ISIDRO SANTOS
v.
LEANDRA MANARANG
G.R. NO. L-8235, MARCH 19, 1914
FACTS:
● Don Lucas de Ocampo died 18
November 1906.
● In his last will and testament, he left all
his possessions to his wife (Respondent
Leandra Manarang) and his children.
● In this will, he wrote: “I also declare that
I have contracted debts… and it is my
desire that they may be religiously paid
by my wife and executors in the form
and time agreed upon with the
creditors.” (this is the provision in
question)
● Petitioner Isidro Santos is one such
creditor who is due a substantial amount
(over Php7,400+).
● On 14 July 1908, Santos filed a petition
in court to reconvene a committee so he
can get his claims to the estate.
● He alleges that he failed to present his
claims at a sooner time because de
Ocampo’s will expressly recognized
him.
● This petition was denied.
● On 21 November 1910, plaintiff filed a
complaint directly against administratrix
Manarang to recover the debt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner as
creditor in the will have valid ground to
pursue the debt?
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
RULING:
● The court is not convinced. He should
have filed his claim with the probate
court within the time prescribed by law:
within 6 months from the time of the
publication of the notice to creditors (23
July 1907 in this case).
● Neither may he file a case against the
administratrix to recover the money
based on the provision in question alone.
● The law provides limitations on the
maxim that ‘the testator’s will is law’:
(1) one’s estate is liable for legal
obligations and (2) the legal portion due
to the heirs of the estate cannot be
disposed of or encumbered by force of
law.
● A provision directing the payment of a
debt is void as it contradicts public
policy and can be used to circumvent
preferred credits. Neither may he imply
these provisions without reference to the
committee.
● De Ocampo was believed to be an
honorable man who wanted to pay his
debts - but between two interpretations
(one of the law and one of the testator),
the interpretation in favor of the law will
prevail.
● An action against the administratrix is
likewise ill-founded because she cannot
be made to pay money obligations.
Neither does the provision in question
serve as a legacy.
DISSENTING:
1. There was no evidence of a notice to creditors
being published. Only self-serving testifications.

2. A notice to creditors was allegedly issued 23
July 1907. An order to publish a new notice was
issued 8 January 1908. This later order and its
subsequent notice should have the reckoning
point, not the prior notice.
3. The claim need not have been submitted to
the committee as the will itself acknowledged
the presence of such debt. The will is the testator
speaking after death and should be given the
force of such ‘according to his will’.
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA
v.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON
G.R. NO. 139868, JUNE 8, 2006
FACTS:
● Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard
Guersey were Americans residing in the
Philippines for 30 years.
● They adopted a daughter named Kyle
Guersey Hill.
● On 29 July 1979, Audrey died. In her
will, she bequeathed her entire estate to
Richard who was also her executor.
● This will was admitted to probate before
the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore,
Maryland USA.
● Richard renounced his appointment so
the court appointed James Philips
instead.
● Atty. Alonzo Ancheta (petitioner) was
appointed ancillary administrator.
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
● In 1981, Richard married Candelaria
Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with
whom he has two children (Kimberly
and Kevin).
● On 12 October 1982, Audrey’s will was
admitted to probate by the CFI of Rizal.
● Ancheta filed an inventory of Audrey’s
property including real estate, a bank
account, and shares of stocks.
● On 20 July 1984, Richard died and left
his property to Respondent - but gave
his share of stocks to Kyle (the adopted
child from the previous marriage).
● This will was likewise admitted by the
same probate court in the USA and in
the RTC of Makati.
● On 19 October 1987, Petitioner filed an
action to declare Richard and Kyle as
heirs of Audrey.
● Four days later, he filed an action to
partition Audrey’s estate (¾ going to
Richard and ¼ going to Kyle).
● This motion was granted on February
12, 1988 and further partitioning
continued to happen until Respondent
opposed.
● The trial court also issued an Order on
April 7, 1988, directing the Register of
Deeds of Makati to issue a new title in
the joint names of the Estate of W.
Richard Guersey and Kyle.
● Respondent opposed and filed a case
claiming in the State of Maryland, “a
legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property
subject of the legacy.”
 ● Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, then his entire ¾ undivided
interest in the Makati property should be
given to respondent.
● The trial court found merit in
respondent’s opposition.
● Respondent contended that Petitioner
committed fraud when he disregarded
his fiduciary duty as ancillary
administrator by omitting Maryland law.
● Respondent argued that since Audrey
devised her entire estate to Richard, then
the Makati property should be wholly
adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾.
● Petitioner denied respondent’s
allegations and alleged that he acted in
his best interest that Philippine Law
would allow the heirs to receive their
just shares.
● On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered
the assailed Decision annulling the trial
court’s Orders (Feb. 12, 1988 decision
to partition).
● Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the
CA.
● This prompted Petitioner to file a
petition for review on certiorari in the
SC.
● Petitioner contended that he acted in
good faith, but respondent argues that
petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty
as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s
estate amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
● Petitioner notes that once a Decree of
Distribution has been finalized, it
becomes permanent.
● According to BP 129 (Old Rules of
Procedure) however, it may be annulled
if found to have been done so with
extrinsic fraud (such as forgetting to
apply Maryland law).
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine Law or
Maryland Law should apply in the execution
of the will.
RULING:
● The SC ruled in favor of the respondent.
● Article 16 of the CC states that it is the
national law of the decedent that is
applicable, hence, petitioner should have
distributed Audrey’s estate in
accordance with the terms of her will.
● In regards to petitioner’s failure to
proficiently manage the distribution of
Audrey’s estate according to the terms
of her will and as dictated by the
applicable law amounted to extrinsic
fraud.
● Audrey Guersey was an American
citizen domiciled in Maryland, USA.
● At the time of Audrey’s death, she was
residing in the Philippines but is
domiciled in Maryland, USA.
● Being a foreign national, the intrinsic
validity of Audrey’s will, especially
with regard as to who are her heirs, is
governed by her national law.
● Furthermore, the capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation of the
 decedent as stated in Art. 1039 of the
CC.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PROBATION
OF THE WILL OF JOSE RIOSA
MARCELINO CASAS
G.R. NO. L-14074, NOVEMBER 7, 1918
FACTS:
● Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917.
● He left a will made in the month of
January 1908, in which he disposed of
an estate valued at more than P35,000.
● The will was executed with section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure in force
then.
● It was not executed in accordance with
Act No. 2654 which amended section
618.
● Act No. 2654 prescribed certain
additional formalities for the signing and
attestation of wills, in force on and after
July 1, 1916.
● Riosa’s will was only in writing, signed
by the testator, and attested and
subscribed by three credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each
other.
● Riosa’s will was not signed by the
testator and witnesses on the left margin
of each and every page as required by
Act No. 2654.
● In addition, the new law went into effect
after the making of the will and before
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
the death of the testator, without the
testator updating his will.
● What was required by the amendment
was for the will to meet the requisites
that:
1. The will should be written in the
language or dialect known by
the testator;
2. Signed by him, or by the
testator’s name written by some
other person in his presence,
and by his express direction;
and
3. Attested and subscribed by three
or more credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and
of each other.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid?
RULINGS:
CFI
● Disallowed the will of Riosa for not
complying with the requisites of the new
law.
SC
● The will is valid.
● The ruling laid down in courts is that the
statutes in force at the testator’s death
are controlling and that a will that is not
executed in conformity with such
statutes is invalid although the execution
was sufficient at the time it was made.
● However, statutory construction
indicates that all statutes must be
construed as having only a prospective
 operation unless the retrospective effect
is expressly declared or necessarily
implied.
● The decision of CFI for the Province of
Albay disallowing the will of Riosa is
reversed, and the record shall be
returned to the lower court with
direction to admit the said will to
probate, without special findings as to
costs.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS,
PEOPLE’S BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY,
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS AND MIRIAM
PALMA BELLIS
v.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-23678, JUNE 6, 1967
FACTS:
● Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the
State of Texas and of the United States.
● His first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate
children: (SET 1)
1. Edward A. Bellis
2. George Bellis (predeceased)
3. Henry A. Bellis
4. Alexander Bellis
5. Anna Bellis Allsman
● His second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate
children: (SET 2)
1. Edwin G. Bellis
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
2. Walter S. Bellis
3. Dorothy Bellis
● He also had three illegitimate children:
(SET 3)
1. Amos Bellis, Jr.
2. Maria Cristina Bellis
3. Miriam Palma Bellis
● On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis
executed a will in the Philippines.
● He directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided.
● On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA.
● His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
● People’s Bank and Trust Company was
the executor of the will and paid all the
bequests including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of
stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three
illegitimate children.
● On January 8, 1964, the executor
submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final
Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition.”
● On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions on the
ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as compulsory heirs.
 ● Amos Bellis, Jr. did not contest despite a
notice sent to him.
● The lower court ruled in favor of the
illegitimate children and that the
applicable law was Texas law which did
not account for legitimes.
● The legitimate children appealed
directly to the SC when their motion for
reconsideration was denied by the lower
court.
● They raised the concern that Art. 16,
Par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code
provides that the law of the land applied
should be where the property is located.
ISSUE: Whether the law that should apply is
Texas law or Philippine law.
RULING:
● The Court ruled that intestate and
testamentary successions shall be
regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may the nature
of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be
found.
● Since the decedent was a Texan citizen
and had his domicile in Texas, Texas
law applied. Even if said properties were
to be given to them, it would be invalid
since Texas law does not allow it.
● The order of the probate court was
affirmed in toto.
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
TESTATE ESTATE OF CARLOS GIL,
ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL
v.
PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO
G.R. NO. L-3361, MARCH 1, 1951
FACTS:
● The CFI of Manila admitted to probate
the alleged will and testament of the
deceased Carlos Gil, 66 years old, of
Porac Pampanga..
● The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de
Murciano appealed to the SC, raising
only a question of law.
● The only copy available is a printed
form contained in the record appeal in
case G.R. No. L-254, entitled “Testate
Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros
Vda. de Gil vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil.
● The appeal being only on questions of
law the above finding of the court below
cannot be disputed.
● The parties agreed that said copy is true
and correct.
● It is noted that the attestation clause
does not state that the alleged testator
signed the will.
● It declares only that it was signed by the
witnesses.
● This is a fatal defect.
● The purpose of the attestation clause is
to certify that the testator signed the
will, being the most essential element of
the clause.
● Without it there is no attestation at all.
 ● This is too much of a clerical error much
for it affects the very essence of the
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will has been
properly executed.
RULING:
● The chief purpose of which is to see that
the testator’s wishes are observed.
● It has always been the policy of this
court to sustain may be presented
apparently meritorious.
● The decision appealed from is reversed,
denying the probate of the alleged will
and declaring intestate the estate of the
deceased Carlos Gil.
LASAM v. LASAM, MARCH 29 1962
58 O.G. 7232, MARCH 29, 1962
It is not uncommon practice of country folks in
the Philippines to convey their properties to their
heirs without executing any private or public
document to that effect. The consistent
jurisprudence in this country, despite express
codal provisions, has recognized oral contracts
as valid and efficacious to bring about partition
of a decedent’s estate among his heirs provided
such partition does not affect the interest of third
persons.
ANTONIO CASTANEDA
v.
JOSE ALEMANY
G.R. NO. 1439, MARCH 19, 1904
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
FACTS:
● Dona Juana Moreno executed a will.
● The will was duly signed by herself in
the presence of three witnesses, who
signed it as witnesses in the presence of
the testatrix and of each other.
● The will was questioned upon her death.
● The appellant claimed that the will was
not written by the testator herself or by
someone else in her express direction.
● It was shown that the will was
typewritten in the office of the lawyer
for the testatrix.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.
RULING:
● The court affirmed the judgment of the
lower court.
● It clarified that it was irrelevant of who
mechanically writes the will so long as it
is signed by the testator and three or
more witnesses in the presence of each
other and the testator.
● The court cannot decide on the validity
of the provisions of the will, such as the
validity of appointing a particular
guardian. It is beyond the court’s
jurisdiction.
JULIANA BAGTAS
v.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-6801, MARCH 14, 1912
FACTS:
● On April 19, 1908, a will was executed.
● On September 28, 1909, the testator
died.
● The will was propounded by the
executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the
decedent, and the opponents are a son
and several grandchildren by a former
marriage.
● The appellants claim that the will was
not executed according to the formal
requisites.
● It was alleged that Paguio did not enjoy
the use of his full mental capacities at
the time.
● For fifteen years prior to the time of his
death, the testator suffered from a
paralysis of the left side of his body; a
few years prior to his death, his hearing
became impaired and he lost the ability
to speak.
● However, he was still able to write, and
through the medium of signs, he was
able to indicate his wishes to his family.
● At the time of the execution of the will,
there were four witnesses (Agustin
Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, Pedro Paguio,
Atty. Senor Marco). Two of whom had
died (Anacleto and the Atty. Marco)
since and were not able to testify in
court.
● The testimony established that Paguio
wrote on pieces of paper the notes and
items relating to the disposition of the
property.
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
● The notes were delivered to Atty. Marco
who transcribed them and put them in
form. And that, Atty. Marco reread the
dispositions and asked Paguio each time
if they were his, and that Paguio
assented each time with an affirmative
movement of his head.
● Atty. Marco gave the document to the
testator and the testator signed it in the
presence of the four subscribing
witnesses after looking over it.
● Appellants alleged that the testator was
mentally incapacitated and presented
physicians.
● However, the physicians were not able
to prove that the testator was mentally
incapacitated.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will created by the
testator, an alleged mentally incapable
person, is valid.
RULING:
● The mere weakness of mind and body,
induced by age and disease, does not
render a person incapable of making a
will.
● The law does not require that a person
shall continue in the full enjoyment and
use of his pristine physical and mental
powers in order to execute a valid will.
● The law is in favor of mental capacity
and there has to be a clear showing that
the testator was incapacitated.
● Perfect soundness of mind is not
essential to testamentary capacity.
● A testator may be afflicted with a
variety of mental weakness, disorders,
 or peculiarities and still be capable in
law of executing a valid will.
● The statements of the witnesses to the
execution of the will and statements of
the conduct of the testator at that time
all indicate that he unquestionably had
mental capacity and that he exercised it
on occasion.
● The evidence shows that the writing and
execution of the will occupy a period of
several hours and that the testator was
present during all this time, taking an
active part in all the proceedings.
● The will in the case at bar is perfectly
reasonable and its dispositions are those
of a rational person.
RAMON DEL ROSARIO
v.
CLEMENTE DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 1027, MAY 19, 1903
FACTS:
● Don Nicolas del Rosario died on July
14, 1897, leaving a last will.
● Several clauses in the case were brought
to court for clarification. Specifically,
the eighth, ninth, eleventh, and
eighteenth clauses.
● In the mentioned clauses, Don Nicolas
stipulated conditions of what, when, and
how the plaintiff-appellee, among
others, can receive the properties left by
the testator.
● In the eighth clause, it was declared that
5,000 pesos will be given to his
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
nephews, Enrique Gloria y Rosario and
Ramon del Rosario.
● In the ninth clause, it was declared that
the 5,000 pesos will be divided. 3,000
pesos will go to Enrique, while 2,000
will go to Ramon provided that the men
will behave themselves and do not cease
to study until taking the degree of
bachelor of arts, and then a business
course. Also, their support is to be paid
out of the testamentary estate and they
will live in the house of the widow.
● In the eleventh clause, it was declared
that if the young men should still be
engaged in study at the time of death of
the wife, support shall be continued,
without deduction from their legacies.
● In the eighteenth clause, it was stated
that if the testator’s wife decides to
marry again, Ramon and Enrique are
authorized to separate from their aunt.
They will continue to be supported by
the estate on an allowance of 25 pesos
per month, provided they continue their
studies or should be in poor health.
● Do​ñ​a Honorata Valdez made her will
three days after that of her husband.
● The testatrix declared that she institutes
her husband as her heir to all property.
But in an unexpected case of the death
of her husband, she institutes as heirs
her brothers-in-law, Don Rosendo and
Don Clemente del Rosario y Alejo, and
her sister-in-law, Luisa del Rosario.
● However, upon the death of any of
them, the property shall pass to the male
children. If Do​ñ​a Luisa dies, the
remainder of her share shall be paid to
 her nephews, Don Enrique and Don
Ramon.
● Do​ñ​a Luisa died one year after Don
Nicolas.
● Don Enrique Gloria died on July 6,
1900.
● On July 7, 1900, the widow, Do​ñ​a
Honorata Valdez died.
● Don Ramon brought an action against
Don Clemente del Rosario, the then
executor, asking that the executor pay
him an allowance from the death of the
widow of the testator at the rate of 75
pesos a month, and that he shall be
allowed to live in the house in which the
widow was living at that time.
● Don Ramon claims that he is entitled, by
virtue of both wills, to a certain share of
the estates left to said Do​ñ​a Luisa during
her life. He asks that the defendant be
directed to render accounts and to
proceed to the partition of the said
estate.
● The defendant claims that the plaintiff is
entitled to nothing under the will,
because the gift to him was conditional.
That he should be the natural son of Don
Clemente.
● The court below held the parol evidence
immaterial and ruled in favor of Ramon
and ordered judgment in respect to the
allowance and the right to live in the
house as prayed for by the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee
has the right to the claims of the wills as
legatee.
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
RULING:
● Regarding the plaintiff’s request that the
defendant proceed to partition the estate,
the court holds that the executors are
given power to pay the legacies.
● The plaintiff under the will of Do​ñ​a
Honorata is a legatee of an aliquot part
of the estate, having become entitled to
receive one-third of it on the death of
Do​ñ​a Luisa.
● The plaintiff has a right to have his
interest as legatee declared yet it can not
be delivered to him without a partition
of the estate.
● Don Clemente, the executor, against
whom the action was directed, was not
only an heir as a life tenant but also in
fee after the death of Don Rosendo if the
latter died without the issue. Upon the
death of the widow, Do​ñ​a Luisa then
being dead, it became his duty to divide
the estate into three parts, or at least to
set off the third, which was to pass to
the plaintiff by the death of the widow
and Do​ñ​a Luisa.
● The plaintiff, being a legatee of an
aliquot part, has the right to seek a
partition that an heir has. But in so
seeking it he must make parties to his
suit all persons interested in the estate.
He has not done this, and he
consequently is not entitled to the
partition ordered by the lower court.
● As to the estate of Don Nicolas, the
plaintiff is not entitled to it, he is not
entitled to any statement of accounts.
● As to the estate of Do​ñ​a Honorata, he is
entitled to be paid a legacy of 1,500
 pesos. Article 907 requires the executor
to render accounts to the heir, not to the
legatee.
● The court rules the following:
1. The plaintiff is not entitled to
any allowance under either will.
2. He is not entitled to live in the
house No. 128 Calle Clavel.
3. He is entitled to be paid, under
the ninth clause of the will of
Do​ñ​a Honorata, the sum of
1,500 pesos, in addition to the
1,500 pesos already received
under that clause.
4. He is entitled to the share of the
estate left by the will of Doña
Honorata to Doña Luisa during
her life, after deducting 1,000
pesos.
5. This share can not be set off to
him in this suit, but only in a
proceeding to which all persons
interested in the estate are
parties.
6. His interest in the share left to
Doña Luisa during her life by
the will of Don Nicolas can not
be determined in this suit.
7. The executor can not be
required to render in this suit his
accounts as such executor.
8. The plaintiffs rights under the
seventh clause of the two wins,
to the share left to Don
Clemente for life are not before
us for decision.
● The judgment of the court below is
reversed and the case remanded with
Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte
directions to the court below to enter
judgment in accordance with this
opinion.
IN RE: WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE
DECEASED REVEREND SANCHO
ABADIA, SEVERINA A. VDA. DE
ENRIQUEZ, ET AL.
v.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
FACTS:
● The deceased Father Sancho Abadia
executed a holographic will in his own
handwriting, numbered and signed by
the testator himself and attested by three
(3) witnesses on September 6, 1923.
● He died on January 14, 1943 in Cebu.
● The will was admitted to probate on
January 24, 1952.
● Some of the cousins and nephews, who
would inherit the estate of the deceased
if he left no will, filed opposition.
● Since it was a holographic will, it is not
recognized by the Old Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the old Civil Code
should apply as to the validity of the
holographic will when the will was executed
or the new Civil Code which could have
validated the will?
RULINGS:
● It should be the old Civil Code. The will
is invalid and he therefore died intestate.
● The new Civil Code, which took effect
August 30, 1950, provides in Art. 795:
 “The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law
in force at the time it is made.”

● Here, the validity of the holographic will

is to be judged not by the law enforced
at the time when the petition is decided
by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. \

● When one executes a will which is

invalid for failure to observe and follow
the legal requirements at the time of its
execution, just like in this case, then
upon his death he should be regarded
and declared as having died intestate.

● This is because the general rule is that

the Legislature cannot validate void
wills.

Ma. Thea Beatriz Barte