ROGERSON V.

VILLANGCA
2016-90218

ABUNDO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 201716
8 January 2013
Ponente: Velasco, J.

FACTS:
For 4 successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local
elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and
2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served
the corresponding terms as mayor.

In the 2004 elections, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the
2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until
the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.

In the 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his COC
for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought Abundo’s disqualification to run
pursuant to the the three-consecutive term limit rule. The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution
finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly proclaimed
2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.

Before the COMELEC could resolve the disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo,
respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto to unseat Abundo on essentially the
same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.

The RTC granted Vega’s petition. The COMELEC affirmed the RTC’s decision. Both ruled that
service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest
is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his
being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service
of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials.
2. Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms.

RULING:
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous
mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to,
and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
 Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides: “The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.”

Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides: “No local elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.”

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the constitutional
and statutory provisions cited above, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.

As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, the principle behind the three-term limit rule
covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put
a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term, albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the
election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the
prohibition.

There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or
her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term,
immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.” This qualification was made as a
deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning
before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary
interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate
as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an
election contest, proclamation of a non- candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the
official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.

The Court then discussed different scenarios and whether or no involuntary interruption
occurred. The Court’s discussions are summarized below:

1. Assumption of Office by Operation of Law: succession in local government office is by

operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from office. Thus, when a
permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position
pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of
the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the
subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application
of any term limit. If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption
 of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered
an involuntary severance or interruption.
2. Recall Election: the Court cited Adormeo v. COMELEC and Socrates v. Commission on Elections.
The Court held in both cases that mayorship is disrupted either by defeat in an election or by the
expiration of the third consecutive term. In such instances, the mayor becomes a private citizen.
Thus, he could run again in case there is a recall election because the continuity of his service
was not interrupted by voluntary renunciation, but rather by an event (defeat in an election) or
because of a legal prohibition (cannot run for a fourth consecutive term). Thus, an elective
official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position
for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the
3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen.
3. Conversion of a Municipality into a City: does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent
official’s continuity of service because the incumbent never ceased from acting as chief
executive of the local government unit.
4. Period of Preventive Suspension: cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of
an elected official’s service because the suspended official continues to stay in office, and his
entitlement to it remain unaffected although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.
5. Election Protest: When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes
office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office,
thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed. The break or interruption need not be for a full term of
three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service.
When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not
constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term.

In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year
period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an
interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007, was the duly
elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on
the three- term limit that the official has been elected is satisfied.

This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for “three
consecutive terms,” as the phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately
before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the question of
whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods,
resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.

The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007
term.
 During the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in
his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on 9 May 2006 and served the term until 30 June
2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. It cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was
able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from 30 June 2004 until 8
May 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor
as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective
office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to
assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly,
Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration,
following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a
little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local
elected officials is 3 years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on
the ground is that Abundo actually served less.

The almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and
ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for
purposes of counting the three-term threshold.

Pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an
ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the
mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years during which his opponent actually assumed the
mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his
protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from 1 July 2004,
such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did
not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position.

DISPOSITION:
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered
IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position.