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PERSPECTIVES OF WARTIME MORALITY:

VIEWPOINTS OF THE WAR IN IRAQ

Soldiers of the United States of America are involved in armed combat with the insurgent

army of Iraq. This war, like every other war throughout history, has presented unpredictable

situations where those involved must make split-second moral judgments. In normal

circumstances, we have a well-defined legal and moral code of conduct by which we can measure

the actions of citizens and determine whether or not they are permissible. During instances of war

and combat however, these legal and moral conventions may not always apply, as the situations

that one finds him or herself in, are often abnormal and unpredictable. To uphold a code of moral

conventions that is regulated by normality and a set of circumstances wholly unrelated to the

incidents in question, is unfair to those involved in combative situations. The customs of a war

and of everyday life are vastly divergent and incomparable in terms of moral issues.

To understand this fully, we must first understand the basic role of the American Armed

Forces in Iraq. Traditionally the role of standard combat soldiers is to take over a specified

territory and to hold it until military victory is achieved. The term “military victory” however is

vague and indeterminate. It is redefined for every war and may even change throughout the course

of a particular war. For the members of the United States Army in Iraq, we can take it to mean

peace. Their job has been to come into Iraq and hold their position within a specified area, and to

bring about certain changes through which peace will ultimately be the result. This is exemplified

most explicitly by the sign that was nailed to the wall of Colonel Kauzlarich’s office in Iraq that

read, “MISSION: TO CREATE A BALANCED, SECURE, AND SELF-SUFFICIENT ENVIRONMENT FOR THE

IRAQI PEOPLE.”1 This sentiment is repeated several times throughout The Good Soldiers; their

mission or goal is to rid the area of an enemy (namely the insurgents) so that the people of Iraq are

free to live safer and better lives.

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The book Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 is the field manual sent out to all battalion leaders,

including to Col. Kauzlarich, outlining the proper procedures of the war that they were engaged

in, as best is possible.2 This newly updated text outlining the tasks and duties the soldiers were to

perform was sent out due to the fact that their mission had changed in tide with the climate of the

ongoing war. Inside this manual, it advised that the best way to defeat the enemy would be to

focus on the needs of the general population and to ensure their security as opposed to “killing

their way to victory.”3 Further to that extent, it explained that winning over the people and

controlling the population would lead to military victory, and that this new system of war didn’t

always rely on force and weaponry, rather upon control and understanding.4 The tactics to be used

then, were not to be overly physical or forceful when not absolutely necessary, but instead to help

develop a secure environment and a sense of safety for the people. They would kill insurgents

when it was vital that they do so, but the majority of their plan was to provide aid and stability in

an otherwise desolate place.

Understanding all of this, we can see that the intent of the American soldiers in Iraq was

to provide safety and security to the citizens and not to inflict undue harm. The third rule in the

doctrine of double effect for Michael Walzer is that “the intention of the actor is good, that is, he

aims only at the acceptable effect, the evil effect is not one of his ends.”5 Looking at the role of

the members of the United States Army in this way, we cans see that they, as a group, have acted

as proper moral agents in that they pursued the good ends of a safer, more stable Iraq and have not

intended on killing any innocent people. Looking solely at their intentions, they could be seen as a

peacekeeping force as opposed to a traditional army regime. This could be true, however the third

rule of the doctrine of double effect extends further than just the intentions of a moral agent. It

goes on to say, “nor is [evil] a means to his ends”6 meaning that the actions he or she takes to

achieve the desired good ends may not in themselves be inherently bad. War itself is often
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considered at the very least not good, if not morally bad. While killing enemy soldiers is generally

considered to be a morally permissible, it is equally considered morally impermissible to innocent

civilians. This additional information changes how we must view the American Armed Forces in

Iraq. Rather than being simple keepers of peace, they are actively involved in removing,

sometimes with deadly force, an enemy from the territory they are situated in. This necessarily

involves an increased risk amongst innocent civilians as well, based solely on their nearness to

conflict.7 We must then continue to view the American Armed Forces as a unit of soldiers

involved in armed conflict.

Whether or not it is morally permissible to kill them is questionable based on many factors

as well as different interpretations of those factors. If the intention of the Iraqi insurgents is

merely to remove Americans from their homeland through the use of terrorist activities, then their

acts are necessarily evil as their intention is bad and the end result is not unequivocally good for

all people of Iraq, and thus it is impermissible. If the main desire is to preserve their cultural

norms from the invasion of a Western-style culture and civilization, then they are more likely to

be considered to be morally right, however the means to their ends is still questionable in terms of

moral propriety. Leaving out the intentions of the insurgents of Iraq, we can look only at the role

of Americans within Iraq to determine whether or not the Iraqi forces are morally sanctioned to

shoot at or kill them. Considering that the American Army is in fact a military presence carrying

out a military operation, it can be seen as permissible to shoot at and/or kill them. Since they are

obeying the conventions of wartime procedure in that they have identified themselves as militants

engaged in fighting, there must be an opposition force that they are engaged in fighting against. In

a traditional combatant versus combatant style war, it would be morally permissible for some

group of organized soldiers to engage in munitions warfare against them which would have the

inevitable result of killing some soldiers. The tactics the Iraqi insurgents have employed in their
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version of war however, are not morally permissible, though that topic will be explored in greater

detail later on.

According to the Geneva Convention, a code of humanitarian law, only those who are

identified as a combatant or as a medic may involve themselves in any way with the war effort

and all others are to be recognized as innocent. Medical officials are to be left unharmed and

allowed to carry out their duties so long as they are identified either by a red cross, red crescent,

or the recently introduced red crystal all upon a white background; the international symbols for

medical attendants.8 Soldiers then must also identify themselves as combatants by way of a

uniform that is distinguishable from the typical dress of civilians of the area and labeled via a

clear and discernible emblem. This is to ensure that only those involved in military combat are

targeted in ammunition warfare while civilians are allowed to carry on with their lives without

fear of unwarranted attack. In Iraq it has become especially difficult to see any type of distinction

between resident and combatant due primarily to the fact that Iraqi soldiers are not unified into a

common grouping, and thus do not bear a distinguishable uniform by which they may be

identified.

The lack of opposition uniform is not an entirely new phenomenon in the realm of

warfare, nor is it a new enemy to the American military. Larry May describes events that took

place in the Vietnam War between American soldiers and the citizens of Vietnam or, more

specifically, of My Lai.

In some wartime situations, every person, soldier or civilian is a potential

threat… [S]ince the soldiers often do not know which civilians are

members of the enemy forces… the border between civilian and

combatant has become blurred.9

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This is strikingly similar to the situation that the American Armed Forces face in Iraq where the

civilian and the combat soldier are virtually indistinguishable from one another. According to

May, this radically transforms the thinking of a combatant soldier, especially when on enemy

territory. The general conception one has of strangers is to presume they are ingenuous unless

they give some indication (whether by way of dress or of action) that they are not to be trusted. In

situations such as Iraq or Vietnam as May suggests, “the burden of proof is on the stranger to

demonstrate trustworthiness, otherwise distrust will be the ‘norm’.”10 That is to say that the

mental state of American soldiers in Iraq is one of suspicion and trepidation, which is abnormal

for everyday circumstances. Since the Iraqis lack a uniform, they are able to hide in plain sight

and thus gain a twofold unfair advantage over the Americans who have clearly identified

themselves. The first advantage is unmistakably that if they are unidentifiable to the Americans,

then they are unlikely to be shot at and killed. The second advantage is of no less significance as it

takes a toll on the mentality of the members of the US Army. Since they are unable to determine

who is the enemy, they are under constant fear of attack and their mental stability will be shaken,

leaving many paranoid, insecure, and anxious. If they cannot plausibly pinpoint their opposition,

everyone falls under the umbrella of suspicion.

The insurgent army of Iraq, in their use of the tactic of hiding in plain sight, is already

carrying out a terrorist action against the members United States Army. Terrorism has many

variant definitions but for the sake of this paper I shall take it to mean any action that is carried

out with the intention of inflicting fear, worry, and uncertainty into the “other” as well as to

demoralize them. Terrorism itself is not an immoral act as it plays a role in every war; it is a

necessary and effective tool used to strike fear and unease into the enemy other. This “other” is a

defined group of individuals who share a specific and unambiguous set of beliefs or

characteristics. For the Iraqi insurgents, the “other” is the United States Army and vice versa.
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Terrorism is a fundamental part of war. To strike fear into the “other” is at the very foundation of

terrorism and indeed of war. To deny that the infliction of fear is necessary, or to deny that the

objective is to terrorize, is to misunderstand the concept of terrorism. It is used to cause fear and

demoralization of the opposition – to make them reconsider their objective and their actions.

Walzer himself claims terrorism is acts against a specified grouping – the “other” – in order to

create a sense of fear in their everyday life and to force precaution and insecurity onto them.11

The Iraqi insurgents repeatedly employ deliberate terrorist activities against the American

Armed Forces as their main tactical approach to war. The most blatant example of this is their use

of Improvised Explosive Devices or more simply, roadside bombs. These bombs are detonated at

random as convoys pass by. They are not targeted at specific individuals, nor are they always

targeted at the front of a convoy; a soldier in the last vehicle is just as vulnerable as a soldier in

the first one. The attack that killed PFC Jay Cajimat was on the third vehicle in a convoy on six 12

and the attack that killed PFC James Harrleson was on the second vehicle in the line.13 This

uncertainty of when and where an attack could occur and the fear that any vehicle could be hit

served not only as a way to physically destroy the enemy, but to mentally ravage them as well. As

Walzer puts it, “[i]t is virtually impossible to protect people against random and indiscriminate

attack.”14 Fear, more so than death, is the main objective of these attacks. An example of Iraqi

insurgents’ disregard for moral customs is their betrayal of religious sanctuary. Places of religious

worship are generally considered safe places where one can connect with their God(s) in times of

need and struggle, even during instances of war. Islamic tradition is deeply spiritual and requires

prayer five times per day and has a holy day where most believers go to a mosque to pray

amongst members of their congregation. Instead of finding a sacred haven, members of the 2-16

Rangers, or more formally, the Second Battalion, Sixteenth Infantry Regiment of the Fourth

Infantry Brigade Combat team, First Infantry Division discovered on at least one occasion that
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insurgents began storing weapons and ammunition within a mosque.15 While American soldiers

were able to carry out random raids on homes and businesses, they were unable to set foot into a

mosque except with special permissions or on rare instances of pursuit on the grounds that they

are religious territories where there are certain customs that are to be followed within them.

Members of the US Army obeyed this protocol because morally they were obligated not to

infringe upon religious customs, however Iraqi citizens and imams, who are supposed to be moral

and spiritual leaders, disobeyed the sanctity of the mosques and of religious grounds to further

their militant objective.

The unwillingness of the insurgents to employ the conventional tactics of acceptable

warfare may be seen as a cunning approach to ensure their victory, but it is in fact morally

impermissible. When engaging in warfare, there are certain conventions that have been put into

place that should not be broken based purely on moral grounds. While war itself is an act that very

few desire to be a part of, it is sometimes necessary that two nations, as with people, disagree.

Both sides often will have such strong beliefs regarding their position that they will fight to the

death in order to preserve their ideals. In doing so, they are morally required to abide by a certain

set of conventions so as to minimize the death toll and the overall negative effects that war has

both on combatants and civilians. The Iraqi insurgents have failed to follow these standardized

customs and their actions can only be seen as morally wrong. The use of car bombs by insurgents

for example, most often not only injures but targets innocent civilians. This tactic can never be

looked at as morally proper because it involves the killing of individuals not associated with the

war effort.

The United States Army itself had employed tactics of terrorism, albeit less explicitly

violent ones. One such example is Operation Ranger Dominance, where every member of the 2-

16 Rangers geared up and walked through the sixteen square mile area they had been allocated to
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patrol days after arriving. The point of this walk was to “see and be seen.”16 In essence, the

purpose was to let Iraqi citizens know they were there and they were unafraid and to strike fear

into the Iraqi insurgents. Another such instance of this intention to terrorize occurred July 12th,

2007, when the 2-16 swarmed an area that had been particularly violent around that time with

“240 soldiers, 65 Humvees, several Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and … two AH-64 Apache

Helicopter gunships.”17 The point was again to intimidate the enemy with their size and firepower

and to show that they had not been unsettled by the recent rise in insurgent activity. While these

terrorist acts were not directly harmful physically, they were used as tools to inflict unease and

fear into their enemy, namely the insurgents. The intent was not to cause physical trauma, but

rather to terrorize. The point is to undermine the enemy’s power and to discourage them from

further attacks.

Going back to May’s idea that the way of thinking for a combatant soldier is radically

changed during times of war, especially when on enemy territory, he wonders if it is permissible

to hold people, namely soldiers, up to the moral standards for normal people given that the

conditions and thought processes of wartime are abnormal.18 In war, the perception of what is and

is not morally allowable can be shifted. War and regular, everyday life are not the same, and thus

cannot be held to the same standards of moral accountability. The circumstances are so entirely

shifted that regular thinking does not apply; there is no room for normal perception in such

abnormal times. Such is true of the day where an innocent photojournalist and his assistant were

killed.

Photojournalists, like medics, are often granted access to war zones if they are clearly

identified and if they are there only to document the situation rather than to involve themselves

within it. They are considered innocent and thus we would see it as immoral for anyone engaged

in combat to knowingly shoot at or kill them in normal circumstances. The risk of them being
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killed accidentally rises exponentially with their proximity to armed combat, and they knowingly

take that risk. The day when Namir Noor-Eldeen and Saeed Chmagh were killed was a day filled

with escalated violence, which is what drew them to the area. Their presence in the area was

unknown to the American military, the soldiers in the area or those flying in the Apache

helicopter that shot at, and killed them.19

All morning long, this part of Al-Amin had been the most hostile . . . east

Al-Amin had been filled with gunfire and some explosions. There

had been reports of sniper fire, rooftop chases, and rocket-

propelled grenades being fired at Bravo Company.20

In an environment where violence had reached such chaotic levels, paranoia and presumption may

take hold of even the most experienced soldier. From the height of the Apache helicopter, a man

carrying a camera equipped with a long telephoto lens might look strikingly similar to a man

carrying a gun. This is especially true considering the fact that the photojournalist and his assistant

were surrounded by men carrying very real and very dangerous weapons such as AK-47’s and

rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Under the strain of a day filled with increased hostilities,

Namir and Saeed could easily be mistaken for combatants, especially considering the Iraqi

insurgents do not have any type identifying attire. While the gunner of the Apache helicopter may

have been hasty in his decision to begin firing at Namir and Saeed after they began to run away,

he would have expected anyone, innocent or guilty, to run away from heavy machine gun fire.

This is a classic example of the mentality of war taking charge; running away implying guilt, not

fear. Left without the opportunity to investigate further or to consider that the men running were

not insurgents and were not in fact going to turn around and shoot at them, the soldiers made their

decision and acted. To say that their acts were immoral would be to misunderstand the entire

situation. Looking at the larger picture of the mentality of war, the escalation in violence of that
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day, the training of soldiers, and the general mental conceptions of them, one can clearly see their

acts were morally permissible.

Michael Walzer may have said it best when he wrote that the laws of war “leave the

cruelest decisions to be made by men on the spot with reference only to their ordinary moral

notions or the military traditions of the army in which they serve.”21 The abnormal status of war

requires soldiers to use their best personal judgment in instances of conflict in combination with

their military training. The Americans acted with the sole intention of killing enemy combatants,

but in the blur of war, innocent people were caught in the crossfire and killed. On June 9th, 2007,

we can see another example of American soldiers relying on their training and instincts to make

split-second moral judgments in instances of conflict. On this day, a convoy of forty-two soldiers of

the 2-16’s Alpha Company went out with eight vehicles into the night with the help of an informant

nicknamed “Batman” to identify two Jaish al Mahdi leaders.22 The night turned frenzied when they

made a stop along Route Tomatoes and “all hell broke loose.”23 The circumstances turned hostile

and the American soldiers had no choice but to react to the situation at hand. What seemed to be a

routine stop became a frenzied firefight that no one could have foreseen. A night where the plan

was to capture two Iraqis turned into a deadly night of self-defense that resulted in the death of

thirty-five Iraqis.24 Their intentions were only to apprehend two known militant leaders in order to

loosen the grip of fear that had taken over the area. Instead their hand was forced by the outbreak of

gunfire directed at them. The actions of the soldiers that night can also be seen as morally

permissible for if they were not shot at, they would not have begun shooting.

As has been shown, there have been many instances where American soldiers acted

morally during fast paced moments of war and their instincts kicked in, but those are not the only

instances of Americans acting morally. The riskiest illustration of their morality was when Brent

Cummings said to Izzy, Colonel Kauzlarich’s interpreter, “bring your daughter here”25 after she
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had been injured by a car bomb. Cummings knew that this girl likely was not entitled to American

military medical assistance but he could not knowingly let a young girl die, so he told Izzy to

bring his daughter to the aid station on the US Army Base. Rules were rules, so Izzy had to get his

family to the FOB, but Cummings had alerted medical staff to be ready to receive a female victim

for when they arrived. As soon as they did, soldiers ran out and “[t]hey lifted her up. … They

carried her through the gate without stopping. They ran with her into the aid station . . . [and soon

she] was surrounded by American doctors and medics.”26 Rules and regulations were forgotten

and all that mattered was saving the life of an innocent eight-year-old girl.27 This is an occasion

where moral duty trumps wartime procedure, where saving the life of a child became more

important than anything else. Despite the fact that Izzy’s daughter was not entitled to care,

morally they could not turn her away. Another less dramatic example of American morality was

when a soldier of the 2-16 stopped by Izzy’s room on the FOB. Upon seeing that someone had

written that no person of Iraqi descent was worth spilling the blood of any American he

apologetically said that that was not right, took a wet cloth and rubbed away at the words trying to

remove them as best as was possible.28 While this may have been a simple gesture, the soldier was

guided by a moral conscience. He believed that statement was wrong, especially in a place where

Izzy, and Iraqi citizen, would have to see them. Erasing those words was not a grand act, but it

was a moral proper one.

Morality during times of war can sometimes seem like an oxymoron since killing others is

not often considered to be a morally permissible action. This may be true of normal situations, but

war is a wholly abnormal set of circumstances and the way in which one is permitted to act

follows a different set of moral conventions. That is not to say that there are no laws to be upheld

or that war erases all moral culpability from agents, but rather that the customs are altered to fit

the situations. Terrorism is a part of war, as is death, but agents are not given a free pass to use
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these tactics. The United States Armed Forces has acted morally right in that they abided by the

moral rules citizens of the world have laid out for times of war, but the Iraqi insurgents have not

done so. While it is permissible to engage in warfare with the Americans, there are ways in which

this can be appropriately carried out. War is an undesirable state of affairs and in order to limit the

negative effects that it has both on civilians and soldiers there must be limits on what is and what

is not allowable. Things that are permissible in times of war may differ from what is permissible

during times of peace, but they all stem from proper moral conceptions of right and wrong while

taking into account the mental state of an acting agent. Sometimes moral duty takes precedence

over conventions of war. In war, as in peace, it is most important that moral duty be upheld.

1
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 268.
2
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 25-7.
3
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 27.
4
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 27.
5
Michael Walzer, “Double Effect and Double Intention,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 194.
6
Michael Walzer, “Double Effect and Double Intention,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 194.
7
Michael Walzer, “Double Effect and Double Intention,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 193.
8
International Committee of the Red Cross, “The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their
Additional Protocols” ICRC
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-
conventions/index.jsp
9
Larry May, “Superior Orders, Duress, and Moral Perception,” in The Morality of War,
ed. Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 436-7.
10
Larry May, “Superior Orders, Duress, and Moral Perception,” in The Morality of War,
ed. Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 435.
11
Michael Walzer, “Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 297.
12
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 21.
13
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 112.
14
Michael Walzer, “Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 302.
15
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 95.
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16
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 17-8.
17
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 92.
18
Larry May, “Superior Orders, Duress, and Moral Perception,” in The Morality of War,
ed. Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 434.
19
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 96-7.
20
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 97.
21
Michael Walzer, “Double Effect and Double Intention,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 193.
22
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 70-1.
23
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 71.
24
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 72.
25
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 154.
26
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 156.
27
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 153-7
28
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 161-2.

Bibliography

Finkel, David. The Good Soldiers. Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009.

International Committee of the Red Cross. “The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their
Additional Protocols.” ICRC.
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-
conventions/index.jsp (accessed November 4, 2010)

May, Larry. “Superior Orders, Duress, and Moral Perception.” In The Morality of War,
edited by Larry May, Eric Rovie and Steve Viner, 430- 439. New Jersey: Pearson
Education, 2006.

Walzer, Michael. “Double Effect and Double Intention.” In The Morality of War, edited by
Larry May, Eric Rovie and Steve Viner, 193 – 199. New Jersey: Pearson Education,
2006.

Walzer, Michael. “Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses.” In The Morality of War, edited by

Larry May, Eric Rovie and Steve Viner, 193 – 199. New Jersey: Pearson Education,
2006.