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Apaar Kumar
Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities,
Karnataka, India
1 Introduction
I
1
n the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant characterizes sensation
[Empfindung] in two different ways.1 In the Transcendental
Aesthetic, he describes Empfindung as the “effect of an
I will employ the German term Empfindung instead of sensation throughout this essay.
Since the concept of sensation is itself at issue here, I wish to avoid any terminological
confusion. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the German are my own. I cite
the relevant passages in German wherever required. Passages from Kant are cited according
to the following key: Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, hrsg. von der königlich Preussischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Band I-XXIX (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1917) [AA Vol.:
page(s)]; Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998) [KrV, A/B];
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998) [CPR, A/B]. I will cite the Reflexionen (reflections) by volume
number of the Akademie edition, and by placing an “R” in front of the number given to the
reflection by the editors of this edition. All references to Kant’s handwritten notes to the first
Critique are from Benno Erdmann, ed., Nachträge zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Kiel:
Lipsius & Tischer, 1881) [E (Roman numeral)].
2
“Die Wirkung eines Gegenstandes auf die Vorstellungsfähigkeit, so fern wir von
demselben affiziert werden, ist Empfindung” (KrV, A19-20/B34).
3
Although Kant says explicitly at A19-20/B34 that an Empfindung comes into being when
the subject is affected by the “object,” he does not clarify the nature of this object. Kant uses
two different terms in German—Gegenstand and Objekt—to signify an object. In addition,
the term “object” has several different senses—the cognized object, the object of appearance,
and the thing in itself. While the object involved in the process of generating an Empfindung
cannot be taken as the cognized object, it is unclear whether it should be seen as the
spatiotemporal object of appearance or as the thing in itself. In this essay, I will not attempt to
resolve this difficulty. Instead, bracketing the task of specifying it further, I will take the
object—which affects the subject in order to give rise to an Empfindung—as a mere
something (etwas). For more on the problem, and one attempted solution (the “double
affection theory”), see Moltke Gram, “The Myth of Double Affection,” in Reflections on
Kant’s Philosophy, ed. W. H. Werkmeister (Gainsville: University Presses of Florida), 29-
64.
4
“Eine Perzeption, die sich lediglich auf das Subjekt, als die Modifikation seines Zustandes
bezieht, ist Empfindung (sensatio)” (KrV, A320/B376). In this passage, Guyer and Wood
translate “sich beziehen” as “refers” (CPR, 398-99). Since I translate the same term as
“relates,” it may be said that I have translated the term to suit my purposes. But this is not the
case. I employ the term “referential” as a term of art in this essay. In the referential view of
Empfindung, Empfindung is to be defined in terms of the interaction between the subject and
the object such that it is in the relationship between the subject pole and the object pole that
an Empfindung is. In contrast, in the non-referential view, Empfindung is defined only in
terms of the subject pole, despite the fact that the object pole may somehow also be involved.
Consequently, even if we translate “sich beziehen” as “refer” in this passage, this would not
entail that Kant wishes to define Empfindung in referential terms. In my view, “refer” here
simply means “relating to the subject.”
University Press, 1990], 68). Finally, Robert Pippin is more concerned with the relationship
between sensation and judgment than with the question of the referentiality of sensation. Paul
Abela endorses Pippin’s general position when he says: “To attribute content to sensations
independent of judgment would be to continue to allow a properly causal relation to bleed
into an epistemological claim” (Paul Abela, Kant’s Empirical Realism [Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2002], 53; also see Robert Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form [New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982], 51-52). Given Pippin’s conceptualism, however, it is not surprising
that he seems to think of Empfindung as non-referential. He says: “[T]he most important
aspect of that description [i.e., Kant’s statements regarding sensations and their role in
judgment] is Kant’s claim that, considered as such a manifold, sensations cannot in any sense
be considered as a mode of knowledge, or determinate representations at all. Relation to an
object is something that must always be established by the understanding in judgment, and it
must be established just because no immediate relation to objects is contained in sensation”
(Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form, 34). All of the authors mentioned here—including to some
extent George whose main concern is to establish the historical thesis that Kant belongs to the
sensationist tradition that includes among others Condillac, Reid and Malebranche—restrict
themselves to merely asserting the claim that Empfindung is essentially non-referential,
without arguing for the viability of this position in the context of Kant’s writings. I propose to
fill this lacuna in this essay.
11
Lorne Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 387n.
12
Ibid., 123. I discuss Falkenstein’s view in detail in §3. Hans Vaihinger also seems to take
the A19-20/B34 characterization of Empfindung as primary, but, unlike Falkenstein, does not
provide any justification for his view (Hans Vaihinger, Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der
reinen Vernunft, volume 2 [Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1922], 26-29).
13
I will explicate, and further critique, Falkenstein’s position below; see §2, and fns 54 and
84.
14
Apart from A19-20/B34 in the first Critique, Kant takes this view in several reflections. He
says that sensation depends on the difference in the movement of body parts (AA XIV:
R112-113.36, between 1770 and 1775; also see AA XIV: R115-116.38, 1770-75); that
sensation is an affection by the object (KrV, B207-8; AA XVIII: R6314, 1790-91; Opus
Postumum, AA XXI: 537); and that affection requires the actual presence of the object (KrV,
A50/B74; AA XVI: R2843, mid-1750s; the anthropology notes: AA XV: R695, 1760 or
1770; and AA XV: R650, 1769, or early 1770s; AA XXVIII: 850, lectures on metaphysics
from 1782-83). Kant also uses the term Empfindung to describe aesthetic feelings and the
moral feeling of respect, but a consideration of these two senses of Empfindung is beyond the
scope of this essay. Here I am concerned only with Empfindung as it relates to the subject’s
representation of an outer object.
16
I briefly discuss the question of the matter of sensation in §4 of this essay.
17
J. G. Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, trans. Daniel Breazeale (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1994), 68.
18
I discuss this issue in a general sense in §4 below, see fn 97.
A
t A320/B376, Kant characterizes Empfindung as relat-
ing solely to the state of the subject. Falkenstein admits
that Empfindung is characterized as a subjective feel-
ing in this passage, although it is not clear why he thinks
A320/B376 can be taken to support the claim that an Emp-
findung is a feeling. However, Falkenstein rejects the idea that
this passage represents Kant’s official definition of Empfindung.
In fact, he argues that Kant is not interested in defining
sensation at all at A320/B376. Kant’s primary aim here is rather
to distinguish his own use of the term “idea” from that of
empiricists like Locke and Hume, and not to explain the
essential nature of Empfindung. Thus, according to Falkenstein,
the characterization of Empfindung in this passage should be
discounted if our aim is to comprehend Kant’s definition of
Empfindung:
does not necessarily follow that other terms in this passage, like
Empfindung, must thereby be defined in only a partial manner.
Second, instead of invalidating the significance of the
A320/B376 passage for defining Empfindung, Falkenstein’s
emphasis on context could in fact support the opposite view:
that the A320/B376 characterization of Empfindung ought to be
taken as Kant’s official definition of the term. It could be argued
that context actually shows the primacy of A320/B376 over
A19-20/B34 in resolving the question of how Kant might have
wanted to define Empfindung. The A19-20/B34 character-
ization occurs in the context of the Transcendental Aesthetic,
where Kant is engaged in the specialized task of delineating
sensibility as receptive. It is with this specific purpose in view
that Kant characterizes an Empfindung as the effect of the
object upon the subject. By contrast, at A320/B376, Kant
provides a Stufenleiter to explicate the basic terms of his
philosophy in a general sense. Since definitions are best
formulated in general rather than specific contexts, it might be
expected that the Stufenleiter—the only classification of terms
provided in the first Critique—would be the best place for Kant
to define his philosophical vocabulary. Hence, the character-
ization at A320/B376 could be taken as the primary definition
of Empfindung, even if we pay attention to the particular
context in which this characterization appears in Kant’s text.
Finally, and most crucially, in a reflection from the 1770s,
when he was preparing to write the first Critique (published
1781), Kant characterizes Empfindung in the same way as at
A320/B376. In this reflection, he writes:
20
“1. repraesentatio. 2. perceptio (mit Bewustseyn). 3. cognitio* (Beziehung mit Bewustseyn
auf Gegenstand) (perceptio objective spectata).
(* eine perception, die blos aufs subject als ein Zustand desselben bezogen wird, heißt
Empfindung; die aufs object bezogen wird: Erkentnis [sic].)” (AA XVI: R2836 [henceforth,
R2836], comment in Meier’s logic text; difficult to date exactly, but from the 1770s).
21
Kant is not always consistent with his classification schema. For instance, in a reflection
from around 1771, he speaks of Empfindung as one of three kinds of cognition
(Erkenntnisarten) (AA XVII: R4440, around 1771). My aim here is to problematize
Falkenstein’s argument that the A320/B376 characterization is not the official definition of
Empfindung. As a result, Kant’s inconstant use of concepts is irrelevant for my present
purposes.
24
KrV, A166/B207-8.
25
“Sensible representations are either Empfindungen and require the senses, or appearances
and have intuitions as their ground; the former are (represented) alterations (Veränderung) of
the state of the subject by the presence of the object; the latter: representations of object itself,
insofar as it [the object] affects (aussetzen) the senses” (AA XV: R650, 1769 or early 1770;
also see XV: R698).
26
Veränderung and “modification” are synonyms, see AA XVIII: R5585 (quoted below in
fn 33).
beschreibt.) Wie ein verschiedenes Moment verschiedene Grade der Geschwindigkeit
erzeugt, so verschiedenheit des Eindruks verschiedenen Grad der Empfindung….*(g Wir
haben 3 qvanta. Raum, Zeit und Empfindung (Bewegung, realität). Die erste hat ein positives
der Grenze, was qvantum ist; die zweyte, was kein qvantum ist, die dritte gar nichts positives
und keine grenze, sondern Schranken.).”
28
KrV, A166/B207-8.
29
KrV, A176/B217, my emphasis. “Die Qualität der Empfindung ist jederzeit bloss
empirisch, und kann a priori gar nicht vorgestellet werden, (z. B. Farben, Geschmack etc.).
Aber das Reale, was den Empfindungen überhaupt korrespondiert, im Gegensatz mit der
Negation = 0, stellet nur etwas vor, dessen Begriff an sich ein Sein enthält, und bedeutet
nichts als die Synthesis in einem empirischen Bewusstsein überhaupt.”
33
Kant uses the term Veränderung (alteration) to describe an Empfindung. In a reflection
from the 1770s, he uses Veränderung and Modifikation interchangeably. He says, “Principle
of the mathematical knowledge of appearances: All appearance has an extensive magnitude
and as Empfindung, a degree. Because (concerning the latter) this is the way each
Empfindung originates from not being, because it is a modification [sic]. Hence, through
alteration [Veränderung]. All alterations however go from 0 to a through to infinitely many
small levels [Stufen]” (AA XVIII: R5585). Here, if we accept my argument vis-à-vis R5582
that Kant is defining Empfindung non-referentially when he says that it is a differential, then
Kant seems to be conceptualizing Empfindung in the same merely subjective way that he did
at A320/B376.
It could be argued that Kant does not always use Veränderung in this way. Sometimes he
suggests that Empfindung is the “alteration [Veränderung] of the senses” (AA XV: R756,
1764-65; and AA XVII: R3958, 1769). These passages could be seen as evidence for
Falkenstein’s view that an Empfindung is the physiological effect of the object upon the
subject. However, there is nothing in these passages to preclude the view that while
Empfindung necessarily requires the alteration of the senses, it is still defined by Kant as the
non-referential modification of the state of the subject. I discuss Falkenstein’s physiological
and referential characterization of Empfindung in §3.
34
It could be said that, unlike the terms “differential” and “modification,” the terms
“movement” and “differential” may not be synonymous. The term “movement,” it could be
contended, has spatial connotations. Hence, a fuller account would be required to show how
this term can be employed to describe the modifications of the state of the subject. This is
clearly an important issue. While I do not have space to explore this issue adequately here, I
do think that Kant seems to be using movement in some non-spatial sense in the passages I
have quoted here. In my view, Kant seems to employ the term “movement” to mark the shift
from one representation to another, akin to the way we speak, metaphorically, of “moving
on” after a traumatic experience. When we “move on” from an experience, we are implying
that we have moved away from thoughts, that is, a shift from one set of thoughts to another
has taken place.
A more complete defense of this general view would require further historical-textual
work. One would have to investigate the way Kant and his contemporaries used the term
“Bewegung” in connection with the concepts “mind,” “soul,” “representation,”
“Empfindung,” etc. But this task is beyond the scope of this essay.
40
Johann Nicolas Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre
Entwicklung (Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard, 1913), 161-62.“In der Empfindung
entstehet eine Veränderung unsers Zustandes, eine neue Modification in der Seele. Ich richte
die Augen gegen die Sonne. Da geschicht etwas, und ich fuehle etwas, empfinde es. Der
Eindruck kommt in diesem Fall von ausser her; so glaube ich es wenigstens; ich fühle mit
dem äussern Sinn, oder ich habe eine äusserliche Empfindung. Ein solches Gefühl ist
zuweilen gleichgültig, zuweilen angenehm oder unangenehm. Die gefühlte Veränderung ist
die Empfindung.”
3 Empfindung as Non-durational
and Obscurely Conscious
given what Kant says in the anthropology notes, one can agree
with Falkenstein that the object must affect the subject physio-
logically for an Empfindung to be generated.43 But this is not
the end of the story. I will argue in §3.1 that, pace Falkenstein,
an Empfindung must be characterized as the obscurely
conscious and non-durational alteration or modification of the
state of the subject. Here, Empfindung is defined in merely
subjective terms without reference to the affecting object.
Subsequently, in §3.2, I will show that this non-referential
definition of Empfindung is consistent with Kant’s overall
theory of cognition, thus reaffirming the validity of adopting it
as Kant’s official definition of Empfindung.
This interpretation of Empfindung as an obscurely conscious
and non-durational modification of the subject—which cannot
be more than an argumentative reconstruction since Kant
himself does not provide us with an unambiguous definition of
Empfindung—offers further support for my contention that
Kant wishes to define Empfindung in non-referential terms. The
justification for this is as follows. A conscious representation is
always synthetic for Kant.44 This synthesis must reflect the
nature of the discursive subject, and, in this sense, must be
considered merely subjective, or non-referential. In other words,
the metaphysical constitution of the synthesis must be
independent of all that it synthesizes, viz., the un-synthesized
stuff, whatever that may be, even if it were the case that this un-
synthesized stuff is necessary for the synthesis to occur. Further,
in this section, we will see that an Empfindung is to be
characterized as obscurely conscious. Therefore, given that
Empfindung is a form of consciousness, and consciousness is
always merely subjective, Empfindung must also be character-
ized in merely subjective or non-referential terms, even though
43
AA VII: 153-57, discussed in Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism, 120ff.
44
KrV, A176/B217, quoted and discussed above, see §2.2.2 above.
Empfindungen are spatial. This view is problematic, because Kant denies that sensations
have extensive magnitude (KrV, A166/B207-8). Falkenstein is aware of this objection.
Nevertheless, he argues that if sensations can be temporally successive without having
temporal magnitude, then, “by the same token there can be no absurdity in sensations with no
extensive magnitude in space nonetheless being presented alongside one another in intuition”
(Lorne Falkenstein, “Kant’s Account of Sensation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20, no.
1 (1990): 36-88, 77). In my view, this argument by analogy is unconvincing. While Kant
does often tend to treat space and time as analogous, this analogy is far from perfect. For
instance, I can be aware of space (or lack thereof) by touch, as Locke points out, but time
cannot be apprehended in this fashion. Since Falkenstein has not shown either that space
and time are structurally identical in a general philosophical sense, or even that sensations
relate to space in the same way as they relate to time in Kant’s works, his argument cannot
invalidate my claim here that Empfindungen are aspatial and non-durational.
In contrast to Falkenstein, T. D. Weldon asserts that Empfindungen are both aspatial and
atemporal, but he does so without any justification. He says: “Objects, or rather light rays
reflected from objects, operate on (affect) the optic nerve and generate impressions which in
themselves are neither spatially nor temporally ordered (Empfindung)” (T. D. Weldon,
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd edition [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958], 110).
55
For instance, KrV, A20/B34, A98-99, A42/B60, A223/B270, A267/B323.
56
Both Perzeption and Wahrnehmung are translated as perception. Unless otherwise
indicated, I am referring to the latter whenever I use the English term “perception.”
57
“Perception is empirical consciousness, that is, something [ein solches] in which
Empfindung occurs [ist] at the same time. Appearances, as objects of perception, are not pure
(merely formal) intuitions, like space and time, (because [space and time] cannot be
perceived at all). Therefore, they [appearances as objects of perception] contain apart from
the intuitions [of space and time] the materials for any object in general (by means of which
something existing is represented in space or time), that is, the real of Empfindung, thus
merely subjective representation, of which one can only be conscious that the subject has
been affected, and which one relates to an object in general” (KrV, A166/B207-8). Also see
76
AA XV: R177, difficult to date, but around 1769. In this passage, Kant speaks of obscure
and clear representations as they relate to the understanding. However, there is no reason to
suppose that the relationship between obscure and clear representations, which Kant
explicates here, would not also hold for cases of perceptual consciousness.
77
AA XV: R177, 1764-68 or 1771.
78
“Negative habit: what one does not feel any more” (AA XV: R261, reflections on
anthropology, 1776-78).
79
In essence, when I am clearly conscious of something, I represent it as something that is
temporally extended. This kind of representation has duration in the sense that I can be
clearly conscious of the elapse of time. For instance, I can be clearly conscious of lingering
before a painting. On the other hand, since an Empfindung is obscurely conscious for me, I
can be aware of it as durational only if I can have a perception of it; but, as an Empfindung, it
cannot be durational for me. Another way of saying this is that the moment of Empfindung is
fleeting, and forever beyond the grasp of the subject. Hence, Empfindungen must always be
non-durational for the subject. Whether or not such a view is phenomenologically sound
requires further thought, but this question is beyond the scope of the present essay.
First, Falkenstein portrays sensation as a non-conscious physical affection. But Kant says
at A320/B367 that an Empfindung is a type of consciousness. Falkenstein does not take this
objection into account, while my interpretation here—that an Empfindung is an obscurely
conscious representation—fits better with Kant’s writings in this regard.
Second, Falkenstein’s distinction between sensation and sensible quality has no parallel
in Kant’s works. In fact, Falkenstein is forced to make this distinction, because he is unable to
reconcile his physiological view of Empfindung (akin to Cartesian mechanical impressions)
and the examples of Empfindungen that Kant provides—for instance, colors, sounds, feelings
of temperature as sensations (KrV, B44); taste of wine and color as grounded [gegründet] on
sensation (ibid., A29); for a complete list of such passages, see Falkenstein, Kant’s
Intuitionism, 124. In contrast, while I admit that the object must affect the subject
physiologically for an Empfindung to arise, my argument that Kant defines Empfindung non-
referentially, or purely subjectively, dissolves the problem of explaining, as Falkenstein must,
how an Empfindung construed as essentially physiological can, at the same time, be a
sensible quality. In other words, if, as I have suggested, we define Empfindung as an
obscurely conscious representation and not as the physiological effect of the object upon the
subject (as Falkenstein does), we do not need to make the artificial distinction that
Falkenstein makes between sensation and sensible quality. Instead, as I have argued in this
section, we can consistently assert not only that (a) Empfindungen are physiological effects
of the object upon the subject; but also that (b) since they are defined non-referentially, they
are essentially sensible qualities that are obscurely conscious, and which can only become
clearly conscious at the higher levels of representation, i.e., at the levels of perception and
cognition. Hence, in my view, the difference between Empfindung and perception in Kant’s
writings captures Falkenstein’s sensation‒sensible quality distinction, which shows that my
interpretation fits much better with Kant’s statements than Falkenstein’s discussion of this
topic.
Unlike Falkenstein, Wayne Waxman does not offer an independent theory of
Empfindung, and his general account of Empfindung is somewhat vague. He says that
synopsis relates to “formless prime matter” (Wayne Waxman, Kant’s Model of the Mind: A
New Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991],
288-89), and suggests that this synopsis cannot even be characterized as an obscure
consciousness (“sensations in synopsis—which is not even so much as an obscure
consciousness—,” ibid., 240). On the other hand, he says that sense-perception is obscure
consciousness, and that obscure consciousness in its “root” meaning is the “apprehension of
the bare synoptic manifold” (ibid., 228). In addition, Waxman thinks that the synthesis of
apprehension involves pre-spatiotemporal imaginative synthesis that makes possible obscure
consciousness as “genuine empirical awareness,” and that spatiotemporal synthesis is the
further synthesis upon this manifold (ibid., 240, 241). Judging by these statements, Waxman
seems to have three notions here: (a) “sensation” in synopsis that is not even obscure
consciousness; (b) obscure consciousness; (c) consciousness relating to spatiotemporal
synthesis by which he seems to mean Kant’s notion of “Wahrnehmung.” I have no quarrel
with (c), but I think more needs to be said regarding the textual and/or philosophical basis for
distinguishing (a) and (b). Further, even if we grant these distinctions, it is unclear which of
these notions Waxman takes to be Kant’s notion of “Empfindung.” If he thinks that Kant’s
notion of Empfindung is equivalent to “sensations in synopsis,” which in Waxman’s view are
not even obscurely conscious, then his account of Empfindung is at odds with the one I have
provided here.
85
In this essay, I have been concerned with the narrow question of whether Empfindung
should be defined in referential or non-referential terms. A broader, more consolidated,
metaphysical account of Kantian Empfindung is beyond the scope of this essay. Such an
account would have to include a more detailed philosophical explication of how the two
aspects of Empfindung—that an Empfindung must be defined in non-referential terms, and
that it can arise only if the subject interacts with an object—can be said to relate to each other
in a coherent manner.
86
KrV, A19-21/B34-35.
87
Ibid., A50/B74.
88
Ibid., A267/B323.
89
Ibid., A42/B60, A167/B209.
90
Ibid., A267/B323.
91
Ibid., A20/B34.
92
P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
(London: Methuen, 1966), 59; Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 197, 199, 257.
5 Conclusion
Bibliography