FALTA PETROLEO!

PERCEPTIONS ON THE EMERGENCE OF A MORE

ECOLOGICAL AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SYSTEM IN POST-CRISIS CUBA

W right J.
Group Communication and Innovation Studies, Wageningen University, the Netherlands, and the
International Development Programme, HDRA (Henry Doubleday Research Association), Ryton
Organic Gardens, Coventry CV8 3LG, UK. Tel. 00 44 (0) 24 7630 8235; E-mail: jwright@hdra.org.uk

ABSTRACT
In the early 1990s, industrialised Cuba was faced with a critical situation: its foreign supplies of
agricultural inputs and food imports were permanently cut off. There was no other option but to
become more self sufficient and to turn to alternative agricultural systems. By the end of the decade, it
appeared that Cuba had not only managed to feed all its population and increase production, but also
to be operating production along organic lines. This research analyses the extent of this change,
based on extensive field work in Cuba between 1999-2001. Is rural Cuba really organic, and can it
really feed its population in this manner? If not, then why not – what were the challenges it faced?
Understanding the Cuban experience is essential for countries which are still unable to provide
national security of food, as well as for all those industrialised countries whose agricultural systems
are dependent on fossil fuels.

INTRODUCTION
Cuba was in a unique situation: since 1959 it had developed a highly mechanised, high-input
agriculture operating through large State run farms, and producing mainly export products - sugar,
tobacco and citrus fruits – which it sold at preferential prices to the USSR in return for cheap fuel,
agricultural inputs and major foodstuffs. In 1989 the Soviet Block collapsed, and with this went the
inputs that Cuba had relied upon – petrol, machinery, chemical fertilisers and pesticides. The
availability of pesticides and fertilisers fell by 80%. Fossil fuels dropped by 65%, and food imports by
over 50%. State subsidies to farming halved. Agricultural production and food availability fell overnight,
with average calorific intake dropping by as much as 30% compared to levels in the 1980s (Rosset &
Benjamin, 1993).

Reports coming out of Cuba throughout the 1990s told of a resounding success story of an organic
agricultural model on a national scale (for example, Levins, 1990; Altieri, 1993; Rosset & Cunningham,
1994; Wilson & Harris 1996; Weaver, 1997; Ritchie, 1998). By 1997, yields of the majority of basic
field crops were higher than previous averages of the 1980s, and especially of roots, tubers and fresh
vegetables (Funes, 2002). It was not only agricultural production which had apparently transformed.
According to reports, the Cuban government had successfully managed to uphold its socialist
principles in terms of food security, through an explicit policy to feed its people.

Cuba is interesting because it had to reorientate its agricultural system to become more self sufficient
under low-external-input conditions, and at the same time its food system under low-fuel conditions.
Given the longstanding global rhetoric to develop a more sustainable, environmentally friendly, less
chemically-dependent agriculture (eg. Soule & Piper, 1992; Goering et al, 1993; Thompson, 1995;
Pretty, 1998), and the concern that using up fossil fuel reserves within the next two decades may
require the strict regulation of petrol and petroleum based products as well as the development of
alternatives, there has been surprisingly little proactive, concerted interest in the Cuban experience by
the formal agricultural research, development or policy community.

METHODOLOGY
Commencing in 1998 and funded for a three year period by the European Commission, this research
was undertaken out of the Social Sciences Department of Wageningen University, the Netherlands.
During this time, over a year was spent in Cuba, based at the Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Agricolas
(INCA), Havana.

The key research issues looked at the mainstream types of agricultural production system operating in
Cuba at the end of the 1990s, the coping strategies of both farmers and institutions in supporting this
production system, the factors involved in shaping the extent of a more ecological production system,
and the extent to which food security has been resolved in the context of the petroleum-scarce
agriculture and food system.
These issues were addressed through analyses of specific cropping systems and types of farm in
three provinces in the east, central and west of the country. Over 330 farmers, research and extension
workers, and Ministry staff from the sectors of Agriculture, Education, Environment and Health were
interviewed.

SELECTED RESULTS
Was Cuba farming organically?

Cuba was not farming with an organic approach. Field results indicated that 75% of farmers were
using synthetic fertilisers, and 65% were using synthetic pesticides. The majority of farmers desired to
use more of these inputs as they became available. In terms of transition, the majority of the country
was at a stage of substitution of synthetics for biological inputs. However, in terms of intensivity, a
distinct patchwork effect was visible throughout the country. Certain crops were allocated higher levels
of inputs, whilst others receive none, and this varied by province and municipality as well as on-farm.
Certain types of farming co-operative use more ecological approaches than others, and this was also
true for individual farmers. The same went for Ministry, for research and extension groups and
individuals. The claim to organic attributed to the urban farming sector which did operate largely along
organic lines and was strongly supported by government policy and research. So why was urban
agriculture different? Because it grew spontaneously as the State allowed individuals to farm on any
piece of land available; because it was small-scale and manageable, because agrochemicals were
accepted early on as being unhealthy for use in an urban environment, and because urban agriculture
had been able to prove its worth in a relatively short period of time. Rural production, on the other
hand, had a history of embeddedness in industrialised thinking and farming systems, and this would
take longer to change, as almost all Cubans interviewed conferred.

Yet both research results and farming practice show that widespread organic production was
technically feasible and would provide sustainable yields, on some occassions surpassing yields of
industrialised production. The main restrictions to the increased uptake of organic techniques were
identified as: lack of access to organic inputs and lack of access to knowledge on organic agriculture.
Educators of agroecology in Cuba identified the main long term challenge of changing the dominant
industrialised mentality at all levels from farm to policy.

Was Cuba able to feed its population?

Although national food production levels were steadily increasing, Cuba remained dependent on both
food imports and food aid, and wastage remained a problem in the distribution system. Human health
problems were increasing, with over-consumption leading to an all-time high for overweight and
obesity rates of 36.5% by the late 1990s (obesity had dropped to 16% in 1993) and heart disease was
the main cause of death. Yet throughout, Cuba had managed to maintain basic daily access to food by
each citizen in the country, even during its most desperate years of the early 1990s, a feat not
achieved by other food insecure countries. Its success in turning the situation around to attain an
equitable level of food security over the decade of the 1990s was attributable to several factors.

Underlying Cuba’s success has been the long term political interest in providing basic social needs:
education, electricity, roads, and housing, and a basic food ration. Thus during this crisis, the ability
was maintained for subsistence occupations to continue and especially of agriculture. Political will also
meant joined-up action, with a self-imposed state of emergency during which time the population
accepted sacrifices in living standards in order to build up levels of self sufficiency. A three pronged
national strategy for food security emerged: the improvement of an early warning monitoring system,
the encouragement of domestic food production, and the continued guaranteed access by all to the
food available. All agricultural institutions refocused to place food security as their top strategic priority
throughout the decade.

Several other important factors were identified. One was of ensuring access by controlled distribution
and social safety nets. For Cuba, this meant maintaining a basic food ration to each citizen in the
country, which it managed to provide even in the most desperate years of the early 1990s. To support
the ration, farmers were obliged to sell a certain quantity of their planned production to the State at an
agreed, if low, price. The State also encouraged diversification of unsubsidised food sources for the
population, as well as employment opportunities. Another factor was the promotion of domestic food
production. To replace the shortfall of imported agricultural inputs, 220 small laboratories and
production centres were constructed nationwide, for the production of biological control agents,
biological pesticides and biofertilisers. This substitution of inputs has meant that, to some extent, the
sector has been able to adapt rapidly without having to massively re-educate the farming sector.
Some recourse was also made to traditional crop husbandry practices such as intercropping, green
manuring, rotations and crop-livestock interactions. Farms were also encouraged to diversify their
production with a priority for local self-sufficiency. In September 1993, a law was passed to allow for
small farmers and co-operatives to receive more land free and in perpetuity if they dedicated it mainly
to the production of certain crops. Further land – approximately 1/4 ha - could be given to individuals
and pensioners interested in family self-provisioning. The general population was urged to participate
through community and family home gardens or community tree planting, and also encouraged was
food production in the workplace, and production by other government sectors such as the military.
Each province was charged with being self-sufficient as far as possible. The State acknowledged that
small, private producers had been more productive than the large State farms. As a result, State farms
were broken up and put into co-operative ownership. In 1992, 75% of cultivable land had been in the
hands of State farms, but by 1997 this figure had dropped to 34%. Within a farm co-operative, an
individual or group could be bound to a piece of land and responsible for its production, and as an
incentive receive a share of any surplus production. Conversely, a share could be deducted from the
wage packet if production plans were not fulfilled. This was called ‘Linking man to the land’ and
provided an incentive for manual workers as well as encouraging increased observation and attention
to detail.

Training in all aspects of more efficient farm management was run at several levels – for farmers,
technical staff and farm administrators - and in all areas of the country, including through long distance
diploma and postgraduate courses. This training included ecological production principles and
techniques. Extension services were expanded, each farm co-operative having a resident facilitator.
Incentives were also increased. On State farms, the basic workers'salary was increased, and both
State and private farms benefited from more diversified and higher priced agricultural markets. Farm
gate prices rose by 50%. Migration to rural areas was incentivised through a regeneration programme
called ‘The Dignity of Farming Life’. Access to credit improved. By the end of the decade, farming was
currently one of the highest paid professions in Cuba and the State had no more need to encourage
migration. Another factor was increased post-harvest efficiency. In 1993, a new food procurement
process was introduced, with farmers bringing their produce to multiple rural collection points at a pre-
arranged day and time, where they would hand over to the State buyers and receive payment on the
spot. With a priority on reducing postharvest losses, local processing plants were installed, and
adequate labour organised for peak harvesting periods. By the end of the decade, most provinces
were self sufficient in the basic staples and seasonally in vegetables and fruits, and an increase in
local and regional production-consumption linkages. Finally, the State also demonstrated selectivity
over imports. Overall there was a priority at farm and regional levels to produce for the national
population rather than for export; partly it was considered immoral to do otherwise, but also Cubans
were aware of their lack of competitive know-how, technology and organisation. Decisions over which
foods to import were made pragmatically, with different rules applying to different crops. Certain
perishable foods would be too expensive to be produced and stored in Cuba, and certain staples
could not yet be guaranteed year round through national production.

The status of the Cuban organic movement

The crisis spawned the Cuban organic movement and offered it a unique opportunity to lead the way
during Cuba’s period of vulnerability. Circumstances were right, the State was open for alternative
approaches, and those who had been thinking organically could use their beliefs to contribute to food
security goals. Some farmers developed organic systems, as for example, banana producers who
chose it as a means to specialise or cope under the conditions. This experience convinced farmers
that organic production was technically feasible. The institutional sector was not so convinced. The
organic movement, also struggling in the resource-poor conditions of the decade, was unable to make
a sufficiently timely and convincing statement in rural Cuba, as it, and the urban agriculture movement,
had done in the cities. This was exacerbated by the somewhat entrenched mindset in the agricultural
sector that was not present in the new institutions of urban agriculture, but also by various institutional
power and ideological factors between a pioneering NGO and government. Two types of organic
agriculture were being developed into the new millennium: one State-pushed and oriented to export,
and the other driven by international donors and oriented toward small farmer development.
The paradox may be that Cuba is trading on its (only partially founded) reputation as an organic
pioneer (perceived as using organic approaches as a tool to meet domestic food security needs), as a
means for developing a standard export (and tourist) led organic model – whilst reverting back to
reliance on agrochemical use (and possible even biotechnology) as a means for meeting domestic
food security needs.
CONCLUSIONS
The case of Cuba demonstrates that the removal of agrochemicals does not signify that production is
organic; converting to organic requires a conscious decision to do so, and the Cuban government had
not yet made this decision. Yet organic agriculture did appear to be technically feasible as a
mainstream component of a nation’s food security strategy. Nevertheless, achieving food security was
less conditional on the farming approach than on political prioritisation to make it happen. Even in the
absence of corporate sector interest groups, political will was still required to ensure both food security
AND organic agriculture, because of the prevailing industrialised mindset. Because of this, and without
an organic-type ethos, human and environmental health-related production problems appeared to
persist.

Cuba may be unique in its governance, but not dissimilar to capitalist countries if we compare with the
extent of corporate control. In fact, while western farming and food systems become increasingly
mechanised, uniform and totalitarian, Cuba is moving toward greater complexity, diversity, human-
scale and bioregional production.

REFERENCES
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