermocouple.
2. The MA-6 spacecraft contained only two cameras, the pilot observer
and instrument observer. The earth-sky and periscope cameras were
deleted.
3. A different type of color film was used in the pilot-observer camera.
77
,. ... • •••
•
• ••••• •••
• • •
>. ••• • • I
4. For MA-6, the mixed sequence of events were superimposed on the

vernier clock signal, which is used as a time reference and at a
pulse frequency of once per second.
A complete list of the instrumented parameters is included in table VI.
Telemetry.- Both telemetry transmitters exhibited a center-frequency

shift and signal-strength rise when the escape tower was jettisoned. This
effect was anticipated and resulted from a change in antenna voltage standing
wave ratio. The change in voltage standing wave ratio is generally not
significant enough to prevent the transmitters from being adjusted to bring
the center frequencies within specification for both tower-on and tower-off
conditions. The signal strengths and deviation from center frequency, as
read by AMR when the spacecraft passed over Cape Canaveral, are shown in
table VII.
Data quality.- The quality of the data reduced from the onboard tape
was very good. Scatter and noise caused by tape speed variations were in-
significant and easily compensable on the continuous channels. The only
problem encountered occurred during the time of maximum exit dynamic pressure,
when vibrational effects on the recorder caused almost complete loss of data
at about ^0 seconds after lift-off. This scatter and noise persisted for
approximately 50 seconds. However, the telemetered data during the same
period covered the lapse.
A comparison of the hand-controller (stick position) data, as instru-

mented on continuous and commutated channels, shows the definite advantage
of instrumenting this parameter by means of a continuous channel. About
50 percent of the stick-position data is lost on the commutated channel, and
that which remains is difficult to interpret.
Photographic.- The instrument-observer camera malfunctioned during the

60-second test at T-55 minutes in the countdown. The film had slipped out
of the film gate, but since the camera continued to run, there was no indi-
cation that it was operating improperly. The results obtained from the
pilot-observer camera were satisfactory. The use of the Ectachrome ER color
film was an improvement over the types previously used.
Onboard timing.- The vernier clock channel malfunctioned throughout the

entire flight. Each time the pilot-observer camera operated, a spurious
pulse was produced in the vernier clock signal. At times when the camera
operated at high speed, the clock signal was rendered nearly useless.
Respiration sensor.- The most serious instrumentation problem during the

MA-6 mission was in the respiration rate and depth channel. The circuit
utilizes a thermistor sensor which is heated by a d-c voltage. The resis-
tance of this sensor is changed when the pilot cools it by exhaling, and the
variation of resistance produces a change in voltage at the output of a
direct-coupled transistor amplifier. The basic problem is that the thermistor
temperature is also affected by environmental changes within the helmet.
Because of these changes, the baseline of the respiratory signal
78 JOHFIDENTIAL
:': •;* :-. : .-. .•• .•• : :
«• C OHFIDE3JTIAL
---™.«
*
••• • » .. ..- - -
varied from a value of 10 percent, which was set during the suiting procedure,
up to a maximum of 85 percent at lift-off. After lift-off, the baseline fell
steadily until it reached a low of 10 percent at 02:08:00. It then began to
rise again and had attained a level of 40 percent at loss of the telemetry
signal. The sensitivity of the signal was degraded in direct proportion to
the baseline shift, since the sensitivity decreases as the baseline increases.
The sensitivity problem is further complicated by the fact that the position
of the sensor is not fixed to the position of the pilot's head. In the
MA-6 mission, much of the data was lost because the pilot was not breathing
directly on the sensor. Both subcarrier oscillators which encoded the
respiration data performed within specification and did not contribute to
the above effects.
Fuel-quantity indicators.- The fuel-quantity indicator for the manual

system registered an average error of approximately 8 percent more fuel than
the actual amount for fuel quantities below 70 percent. The fuel-quantity
indicator for the automatic system registered an error of approximately
3 percent more than the actual amount for all fuel levels.
Heat Protection System
Performance of the MA-6 spacecraft heat protection system during the

mission was satisfactory in all respects. Minor cracking was evident, as
expected, during the postflight inspection. This condition resulted from
the heating experienced during reentry, which is considered to be identical
to that of MA-5.
Since the heating data recorded during the MA-6 reentry are not nearly
so comprehensive as those for MA-5, the reentry temperature survey for the
latter flight is presented in figure 3^. Temperature readings on the conical
and cylindrical portions of the spacecraft employed thermocouples spot welded
to the inboard side of the exterior shingles. The data presented are well
within the specified range and are therefore considered nominal. For a com-
parison of these results obtained theoretically and during preflight wind-
tunnel research, see reference 9-
Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems
All mechanical and pyrotechnic systems functioned normally with the

exception of the premature deployment of the drogue parachute and an indi-
cation of heat-shield release during the orbital flight phase. These
anomalies, along with general systems performance, are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
Parachutes.- The deployment and performance of the drogue and main

parachutes were satisfactory. Since neither parachute was recovered, a
detailed postlaunch visual inspection could not be made. However, observation
by the astronaut verified that both parachutes were undamaged during the de-
ployment phases and throughout descent. The main parachute deployed at a
pressure altitude of 10,000 feet, as determined from onboard measurements.
This is within specification limits of 10,000 ±750 feet.
79
The drogue parachute deployed at an altitude about 27,000 feet, which
is above normal. Onboard pressure measurements (commutated) indicate a
pressure altitude of approximately 29,000 feet at the time of drogue para-
chute deployment, and the integrated trajectory is consistent with a drogue
parachute deployment at about 27,000 feet. The astronaut reported an al-
titude of 30,000 to 35,000 feet was indicated at the time of drogue para-
chute deployment. The drogue parachute barostats actuated properly within
specification pressure altitudes of 21,000 ± 1,500 feet in postflight tests.
The possible causes of an early deployment of the drogue parachute which

are listed below were examined separately and in appropriate combinations.
1. Inertial actuation of the barostat as a result of spacecraft

oscillations
2. Dynamic pressure q effects caused by oscillations of the spacecraft
3- Actual astronaut actuation of the manual drogue parachute switch
^4-. Structural failure within the parachute compartment, particularly

the drogue parachute mortar cover
5. Static pressure buildup in the parachute compartment
6. Spurious or random signals in the drogue parachute mortar-firing

circuit
The first source was ruled out after testing, since the 2g acceleration
imposed by the spacecraft oscillations are within the rigid qualification
specifications governing the flight hardware. Strong evidence exists that
a dynamic pressure could not have built up without being sensed by the static
pressure transducer in the parachute compartment. Item 3 was eliminated as
a cause through postflight interviews with the astronaut and examination of
photographs taken in the spacecraft during the period in question. The pilot
stated that he had raised his arm about halfway to the switch when automatic
deployment occurred. Postflight examination of the parachute compartment
revealed no structural failure, and recorded sequence data indicate that the
mortar was fired by a nominal electrical signal, disproving item U. Tests at
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation have shown that an increase in the amplitude
of pressure oscillation present in the parachute compartment is sensed by the
pressure transducer; therefore, this increase in pressure would have been
evident on the flight record. The last item represents the most plausible
cause since the data reveal that a release signal was apparently received
by the drogue parachute mortar.
Postflight tests have shown the entire circuitry, including the barostats,
to be sound; however, these tests were conducted under static conditions and,
therefore, are inconclusive. The definite cause of the premature drogue para-
chute deployment is unknown.
80
•.••;•
i i ••
i..
Rockets and pyrotechnics. - A postflight examination of the spacecraft
and an analysis of the pertinent data indicate that all rockets and pyro-
technics functioned as intended. It cannot be determined whether certain
pyrotechnics actually ignited (such as redundant clamp-ring bolts and
tower-jettison rocket ignition), since the available evidence shows only
that the resulting function was satisfactory.
Explosive -actuated hatch. - After the spacecraft was secured on board

the recovery ship, the astronaut initiated the hatch explosive mechanism
through the use of the internal actuator on the hatch. The hatch mechanism
appeared to have operated satisfactorily.
Landing -shock attenuation system. - The landing -shock attenuation

system performed normally, as evidenced by the astronaut's statements and
from postf light examinations. The landing bag was found to be torn in
several places (see also Postflight Inspection section), but no restraining
cables or straps were broken. The usual minor damage to ablation shield re-
taining studs and to the bulkhead-protective shield was experienced as a
result cf recontact of the heat shield. The main pressure bulkhead was un-
damaged except for a small dent near the center.
A comprehensive postflight inspection of the limit-switch circuitry

and hardware revealed that both lateral and axial translation would generate
a signal, altho.ugh the switch is designed to actuate only after a rotational
deflection. The cause of this improper operation was traced, after dis-
assembly, to a poorly machined shaft. (See fig. 35-) The shaft was dented
in several places and bent some 5° or 10° . The pilot reported noises and
other indications of heat-shield deployment when he manually initiated this
sequence soon after main parachute deployment; thus the conclusion may be
drawn that the shield mechanism was not unlatched in orbit.
Postflight Inspection
The general condition of the spacecraft upon completion of the mission

was excellent, as indicated in figure 36- The exterior of the spacecraft
showed the usual slight discoloration caused by aerodynamic heating. There
were also deposits of 2024 aluminum alloy which had evidently been trans-
ported in a molten state and had adhered to the surface of several widely
separated shingles. The aluminum retropackage which was retained into re-
entry was the source of these deposits. A brownish deposit was found on a
portion of the spacecraft window exterior surface. As on previous flights,
the window was found to be fogged with water condensate between the two
outer panes .
Structure. - The spacecraft did not experience any structural damage

which would have compromised the safety of the mission in any way.
Ablation shield. - The external surface of the shield (see fig. 37)
had charred in the normal pattern. The edge of the heat-shield center plug
had separated as expected and extended outward approximately 0.5 inch.
However, it remained attached at the center. A circular sector of the
81
shield is of a darker background color than the adjacent area. The same
area contains several radial marks approximately 4 inches in length. It is
obvious that a large piece of the retropackage had melted away in this
direction.
Heat-shield deployment instrumentation.- The switch which senses heat-

shield deployment is located between stringers 2 and 3 and had a loose rotary
stem. The switch would make and break electrical contact when the rotary
stem was moved along its longitudinal axis. The malfunction could account
for the landing-bag-deployed signal that was received during the flight, as
discussed in a previous section.
Landing bag.- The landing bag had several tears, and it was impossible
to determine whether these occurred during landing or in postflight handling.
The most probable time at which this damage occurred is during the landing-
bag stowage operation aboard ship. No landing bag straps or cables were
broken, but some straps were kinked. There was minor damage to the heat shield
shield retaining studs and the bulkhead protective shield, probably occurring
at landing as in previous flights. However, no damage occurred to the space-
craft equipment in this area.
The large pressure bulkhead had a dent from an undetermined cause near
the center approximately 1.5 inches long. The center area is not covered
by the bulkhead shield.
82
•. :• • •• • . : :••: :•• ••
iigP" :-. :•: .1- .:• •:" •:;. :.:
TABLE IV.- FUEL CONSUMPTION
Fpata accuracy to ±0.5 pound of fuell
Automatic system Manual system
Flight phase Fuel used, Fuel remain- Fuel used, Fuel remain-
Ib ing, Ib Ib ing, Ib
Launch 0 36.0 0 2k.k

Turnaround
and damping 5-8 30.2 0 2k. k
Orbital pass 1 k.2 26.0 0.6 23.8
Orbital pass 2 6.0 20.0 11.8 12.0
Orbital pass 3
(to retro-
sequence) 8.6 11 A 5.2 6.8
Retrosequence to
0.05g k.o 7^
5-6 1.2
0.05g to drogue
parachute
a a
deployment ?.^ 0 l.2 0
Drogue parachute
deployment to
main parachute
deployment 0 0 0 0
Fuel depletion occurred during this period
83
TABLE V.- RESULTS OF POSTFLIGHT EXAMINATION OF THRUST CHAMBERS
Thrust- Heat- Orifice Dutch-weave

chamber barrier condition condition Remarks
assembly screen
1-pound, Clear Five particles Top screen Particle diameter
yaw-right on upstream burned and approx. same as
face heavily 0.016 inch
eroded in orifice and
center length somewhat
larger than
0.016 inch
1-pound, Clear Numerous dust Top screen Particle size of
yaw-left size particles burned and the order 100 to
on upstream moderately 200 microns
face eroded
1-pound, Clear One particle Small hole Particle size
pitch- down on upstream in top of the order
face screen and 100 to 200
slightly microns
burned
1-pound, Clear Nine particles Top screen Particle size
pitch-up on upstream burned and same as those in
face practically 1-pound,
eroded in yaw -right,
center above
1-pound, Clear Clean Normal-
counter- only
clockwise slightly
roll discolored
1-pound, Clear Clean Normal-
clockwise only
roll slightly
discolored
Automatic Clear Clean Normal
6-pound,
clockwise
roll
Automatic Clear Clean Slight
6-pound, erosion
counter-
clockwise
roll
'CABLE V.- RESULTS OF POSTFLIGHT EXAMINATION
OF THRUST CHAMBERS - Continued
Thrust- Heat-
barrier Orifice Dutch-weave
chamber condition
assembly screen condition
Automatic Clear Clean Not applicable

24-pound,
pitch-up
Manual Clear Clean Not applicable
2k-pound,
pitch-up

24-pound,
pitch- down
Manual Clear Clean and wet Not applicable
24-pound,
pitch- down
Automatic Clear - Clean Not applicable

24-pound, appears
yaw-left as only
1 screen
Manual Clear Clean Not applicable
24-pound,
yaw-left

24-pound,
yaw-right
Manual Clear Clean and wet Not applicable
24-pound, and wet
yaw-right
TABLE V.- RESULTS OF POSTILIGHT EXAMINATION
OF THRUST CHAMBERS - Concluded
Thrust- Heat-
Orifice Dutch-weave
chamber barrier
assembly condition condition
screen
Manual Clear Clean Normal

6-pound, and wet
counterclock-
wise roll
Manual Clear Clean Normal

6-pound,
clockwise
roll
86
•• •
* • ••• • <
• •< • • •• ••
TABLE VI. - ISSTHUMENTED PARAMETERS TOR MA-6

(a) Commutated quantities
Instrument range,
High-frequency low-frequency 0- to 100-percent full scale,
channel channel Parameter unless otherwise noted
1 1
2 2 Zero ground reference, volte o
3 3 a-c amplifier power supply monitor, volts
It
k
5 5
6 6
7
full scale)
7 "B" command receiver signal strength, nv 0 to 80 (20- to 68-percent
full scale)
8 8 Suit pressure, pflia -0.2, 7.1*-, 15 3 (0- 98- 0-percent
full scale)
9 9
10 Cabin air temperature, *P
10 Cabin air temperature, *F
11
11
12 12 -100 to 7 600
13
full scale)
1}
lit -0.415 to 0 375 (15- to 80-percent
full scale)
Ik
full scale)
15 15 Z-axie acceleration, g units -Jl to 35
16 16 Pitch attitude ASCS calibrator, deg -120 to 17^
17 17 Roll attitude ASCS calibrator, deg -130 to 190
18 18 Yaw attitude ASCS calibrator, deg
19 Low roll clockwise manual-fuel-llne temperatures, "F . . -12 to 260
19 Low roll counterclockwise manual -fuel-line
20 Low roll counterclockwise automatic-fuel-line
20 Low roll clockwise automatic-fuel-line

temperature, °f -11 to 239
21 21
22 22 Static pressure, psia
25 23 Stick position, roll, deg
full scale)
2"t 2l* Stick position, pitch, deg
full scale)
25 25 Stick position, yaw, deg
26 26
27
full scale)
27
full scale)
28 28 Elapsed time (0 to 1 minute), percent
29 29 Elapsed time (0 to 10 minutes ), percent 0 to 100
30 30
31 31 Elapsed time (0 to 10 hours), percent 0 to 100
32 32
33 33
87
TABI£ VI. - CBTRUMEHTED PARAMETERS POP MA-6 - Continued
(a) Connuutated quantities - Continued
Instrument range,
High-frequency low-frequency 0- to 100-percent full scale,
channel channel Parameter unless otherwise noted
^4 ^4
55 0 to 100
56 0 to 100
^
57 57 0 to 100
38 38 On -off
59 59 500 to 2,200 (4- to 95-percent
full scale)
40 40 600 to 2 200 (6 5- to 89^>ercent
full scale)
41 41 95 to 120 (68.5- to 89.3-percent
full scale)
42 42 0 to 50
45 -0.415 to 0.58 (19- to 80-percent
full scale)
43 -4 0 to 4 9
44 -0.415 to 0.575 (15- to 80-percent
full scale)
kk -5 2 to 5 5 (15- to 85-percent
full scale)
45 45 -51 to 55
46 46 On -off
47 47 On -off
US 48 On -off
49 0 to 80 (30- to 78-percent
full scale)
49 0 to 80 (20- to 68-percent
full scale)
50 50 On -off
51 51 On -off
52 52 0 to 565
55 55 On -off
5^ 54 On -off
55 55 On -off
56 56 On -off
57 57 On -off
58 58 On -off
59 59 On -off
60 60 Mayday On -off
61 61 On -off
62 62 On -off
65 65 On -off
64 64 Calibration, Z-cal, normal R-cal (also 25-, 50->
On -off
65 65 On -off
66 66 High-pressure reaction Jet solenoids (- pitch) .... On -off
67 15.5 to 25.4
67 15.2 to 25
68 68 On -off
69 69 On -off
70 70 On-off
71 0 to 80 (30- to 78-percent
full scale)
71 0 to 80 (20- to 68-percent
full scale)
72 72 On-off
TABLE VI. - INSTRUMENTED PARAMETERS FOR MA-6 - Continued
(a) Coonnutated quantities - Concluded
Instrument range,
High-frequency Low-frequency 0- to 100-percent full scale,
channel channel unless otherwise noted
73 Y-axls acceleration, g unite -0.1*15 to 0.38 (15- to 80-percent

full scale)
73 Y-axls acceleration, g units -k. 0 to It. 9
71* X-axis acceleration, g units O.ltl5 to 0.375 (15- to 80-percent
full scale)
X-axis acceleration, g units -3.2 to 3.5 (15- to 85-percent
full scale)
75 75 Z-axls acceleration, g units -31 to 35
76 76 Heat shield temperature (thermocouple), *F -lUO to 2,^70
77 77 ASCS bus voltage, v a-c 90 to 125 (6^.7- to g't-percent
full scale)
78 78 High-pressure reaction Jet solenoids (- yaw) . . . . On-off
79 79 High-pressure reaction Jet solenoids (+ yaw) On-off
80 80 Retrorocket temperature, °F -16 to lUO
ei High-frequency telemetry transmitter temperature, *F 8 to 320
81 low-frequency telemetry transmitter temperature, *F -16 to 326
82 82 Cabin pressure, psla -0.2, 7-1*, 15.2 (0-, 101-, and
0-percent full scale)
93 83 d-c voltage monitor, volts 18 to 28
81* 8* Coolant pressure, pslg 213 to USg
Horizon scanner roll ignore On-off
Roll horizon scanner output monitor, deg -37.5 to 33
87 87 0. 05g relay actuation On-off
Pitch horizon scanner output monitor, deg -53 to 18.5
Synchronize pulse
90 90 Synchronize pulse
89
TAB1£ VI. - IlBTRUMEirrZD PARAMETERS TOR MA-6- Concluded
(b) Continuous quantities

Instrument range,
&- to 100-percent full scale.
R-equency High-frequency system unless otherwise noted
-9.9 to 10
n *A ^5 5 to 31 5
12-9 to 30
13
x o
±12(22- to 79-p*rcent full scale)
10.5 High-frequency conmutator, pulse amplitude modulation
Instrument range,
0- to 100-percent full scale
Frequency low-frequency system unless otherwise noted
-10.3 to 10.5
0 •& ±10.5
0 73 -0.6 to 50.6
17
5* -10.5 to 12
(c) Onboard tape recorder track assignment
Trade Information
Open
High-frequency telemetry multiplex
Voice
Pulse damped modulation, high frequency
Pulse damped modulation, low frequency
Low-frequency telemetry multiplex
Open
90 DNFIDENTIAL
TABLE VII.- TELEMETRY SIGNAL STRENGTH
Deviation
Signal strength, from center
dbma frequency, kc
Mission phase
(b)
Low High Low High
Lift-off -30 -30 13.9 -45.2
Tower release -52 -52 - 1.0 -29.0
First pass -35 -52 - 5-0 -21.5
Second pass -30 -45 - 3-0 -20.9

Third pass -60.5 -55-5 0 -18.0
a.
Decibel referenced to a milliwatt standard
Specification allowable deviation: High link,

±26 kc; low link, ±22 kc
91
>• •1 •
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Figure 29.- Example of the 180° yaw maneuver.
92
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105
• • •• •
• • •• •
Figure 36.- Postflight photograph of spacecraft,
106
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107
AEROMEDICAL ANALYSIS
The aeromedlcal investigations conducted for the MA.-6 mission are

divided into two areas: (l) the preflight and postflight clinical exami-
nations (static examinations) and (2) the preflight and inflight physio-
logical studies (dynamic studies). These investigations are designed to
ascertain the state of the astronaut's health and to provide information
reflecting human responses to space flight. The MA.-6 mission provided a
period of weightlessness of sufficient duration (k hours) for the pilot's
physiological responses to attain a relatively steady state, in contrast to
the shorter Mercury-Redstone flights (refs. 10 and 11), where little time
was available in a zero-gravity state for the astronaut's physiological
adjustment mechanisms to stabilize.
The astronaut's activities during the time immediately prior to his

insertion into the spacecraft have some effect on his countdown and flight
responses. For this reason, his activities for the approximate 8-hour
period prior to his arrival for insertion into the spacecraft are listed
in table VIII.
The pilot began a 72-hour, prelaunch low- residue diet on February l6, 1962.
On the night prior to flight, the pilot obtained k hours and 50 minutes of
dozing, light sleep. No medication was administered.
Clinical Studies
Detailed medical examinations were performed prior to the MA.-6 flight,

and Ri.Tn-na.-r investigations were conducted as soon after the flight as re-
covery practices permitted. Initial examinations were made to determine the
astronaut's state of health and his medical fitness for flight. In addition,
such clinical evaluations serve as baseline medical data which may be later
correlated with inflight physiological information.
The sources of clinical medical data regarding the astronaut are listed
below:
1. Prior physical examinations beginning with astronaut selection

in 1959
2. Detailed preflight clinical examinations conducted on
January 22, 1962, and February 12, 1962
3. Preflight examination conducted on the morning of launch
4. Postflight medical evaluations on the recovery ships and at

the Grand Turk Island Medical Facility
108
• ••
• •
• •
••
•• •
The numerous preflight examinations of the astronaut disclosed no sig-

nificant medical abnormalities; his physical and mental health remained
excellent throughout the preflight period.
The postflight examination of the astronaut began with his emergence
from the spacecraft on board the recovery ship some 39 minutes after landing.
The pilot was described as appearing hot, perspiring profusely, and fatigued.
He was lucid, although not talkative, and voiced no medical complaints other
than being hot.
After his pressure suit had been removed and the astronaut had showered,
he became more communicative and described a mild sensation of "stomach un-
easiness" or "stomach awareness," which occurred during the 17 minutes on the
water while awaiting recovery. This sensation did not commence until after
spacecraft landing and cleared spontaneously within 1— hours. Neither nausea
nor vomiting was experienced. This stomach uneasiness can be attributed to
several factors. First, there is the combination of temperature and humidity
immediately after landing. The suit inlet temperature was 85° F; the cabin
air temperature was 103° F. The ambient air temperature was 76° F, relative
humidity was 60 to 65 percent, and the sea-water temperature was 8l° F. A
second major factor contributing to this gastrointestinal condition is the
moderate dehydration of the astronaut. This dehydration is evidenced by a
weight loss of 5r^ pounds during the mission, diminished urine output with
increased specific gravity for the 2i)--hour postrecovery period, increased
blood concentration, and the recovery physician's clinical impression.
The astronaut had a minimal fluid intake during the 13 hours from break-
fast at 2:50 a.m. e.s.t. to shipboard at 3:^5 P-m. e.s.t.j during this period
the equivalent of only 9^ cc of water was ingested as applesauce puree. The
only other oral intake during the flight was one 5.0-gram sugar (xylose) tablet
used as a test of intestinal absorption; the results of this test were normal
(table IX). His urine output during this period was 800 cc which he voided in
a single specimen just prior to reentry. (See table X.) In examining weight
loss, the pilot had the fluid intake and output shown in the following table:
Urine Fluid intake,

e. s. t. cc e. s. t.
output, cc
___« _.___
Countdown 0 0
Inflight a
800 2:00 p.m. V 11:14-8 a.m.
Postflight, ship 0 ""•""••" 265 (iced tea) 3:^5 a.m.
2^0 (water) 6:30 p.m.
125 (coffee) 6:50 n.m.
Total 800 J2k
rj
Specific gravity, 1.016

119.5 grams of applesauce puree (78.7-percent water)
109
A comparison of the preflight and postflight positive physical findings
and vital signs is listed in table XI. The postflight vital signs noted in
table XI were recorded during the physical examination conducted on "board the
destroyer. There were two small superficial skin abrasions of the knuckles
of the second and third fingers of the right hand without deformation or
fracture. These abrasions were received as a result of the plunger's, which
initiates the explosive actuated hatch, recoiling against the pilot's gloved
hand. The skin also exhibited an area of moderate erythema (reddening) and
a skin depression at the point where the left-arm blood-pressure microphone
had been attached. There was also a mild reaction to the moleskin adhesive
plaster which attached the four electrocardiogram (EGG) electrodes to his
skin. Results of head, eye, ear, nose, and throat examinations were normal.
The heart rhythm, size, and sounds were normal, and the lungs were clear,
without physical evidence of atelectasis (local lung collapse). Results of
the examination of the abdomen were normal, and the lower extremities showed
no evidence of edema (swelling) nor venous thrombosis (clotting). The
results of the neurological examination were also normal.
Blood and urine samples were obtained and processed for later analysis.
Results are listed in tables X and XII to XIV.
Approximately 3 hours after landing, the astronaut was transferred to

an aircraft carrier where posterior-anterior and lateral chest X-rays, a
standard 12-lead electrocardiogram, and a body weight reading were obtained.
Later the astronaut flew to Grand Turk Island where a general physical
examination was begun at 9*30 p.m- e.s.t., approximately 6r hours after
spacecraft landing. Except for the previously described superficial skin
abrasions, the results of this examination were normal. During the subse-
quent 48 hours, comprehensive examinations were conducted by the same medical
specialists who examined the astronaut prior to flight. Special tests were
performed in an effort to delineate any effect of space flight upon the
astronaut's balance (inner ear). No effect was detected. Both the general
and the specialists' examinations revealed no significant changes. The
medical studies were completed at 2:00 p.m., February 22, 1962.
In summary, the preflight and postflight clinical medical studies

revealed no significant differences and, except for the immediate postflight
dehydration, were completely within normal limits.
Physiological Studies
Data sources.- Data reflecting physiological responses to flight were

obtained by evaluating the records of telemetered biosensor data from range
stations and, also, from the continuous onboard tape recorder. In addition,
various inflight tests and the pilot-observer camera photographs were
utilized in the objective analysis. Subjective evaluation was based upon
pilot's reports, from onboard voice recordings, and from the entire postflight
110
debriefing. The countdown period provided baseline preflight information.
Useful comparative measurements were available from the Mercury-Atlas three-
orbital centrifuge simulation, the pad simulated launch, simulated flights,
and the launch attempt of January 27, 1962. Environmental control system data
were correlated with physiological responses where appropriate.
Bioinstrumentation.- The biological sensors used for the MA-6 mission were:
two EGG leads, respiratory rate sensor, and body temperature sensor. A blood-
pressure measuring system (BPMS) was utilized in flight. The BPMS consisted of
a pneumatic nylon cuff placed on the left upper arm and a microphone located
under the cuff over the brachial artery. The cuff was inflated manually to
obtain the blood-pressure reading. The blood-pressure record consisted of the
arterial sound pulses superimposed on a cuff-pressure decay curve. This record
was displayed on the second EGG channel. Comparison of preflight and postflight
calibrations of the blood-pressure system showed no significant change.
The total biosensor monitoring time, from astronaut insertion until just
prior to landing, was 8 hours and 33 minutes. The biosensor readout quality
was excellent throughout the countdown and flight, with the exception of the
respiratory trace. As in prior manned flights, variation with head position
and air density combined to reduce the quality of this trace. There were brief
periods of noise on both EGG channels during countdown and flight, usually
occurring during vigorous pilot activity.
Preflight.- Figure 38 depicts the pulse rate, respiration rate, body tem-
perature, suit-inlet temperature, and blood-pressure values recorded during the
MA.-6 countdown. Times at which significant events occurred are indicated at
the bottom of the figure. Values for the physiological functions obtained from
the simulated launch of January 19 and the launch attempt of January 27, 19^2,
are also shown.
Heart and respiration rates were determined by counting the rates for
30 seconds every 3 minutes until 10 minutes prior to lift-off; thereafter,
30-second duration counts were made each minute. During approximately
45 minutes in the transfer van, the astronaut's heart rate varied from
58 to 82 beats per minute, with a mean of 72. His blood pressure was
122/77 ™n Hg. The heart rates during the canceled-flight countdown of
January 27 varied from 60 to 88 beats per minute, with a mean of 70. These
values were essentially the same as those observed during the MA-6 countdown
when the mean heart rate was 68 beats per minute. Respiration rates were
12 to 20 breaths per minute. Blood-pressure values from the simulated launch
also approximated those observed during the MA-6 countdown. A pulse rate of
110 beats per minute and a blood pressure of 139/88 mm Hg were observed during
countdown prior to lift-off. The low suit-inlet temperature maintained during
countdown resulted in the pilot's feeling cold and was accompanied by a fall in
body temperature from 98.6° F at insertion into the spacecraft to 97-6° at
lift-off.
An examination of the electrocardiographic waveform obtained during the

MA-6 countdown revealed a number of variations in the pacemaker (the point at
which stimulus of the heart beat originates) activity. These variations
111
•• •••
• • •
• • »•
included sinus pauses, sinus bradycardia (slowing), premature atrial and

nodal beats, and premature ventricular beats. On several instances, some of
these reported findings occurred with deep respiration. Similar findings
were recorded from the simulated launch of January 19 and the canceled flight
of January 2J. In addition, a brief run (l6 beats) of atrial rhythm with a
rate of 100 beats per minute occurred during countdown, and an isolated run
(19 beats) of rhythm originating adjacent to the atrio-ventricular node with
aberrant conduction occurred during the attempted launch of January 27-
However, these arrhythmias were not observed at any other time. They are
thought to represent normal physiologic variations. Samples of MA.-6 records
taken at the time of astronaut insertion and at T-50 seconds are shown in
figures 39 and. ^-0, respectively.
Flight.- Figure ^1 depicts the inflight physiological data. Values from
the Mercury-Atlas, three-orbit centrifuge simulation are included for com-
parison. Heart rates in beats per minute were counted at 30-second inter-
vals during the MA-6 launch and reentry phases and for 30 seconds at 3-minute
intervals throughout orbital flight. Because of the variation in respiratory
recording quality, rates were counted for 30 seconds whenever quality permitted,
and these rates varied from 8 to 19 breaths per minute throughout flight.
The heart rate from lift-off to spacecraft separation (powered-flight

phase) reached a maximum of 110 beats per minute. The heart rate varied
from 88 to Il4 beats per minute during the first 10 minutes of weightless-
ness. With the exception of periods of planned, calibrated exercise, it
remained relatively stable, with a mean rate of 86 beats per minute during
the next 3 hours and 45 minutes of flight. At the time of retrorocket firing,
the rate was 96 beats per minute. In the reentry-acceleration and parachute-
descent portions of the flight, the highest pulse rate was 13^ beats per
minute which occurred during the period of spacecraft oscillation during
reentry prior to drogue parachute deployment. This rate was the highest noted
during the mission. These rates suggest that acceleration, weightlessness,
and return to gravity were within physiologically tolerable limits.
The EGG variations noted during the preflight observation period were
not observed in flight, and analysis of the inflight record revealed only
normal sinus rhythm with short periods of sinus bradycardia and sinus
arrythmia. There were rare periods when trace quality deteriorated to a
point that only the heart rate could be determined. Variations in EGG
tracings noted during the pilot's Mercury-Atlas, three-orbit centrifuge
simulation included sinus arrythmia, sinus bradycardia, atrial and nodal
premature beats, and rare premature ventricular contractions. These are
interpreted as being normal physiological variations.
Ten blood-pressure determinations were made in flight, the first

at 00:18:30 and the last at 03:1^:00. Values, as shown in figure 4l,
range from 119 to 1^-3 mm Hg systolic and from 60 to 8l mm Hg diastolic.
112
:*
The mean blood-pressure values from various other blood-pressure data sources
are presented in the following table:
Mean
Number of Mean blood pulse Systolic Diastolic
Data sources determi- pressure, press- range, range,
nations mm Hg ure, mm Hg mm Hg
iron Hg
Physical exams 14 110/66 44 98 to 128 60 to 80
Procedures trainer 15 121/76 45 110 to 132 66 to 87
3-orbit Mercury-
Atlas centrifuge
simulation 56 114/80 34 92 to 136 68 to 92
Launch- pad tests 26 104/76 28 91 to 125 64 to 91

MA- 6 countdown 14 123/87 36 101 to 139 83 to 93
MA- 6 flight 10 129/70 59 119 to 143 60 to 8l
The mean pulse pressure during the MA-6 flight shows a slight widening
when compared with preflight values taken in the centrifuge. The mean
blood-pressure value from procedures trainer simulations was 121/76. The
widened pulse pressure, which appeared after 1 hour of flight, is of un-
certain physiological significance. Samples of physiological data from the
onboard record are shown in figures 42 to 44.
A photograph of the inflight exercise device is shown in figure 45.

Exercise was accomplished by a series of pulls on the elastic bungee cords.
Exercise over Zanzibar during the first orbital pass elevated the pilot's
pulse rate from 80 to 134 beats per minute after 30 seconds. The heart rate
returned to 84 beats per minute within 2 minutes. The blood pressure before
exercise was 129/76 mm Hg and 129/74 mm Hg after exercise, which is similar
to preflight trainer readings.
The environmental control system effectively supported the pilot
throughout the mission. It should be noted, however, that body temperature
gradually rose from a lift-off value of 97-6° F to 99-5° F at biosensor
disconnect. The suit-inlet temperature increased slowly during most of the
flight, with a more rapid rise after reentry and during parachute descent.
During the period immediately following descent, the suit-inlet temperature
increased approximately 1° F per minute for a 15-minute period and probably
contributed to the pilot's overheated status observed at egress. Since bio-
sensor disconnect occurred 13 minutes before loss of signal, the maximum
body temperature may not have been observed.
113
•• ••• • ••• • •• .. .
•• •• •• • . . • ••» ••
• • •• t "I J .' • I • • . • • •
* •• •• • • . , . .
Pilot Inflight observations.- The astronaut's voice reports were

consistently accurate, confident, and coherent through all phases of the
flight. His voice quality conveyed a sense of continued well-being. His
mental state appeared entirely appropriate for the situation. The pilot's
mood and level of performance was satisfactorily conveyed by his voice
reports. His prompt responses to ground transmissions and to sounds from
the spacecraft suggest no apparent decrement in hearing ability. Visual
acuity was maintained, and his report of visual perceptions, especially
with regard to colors, was confirmed as accurate by the inflight photographs.
The pilot's voice report contained observations of physiological significance.
During his postflight debriefing these reports were amplified. Those con-
sidered most significant are discussed in the following paragraphs.
No disturbances in spatial orientation were reported, nor were any

symptoms suggestive of vestibular (inner ear) disturbances described during
the flight. Voluntary, rapid head-turning movements produced no unpleasant
sensations. No sensory deprivation or "break-off phenomena" were noted.
Immediately after sustainer engine cutoff (SECO), the astronaut

experienced a brief sensation of tumbling forward, similar to that
described by the astronauts in the suborbital missions. This sensation
ended promptly with no accompanying nausea. Coincident with retrorocket
ignition, a feeling of movement opposite from flight direction was noted.
This feeling could be expected with the sudden change in spacecraft
velocity. The pilot noted no difference in the sensations associated
with reentry accelerations from those experienced during launch.
Food (applesauce puree and a xylose tablet) chewing and swallowing were
accomplished without difficulty. No liquid as such was ingested during flight.
The pilot urinated without difficulty shortly before reentry. He

described "normal" sensations of bladder fullness with the associated urge
to urinate.
The astronaut described weightlessness as a "pleasant" sensation.

Control manipulation was not a problem, and there was no observable per-
formance decrement. The restraint harness and couch combination was re-
ported to be comfortable.
In summary, the MA.-6 mission provided a period of extended weight-

lessness during which the astronaut's physiological responses apparently
stabilized. The values attained were within ranges compatible with normal
function. No subjective abnormalities were reported by the pilot.
llU
TABLE VIII.- AEROMEDICAL EVENTS PRIOR TO LAUNCH
Date e.s.t. Event
February 19, 1962 9:30 p.m. Retired
February 20, 1962 2:20 a.m. Awakened and showered
2:50 a.m. Breakfast
3:05 a.m. Physical examination
4:28 a.m. Suiting started
5:05 a.m. Entered transfer van
5:20 a.m. Arrived at launch pad and remained

in transfer van
5:58 a.m. Ascended gantry
6:06 a.m. Inserted into spacecraft
6:25 a.m. Countdown resumed
9:^7 a.m. Launch
115
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117
• • ••
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TABLE XI.- HIEFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE ASTRONAUT
[AH times are Eastern Standard!
Preflight Postflight
(launch morning)
General status Eager for flight Alert, but not talkative} sweating
profusely} appeared fatigued}
not hungry
Weight, Ib 171 •& at 3:15 a.m. 166 "& at 6:50 p.m.
Temperature, °F 98.2 (oral) 99.2 (rectal at 4:00 p.m.):

98.0 (oral at 12:00 p.m.)
Respiration,
breaths/min
Heart rate,
beats/min 68 76 on shipboard, 72 at Grand Turk
Blood pressure
(left arm),
_ TT —
nun ntr 118/80 (sitting) 105/60 (standing)} 120/60 (supine)
at 3:45 p.m. } 128/78 (sitting)
at 9:30 p.m.
Heart and lungs Normal Normal - no change
Skin No erythema or Erythema of biosensor sites} super-
abrasions ficial abrasions on second and
third fingers of right hand
Extremity
measurements: Left Right Left Right
Wrist, in, 7 7
Calf
(maximum), in. 16* 16|
Ankle
(minimum), in. ol
9 oi
8
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S 160
06 : 00 06 : 10 06 : 20 06 : 30 06 : 40 06 : 50 07 : 00 07 : 10 07 : 20 07 : 30 07 : 40 07 : 50 08 : 00
Eastern standard tijne, hr :min :sec
(a) Countdown, 06:00 to 08:00 e.s.t.
Figure J>Q.- Respiration rate, pulse rate, body temperature, suit-inlet

temperature, and "blood pressure measured during countdown.
122
>• •< • •
• • • I • •
0 Simulated orbital mission

O Canceled MA-6 attempt
.60 -1*5 -22 -10 -5

Countdown time, mln
06:00 06:10 03:20 06:30 08:liO 08:50 09:00 09:10 09:20 09:30 09:40 09:50
Eastern standard time, hr:min
nr:mln
(b) Countdown, 08:00 to 09:^7 e.s.t. (lift-off).
Figure 38.- Concluded.
123
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(b) Sample of telemetered data received at Hawaii,
Figure ^3.- Concluded.

130
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ASTRONAUT FLIGHT ACTIVITIES
A brief review of the astronaut's activities in preparation for and

during the MA-6 mission is presented in this section.
Preflight Training Si.nrmia.Ty
Spacecraft checkout activities.- The astronaut's participation in pre-

flight checkout and testing provided him vith the opportunity to become
familiar with the MA-6 spacecraft and launch-vehicle systems. His activities
during this period are summarized in table XV. He spent 25 hours and
55 minutes in the spacecraft itself; and many more hours were consumed before
and after each launch-pad checkout operation in preparation, trouble-shooting,
observation, and discussion.
Training activities.- Table XVI summarizes the astronaut's training

activities in the procedures trainer. During the period from December 13, 1961,
to February 17, 19^2, the astronaut spent 59 hours and ^5 minutes accomplishing
70 simulated missions and experiencing 189 simulated systems failures. The
main emphasis during this period was on procedural training, particularly
launch and early mission failures usually calling for a mission abort. The
astronaut accomplished several three-pass missions on the trainer, as well as
several simulations involving the Mercury Control Center (MCC), the blockhouse,
and the entire Mercury Network. The astronaut also spent appreciable time in
briefings on the various subsystems, flight planning, and in individual study.
Flight preparedness.- The astronaut achieved a high level of skill and

knowledge several weeks prior to the actual launch date. There was a gradual
reduction in the intensity of the preflight training program, particularly
on the procedures trainer. Nevertheless, there was no decline in his level
of preparedness.
The astronaut's comments during postflight debriefing sessions indicate

that he acknowledges the value of his preflight training. His major comments
were: (l) that his participation in the spacecraft checkouts was very useful,
(2) that personal briefings from systems specialists were helpful, and
(3) that the air-lubricated-free-attitude (ALFA) trainer was less valuable
than the procedures trainer as an attitude control trainer.
Chronology of Pilot's Activities During Flight
Figure k6 is a simplified chronology of the pilot's activities during

the MA-6 flight from lift-off to landing. Identification of continental
limits, certain celestial observations, photography, and communications modes
are not included in the table, since the communications tapes do not provide
sufficient time correlation. Spacecraft systems problems during the flight
prevented the pilot from completing all of the planned tasks.
133
• • •• •
••••••••••
Attitude Control
The pilot's attitude control activities are summarized in table XVII.
The pilot was able to control the spacecraft adequately throughout the flight
with the exception of the last portion of reentry. The general ability of
the pilot to control the vehicle is illustrated by the brief review of the
major manual maneuvers discussed below.
Control systems check.- The control systems check is designed to exercise

all of the primary control modes in a minimum amount of time and with minimal
fuel usage. This series of maneuvers was accomplished smoothly and efficiently,
and was nearly identical to the performance on the procedures trainer prior
to the flight. The attitudes achieved varied less than 10° and the rates
1°
did not vary over — /sec from the procedures-trainer simulation at any time.
The 60° right-yaw maneuver.- The astronaut performed the 60° right-yaw
maneuver smoothly, overshooting only 3° or U°. This error is within the
accuracy of his visual abilities in determining the exact 60° position on
his attitude indicator. (See 'fig. Vf.)
Three l80° right-yaw maneuvers.- The first 180° yaw maneuver, using the
window as the primary attitude reference, was intended to be a precise
maneuver, keeping the pitch and roll errors minimized. The second and third
yaw maneuvers were executed only for the purpose of observation and photography.
These maneuvers were accomplished satisfactorily, as can be seen in figure U8.
Use of a constellation as a reference.- The astronaut used the constel-

lation Orion as a night reference on two different occasions during the
flight. Figure ^9 illustrates the attitude variations during the second
period with Orion as a reference. These variations are within the accuracy
limits normally demonstrated in the ALFA and procedures trainers, using
instruments.
Gyro caging.- The astronaut caged and uncaged the gyros immediately
after completion of each of the three 180° yaw maneuvers because of a
disagreement between the indicated and observed attitudes. The third caging
exercise was completed shortly before the second sunrise while the spacecraft
was still on the dark side of the earth; the other two cagings were performed
during daylight periods. The records indicate that the pilot correctly uncaged
at approximately 0° in yaw and roll attitudes and at -lk* in pitch for both
day operations. During the night-side operation, he caged and uncaged at
0° in yaw, -148 in pitch, and -20° in roll, but it is unlikely that the pilot
would have made an error in roll which is much easier to accomplish, and
yet been able to aline the spacecraft so precisely in yaw. Therefore, it
seems plausible that the astronaut's attention was diverted by other duties.
The pilot caged and uncaged the gyros at -lU8 in pitch, even though he
reported to the ground that he was going to 0°, 0°, 0° attitude during the
first caging operation. Since it is necessary to cage at least at -1^° in
pitch in order to use the horizon in the window as a reference, the astronaut's
report to the ground was obviously a slight communication error on his part.
CONFIDENT
••• ;•.
: :.: '..\ • :• : r. :.:
.. *" * ~ ^v* * * * * ** **
Retrofire control.- The astronaut backed up the ASCS during the retro-
sequence and retrofire events by using the manual proportional control mode.
It is impossible to assess individually the operations of the ASCS or of
the astronaut at this time. The attitudes did not deviate more than ±3°
during this event.
Reentry pitch maneuver.- The manual proportional control system and the
rate and attitude indicators were used by the astronaut in pitching up to
reentry attitude. As can be seen from figure 50 he performed this maneuver
with precision and was well within the capability demonstrated in ground
trainers.
Reentry damping.- The early part of the reentry through peak acceleration
was controlled by employing the fly-by-wire and manual proportional control
systems, and the oscillations during this period were small. (See fig. 51-)
After c4:V7:00, the pitch and yaw oscillations increased rapidly, and the
pilot's control inputs did not appreciably reduce these rates. It is evident
from an analysis of the fuel usage that his manual fuel was depleted at
C4: lj-7; Oh. The fly-by-wire .control mode apparently still had fuel available,
as indicated by the subsequent effectiveness of the auxiliary damping mode
at 0^:47:^2. The ultimate lack of satisfactory control is attributed to the
change in control effectiveness because of the early depletion of manual
control system fuel.
Pilot's use of external reference.- The pilot reported that, by using

external reference, he was generally able to orient the spacecraft without
difficulty, particularly about the roll and pitch axes. The pilot stated
that there was a period of learning associated with use of the periscope
and the window as yaw references, and he felt that by the end of the flight
he was able, on the daylight side, to adjust yaw within a few degrees.
During the flight, he developed the procedure of pitching down to -60° in
order to increase the apparent terrain drift in the window caused by orbital
velocity. At a pitch attitude of -3^-°, the apparent velocity of terrain
movement is 0.60°/sec, whereas, at -60° pitch attitude, the apparent velocity
is increased to 1.4l°/sec. The greater apparent drift as the vehicle pitches
toward the nadir point aids in the determination of yaw attitude by increasing
the ratio of the terrain movement resulting from orbital velocity to the
apparent terrain movement resulting from a spacecraft attitude rate in yaw.
The pilot preferred the window over the periscope for yaw alinement. He
disliked the periscope high-magnification view because of the unclear area
at the border between the high- and low-magnification views.
On the night side, the pilot reported that the horizon was always visible
through the window. With full moon illumination, he stated that he could
aline the spacecraft in yaw nearly as well as on the daylight side. The
pilot was not able to use the eye patch to dark-adaptj he was able to see
little, if any, of the ground or clouds before moonrise. The pilot reported
that the periscope was not very useful, in general, for determining drift
on the nightside. Even with a full moon, the clouds were too dim in the
periscope to pick up a specific point and follow it for determination of
yaw heading.
135
••
••
••
:.:
The pilot reported that he could use star drift as a reference at yaw
angles close to 90% but that within 10° of zero yaw, it was quite difficult.
The pilot was also able to use constellations as a heading reference . He
reported that the number of stars he could see were approximately the same
as those normally seen from the ground on a dark night . He had no trouble
recognizing constellations and therefore could use the stars to determine
heading by referring to his Star Navigation Charts.
Communication Activities
Table XVIII summarizes the astronaut ' s inflight communications. The

pilot reported that he believed more time was devoted to formal operational
reports during the MA- 6 mission than would be desirable for future flights.
Reduction of the high proportion of communications involved in making radio
contact, reporting switch positions, and relaying instrument readings would
permit more detailed reports by the pilot of his activities and observations .
Scientific Observations
The astronaut's scientific observations are grouped into the following

categories: celestial, meteorological, and terrestrial. In addition, the
pilot's activities using the hand- held camera and a summary of subject
material photographed are presented. See the Astronaut's Flight Report
and appendix C of reference 4 for additional information regarding
scientific observations by the pilot and appendix D of reference 4 for an
analysis of these observations.
Celestial observations.- Numerous small particles, estimated by the

pilot to be from TT to ft inch in size, were observed during each sunrise period
as moving rearward past the spacecraft at a relative velocity estimated at
1.3 to 2.2 meters per second. Since some of the particles were seen to drift
into the spacecraft's shadow, the estimated sizes and velocities can be relied
upon. The small relative velocity of the particles with respect to the
spacecraft indicates that they were in nearly the same orbit, which makes it
certain that the particles came from the spacecraft. They undoubtedly
drifted because of the difference in aerodynamic drag. The most plausible
material for the particles is frozen water, since other substances are either
not present in sufficient quantities, or are limited in source, which should
be exhausted by a third orbital pass. Water from the spacecraft environmental
control system is slightly more probable than water which was ejected as a
product of the reaction within the control system thrusters because of the low
observed velocities.
A luminous band observed around the horizon may be the result of internal
reflections of the moonlit earth between two inclined windows in the space-
craft . This explanation has been strengthened by observations of the band in
earth photographs taken from the spacecraft, by calculations using the
blueprints, and by direct observations in the trainer and in other spacecraft .
The tan-to-buff color is found in one of ten observed reflections . If this
band was not a reflection, the pilot may have seen the 6300 and 6464 angstrom
red layer which is known to exist at about the altitude reported.
136
The sun was observed to be highly flattened on some photographs of
sunset, and this phenomenon was visually confirmed by the pilot. Spectra of six
stars in Orion were obtained with a hand-held, objective-prism spectrograph.
Meteorological observations.- A program of observations for the astronaut,

suggested by U.S. Weather Bureau scientists, was designed to provide informa-
tion for the development of improved optical sensing equipment for satellite
weather-observations systems. Three of the requested observations reported
by the astronaut are listed below.
1. Determine whether cloud heights can be evaluated from orbital

altitude. Report: The astronaut reported he could identify
cloud types and determine their heights.
2. Determine whether clouds can be seen on the dark side of the

earth. Report: The pilot reported that with a full moon he
was able to see clouds and some vertical development on the
dark side.
3- Determine whether lightning can be seen on the dark side of

the earth. Report: The astronaut reported that he could
clearly see lightning in two storms in the Indian Ocean, which
was passed over in nighttime.
The Weather Bureau also suggested that pictures, using infrared film
and a special set of filters, be taken of cloud cover in order to evaluate
the relative effectiveness of various wave-length intervals for cloud
observation. The required filter and film were aboard the MA-6 flight
spacecraft. However, because of operational requirements of a higher
priority, the pilot was not able to accomplish this exercise.
Terrestrial observations.- It is important to learn what the effective

visual horizon for the pilot in orbital space may be and at what distance
he can recognize landmarks for use in navigation and attitude control. The
pilot's observations for the MA-6 flight are summarized in the following
paragraphs.
The astronaut confirmed what earlier earth-sky pictures and Tiros

satellite photographs have indicated, that a large percentage of the earth's
surface is covered by clouds. Only four land areas, the western African
desert, western Australia, the western United States, and the eastern coast
of the United States, were relatively free of clouds during the W hours of
flight.
The pilot reported that he could see the following landmarks during the
daylight periods across the United States: the cities of El Paso, Tex.,
New Orleans, La., Charleston, S. C., and Savannah, Qa.j the Salton Sea in
California; the Mississippi Delta; and Cape Canaveral, Fla. He also reported
a V-shaped figure in the water in the Atlantic, which he interpreted to be
the wake from a ship. This is probably the smallest object reported by the
137
•*• "• ! **; ; ••. **. • • ••• •• •••
* ••• • • •• 7- *.t*
pilot . If it was the wake of a destroyer, it would be approximately 120 feet

in width and perhaps JOO yards long.
The only nonluminous feature seen at night, other than clouds, was a
faint indication of the western coastline of Australia. Two types of features
were reported, lightning produced by two storms in the Indian Ocean and the
lights of the city of Perth, Australia. The Indian Ocean ship flare and
the flares ignited at Woomera, Australia, were not seen, undoubtedly because
of cloud cover.
Color photographs .- The pilot was able to take a total of 70 photographs,

38 of which were on one roll and the balance on a second roll. Table XIX
contains a complete listing of the subjects photographed and their approximate
times of exposure . The pilot attempted to take pictures of the luminous
particles seen during sunrise using the color film. While there are several
photographs containing specks, it cannot be definitely determined whether
these specks are actually the particles observed or imperfections on the
film and the window.
Sensation and Orientation During Weightlessness
General sensations.- The pilot reported that weightlessness was not

unpleasant, caused no problem, and in several respects was easier or more
enjoyable than the Ig condition. For example, there were no pressure points
from the seat, and certain tasks, such as using the camera and other personal
equipment, were easier. This equipment could be left unsupported while another
task was performed.
Of operational significance was his report that, under weightlessness,

the head assumes a new position because of the helmet tiedown straps. This
suggests that the visual angles through the window and the periscope would
be slightly different than if they were measured from the fixed couch
position.
The pilot reported no problem in reaching for and activating controls.

There was no tendency to overreach. This was expected, since experience
has shown that the eyes will quickly correct for muscular reaction inaccu-
racies .
Orientation.- The pilot reported that he experienced two illusions of

motion, but both of these illusions were associated with changing acceleration
fields and not with weightlessness. The first occurred at sustainer engine
cut-off (SECO), when he had a very slight feeling of pitching forward head
over heels . The second illusion of motion occurred during retrograde, at
which time he reported that he felt like he was going back towards Hawaii.
He stated that following retrofire, when he was able to look out the window
and see the terrain moving away from him, this illusion disappeared.
No illusions of position occurred during weightlessness. The astronaut

did not feel at any time that he was standing still and the earth was moving,
or that he was in any position other than the true spacecraft position
during the flight.
138
The pilot reported that he could sense angular accelerations that were
present for a period of time sufficient to produce rates above 5e/sec- This
is approximately in agreement with the results of tests on the pilot, conducted
at Pensacola, Fla. . on the Human Disorientation Device (a two-dimensional ro-
tational apparatus). There is no indication of greater sensitivity to ro-
tational forces under zero g than Igj however, the observations are too limited
to warrant firm conclusion.
A final area of interest was his judgment of the vertical and the
horizontal during weightlessness. Normally, this perception is strongly
affected by the otolith organs of the inner ear. Variations in the ability
to determine the horizontal have been demonstrated when the individual is
asked to adjust a visible line in a completely dark room while lying on his
side. Errors in this adjustment usually occur after approximately 2 minutes
in darkness. Provisions for conducting this test have been built into the
miniaturized photometer carried aboard the spacecraft. The pilot's adjustment
to the horizontal was accurate. However, interpretation of the results is
difficult, since, because of the control system malfunction, the pilot was
hurried and made the line adjustment very shortly after looking into the
device.
Personal Equipment
The equipment that the pilot used and his relevant comments are
presented in this section.
Daylight color camera.- A 35rom camera with a photoelectric cell to

adjust the aperture automatically was provided. (See fig. 52(a).) It has
a 50mm, f-2.8 lens and has been provided with controls permitting rapid
one-hand operation. The only comment regarding camera operation concerned
changing film. The pilot released the casette, and it floated behind the
instrument panel when he reached for it. The results of the photography
using this camera are in the section labeled Color Photographs.
Ultra-violet spectogrsph.- A second 35™ camera with a special lens

system adapted for ultra-violet spectral photography was included. (See
fig. 52(b).) The results of film experiment are inconclusive, and, therefore,
of little value.
Photometer.- The photometer is a miniature device used by the pilot to
determine visually the intensity of celestia.1 light sources, to view the
sun at sunset and to evaluate his capability to orient to the horizontal.
(See fig. 52(c).)
Airglow filter.- All light except the 5577 angstrom line was filtered
out by the airglow filter, (See fig. 52(d).) The only attempt to use this
filter produced no results, primarily because of a low-level night adaptation
at the time.
Night adaptation eye patch.- The form-fitted mold (see fig. 52(e)) which
is attached with tape prior to sunset worked well prior to lift-off, but it
139
I• •
••
failed to remain positioned during the flight. The combined effects of dust,
humidity, and perspiration of the pilot reduced the effectiveness of the
adhesive.
Flight-plan cards.- Three cards, similar in style to figure 46, were

provided to aid in maintaining schedules and to serve as a reminder of
upcoming events.
Food tube.- Two tubes were provided, one containing beef and vegetables
and the other applesauce. (See fig. 52(f).) The applesauce was consumed
without difficulty, but the pilot did not have an opportunity to open the
other tube.
Food tablets.- A food tablet dispenser was provided containing one

xylose tablet and several malt tablets. (See fig. 52(g).)
140
•• ••••••
.• •• •
• ••
•
• •• _»» • •• •
TABLE XV. - TIME EXPENDED IK ASTRONAUT PREIAUNCH ACTIVITIES
Date Activity Duration, hr:min

(ai
January 1962
15 Flight acceptance 7:^5
composite test
IT launch simulation 5:10
19 Launch simulation lj-:15
20 Simulated flight 1:30
27 Countdown ^:00
Total 25:55
Time does not include allowance for preparation, monitoring,

debriefing, trouble shooting, or conferences.
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TABLE XVH. - CONTROL MODE USD ATTITUDE MANEUVERS DURING MA-6 MISSION
Control mode Elapsed time from launch, Attitude maneuvers

(a) hr:mln:sec
ASCS 00:05:00 to 00:07:58 Turnaround.
MP, RSCS, 00:07:58 to 00:10:46 Control systems check. Cheeked MP, rate
auxiliary damping, command, auxiliary damping, and FEW for
rat proper operation.
ASCS 00:10:46 to 00:25:00 Held orbit attitude for radar tracking.
EEW 00:25:00 to 00:28:28 60' right-yaw maneuver to check periscope
as a yaw reference.
ASCS 00:28:28 to 01:30:00 Left-yaw low-thrust failure commencing
at 01:29:30.
ASCS (pitch and roll), 01:50:00 to 01:31:00 Started to drift out of orbit mode in yew;
MP (yaw) brought it back by using MP.
ASCS 01:31:00 to 01:
U31:17"\ Eechecked left-yaw low thrust; still faulty;
FEW or MP 01:31:17 to 01:
L:32:00 J went to FEW or MP.
ASCS 01:32:00 to 01:33:58 Drifted 35° in right yaw; went into orientation
mode; went back to FEW.
nr 01:33:58 to 02:00:20 Day horizon check at 01:52:00; 180* right yaw
maneuver from 01:53:27 to 01:59:10.
ASCS 02:00:20 to 02:01:34^ Rechecked ASCS operation; left-yaw low thruster
ASCS (pitch and roll), 02:01:34 to 02:01:42 ) still faulty; checked operation of low thrusters
MP (yaw) in yaw FEW and MP.
ASCS (pitch and roll), 02:01:42 to 02:02:08
FEW or MP (yaw)
ASCS (pitch and roll), 02:02:08 to 92:02:23
MP (yaw)
ASCS 02:02:23 to 02:08:29^1 Right-yav low thrugtera not operating; Into
ASCS and MP 02:08:29 to 02:13:28 \ orientation mode due to yaw drifting out to
left at 02:02:4?; switched to MP as a back-
up to ASCS
MP 02:13:28 to 03:31:00 Orientation mode at 02:13:02; went to MP to
conserve fuel; held attitudes on Orion from
02:27:10 to 02:29:10; caged gyros by using
night window reference at 02:40:18; uncaged
at approximately -10* in pitch and -20* in
roll; pitched down 60* to observe El Paso,
Texas at 03:05:15; yawed 180* right from
03:14:00 to 03:29:00; caged and uncaged
gyros at 03:29:22, dayside; uncaged at
approximately -13* in pitch and 0* in roll
using window reference.
TCey:
RSCS - Rate stabilization control system
FEW - Fly-by-^fire
MP - Manual proportional
143
• *
• ••
TABLE XVH.- CONTROL MODE AND ATTITUDE MAKEOVERS DURING MA-6 MISSION - Concluded
Control mode Elapsed time from launch, Attitude maneuvers

(a) hr:mln:sec
ASCS 03:J1:00 to 03:37:38 Rechecked ASCS operation.
ASCS (pitch and roll), 03:37:38 to 03:lH:05 Yawed left 35* to observe sunset.
MP (yaw)
ASCS and MP 03:41:05 to 03:52:09 ASCS with MP 'backup; slipped into orientation
mode at 03:51:20
FEW 03:52:09 to 04:25:10 Ho low thruBt in right yaw; held attitude on
Orion from 03:54:10 to 03:58:30; yawed 180°
right to observe sunset from 04:11:03 to
04:15:30; caged gyros at 04:21:26; uncaged at
approximately -14* in pitch and 0* in roll.
ASCS 04:25:10 to 04:28:05 Rechecked ASCS.
ASCS and MP 04:28:05 to 04:36:35 ASCS with MP backup during retrosequence end
retrofire.
ASCS (pitch and roll), 04:36:35 to 04:37:22 In and out of orientation due to faulty right
MP (yaw) yaw thruster; controlled yaw manually.
MP 04:37:22 to 04:41:58 Pitched down approximately 100* for geographi-
cal observations at 04:37:40; pitched manually
to reentry at 04:39:48.
and MP 04:41:58 to 04:47:44 Inserted at left roll of 12*/sec at 04:44:42;
effective damping to 04:47:00; pitch oscil-
lations pegged at 04:47:05; yew oscillations
pegged at 04:47:20.
MP and ASCS or
auxiliary damping 04:47:44 to 04:49:17 Auxiliary damping or ASCS damped oscillations
(drogue) from 04:47:44 to 04:48:40; rate oscillations
pegged in pitch and yaw again at 04:48:40
until antenna fairing separation.
"Key:
RSCS - Rate stabilization control system
SEW - Fly-by-wire
MP - Manual proportional
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Time from lift-off, hr:min
Figure 47.- One 60° right yaw maneuver using the periscope and fly-by-wire.
First maneuver (01:53=30)

Second maneuver (03:14:00)
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46 10 12 14 16 18 20
Duration of maneuver, min
Figure 48.- Three l80° right-yaw maneuvers using the window reference and manual
proportional or fly-by-wire.
150
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153
'•• • •• ••
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(a) Color camera (b) Ultra-violet

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(c) Photometer (d) Air glow filter
Figure 52.- Personal equipment

I ••• • • • • • •• •• ••
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• •• • •
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(e) Night adaption eye patch.
(f) Food tubes. (g) Food tablet dispenser.
Figure 52.- Concluded.
D: 155
PILOT'S FLIGHT REPORT
The pilot's report should be concerned mainly with those items in the
mission objectives where man's observation capabilities provide information
not attained by other means. It is in this type of reporting that a manned
vehicle provides a great advantage over an •unmanned vehicle, which is often
deaf and blind to the new and the unexpected. My report, then, will stress
what I heard, saw, and felt during the orbital mission.
Preparation and Countdown
Preparation, transfer to the launch complex, and insertion into the space-
craft went as planned. The technicians and I had been through the entry pro-
cedure into the spacecraft many times.
During the countdown, short but minor delays were encountered when problems
arose. The support for the microphone in the helmet, an item that had been
moved and adjusted literally thousands of times, broke and had to be replaced.
While the spacecraft hatch was being secured, a bolt was broken and had to be
repaired. During this time I was busy going over my checklist and monitoring
the spacecraft instruments.
The initial unusual experience of the mission is that of being on top of

the Atlas launch vehicle after the gantry has been pulled back. Through the
periscope, much of Cape Canaveral can be seen. If you move back and forth in
the couch, you can feel the entire vehicle moving very slightly. When the
launch-vehicle engines are gimbaled, you can feel the vibration, and when the
tank is filled with liquid oxygen, the spacecraft vibrates and shudders as the
metal skin flexes. The white plume of the vented lox (liquid oxygen) is visible
through the window and periscope.
Powered Flight
When the countdown had reached zero, I could feel the engines start. The
spacecraft shook, not violently but very solidly. There was no doubt when lift-
off occurred. When the launch-vehicle was released, there was an immediate
gentle surge that let me know I was on my way. The roll to the correct azimuth
was noticeable after lift-off. I had preset the small window mirror to watch
the ground. I glanced up after lift-off and could see the horizon rotating.
Some vibration had occurred immediately after lift-off, but it smoothed out
after about 10 to 15 seconds of flight. There was still a noticeable amount
of vibration that continued up to the time the spacecraft passed through the
maximum aerodynamic pressure q . The approach of maximum q. is signaled by
more intense vibrations. During this period, I was conscious of a dull muffled
roar from the engines. Beyond this period the vibration smoothed out noticeably.
However, the spacecraft never became completely free of vibration during powered
flight.
156
The acceleration buildup was noticeable but not bothersome. Booster
engine cut-off occurred at 00:02:09, and as the two outboard engines shut down
and were detached, the acceleration dropped but not as sharply as I had antic-
ipated. Instead, it decayed over approximately 1/2 second. There is a change
in noise level and vibration when these engines are jettisoned. I saw a flash
of smoke out the window and thought at first that the escape tower had jetti-
soned early, which I reported. However, this flash was apparently deflected
smoke coming up around the spacecraft from the booster engines which had .lust
separated. The tower was jettisoned at 00:02:33* an<i I corrected my earlier
report. I was" ready to back up the automatic sequencing system if it did not
perform correctly and counted down the seconds to the time for tower jettisoning.
I was looking at the nozzles of the tower rockets when they were ignited. A
large cloud of smoke came out but little flame. The tower accelerated rapidly
from the spacecraft in a straight line. I watched it to a distance of approxi-
mately 1/2 mile. The spacecraft was programed to pitch down slowly just prior
'to jettisoning the tower, and this maneuver provided my first real view of the
horizon and clouds.
After the tower was jettisoned, the spacecraft pitched slowly up again1 and
I lost sight of the horizon. I remember making a comment at about this time
that the sky was very black. I could communicate well up to and during the
time of the maximum acceleration of 7.7g, which occurred at sustainer engine
cut-off (SECO).
Just before the end of powered flight, there was one experience I was not
expecting. At this time the fuel and lox tanks were nearly empty, and appar-
ently the launch vehicle becomes considerably more flexible under these cond-
itions than when it is filled. • I had the -sensation of being out on the end of a
spring-board and could feel oscillating motions as if the nose of the launch
vehicle were waving back and forth slightly-
Orbital Insertion
The noise level also increased as the vehicle approached SECO. When SECO
occurred at 00:05:01 and the acceleration dropped to zero, I had a very
slight sensation of tumbling forward. The astronauts have often had a similar
sensation during training on the centrifuge, but the sensation was much less
pronounced during the flight.
There was no doubt when the explosion bolts holding the clamp ring between
the launch vehicle and the spacecraft were ignited. There was a loud report
and I immediately felt the force of the posigrade rockets which separate the
spacecraft from the launch vehicle and provide the final insertion impulse.
Prior to the flight I had imagined that the acceleration from these three small
rockets would be insignificant and that I might fail to sense them entirely,
but there was no doubt when they ignited.
As the spacecraft came around to its normal aft viewing attitude, I could
see the launch-vehicle sustainer stage through the window. At that time, I
estimated that it was "a couple of hundred yards away. " After the flight an
analysis of the trajectory data showed this distance to be 600 feet. The
157
capability to estimate distances of this magnitude will be important in future
missions in which the pilot will want to achieve rendezvous, since he will be
counted on to perform the final closing maneuver.
t
I was able to keep the sustainer stage in sight for 6 or 7 minutes while
it traveled over the Atlantic. At the last time I reported seeing it, it was
approximately 2 miles behind and 1 mile below the spacecraft. It could be seen
easily as a bright silvery object against the black background of space.
Orbit
The control system turned the spacecraft around and oriented it into the
proper attitude. After my initial contact with Bermuda, I received the times
for firing the retrorockets and conducted a check of the controls. I had
practiced it many times on the ground in the Mercury procedures trainer and the
test went just as it had in the trainer. This experience was the first time I
had been in complete manual control of the spacecraft, and it was very reas-
suring to see not only the spacecraft react as expected, but also to see that
my own ability to control was as we had hoped.
Following this controls check, I went back to automatic stabilization and

control system (ASCS) control and the spacecraft operated properly in this mode
throughout the first orbital pass.
Thruster problem. - Because of a malfunction in a low-torque thruster at

the end ,pf the first orbital pass, it was necessary for me to control the space-
craft manually for the last two passes. This requirement introduced no serious
problems, and it actually provided me with an opportunity to demonstrate what
a man can do in controlling a spacecraft. However, it limited the time that
could be spent on many of the experiments and planned observations I had hoped
to carry out during the flight.
Attitude reference.- A number of questions have been raised over the

ability of man to use the earth's horizon as a reference for controlling the
attitude of the space vehicle.
Throughout this flight, no trouble in seeing the horizon was encountered.

During the day the earth is bright and the background of space is dark. The
horizon is vividly marked. At night, before the moon is up, the horizon can
still be seen against the background of stars. After the moon rises (during
this flight the moon was full), the earth is well enough lighted so that the
horizon can be clearly seen.
With the lighted horizon as a reference, the pitch and roll attitudes of
the spacecraft can easily be controlled. Yaw, or heading reference, however,
is not so good. I believe that there was a learning period during the flight
regarding my ability to determine attitudes in yaw. Use of the view through
the window and periscope for this purpose gradually improved.
To determine yaw attitude, advantage must be taken of the speed of the

spacecraft over the earth which produces an apparent drift of.the ground below
158
the spacecraft. When the spacecraft is oriented in the plane of the orbit,
the ground appears to move parallel to the spacecraft longitudinal axis.
During the flight I developed a procedure which seemed to help me use this
terrain drift as a. yaw reference. I would pitch the small end of the space-
craft down to about -60° from the normal attitude where a fairly good vertical
view was available. In this attitude, clouds and land moving out from under me
had more apparent motion than when the spacecraft was in its normal orbit atti-
tude pointing toward the horizon.
At night with the full moon illuminating the clouds below, I could still
determine yaw attitude through the window but not as rapidly as in the daytime.
At night, I could also use the drift of the stars to determine\heading, although
this procedure took longer and was less accurate.
Throughout the flight, I preferred the window to the periscope as an atti-

tude reference system. It seemed to take longer to adjust yaw by using the
periscope on the day side. At night, the cloud illumination by the moon is too
dim to be seen well through the periscope.
Three times during the flight I turned the spacecraft approximately l80° in
yaw and faced forward in the direction of flight. I liked this attitude - seeing
where I was going rather than where I had .been - much better. As a result of
these maneuvers my instrument reference system gave me an inaccurate attitude
indication. It was easy to determine the proper attitude, however, from refer-
ence to the horizon through the window or the periscope. Maintaining orien-
tation was no problem, but I believe that the pilot automatically relies much
more completely on vision in space than he does in an airplane, where gravity
cues are available. The success with which I was able to control the space-
craft at all times was one of the most significant features of the flight.
Weightlessness.- The sensation of weightlessness was a pleasant experience.

I reported that I felt fine as soon as the spacecraft separated from the launch
vehicle, and throughout the flight this feeling continued to be the same.
Approximately every 30 minutes throughout the flight I went through-a

series of exercises to determine whether weightlessness was affecting me in any
way. To see if head movement in a zero-g -environment produced any symptoms of
nausea or vertigo, I tried first moving, then shaking my head from side to side,
up and down, and tilting it from shoulder to shoulder^ in other words, moving
my head in roll, pitch, and yaw. I began slowly, but as the flight progressed,
I moved my head more rapidly and vigorously until, at the end of the flight, I
was moving rapidly as my pressure suit would allow.
In another test, using only eye motions, I tracked a rapidly moving spot
of light generated by my finger-tip flashlights. I had no problem in watching
the spot and once again no sensations of dizziness or nausea. A small eye
chart was included on the instrument panel with letters of varying size and
with a "spoked wheel" pattern to check both general vision and any tendency
toward astigmatism.. No change from normal was apparent.
159
•• ••• • ••• •
> • • • ••
• • •• • •• •
An "oculogyric test" was also made in which turning rates of the spacecraft
were correlated with sensations and eye movements. These results were again
normal. Preflight experience in this test had been conducted and a calibration
had been made at the Naval School of Aviation Medicine, Pensacola, Florida, so
that I was thoroughly familiar with my reactions to these same movements at Ig.
To provide medical data on the cardiovascular system, I conducted period-

ically an exercise which consisted of -pulling on a bungee cord once a second
for JO seconds. This exercise provided a known workload to compare with previ-
ous similar tests made on the ground. The flight surgeons have reported the
effect that this had on my pulse and blood pressure. The effect that it had on
me during the flight was the same effect that is had on the ground - it made me
tired.
Another experiment related.to the possible medical effects of weightless-

ness was eating in orbit. On the relatively short flight of Friendship "J,
eating was not a necessity, but rather an attempt to determine whether there
would be any problem in consuming and digesting food in a weightless state. At
no time did I have any difficulty eating. I believe that any type of food can
be eaten as long as it does not come apart easily or make crumbs.
Sitting in the spacecraft under zero g is more pleasant than under Ig on

the ground, since you are not subject to any pressure points. I adapted quite
rapidly to weightlessness. I had no tendency to overreach and did not experi-
ence any other sign of lack of coordination, even on the first movements after
spacecraft separation. I found myself unconsciously taking advantage of the
weightless condition, such as when I would leave a camera or some other object
hanging motionless while I attended to other matters. This procedure was not
done as a preplanned maneuver but as a spontaneous and natural thing when other
items required my attention. I thought later about how I had done this as
naturally as if I were laying the camera on a table in a Ig field. It pointedly
illustrates how rapidly adaptable the -human is, even to something as foreign
as weightlessness.
I had brought along a number of instruments, such as cameras, binoculars,

and a photometer, with which to make observations from a spacecraft. All of
these items were stowed in a special equipment storage kit by my right arm.
Each piece of equipment had a J-foot piece of line attached to it. By the time
I had started using items of the equipment, these lines became tangled. Al-
though these lines got in the way, it was still important to have some way of
securing the equipment, as I found out when I attempted to change film. The
small canisters of film were not tied to the equipment kit by lines. I left
one hanging motionless while working with the camera. When I reached for it,
I accidentally hit it and 'it floated out of sight behind the instrument panel.
Color, light, and visibility.- As I looked back at the earth from space,
colors and light intensities were much the same as I had observed when flying
at high altitude in an airplane. When looking toward the horizon, however, the
view is completely different, for then the blackness of space contrasts vividly
with the brightness of the earth. The horizon itself is a brilliant blue and
white.
160
It was surprising how much of the earth's surface was. covered by clouds.
The clouds can be seen very clearly on the daylight side. The different types
of clouds - vertical developments, stratus clouds, and cumulus clouds - are
readily distinguishable. There is little problem in identifying them or in
seeing the weather patterns. One can estimate the relative heights of the
cloud layers from a knowledge of the cloud types or from the shadows that high
clouds cast on those below them. The U.S. Weather Bureau was interested in im-
proving the optical equipment in their Tiros and Nimbus satellites and wanted
to know if I could determine the altitude of cloud layers with better optical
resolution. From my flight, it seemed quite possible to determine cloud heights
from orbital altitudes.
Only a few land areas were visible during the flight .because of the cloud
cover. Clouds were over much of the Atlantic, but the western (Sahara Desert)
part of Africa was clear. In this desert region I could plainly see dust storms.
By the time I got to the east coast of Africa where I might have been able to
see towns, the land was covered by clouds. The Indian Ocean was the same.
Western Austrailia was clear, but the.eastern half was overcast. Most of
the area across Mexico and nearly to New Orleans was covered with high cirrus
clouds. As I came across the United States I could see New Orleans, Charleston,
and Savannah very clearly. I could also see rivers and lakes. . I think the best
view I had of any land area during the flight was the clear desert region
around El Paso on the second pass across the United States. I could see the
colors of the desert and the irrigated area north of El Paso. As I passed off
the east coast of the United States I could see across Florida and far back
along the Gulf Coast.
Over the Atlantic I saw what I assume was the Gulf Stream. The different
colors of the water were clearly visible.
I also observed what was probably the wake of a ship. As 1 was passing
over the recovery area at the end of the second orbit, I looked down at the
water and saw a little "V. " I checked the map. I was over recovery area G at
the time, so I think it was probably the wake from a recovery ship. When I-
looked again the little "V" was under a cloud. The change in light reflections
caused by the wake of a ship are sometimes visible for long distances from an
airplane and will linger for miles behind a ship.
I believe,, however, that most people have an erroneous conception that

from orbital altitude, little detail can be seen. On the ground, it is common
to see a mountain range, in clear desert air 100 or so miles away very clearly,
and all.that vision is through.dense atmosphere. From orbital altitudes, at-
mospheric light attenuation is only through approximately 100,000 feet of
gradually less dense atmosphere so it is even more clear.
Obviously, on the night side of the earth, much less was visible. This
fact may have been caused not only by the reduced light, but also by the fact
that I. was never fully dark adapted. In the bright light of the full moon, the
clouds are visible, and I could see vertical development at night. Most .of the
cloudy areas, however, appeared to be stratoform.
161
•• •
••
The lights of the city of Perth, in western Australia, were on and I could
see them well. The view was similar to that seen when flying at high altitude
at night over a small town. South of Perth there was a small group of lights,
but they were much brighter in intensity. Inland there was a series of four or
five towns lying in a line running from east to west. Knowing that Perth was
on the coast, I was just barely able to see the coastline of Australia. Clouds
covered the area of eastern Australia around Woomera, and I saw nothing but
clouds from there across the Pacific until I was east of Hawaii. There ap-
peared to be almost solid cloud cover all the way.
Just off the east coast of Africa, there were two large storm areas.
Weather Bureau scientists had wondered whether lightning could be seen on the
night side, and it certainly can. A large storm was visible just north of my
orbital track over the Indian Ocean and a smaller one to the south. Lightning
could be seen flashing back and forth between the clouds but most prominent
.were lightening flashes within thunderheads illuminating them like light bulbs.
Some of the most spectacular sights during the flight were sunsets. The
sunsets always occurred slightly to my left, and I turned the spacecraft to get
a better view. The sunlight coming in the window was very brilliant, with an
intense clear white light that reminded me of the arc lights while the space-
craft was on the launching pad.
I watched the first sunset through the photometer, which had a polarizing
filter on the front so that the intensity of the sun could be reduced to a
comfortable level for viewing. Later I found that by squinting, I could look
directly at the sun with no ill effects, just as I can from the surface of the
earth. This accomplished little of value but does give an idea of intensity.
The sun is perfectly round as it approaches the horizon. It remains

circular until it reaches the horizon, and retains its symmetry until just
the last sliver is visible. The horizon on each side of the sun is extremely
bright, and when -the sun has gone down to the level of this bright band of the
horizon, it seems to spread out ^5° "to 60° to each side of the point where it is
setting. With the camera I caught the flattening of the sun just before it set.
As the sun moves toward the horizon, a black shadow of darkness moves
across the earth until the whole surface, except for the bright band at the
horizon, is dark. This band is extremely bright just as the sun sets, but as
time passes the bottom layer becomes a bright orange and fades into reds, then
on-into the darker colors, and finally off into the blues and blacks. One thing
that surprised me was the distance that the light extends on the horizon on
each side of the point of the sunset. The eye can see a little 'more of the
sunset color band than a camera captures. One point of interest was the length
of time during which the orbital twilight persisted. Light was visible along
the horizon for k to 5 minutes after the sunset, which is a long time when you
consider that sunset occurred 18 times faster than normal.
The period immediately following sunset was of special interest to the

astronomers. Because of atmospheric light scattering, it is not possible to
study the region close to the sun except at the time of a solar eclipse. It
162
had been hoped that from above the atmosphere the area close to the sun could
be observed. However, this observation would require a period of dark adapta-
tion prior to sunset. An eye patch, which was to be held in place by special
tape, had been adapted for this purpose. The patch was expected to permit one
eye to be night adapted prior to sunset. Unfortunately, the tape proved unsat-
isfactory and I could not effectively use the eyepatch. Observations of the
sun's corona and zodiacal light must await future flights when the pilot may
have an opportunity to get more fully dark adapted prior to sunset.
Space particles.- The biggest surprise of the flight occurred at dawn.

Coming out of the night on the first pass, at the first glint of sunlight on
the spacecraft, I was looking inside the spacecraft checking instruments for
perhaps 15 to 20 seconds. When I glanced back through the window my initial
reaction was that the spacecraft had tumbled and that I could see nothing but
stars through the window. I realized, however, that I was still in the normal
attitude and that the spacecraft was surrounded by luminous particles.
These particles were a light yellowish green color. It was as if the

spacecraft were moving through a field of fireflies. They were about the
brightness of a first magnitude star and appeared to vary in size from a pin-
head up to possibly 3/8 inch. They were about 8 to 10 feet apart and evenly
distributed throughout the space immediately around the spacecraft. Occa-
sionally, one or two of them would move slowly up around the spacecraft and
across the window, drifting very, very slowly, and would then gradually move
off, back in the direction in which I was looking. I observed these luminous
objects for approximately k- minutes during each sunrise period.
During the third sunrise, I turned the spacecraft around and faced forward
to see if I could determine where the particles were coming from. Facing in
this forward direction I could see only about 10 percent as many particles as I
had seen when my back was to the sun. Still, they seemed to be coming towards
me from some distance so that they appeared not to be coming from the space-
craft. Just what these particles are is still subject to debate and awaits
further clarification.
Other planned observations. - A number of other observations and measure-

ments during orbit had to be canceled because of the control .system problems.
The scientific equipment carried aloft was not highly sophisticated. It was
believed, however, that it would show the feasibility of making. more compre-
hensive measurements on later missions.
• Some of these areas of investigation that we planned but did not have an
opportunity to check are as follows:
(a) Weather Bureau observations:

(1) Photographs of weather areas and cloud formations to match
against map forecasts and Tiros photographs.
(2) Filter'mosaic photographs of major weather centers.
(3) .Observation of .green airglow from air and weather centers
• .in 5577-angstrom band.with an airglow filter.
163
n "i i
(k) Albedo intensities .- -measure reflected light intensities on
both day and night side
(b) Astronomical observations:

(1) Light polarization from the area of sun
(2) Comets close to sun
(3) Zodiacal light
(4) Sunlight intensity
(5) Lunar clouds
(6) Gegenschein
(7) Starlight intensity measurements
(c) Test for otolith balance disturbance and autokinesis phenomena
(d) Vision tests:

(1) Night vision adaptation
(2) Photometer and eye measurements
(e) Drinking
Reentry
After having turned around on the last orbital pass to see the space
particles, I maneuvered into the correct attitude for igniting the retrorockets
and stowed the equipment in the equipment storage kit.
During the last dawn, my attitude indicators were still slightly in error.
However, before it was time to ignite the retrorockets, the horizon-scanner
slaving mechanism had brought the gyros back to orbit attitude. I crosschecked
repeatedly between the instruments, periscope presentation, and the attitude
through the window.
Although there were variations in "cne instrument presentations during the

flight, there was never any difficulty in determining my true attitude by ref-
erence to the window or periscope. I received a countdown from the ground and
the retrorockets were ignited on schedule just off the California coast.
I could hear the report of each rocket and could feel the surge as the
rockets slowed the spacecraft. Coming out of zero-g condition, the force of
the retrorockets produced the sensation that I was accelerating back toward
Hawaii. This sensation, of course, was an illusion.
Following retrofire, the decision was made to have me reenter with the
retropackage still attached because of the uncertainty as to whether the heat-
shield had been released. This decision required me to perform manually a
number of.the -operations which are normally conducted automatically during the
reentry. I brought the spacecraft to the proper attitude for reentry using
164
manual control. The periscope was retracted by pumping the manual reaction
lever.
As deceleration began to increase I could hear a definite hissing noise

that sounded like small particles brushing against the spacecraft.
Because of the ionization of the air around the spacecraft, communica-

tions were lost. This loss had occurred on earlier missions and was expected-
As the heat pulse started, there was.a noise and a bump on the spacecraft. I
saw one of the straps that hold the retropackage swing in front of the window.
The heat pulse increased until I could see a glowing .orange color through
the window. Flaming pieces were breaking off and flying past the spacecraft
window. At the time, these observations were of some concern to me because
I was not sure what they were. I had assumed that the retropackage had been
jettisoned when I saw the strap in front of the window. I thought these
flaming pieces might be pa'rts of the heat shield breaking off. I know now,
of course, that the pieces were from the retropackage.
There was no doubt when the heat pulse occurred during reentry but it
takes time for the heat to soak into the spacecraft and heat the air. I did
not feel particularly hot until I had descended to about 75,000 to 80,000 feet.
From there on down I was uncomfortably warm, and by the time the main parachute
was out I was perspiring profusely.
The reentry deceleration of 7-Tg wa-sas expected and was similar to that
experienced in centrifuge tests. There had been some question as to whether
our ability to tolerate acceleration might be worse because of the ^ hours
of weightlessness, but I could note no difference between my feelings of
deceleration of this flight and my training sessions in the centrifuge.
After peak deceleration, the amplitude of the spacecraft oscillations

began to build. I kept them under control in the manual proportional and
fly-by-wire modes until I ran out of manual fuel. After that point, I was
unknowingly left with only the fly-by-wire system and the oscillations in-
creased; so I switched to auxiliary damping, which controlled the spacecraft
until the automatic fuel was also expended. I was reaching for the switch
to deploy the drogue parachute early in order to reduce these reentry oscil-
lations, when it was deployed automatically. The drogue parachute stabilized
the spacecraft rapidly.
At 10,800 feet the main parachute was deployed. I could see it stream
out behind me momentarily, fill partially, and then as the reefing line cutters
were actuated iVfilled completely. The opening of the parachute caused a
jolt, but perhaps less than I expected.
165
•• ••• • ••• • •• ••
•
••• ••••• ••*• • •• .• • .• ;
•• •• ••• • »•»
Landing and Recovery
The landing deceleration vas sharper than I"had expected. Prior to

landing I had disconnected all the extra leads to my pressure suit and was
ready for rapid egress, Taut there was no need for this.- I had a message
that the destroyer U.S.S..Noa would pick me up within 20 minutes. I lay
quietly in the spacecraft trying to keep as cool' as possible. The tempera-
ture inside the spacecraft did not seem to diminish. This temperature level,
combined with the high humidity of the air being drawn into the -spacecraft,
kept me uncomfortably warm and perspiring heavily. Once the U.S.S. Noa'was
alongside the spacecraft, there was little delay in starting the hoisting
operation. The spacecraft-was pulled part way out of the water to let the
water drain from the landing bag.
During the spacecraft pickup, I received one good bump.- It was probably
the most solid jolt of the whole trip as -the spacecraft swung against the
side of the ship. Shortly afterwards the spacecraft was on the deck.
I had initially planned egress out through the top, but by this time I
had been perspiring heavily for nearly ^5 minutes.' I decided to come out
the side hatch instead.
- Concluding Remarks
The first orbital flight of a manned Mercury spacecraft has proved that
man can adapt very rapidly to the space /environment. My senses and capabil-
ities appeared unchanged in space, at least for the ^^-hour duration of
this flight, and weightlessness was no problem.
Of major significance is. the fact that much more dependence can be
placed on the man as a reliably operating portion of the man-spacecraft
system. In many areas, his safe return can be made dependent on his own
intelligent actions. Even where automatic systems are still necessary,
mission reliability is~ tremendously increased by having the man as a backup.
Man's adaptability is most evident in his powers of observation. He can
accomplish many-more and varied experiments during each mission than can be
obtained from an unmanned vehicle. When the unexpected arises, as happened
with the luminous particles -and horizon-band observations on the flight, he
can make observations that will permit a more rapid evaluation of these
phenomena on future flights. Indeed, on an unmanned flight there likely
would have been no such observations.
On the ground some things might be done differently. As an example, it

would be more advisable in the event of suspected malfunctions, such as the
heat-shield—landing-bag difficulties, which require extensive discussion to
keep the pilot updated on each bit of information, rather than waiting to
166
.•
send a final clearcut recommendation from the ground. This procedure keeps the
pilot fully informed at all times, which is important if there should happen
to be any communication difficulty and it became necessary for him to make all
decisions solely from onboard information.
Most important, however, the future will not always find us as power
limited as we are now. We will progress to the point where missions will not
be totally preplanned. Therefore, a greater number of alternatives will be
available for the pilot to choose from during a flight, and consequently man's
intelligence and decision-making capability will become mandatory.
167
•• ••• • •!
• • • •
• • •• • «
• • ••
•• ••• •
LAUNCH-VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
All launch-vehicle systems performed satisfactorily. The following

items are noted for information.
.Abort Sensing and Implementation System (ASIS)
The ASIS performed satisfactorily. Rone of the abort parameters were

near abort threshold. As expected in normal sequence, an ASIS abort signal
was generated following sustainer engine cutoff (SECO).
Engine Cutoff
SECO and auxiliary sustainer cutoff (ASCO) signals were transmitted,

and at least one was received and properly acted upon by the launch vehicle.
Instrumentation does not permit determination of whether or not both signals
were acted upon by the launch vehicle.
Orbit Lifetime
Computed data based upon probable thrust having been imparted to the
launch-vehicle tankage by the spacecraft posigrade rockets (-k ft/sec)
indicated at least 10 orbital passes to be expected from the launch vehicle.
The final stage tankage, however, was later found to have reentered some
6 passes following launch. Tracking during the third orbital pass indicated
a perigee of about 95 nautical miles, an apogee of about 131 nautical miles,
and a period of approximately 8j minutes. No useful tracking data were
obtained after the fourth orbital pass.
Guidance
The performance of the Atlas launch-vehicle radio guidance system was

excellent in this flight. The guidance system locked-on the vehicle in
both track and rate at 00:00:68, approximately as planned, and lost lock
at 00:05:32 (2.0 seconds after SECO). Launch-vehicle oscillations resulting
from guidance-system pitch-steering commands are shown in figure 53 and
were within acceptable limits. These rates were measured by the spacecraft
rate gyros, and the data from the MA-5 mission are shown for comparison.
In figures 5^ to 56, the velocity and flight-path angle are shown in

the region of sustainer cutoff.. Guidance system data are shown in figure 54,
and the Azusa data used in the Range Safety Impact Predictor Computer
(IP 7090) are shown in figure 55 to illustrate the noise level during the
time of the go-no-go computations. Both the launch-vehicle radar and the
IP 7090 data are considered excellent, except for two Azusa points im-
mediately after SECO. The cause of these Azusa points scattering has been
traced to a recorder in the line. Except for these two points, the data
scatter shown in the figures is considered normal and is smoothed or
168
averaged for the go-no-go decision.
The system gave a cutoff condition which was about 7 ft/sec low in
velocity and about 0-50° low in flight-path angle. These values are within
the expected accuracy range for the system. In figure 56, these data are
shown as flight-path angle plotted against velocity. This is the type of
display used by the Flight Dynamics Officer in the Mercury Control Center
for the orbital go—no-go decision. Both the launch-vehicle guidance system
and IP 7090 data indicated a go condition.
. Aerodynamic Loads
The angle of attack times dynamic pressure aq for 'the flight is shown
in figure. 57 and is based on the measured wind profile at launch.
TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS . ', .
. , Sequence of Flight Events .
Comparisons of planned .and. actual major event times and pertinent

trajectory information are presented in table XX for the MA-6 launch, -• .
orbital, and reentry phases. These data generally reflect launch-vehicle
guidance accuracy and the performance of the spacecraft sequential system
in effecting these flight events. -
The parameters shown for the "planned" launch trajectory in table XX

were computed by using the 1959 ARDC model atmosphere to maintain consistency
with preflight trajectory computations calculated before the flight. The
density of the atmosphere at Cape Canaveral is approximately 10 percent
higher than that of ARDC model atmosphere in the r.egion of maximum dy-
namic pressure (an altitude of about 37>000 feet). As a result, the
maximum dynamic pressure expected would be about 10 percent higher than that
shown as "planned." For this flight, the maximum dynamic pressure experienced
was about 12 percent higher than that shown as "planned."
Flight Trajectory . •
The entire MA-6 flight trajectory, from lift-off through landing, was
determined and .is compared with the nominal case. Figure 58 presents the
profile of altitude plotted against longitude,for the entire flight, and
detailed data are given below.
Launch phase.- Launch trajectory data, shown.in figure 59^ are based
on the real-time output of the Range Safety Impact Predictor Computer (which
used Azusa MK II and Cape Canaveral FPS-16 radar data) and the launch-vehicle
guidance computer. The data from these tracking facilities were used during
the time periods listed on following page. ,
169
Facility Time, min:sec
Cape Canaveral FPS-16 0 to 00:45
Azusa MK II 00:45 to 01:08
Launch-vehicle guidance system 01:08 to 05:02
Orbital phase.- The orbital portion of the trajectory, shown in

figure 60, was derived first by starting with the spacecraft position and
velocity vector obtained during the second orbital pass near Woomera,
Australia, as determined by the Goddard computer using Mercury Network
tracking data. Integration backward along the flight trajectory to
orbital insertion and forward to the start of retrofire at the end of the
third pass yielded the calculated orbital trajectory. These integrated
values were in excellent agreement with the measured values of the guidance
system at orbital insertion. They were also in accord with the position
and velocity vectors determined by the Goddard computer for passes near the
Canary Islands (first pass), Bermuda (second and third passes), and Muchea,
Australia (during the third pass), thus establishing the validity of the
integrated orbital portion of the flight trajectory.
Reentry phase.- The reentry portion of the trajectory, shown in

figure 6l, was obtained by starting with the spacecraft position and velocity
vector near Corpus Christ!, Texas, as determined by the Goddard computer.
Integration backward along the flight to the end of retrofire and forward
to landing.yielded the reentry trajectory. This exercise assumed that the
retropackage had not been jettisoned and that the drogue parachute was
deployed at 04:49:17 (given by telemetry) at an altitude of approximately
27,000 feet, instead of the planned altitude of 21,000 feet. The spacecraft
decelerations from the integrated reentry trajectory agree within reading
accuracy with the decelerations measured by the onboard accelerometer. In
addition, the times of drogue and main parachute deployment from the integrated
reentry trajectory and those taken from spacecraft onboard measurements agree
within 1 second. This agreement with measurements recorded in the space-
craft serves to verify the validity of the integrated reentry portion of the
trajectory. The integrated values at the end of retrofire were adjusted
by adding the effects of a nominal retrorocket total impulse of 38>880 Ib-sec
at nominal spacecraft retrofire attitudes of -34° in pitch and with 0° in
roll and yaw.
The results, when compared with the orbital integrated values at the
start of retrofire, show that the velocity was low by about 7 ft/sec. This
indicates that the velocity increment actually imparted to the spacecraft at
retrofire was in excess of its nominal value by an equal amount. .This
excessive velocity can result from two factors: the weight of the space-
craft having been below its nominal magnitude during retrograde and the
retrorocket thrust having been above normal. The fact that the spacecraft
landed approximately 40 nautical miles short of the expected landing point
170
can primarily be attributed to this abnormally high velocity increment,
with an additional but lesser effect resulting from the retrograde attitude
being slightly above normal. An error of 1 ft/sec in the velocity increment
at retrofire will give a corresponding error in landing range of 5-2 nautical
miles from the nominal landing point, and an error of 1.0° in pitch attitude
during retrofire will give an error in landing range of 10.0 nautical miles
from nominal. The reentry trajectory and the landing point were only slightly
affected by the retention of the retropackage. The integrated landing point
was about 4 nautical miles.short of the spacecraft pickup point.
The aerodynamic parameters for the planned and integrated reentry
trajectories were computed by using the HASA Manned Spacecraft Center model
atmosphere. This is based on Discoverer Satellite program data for
altitudes above 50 nautical miles, the 1959 ARDC model atmosphere for
altitudes between 25 and 50 nautical miles, and the Patrick Air Force Base
atmosphere for altitudes below 25 nautical miles.
In the trajectory figures (figs. 59 to 6l), the above integrated values
are labeled "actual." All planned values presented were precisely calcula-
ted before the flight for the known mission parameters to arrive at the
expected trajectory data.
A comparison of the planned and actual trajectory parameters is given
in table XXI. The difference between these values primarily resulted from
the actual cutoff velocity and flight-path angle at insertion being slightly
lower than planned.
171
• ••• • «. „, .
•• • . . • . .
::•::•
. . ... • • ««.
•
TABLE XX. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
£L
Event Planned time, Actual time, Difference,
hr:min: sec hr:min: sec sec
Launch phase
Booster engine cutoff (BECO) 00:02:11.4 00: 02: 09. 6 ^1.8
Tower release 00:02:34.2 00:02:33.3 -0.9
Escape rocket Ignition 00:02:34.2 00: 02: 33. 4 -0.8
Sustainer-engine cutoff
discrete (SECO) 00: 05: 02
Tail-off complete 00:05:03.8 00:05:02 -1.8
Spacecraft separation 00: 05: 03. 8 00:05:03.6 -0.2
Orbital phase
Retrograde initiation 04:32:58 04:33:08 J.0.0
Retrorocket no. 1 (left) 04:32:58 04:33:08 10.0
Retrorocket no. 2 (bottom) 04:33:03 04:33:13 10.0
Retrorocket no. 3 (right) 04:33:08 04:33.18 10.0
Retropackage jettison 04:33=58

Reentry phase
b C
0. 05g relay actuation 04:43:53 04:43:31 -22.0 (0)
C
Drogue parachute deployment 04:50:00 04:49:17.2 -42.8 (-1.0)
Main parachute deployment 04:50:36 04: 50: 11 -25.0 C(-1.0)
Main parachute jettison 04: 55: 22 04: 55: 23 1.0 C(-27.0)
a
Preflight calculated, based on nominal launch-vehicle performance.
The 0.05g relay was actuated manually by the astronaut when he was in a
"small g field."
Q
Numbers in parentheses show the time difference between the actual event
based on insertion parameters and the postflight-calculated reentry event.
172
• •
• *
TABLE XXI.- COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS
Condition and quantity Planned | Actual | Difference

Cutoff conditions (including tail-off)
Range time, sec 303-8 302.0 -1.8

Range time, mln:sec 05:OJ.8 05:02 -00:01.8
Geodetic latitude, deg North 30.4273 30.1*533 0.0260
Longitude, deg West 72-5268 72-5865 0.0597
Altitude, ft 528,428 528,381 -47
Altitude, nautical miles 86.97 86.96 -0.01
Range, nautical miles 436.4 1*33-7 -2.7
Space-fixed -velocity, ft/sec 25,715 25,708 -7-0

Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg 0 -0.01*68 -0.0468
Space-fixed heading angle, deg East of North 77-4756 77.1*826 .0070
Post-posigrade firing conditions
Range time, sec 305-3 306.8 1.0

Range time, min: sec 05:05.8 05:06.8 00:01
Geodetic latitude, deg North 30.1*572 JO. 5128 0.0556
Longitude, deg West 72.3797 72.2923 -0.087!*
Altitude, ft 528,1*60 528,361 -99
Altitude, nautical miles 86.98 86.96 -0.02
Range, nautical miles 1*1*4.2 1*49.4 5-2
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec 25,737 25,730 -7-0

Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg -0.0030 -0.0517 -o. 01*87
Space-fixed heading angle, deg East of North 77-55*H 77- 6399 0.0858
173
TABLE XXI.- COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS - Concluded
Condition and,quantity Planned Actual Difference

Orbit parameters
Perigee altitude, statute miles .. 100.1 100.03 -0.02
Perigee altitude, nautical miles 87.0 86.92 -0.08
Apogee altitude, statute miles 166.2 162.17 -4. OJ

•. Apogee altitude, nautical miles ll*.l* 146.92 -3.W
. Period, mln:sec ... 88:32 88:29 -00:03
Inclination angle, deg . 32:52 32:5k 0.02
Maximum conditions
Altitude, statute miles .. 166.2 162.17 -1*. 03

Altitude, nautical miles ' '. . 11*1*.1* 140.92 -3.1*8
Space-fixed velocity, ft/s'ec ..... ~ 25,737.0 25,732.0 -5-0
Earth-fixed velocity, ft/sec 24,1*20.0 21*, 415.0 -5.0
Exit acceleration, g units . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . 7-7 7-7 0
a 16.0
Exit dynamic pressure, lb/sq ft 966 982
b
378
Entry deceleration, g units . . •. 7.6 7-7 0.1
•Entry dynamic pressure, Ib/sq ft . .. 1*72 25
Landing point
North latitude ." . - 21°07'N 21°26'N 00-19'H

C
Vest longitude 68°00'¥ 68°1*1'W '00 "1*1'W
a
Based on atmosphere at Cape Canaveral. •• ,.
Based on 1959 AKDC model atmosphere. . - . ' . • . '

"Actual" landing coordinates shown atove were those resulting from the trajectory
integration. The retrieval point 20 minutes after landing was reported as 21"25-6'N. and
68"36.5'W- by the recovery ship.
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MERCURY NETWORK PERFORMANCE
The Mercury Network consists of the Mercury Control Center (MCC) at

Cape Canaveral (CNV); stations at the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR), Bermuda
(EDA), and at fourteen other locations along the orbital ground trackj and
communications and computing centers at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.
The network affords a data acquisition capability for real-time monitoring,
mission control, and postflight analysis. This section presents information
on the performance of the Mercury Network in the areas of communications,
telemetry, tracking, computing, and command systems. .A brief description
of the Mercury Network is given in reference' 12, and appendix A of reference
amplifies .the performance analysis presented herein.
Mercury Network performance was excellent, all systems were fully
operational at lift-off, and the few minor malfunctions which occurred
did not affect the flight monitoring and control of the mission. Acqui-
sition of data from tracking, telemetry, and air-to-ground (A/G) voice
systems was satisfactory in both quantity and quality for real-time
monitoring and postflight analysis. The relaying of A/G voice back to the
Mercury Control Center from all network sites with a point-to-point voice
capability contributed substantially to the real-time monitoring .of the
mission.
Tracking
Radar tracking on this flight was satisfactory and superior to that of
the two unmanned orbital missions (MA-^ and MA-5)• All stations provided
data for all passes whenever the spacecraft was above their horizon. The
quantity and quality of these data were more than adequate. Minor problems
existed in S-band phasing and handover, but these problems resulted in only
a negligible loss of data. The communications used for the phasing and .
handover were very satisfactory. . ,
Interference of an unknown source caused some .concern on C-band at
Cape Canaveral and Bermuda, but this did not cause an extensive loss of
data. It is apparent that the extensive maintenance, training, and refine-
ment of tracking procedures for the network have yielded dividends. Satis-
factory C-band tracking was accomplished during most of the "blackout"
period. Two Cape Canaveral radars had satisfactory S-band tracking for
the first 2 minutes of blackout, and they were then turned off because the
end of their range interval had been reached. S- and C-band radar-tracking
coverage is shown in figures 62 and 63, respectively. The performance of the
acquisition aid unit was satisfactory, and radar acquisition, in all cases,
was accomplished without difficulty.
Data Transmission
The transmission of both high-speed and low-speed data was satisfactory
throughout the mission.
Trajectory Computation
At lift-off, the selected source for display at the MCC was the output
of the IP 7090. The FPS-16 tracking at Cape Canaveral was utilized until
approximately 00:00:45, at which time the IP 7090 switched to Azusa tracking
and these data were displayed for approximately the next 20 seconds. Launch-
vehicle guidance data through Goddard Space Flight Center were then selected
and displayed throughout the remainder of powered flight. The guidance-
system radar acquired both rate and track at 00:01:08, and the system
locked-on throughout the remainder of the powered phase. The quality of the
guidance system radar data was excellent up to sustainer engine cutoff (SECO)
and during the go-no-go computation.
The programed phase of the flight showed minor deviations of 0.75° in

flight-path angle and 1.0 nautical mile in altitude at booster engine cut-
off (BECO). After launch-vehicle staging, the radio guidance system corrected
these deviations. A maximum deviation of 2.8 nautical miles in crossrange
and an apparent residual of more than 50 ft/sec in yaw velocity was indicated
at sustainer engine cutoff. The yaw velocity was nominal up to approximately
55 seconds before cutoff, but it then appeared to lack response to steering
with the final results as stated previously. The calculated landing point
at the Canary Islands station, however, was right on the expected ground
track, which was difficult to resolve with a residual velocity of 50 ft/sec
in yaw. It was later disclosed$ however, that an error in the scale of the
plotboard at MCC existed, which explains the velocity deviation and accounts
for this misrepresentation. The cutoff conditions displayed in MCC are
listed in table XXII.
Low-speed tracking data from the remote sites were excellent; hence
the orbit was well defined by the end of the first orbital pass. Subsequent
tracking during the second and third passes showed negligible improvement
in the orbit parameters. The number of radar observations received from
each site is shown in table XXIII.
The primary computer was lost during the second pass between Hawaii
and Point Arguello, California. A restart was made in less than 5 minutes
using the Hawaii vector; thus, the computer was ready to accept the White Sands,
N. Mex., data. Because of a malfunction of the secondary computer, data
from Corpus Christi, Tex., and Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., for the second
pass and data from Eglin Air Force Base on reentry were ignored.
During reentry, tracking data appeared to pinpoint the landing location

with a high degree of confidence. The final values from the Goddard computers
indicated a difference of only 2 nautical miles between the landing location
as obtained from the California Station data and the Cape Canaveral FPS-16
data (see table XXIV) . However, the landing point reported by the recovery
ship, as well as that computed by the Cape IP 7090 computer using Cape
Canaveral and San Salvador FPS-16 data, did not agree with the Goddard computa-
tions . The actual landing point was 39 nautical miles short of the planned
196
>•• • • •« •• • • • ••• ••
location. The weight loss of RCS fuel, attributable to the requirement
for manual control during two orbital periods, was much greater than anti-
cipated. This weight difference contributed the major error of 31 nautical
miles from that predicted, since the lower weight for a given quantity of
'retrograde impulse will result in a higher negative velocity increment at
retrofire. A variation in spacecraft attitude during retrofire resulted in
an additional error of 4 nautical miles, and a slightly greater impulse
than the normal value provided another 2-nautical-mile deviation. These
factors account for 37 nautical miles of the actual landing point discrep-
ancy.
The low-frequency cyclic noise pattern was apparent in both the launch-
vehicle guidance computer and IP 7090 data, but this was slightly lower in
amplitude than that for the second unmanned orbital mission (MA-5) and much
lower than the first unmanned orbital mission (MA-4). At insertion, the
guidance-system data gave an inertial velocity of 25,727-6 ft/sec and an
inertial flight-path angle of -0.0674°, while IP 7090 readings were
25,733-3 ft/sec and -0.0907°, respectively.
Telemetry
The data provided by the telemetry system were adequate and of good
quality. Coverage was satisfactory, with data acquisition at all stations
throughout each pass whenever the spacecraft was above the radio horizon.
Coverage is shown graphically in figure 64 and in tabular form with the
commutator figures, range, and elevation in table XXV. Signal strengths as
great as 400 microvolts were achieved and were satisfactory throughout the
mission. Several sites reported lower signal levels when compared with
previous missions.
lonization blackout of telemetry began at approximately 04:42:52 as
seen at Cape Canaveral, and ended at approximately 04:47:14 as seen at
Grand Turk Island. Thus, the blackout period lasted 4 minutes and 22 seconds.
Data flow charts were prepared based on the telemetry summary messages
from the sites. The majority of the data points falls within ± 3 percent
of a faired curve. A few exceptions were evident, however, in that figures
from several sites were consistently off the faired curves of fuel quantity
by as much as 10 percent, as shown in figure 65.
Air-Ground Voice
A transcript of the air-ground communications for the MA-6 -mission is
presented in appendix B of reference 4. The performance of the primary
air-ground voice system (UHF) was good throughout the mission. Signal
strengths were adequate enough to provide favorable signal-to-noise ratios
whenever the spacecraft was above the local visual horizon. In most in-
stances, RF refraction increased the coverage over visual line-of-sight by
1 to 2 minutes of arc. The UHF in-range times averaged almost 7 minutes
per orbital pass.
The HF voice system provided some additional coverage but, as expected,
197
was not as satisfactory as the UHF. The HF voice system was of particular
value during the first and third passes when the stations at the Canary Islands,
Point Arguello, Calif., Guaymas, Mexico, Zanzibar, Indian Ocean Ship, Muchea,
Astralia, and Canton Island were able to converse with the astronaut beyond
the capability of the UHF system. It is interesting to note that, in some
instances where the HF was being used as the spacecraft approached the station,
the quality of communications improved considerably as the elevation angle
became positive, particularly as the switch was made to UHF.
Figure 66 shows approximate coverage compared with times above the
visual horizon. .Through the air-ground voice system, MCC was able to
follow the recovery procedure and monitor all conversations until after the
spacecraft was aboard the recovery ship. •
Command System
The command system for MA-6 operated in a satisfactory manner during
the mission. The few airborne-system anomalies are discussed below. The
600-watt stations appeared to have had coverage beginning at a slant range
of ^00 to ^50 nautical miles, and the 10-kilowatt stations had coverage
beginning at a slant range of 650 to 700 nautical miles. . A summary of the
command handover exercises is shown in table XXVI and a summary of the
command transmissions is shown in table XXVII.
Ground system.- There were several, problems involving the command
equipment and the coder relay panels during the month prior to launch;
however, no delays in the launch countdown resulted. A total of 11 functions
was successfully transmitted from the sites: auxiliary sustainer cutoff
(ASCO) was transmitted from San Salvador, three sets each of R and Z cali-
brations were transmitted from Muchea, and two sets each of R and Z calibrations
were transmitted from Cape Canaveral. Command coverage from all sites was
satisfactory with the exception of Muchea on the third pass. A combination
of slant ranges in excess of ^50 nautical miles, airborne antenna patterns,
and 600 watts of RF power resulted in only 1 minute and 30 seconds of
coverage above receiver threshold.
Airborne system.- Command receiver "A," operating from the l8-volt
isolated bus, appeared to be much more sensitive to signal strengths above
30 microvolts than receiver "B," which operates from the l8-volt standby
bus. Below 30 microvolts the operation of both receivers coincided. The
onboard recorded signal strengths, although acceptable, were about 6 db
below those of the unmanned orbital missions (MA-4 and MA-5). The airborne
antenna pattern problem, which was experienced on MA-1+- and MA-5, was again
evident from the MA^-6 onboard records. Spacecraft attitude changes are
definitely reflected on the signal-strength records. lonization blackout
on the command frequency occurred between 0^:^3:03.5 and 04:^7:12, which
is a period of 4 minutes and 8 seconds.
Triggering of the "All-Function Events Channel" occurred five times
during ionization blackout. The tone channels triggered are unknown, but
198
are coincident with a burst of signal into the receivers. It is known that
the tones keyed were not clock changes, R and Z calibrations," nor a Mayday
signal. Postflight tests of the communication system revealed that inter-
ference between the telemetry and UHF voice transmitters produced a signal
with a frequency on the edge of the command-receiver bandwidth. An increase
of 0.5 me in the assigned low-link telemetry frequency could correct this.
The characteristics of the inputs to the command receivers are shown as an
oscillograph-record reproduction in figure 67.
What is assumed to be random noise with a signal strength from 1 to
4 microvolts was recorded between 01:1^:00 and 01:15:07. Command carrier was
not present during this period.
Ground Communications
All the ground communication networks provided good support for the
mission. Except for a few short prelaunch outages, all voice, teletype,
and datalines were available at all times, and the quality of transmission
was satisfactory. Single-sideband voice communication with the two ships
was very satisfactory, as provided by AMR. Part of the link from the Indian
Ocean Ship had to be relayed through Ascension Island.
199
TABLE XXII. - ORBITAL INSERTION CONDITIONS DISPLAYED AT MCC
Quantity Actual Nominal
Velocity ratio with posigrades . . . . 1.0002 1.00058

Space-fixed flight-path angle,
a
deg -0.0674 0
Insertion altitude, nautical
miles 87
Inclination angle, deg 32.540 32-52
Orbit duration capability , number of

passes 7
Insertion velocity with

posigrades, ft/sec 25,728 25,737
Apogee altitude, nautical miles . .. 141
T?hese values represent the average of the go-no-go computations.
Only the number ascertained by computation; actual orbit

capability was approximately 100 passes.
200
TABLE XXXIX. - SUMMARY OF LOW-SPEED TRACKING DATA
[_Verlort not used in differential correction after correction on FP6-16J
Facility
Total possible Total observations Valid Nonvalid Differential
Station Radar valid observations made observations observations correction
First pass
Bermuda FPS-16 71 56 53 3 43
Bermuda Terlort 71 61 53 8
Canary Islands Verlort 68 72 65 9 50
Muchea ,
Australia Verlort 82 93 76 17 50
Wooniera,
Australia FPS-16 40 85 40 45 40
Havaii FPS-16 (a)
Havali Verlort (a)
Point Arguello,
Calif. FPS-16 (a)
Point Arguello,
Calif. Verlort (a)
Guaymas,
Mexico Verlort 65 6k 51 13 I*
White Sands,
H. Hex. FPS-16 34 56 28 28 28
Corpus Christ!,
Tex. Verlort 6k 71 46 25 0
Eglln Air Force
Baae, Fla. FPS-16 40 39 38 1 38-
Eglin Air Force
Baae, Fla. Verlort (b)
Cape Canaveral,
Fla. FPS-16 71 43 28 35
Second pass
Bermuda FPS-16 66 56 47 9 42
Bermuda Verlort (b)
Canary Islanda Verlort 54 54 46 9 34
Muchea,
Australia Verlort 80 61 60 1 50
Voomera ,
Australia FPS-16 33 65 29 36 29
Hawaii FPS-16 15 15 15 0 15
Hawaii Verlort 56 34 30 4
Point Arguello,
Calif. FPS-16 38 29 28 1 28
Point Arguello,
Calif. Verlort (b)
Guaymas,
Mexico Verlort (<=)
White Sands,
H. Hex. FPS-16 in 63 31 32 31
Corpus Christi ,
Tex. Verlort 60 64 60 !> • 47
Eglin Air Force
Base, Fla. FPS-16 1.0 42 41 1 38
Eglin Air Force
Base, Fla. Verlort (b)
Cape Canaveral,
Fla. FPS-16 58 54 ll Uli
Third pas
Bermuda FP3-16 65 60 58 2 49
Bermuda Verlort (b)
Canary Islands Verlort (a)
Muchea,
Australia Verlort 70 69 65 <l 50
Woomera ,
Australia FPS-16 (a)
Hawaii FPS-16 38 38 0 38
Havaii Verlort 64 23 14 9
Point Arguello,
Calif. FPS-16 Il2 20 17 3 17
Point Arguello,
Calif. Verlort (b) 1
Guaymas,
Mexico Verlort (c)
White Sands,
H. Hex. FPS-16 41 61 34 27 34
Corpus Christi ,
Tex. Verlort 53 60 54 6 1*1
Eglin Air Force
Base, Fla. FPS-16 40 23 22 1 18
Eglin Air Force
Base, Fla. Verlort (b)
Cape Canaveral,
Fla. . FPS-16 33 27 6 22
Out of range
Data not available
C
Passive
201
l» • •• •
- TABLE XXIV.-7 SUMMARY OF LANDING-POINT PREDICTIONS

BASED ON RADAR TRACKING
Condition North West

latitude longitude
Based on Point Arguello, Calif. ,

retrofire time 21°08' 68°01'
Differential correction based on

Point Arguello, Calif., tracking 21°32' 68°55'
White Sands, N. Mex., tracking 21°29'
Corpus Christi, Tex., tracking 21°29'

Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., tracking 68°53'
Cape Canaveral, Fla., tracking 68°53T
Cape IP 7090 landing data:

Based on Cape Canaveral, Fla.,
FPS-16 tracking 68°3l'
Based on San Salvadore FPS-16
tracking 68°35'
Value reported by the recovery ship ° '
21°25 68°37'
202
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TABLE XXV.- TELEMETRY RECEPTION SUMMAH - Concluded
(c) Third orbital pass
Telemetry Dec ommutator Slant range Elevation

Station
Acquisition, Loss of signal, Acquisition, Loss of signal, Acquisition, Loss of signal, Acquisition, Loss of signal,
hr:min:sec hr:min:sec hr:min:sec hr:min:sec nautical mile nautical milef deg deg
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Fla. 03:06:51 03:13:46 03:06:53 03:15:42 780 920 0 0
Bermuda 03:09:56 03:17:03 03:10:06 03:17:03 870 900 -1.2 -1.2
Atlantic Ocean
Ship 03:24:44 03:32:25 03:25:06 03:31:22 900 920 -.5 .5
Canary Islands (b)
Kano, Nigeria (b)
Zanzibar (b)
Indian Ocean
Ship 03:>*6:55 03:56:49 03:48:10 03:56:30 1,050 1,100 -1 -1.4
Muchea ,
Australia 03:56:31 04:04:12 03:56:49 04:04:08 1,030 940 -.7 -.16
Woomera ,
Australia 04:03:16 04:06:19 04:03:31 04:06:01 870 1,000 1 -1.4
Canton
Islands (c)
Hawaii 04:21:49 04:28:49 04:22:02 04:23:39 920 770 -2 .1
Point Arguello,
Calif. 04:31:17 04:37:57 04:31:27 04:37:56 900 540 -2 3-6
Guaymas,
Mexico 04:33:44 04:39:49 04:34:04 04:39:39 770 740 -5 -1.1
Corpus Christi ,
Tex. 04:36:53 04:42:32 04:36:58 04:42:34 930 603 -3 -5
Eglln Air Force
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Cape Canaveral,
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Cape Canaveral, d
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Includes data from down-range stations via submarine cable
Out of range
°Not applicable
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I ••* • *
• •• • *
TABLE XXVII. - COMMAND FUNCTION SUMMARY

(All functions were successfully received!
Time Duration Airborne-receiver

of of signal strength,
Station Function
function, function, microvolts
hr:min: sec sec
San Salvador ASCOa 00:05:01.7 4 20
Miichea, Australia Z Calb 00: 51: 47. 5 21 16
Muchea, Australia R CalC 00: 52: l4 32 17

Cape Canaveral, Fla. Z Cal 01: 36: 12 10 62
Cape Canaveral, Fla. R Cal 01:36:24 14 64

Muchea, Australia Z Cal 02:27:21 15 36
Muchea, Australia R Cal 02: 27: 55 36 35
Cape Canaveral, Fla. Z Cal 03:09:58 9 55
Cape Canaveral, Fla. R Cal 03:10:09 11 53
Muchea, Australia Z Cal Ok: 00: 08 17 7
Muchea, Australia R Cal 04:00:32.5 23 9
a
'ASCO - Auxiliary sustainer cutoff
Z Cal - Instrumentation zero calibration
"R Cal - Instrumentation full-scale calibration
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221
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Figure 6j.- Concluded.
223
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The significance of the first United States manned orbital flight

is well recognized throughout the world. This and other papers have
emphasized the unqualified success of the MA.-6 mission. All spacecraft,
launch-vehicle, and Mercury network systems performed satisfactorily toward
the fulfillment of the specified primary test objectives.
The problems,, malfunctions, and anomalies which did occur were not
sufficient to compromise the mission. The three occurrences which caused
the greatest concern during the flight were: the thruster failure in the
reaction control system, the erroneous signal that the heat shield had
released prematurely, and the spacecraft oscillations and early drogue
parachute deployment experienced during reentry. Each problem has been
intensely investigated and appropriate action taken for future missions....
Regarding the reaction control system failure, evidence exists which

indicates that small metallic particles from the fuel distribution screens
had lodged in the orifices of the 1-pound yaw thrusters and may have caused
the sporadic thruster operation. Although other explanations seem plausible,
the cause of the control system failure is not definitely known. Testing
in this regard is continuing.
The improper signal during the orbital phase of the mission that the
heat shield had released has been conclusively traced to a faulty limit
switch. A-decision to retain the retropackage during reentry, which would
prevent the heat shield from parting the spacecraft prematurely, was made
by the Operations Director at the Mercury Control Center and this decision
proved to be sound even though it was-of no consequence. Immediate steps
have been taken to improve the production techniques and quality control of
these switches, as well as to incorporate necessary design modifications.
In addition, the appropriate instrumentation circuitry has been revised to
make more effective use of redundant elements. The series of oscillations
experienced early in the phase after reentry were adequately reduced in the
auxiliary damping mode, which employs one automatic portion of the reaction
control system. However, a greater-than-expected rate of fuel usage during
the orbital phase resulted in depletion of the automatic fuel during the
reentry period and oscillations again diverged. The astronaut attempted to
control the oscillations manually, but human reaction time at the frequencies
experienced and the remaining manual fuel were insufficient to control the
situation adequately. The oscillations continued to diverge until the
premature drogue-parachute deployment, at which time the oscillations were
reduced to nearly zero. The cause of the early drogue signal is unknown
but a stray electrical signal in the sequential circuit may have been re-
ceived by the drogue mortar. Postflight tests did not reveal any parachute
system anomalies.
Probably the single most important result of the MA-6 flight was the
proof that man not only can successfully function in terrestrial space,
but that he can perform effectively under urgent conditions. Comprehensive
22k
medical examinations before and after the flight disclosed no adverse physio-
logical and psychological effects as a result of ^r- hours in a space environ-
ment under weightless conditions.
The success of the MA.-6 mission established another significant milestone

in the Mercury flight program, as did the two manned suborbital flights
(MR-J and MR-if-). The knowledge gained as a result of the noncritical problems
which arose during the flight will be applied to spacecraft of subsequent
Mercury missions in a continuing program of system improvement. Possibly of
greater importance, however, is the valuable experience which was achieved in
the area of space-flight operations, including the detailed checkout and pre-
launch testing of the spacecraft, the real-time flight monitoring by personnel
stationed around the world, and the vast recovery task which employed many
military vehicles and a staff of thousands. Therefore, this total mission
experience, of which the inflight results are but a portion, will enhance and
lend confidence to future Mercury missions with more demanding overall objec-
tives.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Houston, Texas, February 20, 1963.
225
REFERENCES
1. Faget, M. A. , and Piland, R. 0.: Mercury Capsule and its Flight Systems.
IAS Paper No. - 60-3*)-, Presented at IAS- 28th .Annual Meeting (New York,
N.Y. ), Jan. 25-27, I960. • . . . .
2. Anderton. David A, :•' How Mercury Capsule Design Evolved; Aviation Week.
. vol. 74, no. 21, May 22, 1961. • - ' •
3. Bond, Aleck C. : Mercury Spacecraft Systems. Proc. Conf. on Results of

the First U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight, NASA, Nat. Inst. Health,
Nat. Acad. Sci. , June 6, '1961, pp. 11-18.
k. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the First United

States Manned Orbital Space Flight, February 20, 1962. Sup.t. Doc'.,
U.S. Government Printing Office, (Washington, D. C. )
5. Mathews, Charles W. : Review of the Operational Plans for Mercury Orbital

Mission. IAS Paper no. 60-36, Presented at the IAS 28th Annual Meeting
(New York, N.Y. ), Jan. 25-27, I960.
6. Voas, Robert B. : Astronaut Training, Project Mercury. Spaceflight,

vol. 3, no. 5, PP. 155-157-
7. Voas, Robert B. : Manual Control of the Mercury Spacecraft. Astronautics,

vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 18-20, 3^-38.
8. Leutjin, H. H. : Ground Check-Out and Launch Procedures for Manned.'

Space-Flight Operations. Aerospace Eng. , vol. 21, no. 1, Jan. 1962,
pp. 16-21. ' ^ _ . _ - _ . ---- - ' . •
_ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - • - - • • ---- """" • .;.; •'.' A ' .
9. Weston, Kenneth C. , and Swanson, Joanna E. : A Compilation of Wind-Tunnel
Heat Transfer Measurements on the Afterbody of the Project Mercury ,
Capsule Reentry Configuration. NASA TM X-^95, 1961.
• \
10. Augerson, William S. , and Laughlin, C. Patrick. : Physiological Responses
of the Astronaut in the MR-3 Flight. Proc. Conf. on Results of the
First U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight, NASA, Nat. Inst. Health,
,and Nat. Acad. Sci., June 6, 1961, pp. Vl-50.
11. Laughlin, C. Patrick, and Augerson, William S. : Physiological Responses

of the Astronaut in the MR-4 Space Flight. Results of the Second
U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight. July 21, 1961, NASA Manneli
Spacecraft Center.
12. International Business Machine Corp.: Final Report - Project Mercury.

Western Electric Contract MYX70005, March 1, 1962.
226 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H NASA-Langley, 1964 S~33

First United States Manned Three-Pass Orbital Mission Mercury-Atlas 6, Spacecraft 13 Part 1 - Description and Performance Analysis

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NASA T E C H N I CAL NASA TM X - 5 6 3 - I

J>eciasslfled by authority of HASA

FIRST UNITED STATES MANNED

Edited by John H. Boynto n

Manned Spacecraft Center

NATIONAL A E R O N A U T I C S AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION • WASH|NGTO||t C. • MARCH 1964

FIRST UNITED STATES MANNED THREE-PASS ORBITAL MISSION

(MERCURY-ATLAS 6, SPACECRAFT 13)

PART I - DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Edited by John H. Boynton

Manned Spacecraft Center

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

The first United States manned orbital flight constitutes a significant

General acknowledgement is made of the extensive effort on the part of

The contents of this volume represent the contributions of an assigned

FOREWORD ........ ...................... i

LIST OF FIGURES ........................ .. ix

SPACE-VEHICLE DESCRIPTION ^ ................ ..... 6

SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTION ...................... 6

LAUNCH- VEHICLE DESCRIPTION .................... j8

PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS ....................... Ul

Specific mission preparation ^3

Training activities ..................... 133

PILOT'S FLIGHT REPORT ......... ............. 156

LAUNCH-VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 168

TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS 169

MERCURY NETWORK PERFORMANCE 195

CONCLUDING REMARKS 22k

II. SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATIONS AND INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM . . . . 19

III. AMR OPTICAL COVERAGE OF LAUNCH AND REENTRY PHASES ...... 58

IV. FUEL CONSUMPTION ...... ................ 83

V. RESULTS .OF POSTFLIGHT EXAMINATION OF THRUST CHAMBERS .... 8^

VT. INSTRUMENTED PARAMETERS FOR MA-6

(a) Commutated quantities .............. . 87

VIII. AEROMEDICAL EVENTS PRIOR TO LAUNCH ..... ........ 115

IX. XYLOSE ABSORPTION STUDY .................. 116

X. URINE SUMMARY ............. .......... 117

XI. PREFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE

XII. PERIPHERAL BLOOD ...... ... ............. 119

XIII. BLOOD SUMMARY ... .................... 120

XIV. PLASMA ENZYMES SUMMARY ................... 121

XV. TIME EXPENDED IN ASTRONAUT PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES ......

XVI. TRAINING SUMMARY FOR PILOT IN CAPE CANAVERAL

XVII. CONTROL MODE AND ATTITUDE MANEUVERS DURING MA-6 MISSION

XVTII. NUMBER OF COMMUNICATIONS TO AND FROM SPACECRAFT

XIX. FIIM EXPOSURES

XX. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 172

XXII. ORBITAL INSERTION CONDITIONS .DISPLAYED AT MCC 200

XXIII. SUMMARY OF LOW-SPEED TRACKING DATA 201

XXIV. SUMMARY OF LANDING-POINT PREDICTIONS BASED ON RADAR

XXV. TELEMETRY RECEPTION SUMMARY

(a) First orbital pass 203

XXVI. COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY . 206

XXVII. COMMAND FUNCTION SUMMARY 207

:9- Location of communication systems 26

21. Launch complex modifications 5^

22. Emergency egress tower 55

2J. Wind profile at the launch site 59

2k. AMR engineering sequential tracking camera coverage .... 60

25- Recovery areas and ship locations 64

26. Contingency recovery support forces 65

27. Details of primary landing area 66