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Games
by
Doctor of Philosophy
2014
Abstract
This study of the reception and adaptation of magic tricks, murder mysteries, and con games
calls for magic adaptations that create critical imaginative geographies (Said) and writerly
(Barthes) spectators. Its argument begins in the cave of the magician, Alicandre, where a
mystical incantation is heard: "Not in this life, but in the next." These words, and the scene from
which they come in Tony Kushner's The Illusion, provide the guiding metaphor for the
conceptual journey of this dissertation: the process of reincarnation. The first chapter investigates
the deaths of powerful concepts in reader-response theory, rediscovers their existence in other
fields such as speech-act theory, and then applies them in modified forms to the emergent field of
performance studies. Chapter two analyzes the author as a magician who employs principles of
deception by reading vertiginous short stories written by Jorge Luis Borges. I argue that his
techniques for manipulating the willing suspension of disbelief (Coleridge) and for creating
ineffable oggetti mediatori (impossible objects of proof) suggest that fantastic literature (not
magical realism) is the nearest literary equivalent to experiencing magic performed live. With
comparisons of murder mysteries and con games are made in chapter three. Crime adaptations by
Roald Dahl, Alfred Hitchcock, Pedro Almodóvar, David Mamet and Ricky Jay are analyzed as
different incarnations of specific source texts to compare techniques of deception across multiple
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media and to gauge whether these stories produce critical readers/spectators or naive ones.
Chapter four accepts the challenge of performing magic that produces writerly spectators by
century stage illusion through practice-based research. The scholarly praxis of magic as a
performing art is further articulated in the experimental manifesto with which this dissertation
concludes.
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Acknowledgments
This dissertation is the result of an intense period of growth and change in my life that occurred
thanks to the love, support, and inspiration channeled into its pages by various communities. All
of them have contributed in their own ways to who I am and what you are about to read.
The seeds of this work were sown in my hometown of Sacramento, California. I thank
and the ability to overcome seemingly impossible obstacles. I thank Nathan Livni who showed
me my first real card trick, became my first performance partner, and has been my best friend
ever since. I am grateful to Steve, Don, and Leora Johnson who generously gave me my first job
at their wonder-filled magic shop — Grand Illusions. It was there where I began to see the world
These shimmering roots spread to the coastal redwoods of UC Santa Cruz, where Kasey
Mohammed, Peter Gizi and Gildas Hamel helped me realize that some poems are magic spells.
Hervé le Mansec first taught me to truly speak and think in another language. This allowed me to
how language shapes our subjective realities. I was also lucky, as an undergraduate student in a
graduate seminar, to have Harry Berger Jr. teach me how to apply philosophical concepts to the
study of literature. It was his suggestion to apply to the Centre for Comparative Literature at the
The Centre is where writing a dissertation on magic and storytelling suddenly became a
viable, living project. This would have been impossible without the patient guidance and wisdom
of my PhD committee. Eva-Lynn Jagoe, with whom I first savored the mystifying stories written
by Jorge Luis Borges, supervised the dissertation with grace, steel and affection. She has
consistently taught me how to be an honest critic of my work. Linda Hutcheon, through her
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insightful, thorough and challenging feedback, strengthened nearly every aspect of this
manuscript from start to finish. She has also modeled for me, and many others, how to be a
consummate professional. Stephen Johnson saved me and this project in a number of ways.
Without his expertise as a performance studies scholar and his enthusiastic support of my
practice-based magic research, my study of “The Sphinx” and other illusions would have
remained purely theoretical. Many thoughtful mentors and colleagues helped me to read and edit
partial or complete chapters as they were produced: Neil ten Kortenaar, Charlie Keil, James
Cahill, Martin Zeilinger, Keavy Martin, Baryon Posadas, Joshua Nichols, Ronald Ng, Sarah
O’Brien, Rachel Stapleton, Daniel Brielmaier, Adleen Crappo, Kate Sedon, Lauren Beard,
Matteo Scardellato, Dylan Gordon, Catherine Schwartz, John Mayberry, Jane Freeman, Sasha
Kovacs, Natalie Mathieson, and others all contributed. Will Straw’s external report and lively
comments during my defense gave the dissertation the final intellectual push it needed for me to
consider it done.
John Fraser, master of Massey College, and David Ben, artistic director of Magicana,
each provided me with places to live and libraries to study in over the years. These gentlemen
also invited me and my work into their respective communities. John introduced me to many
brilliant Junior and Senior Fellows at Massey who improved my understanding of this project by
listening to it and comparing it to similarities in their work. A few who come to mind now are
Marcin Kedzior, Dylan Cantwell-Smith, Cara Mckibbin, Anna Shamaeva, Donna Vakalis,
Patrick Boyle, Paul Furgale, Claire Battershill, Cillian O’Hogan, Jordan Guthrie, Olivier Sorin,
Davin Lengyel, Katie Mullins, Hanah Chapman, Tim Barrett, Josh Elcombe, Brys Stafford,
Heather Jessup, Geoffrey Little, Jessica Duffin Wolfe, Heather Sheridan, Michael Valpy, and
Val Ross. I am proud to call all of these talented individuals, and many others, friends.
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Many magicians have contributed knowledge and feedback that helped to shape the
contents of this dissertation. I sincerely thank Jim Steinmeyer, Edwin Dawes, Peter Lane, Bill
Goodwin, Gabe Fajuri, Julie Eng, Bill Kalush, Ricky Smith, Noah Levine, Nathan Kranzo,
Christian Cagigal, Will Houstoun, Lee Asher, Aaron Fisher, and Alex Slemmer from the North
American and English magic communities. Travel grants from Massey College and U of T’s
School of Graduate Studies funded my research in Buenos Aires where the second chapter was
written. Roberto Mansilla and Pablo Zanatta introduced me to the vibrant history of Argentina’s
magic during that visit. In Barcelona, Gabi Pareras and Joaquin Matas welcomed me into their
local scene like a long lost brother. Gabi’s approach to combining critical theory, literature and
the performance of magic gave me a strong sense of solidarity at a time when I felt very alone.
I wish to thank the performance studies scholars, arts organizations and variety
performers whose support made the final transformation of this dissertation (and my career)
possible. I have become a praxis-based scholar thanks to Antje Budde, Nik Cesare, my dear Ars
Mechanica co-founders (Vojin, Natalie, Sasha, and Myrto), Bruce Barton, Moynan King, Shelley
Liebembuk, Paul Babiak, Paul Stoesser, Sarah Kriger, members of the Accademia dell’Arte (in
Arezzo, Italy), The Toronto Arts Council, the Ontario Arts Council, Performance Studies
International, the Digital Dramaturgy Lab, New Gendai Workstation, the Circus Academy, and
the Toronto Juggling club. Finally, I thank Jessamine Trueman — the circus artist whose love
made the final pages of this particular chapter in my life fly by.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... iv
Prologue Reincarnated Texts and Concepts: Towards Faithful and Free Adaptations ........ x
1 Dazzling the Reader: Suspension of Disbelief in Fantastic Literature and “El Aleph” (“The
Aleph”) ................................................................................................................................... 83
2 Exploding Todorov's Model: “La muerte y la brújula” (“Death and the Compass”) and "El
disco" (“The Disk”) ................................................................................................................ 94
4 Playing God: The Detective Story, Smoke and Political Trickery ....................................... 111
Chapter 3 Criminal Adaptations: Hidden Intertexts in the Murder Mystery and the Con
Game .............................................................................................................................. 124
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1.2 Sleight-of-Screen vs. Sleight-of-Pen as Sleight-of-Hand............................................................ 132
1.3 Cross-cultural and Cross-media Adaptation and Reception ........................................................ 139
1.4 Is an Ethics of Adaptation and Citation Possible? ...................................................................... 143
2 Ethical and Unethical Adaptations — Mamet, Jay and the Con Game ................................ 146
2.1 Putting the ‘Con’ in ‘Lexicon’: Jay and Mamet .......................................................................... 153
2.2 The Spectator as Victim: Mark-focused Reception Theory ........................................................ 163
2.3 Adapting Psychological Principles of the Con Game to Film ..................................................... 169
3 Seeing Like Criminals, Seeing Like Victims, Seeing Like Magicians ................................ 175
Chapter 4 “The Sphinx” and “The Sage”: Reception and Adaptation in Practice ............ 180
2 Egyptian Hall: Imaginative Geographies, Colonialist Collectors and Reality-Slippage ...... 201
3 “The Sage Duban”: Narrative Adaptation as Critical and Aesthetic Response ................... 232
4 Thoughts on Magic Adaptation: A Call for Critical Imaginative Geographies and Writerly
Spectators.............................................................................................................................. 243
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List of Figures
Fig. 1. Todorov’s categaories of the fantastic. .............................................................................. 85
Fig. 4. Woodcut illustration from London’s Illustrated Times, 18 October 1865. ..................... 187
Fig. 6. Frontispiece of Hoffmann’s Modern Magic (1877, second edition). .............................. 189
Fig. 7. Miniature model of the optical illusion used in Stodare’s “The Sphinx” ........................ 191
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Prologue
Reincarnated Texts and Concepts: Towards Faithful and Free
Adaptations
Yet if the only form of tradition, of handing down, consisted in following the
“Not in this life, but in the next” is the final line of Tony Kushner’s 1988 adaptation of
Pierre Corneille’s seventeenth-century play L’Illusion comique (83). This proclamation of rebirth
is spoken by the Amanuensis, who is the servant of Alicandre — the play’s magician. The cycle
incantation with which to begin a study of how magic, in particular, and other deceitful
performances, in general, are adapted to various storytelling media through which they are then
received by readers as well as spectators. The Amaneunsis makes his statement after a man
named Pridamant has engaged Alicandre’s otherworldly powers to locate his long-lost son,
Clindor. After the magician consults his version of a crystal ball, in this case a crystal pool of
water, eerily life-like figures appear revealing Clindor’s adventures, misadventures and,
ultimately, his violent murder. Pridamant, convinced that these visions are real, woefully mourns
Pridamant and the audience then learn that Clindor is not actually dead. He is an actor.
Clindor is a professional deceiver, or what Oscar Wilde would call a “perfectly magnificent liar”
(Wilde 10-11), and we the audience have been watching his various performances along with
Pridamant as if they were real events. The sorcerer Alicandre turns out to be the biggest deceiver
of all in The Illusion. He is the one who consciously presents Clindor’s theatrically framed
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performances as if they were scenes from everyday life. Counterintuitively, the magic of
Alicandre’s crystal pool is true. In the diegetic world of the play, it does transmit accurate visions
of life over an impossible distance. What makes the magician’s presentation deceitful is his
manipulation of the frame of what the pool shows. He consciously crops out and hides the edges
of the theatre in which Clindor performs. Like the camera of a film director, Alicandre’s magical
pool has the power to make play events appear as though they are part of Pridamant and
Clindor’s lived reality (a reality which is in itself a piece of fiction that we are watching). Thus,
the central illusion in The Illusion is Pridamant’s and the audience’s reception of an
unannounced play-within-a-play.
sublime emotional crisis.1 The ruse moves Pridamant, a hard, formal and stubborn man, to tears.
It creates the terrifying illusion that his son is dead to impress upon him the opportunity that he
now has for reconciliation. And so, Pridamant leaves the darkness and the apparitions of
Alicandre’s cave, which are also the shadowy illusions of Plato’s cave, to re-enter the world and
to reconcile with his son. On the levels of diegesis and character, then, the central theme in both
Corneille’s and Kushner’s versions of a play about a father’s quest for knowledge is one of
rebirth made possible by the reception of fiction as reality. Sublime recognition is one reception
On a meta-critical level, Kushner’s The Illusion and the concluding line spoken by the
1
The concept of “the sublime” as a simultaneously terrifying and beautiful revelation will
be explored in further depth in the next chapter’s discussion of Todorov’s “fantastic” literature.
For now, I ask the reader to simply note that Pridamant’s devastating reception of Alicandre’s
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Amanuensis are a reflection on the reincarnation — the re-embodiment, the re-staging, and the
re-telling — of Corneille’s play for North American audiences three centuries after it first
premiered in France. In this sense, I read the line “Not in this life, but in the next” as a meditation
on the process of adaptation itself. It can even be interpreted as a political statement promoting a
philosophy of liberal adaptation, because the Amanuensis is the boldest addition made by
Kushner to his version of the play. Named after a term used in the seventeenth century to denote
“one who copies or writes from the dictation of another” (OED), the Amanuensis appears in the
very first scene of The Illusion as a servant/scribe who is both deaf and mute. I therefore
understand the magical restoration of his tongue and his ensuing power of speech at the end of
the play as a statement made by Kushner that matches his dramaturgical practice: informed yet
free adaptations breath new life into the adapted text. The Illusion gives L’illusion comique a
new tongue, one which self-reflexively recognizes that future adaptations, subsequent lives of the
The tongue of the Amaneunsis, in the context of this dissertation, is also a symbol for my
argument that studying the performative language used in magic acts and in con games sheds
new light on how human beings turn fiction into reality. Language that actually does what it
says, thanks to speakers who cleverly manipulate it and to social rituals that give it the power to
affect the material world, will be carefully traced in the pages that follow. Subtle transformations
of performative speech-acts, such as "I promise" or "I bet," and body language, such as crossing-
one's heart or shaking another's hand, will be analyzed as deceptive performances move from
theatrical venues to scenes of everyday life. In other words, the magic spells spoken by tongues
onstage will be read against those spoken on the street to discuss the unethical adaptation of
On an artistic level, however, the creative altering of the voice of a text allows it to say
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something different that a new audience can hear and this should be celebrated. As in Kushner’s
retelling, characters may be added, rhyme schemes may be altered, jokes may be transposed, and
one hundred other minute or extreme changes may be made to customize the transmission of the
play, and its spirit, to the cultural reality of new spectators. The carefully informed yet original
with a mixture of free and rhymed verse that manages to capture, to twist, and to transpose the
difficult and a more lofty accomplishment than any attempt at a literal translation would have
been.
across time and culture in the same media or whether they are made across various media, fall
into the trap of blindly and timidly adhering to the success of past generations. This is the
temptation to slavishly mimic one's predecessors that T.S. Eliot warns us against. Strict
translations lead to conservative adaptations and these are usually motivated by a desire to
replicate the reputation of a text’s previous prestige, success, and popularity in one culture, rather
than a genuine desire to revive the spirit of a text for another time and place. We must accept that
no matter how glorious the past life of a text may have been, once it is incarnated in another
time, place, or medium, it has a new life of its own.2 It must take risks and make a name for itself
2
Jorge Luis Borges’ Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote” (Pierre Menard, Author of the
Quixote”) is one example of the division between the past life of a text and its new life as an
on authorship and originality in relation to adaptation, however, is quite different from the
politics of actual adaptations. A fascinating example of those tensions can be found in Richard
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as an individual.
I argue that tradition today (think: canons or sacred texts) must be even more radically
questioned than Eliot suggests in his famous essay on the art of poetry. Furthermore, this
questioning requires even more rigorous and open-minded study than before. As the media by
which we can tell stories expand, as the depth and range of our historical records of adapted texts
as well as our theoretical concepts (such as the willing suspension of disbelief, denegation, and
more) increase, so does the need to be both an informed scholar and an experimental adaptor.
adaptations prove, is a self-stifling mindset in any performing art and this includes magic.
However, the successful reincarnation of a performance text’s spirit, which is the successful
reception of a story or of an idea born to a new time, place, and cultural environment, may occur
slightly different lesson than the one which audiences needed before. Such a lesson reflects upon
a new or a recurring problem faced by the spectators of today with a heightened level of
sophistication, elegance, and risk that does not worship past works. Instead, it recognizes their
achievements and derives inspiration from them. This paradoxically rigorous respect for tradition
and radical break from it, the kind called for by Eliot in theory and rendered extreme by Kushner
Schechner’s article “Drama, Script, Theatre and Performance” in which his TPG (The
Performance Group) created an experimental adaptation of Tom Stoppard’s The Tooth of Crime.
The production resulted in a heated yet productive polemic exchange between Stoppard and
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in practice, requires the adaptation to be an instance of fictional and critical rebirth. This process
is one example of the constant striving for intellectual and spiritual growth that powers the
humanities.
and con games, I choose to combat what critics Robert Stam, Linda Hutcheon and others refer to
as the fidelity discourse in adaptation studies with the syncretic and spiritual metaphor of
reincarnation. This is a different frame of reference than what Marvin Carlson describes in his
theatre criticism as the intertextual haunting of previous performances, though his semiotic
intertextual haunting is helpful for understanding multiple receptions, but I prefer the less eerie
and more benign concept of invisible past lives connecting to the present as a series of learning
opportunities over the image of ghosts hanging around with unfinished business. Ghosting, for
me, evokes an unresolved, somewhat ominous disunity, while incarnations and reincarnations of
the spirit suggest a continual learning process — a progression of new lessons learned by way of
new experiences.
The mysticism implied by the reincarnation metaphor is fitting, because the performance
of magic tricks as well as any narrative incorporating a magician, such as The Illusion, naturally
raises questions regarding rational versus supernatural explanations for the mysteries of life. The
magician, as cultural descendent of the shaman, has always been consulted regarding two of the
individual’s greatest mysteries in life: birth (where did I come from?) and death (where am I
3
See Marvin Carlson’s book The Haunted Stage: Theatre as Memory Machine and his
article “Invisible Presences — Performance Intertextuality” for the specific language he uses to
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going?). In addition to its otherworldly suggestiveness, the concept of reincarnation forces a
triple analysis — one dedicated to the current incarnation of a text on its own terms (standing
alone as an individual piece), one examining the influence and interconnectedness of its past
lives (where it came from), and one imagining its possible, future incarnations (where it is
going). Kushner’s play serves as a metaphorical reference to magic, to magicians and to the
framed within deception, and of the dead brought back to life circulate throughout this
dissertation’s interrelated chapters on some of Jorge Luis Borges’ short stories, on con game
twenty-first century stage. Throughout these pages, I argue for the benefits of free yet informed
adaptation as both a critic and a performer. Now, it is time to get started. It is time to die.
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1
Chapter 1
Deaths and Reincarnations of Reception Theory
Death, as its Tarot card signifies, is always linked to rebirth. And in that same spirit of
renewal, this first chapter, the theoretical framework of my dissertation, maps out the deaths,
births and name changes of reader-response criticism from the late 1960s to the early 2000s. A
large selection of the major contributors from Western Europe and America — Wolfgang Iser,
Hans Robert Jauss, Roland Barthes, Stanley Fish, J.L. Austin, Jane P. Tompkins, Steven
Mailloux, Michael Riffaterre, Umberto Eco, Anne Ubersfeld, Susan Bennett, Marvin Carlson,
Richard Schechner, and Diana Taylor — are put into dialogue with one another to show that
concepts from reader-response theory are not dead; rather, they have been reincarnated and
reapplied within the fields of speech-act theory, intertextuality and performance studies. I place
these concepts within the context of their historical moments, as breakthroughs in North
American and European literary theory, to discuss their transformations as they cross
disciplinary borders, and then push them beyond another boundary by demonstrating their
directly link the fiction-making process that occurs during reading to that which occurs during a
magic show and other deceptive performances (such as con games or hoaxes). Reader-response
completely invested in anticipating and shaping the spectator’s perception of the event.
Therefore, when theorists such as Stanley Fish, Michael Riffaterre and others analyze the
reception process by thinking of short stories, poems or novels as events experienced in the
minds of readers, an immediate and mutually enriching connection between magic and reading is
made. These events, which include the deliberate act of reading (the performance of physical and
2
psychical actions such as turning pages, moving one’s eyes from left to right, from top to bottom,
and imagining), links the ways authors engage readers in fiction-making to the ways magicians
accomplish that same task with spectators. Authors and magicians manipulate our perceptions
through artifice. Through storytelling they allow us to deceive ourselves. Magicians’ and
authors’ artful lies make it possible to temporarily disengage from what we perceive as “normal”
reality to fully access our imaginations and other worlds – story worlds.
theory derives from its focus upon the receiver of a text (and a receiver may be a reader, a
spectator and/or a participant), it is a natural point of departure for the experimental, cross-
knack for breaching disciplinary, cultural, and media boundaries; this characteristic is inscribed
in its very name. All theoretical approaches have their individual talents for moving from one
field to another, but their names typically focus upon objects (things), rather than subjects
(individuals). The root words forming these neologisms reveal their primary interests:
intertextuality (studying the text and the intertext — the betweenness of texts), structuralism (the
-ism, or belief, that deep, formal structures generate meanings and that structural relationships
between elements merit even more attention than the elements themselves), post-structuralism (a
direct response and critique of the claims of objectivity and comprehensiveness made by
structuralism), and deconstruction (the action of the verb “to deconstruct”: the action of undoing
assumptions about a thing) are only a few examples. Reader-response, on the other hand,
immediately privileges the reader as its central subject. It celebrates individual receptions and
responses to a text. It fought and won its battles against the established oeuvre and the concept of
the Author with a capital ‘A’ as the primary, and even sacred, locus of meaning. As an analytical
3
lens it created a new perspective from which to study textual meaning – the experience of the
reader.
France in the 1970s, resulting from the intellectual aftershocks following the events of mai 68.
This was also the moment of the linguistic turn in literary studies, the moment of speech-act
theory’s application to literature, the shift from structuralism to post-structuralism, and the
blossoming of radical exchanges in critical theory between France and North America. Common
readers had, in a sense, been oppressed by authors, as literary and cultural monarchs, for too
long. The revolutionary energy of the 1960s in the United States in tandem with the widespread
revolts of mai 68 in France, including students illegally occupying ideological state apparatuses
traditional beliefs in literary studies and critical theory. Two of Roland Barthes’ radical
meaning in literary criticism: “la naissance du lecteur doit se payer de la mort de l’Auteur” (“the
birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author”) and “face à l’oeuvre, le Texte
pourrait bien prendre pour devise la parole de l’homme en proie aux démons (Marc, 5, 9) :
« Mon nom est légion, car nous sommes plusieurs. »” (“against the work, . . . the text could well
take as its motto the words of the man possessed by demons (Mark 5:9): ‘My name is Legion:
4
for we are many’”) (Barthes 1: 495, 1214; Heath 148, 160). L’auteur et l’oeuvre are swiftly
dethroned. Texts may be thought of as author-less, because they are composed of countless
4
Translations of Barthes’ articles are by Stephen Heath from the collection Image —
authors (who are the readers as well as those readers’ conceptions of who the author might be).5
Texts are neither stable nor closed, they are instead constructed and deconstructed through a
constant weaving and unweaving, a polysemous coding and decoding, by critics, initiated
readers, and uninitiated readers, all of whom recognize or fail to recognize the intertextual
references – the various, multi-colored, multi-fibrous threads – that cause the text to overflow, to
This overflowing of the text, its escape from the confines of the book by way of the
reader’s experience, is crucial for why reader-response has such potential for re-thinking magic
as a performing art, as well as con games and any performances which intentionally deceive
individuals. Once critics begin to analyze the sites of overflow between written texts, theatre
performances, and the experiences of everyday life, a new space opens up for the analysis of
magic. Magicians must always think critically about their art from the point of view of the
spectator, because they know that the only place where magic actually occurs is within the
spectator’s mind. The reception process of magic is one of the qualitative differences between it
and other performing arts. This new space and the manner in which it allows for a different
understanding of magic tricks and con games are charted out here. Mapping the ways in which
the definitions of certain reader-response terms change as they cross disciplinary boundaries
reveals the formation of new conceptual tools for analyzing magic performances.
From the ‘80s to the early ‘90s, the most useful, adaptable concepts championed by
reader-response theory – the death of the author and oeuvre, l’horizon d’atteinte (the horizon of
5
Michel Foucault would call the reader’s, and his community’s, constructions of who the
author is the product of the “author-function.” See his article “Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur ?” (“What
is an author?”)
5
expectations), the reading experience as event, blancs (blanks, gaps or dummy slots),
distinction), the willing suspension of disbelief, and interpretive communities – combine with
sympathetic concepts found in intertextuality and speech-act theory. Two such examples are the
“open” text and the performative speech-act. After reader-response theory’s success, its initial
assimilation by other theories, and immediately following its decline in traditional literary
criticism (circa 1990), these same concepts are carried forward, repositioned and given new life
Some of these reader-oriented terms — the horizon of expectations, the reading event,
and blanks (formal terms describing the most basic aspects of the reception process) — may be
change to their earlier definitions. Other concepts, like the readerly/writerly distinction, grow in
negative model spectators in magic performances such as “Powers of Darkness” or “The Circus
Card Trick.” This is a logical deepening of sophistication, because the subjective model, or less-
Thankfully, there is a wonderful abundance and variety of individuals who receive stories in the
world. The readerly/writerly distinction also creates a space for discussing how and what
receivers learn, or fail to learn, from experiencing a story, a magic trick or a con game.
Finally, the reader-response revolution, the linguistic turn and the appearance of semiotic
theatre criticism utterly transform Coleridge’s definition of the willing suspension of disbelief by
mixing it with Anne Ubersfeld’s concept of dénégation (‘denial’ or the willing suspension of
disbelief in performance). This re-envisioning of the aesthetic experience of the spectator during
the reception process, combined with the influence of physically present interpretive
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communities, moves the study of fiction-making into new territory both on the level of visual
and tactile reception. This conceptual layering accounts for aspects of the relationship between
the narrative storytelling, the optical and the haptic illusions of magic which govern the art’s
unique aesthetic. Here is a purely visual example: though it is important in any theatre
production to ensure that spectators’ lines of sight allow them a clear view of the actors in a play,
controlling those same lines of sight as perfectly as possible is essential for the effective
presentation of a stage illusion. A spectator who is placed so he cannot see all of the swordplay
in the final, bloody scene of Hamlet, may not have a perfect theatre experience, but that person’s
ability to suspend disbelief and to be immersed in Shakespeare’s play will not be irreparably
damaged. However, if that same spectator, this time sitting in the theatre to watch Houdini
vanish an elephant, is positioned at a poorly controlled angle and is allowed to glimpse the
elephant as it secretly escapes backstage, then any chance of experiencing magic — of being
6
immersed in illusion — is ruined. The role of visual perception for the successful, willing
suspension of disbelief as well as the kind of disbelief elicited, based on what is seen in these two
cases, are related yet qualitatively different. By moving from the earliest to the most recent cycle
context of certain terms as well as their current, conceptual importance for spectator-response
analysis today. Performance studies and theories of adaptation are the fields where my
comparative analysis of certain twentieth-century short stories, magic tricks, films and con
games arrives. Reception theory, and its shifting of critical focus onto the reader and the
6
This, incidentally, is not the method by which Houdini vanished his elephant. However,
I am able to make make this point of my argument here without exposing his method. See Jim
— Haun Saussy
“Theory is dead,” is a popular phrase heard around the comparative literature campfire.
Death of a Discipline (2003) is the title of Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak’s most prominent critique
of my chosen field of study. Also, in 2003-4, Haun Saussy, head of the American Comparative
Literature Association’s ten year review, named his draft for the forthcoming report: “Exquisite
Cadavers Stitched from Fresh Nightmares.” So, as a new scholar and a new arrival to this
academic scene, I quickly developed an obsession with death. You could call it a theoretical
complex. But as the last title suggests, this morbid interest is less about the death of “theory” (as
the literary comparatist’s disciplinary raison d’être) and more about theories’ multiple deaths
and reincarnations — the stitching together of theoretical and literary corpses, old and new. What
does it mean to say that a literary theory is past its prime? How does a theory die? Where is it
debates, their prominent thinkers, and the academic polemics which ensue, but they also engage
the crossing of three main sets of boundaries. The births, deaths, and renamings of reader-
response or reception theory, my chosen case study of this phenomenon, result from
transgressions and travels between national, disciplinary and media frontiers. I use the word
8
transgression, because the import, export, and translation of ideas is sometimes seen as a
“désacralisation” or bastardization by critical scholars who even today, privilege one storytelling
medium over another. Expertise in or a proclivity for prose, theatre, film, or any number of
media is one thing. Indeed, it is a natural result of our scholarly specializations. However, this
specialization sometimes causes scholars to see their objects of study as located within the
chosen media and this righteous belief sometimes seduces them into practicing a form of
of adaptation theory at the end of this chapter and in chapter four, but one of its earlier moments
citing the founding contributions of the University of Konstanz (in Southern Germany) and the
group of literary scholars most prominently represented by H.R. Jauss. His work meets with high
regard in France (as revealed by his numerous bibliographical citations in theoretical manuals
such as Méthodes du texte).7 He has also had a significant impact at the University of Toronto
(where he published Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics) and upon studies of
comparative literature in North America in general. Therefore, Jauss and his manifesto for a new
literary history and an understanding of subjective aesthetic experience are a point of origin or a
7
See F. Scherewegen’s mapping, in 1987, of relevant criticism from a French perspective
in “Théories de la réception,” which includes Jauss, Iser, Austin, Genette, Barthes, Eco and many
touchstone for what the words “reader-response” indicate. Let it be noted that his approach, as
suggested by the –ästhetik suffix of the German term, is primarily concerned with the aesthetic
reception (and production) of the text—not in its immediate political or social influence. This
last characteristic of the Konstanz school’s original brand of thought—its attempted detachment
from social reality and material means of production despite its Marxist inspirations—will be
criticized by both Jane T. Tompkins (in 1980) and other American theorists insisting upon the
need for politically effective and pragmatic criticism. I argue that aesthetic and socio-political
spheres are never completely separate and that announcing and analyzing the point at which this
boundary dissolves is part of the textual critic’s responsibility. For this reason, the final close
readings of this chapter analyze the ethical differences between magic tricks and con games in
terms of social settings and spectator participation. Jauss, despite his focus upon aesthetic purity,
enfranchises the subjective reader as at least an equally important participant in the production of
textual meaning during the reception process. His contribution to critical thought creates a chain
of intellectual reactions, which makes my analysis of magic tricks and con games as performance
the outmoded, nationalistic, and dangerously universalizing “literary histories” of his day (that is,
what were touted as definitive and canonical collections of “classic” German literature), he calls
for a new, reader-oriented history to acknowledge the social praxis of textual production.
Inspired, in 1969, by the focus on social relationships offered by Marxist and Formalist schools
of thought, Jauss proposes seven theses dedicated to the foundational concept of “the horizon of
expectations” and its capacity to write literary history anew.8 This concept’s revolutionary focus
8
Gadamer’s hermeneutic practice —specifically his concepts of horizon fusion and
10
upon the reader’s role was quickly adopted and applied by other scholars in both Germany and
Shortly after Jauss’s call to arms, Wolfgang Iser, and Stanley Fish published articles
dedicated to the reader’s reception of a text’s sentence. In harmony with Jauss’s privileging of
meaning as something that is not inherent to a “sacred” text but created through a reader’s
expectations and participation, two of his colleagues’ earliest contributions focus on a new
aesthetic lens through which the reading process can be analyzed. In “The Reading Process: A
(intentional sentence correlatives) to “examine the way in which sequent sentences act upon one
another” (52). His discussion explores how the reader’s either smooth or interrupted reception of
the sentence in literary prose allows for a dynamic creation of the text based on two poles: the
artistic (the text created by the author) and the aesthetic (the text received and in turn created by
the reader).
“Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics,” which was first printed in New Literary
History 2 (1970), shares Iser’s aesthetic approach and marks Stanley Fish’s first significant
contribution to reader-response theory. This article also discusses one of the most basic concepts,
the existence of what Iser calls blanks (holes or gaps), which is foundational to reader-response
theory. Fish’s argument for a more subjective, reader-based analysis of texts is made through
close readings of mostly single sentences and their temporal reception within the reader’s mind
“historically effected consciousness” — also had an undeniable influence upon Jauss and his
personal twist on the horizon of expectations. See the final afterword written for Truth and
(as the phrase is read and received from left to right). Sentences that are logically
the reader reacts to such ambiguity: “what the sentence does is give the reader something and
then take it away, drawing him on with the unredeemed promise of its return” (72). These
sentences either encourage readers to do an immediate double-take, forcing them to reread them,
or escape the readers’ attention and cause them to miss or to misremember details.
In Roland Barthes S/Z, also published in 1970, these tricky phrases are called scriptible
(writerly) rather than lisible (readerly) (558). They are writerly because they force the reader to
engage with their unconventional difficulty or ambiguity. The sentence’s break with the normal,
logical sense, opens up the same interpretive gaps (Fish calls them “dummy” slots) that Michel
Riffaterre often uses to describe intertextual functions in his work. Barthes describes these holes
as being intrinsic to reading as forgetting: “c’est précisément parce que j’oublie que je lis” (it is
precisely because I forget that I read) (2: 562; Miller 11).9 Riffaterre, Fish, Barthes, and Iser,
during the same period, all focus on the blank spaces left open by the reader’s misunderstanding
of unusual syntax or unfamiliar intertexts as an act of reading occurs (whether it consists of one
In fact, Fish’s “Affective Stylistics” directly engages Riffaterre’s early stylistic methods
of reader-oriented analysis and praises the theorist for reading the poem as an event. Fish claims
that a line of text (or a text itself) “is no longer an object, a thing-in-itself, but an event,
something that happens to, and with the participation of, the reader” (72). Both Fish and
Riffaterre, in 1970, resist other New Critics’ denials of any attempt to focus on the psychological
9
Unless noted otherwise, all English translations of S/Z cited are Richard Miller’s.
12
or aesthetic effects of, for example, a poem as literary artifact. Fish’s article concludes by
insisting that universal meaning or definitive stylistic value judgments are not the purpose of
reader-response theory; rather, its practice is an exercise in “self-sharpening and what it sharpens
is you” (98). Early on, Fish demands that the field ask not the question—what does that mean?—
but the question what does it (the text) or that (the sentence) do? In short, because reader-
response theory is so critically aware of the personal bias or the conventional assumptions made
forces individuals to question what a sentence in a particular work does in terms made famous by
J.L. Austin — what are its illocutory (affective) and perlocutory (contract-forming) effects upon
you as a subjective reader reading within a particular social context? What things are done by the
words in a sentence?
The interactions of Jauss, Iser, Fish, and Riffaterre establish early ties between European
and North American concepts found in both reader-response and intertextuality studies. The
horizon of expectations, gaps, Satzkorrelate (intentional sentence correlatives), and the text
received and experienced by the reader as an event, are representative of Rezeptionsästhetik and
some of its most important foundational concepts. However, these early accomplishments,
including the formalist and structuralist methods used to achieve them, did not satisfy the
canons, in Germany, France, Canada and the United States had been quite successful. One
decade after Jauss’s “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory,” literary theory had,
quite simply, changed; as concepts, the author and the sacred text as the primary makers of
13
meaning were dead, or at least dying, and the importance of the reader had rapidly grown.
Reader-response had won its primary battle and now began to come under fire for not being
revolutionary enough. Therefore, the critique of Jane P. Tompkins makes her the next significant
The essay “The Reader in History: The Changing Shape of Literary Response,” serves as
Formalism to Post-Structuralism. Her argument claims that reader-response critics have not
revolutionized literary theory, but have “merely transposed formalist principles into a new key”
(201). She stresses that although “new criticism” (meaning is in the text) and reader-response
criticism (meaning is in the reader) are diametrically opposed regarding the particular locus of
textual production, the two approaches are both predicated upon the critic’s ability to find and
define meaning. Despite their differences, she sees both of these schools of thought as
institutional efforts to position literary studies as outside of and justifiably separate from the
scientific realms of the academy. In 1980, Tompkins positions the reader-response movement
(beginning in the ‘60s and ‘70s) at the end of an extremely broad framework of literary periods.
Indeed, her essay’s sections are titled “The Classical Period,” “The Renaissance,” “The
Augustan Age,” “The Advent of Formalism,” and, lastly, “Formalism and Beyond” (201-232).
Although her framing is broad, grandiose and at times fallaciously reductive, Tompkins does
provide a lucid and even-handed analysis of the academic and theoretical developments leading
Tompkins, up until her last paragraph, mourns the loss of the Classical and Renaissance
conceptions of the literary text as a truly effective, poetic and political weapon. Her work is
noteworthy not only as a snapshot of reception theory’s perceived importance and flaws in the
14
1980s, but also for her two great questions: “What makes one set of perceptual strategies or
literary conventions win out over another?” and “If the world is the product of interpretation,
then who or what determines which interpretive system will prevail?” (226). These difficult
questions are, in part, answered by the influence of speech-act theories upon reader-response
critics and the institutional polemics that help to make or break academic trends within critical
deconstructionist, feminist, post-colonialist and other fields of criticism begin to rise. By the
Michael Bérubé, which plays a check-point role similar to Jane P. Tompkins’ 1980 critique,
states that by 1990, “any informed observer of the academic scene would have to have wondered
where in the world reader-response criticism had gone” (12). From roughly 1990 to 2000, the
field, which experienced a slight death and rebirth after Tompkins and her complaints,
disappears from the scholarly radar screen. In his critique of a critique, Bérubé claims that
Stanley Fish “killed” reader-response “the day he published his Diacritics review of Iser’s The
Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response under the title ‘Why No One’s Afraid of
Wolfgang Iser’“(13). This polemic is a sad exchange where Iser makes a few logical blunders
and is ruthlessly held accountable by Fish. In short, the rezeptionsästhetik aspect of the field
championed by Iser is eliminated from North American criticism and “interpretive communities”
are all that officially remain — “et tu, Fish?” What are we to make of this intellectual stab? What
happens when one of the great forefathers and one of the main branches of a critical field are cut
down?
Bérubé’s assertion, that this polemic attack altered the genealogy of reader-response
van Oort, Iser discussed one of his later books The Fictive and the Imaginary, and his shift from
a dyadic model of reading fiction (his original text-to-reader model) to a new triadic model based
on: “the real, the fictive, and the imaginary” (2). Towards the end of his career, Iser’s work is
more concerned with the “felicity” — the truths and lies — of speech-acts and the way that
fiction’s literary conventions engage the social spheres of performance and linguistic
communication.
As noted in a recent French survey of literary theory, Jauss, one of the great founders of
the Konstanz school, similarly removed himself from reception theory’s intellectual genealogy at
the end of his career and before his death in 1997. In 1995, the section titled “Théories de la
réception,” from Méthodes du texte, states that “la pensée de Jauss s’est constamment
transformée et déplacée, à un point tel que ce dont l’auteur s’occupe aujourd’hui ne semble plus
avoir qu’un rapport assez lointain avec ses prémisses de 1970” (“the thought of Jauss has so
constantly transformed and repositioned itself that what the author focuses on today only has a
distant relation to his premises of 1970”) (Schuerewegen 325). But are the deaths of certain
response so final? I argue that when an approach to the study of literature like reader-response
casts off its mortal coil(s) and passes away what occurs is an illusory, superficial death. The
spirits of groundbreaking ideas and of theoreticians do not die so easily. Instead, they are
reincarnated — perhaps the ultimate boundary crossing — to new locations, disciplines and
media.
interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely
alliance. The tree imposes the verb ‘to be,’ but the fabric of the rhizome is the
Drama, like conjuring, is an art of illusion. A play does not take place on the stage
ethereal limbo-place where concepts from reader-response went to mix with other theories before
being reincarnated. As Andrea Bernadelli writes in his article “The Concept of Intertextuality
Thirty Years On: 1967-1997,” intertextuality, whose central tenet is that the text cannot exist or
be interpreted as a self-sufficient whole, has, apart from that core belief, come to be a “confused
state of polysemy” (3). Therefore, he justly argues that the term, like so many in critical theory,
must be repositioned with each new invocation. Here, my invocation of intertextuality does link
theory, but the layers I add as I invoke the term move it beyond his focus on literature to include
again, its in-betweenness is intrinsic to its very nature and is also its greatest strength. In the
history of literary theory, the term embodies a new open-mindedness, one which addresses
subjective as well as collective experiences of storytelling and thus harmonizes with reader-
response. Intertextuality, in short, makes possible the shift from theories of reader-response to
As a theoretical movement officially begun when Julia Kristeva coined the ethereal term
in 1967, intertextuality studies first investigated the reader’s, or, more accurately, readers’,
17
one text to another as words are received by the mind and woven, one thread, one denotation and
one connotation at a time, to produce a unique tapestry — an imaginary story world that is
written as much by readers as it is by authors. But why limit the study of this process to readers
and authors, especially when the noun text and so many of its cognates (i.e., textile and texture)
so beautifully remind us that the act of writing is a weaving of voices, of perceptions, of the
words written or read either silently or aloud to describe what is perceived? The roles of body
language, gesture and practiced physical technique are also integral to the act of “weaving” a
story (whether that weaving is done by Penelope keeping her suitors at bay in The Odyssey, by
Madame Defarge naming those who should be executed in A Tale of Two Cities, or by Jean-
Eugène Robert-Houdin sewing secret pockets into his evening wear). Intertextuality theory
reminds us that stories are read and written in the mind of the reader in the same way that magic,
the occurrence of the impossible and the imaginary during live performance, only takes place in
the mind of the spectator. This magic is also only made possible by referring to agreed upon
spells (speech-acts like “open sesame”), rituals and ceremonial gestures (making the holy cross,
pressing the hands together in prayer, the strike of a judge’s gavel) that interpretive communities
invest with the power to perform the impossible. These words and movements transform
envisioned in relation to all of the other texts that it invokes and that choose to invoke it. The
intertext is generated by the author/reader, the playwright/spectator or, better yet, the
source/audience, in that intermediate place where meaning is negotiated on a more or less equal
playing field. That space of negotiation can be called communication. And this communication,
this act of language that makes the intertext possible, may be written, spoken or embodied;
18
visual, oral or tactile; or all of these at the same time. Hence, intertextuality also involves the
study of texts as they move between media — of how media mediate, of how the adaptation of a
story affects the transmission as well as the reception of that story. What I am calling a language
(a written, spoken or body language) creates the double in-betweenness of intertextuality; this
language allows the study of intertextuality to reveal texts that are not necessarily written down;
and this language, specifically the re-thinking of it at the end of the 1960s that helped shape
reader-response, connects intertextuality studies to the study of writing, authors, and readers
reception theory to trace concepts in reader-oriented literary theory as they move to spectator-
oriented performance theory. But such a cross-disciplinary move must be made one step, indeed,
one concept, at a time. Thus far this chapter has presented the most characteristic concepts of
reader-response as its identity: the reading experience as event (the act and duration of a reader’s
physical and psychical engagement with a text), the horizon of expectations (what the reader
expects), intentional sentence correlatives (the fictional world created by author and reader as the
reader relates each sentence to each other sentence), blanks (gaps in understanding or holes of
readerly/writerly distinction (for texts requiring passive as compared to active readers), and
interpretive communities (the social groups that influence a reader’s reception as well as his or
her interpretation of that reception, before, during and after the reading event). Thus far, I have
put the critical voices of Iser, Jauss, Ingarden, Barthes, Fish, Riffaterre, Tompkins, Bérubé and
others into a chronological dialogue with one another to map out early transitions from the reader
to the spectator. However, to account for the subsequent opening of disciplinary boundaries and
epistemological borders within North America and France, to home in on the more experimental
19
comparative look at how those tools are employed in various storytelling forms and media will
now be offered. The study of intertextuality becomes the pivot-point that transforms reader-
response theory into reception theory as a means to study the role of the spectator in performance
and adaptation.
This pivoting, as well as the subtle name change from reader-response to reception,
begins with work on intertextuality done by Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, Norman Holland,
Steven Mailloux, Anne Ubersfeld, and others. I have chosen this small, international group to
create a rough sketch of the movement. In France, Barthes figuratively kills the author and the
oeuvre at the same time that Jauss, in Germany, is attacking similar concepts to champion the
reader and his horizon of expectations. Eco, as a semiotician, builds upon Barthes’
the difficult concept of the hypothetical reader — i.e., the model or implied readers and their
reading in open versus closed texts and of genre conventions designed for older versus younger
readers explore the question of whether the author or the reader is in greater control of textual
reception. Eco’s arguments combine with J.L. Austin’s performative speech-act, Steven
suspension of disbelief to move the semiotics of reader-response into the semiotics of spectator-
response. Finally, Anne Ubersfeld’s concept of “denegation” represents the successful passage of
however, is the point of departure for this entire branch of theory that includes intertextuality,
semiotics and reception. His work emphasizes that the central claim of intertextuality — the text
can never be studied as a self-sufficient whole — results from what was, in his moment, a
20
radical rejection of metaphysical ‘truth’ claims. This was a rebellion against authors and origins.
Such refusal of truth claims is central to magic as a performing art and its celebrations of the
(the text as tissue), to the death of the author, and to the death of the oeuvre link the common
goal of intertextuality and reader-response together in the fight against belief in any kind of
sacred “original.” This crucial move towards what he called texte eventually causes a liberation
from the theatrical oeuvre and an embrace of the performance text. In “La mort de l’auteur”
(“The Death of the Author” 1968), Barthes begins by taking classic criticism to task for not
paying attention to the reader and for its suggestion that the lines of a text release a singular,
theological truth that springs from the mouth of an “auteur-Dieu” (author-God) (493). He rejects
the fallacy of origin connected to this conception of writing. He is right to argue instead that “le
texte est un tissu de citations, issues des mille foyers de la culture” (“The text is a tissue of
10
quotations, emanating from innumerable cultural hotbeds”) and that these intertexts will be
10
Stephen Heath’s by now canonical English translation of this line from Barthes’ article
reads “The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” (146). I
find that his translation of “foyers,” a French noun with connotations of home and hearth-like
coziness, to the English noun “centres” radiates less heat than the hubs of social activity I
envision when reading the original French. Therefore, I have chosen to re-translate this line to
express the idea that many layers of quotations, like rays of light and warmth emanating from
received, recognized and rewritten within the minds of different readers subjectively (494). His
readings as (re)writings, not only kills the author as origin, it also kills the concept of the work
(oeuvre) as origin. In “De l’oeuvre au texte” (1971), he extends the raison d’être of
intertextuality beyond the need to focus on the reader’s reception of these intertexts, to
recognizing the adaptability of a text due to its existence as language. As he says, “l’oeuvre se
tient dans la main, le texte se tient dans le langage” (“the work can be held in the hand, the text is
held in language”) (Barthes 1212); this statement, though more conservative than the move
across media that is eventually made by Marvin Carlson, as well as by Richard Schechner and
Diana Taylor, shows the way in which intertextuality and the linguistic turn in literature allow
Barthes and other scholars to escape previously dominant, material limitations of the oeuvre.
Freed by language, the text exceeds the confines of the book, the space of the library shelf and
happens when a magic performance is recreated from a magic manual — the performance text
escapes the book and is brought to life in the voice and hands of the magician. The critical lens
created by the concept of intertextuality allows for a study of the relationship between
performance instructions encoded within a magic manual and the manner in which a reader
deciphers that code. In other words, how is the embodied knowledge that has been transferred to
paper brought back to life? Acknowledging that an illusion exceeds any singular textual
description and any singular embodied performance is only the first stage of reconstructing its
performance techniques and adapting them to a particular production. Consulting whichever text
is currently thought of as the “original” is important, but far more crucial than this is the perusal
of multiple sources — descriptions written by dead and living magicians, period reviews of
historical performances of the magic effect, and the current embodied knowledge of other living
22
practitioners. All such available material must be considered before a routine, or even an isolated
sleight-of-hand maneuver, becomes a refined performance text stored in the muscle memory of a
Written memory becomes muscle memory. Only two years after Barthes’ “De l’oeuvre
au texte,” in 1973, Richard Schechner refers to this combination of written and performed
documentation as a “script” in the earliest publication of his essay “Drama, Script, Theatre, and
Performance.” In a footnote added to a 2006 edition of that essay, Schechner observes that his
usage of the word “script” is similar to what Barthes and Derrida scholars would have defined as
a texte. Schechner’s major contribution to this term is the concept of a text inhabiting the muscle
Someone with a Derridean turn of mind might say that what in 1973 I called a
“script” a deconstructionist would now call a “text.” There are many different
kinds of text — performance texts, dramatic texts, musical texts, movement texts,
a silicon chip, memory traces in a dancer’s body, or what have you. (111)
and transmitted by a body rather than written down is in many ways for theatre studies what
Barthes’ texte is for literary studies. Both terms stand in contrast to the concept of the oeuvre.
The word oeuvre is weighed down by the baggage of the author-God, who can also be a
playwright-God, and implies a reductive, closed view of the text as a book rather than the text as
an adaptable story or script capable of inhabiting various media; in contrast, the flexible
definition of texte grants each medium equal claims for shaping the meaning, the cultural
importance and the reception of a given story. God is dead, the author-God is dead, and the
23
oeuvre is dead.
These deaths, influenced by Nietzsche and fortified by Michel Foucault’s writings at the
end of the ‘60s and beginning of the ‘70s, reflect a new skepticism toward the interdependent,
illusory concepts of origin, original and originator. Foucault’s approach to intellectual history is
informed by Nietzsche’s approach to philosophy in the sense that both scholars wish to expose
the idea of a simplified, always already present origin – the origin of religion, of morality, or of
(Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 140-141). For Foucault and Nietzsche the
origins, and, by extension, supposedly universal truths, is often a metaphysician (Aristotle, Plato,
and Schopenhauer are a few whom they name) (140-141). This is an apt comparison. The
performing art of magic, after all, is a study of how we perceive, of how we immediately
interpret those perceptions and then of how we record that mixture of perceptions and
the sort of error that cannot be refuted because it was hardened into an unalterable form in the
long baking process of history” (144), then magic puts that baking process on display during the
performance of illusions. But it can also deconstruct the process by which perceptual mistakes
are remembered as actual events, the process by which error is recorded as truth. On the surface
of a stage illusion, i.e. on the level of effect, such as “The Bullet Catch,” a magician is recorded
as having used his mouth to catch a bullet fired from an actual gun; behind the scenes of that
same illusion, on the level of method, the process of how spectators are deceived into receiving
and remembering the clearly impossible event of the bullet catch as factual can be
24
11
deconstructed. The deconstruction of such an illusion and its documentation serves as a
microcosm for how errors are entered into the historical record as truths.
Barthes’ practical response to Foucault, Nietzsche and others' shattering of the previous,
top-down delivery of meaning in literary works, influenced by the radical spirit of mai 68 events,
his polyvalent, semiotic analysis of S/Z in which he reads Honoré de Balzac’s early, nineteenth-
century novella Sarrasine. Barthes reads this piece of literature as a text of various tissues, of
varying layers of meaning, received or not received by subjective readers. One of the beautiful
and enduring qualities of S/Z as a highly original, experimental piece of literary criticism is the
tension it creates by mixing the scientific rigor of Barthes’ semiotic analysis, his careful mapping
of five codes or voices (the proaïretic, hermeneutic, semic, cultural, and symbolic), with his
poetic refusal to claim any singular or stable meaning. He refuses to privilege any one reading
I am speaking of Barthes, the theorist, the semiotic scientist turning revolutionary, the
middle Barthes whom Jonathan Culler has lamented as being eclipsed in twenty-first-century
criticism by the writer/poet Barthes. Culler, whose structuralism is more conservative than what I
am proposing in this project, calls for a return to the early and middle period of Barthes’ career
(see “Barthes, Theorist” 439-446). While I am grateful for Culler’s readings of l’effet de réel (the
reality effect) and the texte/oeuvre distinction, I find the liminal, transition point of Barthes’
work, the liberating embrace of intertextuality in S/Z (1970) to be the most fascinating and
productive for interdisciplinary studies today. I see this study as the highpoint of his systematic
11
For a historical comparison of Robert-Houdin’s, Carl Skene’s, David Blaine’s and
other’s adaptation of this effect see Ricky Smith’s article “The Bullet Catch.”
25
semiotics and also the beginning of an exploratory poetics that leads to his significant work on
photography and on image analysis in general. Barthes, the theorist, is as important as Barthes,
the poet, for his critical movement from linguistics to literature and to visual media via
intertextual analysis. His work creates part of the necessary foundation for performance studies
Barthes’ choice of the enigmatic title S/Z at once reflects his analysis of the central
mystery in Sarrasine and performs his concept of the readerly/writerly, revealing its deep
connection to intertextuality and the participation of an implied reader. I say perform, because
the two simple letters and the slash of S/Z ask the reader to do precisely that for which Barthes
argues: “l’enjeu du travail littéraire (de la littérature comme travail), c’est de faire du lecteur, non
plus un consomateur, mais un producteur du texte” (“the goal of literary work (of literature as
work) is to make the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text”) (558; Miller 4).
And so, the three signs — S, /, Z — are received by the mind of the reader, which goes to work
decoding them and attributing to them possible meanings based on known intertexts. And this
work is done, in fact, each time the cryptic, yet quickly absorbed, title of the book is glimpsed.
And so the title as a unit of reading (what Barthes calls a lexia), first enters my mind, for
example, as a metonymic cipher standing in for the names of Barthes and Balzac (notice the ‘s’
and ‘z’ as representative parts of each author’s whole name). This is fitting, because Barthes is,
after all, choosing to analyze a novella by Balzac to show that even classic texts, which the
former defines as readerly, closed, and offered for passive consumption only, may be opened up,
may in fact be radically re-read via active, critical participation. Barthes and his title actually do
Another reading of the title S/Z turns the letters into resonant sounds from the French
language — consonants moving from text to speech. Saying the name of Balzac’s protagonist
26
aloud — Sarrasine — transforms the second, visual ‘s’ of that name into a ‘z’ sound. And S/Z is,
after all, an analysis of how the young sculptor, Sarrasine, is deceived by his eyes and his ears.
He misreads and misperceives the body and voice of the opera singer La Zambinella, interpreting
And because the intrigue and mystery that S/Z deconstructs with a line-by-line exegesis
derive from Sarrasine’s flawed reception of La Zambinella and the intertexts which code and
decode her body within his mind, the capital letters of the title also stand for their names linked
together by a deadly slash. Even the order of the letters is significant in this reading of the title,
for the identity of Sarrasine’s love interest, the construction of her female perfection, occurs
within his mind. His obsessive idealization, his Pygmalion-like sculpting of La Zambinella, is a
readerly consumption of her as a beauty object — of her body as surface. Though he is given
hints throughout their interactions that this surface is an illusion, that Zambinella is not a woman,
he refuses to doubt his perceptions of her appearance or to question his interpretations of her.
Part of his misreading is cultural. He is oblivious to a key intertext, a cultural code of the
Italian stage, that would have revealed “her” to be a “him” from their earliest encounter; La
Zambinella is a young castrato who sings the roles of female characters. When Sarrasine,
towards the end of the narrative, sees La Zambinella playing a male character onstage for the
first time and asks Prince Chigi why she is dressed like a man, the Roman Prince treats the
young Parisian artist’s cultural misunderstanding with disdain: “La Zambinella! . . . Vous
moquez-vous ? D’où venez-vous ? Est-il jamais monté de femmes sur les théâtres de Rome ? Et
ne savez-vous pas par quelles créatures les rôles de femmes sont remplis dans les Etats du pape
?” (“‘La Zambinella! . . . Are you joking? Where are you from? Has there ever been a woman on
the Roman Stage? And don’t you know about the creatures who sing roles in the Papal States?’”
725; Miller 250). Shortly after this revelation, Sarrasine, still believing that his keen, artist’s eye
27
could not be mistaken, kidnaps Zambinella and, at the monarch’s orders, is shortly thereafter
stabbed to death. The Prince’s revelation of an historic, Italian theatre practice unknown to the
Parisian ex-patriot as well as to the implied French reader of Balzac’s novella, serves as the
primary clue that could have solved the mystery of Zambinella’s secret early on. But the
existence of this hidden intertext blindsides Sarrasine’s horizon of expectations in the same way
that it is meant to blindside the reader’s. Barthes, analyzing these lines from Balzac, makes a
simple claim: “Sarrasine meurt d’une lacune de savoir . . . d’un blanc dans le discours des autres”
(“Sarrasine dies from a gap in knowledge . . . from a blank in the discourse of others” 680). The
semiotician describes the world of cultural connotations and intertexts known by Sarrasine in this
hodgepodge when it comes to certain aspects of Italian culture) (679; Miller 185). This fragile
construction of reality can lead to death if it has a significant defect. In my reading of Barthes’
reading Balzac, the key gap, blank or manque in this personal encyclopedia, which leads to the
readerly (a passive, unassuming) rather than a writerly (an active, questioning) approach to
analyzing the world. This is of particular importance when an individual is a foreigner, when
codes of multiple cultures, languages and constructions of gender intersect. For individuals
become more sophisticated readers of foreign literature and of life by questioning their
assumptions, by admitting, with careful modesty and introspection, that their perceptions,
interpretations and conclusions may be a little bit off, or wrong altogether. Humans must always
process, Barthes does mention that the female article in French disappears from Zambinella’s
name in Balzac’s story after the revelatory scene with the Prince. However, his analysis of the
28
moment at which gender is transformed is not more specific than this. It seems important to
highlight the fact that Balzac employs a subtle narrative trick to magically transform the gender
of Zambinella as that character is received within the mind of Sarrasine as well as within the
mind of the reader. These two levels of diegetic illusion are not exactly the same. The Prince’s
mocking statement — “‘La Zambinella! . . . Are you joking? . . .” (line 470 of Balzac’s text) —
is the first time that a character’s speech changes Zambinella’s sex by mocking the feminine
article given to it by Sarrasine. However, it is not until line 473 that the French masculine noun
“chanteur” (instead of the feminine “chanteuse”) corroborates the Prince’s statement in the
French edition and effects the transformation of gender in the voice of the narrator. This
expository, third-person voice, in addition to typically being received as more reliable and
neutral, has a qualitatively different effect on the reception process of the reader. If the reader has
any doubts about the Prince’s reliability, those doubts are dispelled by the narrative
corroboration now identifying Zambinella as masculine. It is also interesting to note that this
corroboration does not occur at the same moment in the English translation of S/Z, because the
noun “singer” is not gendered. For readers of the major English translation of S/Z, translated by
Richard Miller, the gender metamorphosis is confirmed a bit later, in line 475, when Zambinella
is referred to as a “musico” (250). This very slight yet significant difference points to how subtle
One of the lessons of S/Z is that announced theatrical performances sometimes exceed
the theatre to become unannounced performances in “real” life. Ultimately, La Zambinella (Z) is
another man inverted through a process of reception, deception and self-deception to become an
object of female beauty within the mind of Sarrasine (S). His tragic, willful confusion of fiction
with fact is made possible by the castrato tradition, a practice in Europe from roughly the mid-
sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century and one of the most unusual, gruesome and extreme
29
examples of human nature’s desire to re-write reality. Instead of delving into the history of
castration, or the endless psychoanalytic readings of the subject inspired by Freud and Lacan, I
wish to simply point out that Sarrasine’s misreading of Zambinella – the slash in S/Z — results
from a social practice designed to manipulate the physical development of the human body, and
of genders themselves, for a desired performance aesthetic. Castrating young boys before
puberty prevents developmental changes in the larynx and thus preserves the youthful, feminine
range of their singing voices. This began as a ritualistic practice to create heavenly musicos in
the Roman Catholic church. These singers then began playing female roles in the papal states for
roughly one hundred years of the Italian opera’s history (Heriot 31). They are made neuter,
intentionally rendered blank, one can argue, to make the verisimilar illusion that a female
character singing onstage is actually female that much more convincing; thus, the opera singer
looks (is dressed) and sounds (can sing) like the real thing. In this sense, the slash in Barthes’
title signifies the castration of Zambinella (literally the physical, slashing action), which turns
him/her into a flat surface, a blank canvas, a slightly distorted mirror that at once reflects
Sarrasine’s male identity, his female fantasy and the fantasy of an Italian ritual back to him.
Sarrasine mistakes the mirror’s reflection for reality. In short, as he gazes at a version of himself,
his imagination unwittingly completes the physical sculpting begun by the papacy and what is
now a socially unacceptable performance tradition in opera. The Parisian sculptor chases a false
reception, an illusion created from his lack of cultural knowledge, from his ignorance of
intertexts, and his unquestioning belief in La Zambinella. This is the deception that kills him.
But Sarrasine’s death is not in vain; it allows this study of participatory reading to move
several steps closer to the study of participatory viewing — from fiction-making in literature to
fiction-making in performance. Magic, as a performing art, studies how spectators perceive, how
they interpret those perceptions and, finally, how mixtures of perceptions and interpretations are
30
recorded as either personal or collective memories of an event. With enough time, a large enough
individual’s subjective perception and interpretation of the world may be recorded as a certitude
(as an absolute truth). The human tendency to be overly certain, to believe in a single reading, is
one that magic and critical theory strive to correct. Analyzing Sarrasine’s fate via Barthes’
combination of semiotics and intertextuality gives birth to a new conception of texte, intertexte,
and the goal of the scriptible/lisible distinction — to make readers active producers of texts, not
only consumers of them. That, I should make clear, is the goal of Barthes’ readerly/writerly
distinction and the goal of the genuine critic, but not necessarily the goal of all texts or of all
authorial intentions. Texts that are invested in creating tractable consumers are as important to
2.2 Eco’s Open Text, the Model Reader, and the Double-Model Reader
At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, Umberto Eco, who exemplifies the
reader as producer with his contributions as a semiotic critic as well as a “detective” story author
(thanks to his novel The Name of the Rose), defines consumer-creating texts as closed rather than
open. The closed/open distinction is just one of several examples in his book, The Role of the
Reader, where he builds upon and extends Barthes’ concept of the readerly/writerly in a helpful
way. For example, his choice of the term model reader expresses the same sense of anticipating a
hypothetical audience that Wolfgang Iser’s implied reader suggests, while avoiding the slightly
universalizing, and pretentious sounding archilecteur (of Riffaterre) or the informed reader (of
Fish). The model reader is both called for by a text — either by direct appeal or by presupposing
a specific encyclopedic competence (linguistic, cultural, etc.) — and directed by said text on how
to decode its content (Eco 7-8). Eco rightly suggests that codes are sent out by the author via the
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text in search of model readers who are capable of interpreting those codes. I would add that
performances of all kinds, whether deceptive or not, also telegraph the hypothetical spectator
they have in mind, albeit paratextually, through the selection of their titles, venues, and their
publicity materials.
This is the beginning of a basic filtering; the majority of readers self-select by language,
culture, age, and interest or familiarity with a particular genre and then either continue the
reading event or end it prematurely, based on their ability to participate in the imaginary world of
the text. For me, Eco’s adjective, the model reader, indicates at least two further levels of
screening in this interpretive process, which influence readerly versus writerly participation:
model behavior and good faith. Good faith refers to simply suspending one’s disbelief — to
playing along with the rules of an imaginary story world and believing in it for the duration of
the reading event, even if this means generously overlooking minor inconsistencies. Some
readers, for example, cannot be good faith readers of science fiction, cyberpunk or fantasy
novels, because they find the descriptions of alternative or futuristic worlds simply too irrational,
By model behavior, on the other hand, I mean following the etiquette — the codes of
conduct — indicated by a text. Texts sometimes overtly state how they expect a reader to engage
with them and sometimes subtly imply what kind of reading practice is expected. In Eco’s
examples of Superman comic books and James Bond novels, closed texts encourage a smooth,
readerly acceptance of their narratives; they cue the reader to engage with them relatively
speaks might have moments of direct address such as ‘turn to page fifteen’ when pages of
advertising must be skipped over to find out what the villain does next. But these moments of
direct address in the narration simply state the order in which the story is to be consumed.
32
Additionally, the closed comic book text (though there are many open, more demanding ones,
for example, Art Spiegelman’s Maus) typically does not require readers or even encourage them
of open texts. His quintessential example of an open text is James Joyce’s Ulysses, which
purposefully calls upon readers to disentangle multiple streams of narration and to write meaning
into the structure of its narrative through personal, and subjective, knowledge of Homer’s The
Odyssey. Readers can, of course, deny this intertextual participation by reading Ulysses only as
Ulysses, but this does not change the fact that it requests a writerly reader as its model reader or
that even those previously unfamiliar or less familiar with the The Odyssey will have absorbed
intertextual references (names and characteristics) by the end of the novel that can subsequently
The model reader can never be defined as an absolute (i.e., a constant or invariable
value), and, in fact, negative model readers — those who actively apply Marxist or feminist
readings to Superman comics or those who attempt to read Ulysses at age eleven — must be kept
in mind as examples of textual reception’s unpredictable nature. Eco entertainingly mocks this
kind of reader to iron out the creases of his semiotic approach to reception (Role 9-10). But this
is a missed opportunity, because thinking about these messy, unanticipated readers, the ones who
do not fit the general model called for by a written or performed text, is crucial for understanding
how the sophistication of reading and viewing abilities changes as individuals grow older and
more experienced with various types of texts. In the performance of close-up magic, for
example, almost all children nine-years-old or below are negative model spectators for card
effects in which a selection is lost and then magically found. Though appearances,
disappearances, transformations, animations and any tricks involving live animals are highly
33
effective for creating the experience of magic within their minds, children are simply too young
to be familiar with the conventions or the cultural intertexts connected to a deck of playing cards.
They may perceive that a card is chosen and then found, but having had little experience at this
point in their lives with card games, they will not come to the conclusion that the card was lost
when shuffled amongst others. Furthermore, the power of being able to locate any card in a deck
of cards has little meaning for them if they have not yet learned to gamble (let us hope), been to a
casino or learned about these cultural practices by other means (at school or via storytelling
media at home). By age eleven or twelve, such effects become more magical; by age forty or
fifty card tricks may be the most desirable form of close-up magic, particularly in the mind of a
The final synthesis of Eco’s semiotic approach in The Role of the Reader is the most
helpful for understanding the didactic potential of texts which, due to their deceptive narrative
construction, are simultaneously open and closed, encouraging the participation of a “double
model reader” from the outset (204-205). This nuanced concept of the open/closed text and its
double naïf/critical reader results from the semiotician’s penchant for murder mystery narratives
and metatexts (such as Alphonse Allais’s Un drame bien parisien). Eco’s analysis of the naïf
reading as well as the critical re-reading called for by Allais, one that is built into the somewhat
applied to Borgesian short stories that similarly lull readers into a naive reception of a text before
ending with a paradoxical impossibility calling for a writerly re-reading. “Pierre Menard, autor
del Quijote” (Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote”) and “Abenjacán el Bojarí, muerto en su
laberinto” (“Ibn-Hakam al-Bokhari, Murdered in His Labyrinth”) are just two examples that
come to mind.
The potential for analyzing meta-performance texts from the perspective of a double-
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model spectator is equally exciting. This conceptualization has the potential to disentangle the
magic tricks: “sucker effects” (which fool audience members into thinking they know the
method before fooling them again by ruling out the possibility of that method), meta-patter (in
which the magician addresses two different groups of model spectators in the same audience —
laymen, as naïf model spectators, and other magicians, as expert model spectators), and, finally,
Penn and Teller’s avant-garde “The Cups and Balls” (using clear cups) or their stage piece “Blast
Off,” in which they perform the same stage illusion twice (once as an invisible readerly text and
commentary, a meta-discourse, coded for and addressed to magicians, is added to the superficial
or naive narration of the performance addressed to the lay public. The sequence of one such
comment often given to mixed audiences during performance actions is as follows: “Please pick
a card, sir, any card.” “Thank you, sir, and may the force be with you.” Upon hearing the
technical term force, any magician in the audience unfamiliar with the particular forcing
12
Penn and Teller are, in many ways, at the forefront of magic’s avant-garde, precisely
because their performances create a highly self-reflexive commentary on the performing art
itself. Their rendition of “The Cups and Balls” using clear cups simultaneously reveals and yet
does not reveal the use of an extra ball, the one ahead principle and other principles of magic.
“Blast Off” is a semi-parody of quintessential stage illusions, such as the “Mismade Lady,”
wherein a woman’s (or, in Penn and Teller’s case, a man’s) body appears to be severed into three
different sections and moved to physically impossible locations. Penn and Teller perform the
illusion twice: once as a normal stage illusion and once with entirely transparent props (revealing
the method and the elegant choreography required to make the illusion work).
35
technique used now desires a re-reading of the performance actions to determine which
13
particular type of force was employed (there are hundreds of possibilities). A layperson, it is
assumed, will read this line as a non-sequitur reference to the concept of life-force as a magical
source of power in the ubiquitous Star Wars films. On one hand, such meta-discourse comments
are inside jokes for critical readers of the performance; on the other hand, their presence and
their incongruity signal the presence of another narrative level by way of intertextual reference.
Such jokes invite naive readers of the performance to become active, critical ones in time for the
next reading opportunity. In all of these examples, routines provide a meta-commentary on the
reception process of magic — the manner in which the volunteer is processing the magician’s
At the end of the ‘70s, Umberto Eco’s combination of semiotics and intertextual analysis
a given text filters an extremely large population of readers to select for a range of model readers
(who will both follow textual etiquette and suspend their disbelief in good faith) also applies to
live performances, which are designed to attract a range of model spectators. Eco’s negative
model readers, generally dismissed by him, are even more important for understanding why
magic tricks, mysteries and con games sometimes fail to deceive. Finally, his double-model
reader can easily become the double-model spectator called for in deceptive performances
exhibiting a self-reflexive meta-commentary. All three of these model reader categories become
categories of the model spectator, just as all three (model, negative, and double-model) help to
13
A “force,” as defined by Whaley, is “any one of several methods that gives the
volunteer a false sense of free choice, while he picks the object, number, or color that the
explain the difference between suspending one’s disbelief while reading compared to suspending
screen credits or the first line of a poem or story, we have made a special gesture
of “as if.”
— Norman Holland
Have we not seen how disbelief can move mountains? Is it not enough that we
should have found that something is being kept from us? Before one thing and
— Bertolt Brecht
how readers are either deceived or not deceived as they participate in texts as events. Suspending
one’s disbelief while reading, while watching a play in the theatre, and while watching an
unannounced performance in everyday life are all qualitatively different experiences. The
argument being made here is that particular ideas for understanding the fiction-making process
created by reader-response theorists enrich our understanding of the concepts explaining the
formulations from both of these efforts offer new possibilities for understanding deceptions such
as con games or magic tricks that either complicate or are performed outside of traditional
literary studies, critical work on spectator-response gains increasing momentum in the study of
theatre and drama. By the time intertextuality radicalizes notions of text and begins smuggling
37
concepts across disciplinary borders in the ‘70s, experimental studies of unorthodox theatre have
become a new North American discipline: Performance Studies. The linguistic turn allows
speech-act analysis and semiotic approaches to theatre to focus on the spectator and, later, to go
suspend disbelief to notions of how spectators in the theatre engage in what Anne Ubersfeld
terms dénégation, questions emerge about how defamiliarization operates during announced
versus unannounced performances. What happens when magic renders familiar objects or
physical laws unfamiliar? How do spectators help to create the impossible within their own
minds? And does magic typically call for passive, readerly spectators or active, writerly ones? I
see these questions of how fiction-making occurs in the mind of the audience as central to
performance studies today. As Brecht suggests in the epigraph above, the presence and backstage
workings of certain performances are being kept from us. Now is the time to reveal them — to
Before the curtain even rises, before the title page of a novel is flipped past, the spectator
is already in the theatre and the reader already knows the name of the author and, likely, the
genre of the book about to be read. The willing suspension of disbelief, the mindset of fiction-
making, begins even before the story does. Around the same time that Umberto Eco is
formulating his model approach to the reader’s participation in a given text, Norman Holland
publishes The Dynamics of Literary Response (1968). He bases the following statement on the
work of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Norman Guthrie: “it is not belief in an illusion
that draws us into a play or story—just the opposite. It is a conscious disbelief that becomes
suspension of disbelief” (69). Holland then uses excerpts from both novels and plays to discuss
the ways in which reader or audience response is conditioned by pre-existing genre definitions to
38
engage in either what he calls “reality testing” (non-fiction) versus judging the “sense of reality”
(that which occurs when we know we are reading fiction) (69). I prefer to think of this last
phrase as narrative verisimilitude: how consistent the fictive, internal logic of a story world is.
Similar to Stanley Fish’s discussion of “orphaned” (or unidentifiable) texts, Holland explores the
difference between reading a specific passage as a historical document being evaluated for truth
or as a piece of fiction being evaluated for pleasure. When the text is orphaned and the reader
does not know whether or not its content is fiction or non-fiction, a search for conventional clues
begins. And in most cases, such markers are found right away: the phrase “once upon a time,” a
reference to an impossible creature, or some other tell-tale sign cues the reader to stop reality
testing, to relax, and to begin suspending disbelief. But why is this search happening in the first
place? Because a reader’s everyday mindset is one that is constantly sifting fact from fiction.
This distinction between reality testing and the act of willingly suspending disbelief is as
important for separating non-fiction and fiction as it is for exploring the audience participation
disbelief is a kind of tacit consent—the agreement of an audience to receive fiction as fact (to
“play along”) in the face of reality. The act of purchasing a ticket to a theatre or purchasing a
book chosen from a particular section of a book store, i.e., “science fiction,” “fantasy,”
“mystery,” “historical fiction,” etc., is an explicit investment and the beginning of a cultural
ritual in which the receiver agrees to suspend disbelief in a particular way, knowing that the
sender has designed a text to make that experience as powerful as possible within the frame of a
certain genre or mode of storytelling. This contract of good faith can be broken by either party
during the reception process; each party has expectations of the other. Thus, the willing
suspension of disbelief is one of the most salient aspects of the artistic contract that is negotiated
But the psychological and physiological aspects of this decision to suspend reality
testing and to more fully engage in fiction-making are quite different when reading a page, when
find most intriguing about Holland’s discussion of disbelief is the territory of the reception
process that he leaves unexplored. He frequently repeats the term “absorption” to describe the
physically passive state that receivers adopt as they sit in armchairs while reading, or in theatre
seats while viewing (72-73). But his examples neither leave the traditional limits of the book nor
those of the theatre to explore in a sustained way where the willing suspension of disbelief ends
intriguing analogy of the willing suspension of disbelief to hypnosis (85-86). Holland, however,
limits his definition of hypnosis to its obvious psychoanalytic connotations and references in the
work of Freud. He then abandons this analogy rather quickly in favor of comparing the willing
He reasons that because most people have never been hypnotized, but everyone has dreamed,
this less accurate yet more accessible dream analogy is superior for communicating how the
willing suspension of disbelief functions. It also serves as more direct evidence for the primarily
Why not liberate hypnosis from the psychoanalyst’s office to explore its complication of
questions the power and limits of suggestion as well as the paradoxical behavior of volunteers
onstage during a hypnotist show. Spectators called onto the stage are physically very active
during such shows, participating in all manner of demonstrations to display the depth of their
trance-like state. Despite this activity, one can argue that they are intellectually passive or
40
complicit as they follow the verbal suggestions and commands of the hypnotist. I mention stage
hypnosis, which has been an unorthodox theatrical entertainment since the nineteenth century, as
only one area of performance that is ripe for analyzing performative speech-acts — language that
has the power to do what it says — and the difference between questioning the theatrical
disbelief at work in stage hypnosis has not been undertaken by scholars such as Holland, due to
both its dismissal as popular entertainment with little narrative sophistication and its complicated
in-betweenness (one would have to be an expert in both clinical hypnotherapy and in the
and effects accurately).14 In this sense, hypnosis as entertainment has suffered from the same
stigma and ignorance that magic has as a performing art: its content is regarded as a collection of
episodic tricks or stunts; its methods and effects are misunderstood precisely because its small
subculture results in an even smaller number of experts who specialize in its history,
To some extent the stigma is deserved. Hypnotist shows, like many magic shows,
characters in their diegetic worlds. As fictional figures, magicians and hypnotists do become
central in great works of literature, such as Faust, and in milestone films, such as The Cabinet of
Dr. Caligari (1920), but in these narratives their actual performance techniques are almost
14
In his recent West End theatre show in London, titled Svengali, English magician
Darren Brown hypnotizes a spectator and passes a needle through the skin of said spectator’s
hand. This is one example of a text where the willing suspension of disbelief and the effects of
always stripped of historical accuracy and are distorted to serve the story. The tricks are
subservient to narrative.
The reverse is frequently true of live performances by stage hypnotists and magicians:
their shows tend to be neatly-routined collages of illusions or displays of the unusual and the
impossible that lack an overall story. In this case, the narrative is subservient to tricks. But this is
precisely because a large amount of their performance time is dedicated to direct audience
participation. Constant, experimental and improvisatorial breaching of the fourth wall dominates
to create a different kind of aesthetic experience for which a linear dramatic narrative is
eschewed. This breaching creates two levels of the willing suspension of disbelief within
members of the audience: that of volunteers onstage who are in direct physical and verbal
engagement with the performer, and that of spectators who remain in their seats and in the
comfort of something like the usual separation between house and stage sections of the theatre.
Both groups have willingly suspended reality testing, but individuals called onstage will be
directly, actively engaged in the performance zone compared to those at a more distant, passive
proximity. This is one of the areas of human experience that these performances are in a unique
position to explore: how sustained, relatively intimate interaction between a performer and a
spectator onstage influences the quality of that individual’s reception of the performance as well
as the audience’s reception while watching them — while vicariously living the performance
Magic shows and hypnotist shows allow for the study of how the onstage interaction
between performer and spectator deceives those on and off the stage by breaking with traditional
fictional demonstrations of the impossible. A book and a film cannot call a reader or a viewer to
step into the diegetic action for all other readers or viewers to see. This focus on seeing and
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hearing in cinema and on imagining in literature builds a stronger fourth wall, because the
dominance of these senses is also an absence of touch (of smell and taste too, but here I shall
limit the discussion to touch). One of the largely unexplored questions regarding suspension of
disbelief that comes to mind after reading Holland’s theorizing of fiction-making is how does
close proximity between performer and spectator, one which engages the sense of touch, affect
The theatrical criticism of Anne Ubersfeld published at the end of the 1970s and the
beginning of the 1980s, moves at least one step closer to exploring the suspension of disbelief in
live performances and how that experience is influenced by proximity. In Lire le théâtre
(Reading Theatre) (published in 1978), and in subsequent work, the French theatre professor and
director employs the term dénégation to describe a more theatrically specific version of what
Norman Holland calls the willing suspension of disbelief. Though the acts indicated by these
terms, to suspend disbelief or to de-negate, reveal a similarly contradictory “as if” action, their
differences account for qualitatively distinct fiction-making as it occurs in the mind of a reader
compared to the mind of a spectator. The central difference is the physical presence of the actors
and objects creating that story world. In her chapter “Pour une sémiologie de l´espace théâtral”
(“Towards a Semiology of the Theatrical Space”) Ubersfeld discusses the way a spectator
willfully ignores the mundane status of actors and objects during a play. This is dénégation: the
conscious suppression or denial of actors or objects, which the spectator knows to be real in
everyday life, in favor of their imaginary roles being performed onstage. This active state of
denial, however, is ephemeral and localized. It only exists during the reception process.
Ubersfeld points out that denegation is always linked to the radical separation between
the universe of what is shown in the theatre and the universe of what is lived outside of it. Her
definition incorporates yet also moves beyond Holland’s psychoanalytic approach to a semiotic
43
one that rigorously accounts for the uniqueness of fiction-making in the theatre. She takes care to
simultaneously build on the reader-response concept of the willing suspension of disbelief while
also emphasizing the theatricality implicated by the term. Dénégation (the act of denying,
refusing to recognize or refusing to accept) is distinct from désaveu, from the French verb
désavouer (to disavow), which is stronger denial of having done, seen or agreed to something
(14). Disavowal, I would add, is for serious or legal situations in life; denegation is more of a
theatrical doublethink. The spectator plays along and accepts what is said and shown onstage to
be true. The spectator’s denegation allows at least two contradictory, paradoxical versions of
reality to peacefully cohabitate within his or her psyche. In other words, reality does not
disappear; it becomes a distant, barely perceptible hum within the ongoing noise of the mind as
theatre studies as denegation, Umberto Eco’s model reader is re-embodied as a model spectator
in Ubersfeld’s example of how a chair onstage is received by the audience: “Une chaise sur
scène est une chaise réelle, mais ce n’est pas une chaise du monde, on ne peut pas s’y asseoir” (A
chair on the stage is a real chair, but it is not a chair of the world; one cannot sit in it) (my
emphasis, 15). Eco helps answer why, exactly, an audience member cannot sit in the chair. Some
of the reasons for not getting up from one’s seat to sit on the theatrical stage are based on the
physical divisions separating the diegetic space of the performance, the limbo space of the
audience, and the real-world space lying in wait just outside the doors of the theatre to reclaim
spectators who have temporarily closed themselves into the space of a social ritual. One reason,
then, is that the chair might be difficult, in terms of obstacles, to reach for a spectator wishing to
sit in it; however, this purely physical obstacle, one of proximity, is dependent upon the
architecture of the theatre. That architecture is designed to train or to remind spectators to model
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good behavior. Socialized spectators cannot sit in the chair due to the recognized etiquette of the
theatrical ritual, which makes the act of entering the stage space, before the show, after the show,
as well as the cast would pause and stare if a spectator decided to forgo all decorum by taking a
seat onstage. Finally, there is what Ubersfeld would call a psychic barrier preventing such
behavior and what I read into Eco’s model reader as good faith: the willing suspension of
disbelief, that magical enchantment which transforms lies and fictions into truths onstage, is in
full effect by the time spectators see the chair onstage. Therefore, they think of the chair more as
existing only in the diegetic world of the stage, as opposed to the real world, and do not even
consider sitting in it. That chair, the spectator might think, belongs to the castle of Macbeth that I
am pretending exists right before me; the chair is there and in existence for the part of my psyche
embedded in the world of the play. Even so, in the back of my mind, suppressed yet undeniable,
exists the thought that it is a real chair. This doublethink is the paradox of denegation in the
theatre.
The human mind’s ability to willingly engage in the paradoxical action of denegation, of
suspending disbelief despite the actual physical presence of performers’ bodies in front of them
depending on the fictional frame in which they are placed, complicate denegation in three ways.
First, they create visual special effects whose artifice is so invisible when adapted carefully to
traditional theatre that it causes spectators of a live performance to engage in something beyond
denegation. I consider this a moment of fantastic ambiguity, which heightens the receiver’s
subsequent denegation. Another way to describe this reception experience of intense ambiguity
is that spectators’ minds lose track of their perceptions and interpretations — a momentary short
circuit of the senses and the imagination occurs. This forces them to uncomfortably question
45
their reality testing abilities — they are temporarily profoundly incapable of distinguishing
between reality and mimesis. Second, magic frequently increases the proximity of the spectator
and the performer to the point that touch, a sense not typically engaged in the reception process,
complicates traditional definitions of denegation. Third, magic sometimes lays bare denegation’s
role in the process of live performance through meta-theatrical critique. This final self-reflexive
the same potential for teaching spectators to be more skeptical of how they receive reality
An example of the first aspect, the visual way in which magic questions denegation,
comes from magic historian and illusion designer Jim Steinmeyer’s distinction in Art and
In the theatre, a special effect often is designed to be subsumed within the fantasy
of the production. To ignore its presence, to fall under the spell and accept an
there is no willing suspension. The magician cannot risk the audience ignoring his
illusions or accepting them as part of a larger context; they must be held apart as
professional magic shows is deliberately binary so as to make the point that magic is a
performing art unto itself — a discipline and a profession with an aesthetic of its own. But once
one accepts that magic and traditional theatre are each autonomous, there is nevertheless a
fascinating, liminal space joining the illusions of magic and the special effects of plays, which, in
46
turn, is where Ubersfeld’s denegation (which is a live performance version of Coleridge’s willing
suspension of disbelief) becomes so compellingly troubled. The key for denegation is that what
has changed in the fiction-making process is that spectators have real physical people and objects
in front them. This is a different type of denial than simply reading a page and imagining that
there are goblins in a story. It is one thing to imagine the existence of these creatures from the
comfort of your living-room armchair; it is quite another experience to have an actor playing the
part of a goblin right in front of you during a performance. The spectator sees that the actor
playing the goblin is moving around through time and space (i.e., physical reality) in the same
manner that people do in everyday life. Therefore, denegation accounts for a different quality of
fiction-making during the reception process. This does not make denegation completely separate
from reading a page and suspending one’s disbelief, for there is definitely crossover, but physical
presence makes theatre as a live performing art special and distinct. Spectators must suspend
Raymond Joseph Teller (of the contemporary stage magician duo Penn and Teller) and
performance work inhabiting this in-between space of the magic aesthetic, the special effect
aesthetic, and the process of suspending disbelief via denegation. In his first collaboration with
director Aaron Posner, Teller found a way to seamlessly combine a magic effect with the
narrative of A Midsummer Night’s Dream whose performance drew gasps of surprise from its
audience (Close 35-36). In that production, when Oberon extends a hand to place a love potion
onto the eyelids of a sleeping Titania, her entire body levitates for a few moments as his fingers
briefly contact her skin. The collective gasp of the audience can be explained by the fact that
unlike most special effects in Shakespearean productions, Teller’s was designed to offer no
explanation whatsoever for its occurrence. The levitation was made to look impossible with a
47
level of perfection that audiences are simply not accustomed to seeing live. I read that gasp as the
reception of a fantastic ambiguity, a moment of dissonance for spectators who are willingly
engaged in denegation (i.e., ignoring the real world existence of actors’ bodies to replace them
with the imaginary qualities of faerie characters) and then shocked by a visual impossibility —
by an act which undeniably defies the physical law of gravity. Momentarily, I imagine that
spectators would have been alarmed as their willingly suppressed reality testing suddenly cried
out for an explanation of what was happening. After that initial reaction, the internal verisimilar
logic that love potions cause faeries to levitate in the world of Puck, Bottom and the other
magical creatures of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, would most likely take over and make the
In addition to causing disruptive visual incongruities during the reception process, magic
performances frequently break down the fourth wall by increasing the spectator’s proximity to
the performer and by directly engaging the sense of touch. Traditional denegation does not
account for the complex levels of fiction-making involved in routines such as American
magician Mike Caveney’s “Powers of Darkness,” which is a clear example of magic’s long
tradition of calling spectators onto the stage. This threshold crossing is a central characteristic of
magic’s stage conventions for many reasons, but two of the most pertinent are: 1) its core
aesthetic need to confuse the denegation / reality testing activities of the spectator’s mind to
thereby create a convincing experience of the impossible; 2) the tendency of many magic
and stage environments. A rough performance history of “Powers of Darkness” illustrates this
last point. I recently attended one of Caveney’s performances of this routine in a theatre with a
thrust stage and 200 audience members. Here is a brief description of the effect that was
performed: the magician shows a solid metal square to the audience and asks for a volunteer. As
48
the spectator makes her way onto the stage, the magician explains that the audience will see the
method of this illusion. The purpose of the routine is to demonstrate the different pleasures of
seeing how magic is created (which the audience does) and of being left in the dark, literally for
the spectator in this case, to experience magic by touch. The spectator is then asked to close and
open her eyes as the magician has her (in this case) hold poses (e.g., hands on hips, hands
clasped, hands on head, etc.), which causes her body to form several natural circles that are
separate from the metal square. The square is then made to magically pass through her body,
impossibly linking and unlinking through her arms several times. The spectator, who has the
sensation of actually feeling the impossible travelings of the metal square take place as it links
and unlinks to her body, is then applauded as she returns to her seat. The magician concludes by
asking the audience to keep what it saw a secret in the name of preserving what has been a series
Though I saw “Powers of Darkness” performed live as just described in 2010, Caveney’s
version is an adaptation of English magician Tony Corinda’s routine published under the same
title in 1975. In turn, Corinda explains that his routine is an adaptation of an effect originally
employed by charlatans during séances who would claim that spirits made a wooden hoop (rather
than the metal square used by Caveney) link to the spectator’s arm (313-317). Thus, a magic
effect originally used to prove one’s ability to manifest spirits in the intimate, close-up setting of
a dark séance room is later adapted to a stage entertainment setting in order to demonstrate two
receptions of a magic effect at once: what the revealed method looks like (the audience point-of-
view) and what it feels like to experience the magic without knowing the secret (the spectator’s
perspective). But in both settings, at least two of its characteristics remain unchanged: its reliance
upon intimate proximity and upon the sense of touch as distinct from the sense of sight.
Caveney’s “Powers of Darkness” embodies the characteristic of touch that makes magic
49
an unusually tactile performing art, one that calls for a new understanding of the relationship
between denegation, reality testing and the double-model spectator. What happens to the
reception process — to the fiction-making occurring in the spectators’ minds — when the
performer proves to them that the impossible has happened, despite the reality testing of a
volunteer’s sense of touch? Are spectators able to maintain the same separation of reality testing
and denegation when they are passively seated in the theatre compared to when they are actively
engaged — even in direct physical contact as a volunteer — with the performer? The evidence
from “Powers of Darkness” suggests that this is not possible. The mixture of touch with
denegation experienced by the volunteer, creates a particular aesthetic reception within the mind
of this person by intentionally confusing these two, typically separate, experiential boundaries.
Touch is so personal and is so rarely made a direct part of the reception of fiction in theatre or in
other settings that a higher value of real-world veracity is attributed to it as a sense. It is one of
those senses of perception that is generally reserved for reality testing.15 If reading or theatre-
going conventions can train us to adopt certain fiction-making frames of mind, certain
interpretive colorings, that lessen the veracity attributed to types of sensory information (such as
the dominant sight and sound), then what happens when a sense we typical reserve for reality
testing in everyday life (touch) is engaged in a theatre performance? By mixing senses that are
typically reserved for experiencing the real world with those that are ritualistically trained to help
15
Cramped hands, adjusting one’s glasses, or the sensation of fingers turning pages are
two examples of how touch, while reading, is one of the exterior reminders of physical reality
that to some degree distracts from a reader’s imaginary involvement in a story. In this way, touch
does not add to the fiction-making experience — it is a distraction still connected to reality
testing.
50
space where impossibility invades life. At least, that will be the experience of the model
spectator onstage during “Powers of Darkness.” The rest of the audience will witness that
spectator’s genuine shock as each magical effect happens and play along by applauding, but they
will only be able to imagine what the illusion must feel like by living vicariously through her
onstage reactions. They will see the key method of the effect each time the spectator’s eyes
close, which is why darkness gives the magician powers in this routine. For this reason, the
question of whether the spectator onstage sees the performance a second time (this time from the
revealed, audience perspective) is a question of double spectatorship. In a lesser way, she also
has the ability to re-read the performance by simply asking someone else after the show to
describe what happened while her eyes were closed. Assuming her interlocutor breaks the
contract called for by the magician from his model spectators and tells her the secret, she would
then add a critical reading to her naive one. “Powers of Darkness” gives its onstage volunteer
these choices after its mystery is presented. She may choose to bask in the naive plaisir of not
knowing or she may choose the more writerly jouissance of seeking out the method — of
But what does it mean to draw up Brecht’s at once literal and metaphorical curtain in this
case? If magic’s aesthetic calls for both passive, readerly spectators as well as active, writerly
ones, how can a particular performance be analyzed to determine which type of reception
process it favors? And if Brecht calls for a theatre that is political, one that causes spectators to
think about life and to act differently outside of the theatre, how does this apply to magic
performances? The short answer to these questions can be summed up in one phrase:
defamiliarization liberates.
as Caveney’s “Powers of Darkness,” Penn and Teller’s “Blast Off” or their rendition of “The
Cups and Balls” with clear cups), its complication of reality testing always defamiliarizes. Part of
magic’s aesthetic raison d’être is to inspire wonder about simple objects, to render the ordinary
extraordinary. This is precisely why it must blur the line between the willing suspension of
disbelief, denegation, and reality testing. This blurring of boundaries, this defamiliarization, is
also what Brecht sees as causing spectators to question the world in new, socially active ways.
Brecht and Steinmeyer both see the defamiliarizing potential of performance as a way to
documentary interview on the meaning of magic, Steinmeyer laments the way in which much of
the world is designed to “make you stop wondering about things” (Wizards of Awe). He provides
a scientific example of how social institutions condition us to not ask certain questions and of
how magic performances amaze us into asking the simple question “Why?” The illusion designer
If I think about it I don’t understand why the chlorophyll dying makes them turn
red, except that someone told me “We’ve got that figured out; you can stop caring
about it now.” . . . And what a magician does, hopefully, a great magician, is take
a coin, something that you’ve handled hundreds of times, and the coin disappears
and you say: “Gee, there’s something about coins and hands that I’ve never
Performed correctly, this vanish — a defamiliarization of hands and coins — looks so impossible
that it short-circuits the spectator’s reality testing. There is, of course, no guarantee that a
spectator will leave the magic performance, go home, and pick up a coin from the living room
table with a new sense of wonder; however, there is a possibility that this will happen — that an
individual will respond to a magic performance by re-evaluating his or her assumptions. Even
52
fewer receivers of such a performance will take the extra step required to research how to
perform the coin vanish by seeking the instruction manuals or the experts explaining it. Fewer
still will then analyze the way in which the method for a coin vanish might be applied to
different objects or how the flaw in human perception being exploited by a particular vanishing
technique might manifest itself in ways that exceed magic as a performing art. And yet, in this
series of diminishing likelihoods, in this spectrum moving from readerly to writerly to living
understanding the world is there. This is the potential of amazement, of the experience of magic
within the spectator’s mind, to give the receiver fresh eyes for investigating reality — to ask new
questions which no longer take simple, seemingly known objects, for granted.
In his “Short Organum for the Theatre,” Brecht describes performance, scientific
explanation and defamiliarization as intertwined. His theatre practice calls for a wide array of
alienation (Verfremdung) effects designed to create writerly spectators who will critically engage
with the content of the play being watched and, in subjective ways, apply what they learn to their
own social realities once they leave the theatre (186). The goal of his avant-garde techniques is
never to allow the audience to “fling itself into the story as if it were a river and let itself be
carried vaguely hither and thither” (201). He argues that seamless mimesis enchants and
hypnotizes the very spectators who must be snapped out of such dreamlike reveries both in the
theatre and in everyday life.16 Brecht elucidates this with an example of the kind of critical
16
There is a clear connection between the enchanted spectators Brecht describes and the
Project (389). Benjamin, too, wishes to awaken the members of society from the complacent
awakening he hopes his theatre practice will achieve. He tells the story of Galileo observing a
chandelier as if it were not a familiar, quotidian object, but something alien and unknown:
suspicious inquiry he would need to develop that detached eye with which the
motion, as if he had not expected it and could not understand its occurring, and
this enabled him to come on the rules by which it was governed. Here is the
outlook, disconcerting but fruitful, which the theatre must provoke with its
representations of human social life. It must amaze its public, and this can be
Indeed, the skeptical eye is achieved by alienating what is supposedly known (e.g., leaves,
chandeliers, coins, objects, and other phenomena), by questioning traditional assumptions and
On the one hand, I doubt that Brecht had magic performances in mind when he wrote his
famous essay on the alienation effect. Many of the meta-theatrical techniques that he
recommendations on music, title cards, and acting style) are distancing devices not typically used
in magic shows. On the other hand, gasp-evoking levitations, such as Teller’s in A Midsummer
Night’s Dream, or the intimate engagement of the sense of touch in routines like “Powers of
Darkness” are examples of magic’s special knack for defamiliarizing the familiar. These are
unconventional performance techniques in standard theatre, but they have consistently been
employed by magicians to challenge how spectators test reality and how they engage in fiction.
These techniques create the pleasurable aesthetic experience of magic in the minds of audience
members. They also encourage writerly spectators to question their sensory perceptions, their
54
interpretations and their ensuing assumptions about chemistry, physics, and other “common
Immediately following his example of Galileo and the chandelier, Brecht describes
theatre that alienates the familiar as a practice of “dialectical materialism” or, more simply, a
technique that reveals “society’s laws of motion” (193). One can hear the earlier voices of Marx
and Benjamin in this statement. Brecht’s theatre aims to awaken what Benjamin calls “the
dreaming collective” to social laws, economic facts, and physical realities that will remain
hidden or mystified until members of society become more critical, reflective and writerly. This
is another way to interpret what Brecht means by drawing up the curtain. The performances on
his stage alienate and defamiliarize to create a reception process in which spectators are ideally
active both during and after their visits to the theatre. Magic as a performing art, similar to
Brecht’s theatrical philosophy, encourages its performers and spectators to examine the
boundaries between performance and everyday life from a new, critical perspective. It does this
when performed in the traditional frame of a theatrical setting. It also does this when performed
Magic tricks often move outside of the theatre and into other social zones. In these
instances, which range from surprise performances to friendly bets to full-blown con games, a
spectator’s faulty interpretation of reality during a trick can be made to have material
consequences in real life. The following close reading of “The Circus Card Trick” and receptions
the difficulty of determining when a theatrically framed magic trick transforms into a different
kind of manipulation — a social and physical deception that sometimes plays on the border of
Communities
When the saint baptized the penguins, was this void because the procedure of
meaning.
interpretive community agrees to recognize the baptizing of penguins for long enough, then
society’s legal and religious institutions will eventually be altered to allow for a new conception
of penguin-hood. As ridiculous as penguins with names recognized by both the courts and the
church may sound, Brecht’s lesson of the theatre, Benjamin’s lesson of the arcade and
Steinmeyer’s lesson of the magic trick is that individuals forget how malleable reality is. People
are fooled, and fool themselves, into believing that there are certain unalterable truths; they are
lulled into consuming commodities without questioning the spells of consumption cast upon
them; in short, they fall into the trap of accepting superficial appearances and superficial
these certitudes, an entertaining rejection and questioning of what a society chooses to define as
reality’s limits. Con games, on the other hand, are criminal tricks manipulating those same limits
56
between reality and fiction for unethical gain. When detected, large-scale cons such as Bernard
Madoff’s or Charles Ponzi’s schemes (which tricked investors into believing that non-existent
investment strategies were making excellent returns) are outlawed, litigated and penalized. In
other words, interpretive communities (juries, theatre audiences, and even informal gatherings of
individuals) are constantly defining and evaluating where reality ends, where fiction begins, and
in what context these tricks are or are not acceptable violations of those limits — that is, whether
The central problem of locating where this transition from reality to fiction takes place,
and of how human beings manipulate language to make that transformation occur, can be
explored by analyzing “The Circus Card Trick” which lies near the border of magic and con
artistry. Though it is far from being a crime, this routine is a taste of grifter-like manipulation.17
It is also a transition point where the “as if” of fiction-making suddenly becomes the “it is” of
reality, which is why J.L. Austin’s study of what happens when words have the power to do what
they say is of such enormous value here. In this analysis, I build upon Austin’s definition of the
question Anne Ubersfeld’s reading of the performative utterance in theatre. I do this to insist that
distinguishing between the power of language in what Ubersfeld describes as the laboratory-like
when a theatrical frame is obvious and announced. But what is to be done when the theatrical
close-up magic and con games becomes a way to explore how members of society have the
17
The U.S. slang word “grifter,” or sometimes “grafter,” is defined by the OED as a
power to informally turn fiction into reality — to play with the suspension of disbelief and
theatre.
Before delving into the performative language of the trick mentioned above, it must be
understood that certain magic jargon and even some pre-packaged magic tricks sold at retail
shops reveal the potent influence of the grifter or con artist subculture upon magic as a
performing art. “The Circus Card Trick” is what magicians define as a “Sucker Effect.” The
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Magic describes this special category of trick as “any effect where
the magician leads the spectators to believe they have detected the method and then works a
double bluff to surprise them even more” (Whaley 893). These types of tricks, as the terms
“sucker” and “double bluff” suggest, are direct adaptations either of con games or of the con
artist / victim dynamic for entertainment rather than criminal purposes. Before I ever learned to
perform “The Circus Card Trick,” I bought the S.S. Adams Co. mass-manufactured “Coin Con”
for $2.95 from my local magic shop at the age of fourteen. This was my first “sucker effect,”
though I had no knowledge of that phrase at that time or even of what the word “con” actually
meant. I was attracted to the effect, because the demonstrator described it as “the trick that pays
for itself.” He suggested that I simply make it clear at the beginning of the trick that it would cost
the spectator twenty-five cents to see it performed and that they must promise not to get mad
This is where a simple Austin performative, the participant’s “I promise,” establishes the
performance price of this magic effect via verbal contract in advance. “Coin Con” is one of the
few performances where the ticket price is the central focus of the drama. The spectator’s
willingly surrendered quarter is placed flat onto a small plastic pedestal with a circle of red felt
cut to the same size of the coin. A plastic lid covers the coin, some magic words and gestures are
58
performed. The lid is then lifted to reveal only the circle of red felt: the coin has vanished. I
would then either pass out for examination or accidentally nudge the pedestal, which would
make a rattling sound. After hearing the tell-tale rattle of a coin, the spectator would open up the
opposite end of the hollow pedestal with a satisfied grin that they had discovered the trick’s
method. But the grin would vanish, as quickly as the quarter, when they discovered only a plain
metal disc inside that had simulated the rattling sound of a coin. The disk has a message printed
on it that reads “Thanks for the quarter.” After thirteen performances, I had recouped my $2.95
plus tax. I had also, rather unwittingly, learned to perform a trick inspired by the history of con
artistry.
Another, perhaps even clearer, example of a con game adapted to slum, i.e., cheap retail
magic, is the S.S. Adams Company effect named “Money Maker.” This trick, which is a self-
working plastic contraption that appears to print legitimate currency from blank paper, contains
no reference to its con game history in its packaging or instructions. The North American short
con known as the “Money Box,” however, performs exactly the same effect to sell the “mark”18
what appears to be a counterfeiting device for a large sum of money. Later, of course, the mark
19
will discover that the device is useless and that the con artist’s demonstration of it was a trick.
For the moment, however, I prefer to focus upon “Coin Con” because it is a straight-
forward case of an announced magic trick performed outside of a traditional theatrical space. It is
18
A “mark” is the U.S. slang term for the target of a con artist, the victim who is to be
also a clear example of the performative “I promise” as the signing of a performance contract, of
a con-game-inspired sucker effect devoted to “getting the money,” and of the critical training
that such sucker effects offer spectators — that is, an increased ability to detect when fiction may
have material consequences in real life. Participating in and feeling the sting of “Coin Con” is an
exercise in “self-sharpening,” to borrow once again Stanley Fish’s description of how reader-
response criticism teaches us to analyze not what a poem, or any text, means but what it does.
Instead of seeking a poem’s or a performance’s truth, reception theory seeks its practical effect
on the reader. What are the results of the reception process? In terms of spectator-response, I see
the reception and reflection experience of a simple trick like “Coin Con” as related to the reading
experience of a short, clever poem like the following one by e.e. cummings:
l(a
le
af
fa
ll
s)
one
l
iness
Imagine a reader’s reception of this poem as an event: the reader’s eyes most likely move left to
right, and down; left to right, and down; left to right, and down again until the end of the poem.
The eyes then move up and scan just about everywhere to determine what the poem could
possibly be saying. Eventually, an English-speaking reader will be able to spatially rearrange the
cryptic, enjambed letters to create the line “l(a leaf falls)oneliness” or some minor variation
thereof (cummings 1). Once the falling leaf image placed inside of the word “loneliness” has
been deciphered within the reader’s mind, a wide range of interpretations can be made of
60
cummings’ elegant, minimalist creation. Whatever the reader’s ensuing interpretation might be,
he or she first had to fill in the mysterious blanks, the intentionally ambiguous knowledge gaps,
created by cummings’ pre-meditated enjambment. The reader has a new tool that may be applied
to analyzing any writing that employs similar syntactic tricks. Tricks which anticipate and thwart
the readers left-to-right and top-to-bottom reading strategy will henceforth be more easily
untangled by readers whose senses and interpretation abilities have been sharpened by this poem.
This is at least one lesson that can be taken from the reception process, a way of reading
enigmas that will help the receiver to recognize patterns and to solve future ones more quickly.
making promises with material consequences, and to be skeptical of any performer who offers an
easy explanation for a trick (i.e., the audible rattling in the base of the pedestal simulating the
missing quarter). A skeptical spectator watching this performance a second time would avoid
paying attention to the red herring (the false rattle), would avoid interpreting that rattle as a noise
made by the quarter, and might scan the correct zone of the performance space to determine how
the coin is actually spirited away. In short, a quarter is the price paid for a taste of the kind of
verbal and physical manipulation that the same spectator might experience at the midway games
of the local carnival. Those games cost significantly more than a quarter. In turn, failing to
recognize the chicanery of large-scale financial scams, such as the Ponzi schemes mentioned
earlier or a deception like the Nigerian letter scam, costs significantly more than being
bamboozled at a carnival. The axiom of magician Karl Germain is one description of the didactic
nature of grifter-inspired magic tricks: “A knowledge of conjuring tricks makes a boy more alert
to the trickery of the world he will have to cope with in maturity” (qtd. in Whaley 968).
“The Circus Card Trick” is another basic yet also more sophisticated lesson in the
physical and verbal manipulation made possible by an informal and ambiguous performance
61
environment. Its simulation of the con game’s manipulation of a spectator’s tendency to engage
in denegation as compared to reality testing is stronger, because its use of performative language
happens in the middle of the routine rather than at the end and because of its invocation of the
performative agreement “I bet” in place of “I promise.” This difference in verb choice also
reflects a difference in the contractual announcement in “Coin Con” compared to “The Circus
Card Trick.” The price of the former trick is clear and is agreed to in advance of the
performance; the latter trick, however, is transformed from an off-hand piece of entertainment to
a proposition bet via ambiguity. The bet made in “The Circus Card Trick” is agreed to in a
spontaneous, off-the-cuff fashion. The manner in which it is presented demonstrates how the
performative verb “to bet” appeals to a specific set of social conventions that have the power to
make a spoken bet felicitous or infelicitous. In other words, the amount of the felicitous bet that
is made in this trick is not fixed at twenty-five cents; it is flexible, fluid and can be determined in
performed. Fortunately, the first time that I participated in the game-playing narrative that is
“The Circus Card Trick,” the bet that I lost was relatively minor and my deceiver was kind
The framing of the performance in which I was deceived was informal. A group of us
who had become friends were snacking, chatting and playing cards before the beginning of our
introduction to acting class. Jason, who has since become a close friend, picked up the cards and
offered to show me a trick. He asked me to shuffle the pack, to pick a card, to memorize it (the
Ace of Hearts), and to place it face-down on top of the shuffled deck. He then asked me to cut
the cards once or twice, thereby burying the selection somewhere in the middle of the pack.
“Fair?” he asked. “Fair,” I replied. He then took the cards and began dealing them face-up onto
the table, for the group to see, one card at a time. He told me to avoid reacting if I saw my card
62
go by. He was to receive no external clues from me or from anyone else regarding its identity.
Everyone was asked to instead concentrate on the identity of the card — to imagine its suit and
value in their minds. He would know when he had arrived at my card thanks to his powers of
extra sensory perception (ESP). After about half of the deck was dealt, I noticed my Ace of
Hearts flip face-up onto the table and then another three or four cards flip face-up on top of it.
Jason kept turning cards over. He suddenly stopped, apparently receiving some kind of telepathic
signal, gave the next face-down card in his hand a small flick with his index finger and asked:
“What do you bet that the next card I flip over is your card?”
I knew that he had made a mistake. He had already passed my card. I could even see the
tip of it sticking out of the face-up pile on the table. In fact, I was so certain that I answered with
enthusiasm and not a little sarcasm: “My soul!” “Really, you bet your soul that the next card I
turn over is the one you chose?” “Absolutely.” I then watched as Jason’s right hand, the same
hand that had so clearly indicated the next face-down card on top of the deck, moved to the table,
uncovered the Ace of Hearts I had chosen and triumphantly turned it over. There it was: my
chosen card, face-down. Grinning, he said: “You owe me one soul.” Being a man of my word, I
wrote up an improvised deed on a piece of scrap paper, signed it in front of our fellow aspiring
actors as witnesses, and handed it to Jason. Class was about to begin, so our group went into the
theatre, and, after we were out, Jason taught me the trick. I have no idea whether or not he still
The primary lesson that I learned from “The Circus Card Trick” is that confident acting
combined with precise manipulation of the performative verb “to bet” is the key to eliciting the
desired spectator-response: an agreement (i.e., a felicitous wager). The bet that Jason and I made
was successful yet infelicitous in Austin’s terminology. It was playfully sarcastic, rather than
sincere, and, despite Faustian traditions, the interpretive community present had no precedent or
63
ritual in place for validating the official transaction of my soul. Though Jason certainly
entertained us, and taught me not to fall for this particular performative trap in the future, the
practical result of the speech-act was similar to that of the saint baptizing the penguins. The bet
was void, because it was applied to a soul. If I had bet something else, a dollar perhaps, the
speech-act could have easily been felicitous and I would have incurred a monetary loss. More
importantly, if the betting had occurred in the social context of a bar, a carnival, a circus, or a
horse-race track, Jason could have won material returns from me had he directed the bet more
carefully.
The aforementioned environments are where “The Circus Card Trick” gets its name and
where it was originally performed as a more serious con.20 The most ubiquitous and effective
social context in which to analyze its performative language and its material consequences in my
experience, however, is the North American pub or bar — a liminal, informal environment
where small bets, which I will refer to as proposition bets, are socially acceptable. From the
performer’s point of view, proposition bets are a fascinating study of how the spectator who
makes a bet joins onlookers to form a local and immediate interpretive community, which has
the power to define or reject the felicity of the bet. The bet of “The Circus Card Trick” thus
becomes a social text, an informal performance text, that will be read and interpreted by a
similarities between communication in speech-act analysis and reading, he makes the rather
conservative statement that “part of a text’s meaning emerges in the reader’s perception of
20
See Roberto Giobbi’s performance manual Card College Light and his description of
the “The Circus Card Trick” for a reference to the trick’s history and to further details on method
(67-75). Incidentally, I prefer to perform a different “glimpse” than the one he mentions.
64
whether the text follows or violates traditional conventions” (158). Stanley Fish, in his essay on
interpretive communities “Is There A Text in This Class,” goes one step further to argue that
almost all of a text’s meaning emerges from a reader’s interpretation of these conventions. In
addition to agreeing with Fish, I would like to add that social conventions, such as making a
verbal bet or shaking hands, during a performance have varying degrees of power that are
entirely granted or denied by local interpretive communities in the heat of the moment. These
communities retroactively, but local, low-stakes agreements like those made with a handshake
choose to increase the odds that “The Circus Card Trick” will result in my own material gain.
This can be accomplished by heightening the felicitous conditions of the trick’s bet, which is the
happy or unhappy reception of the bet, in three ways: 1) by choosing a social environment in
which the ritual of betting is a more or less natural and traditional social activity (in this case, the
university pub); 2) by slightly fracturing the fourth wall of the trick’s performance with a
linguistic trap that set for a negative model spectator (i.e., manipulating a spectator to switch
from the activity of denegation to one of reality testing in a premeditated manner); and 3) by
breaking through the fourth wall of the performance more completely with a physical handshake
— an informal yet traditionally strong form of contractual agreement. This final step
symbolically moves the trick from the realm of intangible fiction to the realm of material reality.
imagine that you, several acquaintances and I have all gone out for drinks at a university pub
following a full day of panel discussions and conference presentations at the annual conference
naturally discussing each other’s work and the theoretical concepts at the center of our particular
enquiries. I perform a card effect, such as “The Mona Lisa Card Trick,” to illustrate the manner
in which the willing suspension of disbelief and the denegation processes combine to create the
sensation of magic within the mind of the spectator, a visual transformation in the case of this
effect. You and the others in our group respond positively to this short performance with the
exception of one person who insists on knowing how the trick was accomplished. This is an
individual who, it is clear, did not particularly enjoy being deceived visually. I then ask this
spectator, who will be known as Mr. R. (for his insistence upon rational explanations with a
capital “R”), if he would help with another card trick. As a performer, I have thus sifted the
personality types of our small group and selected a suitable participant for “The Circus Card
Trick.” This sifting is the same filtering process described by Eco in his description of how
written texts select for model readers. Mr. R., for the vast majority of card tricks, would not be a
model spectator at all. For magic, in general, he is a negative model spectator, because he is less
willing to suspend disbelief, to denegate, and, in short, to play along with the fiction-making
process required to experience magic within his own mind. This, however, makes him an ideal
candidate for the sucker effect of “The Circus Card Trick,” because the success of the trick
depends upon baiting the spectator into betting on the fact that the magician has failed. The
magician’s failure, in this case, must be an outcome that this spectator desires. This desire
usually stems from a dislike of the magician who is perceived as a threat, because he is a figure
representing the instability and ambiguity of reality. After Mr. R.’s card has been selected, lost,
and flipped face-up onto the table along with the other rejected cards, it will be obvious to him
and to the group that the magician has made an error. In other words, the imaginary fourth wall
of my performance, the zone in which I am presenting the card trick as a demonstration of ESP is
66
fractured. My extra-sensory perception is seen to have failed once I have skipped past the correct
card and stopped instead on a different face-down one. It is impossible for the spectators at this
moment to believe in the story of the trick, in the fictional presentation of myself as a magician
with ESP, because my mistake so clearly contradicts my supernatural claim. Reality testing —
the spectator’s perception and interpretation that the trick has failed in the real world — is thus
activated and supersedes any willing suspension of disbelief or denegation at this moment.
Paradoxically, this is the same instant at which I act as though I have indeed received a signal
“Ah!” I flick the incorrect face-down card with my right forefinger and ask Mr. R., “What do
you bet that the next card that I flip over is your card?”
The open question, this time directed at a model spectator (Mr. R) for this sucker effect,
demonstrates how the performance of close-up magic, especially when turned into a proposition
bet, poses new questions for the study of Austin’s performative speech-acts. This invitation to
bet, at the moment when an already ambiguous fourth wall is broken, is made real by the same
conventions that Stephen Mailloux discusses when he compares the behavior of readers reading
a certain genre of American fiction to the actions of sports fans participating in certain
conventional rituals at the beginning of live baseball games (127).21 The act of making a bet is a
21
According to Mailloux, in his essay “A Typology of Conventions,” traditional
conventions “are based on precedent and manifested most explicitly in a society’s customs and
rituals. For example, singing the national anthem before a sporting event is a traditional
convention in contemporary American society” (127). Using this national anthem example
throughout, Mailloux breaks his typology of conventions into three categories: Traditional (past
social custom, a ritual which has certain traditional connotations within the environment of a
North American pub (a place where televised sporting events are watched, where games such as
darts and pool are played, and where bets on particular outcomes are often made). There are
social precedents for the behavior of staking money on what will happen next. In this social
space, betting on a card trick, as opposed to baptizing a penguin, does not strain the spectator’s
or the other group members’ horizons of social expectations. All of these conditions increase the
odds that Mr. R. will voluntarily bet a beer, or even five or ten dollars that I will fail to flip over
his card. The range of his potential responses to the question, however, is quite wide and there is
no absolute guarantee that felicity will ensue. He could refuse to bet or he could render the bet
implausible by betting a sarcastic amount, such as his car, his house, a million dollars and so on.
Though these large bets might be felicitous with the right spectator in the right environment (e.g.,
performing for a billionaire near a high-stakes roulette table in one of Monte Carlo’s casinos),
their material value is far too high to validate them within the social context of a pub. The
traditional conventions imagined for such a space within the minds of the group that will serve as
the bet’s interpretive community must match certain expectations. Therefore, if Mr. R. does not
make a normal bet, I will suggest one: “Would you bet a beer?” This challenge, which is an
opportunity to win a free beer and to prove that the magician does not have psychic abilities, will
typically be too great of a temptation for a model sucker effect spectator such as Mr. R. to refuse.
Any kind of passive consent, such as the vocal responses “yes,” “sure,” and so forth, is then
guided into a more concrete social commitment with a handshake. This physical gesture is paired
with an explicit rephrasing of the bet. I extend my hand to Mr. R. and state: “You bet a beer that
the next card I flip over is not your chosen card, right?” Once the tactile consent of the
handshake is made for the group to see, the informal bonds —the verbal and physical felicity
conditions —of the bet are in place. The fourth wall has also been broken entirely: the spectator
68
bet. When I flip over the correct card, the fact that my actions match the literal and explicit
statement of the bet’s terms will trump the fact that the communicative phrasing of the bet was a
linguistic trap. In short, the use of performative language combined with the physical consent of
the handshake and the presence of a local interpretive community will almost always ensure
felicity. Mr. R., in response to the customs, the rituals, and the social pressure of those who
witnessed our informal agreements, both linguistic and tactile, will pay the amount lost. By this
process, the words uttered by the spectator and the performer in “The Circus Card Trick” have
This close reading —based upon my first reception of “The Circus Card Trick” as a
spectator, written documentation of the effect in magic manuals and reference materials, and an
imagined performance situation based upon personal experiences transmitting the same effect to
performing art. In other words, the transition I have made via references to Teller’s levitation in a
adaptation of “Powers of Darknesss,” to the retail effect “Coin Con,” to, finally, various versions
of “The Circus Card Trick” is a trajectory that signals the gradual disintegration of any kind of
stable theatre environment. The walls of the theatre simply cannot contain performance anymore
than the covers of a book can contain textual meaning. This protects us from an oversimplified
Coleridge’s willing suspension of disbelief and reality testing are for reader-response theory, and
as useful as Anne Ubersfeld’s definition of denegation is for identifying one of the qualitatively
different fiction-making behaviors that occurs in the mind of spectators during theatrical
69
performance, I propose that these concepts must move beyond what has been defined as theatre
studies into what has become performance studies. The move to privilege the role of the
spectator in the reception process, with the same rigor that reader-response theorists shifted
attention to the reader, has been made by Ubersfeld in her three-volume Lire le théâtre (Reading
Theatre). That shift also occurs in Susan Bennett’s Theatre Audiences: A Theory of Production
and Reception. These studies, however, focus on the same passive spectator who is seated at a
safe distance from the action. This is the same kind of theatre-goer described by Holland to flesh
out his conception of the willing suspension of disbelief over forty years ago. This conception of
the spectator results from the frequently passive, epistemological limitations of a disciplinary
approach that takes the word “theatre” as its point of departure. Performance studies, whose
development as a discipline over the last fifty years is concisely described in the opening of
Diana Taylor’s The Archive and the Repertoire, obviously chooses performance itself as its
object of study. Performance studies sees sacrificing the established academic prestige of theatre
studies as a small price to pay for escaping its entrenched assumptions. Like Taylor, my
particular investment in performance studies as a discipline “derives less from what it is than
what it allows us to do” (16). In the case of magic tricks, mysteries and con games, performance
studies allows this inquiry to draw upon rich theoretical conceptions of receiver-oriented reading,
viewing, and — here is the addition that performance studies facilitates so well — participation.
This includes an individual’s tactile reception of fiction and reality. All of these methods of
reception, but especially this last one, are where I see an opportunity to draw up Brecht’s curtain,
to examine how the fourth wall is broken down, and to explore the self-sharpening lessons
offered by the paradoxical performances of magic tricks and con games. The interactive
My focus upon the tactile as a key aspect of the participatory mode of fiction-making,
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which is so important for the reception of magic tricks and con games, is similar to Linda
Hutcheon’s discussion of the “kinetic” and the “somatic” reception of texts in her book A Theory
of Adaptation. Hutcheon’s exploration of adapted texts examines media and genres that are used
either to tell stories, to show stories, or to allow interaction with them (xiv). In general, her
interaction to better understand the physical aesthetic of theme-park adaptations like Disney’s
players as their rapidly moving fingers connect and respond to the diegetic world of a game
(135-138). To analyze the manipulation of the sense of touch in magic, con artistry and
important as his or her experience of static touch. Static touch encompasses the stationary tactile
or haptic aspect of somatic reception. To give just one example, both real and theatrical
pickpocketing often rely upon putting static pressure upon a more sensitive part of the spectator’s
body to direct attention there rather than to the less sensitive wrist from which a watch is being
22
stolen.
The use of performative language, particularly in combination with kinetic and tactile
reception that influences how words do what they say, is central for understanding how the limits
of traditional theatre dissolve into the ambiguous performance settings of everyday life to change
the quality of the sensory perceptions and the imaginary interpretations of a spectator. The
suspension of disbelief, the act of denegation, and fiction-making in general do not only operate
in the theatre. These processes also operate in varying degrees of interrelation in semi-theatrical
zones and in what society considers the zone of the real world.
22
See Jim Ravel and Paul Butler’s book Jim Ravel’s Theatrical Pickpocketing.
71
Another example of how I see this subject of performative language approached yet not
pushed beyond the realm of the stage occurs in the chapter titled “Saying and Doing in the
Theatre,” by Ubersfeld. There, she performs a careful and rigorous analysis of several speech-
acts uttered in Racine’s Phèdre. She maps the Austinian locutory (meaning-producing),
commands issued and obeyed by Phèdre and her nurse as they interact onstage. Ubersfeld’s key
distinction in her analysis of these performatives is that though these speech-acts have the power
to create monumental shifts in power relations between the characters onstage, they have no real-
world illocutory (read: contractual) effect upon the actors playing those characters or upon the
audience. In other words, these commands have the power to result in felicitous contracts
binding the fictional characters to perform certain actions, but this is not so for the actors or the
spectators. Hence, she ends her chapter with a statement suggesting that the language of theatre
If there is one area in which it would be difficult to deny theatrical mimesis it is—
and maybe there is only the one—the domain of language. The reader-spectator
observes it taking place in what one might call “laboratory conditions.” (103)
There is, of course, much to be learned from witnessing the theatrical discourse that Ubersfeld
elsewhere describes as a “mime of speech in the real world,” or as a “scale model” of what
individuals might experience in real life (102). But there is also much to be learned, indeed, a
knowledge only produced by way of a qualitatively different reception experience, through the
analysis of points at which the walls of this theatrical laboratory dissolve. These are moments
when deceptive performances designed to take advantage of passive, readerly participants are
encountered in everyday life. Let us return for a moment to magician Karl Germain’s statement.
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How exactly do conjuring tricks equip those who study them with the tools needed to analyze the
trickery of rigged bets, short con games and even elaborate Ponzi schemes? Analyzing speech-
acts from the safety of one’s seat in the theatre is certainly a type of self-sharpening. It is an
intense study of language at one step removed. It is not, however, the same as being called onto
the stage to experience the manipulation of touch that one will experience in so many situations
in real life.
This somatic lesson in self-sharpening places an emphasis on what Diana Taylor and
other performance studies critics refer to as “embodiment” (16). Embodied performance is the
transmission of cultural knowledge that typically escapes written culture. These nuances of
knowing, which include gestures, variable pressures of touch, and other physical movements, are
often as much a part of the reception process as the language that receivers hear or the words that
they read. I do not wish to privilege embodiment above all else. However, I must insist that the
written script, the theatrical utterance, and the performative touch are of equal importance.
Certain performing arts, such as magic, clearly reveal how some performance knowledge is
contained in the archive (in libraries or other collections of material records), while other
performance secrets reside and are passed down through the repertoire (the corporeal, ephemeral
Borges. This chapter has focused on certain deaths and reincarnations of reception theory to
establish the theoretical underpinnings of the dissertation. The births, deaths and name changes
of reader-response criticism from the late 1960s to the early 2000s have been mapped out. A
large selection of the major contributors from Western Europe and America — Wolfgang Iser,
73
Hans Robert Jauss, Stanley Fish, Roland Barthes, J.L. Austin, Jane P. Tompkins, Steven
Mailloux, Michael Riffaterre, Richard Schechner, Susan Bennett, Anne Ubersfeld, Diana Taylor
and others — have been put into dialogue with one another to reveal that concepts from reader-
response theory are not dead. Instead, the combination of these scholars’ ideas suggests the
opposite: that their intellectual tools for understanding reception have been reborn and reapplied
This exploration of reception theory has already emphasized theoretical concepts directly
linking the fiction-making process that occurs during reading to that which occurs during the
experience of magic shows and other deceptive performances (such as proposition bets and con
games). I have argued that reader-response theory is relevant to the performance of magic, first
and foremost, because magic as a performing art is so invested in controlling the spectator’s
perception of the event. Experienced magicians constantly remind their students that the only
place where magic occurs is within the mind of the spectator. Conjurors therefore naturally
privilege the subjective interpretation of events: the individual’s active participation in the
construction of what becomes the performance. This approach to analyzing the text (in this case,
a performance text), which favors the point-of-view of its receiver, is inspired by the iconoclastic
University of Konstanz scholars. Their successful refocusing of critical atention on the reader
inspired subsequent thinkers to argue for the death of the sacred written text as the locus of
textual authority. Privileging the reader’s experience also echoes the cries of the mai ‘68
intertextual critics, led by Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes, who pronounced the death of the
author. In all three examples, the receiver of the text (whether written or performed) has been
recognized as at least an equal participant in the generation of textual meaning and is often
thought of as the most important individual for understanding what a particular text does.
As we have seen, this liberation and celebration of the receiver of the text are simply the
74
point of departure for what literary analysis has to teach us about magic as a performing art and,
on a darker note, about con games as crimes. The journey became more interesting and complex
while discussing how ambiguous and difficult texts call for scriptible (writerly) rather than
lisible (readerly) participants. Sarrasine’s fatal misreading of Zambinella has shown us how the
sex-change of a character can be enacted by an author with the subtle magic of transforming an
article from the feminine to the masculine. Sarrasine’s error and death, it has been argued, are an
excellent example of how literature teaches readers to adopt a writerly approach to analyzing the
world. I have argued that forcing readers to become writerly, challenging them to provide a large
portion of textual meaning through subjective analysis while reading and then re-reading, is a
lesson in enigma analysis. Receiving and interpreting literature such as Alphonse Allais’ Un
drame bien parisien (“A Fine Parisian Drama”) or e.e. cummings’ puzzle poem about a leaf are
exercises in self-sharpening and these skills are applicable to written and performed texts that
fiction have been seen to increase and to move beyond the reception of subjective individuals
once a person’s local, interpretive community is taken into account. We are, of course, not alone
in everyday life. We exist in relation to our local communities, institutions, national identities
and global realities. The speech-acts that we ourselves use or encounter within these webs of
power are magic spells that give our language the ability to do what it says. This speech-made-
reality power is generated from the individual’s interpretation as negotiated and combined with
group interpretations, which become informally codified (sometimes by the tactile contract of a
way of larger and more entrenched social formations. Written fiction freezes the magic spells
that we have looked at thus far into a stable, visual place on the page where we can read and re-
75
read them if we wish to parse their rhetorics to understand exactly how they function.
Live performances (Kushner’s The Illusion, Christopher Marlowe’s Dr. Faustus and
Goethe’s Faust, for example) offer what I consider to be a more visceral, proximal and
theatrically announced experience of such magic spells. These theatrical rituals of communal
fiction-making, compared to the more private act of reading, demand a different kind (rather than
degree) of the willing suspension of disbelief. We have discussed that such traditional theatre,
performed within an explicit and announced fictional frame, signs a contract with its model
spectators when they purchase a ticket at the box office. This token of the fiction-making
Despite the above differences between live (performed) and frozen (written)
transmission, the script of a play — the written record of the live — shares at least two affinities
with the analysis of the qualitatively different willing suspension of disbelief experienced by a
reader receiving poetry or prose. First — as with written fiction — one may delve back at any
time into the textual record of a play like Kushner’s The Illusion to focus upon the exact wording
of his magic spells. Second, both initial (the live) and subsequent (the written) receptions of a
theatrical text are “safe” in the sense that the receiver has agreed to participate in a communal
ritual of believing that the performance is occurring in real life even though it is not. One can
watch, or even temporarily become, Pridamant as he is duped into thinking that his son is dead.
One can gawk in wonder as the tongue of the Amenuensis is restored and he is miraculously
given back the power of speech. After all of these feats, one can later peruse the written record of
the play to reconstruct exactly how this at once individual and communal ritual of belief gives
theatrical language the power to do what it says (at least, within the diegetic world of the play
This second affinity that live theatrical performances and pieces of written fiction share
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— safety — is both a blessing and a curse. The blessing of the imaginary experiences made
possible by safe fiction-making is that the successful enigma-analysis tools sharpened in the
receiver become important implements of potential financial and emotional survival when one
encounters unethical magic spells outside of the theatre: illicit speech-acts. Examples of such
treachery are pieces of fiction posing as non-fiction for personal enrichment,23 the less-than-
ethical proposition bets that were discussed in this chapter (“Coin Con” and the “Circus Card
Trick”), as well as full blown con games such as “The Flue” or other shortchange cons that will
be discussed in chapter three. The curse of relatively safe receptions is that as challenging and as
powerful as some of the speech-acts in written fiction or live theatre performances might be, they
are limited by their occurrence in well-defined fictional zones — in curtained frames. Therefore,
though receivers experientially learn that these storytelling deceptions cannot successfully
happen without their active belief as well as the active belief of the interpretive community
surrounding them, the deceptions, illusions and enchantments encountered occur in an all-too-
safely-announced environment. At some point, the training wheels on the bicycle must come off.
Receivers must eventually navigate the real world where unannounced deceptions occur and
where one is forced to analyze enigmas presented by living criminals and con artists in real time.
How these kinds of willing or unwilling suspensions of disbelief are activated (whether
positive or negative; ethical or unethical; or, as is often the case, a mixture of both)? How I am
23
An excellent example of this kind of pseudo-fiction is Norma Khouri’s bestselling
autobiography Honor Lost, which was published by Random House in 2003 and revealed as a
literary hoax in 2004. Anna Broinowski’s documentary film Forbidden Lie$ (2007) is one of the
most stunning records ever made of a con artist’s ability to lie, manipulate, deceive and charm
individuals.
77
persuaded by language, its tone, and its narrative arrangement to do what it says (even if what it
says is normally thought of as impossible)? These questions are what is being studied in this
dissertation by looking closely at a variety of media. Why? Because life is and always has been
intermedial.
This chapter has outlined the conceptual tools as well as the three media (fiction, film and
live performance) through which the processes of reception and adaptation will be studied as
they apply to magic. Each of the three following chapters privileges one of these media and what
it teaches us about the pleasures, dangers, and possibilities of the willing suspension of disbelief.
The figure of the magician and the experience of magic as a performing art guide each
discussion. So we move onward, out of Alicandre’s cave and into the language and landscapes of
Chapter 2
The magician as he appears in the Rider-Waite Tarot deck stands before a table upon
which the symbols of the other cards rest. These represent the four suits: swords, staffs, cups and
pentacles. He is the figure capable of manipulating these signs to generate both meaning and
mystery. He holds a wand aimed towards the sky (the divine realm), while his other hand points
towards the Earth (grounded reality). Above his head floats the figure eight turned sideways,
representing infinity. This symbol is also his crown, his halo. Now imagine a young Jorge Luis
Borges standing in for the magician on the tarot card. His wand becomes a pen. The suits of the
cards become the categories into which society classifies writing. The thirteen values of each suit
become vowels and consonants that are arranged and rearranged by the author. Most Tarot decks
contain 78 cards. The magician is assigned the number one. His is a paradoxical and self-
referential card, because he is at once contained within the pack (the first of its major arcana) yet
also placed above all other cards in its hierarchy. For this reason, one of the divinatory meanings
of the card is the intoxication of power both “good” and “bad.” There is something inherently
Faustian about the figure of the magician — the paradox of the human who appears to be a deity
other fields of cultural production behind us, we now move to a sustained analysis of written
fiction and certain short stories by Jorge Luis Borges: the author as magician. Here, I propose
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that the literary mode, or genre, known as “fantastic literature” is the closest literary equivalent
1
to magic as a performing art. Magical realism, in part because of its name and in part because
many critics attribute the novels of Angela Carter, Isabel Allende, Gabriel García Márquez,
Salman Rushdie and Toni Morrison to it as a category, appears to many to be the mode of
writing most closely resembling the illusions performed by magicians. For me, however, magical
realism falls short of being the best candidate for this comparison between arts. Instead, the
powerful reality-slippage and defamiliarization experience that occurs when watching magicians
of the highest calibre perform live (my personal experience being limited thus far to practitioners
in those countries where I have studied: the United States, France, Canada, Spain and Argentina)
is far closer to the aesthetic experience created by the fantastic literature of E.T.A. Hoffmann,
Julio Cortázar and, above all, that of Jorge Luis Borges. Magical realist literature certainly
contains deep and important moments of magic, but its magic events, creatures and objects are
too often accepted as part of the diegetic universes described in those story worlds created by
The magic in Borges’ narratives is more unruly. It is not easily accepted or dismissed.
Instead, it disturbs. It dismays. Reading it leads to surrealistic dreams and waking reveries that
pose profound and sometimes troubling philosophical inquiries. In his short stories, nearly
always, magical objects and effects are encountered that cannot — and must not — be accepted
1
There will be no lengthy debate in what follows about whether the fantastic is either a
Todorov’s model has convinced most critics to label this kind of storytelling a mode. Todorov,
Jackson and Nancy Traill have all written book-length studies reformulating the fantastic
as having occurred without seriously testing the sanity of both the protagonist and the reader.
Borges reminds us that language is a complex and generative power. As we have discussed, the
power of its written form, when it comes to the experience of magic, is qualitatively different
from that of its spoken form. We have also determined, however, that these two qualitatively
different forms are never completely separate from one another: the gray zones of human
language generation (like those times when our lips barely mouth the words of a text we are
reading) unite these experiences of the spoken and the written so that they exist very near each
Examining the linguistic sleight-of-hand executed by Borges in his fantastic short stories
moves this study directly to one of the most potent sources of storytelling magic in the twentieth
century. His meta-fictional reality-bending has influenced the critical theorizing of Michel
Foucault,2 the politically volatile fiction of Salman Rushdie and continues to challenge authors
writing both magical realist and fantastic fiction today to create moments of equally troubling
impossibility.3 Borges’ stories create paradoxical receptions that break apart his readers’
2
Foucault notes in his introduction to Les mots et les choses (The Order of Things) that
one of Borges’ short piece “John Wilkins’ Analytical Language” inspired his study of language,
meta-language and the human categorizations of knowing that spring from the power of words.
3
Rushdie’s highly controversial and politically significant novel The Satanic Verses cites
Borges’ description of the Manticore in El libro de seres imaginarios (The Book of Imaginary
example of how words have the power to do what they say. In one of its scenes, an Indian man
named Saladin Chamcha is transformed into a cloven-foot goat (symbolic of his character’s role
as the book’s devil) while living in London. He is arrested, beaten and held captive in a hospital
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previous conceptions of how often and how profoundly reality and fiction mix. The result is the
liberating creation of what Galileo and Brecht, as discussed in chapter one, call the “skeptical
eye” — a way of looking at the world anew. The paradoxical reception, the dizzying reality-
slippage, the vertiginous vacillation experienced by the reader during the most magical of
Borges’ storytelling moments have the power to strip away one’s assumptions of what is possible
in life; this liberation is precisely what happens to spectators when they witness great magic. It is
a magic that defamiliarizes. In the same way that Jim Steinmeyer describes how an elegant coin
vanish causes a spectator to rethink the nature of two things that were previously familiar and
even mundane (coins and hands), Borges’ magic effects cause his readers to suddenly revaluate
the assumptions upon which they have previously been operating. This act of fiction-inspired
reevaluation increases their potential for radical and critical thought. Borges’ magician-like
narratives force readers to recognize that the illusions made possible by rituals of writing and
reading are more powerful and more applicable to the opportunities and the perils of everyday
with other Indian minorities who have transformed into monsters. When he is approached by a
Manticore, Saladin asks the creature how the police, the media and the English people have
made these transformations occur. The Manticore explains simply: “‘They describe us. . . .
That’s all. They have the power of description, and we succumb to the pictures they construct’”
(174). The suggestion, if I am reading Rushdie correctly, is that the interpretive community
surrounding these characters begins their monstrous transformation. It is completed by the Indian
men themselves, who accept this description. Through the dark magic spells of otherness and
alienation, these men internalize the monstrous perceptions of the now hostile English
life than current scholarship on the topic has thus far accounted for. Borges intrigues his readers,
he enchants them and then he explodes their realities. He defamiliarizes everyday objects (books,
disks, maps and more) by startling us when they emanate unexpected and deeply meaningful
magic. He renders us childlike before these objects, so that the next time we encounter them in
real life our conception of their possible functions and interactions with living beings has
changed.
Five of Borges’ fantastic stories guide this exploration of the unique magic his writing
allows readers to experience. “El Aleph” (“The Aleph”) is a particularly strong example of how
readers are dazzled — blinded and “dazed” (which is one of the roots of the verb “to dazzle”) to
the point of sensory overload — by what I consider to be one of the purest instances of the
fantastic literature aesthetic. The clarity and notoriety of that short story are the foundation of my
argument that fantastic literature is a didactic and sublime mode of storytelling, one that is made
possible by a particular kind of suspension of disbelief. This reading of “El Aleph” (“The
Aleph”) also classifies the story as a textbook example of Tzvetan Todorov’s original definition
of “le fantastique pur” (“the pure fantastic”) category (49; Howard 52). It therefore contrasts well
with my readings of “La muerte y la brújula” (“Death and the Compass”) and “El disco” (“The
Disk”), which are used to explode passageways into the otherwise solid and systematic
boundaries of Todorov’s theorizing. “El arte es un arma” (“Art is a weapon”), as Diego Rivera
tells us, and the magic of Borges’ writing has the power to blast through innumerable borders
(211). Reading “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” reveals another of the most magician-like
techniques that Borges employs for fracturing reality and causing the experience of what I term
“slippage” within the reader’s mind. In this story, Borges conjures objects of proof — factual
evidence that material has passed from the dream world to the real world — through his
manipulation of how his readers willingly suspend disbelief. Impossible objects of proof are
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precisely what magicians like Gabi Pareras and myself attempt to create for spectators in live,
close-up performance situations when we perform magic effects expressing his concept of magia
the fiction and non-fiction categories sets the stage for reading “El tema del traidor y del héroe”
(“The Traitor and the Hero”). Meditating upon this final story demonstrates the self-reflexive
pleasure that Borges takes in playing God. The temptation to unethically manipulate the receiver
of the text for personal glory and social gain is one of the dangers uniting the crafts of the writer
and the magician. Borges, in his most Faustian moments, teaches us how deceptive spells of
storytelling can either empower or disenfranchise the reader outside of the imaginary realm: in
life itself.
4
Gabi Pareras’ philosophy of magia ficcional is most thoroughly described in his
manuscript Alicante Ficcional, but has also been outlined in No. 14 of Roberto Mansilla’s magic
journal Profonde (August 2010). The piece of magic that I perform which best expresses
“Flowers from Paradise.” That routine is an hommage to Samuel Tayolor Coleridge and his
before breakfast.”
Fantastic literature has the power to teach even hardened, skeptical readers how to once
again believe in the impossible. As a literary genre and mode, the fantastic, I argue, is an
intrinsically didactic tool. Analyzing the complex way in which a fantastic object or event in a
story causes one to doubt the limits of mimetic reality, of genre conventions and, finally, of
reality outside of the text reveals important lessons about the relationship between how we are
deceived while reading and how we are deceived in everyday life. This discussion calls upon
both early and recent scholarship on fantastic literature to focus upon its magical effects as if
they were bursts of fire or light produced from thin air. These are moments that “dazzle” readers,
a verb which means “to daze” both the eyes and the rest of the human senses to produce the
sensation of stupefying awe. It is through this analytic emphasis upon the particular moments
that provoke a fantastic experience in readers that the subversive and defamiliarizing power of
these narratives can be understood, for these are the moments when the experience of reality-
slippage is most blatantly manifest. These are also the moments when the fantastic mode of
storytelling reveals its narrative power to authenticate and to de-authenticate — to undermine the
The structuralist poetics of Todorov and the experimental fiction of Borges are highly
complementary for investigating the in-between spaces of binary oppositions such as fiction vs.
reality. My particular definition of fantastic literature will deepen as the argument in this chapter
unfolds; however, at this point, a brief schematic summary of Todorov’s model fleshed out by
practical examples drawn from the Argentine author as well as two of his major influences (The
Arabian Nights and Edgar Allen Poe) will clarify some basic terminology and key characteristics
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of the fantastic:
uncanny marvelous
The central line in Todorov’s schematic, faithfully reproduced above, is deceptively thin.
For that thin border is specifically where the Bulgarian-born critic pinpoints the experience of the
pure fantastic — a profound vacillation in which both readers and characters can no longer
distinguish what is real from what is not. The fantastic occurs when the reader, usually in tandem
with the protagonist or the narrator of a story, encounters an event so impossible, so shockingly
incongruent with the known laws of the universe, that it produces a strong emotional and
intellectual dissonance. Our personal logic, composed of the convictions and certitudes we have
spent a lifetime forming, is suddenly thrown out the window. This sensation of free fall,
according to Todorov, is generally ephemeral (46; Howard 42). In most narratives, the author
then gives the story a final push towards either a rational explanation (the fantastic-uncanny
experiencing the fantastic event and readers along for the ride are encouraged to favor one
5
All translations of Todorov’s The Fantastic are Richard Howard’s unless otherwise
noted.
86
Todorov’s principal requirement for fantastic literature is that the model readers called
for by a story must accept the story world presented as one inhabited by living, breathing human
beings similar to themselves (37; Howard 33). In other words, the protagonist and the diegetic
universe described must persuade readers to accept them as versions of reality reasonably similar
to their own.
These two characteristics of fantastic literature — the fact that the reader is forced to
choose either rational rejection or supernatural acceptance of an impossible event and the
occurrence of that event within a real-world environment — are identical to what spectators
vacillation and discomfort in response to magic effects that I have performed come to mind
California, I once performed a piece of card magic for a woman who responded “That’s not
right. I’m Christian.” I thought that she was joking, but upon further questioning realized that she
was serious and thought that my magic effect was blasphemous. For me, this suggests that any
experience of reality-slippage in the spectator’s mind that is not overtly marked as fictional may
occasion, in Galicia, Spain, I played what I thought was a harmless magical prank when paying
for pastries at a bakery. I asked the middle-aged woman working there if I could pay in magic
Euros and handed her blank pieces of paper. When she looked at me with confusion and shook
her head, I apologized and said that I could change them into real Euros for her. After using
sleight-of-hand to create a visual transformation of the paper bills into real ones, I offered her the
proper payment. She looked deeply concerned and would not accept the money. I was confused,
because I had performed this magic effect many times with success in other parts of that same
Spanish city, Santiago de Compostela. On those other occasions, the transformation effect
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elicited smiles and delight. “No le gusta la magia, Señora?” (You don’t like magic?) I asked in
response to the baker’s expression of discomfort and distrust. She only shook her head
apprehensively and waited for me to depart. It seems likely that my performance clashed
negatively with one or more of her religious beliefs, cultural superstitions concerning magic or
stereotypes regarding foreigners. Like these surprise magic performances, which cause a
fictional event to arrive out of the blue to clash with reality, fantastic literature sometimes
The majority of Borges’ short stories begin by situating us in a world where the main
characters are subject to the same laws of nature we encounter in everyday life. Our ability to
identify with the protagonist and to accept as natural the early events of the story is precisely
what makes the fantastic event so startling when it appears. As critic José M. Martínez states,
certain mimetic techniques are required by the very structure of fantastic narratives to create a
dated historical context for the development of the plot, the presence of the
beginning of the story, and the typical skepticism of the narrator, character
“El Aleph” (“The Aleph”) relies upon several of these verisimilar devices. It begins with slow-
paced, first-person narration describing Buenos Aires in the 1930s and the death of a woman
who was an intimate friend (Beatriz Viterbo). Among other observations the protagonist
describes his distaste for the late Beatriz’s pedantic first cousin — Carlos Argentino Daneri
(whose middle name mocks Argentine pedantry). Borges (both the author and protagonist) is
forced to listen to Carlos Argentino’s pretentious poetry every year on the occasion of his
88
memorial visits to Beatriz’s family home. The mundane nature of these annual conversations is
finally interrupted by what Borges can only explain as Carlos Argentino having lost his mind.
The man claims that the Aleph, a supernatural presence, inhabits his cellar. When the absolutely
skeptical narrator, enshrouded by the darkness of the basement, suddenly sees “una pequeña
esfera tornasolada, de casi intolerable fulgor” (“a small iridescent sphere of almost unbearable
brightness”) (1068; Hurley 283), the story enters the realm of fantastic literature. And in this
wondrous moment, as the narrative prose spirals into a fragmented, page-long litany of the
infinite images contained in the tiny Aleph (an impossible list, for the Aleph displays the entire
universe at once), as Borges weeps in response to encountering the supernatural, both the
But what type of awe? In addition to the intense vacillation between the real and the un-
real identified by Todorov, the tremulous effect of the fantastic that I experience when reading
“El Aleph” (“The Aleph”) is more precisely described in Immanuel Kant’s “Analytic of the
Sublime.” For him, writing in the eighteenth century, the sublime is a formlessness, a
encounter with the Aleph just described. Kant emphasizes: the sublime is that “in comparison
with which everything else is small” (134). Indeed, those who see The Aleph and are bombarded
with its vastness feel minuscule by contrast. As an additional distinction, the philosopher
separates the experience of the sublime from the pleasure associated with the experience of
charm or beauty (which are positive pleasures); instead, he defines the sublime as a “negative
Friedrich Schiller, one of Kant’s German contemporaries, echoes this dichotomy of the
beautiful and the sublime by likening them to two genii that accompany us throughout life. I
wish to add the image of these genii to this dissertation’s definition of the fantastic reception
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experience and its potential for life-changing epiphanies. These genii, I like to imagine, sat on
the shoulders of Galileo as he wondered at the pendulum movements of the chandelier described
in chapter one. In Schiller’s philosophy, the guardian genie representing beauty is linked to
natural, physical perceptions and the earthly senses of the world; the second attendant spirit, who
is “tacit” and “solemn,” represents the sublime and has the power to move us beyond the
shackles of reality to fly over and across “vertiginous depths” (197). Though this second genie is
more ominous, Schiller argues that it ultimately serves to liberate and instruct mankind in a way
that beauty cannot. From this perspective, one that combines Todorov’s literary theory with
German philosophy, the tears shed by Borges in “El Aleph” (“The Aleph”) are not in response to
pure beauty or to pure horror; instead, they are a mixture of both. The tears are a spontaneous
overflow, a débordement, expressing the Kantian state produced by an object whose aesthetical
appreciation combines these two aesthetic experiences: terror mixed with beauty. This is similar
to the experience of standing too close to a large waterfall. This sublime reception of a highly
unusual object (in this case, the fantastic Aleph) “stretches the imagination to its limit” and
thereby signals a special order of awe (Kant 151). The Aleph, as a sublime and fantastic being,
brings with it connotations of violence and negative pleasure. Its infinite nature and undeniable
presence in Carlos Argentino Daneri’s basement shatter the protagonist’s previously stable
conception of reality.
The Aleph also resides within the thin black line of Todorov’s schematic that separates
the moment of astonishment — of absolute vacillation — from the “fantastic-uncanny” and the
supernatural phenomena in reality? Granted, the reality in question belongs to the diegetic
universe of the short story in which the reader is currently immersed through the shared
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perceptions and thoughts of the protagonist. Still, the question remains: How shall we explain the
individual readers will have to questions raised by the ambiguous quality of the fantastic.
However, fantastic literature can be categorized based on suggestions offered by the author at the
chosen phrase) who is open to the experience of the fantastic and who will reject reading the text
as merely “allegorical” or “poetic” is assumed (Todorov 35-37; Howard 32-33). This reader is
similar to Umberto Eco’s model reader and is part of the structural rigidity or narrowness of
Todorov’s conceptualization that my argument seeks to loosen. Eco’s model reader, double-
model reader and negative model reader categories offer a more broad and nuanced approach to
imagining such hypothetical readers than Todorov’s (see chapter one, section 2.2).
One response the reader may have to the fantastic is to simply accept and marvel at the
impossible. Borges frequently ends his tales with acceptance of the supernatural — a synthesis of
reality as conceived before and after a story’s fantastic event(s). As a result, his characters must
frequently alter their previous and otherwise rational world views (by this I mean views that are
considered normative and rational within a given culture at a given time) to make space for
mysterious entities or objects that exist beyond common understanding. For example, the
persistence of mystery and recognition of the supernatural expressed in the final paragraphs of
“El Aleph” (“The Aleph”), when the narrator insists that he did see the impossible, locate the tale
The other principle strategy, which is not offered to readers of “El Aleph” (“The
Aleph”), is to demystify the fantastic event with a convincing, rational explanation. This would
be the equivalent of a magician revealing the methods of his magic at the end of a performance
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(or at least appearing to, as English magician Darren Brown so often does).6 Borges rarely
demystifies. Other impossible objects from his fiction — the Zahir (a twenty-centavo coin with
demonic powers),7 a tiny yet impossibly heavy metal cone (from the world of “Tlön”),8 the
infinite book in “El libro de arena” (“The Book of Sand”),9 and more — echo the author’s
frequent refusal to provide the reader with any stable, scientific evidence explaining away the
fantastic. In his critical typology of fantastic objects, José Martínez argues convincingly that the
oggetto mediatore — the object of proof — is in fact presented by Borges as scientific evidence
verifying the fantastic.10 In these cases, the impossible, supernatural object is accepted and
It is no surprise that Borges’ particular style of fantastic literature and impossible object
creation is directly influenced by the blue flower of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. The flower is
plucked from the gardens of paradise in a dream and appears, impossibly, the next morning in
6
See, in particular, the recording of Darren Brown’s stage show Something Wicked This
Way Comes.
7
See Jorge Luis Borges’ “El Zahir” (“The Zahir”), 1037.
8
See Jorge Luis Borges’ “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” 833.
9
See Jorge Luis Borges’ “El libro de arena” (“The Book of Sand”), 69.
10
Again, see José M. Martínez’s “Subversion or Oxymoron?: Fantastic Literature and the
Metaphysics of the Object.” As his title indicates, Martínez offers a non-traditional argument
within the fantastic discourse. Using a wealth of examples of impossible objects from Latin
American short stories, he argues that the proof of the fantastic event offered by these physical
the reality of the dreamer.11 The undeniable presence of the object records a tangible breach of
the reality/fiction boundary within a story and within the mind of the reader. As Marianne Moore
states so lucidly in a poem on the art of poetry, the goal is to present for the reader’s inspection
have “the willing suspension of disbelief.” This is a key phrase for understanding how the
fiction/reality threshold is crossed to allow flowers, frogs and Alephs to exist in places they
In this idea originated the plan of the Lyrical Ballads; in which it was agreed that
least romantic; yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a
willing suspension of disbelief for the moment which constitutes poetic faith.
As one of the founders of romanticism in English literature, Coleridge’s task, outlined above, of
endowing supernatural characters with a certain amount of natural truth (or believability) is
nearly one century and a half removed from Borges’ short stories (which slightly pre-empt
though significant temporal, geographic and stylistic differences divide the two authors, the
radically test the limits of poetic faith through written storytelling, unites them.
11
See Borges’ “La Flor de Coleridge” (“Coleridge’s Flower”), 18-20.
12
See Marianne Moore’s “Poetry,” 36-37.
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In this exploration of fantastic literature via Borges, the willing suspension of disbelief is
conceived of as a contractual agreement entered into by the reader as he or she understands the
rules of fiction-making proposed by the author. This employment of the phrase differs
description, which privileges the moral and religious connotations of his day. The word willing is
emphasized to call attention to the voluntary and active participation of the reader once engaged
with a text. When experimental literature transgresses the fiction/reality boundary, at what point
are readers pleasantly surprised by being deceived and at what point do they feel abused,
This question will be reiterated as the short stories examined become increasingly
controversial, but a partial answer begins to take shape by joining Coleridge’s phrase to the
criticism of Fredric Jameson. Anyone watching, reading or listening to a story tends to employ
the willing suspension of disbelief automatically (based on media-specific cues), because this
faculty of the imagination is conditioned by established social conventions. Aural and visual
gestures tap into a codified form of communication cued by normative behaviors and agreed
upon regulations.13 In the case of literature, Jameson points out that genres (tragedy, comedy,
romance and so forth) are written agreements between authors and readers; they are literary
standards designed to provide the context for communication that we usually have during face-
to-face encounters (135). Half of the fun in storytelling, however, is the point when a storyteller
subverts expected genre norms to transgress the contract entered into by transmitter and receiver.
Fantastic literature and unannounced magic performances both breach the willing suspension of
13
See my discussion of interpretive communities and conventions of belief that are
effective technique of defamiliarization in both writing and performance, enacted by the hands of
both authors (holding pens) and magicians (holding wands). It is also a dangerously transgressive
storytelling technique, one which risks offending, threatening and disturbing receivers for the
Rosemary Jackson, along with an entire wave of critics inspired by her book Fantasy:
The Literature of Subversion, argues for the revolutionary potential of fantastic literature; she
renders the fantastic radical by arguing that it “. . . points to or suggests the basis upon which
cultural order rests, for it opens up, for a brief moment, on to disorder, on to illegality, on to that
which lies outside the law, that which is outside dominant value systems” (4). While Jackson’s
statement is an accurate description of most fantastic literature, it is especially true for the
subversive power of Borges’ short stories. Yet regardless of how subversive a given piece of
fiction may be, it is the scholar’s task to help direct its potential energy to various aesthetic and
political ends as well as to specific contexts; the author provides the explosives, but the receiver
must strategically detonate the package. In this section, analysis of Borges’ fantastic tales will be
planted within and detonate the rigid, structuralist walls of Todorov’s model (developed in the
Borges’ techniques for creating volatile fantastic moments and objects within his short
stories are inspired by Coleridge and at least two other literary predecessors: the anonymous
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authors of The Arabian Nights and Edgar Allen Poe. Each of these influences provides a clear
example of the two outermost categories in Todorov’s schematic: the “marvelous” and the
“uncanny” (see fig. 1). Aladdin’s wondrous lamp is a “marvelous” rather than a “fantastic” or a
storytelling genre invoked to accept the supernatural as natural from the very outset. As in many
fairy tales or epics (such as The Odyssey), the magical objects, the geniis and the talking animals
of The Arabian Nights produce wonder in the reader, but they are par for the course. Like
Aladdin’s lamp, their appearance within the story does not generate a severe rupture within
reality, because the fictional characters acknowledge that magic, supernatural beings and other
impossible creatures exist. For example, the King’s Vizier suspects that Aladdin used sorcery to
build his palace early on in the narrative of the lamp; wizardry in the world of that tale and others
from The Arabian Nights is simply a part of the diegetic universe constructed and the fiction-
making contract being negotiated (142). Furthermore, the mimetic techniques employed (third-
person narration, indistinct dates and geographical locations as well as a lack of documentary-
like presentation, etc.) cue readers, such as Borges when he first read the tales or Sir Richard
Burton (whose translation dominates the English reception of them), to marvel at a time and
A moment of pure fantastic vacillation, like the one generated by Borges’ “El Aleph”
(“The Aleph”), is similarly lacking in Poe’s “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” but for converse
reasons. The mimetic verisimilitude of Auguste Dupin’s Paris, as well as the detective’s
skepticism, construct the perfect ambiance for what Todorov defines as the fantastic. Poe simply
chooses to not invoke the supernatural in his narrative. The double murder of Madame
L’Espanaye and her daughter creates a central and profound mystery within the story, but
otherworldly forces are never extended to the reader as a possible explanation. Dupin does not
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conjecture that evil spirits somehow entered and exited the locked-room environment of the
crime scene; instead, he rationally deduces that a bizarre and unfortunate coincidence of events
has occurred. In the end, an escaped orangutan is discovered to be the “uncanny” yet rational
explanation for the gruesome crimes committed. The thought of wild animals loose and roaming
the streets of a major metropolis is deeply frightening rather than fantastic, because though such
an event is not plausible, it is possible. This plausible/possible point of distinction is also what
separates most urban legends (the one about a man killed by crocodiles in the sewer system, or
the one about the child who was given an apple filled with razorblades for Halloween), which
inspire terror within the secular realm of the city imagination without invoking the
“accent is on the reader’s fear, not his hesitation” (152). The reader hesitates as if a crack in
reality has broken the ground beneath his or her feet: the reader is at a loss as to which side of
Todorov makes a clarifying linguistic analogy between three grammatical tenses and the
three categories focused on thus far — the pure fantastic, the marvelous and the uncanny. These
tenses emphasize the lifespan of the “fantastic” moment: the duration of ambiguity as
experienced by the protagonist and reader. He likens the “marvelous” to the future (the unknown
or the hypothetical), the “uncanny” to the past tense (the familiar or the known) and the pure
“fantastic” to the present tense (an evanescent, indeterminate state). He also performs a close
14
Two of the most recent and comprehensive books cataloguing such urban legends and
analyzing their social functions are Gail de Vos’ Tales Rumors, and Gossip: Exploring
Contemporary Folk Literature in Grades 7-12 (1996) and What Happens Next?: Contemporary
reading of the ubiquitous imperfect tense in Aurelia, highlighting the linguistic doubt Gérard de
Nerval invokes to intensify the sensation of uncertainty surrounding that narrative’s fantastic
events (42; Howard 38). This analogy is helpful, because it touches upon the motion and
movement of time as marked out by language and how time seems to stop or go haywire in the
Our definitions of exactly when tomorrow becomes today or today becomes yesterday
are foggy without the artificial aid of a clock, one of our most common authenticity devices.
Time, like language, is not only in constant motion, its motion is also bumped and nudged as
each subjective individual perceives it. Although Todorov’s analogy recognizes the slipperiness
of language, the black and white categories of the fantastic in his schematic are too fixed to
Instead of attempting to argue and explicate fantastic narratives into the four, well-
defined units separated by lines, why not imagine the stories in question as textual spheres which
marvelous,” and “marvelous” categories in question? Mapping out and justifying smaller or
larger orbits for fantastic stories which trespass these categories in varying degrees are
reasonable tasks for the literary critic. At the very least, a greater range of motion — the motion
of the living text (alive because it comes to life in the minds of flesh-and-blood readers) — will
be expressed in this adapted theoretical model of the fantastic. Borges’s stories swing through
the walls of Todorov’s model like wrecking balls. His work forces the model to fracture and
change. Here is an illustration of the trajectories, wreckage and weathering that occur when the
I will argue that the above visual, from left to right, traces the paths of Borges’ “La
muerte y la brújula” (“Death and the Compass”), “El Aleph” (“The Aleph”) and “El disco” (“The
Disk”) as they travel through the space of Todorov’s categories. The left and right poles in this
schematic have already been established — the pure “uncanny” territory of “The Murders in the
Rue Morgue” and the pure “marvelous” zone of “Aladdin; or the Wondrous Lamp.” The central
plane — the apex of the “fantastic” — has also been exemplified by the climactic and ambiguous
conclusion of “El Aleph” (“The Aleph”). The time has come to challenge, to break through and
to break open these divisionary planes with the aid of two of Borges’ more volatile fantastic
stories. One key object in each story will reflect the frequent movement of these texts through
and between the boundaries Todorov attempts to stabilize in his discussion of fantastic literature.
It must be kept in mind that the image above is a snapshot of a process that is in constant motion.
The text spheres should be imagined as moving forward and gyrating at different velocities.
15
This graphic is my own adaptation of Todorov’s model.
99
Their locations within these fantastic categories are never exact; they spin from one place to
another as various events occur within a story and as various readers respond to new
determine a specific, static position of a fantastic text at any one time. Therefore, this model
The closest Borges comes to a fantastic object in “La muerte y la brújula” (“Death and
the Compass”) is the “Tetragrammaton” — the ineffable, four-lettered name of God in the
Hebrew tradition, which up to the end of the short story suggests a supernatural motivation for
the crimes. The omniscient, third-person narration describes Erik Lönnrot as a detective who
“aventurero” (“gambler”) (892; Hurely 147). This direct reference to Poe’s typically “uncanny”
brand of detective fiction (based on strange yet natural occurrences) begins to situate “La muerte
y la brújula” (“Death and the Compass”) in that same category (see the far lefthand side of the
visual above). However, in a break from the stylistics already discussed in “The Murders in the
Rue Morgue” and from the narration techniques employed by Borges in “El Aleph” (“The
Aleph”), Detective Lönnrot investigates four crimes in a city that has neither a specific location
in time (a year is never given) nor a stable geographic location. He finds the phrase — “La
primera letra del Nombre ha sido articulada” (“The first letter of the name has been written”) —
typed by the typewriter of the first victim, Dr Yarmolinsky, found dead in his room at the Hotel
du Nord (893; Hurley 155). The French name calls to mind Paris. The second crime representing
the second letter of the Tetragrammaton seems to corroborate this when Daniel Simón Azevedo
is killed in what is only described as the western outskirts of “la capital” (“the capital”) (894;
Hurley 149). However, like the mixed nationalities and cultural identities suggested by the
names of the characters in the story, the place names of the third and fourth crimes frustrate any
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attempt on the reader’s part to connect the mimetic world to one particular city in reality. The
penultimate crime occurs in the “Liverpool House” pub (owned by the Irish character Finnegan),
which is located on another French street — the “Rue de Toulon” (894; Hurley 152). This
postmodern mixture of specific cultural identities and connotations combined with otherwise
fragmented and vague environmental descriptions of the city as a whole mirrors the hodgepodge
The “compass” which leads Detective Lönnrot to the final crime scene is composed of
the following rational and irrational ingredients: a page of the city (whichever it may be) torn
from a Baedeker map, the four cardinal directions on a navigator’s compass, the four dates of the
crimes (a murder is committed on the same day of each month) and the four letters of the
Tetragrammaton — YHVW (Yahweh). Towards the end of the narrative, it seems that Borges
shatters this compass and reveals it to be an illusion of rational evidence mixed with a mystical
search for the name of God. Detective Lönnrot, imagining that his unorthodox navigational
device has solved the crime, that it has pointed him to the exact location and time at which a
Cabbalistic sect is about to commit its final murder, is deceived. Red Scharlach, an enemy
seeking personal vengeance, captures the investigator at the final location (“Villa-Triste-le-Roy”)
and explains that all of these elements — the Tetragrammaton, the map, the compass, and the
predictable dates of the crimes — are his own contrivances, a cunning hoax, a labyrinth designed
to mislead the detective (898-899; Hurley 155). This trickery replaces the supernatural
explanation of the crimes with a rational one, temporarily pushing the story into the “uncanny”
territory.
However, Lönnrot’s final dialogue with Scharlach is a discussion about the next avatars
of their lives. Before the final shot of the story is fired, Borges pushes the reader once more
towards the fantastic. Though the Tetragrammaton is demystified as an artifice, both the
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detective and the criminal mastermind agree to the cosmic nature of their conflict. Like much of
Borges’ detective fiction, this postmodern murder mystery resists classification; it crosses back
and forth between the “uncanny” and the “fantastic-uncanny” as if it were a round ball skirting
square holes. It proposes supernatural forces, replaces them with a rational explanation and then
invokes the supernatural once again (reincarnation and a potentially endless repetition of the
detective/criminal duel) (899; Hurley 156). As critic Maurice J. Bennett concludes, despite
Borges’ skepticism regarding a specific cosmic order, the author returns most frequently to a
“pantheistic notion of the universe as an emanation of God” (267). Somewhere between the cold
hard facts explaining a murder case and the mystical possibility of life after death — between the
“uncanny” and the “fantastic-uncanny” — the textual sphere of “La muerte y la brújula” (“Death
Another circular object from Borges’ repertoire of fantastic literature breaks through the
boundary separating the “marvelous” and the “fantastic-marvelous” on the right-hand side of
Todorov’s model. “El disco” (“The Disk”) strains genre classifications. Because it is nestled
between two other short stories, “Avelino Arredondo” and “El libro de arena” (“The Book of
Sand”), both of which situate their narratives in specific times and places with documentary-like
precision, the opening line of “El disco” (“The Disk”) becomes even more ambiguous and
difficult to assign to a specific genre of fiction. “Soy leñador” (“I am a woodcutter”), begins the
first-person narration of a man who is only able to describe his mimetic reality in the most basic
terms (66; Hurley 447). Read in isolation, this statement as well as the protagonist’s self-
proclaimed ignorance of the ocean or anything else beyond the section of forest in which he lives
suggests to the reader that a fairy tale or a fable, possibly set in medieval times, is being told.
However, these narrative cues are subtle enough so that those who read these short stories as a
connected series of fictions might assume the woodcutter to be an ordinary person living in a
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world subject to the same laws of physics as our own. Therefore, when an old vagabond appears
and tells the forest dweller that he is the secret king of the world, because he holds the disk of
Odin, the narrator, as well as the reader, believes the elderly man to be crazy. The woodcutter’s
rational skepticism persists until he is allowed to briefly touch the disk, described as the only
object on earth that has one side. At this moment of fantastic vertigo, created by the perceptual
incongruity of seeing nothing in the old man’s palm yet feeling the “cold,” unmistakable
substance of the object with his own fingertips, the protagonist vacillates between belief and
experience. Moments later, however, this gives way to such strong conviction that the
woodcutter uses his axe to murder the vagabond with the intention of stealing the disk and its
power. This acceptance of the impossible object’s existence by both characters, along with the
lack of immediately recognizable genre-flagging phrases (such as “once upon a time . . .”), at
first causes the short story to swing into the territory of the “fantastic-marvelous.” Yet despite the
movement of “El disco” (“The Disk”) towards what Todorov would call the pure fantastic, one
element of the narrative in particular causes it to spin back towards the “marvelous” literature
zone.
Borges’ allusion to Odin (the supreme god and creator in Scandinavian mythology),
combined with the abnormal characters and setting in “El disco” (“The Disk”), sends the text
into the realm of mythology. Parallel to the earlier discussion of The Arabian Nights, wondrous
objects from epic literature such as The Odyssey or The Iliad do not qualify as fantastic. The
magic of Eris’ golden apple or of Hermes’ winged sandals, like the gods themselves, are
accepted as natural components of mimetic reality once the stylistic presentation of an author
invokes the myth genre. The fact that both characters in “El disco” (“The Disk”) are not
individuals one can easily imagine encountering in daily life, along with their acceptance of
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Odin’s ability to bestow magical powers upon a circular object, cues the reader to imagine the
still extraordinary turn of events as taking place in a fantasy realm that is incompatible with the
realistic setting described by “El Aleph” (“The Aleph”). On the other hand, Odin never actually
appears in “El disco” (“The Disk”) and the narrative signals for a mythological reading are not
explicit. Indeed, it is never clear whether the woodcutter actually understands who Odin is. He
murders based upon the sensory evidence of the one-sided disk that his perceptions provide and
the promise of secret power described by the old man. Furthermore, after the crime is committed,
the semi-invisible disk falls to the forest floor and is apparently lost forever. As the aging
woodcutter continues a possibly endless search for his one-sided prize, the story leaves readers
without compelling proof of the fantastic. Like Odin’s disk, the story oscillates between two
worlds: one of strict mythology (the “marvelous”) and another similar to our own in which the
to amaze, astound.”
— Borges
The previous analyses of “La muerte y la brújula” (“Death and the Compass”) and “El
disco” (“The Disk”) have engaged the question of how authentic/fake and fiction/reality
oppositions appear within the diegetic worlds produced by Borges. The focus has been placed on
fantastic objects, which are experienced as impossible objects that somehow breach and
detective story, at one extreme, and the fairy-tale-like narratives from The Arabian Nights, at the
other — have been compared to several of Borges’ early, postmodern twists on these genres. “El
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Aleph” (“The Aleph”), has thus far offered the clearest example of the pure fantastic and what I
consider to be the literary equivalent of a performed magic effect. We see the reality-testing of
Borges, as the protagonist and first-person narrator in that story, go haywire (along with our
own) when the supernatural Aleph enters to create a profound sense of reality-slippage. This
slippage occurs within a diegetic world that most readers would consider extremely similar to
their own. However, the genre of this short story, which might be called a fantastic version of
autobiographic metafiction,16 is far from the most extreme example of how Borges (the author)
their disbelief. One of the reasons that these stories of his are ideal for expressing the disruptive
power of magic as a performing art, is that Borges conjures up impossible objects of proof using
The case of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” (“Tlön” henceforth) reveals a different, more
hoax-like layer of Borges’ narrative technique for creating the strange vacillation that we identify
with fantastic literature. This story raises the stakes of impossible object creation, because its
construction breaches both the fiction/reality borders within its diegetic world and without,
extending beyond that diegetic world to the realm of factual writing. It does so by presenting
itself at times as a rigorous piece of non-fiction. Readers of “Tlön” are cued to engage in a
particular type of reading as reality-testing due to the short story’s stylistic resemblance to an
academic article (which in part explains the ample attention it has received from literary critics).
15
For an in-depth discussion and definition of the postmodern characteristics of
“historiographic metafiction,” whose definition I am playing with a bit here, see Linda
As a result, the clash of the reader’s reality testing mode with the descriptions of fantastic objects
presenting themselves as facts is disarming and unsettling in a qualitatively different way from
what readers experience in “El Aleph” (“The Aleph”). The performance equivalent of “Tlön”
would be a more premeditated and extreme version of an unannounced magic effect or a piece of
guerrilla theatre or a hoax than the examples that I have provided thus far. “Tlön” transforms the
In addition to creating several fantastic objects in its text and satisfying the mimetic
the reader to Borges’ partner in authorial crime. The narrator and author of the short story, once
again both are Borges, begin by recounting a quotation concerning mirrors that Adolfo Bioy
Casares cites during one of their evening chats. Intrigued by those lines from an entry reprinted
in the tenth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, Borges searches for the citation his friend
mentioned (831; Hurley 69). When he is unable to locate any trace of the phrase, he suspects that
Bioy Casares invented the existence of the reference as a modest and playful form of deception.
This suspicion of his friend and collaborator is particularly amusing when read in conjunction
with knowledge of their works published under the joint-pseudonym H. Bustos Domecq —
literary tricksters, one surmises, will even suspect their collaborators. However, the skepticism of
the protagonist, along with the model reader’s, is dispelled once Bioy hands over a tangible copy
of the encyclopedic entry in question, which is attributed to one of Tlön’s “heresiarchs” (from
the Greek for leader or founder of a school or sect) (831; Hurley 69).
There are several noteworthy moves made by the author to create a distinctly authentic
academic ambience in “Tlön.” First, an invitation is given to informed readers to conflate, in part
or in full, the close, personal relationship Borges and Bioy Casares had in reality as Argentine
literati with their relationship as imitated in the fictional world of the narrative; second, authentic
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and fake references to authors such as De Quincey (authentic) and Silas Haslam (fake) appear
side by side to either directly or indirectly corroborate the existence of scholarly references to
Tlön;17 third, the central, fantastic object — A First Encyclopaedia of Tlön Vol. XI, which depicts
its strange world — is discovered by Borges in the second subsection of the short story. The
sense of vertigo or “dizziness” the protagonist describes when he first holds a weighty volume of
a secret society’s works of culture, humanities and sciences is a fantastic moment of ambiguous
recognition (833; Hurley 71). The uneasiness which this discovery provokes in Borges the
protagonist is evidence of his instinctual desire to deny that such a book could exist. By
introducing a passing reference to Tlön in the preliminary section of the story, by materializing
an entire encyclopedia devoted to the society in the second, and by describing physical evidence
of fantastic objects from Tlön in the third or “postscript” section of the narrative, Borges
consistently reinforces a simulation of academic rigor to justify the increasingly fantastic events
diegetic world. “Section I,” “Section II” and the “Postscript—1947” section each represent
different versions of the narrator/protagonist Borges. The everyday setting and academic
conventions established in the first third of the narrative lay the foundations of the story’s basic
mimetic reality. This layer allows for the mise en abyme effect produced in the second section,
when the fantastic encyclopedia of “Tlön” appears and a much altered Borges delves into the
details of the secret world’s languages and impossible duplicate objects known as “hönir.” These
last items are based on a convincing, alternate conception of physics and psychology (839;
16
For a critical guide to these and Borges’ other fake/authentic references, see Evelyn
Hurley 77). The encyclopedia should not exist, but it does. This is the object of proof bridging
the first mimetic world (similar to the reader’s) to the alien territory of “Tlön.” Thus, there is a
With these layers of the narrative firmly linked together, one embedded in the other via
the encyclopedia as fantastic object, a third, retrospective version of Borges — whose tone is that
of the author revealing the mechanics of his work — delivers a diabolical postscript. This final
section initially appears to be a rational explanation of Tlön and its encyclopedias as a giant
fictional undertaking financed by a millionaire named Ezra Buckley and executed by as many as
three hundred members of his organization (841; Hurley 79). Ah, sighs the reader, all of this was
an elaborate hoax. The literature, the science, the objects with impossible physical properties
were all part of a twisted dream and this Borges, the author behind the curtain of the short Tlön
story, is writing a postscript to explain away any ambiguity. Yet it is precisely at this moment of
relaxation, in this space of the story assumed to be removed both in time (the postscript date is
1947) and in authorial tone (as indicated by self-reflexive observations on the writing process),
that Borges most thoroughly contaminates all three mimetic layers discussed. Sustaining the
serious, rational tone of his postscript, he describes a small Tlönian compass discovered by
someone in Paris, followed by his own eyewitness encounter in Cuchilla Negra, Argentina, of
impossibly heavy metal cones (made from alien metal). The last of these fantastic intrusions, of
these oggetti mediatori that serve as tangible, scientific evidence of a breach between the
fictional and the real, is the most disturbing. Not only do multiple characters portrayed in the
narrative experience the metal cones as discomfortingly otherworldly, they are also linked to the
otherworldly phenomena causes the “Tlön” narrative to wobble between offering rational,
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skeptical explanations and acknowledging the existence of a secret, mystical society along with
its supernatural universe. At various points, the short story can therefore be classified as either
the two categories causes “Tlön” to orbit almost directly above the same space as “El Aleph”
On a biographical and historical level, “Tlön” offers an excellent point of departure for
exploring Borges’ unusually early tendency to subvert academic conventions for fictional use.
Kimberly A. Nance’s article, “Borges and Georgie,” is a compelling analysis of the influence the
Argentine author’s younger, reading self had upon his older, writing self. After outlining the
body of critical work devoted to studying Borges’ early influences and his biography, Nance
makes a strong argument that the author’s early fascination with the genre conventions of
fantasy, detective stories, epics, folklore and academic literature (encyclopedias, scholarly
articles, etc.) led him to master the conventional codes employed by these types of texts early in
his career. This resulted in his mixture of them in his later work to produce a sense of “textual
vertigo” (23). Nance’s lucid analogy of the medical definition of vertigo (when the
technique of embedding two conflicting sets of conventions within the same story is a significant
contribution to current scholarship investigating the fantastic. She indicates that he escaped mid-
career boredom with conventional storytelling codes by engaging in experimental parodies of the
detective story with Adolfo Bioy Casares. She also argues that Borges wrote short stories which
Borges begins a story by deploying a given set of narrative conventions (from the
vast inventory that he had observed and cultivated) to evoke a corresponding set
Nance describes the signal-flare phrases of literature — “Once upon a time,” “yesterday in the
park,” and so forth — as part of a storytelling communication system that readers acquire at a
very early age, the age of bedtime stories and campfire tales. Therefore, she sees the way in
which both writers and readers learn to navigate these codes, to play with them and to parody
them, as an intensely folkloric process. This process begins during children’s early, oral
As a mature writer, Borges took advantage of more than just the stock, oral storytelling
phrases that cue readers to begin reading a story with a particular genre of fiction in mind.
Knowing that footnotes with specific bibliographic information and academic formatting cause
readers to enter into a specific kind of tacit consent (in this case a non-verbal agreement with the
author that what is read is non-fiction), Borges renders the impossible objects in “Tlön” that
much more disturbing and magical. They are received as more real, more factual, because they
are found mixed in with what readers have been taught to interpret as a more rigorous mode of
writing. Thus the fantastic short story “Tlön” gives us the feeling that it has been fact-checked
Different reader expectations and different claims of stable reality lead to different kinds
skeptic James Randi. With the help of Randi, two young sleight-of-hand and mentalist
performers (Steven Shaw, also known as Banachek, and Michael Edwards) used magic
Missouri, that they had supernatural powers. Dr. Peter Phillips, a physicist, and Mark Schafer, a
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psychokinetic metal bending under stringent laboratory conditions at the university. The
researchers, though they could never verify their subjects’ extra sensory abilities in the lab,
reported encouraging results during their exploratory tests and were informally convinced of
Shaw’s and Edwards’s genuine abilities to perform psychokinesis (Thalbourne 362-363). These
two performers, who applied to the study as a hoax, seemed to always perform the impossible on
the edge of scientific proof — bending spoons and reading minds. They managed these feats just
frequently enough outside of the lab that the scientists felt they had found experiment
participants with psychic abilities and reported this to their parapsychology colleagues.
James Randi revealed the hoax that he had orchestrated shortly thereafter, which created
a large amount of negative publicity for both the university and its researchers. Responses to the
hoax have been extremely diverse. One of the most thorough and interesting discussions of the
ethical issues surrounding the hoax itself and the difficulty of conducting scientific studies of
supernatural phenomena is titled “Science Versus Showmanship: A History of the Randi Hoax,”
which was written by a member of the University’s research team. One cannot help but let out a
Borgesian laugh while reading psychologist Michael A. Thalbourne’s article. It spends much of
its energy distinguishing between “exploratory” research and “formal” research to protect the
Washington University team from Randi’s criticism of the project’s scientific methods and
observations. How true it is, in both the short story “Tlön” and in the hoax of the McDonnell
Laboratory for Psychical Research, that the more that humans attempt to make hard distinctions
between such categories — the informal and the formal; the non-fact-checked and the fact-
checked — the more disturbing it is when supernatural phenomena appear where it seems
Unethical hoaxsters, like Borges and James Randi, manipulate the rigorous traditions of
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scientific writing and experimentation to question how the categories of “fact” versus “fiction”
are constructed and who (authors, magicians, or scientists) are the most nimble negotiators of
these realms. The manipulative and transgressive aesthetic of Borges’ short stories, show us that
the power that comes with the study of language as mediator of the human imagination tempts
Experience has demonstrated that the ignorance of the public with regard
connected with every kind of deception. If the public only knew a little
more in this respect, the thousand and one quackeries which flourish in
— Abraham Lincoln
teaches his audience a special form of skepticism. His dedicated readers become natural analysts
of deceptive practices in three ways. First, as Todorov points out, any re-reading of a fantastic
text operates as a meta-reading, because the reader cannot succumb to the fantastic text’s magic
twice. In other words, each meta-reading of a fantastic short story diminishes the “spell” the text
casts and brings its methods for casting that spell more clearly to light (Todorov 95; Howard 90).
A meta-reader of Borges is examining the backstage workings of the strong magic needed to blur
the fiction/reality boundary. Second, Borges makes clear that much if not all of the extra-textual
material (interviews, non-fictional essays, etc.) surrounding his work is suspect. This tactic
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indicates to his readers that he is actively toying with the limits of fact versus fiction within his
short stories as well as outside of them, in the documentation of everyday life. His sources must
constantly be verified. Finally, Borges pays hommage to previous authors and historical
narratives that are deceptive so as to warn us against the tendencies of certain individuals to play
God. This game of power abuse is one that Borges both exposes and knowingly plays himself.
To illustrate this last quality of his fiction more clearly, it is necessary to leave the realm of
fantastic literature and to plant our feet firmly on part of the fictional territory Todorov labels as
How do all of us, as human beings, learn to process information more carefully? How do
we learn to question our assumptions? Detective narratives like Israel Zangwill’s The Big Bow
Mystery and cloak and dagger tales such as Borges’ “El tema del traidor y del héroe” (“The
Traitor and the Hero”) are fictional stories that demonstrate how humans make false
assumptions. These two stories illustrate specific deceptive devices that can leave the aesthetic
realm and enter the political to fool the uninformed masses. Rather than going into a detailed
analysis of each work, this section will focus on key moments in the two texts when a reader or a
spectator is mislead on the basis of a false assumption. The first will illustrate the power of
breaking previously established detective story conventions, while the second will demonstrate
how a psychological device — the use of “smoke” — is used to deceive readers. Each of the
authors in question will also be discussed in terms of how their exploits are forms of playing
God.
Israel Zangwill was an English author, an early influence on Borges’ study of the
detective genre, and is credited with the invention of the “locked-room” subgenre of murder
subsequent editions of The Big Bow Mystery (1890), Zangwill explains that he had set about the
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problem of how to write and solve what is now known as the “locked-box” type of murder
mystery well before the publication process: “I said to myself one night that no mystery-monger
had ever murdered a man in a room to which there was no possible access” (8). Zangwill’s
innovative narrative structuring of a man’s murder in a completely isolated location also inspired
him to break a formerly stable murder-mystery convention. His novel is the first to give the main
These ploys against readers’ assumptions that 1) the detective cannot possibly be the
murderer, and 2) that the murder takes place while the room is inaccessible, have spawned
countless variations since The Big Bow Mystery’s publication. These creative deviations from
detective story norms clearly had an influence on Borges’ experiments in the genre. In
Labyrinth”) the Argentine author directly cites Zangwill’s Victorian novella, which is seen as the
first pure example of the “locked-room” narrative (1047; Hurley 256). Borges scholars’ Evelyn
Fishburn and Psiche Hughs explain that the crimes committed in such stories are “committed in a
place where all the exits are locked from the outside and there is no criminal inside; the solution
is that the murderer is the person who discovers or pretends to discover the crime” (264). By
making that person a retired detective, Mr. Grodman, Zangwill demonstrates how his readers, up
to the point of The Big Bow Mystery’s publication, often assumed that detective characters were
free of suspicion.18 Even more fascinating than the fact that Grodman secretly murders his
neighbor, while supposedly discovering his dead body, is his more deeply seated motive for the
18
It might be argued that this assumption is less common since the popularity of Agatha
Christie’s stage play The Mousetrap, which anticipates the same assumption to be made by the
receiver of the text and holds the record for the longest run ever in London: 1952 to 2014.
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crime.
The sole reason the ex-detective character commits murder is “the desire to commit a
crime that should baffle detection” (149). After retiring and publishing his memoirs, Mr.
Grodman suffers from extreme boredom and is haunted by the fact that all of the evildoers he
caught were completely unimaginative. His goal in life becomes the execution of a perfectly
undetectable crime. In the end, even though an innocent fall guy has been convicted of the crime,
the ex-detective turns himself in. He does this because he does not want a rival investigator to
receive undeserved credit for solving the crime. With stunningly egotistical panache, Mr.
Grodman confesses the entirety of his crime to the authorities. He insists that a clerk record his
words, because he wants the statement to “form the basis of an appendix to the twenty-fifth
edition — sort of silver wedding — of my book, Criminals I Have Caught” (148). In a moment
of self-reflexive mythmaking, this detective/author character both creates and solves a murder in
order to write the last chapter of his autobiography. He decides to end his career by catching
himself. The man is clearly playing God, ending someone else’s life to perfect his personal
narrative, and wants to be remembered in the history books for doing so.
Zangwill, the flesh-and-blood author of The Big Bow Mystery, also reveals a strange
assumption early readers made about his writing process and a certain pleasure in knowing that
his audience is one step behind him. This alluring power of manipulation in which creators of
murder-mysteries participate is reflected in that introduction to the book’s 1894 edition. Despite
the fact that the author had come up with a solution for his mystery well before it was serialized
in a London newspaper, The Star, he later dedicated a letter to that paper’s editors and general
readership. In the letter, he thanks the hundreds of readers who sent in unsolicited solutions for
The Big Bow Mystery as each installment was printed and circulated. The letter adopts a tongue-
in-cheek style, with its most enjoyably sarcastic moment being Zangwill’s apology for having
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chosen the murderer based on a big list where he checked-off the solutions and suspects
submitted by eager fans; thus, his hand was forced to pick the most unlikely character of all —
ex-detective Grodman — the one who helps to discover the body and solve the crime:
Had I not been impelled by this consideration I should certainly have brought in a
verdict against Mrs. Drabdump, as recommended by the reader who said that,
judging by the illustration in the “Star,” she must be at least seven feet high, and,
therefore, could easily have got on the roof and put her (proportionately) long arm
Zangwill is on one level making fun of the ludicrous, unrealistic, and overly complex
explanations that many readers came up with — none of which divined his unorthodox choice.
On a public level, the author craftily removes some of the intellectual sting his story must have
had for those readers who tried hardest to determine the mystery’s solution. On a private and
more retrospective level, the author is absolutely amazed that some readers assume that the story
was written one section at a time. This erroneous assumption was made by some, because the
novel was published in individual installments for The Star. The serialization and
commodification of the novel into newspapers sold at newsstands gave the illusion that the text
was being written in installments rather than completed in advance. His final paragraph shows
absolute shock at the fact that some readers took statements from the above citation (his public
letter) seriously, which indicates his mass audience’s inability to understand one of the mystery
story’s narrative prerequisites: “it is obvious that the mystery-story is just the one species of
story that cannot be told impromptu or altered at the last moment, seeing that it demands the
most careful piecing together and the most elaborate dove-tailing” (10). The assumption that
stories are written in the same manner that they are printed and released for public consumption
is a dangerous one. Though Zangwill is only out to deceive his readers and to write a good
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mystery for entertainment purposes, one can imagine how such storytelling tricks might be
In his short story “El tema del traidor y del héroe” (“The Traitor and the Hero”), Borges
shows exactly how assumptions about stock characters and the form in which stories are
published can be manipulated to rewrite history. Unlike Zangwill, who baffles his audience by
making his detective character a murderer, Borges turns a heroic Irish rebel into a traitor. It could
be argued that these differences have something to do with the various characteristics separating
the cloak and dagger and the detective story genres. However, I argue that the more significant
difference between these two stories is political intent. Both are murder mysteries, both break
with the assumptions readers make about diametrically opposed stock characters and both reveal
the powerful way publication media (newspapers and history books) influence reader reception.
The key difference between Zangwill’s and Borges’ stories is that the second author ends
his narrative by covering up his protagonist’s crime. He does not bring the central deception of
his story to light or its hero (secretly a traitor) to justice. Instead, Borges focuses on the process
of deception and the creation of mystery. Like a magician, he is once again more interested in the
persistence of the unexplained. For this reason, “El tema del traidor y del héroe” (“The Traitor
and the Hero”) provides an excellent example of a psychological tactic used to fool readers and
“Smoke” is a specific type of red-herring that “creates a false line of logic” rather than
merely confusing its receiver (Whaley 845). This logical fallacy — usually manifesting itself as
in the performance of a magic effect. Frequently, the magician accidentally forgets a spectator’s
name or “miscalls” the identity of a spectator’s chosen playing card in what appears to be a
moment of confusion or clumsiness. Almost always, though real mistakes do sometimes happen,
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this supposed accident is timed to create a metaphorical cloud of smoke, one that conceals the
backstage workings of the magic effect and creates a foggy, blank space in the audience’s
memory. With this in mind, let us turn our attention to Borges’ narrative account of Fergus
Kilpatrick’s mysterious death and the moment when a particularly important line of “smoke”
Otras facetas del enigma inquietan a Ryan. Son de carácter cíclico: parecen repetir
o combinar hechos de remotas regiones, de remotas edades. Así, nadie ignora que
los esbirros que examinaron el cadáver del héroe, hallaron una carta cerrada
que le advertía el riesgo de concurrir al teatro, esa noche; también Julio César, al
memorial que no llegó a leer, en que iba declarada la traición, con los nombres de
[Other aspects of the mystery disturb Ryan; certain things seem almost cyclical,
seem to repeat or combine events from distant places, distant ages. For example:
Everyone knows that the constables who examined the hero’s body found a sealed
letter warning Kilpatrick not to go to the theater that night; Julius Caesar, too, as
he was walking toward the place where the knives of his friends awaited him,
received a note he never read—a note telling him of his betrayal and revealing the
In the above quotation, Borges writes about a fictional biographer — Ryan — who is
researching the murder and subsequent martyrdom of his great grandfather, the Irish rebel Fergus
Kilpatrick. Ryan, after reading certain early nineteenth-century accounts by James Alexander
Nolan (one of his great grandfather’s right-hand men), discovers that his famous relative’s
assassination was actually an elaborately staged suicide. Someone keeps thwarting their planned
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uprisings and Nolan is commanded by Kilpatrick to find out who the traitor is within the rebel
group’s midst. In a strange plot twist, Nolan proves that Kilpatrick, the leader himself, has
betrayed the cause. As punishment for his treason, his group sentences him to death. However,
the now condemned, redemption-seeking Kilpatrick begs that his execution not harm the
rebellion effort. Nolan, with the willing help of the Irish hero-turned-traitor, carefully scripts out
a two-day sequence of events ending with an assassination attempt that both men agree upon.
Everything is successful. Kilpatrick becomes a martyr. The Irish people blame the British for the
assassination. They become enraged and as a result the rebellion is finally victorious. In short,
Nolan pulls off a perfectly successful political deception by adapting scenes from Macbeth and
Borges makes clear to the reader that generations after this mass deception, Ryan
(Kilpatrick’s great grandson) becomes suspicious of the same bit of “smoke” that so effectively
convinced the Irish population that Kilpatrick was unjustly murdered. In other words, the
unopened letter functions in two separate ways at two different historical moments. On the night
of Kilpatrick’s suicide (or staged assassination) and in the months that follow, the letter acts as a
key prop in the political play conceived by Nolan to create outrage and make the rebellion
successful: it is pure “smoke.” The unopened letter was always intended to be found sealed by
the police examining the national hero’s body to reinforce the fact that he was assassinated. To
the Irish populace it seems a tragic mistake that Kilpatrick died with the unopened letter that
could have saved him — right there, in his own pocket! The condemned man knew exactly what
was about to happen though and kept the piece of mail on his person as a kind of insurance
policy. On the night of his death in 1824, it ensured that he would be remembered as a hero
rather than a traitor. After all, why else would he be carrying that letter?
Roughly one century later, this same letter inspires Ryan to investigate the circumstances
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of his great grandfather’s death more rigorously and leads him to the conclusion that truth might
be stranger than fiction, because much of what is assumed to be true actually is fiction. Upon
uncovering the truth and unearthing Nolan’s deception, there is a moment of tension. Will Ryan,
who is about to publish a biography on Kilpatrick, reveal the hero’s unknown act of treachery?
The answer is no. Just as a magician guards the secret methods of his illusions to
produce mystery and to perpetuate belief in the impossible, Ryan chooses to silence the
discovery that would ruin Kilpatrick’s reputation (891; Hurley 146). Even though the crucial
political moment has passed and the revolution is over, the great grandson chooses to preserve
the sparkling, illusory reputation of an Irish hero. After all is said and done, the biography is
published to authenticate the same fake history so many books before had set in motion. The
fictional public within Borges’ short story world will never be told that the mysterious
assassination of Kilpatrick was a setup. The real murderers, Nolan and Kilpatrick himself, will
never be exposed. At this point, Ryan, the biographer realizes that Nolan’s manipulation of the
facts in 1824 is so powerful that he too has become part of its plot — he too has become an
accomplice. This is not the first or the last time that those writing the history books get away
with murder.
authenticity:
genuine…
legitimacy:
As “El tema del traidor y del héroe” (“The Traitor and the Hero”) demonstrates, there is
an “inheirent”19 link between the authentic and the legitimate. The historian, Ryan, despite
conflicting ethical impulses, chooses to knowingly fake history (by preparing what appears to be
an “authentic” biography of Kilpatrick) in the name of — what else? — the family name. He lies
to protect his legacy. The sense of his own personal legitimacy, as an extension of his blood
relation to a national hero, is at stake. To preserve a personal narrative, one supporting a complex
cultural and political identity, that he, his relatives and Ireland have constructed, Ryan willingly
deceives.
The subject of this final close reading has been an extension of the primary corpus
belonging to this chapter — fantastic literature — and a segue to the mode of storytelling that
will be discussed next: the con game. We are about to journey from the office of Ryan, the Irish
historian who falsifies history, to the film studios and distribution networks of Hollywood where
19
The misspelling is intentional. The legitimate heir to the rebel throne, Ryan, has
genuineness and authenticity inscribed in his bloodlines and in the letters of his family name:
Kilpatrick. What is assumed to be a non-fictional narrative — the story of his family’s power and
social status — justifies his privileged position in Ireland’s history, in a social hierarchy based on
heroes.
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This chapter has parsed certain short stories by Jorge Luis Borges to illustrate how
concepts from reader-response theory (discussed in chapter one) help to explain how magic
effects occur within spectators’ minds during the reading process. I have argued that fantastic
literature, exemplified for me by this Argentine author’s writing, is one of the closest literary
receive live magic performances. This is precisely because Borges’ writing challenges traditional
author/reader relationships and the willing suspension of disbelief process. By doing so, his work
evokes a sensation of reality-slippage within us as readers that somehow explodes our previous
conceptions of daily life. His knack for creating this unusual reception experience is so effective
that some of the twentieth century’s greatest authors and philosophers cite him as an inspiration
for thinking through impossibility. Michel Foucault states that his study on how humans classify
knowledge — Les mots et les choses (The Order of Things) — was born out of his laughter in
response to reading a page by Borges that “secoue . . . toutes les familiarités de la pensée”
(“shatters . . . all the familiar landmarks of thought”) (7). Borges’ extremely subtle and deceptive
techniques as well as the affect they create in the minds of his audience — a startling, intellectual
and emotional vacillation between what is real and what is not real — are those of a magician.
dissertation apply to Borges’ literary magic and to the lived world beyond it, five of his short
stories have been deployed. First, looking directly at the dazzling effect produced by “El Aleph”
(“The Aleph”) established the foundation of my argument that the kind of willing suspension of
disbelief generated by fantastic literature renders it a didactic mode of storytelling akin to magic
as a performing art. Analyzing the moment when the Aleph appears as a moment of sublime
reception and reading the whole story as an example of what Todorov calls “le fantastique pur”
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(“the pure fantastic”), have more clearly defined how destabilizing magic effects call out to and
produce writerly readers. As helpful as Todorov’s model of fantastic literature is, two more of
Borges’ stories “La muerte y la brújula” (“Death and the Compass) and “El disco” (“The Disk”)
were used to explode its rigid structuralism to thereby open it up further. Leonard Cohen’s words
“Forget your perfect offering / There is a crack, a crack in everything / That’s how the light gets
in” could be the refrain of those readings.20 The cracks created in Todorov’s model by Borges’
stories allow for the light given off by not just one ideal reader, but by the contributing
imaginations of a multiplicity of readers (model, double-model, negative readers and others) who
are also writers of the fantastic text as its narrative progresses. The objects of impossible proof
conjured by Borges for the reception of these readers in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” were then
compared to those that practitioners of magia ficcional (“fictional, or narrative, magic”) make
appear in the hands of their spectators. Both groups of impossible objects short-circuit the
audience’s willing suspension of disbelief to create the visceral reality-slippage that I argue is so
central to the reception of strong magic. Finally, my analysis of “El tema del traidor y del héroe”
(“The Traitor and the Hero”), along with its reference to the first locked-room murder mystery
written by Israel Zangwill, has suggested that authors, like magicians, revel in playing God and
As promised earlier, the radical potential of the techniques used in fantastic literature to
blur the lines between the fiction/reality and authentic/fake binaries will now be considered for
their applications outside of purely fictional realms. Moving from a comparative study of the
author as magician to one of the storyteller as criminal allows for a shift of emphasis from the
20
Leonard Cohen sings these words in his song “Anthem,” the fifth track on his album
mostly aesthetic concerns of the fantastic or sublime moment of deception to issues of legality.
What happens when a storyteller steals from another text without crediting it as a source? What
are the ethics of adapting a real world con game to film and how do we, as a society, respond
when that fictional adaptation subsequently becomes the model for an actual crime?
The answer to these questions reveals the common ground linking the third definitions of
“authentic,” or the “genuine,” in fiction are intrinsically connected to the rules, principles and
conventions governing law and logic (i.e., rationality) in social systems at large. But how
effective can any legal system be, which derives its authority from social conventions and
established rituals, when attempting to rein in storytellers who break the rules of fiction or the
Chapter 3
Criminal Adaptations: Hidden Intertexts in the Murder Mystery and
the Con Game
This chapter continues to investigate the relationship between playing God in fiction and
playing God in reality as these activities relate to the reception and adaptation of crimes both
imaginary and real. Conceptually, my dissertation’s argument now moves from reader-response
deception, and how successful confidence games are structured as interactive narrative
performances. For all three of these topics, the director’s cinematic mediation of the performer’s
body influences spectator reception and allows for a visual aspect of analysis that is not possible
when studying written fiction. One might argue, of course, that when we read we visualize and
this is true. However, what I wish to emphasize here is the perceptual mediation of reality
accomplished by human eyes, some techniques used to direct and therefore deceive those eyes,
and how those techniques inform directorial choices made in the mediation of filmed narratives.
With this visual preference in mind, three incarnations of the same short murder mystery
narrative — Roald Dahl’s, Alfred Hitchcock’s and Pedro Almodóvar’s versions of “Lamb to the
Slaughter” — will be explored to investigate the aesthetics and the ethics of criminal adaptation.
The murder weapon in this narrative, a leg of lamb, is similar to an object in a magic
performance, because the narration of the story causes it to suddenly appear and then disappear
as if by sleight-of-hand. The protagonist’s choice, in this narrative, to take the law into her own
hands and to cunningly deceive authorities by simulating a performance of her everyday life
activities, is a fictional example of how criminals and con artists deceive us in real life. Each of
the three media forms successfully inhabited by the adapted narrative (a short story, a television
broadcast and a film) is shown to add intertextual, intermedial and cross-cultural layers of
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meaning to “Lamb to the Slaughter.” These media are analyzed as equally important homes of
the text, thereby rejecting the “fidelity” or “bastardization” prejudice found in much adaptation
criticism. The line of thought giving rise to such prejudice against newer media forms and their
adaptations is linked to the argument that meaning is derived from a sacred and originary text. In
other words, another connection between reader-response and spectator-response is their mutual
desire to denounce any trend in criticism that privileges an “original” or “true” source of
meaning for a given narrative. Thus, this first half of the chapter celebrates what can be gained
artistically and culturally by eschewing a blind-faith approach to adapting the source text. In this
sense, it argues for the virtues of infidelity. At the same time, it ends by asking if it is possible to
construct an ethics of citation and adaptation for murder mysteries and con games. I submit that
such an ethics would make greater artistic experimentation possible while also creating more
writerly viewers: spectators with sharper abilities of enigma analysis. The faithful documentation
This question, of how to reject the “fidelity” prejudice in adaptation criticism without
neglecting or discounting the importance of historical context and cultural origins, is addressed
in the second half of this chapter’s corpus. This ethical adaptation dilemma is discussed by
analyzing fidelity issues surrounding David Mamet’s adaptation of various con games in House
of Games (1987). The complex and, at times, problematic roles played by Ricky Jay in this film
— actor, professional magician and confidence game consultant — become the center-point of
my argument that adaptations should be both faithful, when it comes to research and knowledge
of a text’s past, and free with regards to that text’s adaptations to new media or the same
medium. I read Jay’s presence as strengthening the historical accuracy of the film’s lexicon (i.e.,
con artist terminology) as well as the adapted, visual performances of the con games themselves.
Mamet’s adaptation of the performative speech-acts used in actual con games, his
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unconventional choice to place the audience in the role of mark or victim during the reception
process and the psychological principles that he borrows from confidence games to deceive the
spectators of his film are my other focal points of analysis. Here, we shall think through these
elements of adaptation in terms of faith, consent and what happens to the fiction-making contract
when events occur without a theatrical frame. Reading the short (simple, contained) and long
(extended, complex) con games in Mamet’s film allows us to compare how a film director, a
magician and real-world con artists employ similar narrative techniques to elicit the voluntary,
and sometimes involuntary, suspension of disbelief in their audiences. I will also compare how
they profit from that belief. In all of these cases, whether legally or illegally, one person is selling
— Quentin Tarantino (who stole that last line from T.S. Eliot)
Steal once and they call you a plagiarist; steal a thousand times and they call you a
genius. The art of adaptation is, in many ways, the art of creative and usually acknowledged
thievery. Sometimes a story is lifted from one medium to another (such as from a novel to a
film), but in other cases the act of theft crosses cultural borders rather than artistic ones. In 1994,
Mike White accused filmmaker Quentin Tarantino of unfairly adapting Ringo Lam’s Lung fu
fong wan (1987) to create Reservoir Dogs (released in 1992). White constructed an 11-minute
short film, titled Who Do You Think You’re Fooling? (The Story of a Robbery) (1994), which
juxtaposes the Hong Kong and the U.S. films’ strikingly similar plot elements and camera
angles. Closer scrutiny of this short piece of video criticism reveals that Tarantino and Lam’s
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films complement each other intertextually – exploring interesting parts of the narrative left
unexplored by the other. Here, I would simply like to signal the emotionally charged tone of
White’s title and how this example puts a new twist on an old prejudice that has consistently
“Who do you think you’re fooling?” is the rhetorical question shouted by the betrayed
lover to the unfaithful partner. The question is actually a statement, which assumes guilt and
expresses anger precisely because it is formed as a question: “you should have known better than
to try and lie to me” is the veiled meaning. White as a viewer had developed what he described
1
as a “love affair” with Tarantino and his films. His discovery of the filmmaker’s lack of citation,
however, was the beginning of the end of that relationship. And although White’s video
criticizing Tarantino for not citing Lam’s film as a source of inspiration is in many ways
justified, the tone of its title echoes the counter-productive and self-righteous “infidelity”
In the introductory chapter of his Literature and Film: A Guide to the Theory and
the moralistic and presumptuous tone taken by many literary critics towards adaptations (3).
Here, however, Stam is arguing against the classic prejudice of scholarly connoisseurs regarding
works of literature adapted to film. Like the majority of criticism devoted to tackling questions of
adaptation – George Bluestone’s “The Limits of the Novel and the Limits of Film,” Seymour
Chatman’s “What Novels Can Do that Films Can’t (and Vice Versa),” and Bruce Morrissette’s
1
White used this phrase to describe his initial enrapture and later disenchantment with
“Aesthetic Response to Novel and Film” to name just a few – Stam approaches the issue of
adaptation prejudice with the novel/film relationship at the theoretical forefront. But how do
Austen or Charles Dickens’ story, Mike White expresses moral outrage of a different sort; it is as
if Tarantino’s Reservoir Dogs has cheated on him (the viewer) by sleeping with another text and
then hiding that fact. In this instance of uncited and unmarked adaptation, fidelity to the
“original” text is not the main problem; instead, fidelity to the spectator (who wishes to be
informed of such textual relations) is paramount. Is there a shift in moral outrage indicative of
the different attitudes concerning cross-medium adaptations (literature to film) versus like-
medium adaptations (film to film)? And if so, how does the added element of a cross-cultural
adaptation influence that bias? In short, we are about to think through how the infidelity
discourse plays out in the field of cultural production when it is applied to changes in media,
the novel. Instead, Alfred Hitchcock, Roald Dahl, and Pedro Almodóvar’s versions of “Lamb to
the Slaughter” – a television broadcast, a short story, and part of a film respectively – will be
used to analyze the results of cross-cultural and cross-medium “translation.” I place the word
“translation” in quotation marks to indicate its near synonymous relationship to the concept of
adaptation in this discussion. This theoretical proximity is only possible based on the new brand
recoding of a text into “a new set of conventions as well as signs” (16). In that book, she also
notes that this recent conception of translation is a far cry from old-school approaches, which
idealize the “source” text and denigrate the “target” text. Since at least the beginning of the
twentieth century, adaptation critics have inherited translation critics’ biases toward the
Here, however, we will focus on the moment of contact and the process of transaction
taking place as multiple languages or texts cross paths. While others might read “Lamb to the
Slaughter” thinking of it in a chronologically determined order of creation (from the source to its
adaptations), I read it according to the necessarily unpredictable order of its reception. One of the
many benefits of focusing upon the moment of translation and reception of “Lamb to the
Slaughter” as an always already adapted text is the elimination of the typical source-to-
adaptation hierarchy. As a professional translator, adapter and screenwriter has recently argued,
translation is adaptation (Paquin 1). The Latin preposition trans – across, beyond or over –
captures the movement of “Lamb to the Slaughter” from one continent and language to the next;
the verb “adapt” – to fit or to modify – signals the text’s multi-media recoding. The combination
trans-Atlantic
English American
Short Story T.V. Episode
(Dahl) (Hitchcock)
1953 1955
“Lamb to
tra
l
ra
the
ns
ltu
Slaughter”
-lin
-cu
gu
ss
ist
cro
ic
Spanish
Film
(Almodóvar)
1984
There are surely others waiting to be discovered. Therefore, it does not assume that an “ideal”
reader (no such person exists) needs all three versions mentioned to complete some textual
2
Another adaptation of “Lamb to the Slaughter,” one not discussed here or shown in the
visual that I have created, is introduced by Roald Dahl onscreen as the fourth episode of the
British television series Tales of the Unexpected. It aired in 1979 and is notable for the heavy
puzzle to thereby unlock the secret meaning (no such thing exists) of this narrative. It has been
version of “Lamb to the Slaughter,” because the model makes no assumption as to which
incarnation of the text a viewer will receive first. A receiver may see one, two or all three
versions of the adapted text, but the order of those receptions is unpredictable. Therefore, the
purpose is to facilitate readings of each section of this central text’s tripartite and symbiotic
existence as a case study of citation practices, different medias’ aesthetic techniques and the
cultural modifications employed to make each adaptation successful. It is meant to be a tool for
the evaluation of how well a text stands on its own (is successful in its local environment) as well
as how successfully it references and co-exists with other versions of itself. For example, both
Alfred Hitchcock and Roald Dahl’s’ versions of the same story operate autonomously and
American translation. These attributes are part of what makes them such successful adaptations.
To begin, three specific moments in the TV version will be isolated and compared to
Dahl’s prose version. This method of analysis attempts to read the two texts against the common
critical grain, which often approaches adaptations as necessarily linear events; in other words, as
a literary source and its filmic derivative or a primary source and its secondary instance.3
Frequently, the order of a story’s appearances in the artistic world has little to do with the order
in which the spectator receives them. Despite the fact that Dahl’s fiction was widely read in the
U.S. when the short story was published (1953), Hitchcock’s 1955 broadcast (or one of its
3
Here I cite another two appropriately titled articles: “From Novel to Film” (Michael
subsequent rebroadcasts) more likely constitutes the average person’s first reception of “Lamb to
the Slaughter.” Therefore, examples of differing artistic renderings will be analyzed through
reception of the central narrative event in “Lamb to the Slaughter”: the unique way in which one
shocked, desperate, and temporarily insane housewife kills her husband by hitting him on the
back of the head with a frozen club of meat. The actual murder, which in both Hitchcock and
Dahl’s versions is surprisingly abrupt, is designed to catch the audience, like Patrick Maloney
(the husband), completely off-guard. The following shot-by-shot analysis of the murder begins
right after Mary Maloney has distractedly carried a frozen piece of meat from the garage into the
kitchen. Though Patrick has just announced to his pregnant wife that he loves someone else and
wants a divorce, Mary, in a daze of disbelief, automatically begins to prepare the evening meal:
[Medium shot of Mary unwrapping the leg of lamb on the kitchen table]4
[Long shot of Patrick in the living room preparing to leave without his supper]
MARY. “Patrick you can’t. You can’t go, you can’t, you can’t.”
The smooth shift from a medium to a medium close-up shot redirects the audience’s
view of Mary away from her hands and the huge leg of lamb nearby. The meal’s main course,
4
This section is a combination of quotations transcribed from Hitchcock’s episode and
soon to be a murder weapon, is subtly placed off-screen, out of sight and out of mind. The more
desperate tone in her voice and her increasingly distraught facial expression command the
spectators’ attention and naturally motivate the camera’s closer framing of her body. The
audience, like Mary, has forgotten about the lamb on the table, because Patrick’s impending
PATRICK. “No?”
[This is Patrick’s disinterested response from the living room which openly
adjoins the kitchen. His reply is strictly oral. The camera remains on Mary and her
imploring face]
PATRICK. “There’s no sense getting hysterical about this whole thing.” [The
[Long shot through the open doorway of Patrick as he turns from the writing
desk]
At this point, Mary slowly, almost involuntarily, moves from the kitchen and through the
doorway. The only sound heard is a scrape or two of her feet on the linoleum before she steps
onto the living room carpet. The camera follows her movement, tracking smoothly from left to
right. Mobile framing reveals slightly more of Mary’s figure as she approaches Patrick with an
imploring look on her face. To the audience it appears that she is walking with her hands folded
in front of her. As she moves from the the kitchen to the living room, Patrick’s figure, still
standing and bending over the desk, enters the frame. Only in the last second or so of this
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tracking shot is it noticeable that Mary holds onto something with both hands. By the time the
audience realizes that she has invisibly carried the frozen leg of lamb with her from the kitchen,
the murder is taking place. Suddenly her arms heave up, raising the club of meat into full view,
right before crashing it down onto Patrick’s unsuspecting head. Immediately after, she stumbles
in a daze to the kitchen and mechanically puts the lamb into the oven.
Hitchcock’s masterful use of visual deception in this scene is storytelling magic. The
way in which a mundane leg of lamb vanishes from the spectator’s perception and then suddenly
Hitchcock’s careful direction of the camera and his principal actor here as sleight-of-screen,
because the manner in which he manipulates his spectators’ reception of the event matches the
subtlety and the naturalness that conjurors employ when performing sleight-of-hand.
In an essay titled “Getting the Mis Out of Misdirection,” master magician Tommy
Wonder argues that elegant direction is far more powerful than misdirection for creating surprise
within the minds of the audience. He poetically describes how the creation of “shadow areas”
occurs as a natural result when a storyteller directs spectators’ attention to the more important,
and therefore better lit, details of a performance (30). Wonder advises magicians to find these
execute their secret methods within these areas so as not to distract from the warmer, brighter
zones of attention where the magic effect — the surprising result made possible by the
These zones of shadow (inattention) and light (attention) are precisely what Hitchcock’s
direction, the acting of Barbara Bel Geddes (Mary), and the editing of the scene quoted above
manipulate so effectively. The tracking shot of Mary as she crosses from the living room into the
kitchen is framed so that the murder weapon is just barely offscreen. The spectator might notice
135
this if Mary ever glanced down at her hands, but Barbara Bel Geddes keeps her character’s gaze
and sight-lines exactly where the emotional drama of this moment in the story directs them:
squarely at Patrick, who stands offscreen and to her right. Hitchcock could have used a closer
shot scale to mediate this part of the story (a close-up of Mary, for example) and this would have
made the murder weapon extremely easy to hide, but such a choice would have produced a less
surprising result. Part of the power of the appearance of the leg of lamb, when Mary finally
reveals its presence in her hands, is derived from the openness that comes with a shot scale and a
Hitchcock makes the same choice that a master magician would when it comes to hiding
a surprise. He choreographs the story so that spectators feel like they were shown everything
openly and naturally, even though a giant, club-like piece of meat was being hidden just outside
of their perceptive grasp. A novice magician, like a novice director, might have buried this
murder weapon farther offscreen, wanting to plunge it into darker shadows unnecessarily.
Hitchcock’s work illustrates the importance of using excellent direction, rather than misdirection,
to shock his audience during this pivotal moment in the murder mystery.
The passionate dialogue and subtle framing just analyzed above represent the filling in of an
ellipsis left open by Dahl’s original text. “Ellipsis,” according to Robert Stam, occurs “where
major or minor events are completely skipped over” (33). For example, the description of Patrick
Maloney’s murder in the short story is described by a mere six lines of prose:
“For God’s sake,” he said, hearing her, but not turning round. “Don’t make supper
At that point, Mary Maloney simply walked up behind him and without any pause
she swung the big frozen leg of lamb high in the air and brought it down as hard
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She might just as well have hit him with a steel club. (Dahl 111)
Hitchcock’s scene breaks into and opens up this part of the narrative after Patrick’s line “I’m
going out” (or “I’m leaving,” as is said in the television episode). Narratively and visually, the
filmed segment adds dialogue, facial expressions, and physical movement that the prose version
either leaves vague or does not provide at all. Because Hitchcock is turning an eight-and-one-
half-paged story into a twenty-three-minute television broadcast, he is able to spend extra time
fleshing out the murder scene without eliminating important plot elements. His addition of detail
and filmic sleight-of-hand with a leg of lamb does not slow down the action of the murder itself.
The two presentations of Patrick’s death each highlight the event’s speed. Using two different
artistic techniques, both versions deny premeditation on Mary’s part and emphasize the
“Ellipsis” in the terminology of both literature and film also refers to the skipping-over
of larger narrative events as a whole in terms of plot-time and story-time. An exaggerated and
cliché example of a technique used to visually cue audiences that a large amount of story time is
passing though only portions of it are shown onscreen is the often parodied training montage
from Rocky (1976). A more subtle example from an art house film would be the opening
sequence of Jim Jarmusch’s Dead Man (1995), in which the protagonist’s long train voyage from
the Eastern to the Western United States is expressed through recurring close-up shots of the
wheels of a train turning, him falling asleep inside its passenger car and the changing faces of his
fellow travelers.
Two other scenes from “Lamb to the Slaughter,” the one following the murder and the
one preceding it, reveal artistic modifications made in Hitchcock’s filmed narrative and Dahl’s
137
written one based on ellipsis. After coming to her senses and putting the lamb into the oven to
cook, Mary Maloney decides to cover up her crime by engaging in a deceptive performance
played out on the stage of everyday life. The audience watches her make a phone call to cancel a
date the couple had arranged with friends, because Patrick is terribly “tired” and wants to have
dinner at home. Mary then goes to the grocery store to buy some vegetables for the meal,
creating an alibi for herself during her exchange with the grocer. Dahl’s prose spans an entire
page describing both Mary as she practices what she will say to the grocer and then the
encounter itself, but Hitchcock uses ellipsis to rapidly express this part of the narrative with a
kind of visual summary. The camera shows Mary leave the house and then a quick dissolve-
sequence of her items being rung up at the store, indicating in a few seconds of visuals (plot-
time) the passage of a roughly twenty-minute shopping trip (story-time). The next shot shows
Mary returning home, pretending, even convincing herself, that she has just discovered her
husband’s dead body. She really does cry and sob into the phone as she notifies the police.
Hitchcock uses an ellipsis to visually gloss over the narrative’s shopping trip – constituting an
In an earlier scene, however, Hitchcock does just the opposite and fills in an elliptical
gap left open in Dahl’s prose. To describe the initial confrontation between Patrick and Mary and
the revelation of his extramarital affair Dahl simply writes: “And he told her. It didn’t take long,
four or five minutes at most, and she sat very still through it all, watching him with a kind of
dazed horror as he went further and further away from her with each word” (110). Here, there is
a specific reference to four or five minutes of story-time passing that the author tells the reader to
skip-over in plot-time. The script (also written by Dahl) as adapted and filmed by Hitchcock fills
in the “he told her” ellipsis with specific dialogue and details:
PATRICK. “I wanna leave you, Mary. You understand me don’t you. I want to
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leave you.”
PATRICK. “Yes I do mean it, and what’s more I want a divorce. There’s
someone else I want to marry. That’s really all there is to it. I love her and she
loves me. Now, we’ve got to be sensible about it all – calm and sensible. I’ll
quickly establishes the harsh facts of the situation and presents Patrick as a cold and indifferent
person.
narrative, while skipping over others developed at greater length in the short story in an
extremely satisfying manner that successfully adapts the text for its transmission and reception
via television. More than once, ellipsis represents a fictional give and take between these two
texts. Read together, these versions of the same basic narrative combine to form a richer and
more aesthetically complex murder mystery. This intersection of two very different media also
reveals an act of cultural and linguistic translation between two distinct English-speaking
countries. This sort of textual promiscuity and experimentation is unfaithful to the concept of an
original or a sacred text in just the right way. Both the UK and the U.S. versions of “Lamb to the
Slaughter” are successful versions of one another, because they are faithful to the diabolical
twists of the story being told yet are freely adapted to the media that house them and to the
5
All quotations are transcribed from Hitchcock’s 1955 episode “Lamb to the Slaughter.”
139
character are relevant to English, American and (soon-to-be-discussed) Spanish audiences, the
way the murder weapon is described changes with each retelling of the story. When comparing
Hitchcock and Dahl’s versions, little linguistic markers appear at odd yet significant moments to
signal the presence of cultural modifications. “Lamb to the Slaughter” adapts its language
depending on its geographic location to speak more clearly to the audience receiving it.
Although the English Mary and the American Mary are both stereotypical examples of a
1950s homemaker, they have two different vocabularies and these must be modified for their
local reception communities. This fact is most noticeable during a scene when detective Jack
Noonan (who has the same name in both versions) questions Mary about possible murder
weapons. The central source of suspense and tension in both Hitchcock and Dahl’s stories results
from the investigators’ inability to discover the implement of Patrick Maloney’s demise. Mary
has, of course, cleverly hidden the instrument of death in the most unlikely of places – inside the
oven — and must play dumb. Both detectives explain that they are searching for a heavy, blunt
object and ask her if there is anything in the house that might meet that description. Do you have
something like a club or “a heavy metal bar,” suggests Noonan to the American Mary who then
replies: “oh, like a baseball bat?” Do you have something “like a big spanner,” suggests the
English Jack Noonan to the English Mary (115). The difference may seem a trifle, but use the
word “spanner” instead of “wrench” on American television and 80% of the viewing public will
have no idea what object is being described. Likewise, the average English household might
have a “cricket” bat around, but not a single piece of equipment used to play American baseball.
These linguistic translations and cultural references are necessary textual infidelities (departures
from one text or the other) that must be made as part of the transcontinental adaptation process.
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Though the specific language and references of “Lamb to the Slaughter” must be adapted
to fit their target audiences, the techniques of deception employed by Mary remain exactly the
same. This suggests cross-cultural and cross-media reception of the three methods that the
betrayed housewife uses to avoid prison — a simulated performance of one of her routines in
everyday life, playing dumb and the use of a weapon that can later be eaten — are, at least in
these two cultures, received as universally effective deceptions. It makes sense that the final
vanish of Mary’s magical leg of lamb does not require complex cultural translation, because, as
far as I know, all police eat. Some eat more voraciously than others.
At the end of the Hitchcock Presents episode – as the worn out and hungry detectives
devour the leg of lamb Mary has offered them for dinner – one of the Irish policemen even uses
the word “shillelagh” to imagine what could have been used for the crime. This nuance points to
the stereotypical “Irish cop” character within the U.S. film discourse (particularly strong during
the 1950s). Each culture invokes different linguistic codes to conjure up images of potential
weapons for which they are searching. The overall texts of these two versions are remarkably
similar (mostly because Dahl wrote both of them). At the end of the short story and the TV
episode, Mary has the last laugh and literally chuckles as the police gorge themselves and
wonder aloud about the location of the missing weapon: “probably right under our very noses?”
(116).
Oddly enough, the first shot of the same investigation scene in Pedro Almodóvar’s
version of “Lamb to the Slaughter” is a close-up of a Spanish detective’s nose hovering above a
bowl of cooked meat. At this exact moment, another officer is heard saying that the crime must
have been committed using a very blunt object. Many of the same key elements from the English
and American versions are present in this third take on the narrative including the interrogation
of the murderer. Her name this time is Gloria. However, ¿Qué he hecho yo para merecer esto?
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(1984) (What Have I Done to Deserve This?) comes out about thirty years after Dahl and
Hitchcock’s versions and is a strange mixture of the two. The simultaneous influence of both the
U.S. and English texts is in evidence during the quick-paced interview conducted by two idiotic
officers. “¿Buscas algo?” (Looking for something?) asks Gloria, and the two policemen (P1 and
Aside from these two implicit markers from the other texts (the basball bat and the “llave
inglesa”), there are also key plot similarities. However, Gloria is an entirely different cultural
Spanish family. Being released only five years after Franco’s death, it aims to subvert the
normative values established during the years of his regime. Instead of a short narrative about the
picture-perfect 1950s family destroyed by a husband’s infidelity and subsequent murder, Gloria’s
life is a postmodern portrayal of dysfunction. One of her sons deals drugs; another is sold to a
pedophilic dentist; and her best friend, Cristal, is a prostitute. Gloria is hooked on “No-Doz”
(alertness pills), because when she is not cooking and cleaning for everyone at home, she hires
6
Spanish quotations have been transcribed from the film and the English translations are
my own.
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herself out as a maid to both a karate studio and a wealthy author. When she finally snaps –
clubbing her unfaithful and physically abusive husband with a leg of lamb – she represents a
different kind of female protagonist. When the English or American Patrick Maloney dies the
audience is shocked. When the Spanish Antonio is killed the audience is relieved and might even
experience feelings of joy and liberation. The former male character is dislikable, but the latter is
a disgustingly macho oppressor. He uses Gloria’s bobby pins to clean his ears. He makes no
effort to please her sexually. He forbids her to work outside of the home and, just before he is
murdered, Antonio slaps his wife for refusing to iron a shirt he wants to wear for a date with
Ingrid Muller (his former German mistress). The audience empathizes as Gloria fights back,
putting an end to both him and the legacy of misogynistic entitlement his character embodies.
His death is, in many ways, Franco’s death. Similarly, Gloria’s liberation is the liberation of
Spanish women and minorities who finally have greater cultural room to live their own lives.
Almodóvar’s placement of the short “Lamb to the Slaughter” narrative within his feature
length film is both a subtle hommage (to Hitchcock and Dahl) and a clever rendition of the
suppressed housewife’s revenge.7 Despite many changes – the police do not actually consume
the murder weapon, a green lizard dies who is the crime’s “único testigo” (only witness) and
Gloria lives in one of Madrid’s giant, cube-like and poverty-stricken housing projects – there are
still key characteristics and easily identifiable traits uniting all three stories. Almodóvar’s version
is such a free and unfaithful adaptation of the two others that it is difficult to find a particular
moment where he obviously opens up and enters a particular part of a previously established
narrative. There are no striking camera shot similarities between his and Hitchcock’s
7
Henrik Ibsen’s nineteenth-century play A Doll’s House is one of the most frequently
presentations. Furthermore, the techniques of such a postmodern film (filled with fragmented
allusions to other texts and disjointed chronological events) make it difficult to draw direct
aesthetic comparisons to the straight-forward and linear storytelling of the TV episode or the
short story. Therefore, the film’s real contribution to this chapter’s tripartite model of textual co-
presence lies in its cultural difference, its more modern feminist protagonist and its
demonstration of the fact that even unfaithful and more experimental adaptations increase our
the textual mix and a Spanish perspective that dramatically changes the language and the local
politics of this murder mystery. Regardless of their individual contributions, together the U.S.,
English, and Spanish tellings of the same murder mystery represent a successful, multi-
Slaughter.” Whether a spectator or a reader receives one version of this text or all three, the
process of experiencing the same story from the vantage points of various cultures, time periods
also slept with all the other texts that that other text has slept with.
— Robert Stam
The Internet Movie Database’s (IMDB, henceforth) entry in 2005 for ¿Qué he hecho yo
para merecer esto? (What Have I Done to Deserve This?) listed Roald Dahl as a contributing
author with this note: “Lamb to the Slaughter (uncredited source).” In 2013, this listing is no
longer present. Is this the online textual equivalent of a couple announcing their relationship on
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Facebook and then breaking up? Long distance is tough. In all seriousness though, why has this
source been removed from the IMDB listing and why was neither Alfred Hitchcock’s name nor
his 1955 broadcast mentioned? It appears that textual relationships are as fickle as human ones
The fact that the TV version was careful to credit Dahl as author makes perfect sense,
because he wrote the screenplay. But should Almodóvar, who directed and wrote another
screenplay with quite loose references to Dahl’s short story, be chastised for not citing the
English author? Furthermore, is it not possible that the short story was inspired by an uncited
source to begin with? It is difficult to explain exactly why and how adapted material is
referenced precisely because it travels between artistic media, languages and trends in citation
practice. It turns out that a large number (at least five) of the Hitchcock Presents episodes were
adaptations of Dahl’s stories. Therefore, it is likely that many modern-day directors who were
influenced by Hitchcock will retell, in part or in whole, those stories. By doing so, they may
unconsciously adapt both his and Dahl’s work. In such cases of adaptations inspired by
In his contribution to the film Four Rooms (1995), Quentin Tarantino self-reflexively
cites Alfred Hitchcock’s TV broadcast “Man from the South” (also a Roald Dahl short story) as a
source. However, the credits of Four Rooms make no explicit reference to either Dahl or
Hitchcock. Here we have Tarantino apparently violating his own rule. His story in Four Rooms
is more of an hommage to Hitchcock’s “Man from the South” than a simple theft of its contents.
The case of Tarantino brings this exploration of adaptation, translation and fidelity full circle.
One cannot help but feel a bit dizzy. The current state of cross-media and cross-cultural
Therefore, I argue that an ethics of citation and adaptation is possible. We must embrace
the chaos as individuals. The construction of such an ethics begins on a personal, subjective level
and is created in dialogue with the artistic etiquette of one’s mentors and peers. My adaptation
philosophy when it comes to magic as a performing art is that “fidelity” need not be observed in
terms of artistic content, but must be observed in terms of historical awareness and general
citation. I hope that the discussion above has argued convincingly that proper citation, which aids
in the exploration of previously unknown intertextual relationships, allows for a deeper and more
intimate reception experience of texts like “Lamb to the Slaughter.” Though their citation of one
another is not as thorough as I would prefer, the three incarnations of the short murder mystery
discussed are still examples of successful, productive and provocative infidelities. They stand
alone as self-sufficient tellings of the murder mystery and also combine well with one another
when read as multiple incarnations of the same textual entity. The fact that most of these texts
know of one another, that these texts reveal to us an awareness of their coexistence through
quotations and references, opens up pathways of intertextuality for their receivers to follow.
These paths are just as indispensable for scholars like myself, who study the processes of
adaptation and reception, as they are for artists who will adapt “Lamb to the Slaughter” for future
tellings. Citation, while difficult and perhaps impossible to enforce, allows receivers of all types
to follow the sometimes explicit, sometimes subtle and sometimes secretive trails that link and
Artists should be free to change the content of a story, to translate it to other languages
and to adapt its expression to other media formats, but that freedom should not be at the cost of
ignoring or obscuring historical sources. Pointing interested viewers, readers and participants to
other known versions of the text, in the credits of a piece at the very least gives individuals
receiving it the opportunity to learn more about its cultural significance at other historical
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moments and during other historical conditions. Discovering such intertextual relations, the
secret sex lives of adapted texts, is more than a simple opportunity to engage in the gossip of
who stole what and from whom. Such discoveries also reveal that the storytelling world is a
larger, more interesting and more interconnected place than it first seems when one has only
received a single version of a text. Lastly, thorough citation of adapted texts helps receivers of a
story to understand what their social function might be. Thinking through that function, what
lesson a story has to teach us locally as well as how that lesson might shift, change or be
modified in another part of the world, gets us closer to understanding what is at stake when
How magician Ricky Jay and director David Mamet chose to adapt illicit con games to
the film House of Games, for example, illustrates the importance of understanding the social
history of certain twentieth-century deceptions as well as their earlier and newer incarnations.
The adaptation of these texts to filmmaking — how completely their methods are revealed to us,
whether we receive them from the perspective of the con artist or from the perspective of the
victim, and how thoroughly we understand their psychological principles — influences our
abilities to subsequently deal with the criminal attempts made to manipulate us in real life.
2 Ethical and Unethical Adaptations — Mamet, Jay and the Con Game
It occurred to me while I was doing House of Games that the difficulty of making
the movie was exactly the same difficulty the confidence man has. For the
the audience sufficiently so they feel pleased when they find out they’ve been
misled, tricking them so that every step is logical, and at the end they’ve defeated
themselves. So, the process of magic and the process of confidence games, and to
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a certain extent the process of drama, are all processes of autosuggestion. They
— David Mamet
— Ricky Jay
A clip of Ricky Jay’s performance of the con game “Three Card Monte” as broadcast on
the Dinah Shore show in the 1970s elegantly expresses his relationship to the performative
speech-acts, the mark-oriented reception and the narrative principles of deception in David
Mamet’s criminal adaptations. During the talk show, Jay explains to Dinah Shore’s guests that
“Three Card Monte” is a popular street swindle in which the operator, or “broad tosser,”8
shuffles around two black cards and one red card by tossing them onto a small table one at a
time. For a few moments Jay turns toward actress Elizabeth Ashley to give her advice on how to
find the red card or the “money” card. During this action, comedian Steve Martin surreptitiously
picks up the red card, puts a bend in its corner, and then places it back on the table. The studio
audience sees this and laughs, but the magician does not and continues speaking with Ms.
Ashley. He then mixes the cards for her, including the now bent one, and finally asks her where
the red card is. He is promptly interrupted by Martin who says “Want me to guess?”9 Jay assents
8
The “broad tosser” is one name for the dealer who literally throws the “broads” (i.e.
cards) during a Three Card Monte game. See Haydn and Anton’s Notes on Three-Card Monte
for this and other definitions of slang terms related to this particular short con (155).
9
All quotations from this television broadcast have been transcribed by me based on the
insertion of this clip into the recent documentary Deceptive Practice: The Mysteries and Mentors
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and Martin easily chooses the correct card, the red queen, thanks to its now bent corner. Jay,
slightly perturbed by the comedian’s luck, says that he will mix the cards again. Martin gets out
his wallet and asks if the magician will put fifty dollars on the next round of tosses. Jay
reluctantly agrees, at first. Then he chides: “Is that all? Fifty dollars?” Martin pulls out another
bill and boldly replies: “Hey, fifty-one.” The cards are thrown and Jay asks once again where the
money card is. Martin points to the card with the bend. Jay picks up the card, confirms that the
bent corner is what Martin has been looking at, and then turns it over to reveal a black card.
Martin’s face scrunches up in confusion and dismay as the magician collects his money and the
I open this discussion of con game adaptations found in David Mamet’s film House of
Games with this performance by Ricky Jay for several reasons. First, it is an interesting example
of a performative speech-act — a verbal bet that is given the power to do what it says — which
performance adapts the ritualized movement of money from one individual to another that occurs
during a short con and this is similar to several adaptations of con games that will be examined in
David Mamet’s film.10 Second, the manner in which Jay chooses to present “Three Card Monte”
of Ricky Jay.
10
The Expert at the Card Table (published in 1902), by S.W. Erdnase, contains the
earliest thorough description of the sleight-of-hand employed by Jay on the Dinah Shore show.
An earlier, less complex, description of “Three Card Monte” can be found in Robert-Houdin’s
Les Tricheries des Grecs (Cardsharpers: Their Tricks Exposed) (1861). Brief references to the
three-card trick appear in M.P. Adam’s The Rich Uncle from Fiji (1795) and, some scholars
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on the Dinah Shore show causes the audience to receive it, along with Steve Martin’s character,
as a victim of the con.11 The sting of this text, similar to discussions in chapter one of “The
Circus Card Trick” and “Coin Con,” is enjoyable for the audience at large, because Martin is the
one who actually loses and because the stakes are low enough to be playful. Still, the storyteller
— Ricky Jay — manipulates spectators as if they too were targets of the con to create what I will
describe as a mark-oriented reception experience that Mamet’s House of Games also produces.
The result in both Jay’s performance and the film’s narrative is the transmission of ethically
complex lessons in enigma analysis. These are experienced and may or may not be internalized
by the audience. Finally, one of the primary source texts from which Ricky Jay adapts his “Three
Card Monte” performance — The Expert at the Card Table by the extremely intelligent and
poetic professional criminal who wrote under the pseudonym S.W. Erdnase — is a fascinating
example of how some of the most effective sleight-of-hand techniques and psychological
principles of manipulation are derived from criminal subcultures.12 As I analyze the language
Martin attempts to fool the con man and is fooled himself. In reality, Martin and Jay would have
rehearsed this seemingly impromptu bit backstage and before the show.
12
For the sake of brevity, I simplify the processes of adaptation and transmission that
have clearly gone into Ricky Jay’s version of “Three Card Monte.” To begin to understand the
importance of Erdnase’s text for maneuvers such as the invisible transfer of a bent corner from
one card to another, as well as magic mentors like Dai Vernon who interpreted the written
descriptions of such moves and brought Erdnase’s text to life for students like Jay, I recommend
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and the narrative ploys that Mamet adapts from the world of the con artist in the pages that
follow, I will on the one hand explore the benefits of engaging with the dark side of deception
for the purpose of the spectator’s intellectual and emotional training. On the other hand, I will
point out the drawbacks of treating the spectator like a victim to argue that embracing the
swindler’s mentality risks the complicit celebration and glorification of the ugliest and most
abusive traits found in magic as a performing art. The mentality of the swindler and the
cardsharp tempts magicians to not only play at being gods, but to become malevolent, criminal
ones.
Analyzing the language — the slang, the professional terminology and the speech-acts
— of criminal cultures, specifically the non-violent criminal culture of con artists, reveals a
disturbing mode of thought. However, that mode of thought is no less alarming than many of the
daily operations of late capitalism itself. The work of David Mamet, famous for its apt use of the
criminal, corporate and vulgar vernacular, often allows its audience a view into the dark bars and
underhanded dealings within U.S. subcultures. American Buffalo (1975) takes place in an inner-
city pawn shop and is presented in the foul yet poetic language of three petty thieves; Speed-the-
Plow (1976) incorporates the specialized vocabulary of Hollywood producers and promoters to
tell a story of interpersonal betrayal in the movie industry; and, in 1984, Glengarry Glen Ross
won both the Drama Critics’ Award for Best American Play and the Pulitzer Prize for its
depiction of a desperate group of salesmen and their backstabbing manipulations. All of these
plays, though their particular settings and groups vary, challenge spectators with environmentally
determined vocabularies that are simultaneously familiar and unfamiliar. The audience often
feels like it is eavesdropping in the usually inaccessible rooms where different languages —
personal, private, and often ruthless dialects — are spoken within groups. These groups and their
interactions with outsider characters (including the spectators) tend to represent the darker, more
devious strains of their ideological origins: the underworld of U.S. capitalism in the twentieth
century.
One iconic setting in that world, and one of Jay and Mamet’s favorites, is the poker
game in the back room of the bar. Erdnase’s The Expert at the Card Table: A Treatise on the
Science and Art of Manipulating Cards, which describes a thorough system for cheating at such
games, is one of the underground intertexts that flows like a subterranean well of information
beneath the professional work of David Mamet, Steve Martin and Ricky Jay. Years after the
performance of “Three Card Monte” on the Dinah Shore show, which marks an early
collaboration between Jay and Martin, Mamet directed an updated version of the routine that was
performed as part of the theatre show Ricky Jay and his 52 Assistants. Another magic routine in
that play, whose monologue is taken nearly word-for-word from Erdnase’s publication, but that
would have been blocked and choreographed by Jay, Mamet and their creative team together, is
an effect in which three queens vanish from three separate piles of more common playing cards
to magically rejoin their fourth sister. The title of that piece is “The Exclusive Coterie” and
opens the third section of The Expert at the Card Table in which “Card Tricks” are discussed
(109). The second section of the book is “Legerdemain” and describes a number of sleight-of-
hand moves that are not quite deceptive enough for the stringent requirements of the professional
cardsharp, but that the author finds suitable for the performance of magic. In those two sections,
the receiver of said magic tricks is referred to as the spectator or “the audience” (127, 193, 196).
The majority of the book’s contents, however, can be found in its first section: “Artifice.” There,
an entire philosophy of how to cheat at cards professionally and invisibly is described in precise
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detail. This section develops a card manipulation system that emphasizes the importance of
uniformity of action, proper deportment and naturalness.13 The tone of this section contains a
significant shift in mentality. As a reader of these pages one is immersed in the mindset of the
cardsharp and is taught to think of and refer to the receiver of one’s artifice as an “opponent” or
The shift between the discourse of the cardsharp and the magician, between the
descriptions of the other as “opponent” vs. “spectator,” occur directly after Erdnase’s entry on
“Three Card Monte” (119-124). His description of the short con works like a hinge in the book.
Although it concludes his section on card table artifice and is taught as a method for employing
sleight-of-hand to beat gambling opponents, it is written-up in quite a jovial tone: “Only three
cards are used, but the more players the merrier” (119). As Gary “Gazzo” Osborne, an
internationally respected magician who briefly worked as a lookout kid for a London monte
mob14 before choosing to abandon the criminal path, told me in a personal interview, “‘Three
Card Monte’ is blatant thievery, but Erdnase wrote it up in such a way that it was like a game.”15
This suggests that since Erdnase, and arguably much earlier, this routine has been one of the
great representatives of those street crimes that has tempted magicians to become criminals and,
vice versa, criminals to become magicians. In terms of adaptation then, “Three Card Monte” is a
13
206 instances of the word “natural” or variations of it occur in Erdnase’s text.
14
A “monte mob” is the general phrase used to describe the entire team of con artists
who work together to perpetrate a “Three Card Monte” game. Again, see Haydn and Anton’s
text that Jay, Martin and Mamet have all slept with. As a study of criminal techniques,
psychology and storytelling, it has influenced their collaborations and brought with it a certain
through the argument of the trick in such a way that the spectator believes he is
thinking for himself. This is the type of manipulation at which the street swindler
excels.
David Mamet was born and raised in the same metropolis where The Expert at the Card
Table was published: Chicago, Illinois. Growing up in the place that poet Carl Sandburg
immortalized as the wicked, crooked and brutal “City of the Big Shoulders” may be part of why
Mamet has a unique ability to accurately incorporate U.S. slang systems and popular criminal
narratives into his characters’ speech. The Untouchables (1987) and Hoffa (1992), both written
by Mamet, each revive two famously violent criminal icons and their respective twentieth-
century mythologies: Al Capone (Chicago gangsterism and corruption) and Jimmy Hoffa (the
mafia-like Teamsters Union). Mamet’s screenplays are known for their ability to express the
and street-level swindler subcultures. He has a knack for capturing the proper language spoken
by both refined and rough individuals when they speak about deceitfully screwing someone over.
The author’s ear for authentic, accurate terminology has also picked up on a less violent and
nonviolent hustle in which a target is deceived into parting with his money in an atmosphere of
artificially generated trust” (Prus and Sharper 169). And though many theatre and film critics
have commented upon Mamet’s themes of crime, violence, and corporate greed, few have
engaged the deeper ideological significance indicated by the con game in House of Games
(1987). A handful of critics, such as Barry Goldensohn, have noted the presence of Mamet’s
intertwining of deceptive text, speech, and ideology in the film.16 In his essay, “Melville’s The
Confidence Man and His Descendants in David Mamet’s Work,” Goldensohn says “it is not only
in the figure of the confidence man but also in the ongoing debate about trust, confidence, truth,
falsity, deceit, and manipulation that we see the connection between Melville’s novel and all of
Mamet’s plays and films” (158). The general, thematic, and cultural connections between this
playwright, foundational American novels like Melville’s and Ur-characters of U.S. mythology
such as Mark Twain’s famous swindlers (Huck Finn and Tom Sawyer) have thus been
established. How logical that these stories appear just after the birth of the American terms
“confidence game” and “confidence trick,” whose most prolific literary use the Oxford English
My contribution here is a reading of Mamet’s con game discourse and its roots in the
United States as expressed through the performance adaptation work done by Ricky Jay in the
capacity of con game expert during their collaborations. A rigorous perusal of the codified
16
William F. van Wert’s article “Psychoanalysis and Con Games: House of Games” and
Ilkka Joki’s book Mamet, Bakhtin, and the Dramatic: The Demonic as a Variable of
Talk and Flush Times, as entering the public U.S. discourse in 1849.
155
language of con artists, and how that language is adapted to Mamet’s House of Games, reveals
the presence of certain adapted source texts such as “The Flue.” To bring these connections to
light, I draw upon in-depth studies of professional con artists and magicians. The goal is to
explore the ideological significance of these terminologies and the ways they engage viewers of
Mamet’s film through a deeper analysis of Ricky Jay’s role. For example, are spectators of
House of Games truly taught to be more skeptical, writerly individuals as they watch the film or
do they leave vulnerable as ever to the con games depicted? This question of to what degree con
game adaptations cue spectators to become writerly skeptics depends upon whether or not
writerly (i.e. active) participation is rewarded by the text. This is also determined by how
accurately the con games mediated by the film correspond to those one might encounter in
reality. To answer that question as it pertains to the two Mamet films analyzed here, requires a
Ricky Jay is far more famous in the esoteric world of professional magic than in the film
industry. As a scholar of unusual performance, he has written extensively on con games, the
history of variety performance, gambling, dice, and magic.18 His first book Cards as Weapons is
now out of print and has become a collector’s item. (It is currently being sold on Amazon.com
for $300 to $667.) He has also delivered numerous papers and keynote addresses on the history
18
Ricky Jay’s publications include Cards as Weapons (1977), Learned Pigs and
Fireproof Women (1986), Many Mysteries Unraveled or Conjuring Literature in America 1786-
1876 (1990), The Magic Magic Book (1994), Jay’s Journal of Anomalies (2001), Dice:
Deception, Fate, and Rotten Luck (2003), Extraordinary Exhibitions: The Wonderful Remains of
an Enormous Head, The Whimsiphusicon & Death to the Savage Unitarians (2005), Ricky Jay
Plays Poker (2006), Magic: 1400s-1950s (2009) and Celebrations of Curious Characters (2010).
156
of deception, such as his “The Origins of the Confidence Game” given at the Police Against
Confidence Crime conference.19 Finally, David Mamet directed both of his most recent and most
notable stage performances: Ricky Jay and His 52 Assistants (1994) and Ricky Jay: On the Stem
(2002). The former of the two one-man sleight-of-hand shows was revived in Washington D.C.,
at the beginning of May 2005, to rave reviews. This indicates the continuation of his parallel
existences as a professional actor, con artist consultant and magician. Mamet and Jay’s
collaborative projects bridge the gap between these categories as well. In Mamet’s True and
False and Writing in Restaurants, the influence of magic as a performing art is very present in
his theories of acting and writing. However, the intertextual significance of magic, gambling, con
artist terminology, and the structure of the director’s storytelling can be most clearly understood
by looking at how he employs them in his artistic practice. Reading and rereading a scene from
House of Games allows us to analyze how David Mamet (as screenwriter and director) and
Ricky Jay (as confidence game consultant and actor) work together to put the “con” in the film’s
“lexicon.”
The adaptation of a criminal text that one of the characters in Mamet’s film calls “a little
page in the history of the short con” began with a mere thirteen lines written by the Chicago-born
director to create a didactic performance in which an outsider is given a glimpse into the
backstage methods of con artistry (Mamet 26). The scene is composed of three con men — Mike
(Joe Mantegna), George (Ricky Jay) and Joey (Mike Nussbaum) — and their single audience
member, Dr. Margaret Ford (Lindsay Crouse). The latter is a psychologist, though she does not
tell the men this, who has recently seen through a trap set for her by these criminals that was
19
For the most detailed listing of his lectures and publications to date please consult his
designed to con her out of $6,000. Having just escaped and recognized her assailants for the
criminals they are, she speaks with the three of them as she waits for a cab outside of and across
the street from “The House of Games.” This establishment is simultaneously a bar, a pool hall,
and a poker house — three staples of con artist iconography. The location also acts as a small
theatre of everyday life where the con artists botched a poker game scam meant to swindle
Margaret. Now that the jig is up, she is surprisingly more intrigued than appalled by her
company and begins to ask them about their criminal activities. Joey, Mike and George/Vegas
Man decide to give her a glimpse into the hustling world and argue about which scam to reveal.
They choose not to show her the “Mitt” and instead to explain the “Tap”: a ploy used to short-
change cashiers out of small sums from the register. These are the terms that Mamet chooses in
the original script and they are convincing enough for the average audience member. “Mitt” and
“Tap” both snap off the tongue like those dark and delicious lines spoken by shady characters in
the noir novels of Hammett and Chandler. The closest actual definition that I can find for “Mitt”
in twentieth-century U.S. con artist slang, however, is a game known as the “Big Mitt.” It is
defined by linguist David Maurer in The Big Con as a deception in which a mark is cheated
within the context of a crooked poker game. So, this reference chosen by Mamet has some
historical credibility (285). Yet it seems unlikely that the characters in the film would choose to
expose a con so similar to one they just attempted on Dr. Ford. That would be a redundant
“The Tap,” on the other hand, sounds like an authentic con game to the average viewer,
but is probably an apocryphal name invented by Mamet or borrowed by him from a pulp fiction
source. I can find no reliable reference for “The Tap” as an actual con game practiced in the
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United States.20 Also, Mamet’s description of it in the original script, though it does add
believable flair to the codified vocabulary sprinkled throughout House of Games, is difficult to
follow. The action it describes would be vague and unconvincing for both naive and initiated
viewers as a piece of con artistry that might be performed in the real world. Fortunately, Ricky
Jay, as he is listed in the credits, not only plays “George/Vegas Man,” but is also listed as the
confidence game “consultant.”21 His influence transforms this scene into a more complex study
of criminal adaptation and makes the street con about to be described historically realistic with
In the completed film, the con game’s name has been changed from “The Tap” to “The
Flue” and the manner in which it is performed, taught to Dr. Ford and filmed from the point of
view of both the mark (for performance demonstration) and then the con artist (for behind-the-
20
In Maurer’s Language of the Underworld, there are a few specialized names that have
a similar ring to Mamet’s “The Tap.” “Tap dice” or “Tappers” are names for dice loaded with
mercury, but these do not refer to a con game in and of themselves (193). “Tat” is a noun
describing a mis-spotted die that has only high numbers and is also the name of a short con run
using this same gaff. None of these definitions, however, exactly match the name written by
Mamet.
21
The Internet Movie Database credits Jay with this title: “consultant: con games.” He
also has a well-established consulting company, “Deceptive Practices,” which advertises the
revelation of “arcane knowledge on a need to know basis” (Jay 2003). Aside from providing
theatrical illusions and instruction for House of Games, Forrest Gump, Angels in America (the
Tony award winning Broadway production) and other projects, the company has also been hired
scenes instruction) enhances the real-world value of the con artist intertexts present in House of
Games. Mamet asked Ricky Jay to contribute real material to the scene as the film’s con artist
consultant. The sequence, which consists of Joey role-playing a manipulation of everyday life
with Dr. Ford wherein he shows her the same mini-con twice, turns out to be nearly double the
length of the screenplay’s original text. Jay contributed this material based on a historical con
game. The result is the following dialogue in which Joey and Dr. Ford simulate the actions of a
short-change routine:
JOEY. You run a candy store. This is the candy store. Now I come into your
candy store and I give you twenty dollars in singles and I say, “excuse me miss
could you please give me a $20 bill. I have to send a registered letter to my
mother.”
GEORGE/VEGAS MAN ... And its addressed and there’s a stamp on it ...
And I seal it, and you watch me seal it, in the envelope.
Now, I gave you what appears to be $20 in singles. But, when you count it,
there’s only nineteen. And you say, “I’ve only got nineteen.”
JOEY. Here let me count it. And there are only nineteen. “God I’m sorry, let me
get another dollar from my wife in the car. Here hold this a minute.” And I give
you the envelope with the $20 in it. And I take the nineteen dollars and I go home,
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The key deception here, of course, is that the clerk running the candy store thinks that she is
holding an envelope with the $20 from the register inside. When Dr. Ford, playing the role of the
clerk, tears open the envelope she finds that it is empty — she has been subtly robbed. The con
man, played by Joey, leaves with his original nineteen singles as he supposedly goes to the car to
get one more dollar. Unbeknownst to her, he has also departed with the $20 bill from the cash
register. He has used sleight-of-hand to secretly and invisibly steal it from the envelope.
The visual direction of this scene mirrors the perspective of Dr. Ford and is a good
example of how viewers of this short-change con in House of Games first experience it as marks.
She and the audience receive “The Flue” as model, or naive, spectators of the con, because both
she and viewers of the film are unable to detect at which point and by what method Joey
surreptitiously moves the bill from the envelope to his pocket. When Dr. Ford asks how he stole
it, George/Vegas Man replies: “Secrets of the pyramids.” Mike, however, persuades Joey to
reveal the confidence trick’s mechanics by saying: “We owe her one.” After some initial
hesitation, it appears that the audience and the protagonist are initiated into this criminal
discussed in section 2.2 of chapter one), it appears that we now receive the con as negative
model spectators. Negative, because we know that “The Flue” is designed for a mark, a pigeon,
an unsuspecting target. Its performance as a crime does not cue a double-model spectator (i.e. an
initiated or critical spectator) for several good reasons. First, it is a con perpetrated by a single
22
I have transcribed this dialogue from the Criterion Collection’s 2005 re-release of the
film.
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con artist; thus there is no need for the kind of veiled argot such as the mark manipulation
techniques shouted by the card thrower in “Three Card Monte” games as commands to his team
of fake players (Ortiz 202-204).23 In other words, there is no pragmatic need for a writerly or
critical audience to ensure the success of “The Flue.” Second, this short-change con is not
supposed to be read (as in analyzed) or viewed from backstage where its method is visible. We
the audience, along with Dr. Ford, gather from George/Vegas Man’s comments that it is not
supposed to be performed unless it is being used as a crime. “Never wise up a sucker,” as Maurer
has documented, is an underworld maxim (Whiz Mob 192). Still, here are the con artists breaking
their own rules for us. So, we feel as though they are letting us in. This moment of intimacy,
Joey’s repeat performance of “The Flue” employs a principle of deception used within
con artistry, magic and many of Mamet’s narratives: the fake revelation. This time the audience
and Dr. Ford are treated to the exposed view of Joey’s actions. The camera shows him using his
mouth to steal the bill out the back of the envelope (a small movement covered by larger licking
and sealing actions). All of the motions and words are repeated, but Joey now allows us (the
23
In his Gambling Scams, magician Darwin Ortiz describes his eye witness account of a
New York monte team using a closing-the-gates technique to physically separate an eager female
mark from her protesting boyfriend. There he notes that the monte tosser worked the following
command into his sing-song patter while throwing the cards: “follow the lady . . . block her man”
(202). The naive, model spectator or the mark receiving patter is cued to misconstrue the noun
“lady” and the possessive pronoun “her” as referring to the red queen or the money card on the
table. The double-model spectator, the monte tosser’s fellow con men, grasp the second meaning
spectator and protagonist) to look over his right shoulder. Suddenly, we feel closer to the con
men. We have viewed the same deceptive text twice and now feel that we have been shown a
different levels. Most obviously, the protagonist and the spectator begin to empathize and
become emotionally attached to the con men. Mike Nussbaum’s character is absolutely charming
and polite in both his appearance and his presentation of the trick. With his white hair, circular
rimmed glasses, light colored suit and bowtie, his formal manner of speaking (clear and correct
enunciation), he has a grandfatherly appeal. Joe Mantegna, as Mike, is charismatic, sharp, and
confident throughout the film. As the young and handsome leader of the group, he speaks about
con artistry and human nature in a direct, calculating and yet forthright manner. When they teach
Dr. Ford, and us as viewers, a con game’s secret, we also begin to learn their specialized
vocabulary (terms like the “Flue”) along with their devious methods. We feel initiated, by
knowing these passwords, and feel to some extent like we can understand and maybe even speak
The excitement of learning a con game’s secret is similar to the curious pleasure of being
shown the secret of a magic effect by a knowledgeable performer. The pleasure of being taught
insider information in person is always at least twofold. First, there is the “ah-ha” moment of
appreciating how one’s senses were deceived; second, there is the intimacy of the revelation.
Being shown a secret by a practitioner is a sign of respect and trust. Such sharing generally
makes one feel they have passed from a stage of being culturally uninitiated to initiated. These
positive feelings are two of the reasons that initiates return to a group.
On another night, when Dr. Ford visits the House of Games to continue her underground
education, Mike describes his art with simple phrases and participatory examples: “The basic
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idea is this: it’s called a ‘confidence’ game. Why? Because you give me your confidence? No.
Because I give you mine. . . . This is called “Short Con.” Watch closely.” He then has her play
the role of his wife in a quick series of one-act (“short con”) larcenies. Ultimately, Mike seduces
Dr. Ford under the guise of various lessons in con artistry. As they bond during this sequence of
swindler training, Dr. Ford steadily moves from what anthropologists refer to as an “etic” point
of view, the position of the neutral scientist (in her case the position of the non-moralizing
these con artists as if she were part of their culture. For example, Mike uses simple misdirection
at one point to purloin a key from a hotel’s counter. He then gives Margaret, Dr. Ford’s first
name, the opportunity to take the key and break into an unknown patron’s room for both of them.
What began as a flirtation with con artistry becomes a passionate affair founded on transgression
when she makes love to Mike in the stranger’s room. As a personal souvenir of the event, we see
her quietly steal a pocket knife from the sundry personal items left atop a bureau.
conducted in the setting of a fancy hotel. Mike’s seduction of Dr. Ford is what the Road Hustler
defines as a “double steer: a double-cross involving a target who believes he is taking advantage
of another” (Prus and Sharper 169).24 The “double steer” is in some ways the con game version
of the “sucker effect” that is sometimes used in magic routines or in proposition bets. Think of
“The Circus Card Trick” as discussed in chapter one, but involving a greater number of
24
This definition comes from the 1977 collaboration of Robert C. Prus (a professor of
characters and much higher, real-world stakes. Though convinced that she and Mike are stealing
someone else’s room together, Dr. Ford and the audience later learn that this was a setup. In a
scene of true revelation, near the end of the film, she sneaks back into the “House of Games”
where the audience (peeking with her from the shadows through a point-of-view shot) overhears
the gang describing how the hotel room had been prepared in advance. It had been filled with
objects to simulate a stranger’s belongings. The man whose key they stole from the counter was
actually part of the con artist team. The pocket knife that Margaret took was actually a prop that
belonged to Mike. The entire evening, along with his supposedly intimate revelations of con
artist secrets, was a series of carefully staged and improvised events posing as the coincidences
and accidents of everyday life. Mike’s teaching exercises, even though his demonstration of a
“sympathy con” in a Western Union office is accurate enough, were merely used as tools to gain
her trust under the guise of showing her how to manipulate others.
It may be argued that these fake lessons, designed to gain Dr. Ford’s confidence, do not
always implicate the audience. Her quick fall for Mike, for instance, is clearly dangerous and
impulsive. That being said, there is another intertextual and invisible level to these deceptions
that cons the audience as effectively as Dr. Ford. A re-examination of Ricky Jay and his
contribution of “The Flue,” shows that Mamet and his collaborator deceive spectators on a non-
diegetic level too. In 1998, I was present for the live recording of Terry Gross’s interview with
Ricky Jay in San Francisco’s Herbst Theatre. At one point, he discussed his Hollywood-based
consultation business (appropriately named Deceptive Practices) and his specific work on House
of Games. It turns out that Jay invented an alternative method, the one that Joey reveals to Dr.
Ford and the audience, to protect the real modus operandi (one that street hustlers still use today).
As “someone who loves the con,” the scholar chose to create a historically plausible yet
the qualifying tagline of his consulting firm suggests — “arcane knowledge on a need to know
basis” — the actor/magician is simply, as he tells Terry Gross, “not interested in the gratuitous
exposure of this kind of material.” And so, regarding the true origins and methods of “The Flue,”
the audience is deceived in more ways then one. As a diegetic device in Mamet’s film, the
scam’s explanation falsely characterizes the con artists as friendly and open; in Jay’s adaptation
of the street hustle, the true confidence trick appears to be revealed, but secretly remains veiled.
I would like to point out that “arcane knowledge on a need to know basis” is an
excellent, yet also subjective policy. In this dissertation, for example, it is necessary for me to
reveal certain information to my readers so that an in-depth and rigorous discussion of how con
games are adapted from real life to magic performances and to films can be had. Furthermore,
one’s personal politics and performance philosophy always inform the decision of who needs to
know what. Jay and Mamet, in the case of the short-change con as adapted to House of Games,
reveal a bias that favors criminal practice. My bias here favors spectators as well as scholars who
are willing to invest the time required to read this document and to think through the
complexities of reception and adaptation. Also, I submit that the artistic world is made more rich
by historically accurate adaptations of the con that give writerly readers the chance to analyze
For a better example of the real work on a more direct and modern version of the short-
change con, watch, re-watch and study the first three minutes of Fabian Bielinsky’s Argentine
masterpiece Nueve Reinas (Nine Queens) (2000). In the first scene of that film, actor Gastón
Pauls performs a short-change con that much more closely resembles those described by linguist
David Maurer in his ethnographic work based on personal interviews with professional
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criminals.25 Bielinsky has no qualms about revealing the exact ways in which a number of cons
are played in Buenos Aires, the economic and government capital of the country. Perhaps this is
because the setting of his drama is a very real economic depression. The catastrophic devaluation
of the Argentine peso had become undeniable by the turn of the twenty-first century. This led to
a run on the country’s banks, in 2001, and resulted in the government effectively freezing the
accounts of its citizens by the end of that year to maintain financial control. In short, the director
of Nueve Reinas (Nine Queens) and its intended audience desperately needed to know how they
were being conned out of currency and, on a more fundamental level, the value of that currency.
Jay’s desire to protect the veritable sleight-of-hand used in “The Flue” reveals a core
conflict of interests that separate con games in real life, which are unannounced and closed texts,
from filmic adaptations of con games, which are announced and open texts. Con games are not
designed to produce more writerly, critical spectators, simply because to do so is not in their
economic interests. As criminal texts, extracting money from naive marks is their raison d’être.
To educate is antithetical to their very essence. This is why the con game’s deception when
performed as a crime is not announced and why its marks are “cooled out” (i.e., pacified) after
“the sting”: the moment of monetary loss (Pruss and Sharper 169) (Maurer 288).26 Con games
can produce critical, writerly spectators if significant errors are made during their performance
and the mark becomes aware of the closed text’s deception and malignant intent. Police, also,
25
Many versions of the short-change con are described in the chapter called “The Hype”
stage of a con game see The Road Hustler, Notes on Three Card Monte and Erving Goffman’s
essay “On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure.”
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may become writerly spectators of a con if a team of con artists plays it while being surveilled by
them often enough that they become experts at analyzing it. Such exposure, however, is
dangerous for both the con artists and the con game for it means the announcement of a text that
was always meant to remain secret and closed. It may also mean incarceration.
The filmic mediations of con games in House of Games, however, automatically tend to
create writerly, critical spectators of them. This occurs because the filming of con games allows
for multiple viewings of the exact same performance of a text. Like most entertainment versions
of con games, recording freezes them into a form of media storage that allows for closer scrutiny
and analysis of their deceptive techniques. This repetition is in the economic interests of Mamet
and Jay, for they profit from House of Games being viewed by as many spectators as possible in
cinemas, on DVDs at home or through other commercial formats. The adaptation of con games
for entertainment purposes by magicians, filmmakers and others therefore forces these closed
texts to open as long as not too much fidelity is lost regarding how the cons are actually played.
This filmic mediation of con games allows for an announced reception of what are usually
unannounced crimes during which greater rational analysis of the con being practiced can occur.
For this result — the sharpening of spectators’ abilities in enigma analysis — Mamet and Jay
should be applauded.
However, there is at least one exception to this tendency: “Laying the Note” is defined in
Road Hustler as a general term for the short-change con family of which “The Flue” is a
particular member (Prus and Sharper 170). So while “The Flue” is a historically accurate name
of the con according to both Jay’s interview and David W. Maurer’s The American Confidence
Man (281), the sleight-of-hand method shown in the film is not. Jay’s invented method of “The
Flue” reveals an adversarial approach, similar to the one discussed in Erdnase’s text, adopted by
the magician / con artist expert with regards to the spectator. In this case, both the historical con
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game and his fictional adaptation of it are designed to produce a readerly or naive spectator. In
this specific example of a knowingly fake revelation, the only hope of producing a writerly,
critical spectator occurs through the reception of extra-diegetic information coaxed out of Ricky
Jay by Terry Gross during her interview with him. That information then must be applied to a re-
watching of the film in tandem with further critical research. “The Flue” adaptation in House of
Games, unlike the majority of the cons depicted therein, is not designed to produce a critical,
In an odd twist of fate, however, it does. In his same interview with Terry Gross, Jay
relates an anecdote that challenges the relationship between real and fictional depictions of con
artistry. Sometime after the film’s release, he received a newspaper clipping from a police
investigator friend detailing the arrest of an insurance salesman who had copied and successfully
applied “The Flue’s” invented method to rob cashiers in Denver, Colorado. Ricky Jay tells Gross
that he then sent a note to Mamet joking “this is clearly the only practical thing I’ve ever done in
my life.” Jay’s adaptation in this case does have the potential to produce writerly spectators who
might be better at enigma analysis — at recognizing and avoiding this short-change con. His
invented method produced at least one individual who became a writerly criminal. Paradoxically,
of course, this means that if this newly minted con artist attempted “The Flue” on a cashier who
happened to have watched House of Games closely, that employee might also be a critical viewer
This instance of art imitating life imitating art is an especially complex form of
performance adaptation and raises questions about the ethics of criminal adaptations, which
paradoxically both aid and stymie the production of writerly spectators. The fact that Ricky Jay
is a celebrity in the magic world and a con game expert, who in this case is more devoted to
protecting the criminal than the general audience member, is rather obscure information. Most
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spectators, including the inspired Denver insurance salesmen, will never be aware that they were
consciously shut out from the real workings of the professional swindler community. In this case,
strangely, this social exclusion did not prevent the salesman from successfully “laying the note”
and hustling cashiers. As our exploration of Mamet and Jay’s collaborative adaptation of the
language, the visual sleight-of-hand and the psychological principles of deception from the con
artist world advances, I will continue to argue that House of Games does produce critical,
writerly spectators even when it holds information back. Con games are some of the most closed
texts in existence, because they are crimes. Thus, it is that much more fascinating when magic as
actually tell the audience that you are about to give them some information and
that it is important to what happens later in the play. In a good play the
information is delivered almost as an aside. The same mechanism holds true in the
con game. . . . Later you [the audience] use that information, which you think you
got accidentally, to put together what you think are the pieces.
— David Mamet
Ricky Jay’s portrayal of a con artist in House of Games illustrates a few more tools of
narrative trickery similar to the disarming practice of “teaching,” or falsely revealing secret
information to a mark. During her first encounter with the con men, just before the laying-the-
note scene, Mike asks Dr. Ford to sit with him at the poker table (to pose as his girlfriend) and
watch Jay’s character “Vegas Man” as he plays cards. At this point she does not know that she is
part of a play-within-a-play, knowing only Mike and not the others, and is convinced that George
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(Jay’s real character) is an out of town gambler. The audience is also unaware that a play-within-
play is taking place and thus believes the Vegas Man when he threatens both Mike and Dr. Ford
with a gun after Mike mistakenly loses a hand and is slow to pay up. “Gimme the goddamn
money” says Vegas Man. Convinced that the danger is real, the therapist (who was fooled into
backing Mike’s bet) writes a cheque for $6,000. Shorty thereafter, however, she decides not to
hand the check to Jay’s character-within-a-character. The realistic looking pistol leaks a few
drops of water onto the poker table and she realizes that the entire turn of events has been a
scam: the gun is a squirt gun. Mamet adds a nice visual touch by having the lights come up in the
smoky poker room: a theatrical convention that says, “the show is over.” Both Dr. Ford and the
In this moment, both the con men and Mamet exploit two important assumptions to
further deceive their spectators. Michael Close, a professional magician who has written on how
to theorize spectator assumptions, describes these two presuppositions with the phrases “the
show is over” and “mistakes are not rehearsed.” “Spectators assume that a performer rehearses
his effects in order to produce a smooth, polished performance, free from the tiny, annoying
screw-ups that plague us in everyday life,” writes Close (435). Water leaking from the tip of
Vegas Man’s supposedly deadly weapon is one such error. This group of con artists is a cross
between a group of magicians and a small repertory theatre troupe. Road Hustler also cites “the
practice and rehearsal a given operator has devoted to the polishing of a game,” as one of the
swindler’s chief advantages over the mark or “target” (Prus and Sharper 2). George/Vegas Man,
Mike and Joey have obviously put a lot of time and effort into their poker game performance.
Therefore, when an unforeseen error arrives to break through the show’s artifice, we are at first
dismayed and confused. Then, however, we receive it as an act of chaos — like the unopened
letter warning Kilpatrick of his betrayal in Borges’ short story, we do not imagine that this
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mistake could have been intentional — we buy it hook, line and sinker. Furthermore, Mamet
inserts a joke to remove any suspicion from the moment. When George (the now unmasked
Vegas Man) complains that he knew a squirt gun would never work, Joey replies: “Well, you
didn’t have to load it.” Audience laughter relieves the tension, the collective mood lightens, and
the story moves on to the good-natured conversation between the con men and their missed mark
in “The Flue” scene. Not until much later is the audience forced to reconstruct and reconnect
At the end of the film, the spectator realizes that all of these smaller cons (at least two of
them are purposeful failures) join together to form a multi-staged “master con.” In other words,
“the show” did not end when the lights came on in the poker room. Dr. Ford is ultimately duped
into handing over $80,000, because she underestimates the acting skills, persistence, and
patience of these criminals. We are taught that we can never trust our ability to distinguish
between announced versus unannounced moments of fiction in the presence of con artists. In
House of Games, these men manipulate social and theatrical conventions to hide the
interconnection of each short con vignette in the film’s diegetic world. Each turns out to be part
of a seamless narrative, not a disparate one-act play. In hindsight, most of the con men’s errors
should have been clues. For example, it simply does not make sense for George to make such a
blunder as unnecessarily filling a fake gun with water, does it? Well, it does if there is a prospect
of a much larger score to be had at the end of a prolonged performance. True to con artist form,
these men have done their homework on Dr. Ford and know that she is capable of yielding much
more than $6,000. Mike, by repeatedly asking what her name is at the beginning of the film, also
hides the fact that his extended confidence trick has already begun. He knows exactly who she is,
but this verbal intentional mistake — his apparent need to be reminded of her name — is a piece
of smoke. To return to one of Close’s magic performance principles: “what appears to be the end
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of a trick is not; it’s really the beginning of the next trick. And what appears to be the start of the
next trick is not; the trick actually began much earlier than was assumed” (435). To better
understand the way intertextual connections are hidden and manipulated within con artist master
narratives and how Mamet applies these deceptive techniques to his films, a more in-depth
“Short” vs. “long” denotes the difference between a quick and an extended narrative
deception. Within both trick formats, however, internal textual relations are obfuscated. The long
form con entails more elaborate preparation, set-up and is often composed of multiple stages. A
good example is the fake horse race con performed by Robert Redford and Paul Newman’s
characters in The Sting (1973), one of the seminal con artist narratives in American popular
culture.27 Peter Bogdanovitch’s Paper Moon (also released in 1973) contains the performance of
a “short” con that serves as another example of the “Laying the Note” or short-change variety
already discussed in House of Games. In the former film, Moses Pray (Ryan O’Neal) enlists the
aid of his ten-year-old daughter Addie Loggins (Tatum O’Neal) to similarly con a store cashier
out of a $20 dollar bill. In Bogdanovitch’s film the clerk, played by Dejah Moore, is tricked into
giving Addie change for a twenty when the little girl actually pays for her candy with a one-
dollar bill. When Addie complains that the she has received insufficient change the clerk says
that she gave her the correct change for a dollar. The little girl begins to cry and whines that the
$20 bill was a birthday present: “It said ‘Happy Birthday Addie.’” The cashier checks and, sure
27
“The Wire,” its phase “The Shut-Out” and other real con games documented by
Maurer appear throughout director George Ray Hill’s The Sting (1973). One of the secrets to this
film’s beautifully unified narrative is the accuracy and care with which authentic con games and
enough, there is a twenty in the till dedicated to Addie as described. Surprised, but now
convinced that she must have made an error, the woman hands over the excess change to the
underage hustler. How did such a bill get into the cash register? The answer is an example of
how techniques of narrative deception can be applied to commit crimes in everyday life.
Earlier, Moses prepared the bill for his daughter (writing the birthday greeting and her
name on it). He then went in — before her transaction — to pose as an unrelated customer
buying an item. His preliminary purchase, which the store clerk is unable to see as connected to
the mistaken currency exchange that subsequently takes place with Addie, is what magician’s
call pre-show work. Michael Close describes this concept as the “this is the beginning of the
show assumption” (432-433). Just as theatrical conventions make the audience believe that the
play only begins when the curtain goes up (a clever production may have begun setting up the
audience well in advance), the cashier believes that her customer transactions begin and end in
the traditional way — when someone comes to the counter. She simply does not think of the two
dialogues (one with Moses and one with Addie) as part of the same narrative — for her they are
separate self-contained events of everyday life. “When we walk out on stage, or when we walk
up to the table, the spectators assume that we are beginning the show,” states Close of the
magician’s audience (435). Likewise, the father/daughter con artist team predicts the cashier’s
presupposition, plays upon it and avoids suspicion at least until she counts out her cash drawer at
the end of the day. At that point, she may be so convinced as to misremember (or half remember)
the day’s events so that the moment of confusion (with Addie) will stand out clearly, but her
brief and unremarkable interaction with Moses will fade away altogether. Indeed, she may be so
well deceived that no reconstruction of the work-day satisfactorily explains the mysteriously
In House of Games, Margaret Ford is conned based on the same principle of invisible
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pre-show work. The difference is that she and the audience are fooled together, while in Paper
Moon an insider’s perspective that allows spectators to witnesses the con game’s preliminary
work is given. In Mamet’s film, both the female psychoanalyst and the audience experience
either deception or revelation together. Throughout the story the camera follows Lindsay
Crouse’s character, privileging her point of view. In early scenes of her working alone at her
desk or conducting therapy sessions, we observe patients from her point of view — so much so
that we can read her private notes. This privileged perspective continues up until the film’s final
scene during which she eats lunch at a table by herself. Therefore, when she notices Billy Hahn
— a patient whose victimization initially led her to the con men — climb into a car belonging to
his supposed enemies (criminals Mike, Joey, George, and others), the audience sees a
discrepancy too and begins to realize how early the master con began. Although the spectator, at
this point, is most likely one step ahead of Dr. Ford in suspecting foul play regarding a twist of
ill fate that costs her $80,000, she and the audience share the discovery of definitive proof that
Billy is a confederate (and not a victim) at the same moment. Suddenly, the small, seemingly
isolated narratives within the film — Billy Hahn’s visit, the failed poker game con, the false
sincerity of being “taught” the tricks of the trade — all connect to shatter her previous
assumptions of when the show began. The audience along with the psychoanalyst realizes that
both the screenwriter and the con artists have been lying much earlier and much more completely
than expected.
and emotional betrayal as related through its main character. As Mamet said in an interview with
John Larr about the process of dramaturgy: “what one wants to do is put the protagonist and the
audience in exactly the same position” (Kane 110). His film intentionally places the audience in
the same reception position as the “mark.” This is a deviation from the approach taken by most
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con game films — The Hustler (1962), The Music Man (1962), The Flim-Flam Man (1967),
Matchstick Men (2003), Catch Me If You Can (2002) and others. These films, as most of the
titles suggest, almost always relate the dynamics of deception from the male con artist’s point of
view. Paper Moon, does, for example, present an unusual father/daughter (male/female) hustling
team, yet it also has the spectators watch the story from the more common hustlers’ position
(Moses and Addie). Though all of these films give the viewer the same vantage point as the
protagonist(s), Mamet’s chooses to tell much more of the story from the outsider’s perspective
— the position of the “mark.” This position changes the didactic aspect of the film and forces the
audience to participate in the process of being fooled as a naive, readerly spectator rather than
the process of fooling. Because we the audience ultimately receive the con much more than we
give it, House of Games teaches us an original lesson. We are forced to reconstruct the language,
the action and the psychological principles of the con’s trickery from the loser’s perspective.
Almodóvar’s “Lamb to the Slaughter” — and various confidence tricks in David Mamet’s House
of Games, this chapter has advanced the dissertation’s discussion of reception and adaptation
narratives just covered has allowed for a visual aspect of analysis that was not possible when
studying Borges’ written fiction to better understand how magic effects take place within the
minds of readers. Moving to the filmic mediation of criminal acts has given us the opportunity to
conceive of adaptation as infidelity or outright theft, to look closely at how visual deception
We have, in these pages and at various times, shuttled back and forth between seeing these
primary texts through the eyes of the criminal, the victim and the magician.
see from these three vantage points, but primarily as criminals. Hitchcock’s elegant sleight-of-
screen causes a leg-of-lamb murder weapon to appear as suddenly and as unpredictably for us as
it does for the man whom it murders. Thus, like him, we see by not seeing — by being caught off
guard as naive victims. Re-watching this scene — through the lens of magician Tommy
Wonder’s observations on shadow and light — causes us to view it from a new angle: the angle
omniscient narration of “Lamb to the Slaughter” shows us how the protagonist of this story
cunningly deceives the police and therefore teaches us how to see and think like a criminal. First,
Mary employs a bit of self-deception to convincingly lie to the authorities on the telephone.
Then, she simulates a performance of her shopping routine in everyday life. Finally, she boldly
thinks outside of the box (and the oven) to successfully feed the murder weapon to the
My approach to cross-cultural and cross-media adaptations in the first half of the chapter
embraces transgression, as Mary Maloney does, out of necessity — the need for freedom. Thus, I
have celebrated the productive and liberating experimentation that can be gained artistically and
culturally be being unfaithful to a given source text. Rejecting what Stam and others have
developing progressive theories of adaptation, which embrace all media. On the other hand, I
have also argued for a necessarily subjective yet rigorous ethics of citation when adapting texts.
The hope is to create more writerly spectators, or to phrase it differently, to produce viewers with
sharper tools of enigma analysis by providing them with the sources they need to deepen those
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skills.
Mamet’s House of Games and Ricky Jay’s contributions to its narrative as con game
consultant teach us to see the film’s deceptions as victims, as criminals, as more deeply betrayed
victims, and finally, with a little help, as magicians. As viewers accompanying Dr. Ford on her
journey into the world of con games, we share her experience of being targeted as a mark when
we are drawn into the iconography and unfamiliar lexicon of a crooked poker game and the
performative speech-acts of its betting rituals. We are then given the illusion of seeing the short-
change con “The Flue” and other confidence tricks from the backstage point of view of the
criminal. This lesson and the others which follow it, however, prove to be what con artists call a
“double steer,” what magicians call a “sucker effect” and what David Mamet calls good
screenwriting. By employing the deceptive narrative principles of the fake revelation (magic),
the double steer (con artistry) and the unannounced play-within-a-play (theatre), Mamet allows
us to experience the deeper betrayal that Dr. Ford feels after she mistakenly believes that she has
Subsequently, however, and with the aid of intertextual information we are able to see
and analyze these cons through the lens of the magician. “The Flue” does not call for a double-
model reader until and unless one hears Ricky Jay’s extra-diegetic interview with Terry Gross.
Up to that point, the con game — by its very nature — does not seek a double-model (i.e. a
critical) spectator. It is the magician as entertainer and bearer of historical clues, like the correct
terminology of the cons in question, who adds historical information to a con game or a
cardsharping technique through other materials. This allows the con to be produced and received
by a smaller, critical double-model audience. For these reasons, I applied magician Michael
Close’s thoughts on how three assumptions — “the show has not started,” “the show is over” and
“mistakes are not rehearsed” — to a critical analysis of House of Games and its narrative
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structure. The professional magician benefits from critical spectators who will purchase extra-
diegetic material. One example of this is Ricky Jay Plays Poker — a DVD that contains both a
cardsharping techniques that unethical players have used to cheat at cards in the past.
Con games are among the most closed texts a spectator will experience; thus it is that
much more fascinating when the performing art of magic causes their locked doors to open. I
have argued that the magician runs a risk during the process of this opening, however. One
cannot truly understand these criminal subcultures without embedding oneself to a significant
extent within their oral and written traditions. Ah, but there’s the rub. The deeper one delves into
the secrets of professional con artists and advantage players the likelier one is to adopt their
mental stance toward the audience as opponent, adversary, target, mark or victim. This is the
vague and ominous “price” that Erdnase warns his readers of in The Expert at the Card Table
(14). Freud offers a similar warning to would-be psychotherapists: “No one who, like me,
conjures up the most evil of those half-tamed demons that inhabit the human breast, and seeks to
wrestle with them, can expect to come through the struggle unscathed” (109). The necessarily
mindset often stunts the magician’s ability to connect with and to express love for spectators.
To dazzle, to educate and to entice spectators’ to sharpen their own abilities of enigma
analysis by becoming writerly spectators are, for me, the greatest gifts that a magician can give
the audience. To accomplish these goals effectively, the love-based philosophies of the
twentieth-century Tamariz school of magic and of Gabi Pareras’ magia ficcional (fictional
magic) in Spain are more promising paths to follow than the darker, con-saturated history of
North American magic. As instructive as it is to study the philosophy of the cardsharp in The
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Expert at the Card Table or to appropriate the street swindler’s psychological ploys for the
performance of con game adaptations, the bedrock upon which these approaches are founded is a
predatory love of one’s own power over others. Tamariz’s book La vía mágica (The Magic Way)
articulates an alternative to this approach. His description there of how magicians should lead the
minds of spectators to the beautiful experience of a magical emotion is founded upon love for the
spectator and love for the communal dream of magic itself (18-20). So it is with a disillusioned
understanding of how to analyze deception through the eyes of the criminal that we move
forward. We now exchange the eyes of the criminal for the eyes of the benevolent magician to
seek a healthier relationship with the spectator and the art of magic itself.
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Chapter 4
“The Sphinx” and “The Sage”: Reception and Adaptation in
Practice
Enter the illusion designer’s workshop and the magic theatre. This final chapter moves
this dissertation’s exploration of the relationship between adaptation and reception from
theoretical and critical analysis of magic as a performing art to direct engagement with the
practice of that art onstage. It serves as a retrospective critique of a re-writing, adaptation and
performance of Colonel Stodare’s nineteenth-century stage illusion “The Sphinx,” in which the
magician causes a decapitated head to temporarily regain the powers of life and speech. What
began for me and my team as a straight-forward historical reconstruction of this stage illusion, in
collaboration with the Drama Centre at the University of Toronto, became an experimental
adaptation of it with another narrative: “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban,” from The
Arabian Nights. This mixture of stage illusion and fantastic-marvelous short story resulted in our
performance titled “The Sage Duban,” which ran for three consecutive days at The Studio
In the following pages, I analyze Stodare’s “The Sphinx” on three levels. First, I read it
as a magician searching for the pragmatic details needed to create an act. I discuss it as an object
of historical reconstruction to demonstrate gaps of knowledge that were only possible to fill by
combining university archives, magic community archives, and the embodied knowledge of the
1
“The Sage Duban” was the opening act in the Drama Centre’s Hallowe’en Vaudevilles:
An Evening of Magic, Mayhem, and Melodrama. Each of the production’s three acts were based
America or both.
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repertoire.2 My goal with this first layer of analysis is to show practical evidence of what magic
historians and professionals working within the magic subculture have to offer scholars in the
academy who take the performing art of magic as an object of critical study. The rough and
highly subjective adaptation philosophy, for which I argue in this chapter relies on equal
function based on the venue where it was performed: a building in London named Egyptian Hall.
Egyptian Hall was built in 1812 to display the personal wonder cabinet of William Bullock. By
1850, Bullock had established the institution as a natural history museum. By the end of the
century, Egyptian Hall had become an important magic theatre where some of the earliest motion
pictures were shown. Stodare’s illusion is situated in the context of this space where imaginative
geographies flourished and exceeded empirical reality to take on fantastic forms and shapes.
Edwin Dawes begins this historicizing of “The Sphinx” in his book Stodare: The Enigma
Variations by mentioning the popularity of English travel literature set in Egypt, such as Henry
Kinglake’s Eothen (69). He also provides a brief history of Egyptian Hall’s construction, its
exhibits and its early performances in The Great Illusionists (142-150). My discussion in this
chapter builds upon Dawes’s work by asking larger questions regarding what social functions the
venue had for English society in relation to fantasizing about and ordering the foreign East. A
larger corpus of literary texts that were widely read during the lifespan of Egyptian Hall are
considered here. Simon During, another magic scholar, makes a general statement in his study
Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic regarding “The Sphinx” illusion as
2
For more information on this performance studies concept see Diana Taylor’s The
an invocation of the “long history of literary Orientalism” in England (144). The breadth of his
cultural study, which seeks to map the cultural power of three centuries’ worth of magic
performance in one volume, allows him to touch upon two examples of this tradition in relation
to “The Sphinx” — a short story by the American author Edgar Allen Poe and Baron Edward
Bulwer-Lytton’s novel The Last Days of Pompeii (143).3 My analysis narrows its scope to enter
into a more sustained engagement with diverse Orientalist texts produced by nineteenth-century
English culture and with earlier exhibits at Egyptian Hall to explore how these sources help us to
understand what the Orientalist qualities of Stodare’s “The Sphinx” suggest about magic as a
performing art. Susan McCosker’s attentiveness to Egyptian Hall’s origins, its previous exhibits,
such as Professor Faber’s “Euphonia” automaton, and her employment of an early performance
studies methodology begins to expose the curious roots of the venue (570-581).4 My sense is
that this stems from her consultation of Robert Altick’s extremely careful and thorough study,
The Shows of London. All of these works, by an independent magic historian, a cultural studies
scholar, a performance studies scholar, and a literary scholar, provide bits and pieces of
3
During’s approach in Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic is
ambitious in its scope. This leads to a broad, bird’s-eye view of magic history that sometimes
repeats smaller errors in the historical record. For example, Colonel Stodare’s real name is
incorrectly cited as Alfred Inglis (131). Edwin Dawes has cleared up the genealogical confusion
surrounding the performer’s family name and correctly identifies it as Joseph Stoddart in his
book Stodare.
4
McCosker, it should be noted, reproduces specific lines of dialogue from Stodare’s
debut of “The Sphinx.” The source from which she draws these quotations is Geoffrey Lamb’s
Victorian Magic. Lamb’s text, unfortunately, provides no references for this information.
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productive evidence that I bring together here for a new analysis of “The Sphinx.” Altick’s and
Said’s contributions, it should be emphasized, have also been invaluable resources for this
chapter’s deeper critical inquiry into the reality-slippage aesthetic of Egyptian Hall as a site of
English colonialism.
Third, “The Sphinx” will be read in relation to our “The Sage Duban” adaptation from
2009, which was a practical attempt to create a successful cultural and artistic infidelity — a free
yet faithful adaptation. The goal of “The Sage Duban” was to be faithful to the spirits of both
“The Sphinx” and the short story “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” as independent
works of art, while simultaneously causing them to work together as literary and performing arts
that typically remain separate. How one is “faithful to the spirit of something” is always a
subjective question. In the case of “The Sphinx,” our production team was faithful to its form (its
material construction and choreography) while changing its content (its story and politics).
Regarding “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban,” we were faithful to the story’s
content (its theme and characters) while changing its formal vehicle (from a traditional oral story
otherworldly magic in the case of both texts. The magical theme of life after death made possible
by spells unites them. This mutual adaptation of texts facilitates an exploration of how the
willing suspension of disbelief operates when a complex narrative and a stage illusion are
combined. It also allows for a re-examination of the political and cultural values of both texts
within spectators’ imaginations. The re-scripting and adaptation of “The Sphinx” into a tale with
spectator response in relation to what Edward Said calls “imaginative geography” (53-55). The
knowledge of times and places distant from one’s own — in both marvelous short stories and
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stage illusions is one that I interrogate here by way of practice, theory, and post-production
analysis.
remains, bones, videos, films, CDs, all those items supposedly resistant to change.
gestures, orality, movement, dance, singing—in short, all those acts usually
There are more miracles in print now than you’ll ever use. There is, however, a
On the night of October 16th, 1865 Colonel Stodare appeared before the audience at
London’s Egyptian Hall carrying a wooden box, which, he explained, contained the decapitated
head of a sphinx. Placing the box on a simple, bare table, he then unlocked and opened its front
to display a mummified head wearing an exotic headdress. Stodare then retreated several paces
to the edge of the stage, at which distance his well-known talents for ventriloquism would be
useless, and issued his command: “Sphinx, awake!” Slowly and miraculously the sphinx came
to life: it opened its eyes, responded to questions, and, finally, recited a number of enigmatic
verses. After the presentation of these impossibilities, Colonel Stodare explained that the
enchantment which gave the sphinx life only lasted fifteen minutes each night and closed the
box. When the audience begged for more, Stodare opened the box to reveal a pile of ashes.
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Ashes to ashes and dust to dust, the sphinx could only be resurrected again at the next evening’s
performance.5
Reconstructing a stage illusion like Colonel Stodare’s “The Sphinx” reveals the
epistemic interdependence of the magic archive, the university archive and the repertoire of
living performers. The dramaturgical research required to create as accurate a picture as possible
of Stodare’s performance in 1865 for our re-staging of it was culled from patents in the public
academic studies of magic published within the university, and personal correspondence with
illusion designers. All of these documents led to the physical reconstruction of the principal
optical illusion employed in “The Sphinx,” to the choreography and performance secrets needed
to make that illusion deceptive, and to an understanding of the social context explaining why
such a presentation would have been magical and appealing to the minds of Londoners in 1865.
As building a nineteenth-century stage illusion from scratch reveals, the gaps separating
written and embodied knowledge are created by the magic world’s intentional secrecy as well as
the unintentional loss of performance details due to either lack of documentation, the passage of
time or a combination of these factors. In the case of “The Sphinx,” these historical conditions
have led to some informative yet paradoxically vague descriptions of the illusion’s modus
5
This is Stodare’s performance as I currently conceive it. It may contain some
accuracy of P.H. Cannon’s (Henry Hatton’s) account of the illusion’s ash-filled conclusion
Stodare’s patter as published in Modern Magic (1876). I have taken poetic license with the final
line.
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operandi. For example, the language of the British patent that T.W. Tobin and Colonel Stodare
filed in 1865 to protect their intellectual discovery is purposefully vague: “Mirrors are placed
under a table or slab at such angles as to reflect images of surrounding scenery or objects, and at
the same time serve to conceal persons or objects controlled by a conjuror” (Rees and Wilmore
13).
Though the basic secret — that the body of the actor whose head plays the role of the
Sphinx is rendered invisible by mirrors underneath a table — may be inferred from this public
document, there is also no mention of a specific angle or range of angles at which the mirrors
should be placed. There is no explanation for how the actor’s head might appear and then vanish
from the tabletop at the correct moments to create the illusion that The Sphinx’s head arrives,
and then leaves, by way of the box carried on and off stage by the conjuror. The open language
of the patent is paradoxical for it attempts to protect the discovery of a stage illusion principle as
an invention without revealing the secret details that would make “The Sphinx” easily
reproducible by competing illusionists of the day. This vagueness is likely the reason that Tobin
and Stodare’s only patent received “provisional protection” (Rees and Wilmore 13). Thus, the
information provided by this primary source is inadequate for a successful reconstruction of the
illusion without the aid of other, more communicative sources. In this way, the document
continues to guard the secret of “The Sphinx” well after the demise of its creators.
A rather exquisite illustration of Stodare’s “The Sphinx,” which is another primary source
document available in the public archive, visually demonstrates this same epistemological gap of
public versus secret information between not only the archive and the repertoire, but also
between two types of archives: one that I will call the profane or public archive, and another that
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I will call the magic archive.6 The beautifully detailed wood engraving in question can be placed
firmly within the profane archive, first, because it was published in London’s Illustrated Times
on the 18th of October immediately after the illusion’s debut, and second, because it so ideally
presents the optical deception of “The Sphinx” from the perspective of a layperson in the
Figure 1: Wood cut illustration from London’s Illustrated Times, 18 October 1865
A particular detail added by the illustrator of this Times image qualifies it as coming from
a model spectator’s point of view: note the natural shadow extending from the legs and table,
created by a light source somewhere to the right and in front of the illusion. In practice, this
shadow is impossible due to the location and arrangement of the mirrors beneath the table as well
6
I prefer these two terms as substitutes for what magicians might call the “lay” or
“laypersons’” archive. In Spanish, one is either “un mago” (“magician”) or “un profano” (a
“layperson”). The adjectives profane and public will be used interchangeably in this sense.
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as lighting restrictions. The table in “The Sphinx” must be lit primarily from above during
performance to shield the mirrors below from any direct light that might cause tell-tale
reflections. However, this small false memory of Stodare’s debut in the illustrator’s mind — the
example of how magic occurs and persists within the mind of spectators well after the
performance event. This memory of “The Sphinx” as presented to readers of The Times is
precisely the kind of public reception for which Tobin and Stodare strove: one that includes the
found in the only known photographic portrait of the magician with his illusion (fig. 5).
Figure 2: Portrait of Joseph Stoddart as Colonel Stodare (79 Daniel, Caveney, and
Fig. 5. Portrait of Joseph Stoddart as ColonelSteinmeyer)
Stodare (79 Daniel, Caveney, and Steinmeyer).
As with the illustration from The Times, it is important to note the duplicity in this visual
representation of “The Sphinx.” This is necessarily a duplicate table and hand-crafted model of
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The Sphinx’s decapitated head. Therefore, rather than an incorrectly remembered and drawn
version of the actual illusion in action, this photo has been staged to give the impression that
Colonel Stodare could actually stand where he is standing, that a shadow could form beneath the
table, and that these were the actual props used in performance.
In contrast to the Times’ illustration of “The Sphinx” and the misleading photographic portrait
of Joseph Stoddart in character as Colonel Stodare posing with his illusion, several other
depictions from the magic archive serve as much more communicative sources. These provided
“The Sage Duban” production team with lucid descriptions of the illusion’s method. They made
it possible to construct our earliest miniature model of “The Sphinx” table to further study its
deceptive optical principles. One illustration (printed via wood engraving) in Hoffman’s Modern
Magic (1876) is a practical and realistic rendering of the modus operandi used in Stodare’s debut
Figure 3: Frontispiece wood engraving from Hoffmann’s Modern Magic (1877, second
Fig. 6. Frontispiece wood engraving from Hoffmann’s
edition) Modern Magic (1877, second edition).
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Notice in this representation the same elements of head, box, and three-legged table that are
found in the Times illustration, but now with the important additions of the three curtains
required onstage and dotted lines indicating the location of the secret mirrors, the actor’s hidden
Add to this illustration (first published in 1876), Jim Steinmeyer’s recent comparison of
“The Sphinx” to other stage illusions (“The Protean Cabinet,” and various Charles Morritt
creations) in Art and Artifice, and it becomes possible to grasp the practical employment of what
is called the “v-mirror” principle from an illusion designer’s point of view (108-138).
Steinmeyer’s analysis is the first I have found that clearly elucidates how spectators' sight-lines
reflect off of the v-shaped mirrors to visually “grab” two sections of the curtains and any scenery
from stage-left and stage-right of the table (142). Because these visually grabbed zones
identically match the backstage space of what is behind the table, an effect of optical continuity
is created (one which takes hours to properly align). The mirrors essentially cloak the body of the
performer playing the role of The Sphinx. The result for the audience is a sense of transparency:
spectators feel as though they see not just underneath and through the table, but also objects from
the mise-en-scène in the space directly behind the table. The early miniature model of “The Sage
Duban” table that we made demonstrates this sense of depth. The v-mirrors each grab the white
curtains and the two real batteries to their right and left to create the illusion of a third battery in
the background. In person, the three dimensional depth of the illusion remains startling even
when one conceptually understands the optical principle being witnessed (fig. 7).
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Fig. 7. Photograph of our miniature model of the optical illusion used in Stodare’s “The Sphinx”
Figure 4: Photograph of our miniature model of the optical illusion used in Stodare’s
“The Sphinx”
Despite the combined information from sources in the profane archive and the magic
archive, our miniature model of “The Sphinx” lacked significant refinement and construction
details needed for creating a fully functional version of the illusion. Some of these performance
tips and secrets — the details that in magic parlance are called “the real work” — ultimately
came from the magic repertoire of a living illusion designer.7 Jim Steinmeyer, both via personal
correspondence and in conversation, generously offered his advice on how to fill in knowledge
gaps concerning construction and set design. His experiential knowledge garnered from a career
tips on many fronts. Three of the most interesting, in terms of the relationship between
conceptual understanding and practice, were the suggestions of 1/8th-of-an-inch thick mirror
glass, contrasting colors for the carpet and curtains surrounding the illusion (to make it visually
7
See Bart Whaley’s Encyclopedic Dictionary of Magic for a complete definition of this
pop), and the addition of vertical black lines on the table legs to hide the edges of the mirror. I
cannot emphasize enough the value of this last professional touch. One of the most difficult
aspects of lighting the illusion and leveling the set for “The Sage Duban” was ensuring that the
edges of the mirror contacting the ground and the table legs were completely invisible to the
human eye. A close-up photograph of the vertical black lines painted onto the wood reveals how
they are able to make half of a table leg contacting the mirror double itself to look like a
flawlessly complete table leg. This invisible doubling is one part of the optical illusion that feels
like magic in and of itself, no matter how many times one sees it (fig. 8).
Figure 5: Photograph of “The Sage Duban” production’s table leg and black line
masking (notice the disjunction of backgrounds).
Fig. 8. Photograph of “The Sage Duban” production’s table leg with black line masking (notice
the disjunction of backgrounds).
Moving from the public archive to the magic archive to the magic repertoire and mixing
together the different kinds of knowing that these sources offer, led to the process of embodied
learning that became so prominent during the rehearsal and performance stages of reconstructing
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“The Sphinx.” Sometimes this meant applying and building upon a lesson from the repertoire.
For example, Professor John Mayberry and I adapted Steinmeyer’s tip for masking the vertical
seams of the mirror to hide the horizontal ones touching the stage floor. For this bit of
camouflage, we experimented with various unsatisfactory fabrics and carpets before finally
discovering that the bottom of the mirror’s seams vanished when sitting on a floor cloth of black
felt. This solution was, for us, an example of experiential knowledge from someone else’s living
repertoire showing us how to improvise and overcome similar obstacles on our own.
however, resulted from details, warnings, and anecdotes in the historical archive. Creating the
blocking and business of my character’s movements on stage, for example, was partially
influenced by Henry Hatton’s description of how Stodare (or perhaps another conjuror)
successfully interacted with the illusion table and stage space to give the appearance of natural
The Performer when addressing the audience is always careful to get out of the
angle of the glass, otherwise he, too, might be reflected. He generally stands at the
“wing,” and always, before approaching the table, walks to the foot-lights
(addressing the audience as a pretext for doing so), until in a direct line with leg
8
Though Henry Hatton, also known as P. H. Cannon, publishes a detailed description of
“The Sphinx” in the November, 1866 issue of “Our Young Folks,” it seems likely that he would
have witnessed another performer’s rendition of the Sphinx in North America rather than
Stodare’s. For the time being, I have no evidence that Hatton would have made it to London and
to Stodare’s performances.
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These directions had to be taken with a grain of salt. Marching “straight to the table” and its front
leg both looked and felt awkward compared to making a more casual arc from the downstage
space (where I addressed the audience) to the upstage space (where I placed, unlocked, and,
finally, removed the box containing The Sphinx). This process — the embodied refinement of
suggestions from the archive — was repeated with another of Hatton’s comments in mind: that
the performer’s “fumbling” for the key in his pocket to unlock the box containing The Sphinx
allows the actor playing that part enough time to put his head up through the trap door of the
table (693). Though I discarded the concept of fumbling, we did choreograph the business of
unlocking the padlock, lifting the latch, and lowering the box’s front panel into three distinct
beats to which John Mayberry, who played the role of the disembodied head, could time and
execute his concealed appearance. This created a perfectly natural continuity of action from the
spectator’s point of view during the setting down and opening of the box, as well as the closing
and removal of it at the end of the performance. In practice, these crucial movements had to look
like nothing more than placing a box upon a table, opening it, closing it and then removing it.
Fumbling, overstated movements or any unnecessary bits of business are suspicious actions that
might have distracted spectators, thereby making it difficult for them to focus on willingly
Anecdotes of Sphinx failures from the written past also served as warnings for how to
avoid accidentally shattering our spectators’ reception of the illusion in 2009. Two noteworthy
tidbits of wisdom inspired parts of our pre-show preparations and my scripted preamble for each
performance of our Sphinx adaptation. The first of these helpful historical mistakes is attributed
to one Mr. Alfred Thompson. His eyes, after being thoroughly deceived by Stodare’s entire
debut performance at Egyptian Hall in 1865, caught sight of two small fingerprint smudges on
one of the mirrors at the show’s conclusion. Thompson, who was a theatre manager and would
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have had some experience with magic of the day, writes euphorically about how these tiny prints
gave him the key to the riddle of “The Sphinx” (Evans 116). Keeping this pitfall in mind, John
Mayberry and I made it part of our pre-performance ritual to meticulously clean the mirrors for
fear of smudges as well as the table’s felt ground cloth for fear of lint from the previous
performance. These measures helped us to avoid ruining the illusion for any spectators as
Another safeguard put into active practice during the show derived from the most
amusing account of M. Talrich’s “Le décapité parlant” (“The Talking Head”) attraction, whose
equally rapid success and failure in Paris (c. 1866) resulted in the eventual closure of his
waxwork exhibition called Le Musée Français. “Le décapité parlant” was an inventive adaptation
of Tobin and Stodare’s “The Sphinx” and Madame Tussaud’s popular “Chamber of Horrors” to a
new performance environment. Talrich bought the rights to “The Sphinx” from T. W. Tobin and
designed a version of it that became the central attraction of his new wax museum in Paris.
lush description of the curious exhibits spectators would see before descending into the
cavernous cellar of the Musée Français (902-904). After passing a scene of the famous French
anatomist Dr. Guillaume Dupuytren teaching his students about the inner workings of the human
body and a gruesome tableau depicting a torture scene from the Inquisition, visitors would
advance through an underground corridor to gawk at a mysterious decapitated head resting upon
a table. The head would come to life, tell the story of its own torture and then answer the
audience’s questions. Talrich’s exhibition, however, was undone by poorly managed spectators
who took to throwing or shooting pellets at the head. The actor did not have to endure this torture
for long. Soon, skeptics noticed how poorly aimed pellets would uncannily ricochet off of what
should have been empty space below the table. This quickly betrayed the presence of the hidden
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mirrors responsible for the exhibition. The exposure of what then was sold as a veritable
supernatural attraction (according to Robert-Houdin’s critique) and what today might be thought
of as an unusual performance art piece led to diminishing returns, popular discontent and the
While I had no fear of a formal theatre audience shooting objects at our reconstruction of
The Sphinx, the above anecdote did cause me to worry about another kind of shooting — flash
photography — as well as the possibility of accidental mirror vibrations. I discovered prior to our
final rehearsals that one flash photo would light up the hidden mirror glass like a Christmas tree,
an image that would be so difficult for spectators to erase from their minds that it would likely
destroy any sensation of magic. The solution was to script the following lines into my opening
begin, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to remind you that cell phones, digital
cameras, and other such recording devices did not exist in the nineteenth century.
So if you have these items, please turn them off and hide them immediately.
Thank you.
Fortunately, all of our audience members responded respectfully to this by now common
While the ubiquity of personal cameras capable of producing a flash is a visual version
of the same threat of the projectiles that undid M. Talrich’s presentation of the illusion, the other
fear raised by his story was the possibility of causing the mirrors to shake or vibrate even slightly
when the Superlative Pepper made contact with the table. Justin Blum, Paul Babiak, and others
involved in the project observed and directed the choreographed moments during which I set the
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box upon the table and placed its heavy padlock off to one side. These actions had to be both
natural yet also secretly softened to avoid sending vibrations through the table significant enough
to jiggle the mirrors. Ambient light would bounce into the eyes of the audience if my motions
were too exaggerated. Numerous repetitions of these table and box sequences helped to develop
the muscle memory required to interact with the table in an apparently nonchalant manner (as
one would while using any normal table) without causing any scatterings of light.
With the table constructed and the basic choreography blocked, the final gaps to be filled
for an historical reconstruction of “The Sphinx” proved to be the most significant in terms of
how the stage illusion was read and received in 1865 and how this reception would be
qualitatively different in 2009. These gaps were the missing lines of Stodare’s script and the
questions of socio-historical context raised by (re)-writing those lines while imagining his
performing environment. Thus far this analysis has moved from sources in the public archive to
ones from the magic archive and the magic repertoire to focus upon “The Sphinx” as a material
faithfully rebuild and accurately perform Stodare’s illusion. This is one aspect of the practice-
based research approach for which I advocate in this chapter. This level of detailed performance
information, as far as I can determine, has never been published as an integral aspect of an
academic analysis of “The Sphinx,” due to the practitioner versus theoretician divide. In my
experiences studying and performing magic, there is a significant disconnect between experts
privileging the archive and those favoring the repertoire. This kind of experiential performance
knowledge is one example of what the magic community and its predominantly independent
researchers have to offer the university community. My work seeks to bring together scholars
object of cultural, political, or economic study with those who interact with the art on the level of
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lived practice.
Now, I will switch critical perspectives to think about audience reception of “The
Sphinx” from these broader historical and epistemological levels, which allow me to read
as a cultural phenomenon in the world at large. This shift in reading stance also reveals what
more theoretically inclined experts in fields such as cultural studies (Simon During),
performance studies (Susan McCosker and Michael Mangan) and literary studies (Robert Altick
and Edward Said) have to offer magicians who strive to reconstruct, document and understand
the great illusions of the past. While none of these scholars individually answers the main
questions of audience reception and social context that plagued me during the scripting process
of “The Sage Duban” project, the convergence of their work has led me to connect “The Sphinx”
to powerful and sometimes disturbing human traditions of exoticism, of ordering reality, and of
reality-slippage. The reception questions that I was forced to ask due to the complete absence of
a reliable script of what Stodare and the actor playing the Sphinx said during in 1865 were the
following:9 why did Joseph Stoddart choose to present his new illusion as a decapitated sphinx
rather than the head of any number of compelling characters (such as M. Talrich’s victim of the
Inquisition, a French aristocrat guillotined during the revolution, or someone else)? Why was
9
As mentioned in a previous footnote, I have yet to see satisfactory documentation for
the words some claim were spoken during Stodare’s 1865 performance. Henry Hatton’s account
is the earliest publication purporting to reproduce lines from “The Sphinx.” His work has led to
embellishments. This led Susan McCosker’s to cite Lamb along with his undocumented
this choice so magical and appealing for his London audience? And, finally, when the Sphinx
Stodare’s performance script. The idea was trial by reconstruction. This would include having
the Sphinx respond to audience questions or, at the very least, recite lines of verse, as described
by the earliest and most trustworthy review of his London debut. However, there was something
deeply flawed with the kind of personality I imagined the creature would transmit when
mysterious and awesomely powerful figure — a Sphinx that, as one reviewer of Stodare’s said,
would be “worthy of an Oedipus” (10 London Times). The main twist of our production would
be having the role played by a woman, rather than a man, in reference to the fact that Sophocles’
sphinx in Oedipus Rex is female. After all, would it not be terrifying to bring back to life that
monstrous being from the famous Greek myth that tore asunder and devoured those who
incorrectly answered her riddle at the gates of Thebes? But Sophocles’ sphinx, which premiered
onstage c. 429 BCE, is a much later, less benign, and less Egyptian incarnation than the oldest
known, monumental version of the figure: the Great Sphinx at Giza, which was constructed in
approximately 2500 BCE.10 Upon further reflection, it became clear that these particular cultural
connotations did not fit the aesthetic of Stodare’s 1865 performance nor our reconstruction of it
in 2009. Since the threat of the Greek creature is primarily a physical one, there would be
nothing immediately intimidating or frightening about a de-clawed and de-winged Sphinx whose
head is safely contained in a conjuror’s box. The myth of Oedipus and its sphinx was and
10
For more details on the history and symbolic meanings of the Great Sphinx at Giza, see
certainly remains a cultural reference attached to the history of “The Sphinx” illusion, but the
symbolic power of the Greek monster neither fits the presentational aesthetic nor explains the
cultural connotations represented by the curious object that Stodare presented to Londoners as an
Egyptian relic.
No, what made the illusion particularly compelling and topical to its English audience
was the Egyptianness of the head and how an enchanted, exotic, and foreign icon tapped into a
distinctly British imaginative geography and history that spectators would associate with that
country and with communal conceptions of the “Orient” at that time. Following Napoleon’s brief
occupation of Egypt roughly sixty years earlier (1798-1801), an event which Edward Said
the French and the British empires at the turn of that century (Said 42-43), England began to
Exhibitions of oddities and magic performances like “The Sphinx” participated in this English
political expansions, the English began to colonize Egypt. The pre-history and cultural influences
connected to Stodare’s performance in 1865 are fascinating, because they reflect a slow yet
by objects such as a decapitated head brought back to life and made to speak. This is only one
postcolonial lens of many through which “The Sphinx” can be viewed today. That being said,
when the stage illusion is read in relation to the United Kingdom’s becoming a co-owner of the
Suez Canal with France in 1875, followed by Great Britain’s colonization of Egypt by military
force in 1882, it becomes easy to see how a character bearing the military title of “Colonel” who
demonstrates his magical power to literally give and take away life from an object representing
Egypt’s most iconic and exotic landmark appealed to London audiences. Read within this
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and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation
will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them,
What I argue in this second reading of “The Sphinx” is that the willing suspension of
disbelief must be put into socio-historical context to properly understand its relationship to a
community’s sense of imaginative geography and history. Every adaptation of a stage illusion
and every reception by an audience of a performance has a specific time, place and space.
Analyzing these conditions, by which I mean the relevant political, economic and cultural
realities of a given performance, allows for a deeper understanding of how the aesthetic effect
experienced by spectators watching an illusion like Stodare’s “The Sphinx” also has the power to
entertainment with several of Said’s theoretical concepts, “The Sphinx” can be read in the
context of Egyptian Hall — a space that transformed from English wonder cabinet to natural
history museum to, finally, a magic venue whose walls absorbed, over the years and layer by
layer, earlier popular exhibits, works of English travel literature, and magic performances. These
popular exercises in mixing fact and fiction influenced spectators’ receptions of exotic creatures,
of archeological artifacts, and of stage illusions like “The Sphinx,” all of which contributed to
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the cultural power relations negotiated at the venue. The building facilitated and even
which came to exist in the minds of its patrons by 1865. I will move through three brief close
readings of the venue to map the process of Londoners’ poetic colonization of a very real Egypt
as it occurred in this space and to understand how Stodare’s illusion contributed to an imperial
First, reading the façade of Egyptian Hall in tandem with William Bullock’s catalogue
description of the museum’s earliest exhibit shows the founder’s desire to turn his privately
owned wonder cabinet into a national institution dedicated to collecting and classifying the
exotic. The language Bullock uses and the manner in which he calls out to his model English
reader/visitor in his text reveal his interests in a colonial project of collecting and scientifically
classifying creatures and objects from abroad. These items are valuable precisely because they
are rare or unknown (i.e., yet to be classified) in England. Spectators visiting Egyptian Hall pay
Next, analyzing the head of Ramses II as the centerpiece of Giovanni Baptista Belzoni’s
exhibit of Egyptian artifacts in 1821 establishes the success with which Egyptian Hall played its
role as one of England’s earliest natural history museums. By carefully mixing systems of
classification with spectacle, the Hall created an ambience of imaginative history and geography
early on that would be highly conducive to the narratives of later stage illusions and their popular
reception in London. Here I have in mind acts that artists actually brought to the West from the
Orient (such as “The Indian Basket Trick” and the “Indian Mango Trick”) as well as acts like
“The Sphinx,” which originated in England. All of these stage illusions were performed at
Egyptian Hall and generated their own versions of Oriental mystique. “The Sphinx,” however, is
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a clear example of those illusions whose particular exotic aesthetic focused on collecting and
Finally, comparing the imperialist, master/slave imagery from “The Sphinx” chapter in
Kinglake’s Eothen to the lines that several scholars claim were spoken by Colonel Stodare and
the Sphinx onstage demonstrates how the illusion can be read as an imaginary celebration of
England’s mastery over one of Egypt’s most iconic symbols of power. All of these textual layers
contribute to the shared, national fantasy of England as a colonialist collector and cataloguer of
Egypt in the nineteenth century. This fantasy is precisely what our adaptation chose to resist and
to critique by adapting Stodare’s illusion to “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” — a
narrative in which a different yet also “Orientalized” symbol of power is given its own voice to
tell its own story. The magician who devises and adapts these illusions must also critique their
earliest socio-historical meanings. The purpose of such critique is to understand how the
historical moment influenced a given illusion’s aesthetic reception and how new moments —
shaped by current political and cultural connotations —will influence how audience members
To read the façade of Egyptian Hall and the institution’s pre-history, I must specify the
geography and imaginative history. I invoke the phrase “imaginative geography” to repeat and
extend Said’s use of a concept that describes how human societies tend to define, order and
classify objects as well as living things within their immediate environments in contrast to
vaguely known or foreign things outside of that environment. Said bases the “imaginative
geography” concept on what Claude Lévi-Strauss calls a “science of the concrete,” which is the
human act of assigning names, functions and meanings to local objects as a way of mapping the
world. This environmental delimitation is one way to feel secure in the fact that one’s
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surroundings are known and predictable (Said 53-55). Despite this need for logical ordering
required by the mind, many of the names and classifications used for this task are somewhat
imaginary and arbitrary. They appear as concrete, stable facts to provide human groups with a
sense of positivistic stability, but this stability is only ever partial due to human subjectivity. An
individual interprets physical reality based on immediate subjective perceptions, then cognitively
interprets those perceptions, and finally compares them with the reception experiences of his or
her local, interpretive community to come to some sort of agreement on what an object should be
called or where a boundary lies. One culture’s logic for naming, classifying and delimiting
objects in space, however, is often significantly different from another’s. To confirm this, one
needs only to look at the history of world maps and the seemingly random ever-changing
boundaries drawn there. Those borders serve as a constant reminder of the human tendency to
mix together wishful, magical thinking with empirical measurements of the globe’s physical
features. The current legal and political battles between nations concerning what place names
and boundaries should be written into history books and displayed online via Google Maps, for
example, are evidence of the ever-changing, subjective, and malleable definitions of where “our”
This combination of the empirical and the poetic, between what is “here” versus “there”
(England/Egypt), also applies to the “interior” versus the “exterior” (the familiar/the foreign), the
“present” versus the “past” (today/antiquity), and the presence of all three binaries within the
11
See Leuenberger and Schnell’s article “The Politics of Maps: Constructing National
Territories in Israel” for one example of highly contested imaginitive geographies and
construction, and its eventual status as one of magic’s most important venues, also reveals these
oppositions. In Orientalism, Said interprets and extends Gaston Bachelard’s ideas from La
poétique de l’espace (The Poetics of Space) to argue that nations blend the objective realities of
zones such as the East versus the West with their poetic fantasies about them in the same way
that humans imbue the physical realities of their homes with more imaginary qualities:
The objective space of a house—its corners, corridors, cellar, rooms—is far less
important than what poetically it is endowed with, which is usually a quality with
an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel: thus a house may be
even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous
reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here. (my emphasis, Said
55)
In other words, an austere interior closed off by shuttered windows and wrought-iron grills helps
create a prisonlike reception of a house in the same way that creaking wood, decay, and an
appearance of general abandonment will encourage the neighborhood children to tell the ghost
stories that make another house feel haunted. Of course, there is a distinction to be made between
a neighborhood house that unintentionally falls into disrepair, thereby favoring a haunted
reception, compared to a house or another building which is constructed with the express
The façade of Egyptian Hall at Piccadilly, for example, was consciously designed to
encourage Oriental mystification at first sight. It is easy to imagine that Londoners in 1812,
before ever setting foot inside, would have done double-takes as they walked by and tried to
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make sense of the new, paradoxical structure. This is exactly the kind of spectator reception that
founder William Bullock had in mind. Visual evidence of this intent can be seen by scanning an
early aquatint of Egyptian Hall reproduced in The Shows of London (see fig. 9).
Reading the façade’s surface from top to bottom in this image, one sees the word “Museum”
boldly carved into the uppermost part of the cornice, followed by various icons which radiate
Egyptianness: a large scarab beetle and two sphinxes. Immediately below, statues of Isis
(goddess of motherhood, magic and fertility) and Osiris (god of the afterlife) stand, curiously out
of place, upon a block of stone that once again announces the building’s purpose: “London
Museum,” it reads. Here, Egypt’s magic is the object of English collection and classification.
Egyptian hieroglyphs, which have been etched into the frames surrounding the façade’s
iconography. Directly below these frames stands the entrance to Egyptian Hall where a man and
woman traverse its threshold. Even before they enter, I read this couple as having begun the
slippage created by Egyptian Hall. One can picture the man and woman thinking to themselves:
Where is Egypt on the map again? How old are these statues of Isis and Osiris? Are they real?
These are questions in response to a kind of placelessness and a temporal time-out-of-joint effect
The mixture of what were at the time indecipherable hieroglyphs (the building was
constructed in 1812, but the Rosetta Stone was not actively used to decipher these ancient
characters until 1822) with a familiar place name that required no translation — London — and
the authoritative label — Museum — initiates the colonial hierarchy with which Egyptian Hall
presented its exotic collections. The difference in scale of these symbols on the building’s
surface not only mix the foreign and the familiar, but also make the Egyptian icons and writing
much larger and more visually striking than the simple English nouns expressing the institution’s
purpose. Greater size, in this case, does not mean greater authority. The Egyptian icons dazzle
I read the couple in this aquatint as representative of generic Londoners who, surprised
and intrigued by the sight of perhaps real or perhaps replica ancient Egyptian architecture
materializing in the middle of nineteenth-century London, would have been enticed to inspect the
building more thoroughly. After all, juxtaposed with its fairly uniform neighbors, Egyptian Hall
calls immediate attention to itself. Upon closer investigation, the English nouns hint at the
reasons for this exotic architecture and at the real power relations governing this piece of the
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reveals that these objects are pieces from outside, from over there, and from the past,
conveniently located here, inside England, and now in the ever-evolving present (the present of
Both the façade of Egyptian Hall and the collection’s earliest catalogue establish the
institution as playing the multi-faceted role of collector, naturalist, and colonizer. The museum’s
earliest document celebrates these vocations and then hails visitors as participants in these
The Museums of France have been enriched with the spoils of nearly the whole
Continent, and the Gallery of the Louvre contains more treasure in Painting and
Sculpture than perhaps will ever again be amassed in one Collection. But though
her active and persevering Ruler, desirous of making his capital the centre of
Natural History which in the present state of the Continent could be procured, our
unrivaled Navy, and the extension of our Colonies throughout the habitable
world, present such advantages to this country [England], that the writer feels
confident, that if his exertions are seconded by the Public as they have hitherto
been, he will very shortly be enabled to make a Collection of Natural History far
exert his utmost power in accomplishing this important work (Bullock iv-v, my
emphasis).
This is Egyptian Hall’s earliest mission statement from its first catalogue. The language of owner
and proprietor William Bullock, its author, reveals that he clearly saw Egyptian Hall as an
institution in direct, international competition with France and the rest of continental Europe.
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Much as the fame of Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century inspired
England’s military occupation of it in the nineteenth, the cultural achievements of the Louvre
(founded in 1793) inspired Bullock to transform his private collection of oddities into the
publicly accessible and nationalistic Egyptian Hall. In the paragraph above, he frames the global
competition of the French and British empires within the capital cities of London and Paris
where the race for the greatest natural history museum is also the race to acquire the most
colonial “treasure” conceivable. Bullock was a Liverpool jeweler and silversmith who began his
private collection by purchasing rarities from captains and ships returning to that port city from
abroad (Altick 235). Here, he calls upon the catalogue’s reader as a citizen of England to help
him increase the scale of Egyptian Hall and to raise its status by becoming a collector too (albeit
a vicarious one).
Notice the strategic use of the possessive pronoun “our” in the previous excerpt. The
ideal visitor to the museum, who is also the model reader of this catalogue, is hailed with phrases
of militaristic power: “our unrivaled Navy,” which continues to extend “our Colonies” and, in
these efforts, aims to make England a greater world power than France (Bullock 235). With a
combination of militant and intellectual appeals, the museum positions its visitors as subjects
who vicariously collect objects that are described as both treasure (highly valuable commodities)
and as scientific “specimens.” The possessive “our” of Egyptian Hall, the first person and
scientifically classify, to poetically fantasize and to thereby colonize the outside world through
In my reading, Bullock’s catalogue suggests that the economic value and the cultural
importance of the objects on display at Egyptian Hall are determined through this three-step
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process of collecting, classifying and eventually creating a poetic and, as we shall see, magical
appropriation of countries like Egypt. The language of the publication reflects these steps as one
advances through its contents. The museum becomes an enterprise of cultural colonization.
Opposite the opening page, Bullock announces to the reader of his catalogue that he will pay
“full value” for “Quadrupeds, Birds, Fishes, Reptiles, Shells, Old Paintings, Carvings on Wood
or Ivory, Stained Glass, ancient and foreign Arms and Armour, or any uncommon production of
Art or Nature” (my emphasis). This appeal, combined with the rhetoric of the previous
quotation, reinforces Bullock’s suggestion to his reader that by selling one’s items to him, an
individual is helping England to compete with and to eventually overtake France’s national
collection. His adjectives also indicate that what is valuable about the objects sought is that they
are either “ancient” (from a distant time), “foreign” (from a distant location), or “uncommon”
explanations of the Linnaean system of scientific classification. The visitor to Egyptian Hall who
began as an honorary collector now becomes an honorary naturalist. Touring the museum, the
London couple in the previously mentioned aquatint are to be taught the “Linnaean arrangement
of Quadrupeds” with the aid of taxidermic displays presenting roughly sixty species of apes,
baboons and monkeys (iii). A systematic grid, a stable yet always incomplete structure of
classification, is being built within the imaginations of the museum visitors. But the most
exciting and valuable species on display are those which “are not yet described by any
Naturalist” (Bullock 2) — the creatures without fixed labels, which escape the day’s scientific
categories. The qualification that Bullock fails to make, of course, is that no English naturalist
has yet described these species. In their environments of origin these species would most likely
have been known and would have been given names by the local inhabitants. In London,
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however, and well removed from their foreign homelands, the visitor to Bullock’s museum is
invited to help complete the always incomplete classification of Egyptian Hall’s ever-expanding
contents.
The competitive drive to label the most objects, to define, to classify and to control the
greatest number of things from the farthest reaches of the planet as expressed in Bullock’s
catalogue moves from scientific classification to a poetic process of metonymy in Egyptian Hall.
This element of metonymy is reflected in both the physicality of the objects on display and in
their catalogue descriptions. In many exhibits following those dedicated to the animal kingdom,
the part stands in to represent the whole. This phantom whole — this not-there-ness of the
dismembered relic as a type of souvenir — is one of the areas that is most conducive to the
generation of imaginative geography and history. The cultural contexts of empirical objects
presented to viewers at Egyptian Hall vanish along with the parts of them that were lost to decay
(travels through time) or to transport (travels through space). A key example found in Bullock’s
catalogue is a display given the vague title of “Glass Case, containing an Egyptian Mummy”
(131). The item’s description reads: “The Mummy in this collection was brought from Egypt by
the French, and taken from them by an English privateer, and was remarkable for containing
only the head and part of the thigh and leg bones, . . .” (Bullock 131-133). Here, ancient human
remains are cut off from the cultural environment which gave them meaning during the processes
of collection, transcontinental travel, and the changing of hands (from the Egyptians to the
French and from the French to the English) by force. This enforced metonymy through collection
abroad and curation back home transforms the items at Bullock’s museum into special
and disappearances reminiscent of the language Marx uses to describe the commodity in Capital.
The vanishing of the body of the nameless Egyptian mummy described in Bullock’s
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catalogue — a human relic whose cultural history is unknown due to the nebulous succession of
thefts, purchases and sales involved — feeds into the same human tendency to obsess about the
part at the expense of the whole that is required for the production of the commodity fetish. It is
quite fitting therefore that Marx, who researched and wrote the majority of the first volume of
Capital from within another nearby wonder cabinet turned natural history museum (the British
Museum) and published it in 1867 (only two years after Stodare’s performance), employs the
same terminology to analyze capitalism that contemporary stage magicians were using to
transformations. This shared lexicon is particularly apparent in the section at the end of Marx’s
first chapter titled “The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret.” There he explains how the
through an irrational and even mystical reverence for the tangible object once it has taken the
form of a commodity.
One of Marx’s most famous examples of this process describes how a table carved by
hand from a larger mass of wood becomes magically separated from its labor history and social
relations as soon as it takes the shape of a table and enters the exchange economy: “It [the table]
not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on
its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were
to begin dancing of its own free will” (163-164).12 Marx’s basic meaning in this rather fanciful
12
In general I prefer the more recent Ben Fowkes translation of Capital, which I cite
here. In the case of this particular line, however, I prefer Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling’s
statement is that through a series of substitutions the table as a product of labor becomes a
“sensuous,” “supra-sensible,” and “social” commodity (165). Its use value, as wood, is replaced
by its exchange value on the open market. But I would argue that more important than both of
these well-known transformations for scholars reading Marx today is his implied reference here
to the dancing and speaking tables of the spiritualist performances in London and throughout
Europe in the 1850s. This practice, known variously as “spirit-rapping,” “table tilting,” and
“table turning,” was popularized by spirit mediums who claimed supernatural powers while
employing methods of deception familiar to the day’s magicians.13 Marx knows that the table
newly transformed into a commodity is not speaking or dancing of its own free will — it simply
appears to do so. Its operator, the medium, and its consumers, the audience, have reified the table
into a mystical commodity — one that in spiritualist seances was imagined to mediate
The severing of the table from its history of labor conditions, the vanishing of the bodies
of those who constructed it once the table appears as a commodity, represents a series of
substitutions that are analogous to the acts of metonymy at Egyptian Hall, where the local stories
of meaningful objects and human remains disappear from Egypt and then reappear in England as
collectible souvenirs. Bullock and the spectators of his exhibits then employ these souvenirs to
13
For a credulous account of table turning in the mid-nineteenth century see Joseph
Ennemoser’s The History of Magic (502); for a scientific explanation exposing the practice in the
same year that it become popular in England see Michael Faraday’s “Professor Faraday on Table
Moving” The Athenaeum (London), No. 1340 (July 2, 1853): 801-803; for Jean-Eugène Robert-
Houdin’s method for magic performances of the same effect at that time see “Esprit Frappeur” in
create new and exotic tales, which operate as nationalistic travel narratives controlled by a
collective English cultural imagination. The value — the cultural capital — of the foreign
souvenir is increased by these replacement stories, because they appeal to England’s national
identity. Such narratives become distorted mythologies of Egypt that belong to the perspective of
the colonialist collector. These poetic travel narratives appear and become attached to the
material collectibles of Egyptian Hall just as the collectible object’s local meanings and previous
For these foreign objects to function as exotic souvenirs they must be incomplete in one
way or another, they must be somehow metonymically cut off from their points of origin. This
lack of a whole is essential. The missing body parts of the Egyptian mummy described in
Bullock’s catalogue, like the absent bodies of Ramses II’s head and the one in Colonel Stodare’s
“The Sphinx,” create the need for a narrative — for a fleshing out of the object’s incompleteness
by its storyteller. And who is the object’s storyteller? Its possessor. Susan Stewart points this out
in On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection where her
rather moving application of Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism reveals how we, as
individuals living in the exchange economy of late capitalism, collect souvenirs as an attempt to
capture an authentic trace of our own lived events (On Longing 137). Stewart’s examples of
exotic souvenirs tend to be intimate items that a traveler brings back home: a postcard stamped
and mailed from an exotic location, or the impossibly large ring of a giant sold to spectators at a
circus freak-show (134). These items had to be earned, had to be purchased in person, and by
doing so the possessor buys the power to turn them into props for recounting the story of his or
her travels. These objects contain various charges of magic based on how unlikely, unbelievable
or exotic the lived experience seems to the listener of the story. Yes, the traveler says, I have
been to the little-known island country of Nauru. Here is a post-card, stamped and dated, which I
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sent home from the world’s smallest Republic. Yes, insists the freak-show attendee, I shook
hands with a real giant. This is the ring that he wore. Now let me tell you the whole story.
These objects, which have fairy-tale and quest-like qualities, are real-world versions of
the oggetti mediatori (the objects of proof) discussed in my second chapter. There, my examples
were objects such as the impossibly heavy cone from Borges’ short story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis
Tertius” whose inexplicable physical properties are received by the protagonist as a kind of
exotic magic and proof of an alternate universe — one whose existence is hidden from the world
by a secret society. Here, my examples are of objects that create a similar reality-slippage
aesthetic in real-world performance and exhibition environments. These objects are indirectly
purchased by the spectator temporarily, for the price of an admission fee, in an act of ownership-
once-removed. The cultural function of this abstract form of ownership at Egyptian Hall is an
imaginary colonization of Egypt and its magical symbols of power from the comfort of home.
The nameless mummy from Bullock’s catalogue (1812), the head of Ramses II from
Giovanni Baptista Belzoni’s exhibition (1821), as we shall soon see, and the mummified head in
Stodare’s “The Sphinx” (1865) are examples of qualitatively different yet equally mystical
Egyptian souvenirs — objects of proof — whose presentations to the English public build upon
one another to construct a collective exoticism of Egypt as the century progresses. There is a
poetic layering of Egyptianness at Egyptian Hall that heightens the exotic reception of the
objects displayed there as time goes on. Part of my aim with this line of inquiry is to push Susan
Stewart’s observations on the magical qualities of the collectible commodity beyond the
personal, individual and intimate magic of ownership that she investigates so thoroughly in her
work. This move allows us to think through collections like Egyptian Hall and the British
Museum on the grander scale of national imagination and in relation to diverse cultural
productions which influence the magical reception of these objects and the stories in which they
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become props (specifically, in the exotic travel narratives and magic performances examined
here). Stewart does not fully extend the concept of the souvenir’s magic to fantasies at the
national level. Moving to this level of observation allows me to examine what I see as acts of
participant colonial collecting that English spectators engage in by paying for admission to
Egyptian Hall. They do so by paying taxes for “free” entry to the British Museum, by paying to
read travel narratives, and by purchasing tickets to watch stage illusions that fostered communal
fantasies of Egypt. All of these acts of cultural production created a nation of English collectors
who appropriated Egypt through the landscape of an imaginative geography and history before
accompanying travel narrative that he sold to London patrons of Egyptian Hall were the next key
contributions to this imaginary conquest. Records of the live exhibition event and its text
demonstrate the fascinating success with which a man who began his career as a circus
performer and a magician became one of England’s earliest and most successful Egyptologists.14
As an independent collector for the crown, Belzoni brought back one of the most significant
poetic symbols of the Orient ever acquired by England’s natural history museums: the head of
14
For a more detailed account of Belzoni’s exploits as a performer and then as an
Figure 7: Bust of Ramses II, Younger Memnon, currently on display at the British
Fig. 10. Bust of Ramses II, Younger Memnon, currently on display at the British Museum.
Museum.
Per capita ticket sales for the exhibition of this object at Bullock’s museum, along with other
artifacts from the Egyptologist’s voyage, proved the power of its allure and the extent of its
symbolic value (Altick 244-245). Even more important than the “discovery” of the incomplete
statue and its first presentation to the London public are the ways in which Belzoni’s exhibit and
his exploits as a cultural figure resonated within the English imagination. Charles Dickens and
Sir Walter Scott praised him, a bestselling children’s book was written about him, and the
autobiographical account that was published just before his 1821 exhibition — Narrative of the
Operations and Recent Discoveries within the Pyramids, Temples, Tombs, and Excavations in
Egypt and Nubia — became a popular piece of travel writing that has been republished by the
British Museum Press as recently as 2001 (Altick 243-244). In short, the story of Ramses II’s
head became successful as a story celebrating its discoverer and collector. The statue of Young
Memnon, along with the other items in the 1821 exhibit, became exotically charged props in the
After a successful year-long exhibition run at Egyptian Hall, Belzoni’s discoveries were
sold at auction as collectible commodities now infused with added layers of poetic significance.
These layers of cultural value were generated by the public reception of his personal narrative
and by the general Oriental aesthetic that the venue of Egyptian Hall intensified for London
spectators who visited those items in person. What I am emphasizing here is that in addition to,
and even before, the economic and political gains that England enjoyed during its colonial forays
into Egypt, the country also benefited — and continues to benefit — from the mythos that
figures like Belzoni, venues like Egyptian Hall, and objects like the head of Ramses II, called
into being. This mythology still spills over into the imaginations of foreign visitors to such
cultural institutions. Today, the same statue of Young Memnon is on display at the British
Museum as part of its permanent collection (“Statue of Ramses II”). Though some curatorial
practices have improved since the nineteenth century, the fact that the head remains in England is
a testament to the ways in which colonial power, the cultural exoticism it generates, and the
cultures.
Belzoni, his exhibit in 1821, and his autobiographical text are relatively straight-forward
examples of how the narrative of the exotic souvenir becomes the narrative of that souvenir’s
possessor, and, in turn, a national narrative that continues to objectify Egypt’s archeological past,
geographical landscape and its people. Belzoni’s written account lacks the principles of
humanism for which Edward Said argues so eloquently in his introduction to Orientalism (xvii-
xxiii).15 Instead of learning from or empathizing with the individuals whom he encounters
15
The aspect of Said’s definition of humanist cultural research that I find both most
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during his travels, Belzoni describes them as either tools that must be used or obstacles that must
be overcome to achieve his goals. The section of his account, which details the drawn-out
removal of Ramses II’s bust from its temple, “the Memnonium,” is a clear example of his
imperial perspective (Belzoni 109-115). There he comments that the Arab workers whom he
employs and commands are “in point of skill no better than beasts” (112). Furthermore, instead
of gleaning any significant local knowledge about the statue, its temple, and what inhabitants of
the area might have known about it at that time, Belzoni chooses to paint detailed portraits of the
“insolent” officials whom he must either bribe or coerce to ensure that his prize artifact is
transported to his ship (113). Belzoni, shortly after an intricate description of a physical
altercation with one uncooperative official, apologizes for his long description of the event to
readers who “may think my narrative too minute; but I beg to observe, that it is in this way only
the true character of these people can be known” (113). Belzoni, as a colonial Egyptologist, did
not see his written account as one searching for the contextual meanings of the objects he
removed or for the living knowledge that could have been accessed through interpersonal
communication with Egyptians. Instead, he saw his book as documenting both his personal
exploits and his expression of the “true” nature of these foreigners. His text is, in short, a
narrative about the discovery of wondrous foreign objects, of troublesome foreign others, and of
how the author tames them and cunningly acquires their treasures for the enjoyment of the
English public.
compelling and whose absence I find most disappointing in Belzoni’s work is the conviction that
the interpreter’s mind should “actively” make a place in it for the foreign Other with a spirit of
One of the unique aspects of Belzoni’s travel narrative is the fact that it is accompanied
by the largest material souvenir, the heaviest and most significant object of proof, to be taken
from Egypt and delivered to England in the early nineteenth century. Even today, the website of
the British Museum notes that the magnificent scale and craftsmanship of the Ramses II statue
caused English curators and museums to begin conceiving of Egyptian artifacts as works of art
on par with those brought from Greece. Greek artifacts had previously held the greatest status
and fetched the highest prices in the realm of ancient collectibles (Miller 198-201). Furthermore,
and once again persisting to this very moment, the British Museum points out that a large hole,
which burrows through the breast of the statue’s granite, is believed to have been made by
Napoleon and his expedition to Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century during a failed attempt
to remove it. Despite improvements in Britain’s understanding of the historical and cultural
context from which the statue was taken, despite the end of the colonial era and the open self-
fashioning of Great Britain as a colonial empire, one of the most important and identifying
characteristics of this sculpture is its continual mythologization as the massive souvenir that
After the 1821 exhibition of the bust of Young Memnon at Egyptian Hall, the English
mythologization of Egypt moved upward — to greater heights, larger monuments, and more
intensely symbolic and abstract narratives of collecting. Thus, the enormous and immovable
Sphinx of Giza became an object of English desire that matched the increasing economic and
militaristic ambitions of the empire. Though still a piece of architecture firmly planted in
material reality, its unobtainable nature meant that as a fantasy object it could accommodate a
colonial narrative of even more epic proportions than Belzoni’s prize. These proportions were
temporal: the Sphinx at Giza is older than the sculpture of Ramses II by roughly 1,200 years.
They were also spatial: the 7.25 tons that Ramses II weighs are relatively manageable compared
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to the roughly 200-ton Sphinx. Being far too large to physically bring back home, the Sphinx
was made part of the nation’s imaginary collection through abstract means: through its
One of the most influential Orientalist travel narratives linked to Egyptian Hall and
following Belzoni’s exhibit is Alexander Kinglake’s Eothen (first published in 1844), a book
seduction, and power. It is worth analyzing the language and the imagery that Kinglake employs
in his chapter devoted to the monument, because Eothen is one of the most common literary
references mentioned in relation to the public reception of Stodare’s stage illusion. For all of
these mentions of Eothen, however, I have yet to come across any sustained analysis of its
chapter on “The Sphinx” or a comparison of that chapter’s tone and meaning to Stodare’s
performance of the same name. I will therefore provide such analysis here as a way to connect
establishes English dominance through a rather disturbing master/slave dichotomy, one that has a
different flavor to it than the more blunt prejudice discussed previously in Belzoni’s travel
writing:
And near the Pyramids, more wondrous and more awful than all else in the land
of Egypt, there sits the lonely Sphynx. Comely the creature is, but the comeliness
is not of this world: the once worshipped beast is a deformity and a monster to
this generation; and yet you can see that those lips, so thick and heavy, were
now forgotten—forgotten because that Greece drew forth Cytherea from the
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flashing foam of the Aegean, and in her image created new forms of beauty, and
made it a law among men that the short and proudly-wreathed lip should stand for
the sign and the main condition of loveliness through all generations to come. Yet
still there lives on the race of those who were beautiful in the fashion of the elder
world; and Christian girls of Coptic blood will look on you with the sad, serious
gaze, and kiss you your charitable hand with the big pouting lips of the very
Sphynx. (285-286)
Thus, Kinglake and his reader are invited to imagine their “charitable” English hands being
kissed by the paradoxically sensual and monstrous lips of an exotic Egyptian woman: a racial
construction written into existence by this author, his contemporaries, and their predecessors.
There is a distinct quality of the master being attracted to the servant’s submissiveness in this
passage. Her beauty, like the ancient beauty and power of the Sphinx is no longer worshipped
here; it is made to worship others. The “Christian girl of Coptic blood” who has inherited the
creature’s full lips now bows her head in the act of acknowledging a superior.
Sphinx, and of the mythological past the monument symbolizes for him. Immediately following
the above quotation, he compares the Sphinx to a deity whose “tranquil mein everlasting”
watches, immutable, as ancient Arab and Ottoman conquerors, as well as the Romans, Napoleon,
Herodotus, and Warburton (one of Kinglake’s fellow travel writers who also mythologizes the
Orient)16 pass through the Egyptian landscape to control, influence, and re-imagine the region
with varying degrees of power (Kinglake 286). As Said has remarked, the often repeated motif of
a mystical timelessness is invoked in English travel writing about the Orient and Kinglake’s
16
See Warburton’s The Cross and the Crescent.
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descriptions of the Sphinx are textbook examples of this tropic obsession (Said 72). The author,
who is also the travel narrative’s protagonist, describes the monument as “for ever and ever
inexorable,” “sleepless,” and an idol of “unchangefulness in the midst of change” (286). Most
important of all, his poetic rendering of the Sphinx as an historical object of seemingly infinite
time also frames the history of Egypt as one that is, as if by its very nature, available for
conquest by Britain. The vast size of the Sphinx and the vastness of history to which Kinglake
poetically links the monument are expressed in terms that open up a space for English
colonization. It is as though England is simply the most recent appearance in a long line of
conquerors who form a natural and assumed progression of invasions on Egyptian soil. The
author ends his litany of battle and race references with a final image of the “Englishman”
maintaining his control of India and firmly planting his foot on “the banks of the Nile” to extend
his stance across the Orient (286). This imaginary figure, whose size in this passage has taken on
gigantic and cartoonish proportions to compete with the spectacular scale of the Sphinx, is a
However, as bold as this English figure is who wishes to control both the expansive
landscape and the immeasurable past of Egypt, Kinglake surprisingly emphasizes that this
ambitious colonizer is mortal compared to the immortal Sphinx. It is fascinating that after an
entire passage romanticizing the dominance of the English race over the Egyptians and
supporting his country’s colonial project, Kinglake’s final line is a warning to his readers: “You
dare not mock at the Sphynx” (286). Thus, his chapter ends with a strange, almost paradoxical,
beauty that is past its prime, and despite his construction of an imaginary history and geography
in which England is master and Egypt is the slave, the monument of the god-like Sphinx is not to
be trifled with. Its power, as an immortal religious symbol that watches over the petty
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colonizations and decolonizations of its lands, remains. Thus, the paradox of this chapter is that it
celebrates England’s bold ambition to control a people whose lips resemble those of the Sphinx,
while its narrator simultaneously trembles at those same lips when they are monumentalized in
stone. Kinglake writes as if mocking the Sphinx or dismissing its unearthly power might cause
His fear is inspired by the mysteriously divine and foreign magic of the Egyptian other
as embodied by the Sphinx. It is a fear that he passes on to his English readers as they construct
an imaginative geography of that country. His image of Britain as a giant body politic stretching
out across the Orient is similar to other cartoons of the era in which the British empire
consistently conceives of itself as a successful colonizer while that very process of colonization
takes place.17 The difference between some of the more confident self-conceptions of England
within the Orient and Kinglake’s descriptive image of the colonizer is that though his cartoonish
figure confidently plants his foot on the banks of the Nile, he also rather fearfully tiptoes around
the Sphinx. Thus, the author’s imaginary collection of Egypt, its people, and its landscape does
not yet dominate this sacred symbol. The Sphinx, as a monument and as a cultural icon, remains
to be mastered.
Roughly twenty years later, Joseph Stoddart’s performance onstage at Egyptian Hall as
the magician “Colonel Stodare” does just that. His act, “The Sphinx,” not only dares to mock the
mythical creature as a symbol of power, it also tames the entity on a psychological level by
17
One of the most iconic examples of this is Punch magazine’s caricature of Cecil
Rhodes in which a colossal version of the man wearing the stereotypical boots, helmet and gun
of the colonizer has one foot planted in Cairo and another planted on Cape Town (10 December
1892).
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cultural text, the performance is an abstract overcoming of the fear that Kinglake reveals in his
chapter on the Sphinx. The magician, Colonel Stodare, demonstrates the dominance of English
magic over Egyptian magic in a stage illusion where he is able to command the creature’s lips.
The plot of this demonstration of power, as described in my summary of its 1865 debut at the
beginning of this chapter, can be broken into three basic parts: the magician sets the mummified
head of an Egyptian sphinx on a bare table; he brings the head to life; then, at the end of his act,
he returns it to death.
Stodare), and the unknown actor (playing the Sphinx) said onstage in 1865 is unreliable, there is
enough evidence to confirm a continuation as well as a telling power shift in the master/slave
relationship between the image of the magician as a colonial English collector and the image of
the exoticized Sphinx. Notice how in the opening lines of Stodare’s illusion the story of the
decapitated Sphinx becomes subservient to the travel narrative of the magician who now
possesses it:
magician. When he died he bequeathed me this box. It contains the living head of
an ancient Sphinx which can answer questions. Are you present, Sphinx?” A
Thus, a bodiless, de-clawed, and easily transportable Sphinx is brought back home to England to
be displayed as an enchanted souvenir by the wandering magician and military officer, Colonel
Stodare. How interesting that the magical item is not purchased from the nameless Egyptian
conjuror, but is instead “bequeathed” to the colonial visitor. It is as if Stodare has automatically
and quite naturally inherited the right to be the Sphinx’s master, to remove it from its homeland,
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and to command its ancient magic for display to London audiences. From the beginning to the
end of the illusion, the collector — as possessor and enchanter of the Sphinx — controls its life,
death, and the length of time for which the creature may speak.
The concluding lines of the performance are further evidence of this master/slave and
collector/collected power dynamic: “‘The charm by which I am enabled to revive for a brief
while the ashes of an ancient Egyptian soothsayer . . . lasts only for a few minutes . . . . The head
which astonished you with its mysterious eloquence has now returned to its original ashes’”
(McCosker 579). Stodare’s enactment of a “charm” gives the Sphinx life and then takes it away.
Stodare’s power as a magician exceeds that of the less powerful Egyptian “soothsayer,” because
he is able to so precisely control the lifespan of the Sphinx’s resurrections. These brief periods,
the minutes when the Sphinx is allowed to speak, are timed to end just when the audience is left
wanting more. In typical Barnum and Bailey fashion, Stodare manipulates the death of the
Sphinx to increase ticket sales for the head’s next theatrical appearance, which was usually the
very next day. Londoners, deceived by the unsettling illusion created by a new optical principle
at work onstage, would also be psychologically relieved that one of their own magicians had
tamed and collected some of the exotic magic that they were told was being encountered abroad.
On a metaphorical level, and on the level of theatrical ritual, the message of Stodare’s “The
Sphinx” is that controlling and collecting a mysterious power symbol of this magnitude is now
possible.
The opening and closing dialogue in Stodare’s performance cited above was first
recorded by Geoffrey Lamb in Victorian Magic and later cited by Susan McCosker in her
both the core themes of “The Sphinx” illusion and the ease with which embellishments in magic
history are sometimes recorded as fact in academic criticism of the performing art. The desire to
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embellish is a subject that must be touched upon here. Readers may realize that I have
consciously flaunted an academic convention in the above paragraph by citing Stodare’s and the
Sphinx’s lines via Geoffrey Lamb’s book and then Lamb’s lines via McCosker’s dissertation.
One should always cite the original source rather than one author through another indirectly. My
transgression is a conscious one though, and is meant to demonstrate how a very loosely
documented and potentially inaccurate source (Lamb) reveals both what is known about the
script of this 1865 performance, what remains unknown, and how certain gaps in the record have
a tendency to be too liberally filled-in by magic historians. When it comes to magic history, one
must not only cite the original source, one must learn how to detect and interpret
embellishments.18
It is currently impossible to know what exact words were spoken by Stodare and the
Sphinx in 1865. The source that I consider to be the most trustworthy, the earliest review of the
illusion published in the London Times, paraphrases what Stodare and the Sphinx said onstage
without supplying any direct quotations whatsoever. So, from where are Geoffrey Lamb’s
detailed wordings sourced? His book, Victorian Magic, is published nearly a century after
Stodare’s performance and neither provides citations nor a bibliography for lines that I have not
read elsewhere in earlier accounts. Therefore, I was rather surprised to see these direct quotations
of dialogue appear. As far as I can determine these are Lamb’s embellishments, which then enter
18
Historical scholarship must be mindful of embellishments in all fields, of course. Even
so, extra caution is needed when analyzing magic. Magicians have a habit of seducing historians
and are professionally trained to present fiction as fact. Professor Beth Kattleman recently
presented a paper to American Society for Theatre Research on this subject titled “Lying in the
Archives: Magicians, Charlatans and the Economy of Deception” (19 November 2011).
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into the academic realm via McCosker’s otherwise quite carefully researched dissertation. I
mention this for two reasons: first, to ensure that future scholarship in this particular area does
not unquestioningly repeat information recorded by yet unverified sources; and second, to point
out how exaggerations like Geoffrey Lamb’s wording for “The Sphinx” can still be quite
While Lamb’s account cannot be trusted to tell us precisely what Stodare and the Sphinx
said, it does reveal what he would like to imagine was spoken as an English magic historian
looking back and writing an account of “The Sphinx” in the 1970s. The specific lines of dialogue
that he added to his description of the illusion are, after all, plausible. What I find intriguing
about his particular additions to the historical record is that they reveal a desire to render more
poetic the basic master/slave narrative already contained in the earlier and more reliable
description of “The Sphinx.” From the 1860s to the 1970s and even today, the tendency to
uncritically repeat and celebrate the theme of the English master and the Egyptian slave in
mysterious and magical narratives continues. This ideological habit resembles the persistent
celebration and repetition of Belzoni’s story from one century to the next via its curation
alongside the bust of Ramses II in the British Museum. In both cases, the origin story of the
souvenir on display — the voice of the foreign other — is significantly muted and eclipsed by
My argument, therefore, is that the exotic magic aesthetic of “The Sphinx” illusion, its
narrative, and the manner in which the historical record of its performance has been embellished
all celebrate and perpetuate an English colonialist-as-collector fantasy, which prefigured and
perhaps even bolstered the British empire’s decision to economically and militarily invade Egypt
shortly after 1865. It is as if Great Britain wished to play out onstage the dream that it already
owned and controlled a power symbol like the Sphinx before capturing and collecting that
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symbol in reality. The economic and political means for realizing this fantasy appeared during
the construction of the Suez Canal (1859-69) and immediately after its completion. Egypt,
through a mix of poor judgement and foreign manipulation, was forced into extreme debt by
France during the canal project and into even worse debt by Britain directly after. The combined
loansharking maneuvers of these two empires effectively bankrupted Egypt, which enabled them
to acquire complete ownership of the canal together.19 By 1875, Britain owned roughly half of
this new “Highway to India” and thereafter rapidly increased the number of trade ships sent
During the same years that Britain took substantial control of the Suez Canal (1875) and
then invaded Egypt (1882), at least two other Oriental fantasies played out on Egyptian Hall’s
main stage. One of the most popular illusions being presented at the time was “Psycho” — a
“fakir.” The nineteenth-century Western use of the word “fakir” is an anglicization of the
Arabic faqīr, which translates as “poor” or “indigent” person. The word became a popular
misnomer for describing a general category of Indian conjuror associated with the suddenly more
accessible subcontinent of India.20 Fakirs were often mendicants or sanyasis (“renouncers” in the
19
For a timeline and loan analysis of the Suez canal and its management by France and
Great Britain, see John Newsinger’s “Liberal Imperialism and the Occupation of Egypt in 1882”
(57-58). Also, see A. G. Hopkins’ “The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the
mistranslation of this foreign word in the English language, one of the only magic historians to
mention the error explicitly is Bart Whaley in his Encyclopedic Dictionary of Magic (347-348).
230
Hindi ashram system) and though some certainly did magic tricks to survive, this is a reductive
and inaccurate choice for the Western equivalent of magician or conjuror. “Jadugar,” the Hindi
word for magician (“jadu” for “magic” and “gar” for “doer”) is a much better general equivalent
for the Western concept of a magic performer. The misheard and misunderstood word “fakir,”
however, has a crispness that appeals to an English speaker’s ear. Perhaps its aural resemblance
to the word “fake” also conjures up the image of an exotic master of fakery. Thus, the mystical
automaton “Psycho” was presented as a fakir, who could count, spell words and play cards, and
In 1882, precisely when Britain shells Alexandria and invades Cairo under pretenses of
stabilizing a destabilized Egypt to thereby protect its interests in the Suez Canal, the magicians
John Nevil Maskeleyne and George Cooke are selling tickets at Egyptian Hall for one of their
most recent illusions — “Cleopatra’s Needle.” As with the Sphinx, the title of this performance
references a monumental Egyptian power symbol that both exists in reality and was presented
onstage in a miniaturized form. In the act, the English magicians caused a lightweight replica
model of the Egyptian obelisk to impossibly produce two people. The actual monument, which
stands in London today and is still commonly referred to as Cleopatra’s Needle, greatly predates
her reign. It was given to England by the Khedive of Egypt in 1877 and does not have any deep
historical relationship with Cleopatra (Whaley 205). That the popular name Cleopatra’s Needle
has flourished in England despite the fact that the obelisk was erected in Egypt over one
thousand years before her time is yet another example of the English mystification of Egyptian
artifacts and their historical relations. These magic performances, which contributed to new
nineteenth-century English mythologies of the Orient, mark the beginning of Maskelyne and
Cooke’s dominion at Egyptian Hall and the period of time (roughly 1873 to 1904) when the
In short, the venue that becomes commonly referred to as “England’s Home of Mystery”
rises to this prominent status in the same ten- to twenty-year period that encompasses Great
Britain’s successful economic and military takeover of Egypt.21 It is difficult to measure the
exact influence that stage illusions such as “The Sphinx” and “Cleopatra’s Needle” had upon the
material, political, and economic actions of the British Empire. There is little doubt, however,
that in the English imagination — and within England as an internalized, imagined community
— Egyptian Hall and the exotic, magical entertainments produced there shaped cultural
conceptions about the East, about its mysteries, and about the hierarchy of English, Egyptian and
Indian magicians outside of the theatre. The symbolic content and narrative themes of many of
relationship in which England was dominant and Egypt was subjugated. This power dynamic
played out onstage in multi-modal entertainments that blurred the lines between archeological
artifacts and imaginary fantasies. As a result, this relationship became more completely fixed in
an English conception of reality when received on a stage located within a natural history
museum. I therefore see Joseph Stoddart’s character (Colonel Stodare) and his Sphinx illusion
colonialist as collector. From this perspective, it is no surprise that the rise of exotic and
Orientalized magic performances at Egyptian Hall coincided with the economic and military fall
21
The association of the phrase “England’s Home of Mystery” with Egyptian Hall was
part of Maskelyne and Cooke’s highly effective publicity campaigns and was emblazoned upon
many magic posters of the era (Jenness 40). Such posters are collectors’ items today.
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appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You
cannot value him alone; you must see him, for contrast and comparison, among
the dead.
“The Sphinx” exemplifies the human tendency to generate imaginary geographies and to
locate magic in the distant, lesser-known lands of the other. In many ways, this is a positive
rather than a negative aspect of human nature. It derives from our earliest experiences of
curiosity and wonder as children exploring an ever-expanding world, the borders of which are
uncharted territories filled with magical possibilities (with objects and forces that may be beyond
anything we have experienced before and which may positively force us to reevaluate our
previous assumptions). As adults exploring the edges of the mapped world, nineteenth-century
English colonizers found it hard to separate this childlike wonder from the capitalistic desire to
possess and dominate. The aesthetic beauty of “The Sphinx” illusion, the basic concept of
bringing an ancient and foreign source of wisdom back to life, is tainted for me by the imperial
politics of its historical moment. What is worrisome about Stodare’s debut performance and its
reception by both spectators and scholars up to the present is the frequently uncritical repetition
of its ethnocentric colonialist themes. This includes its master-slave hierarchy, which explicitly
empowers the collector by weakening the collected. This tradition of erasing local historical
relations by reliance upon superficial (or stereotypical), rather than self-critical, forms of
mystification and spectacle is disturbing when one closely examines many of the cultural
products that magic as a performing art has produced. The uncritical vanishing of voices, of
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foreign contexts, and the subjugation of foreign power symbols are what my production team
and I chose to reverse and to subtly critique by transforming Stodare’s “The Sphinx” (London,
The biggest challenge for our adaptation was finding a way to retain the aesthetic beauty
and exotic ambience of Stodare’s act without repeating a naïve cultural reception of its
prejudices in the twenty-first century. The title of the performance, “The Sage Duban,” alludes to
the best solution that we found: the hybridization of “The Sphinx” with a new narrative, a short
story from The Arabian Nights, titled “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban.” The most
adaptation philosophy that would preserve the magic of the stage illusion while also
revolutionizing its politics — was a complete re-scripting of its narrative and its main characters.
By significantly modifying the story of the decapitated head, its role as a fantastic relic telling
that story, and the persona of the magician who presents the head, “The Sage Duban” responds to
the progression of colonial collectors who surface when one investigates the history of
exhibitions, travel narratives, and their cultural functions at the performance venue that was
Egyptian Hall.
As a written source text, “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” makes a
response to “The Sphinx” and its historical conditions possible, because it is neither a travel
diary like Belzoni’s account of his archeological plunders, nor a self-celebratory tourist memoir
like Eothen; instead, it is a local, Middle-Eastern narrative that gives its subject of mystification
the power to speak back. “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” is the story of a
mysterious traveler, his impossible traversal of death, and the miraculous way in which he is able
to punish an unjust king from one of the most powerless positions of all — as a victim of
decapitation. It is briefly alluded to by the London Times journalist who reviewed Stodare’s
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debut of “The Sphinx.”22 Apart from this small mention, however, the rather morbid morality
tale has never been placed into a more meaningful or sustained dialogue with the stage illusion.
The plot of “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” focuses on the relationship
between a powerful and wealthy king, who suffers from incurable leprosy, and an itinerant sage
who heals him using a mixture of ritual and chemical magic. King Yunan, overjoyed at his
recovery, showers gifts upon his mystical savior, and thereby arouses a competitive and wrathful
jealousy in his court Vizier. Seeking to displace Duban and to regain his status as the king’s most
beloved counselor, the Vizier eventually convinces the ruler that the sage is a dangerous spy who
must be executed. When the announcement of his execution is made, Duban attempts to dissuade
Yunan from committing this unfair crime by repeating the phrase: “‘Spare me, and God will
spare you. Destroy me, and God will destroy you’” (Haddawy 45). The king, unmoved, ignores
these pleas. The sage, accepting his fate, requests that he at least be allowed to distribute the
wisdom from his personal library before being killed and offers Yunan a book titled The Secret
of Secrets. He instructs the king to place his decapitated head upon a mixture of powders
immediately after it has been struck off and to read from a specific page in that volume. Duban
says that his head will be magically resurrected if he does so. The day of the execution arrives.
The sage’s head is chopped off, placed on the strange powder, and the magical book of secrets is
opened. As Yunan confusedly thumbs through its blank pages, however, Duban’s severed head
comes to life of its own accord, speaks out and reveals to the king that he has just poisoned
22
The article, published on 19 October 1865, likens Stodare’s decapitated Sphinx to the
head of “the Physician Douban,” which might suggest that the author had read the story in an
edition of the Arabian Nights’ Entertainments that was anonymously translated to English and
himself. The book’s real secret was the deadly venom concealed in its paper. The sage then
“Tis tit for tat; blame not just destiny.” (Haddawy 47)
The moral spoken by the head of Duban, the now bodiless yet paradoxically empowered martyr,
is punctuated by the death of King Yunan. The sage’s head also succumbs to death at the end of
his story. As a magician and esoteric apothecary, Duban sacrifices himself to send a political
warning to all tyrants and to forcibly remove one from power. Thus, the “Tale of King Yunan
and the Sage Duban” as a new narrative for Stodare’s “The Sphinx” increases the importance of
This pivotal scene — Duban’s resurrection and the killing of the king — not only
demonstrates the increased agency of the severed head as narrator and mastermind of its own
death as political action, but also represents the greatest achievement of our experimental
adaptation. This is the moment when the two adapted texts (the Middle-Eastern short story and
Stodare’s original illusion) and their artistic genres combine most completely to transform
Duban’s head into what the audience receives as a meaningful, fantastic-marvelous relic during
live performance. In “The Sage Duban,” the height of the written text’s macabre magic and the
climactic effect of Stodare’s illusion become one when the victim of execution opens his eyes
and then speaks. This is the point at which spectators of “The Sage Duban” gasp in an instant of
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fantastic vacillation. This is when the walls of the theatre seem to pulse and spin.23 This, to
harken back to my chapter on Todorov’s categories of fantastic literature and the impossible
objects in Borges’ short stories, is the performance’s most pure expression of the audience
encountering that thin and ephemeral line known as the pure fantastic. It is the moment when the
Aleph appears to submerge the viewer in the vast and overwhelming infinity of the universe; it is
the moment when the genie pours forth from Aladdin’s lamp to fill the perceivable world with
thick, blue smoke. It is unadulterated reality-slippage. But it is only a moment: the length of that
ineffable and immediate reception of the fantastic-object within the mind of the spectator. What
happens after the gasp? And how does that instant of cognitive short-circuiting attach to any kind
of narrative meaning?
One of my frustrations with the absence in the historical record of what exactly the
Sphinx character said in Stodare’s presentation of the illusion is that the first lines spoken by the
decapitated head are the most momentous of the entire performance — those lines are wedded to
the most profound magic of the scene and will have the greatest impact upon spectators’
reception of what “The Sage Duban” expresses. So, how does the mind of an audience member
— still reeling from the reception of an illusion that looks startlingly realistic — interpret that
effect in relation to the diegetic world of the “The Sage Duban”? One hopes that the previously
established fantastic-marvelous conventions associated with the universe of The Arabian Nights
and “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” guide the interpretive logic of the audience.
Multiple genre conventions are present in the Middle-Eastern narrative to hint at what kind of
fiction-making should be taking place, including the cue of the opening, fairy-tale like line:
23
The gasps of the audiences on October 30, 31, and November first 2009 are preserved
“There once was a king called Yunan, . . . “ (Haddawy 36).24 In imaginary worlds where kings
can be cured of leprosy, genii are known to exist, and magical spells are cast. Thus, the
potentially distracting or rupturing effect of a stage illusion upon the spectator’s mind is naturally
channeled back into their active imagining of such a world. The overall reception effect is
designed to balance the magic of “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” text with the
magic of the stage illusion as perfectly and as naturally as possible so that one does not subsume
or dominate the other.25 Thus, the Sage Duban’s head becomes a fantastic-marvelous object
from the pages of The Arabian Nights that in the minds of ideal spectators has somehow made its
24
The cue for the audience to receive “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” in a
fairy-tale mode of storytelling is even more overt in Sir Richard Burton’s translation: “Know,
thou Ifrit, that in days of Yore and in Ages long gone before, a King called Yunan reigned over
to a production of Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream that came up toward the end of
chapter one. This performance is an example of striking what I consider to be an ideal balance
between story magic and stage conjuring. This is the same moment when Oberon places a love
potion on the eyes of Titania and, for a few moments, her body is rendered weightless as an
borrow Umberto Eco’s adjective once again, a model spectator. Perhaps they have never read
The Arabian Nights or have never heard similar fairy tales. As was seen in the discussion of
reception theory in chapter one, the text calls out to model spectators and attempts to cue even
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And yet, in “The Sage Duban” adaptation, the enchanted head is not received by the
audience solely as a fantastic-marvelous object either. Instead, it is transformed one step further
into a fantastic-marvelous relic with a voice of its own. I say relic, because in this narrative it is
not as though a lifeless object is endowed with magic (like the invisible coin that Borges’ writes
about in “The Disk”) or as though an inanimate stone sculpture has come to life. I disagree, for
example, with Marina Warner’s reading of Duban’s head as an eidolon (a special kind of Greek
idol, which can be described en bref as a statue that appears to, or actually does, speak). This is
how she classifies it in her recent study Stranger Magic: Charmed States and the Arabian Nights
(205-206). To call the Sage Duban’s head a statue, an automaton or an object is to deny the fact
that the individual character to whom it belongs is a person rather than a thing. The
transformation that takes place in “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” and in our live
body parts that were once attached to a living, breathing being (even if that being is a fictional
character).
human rather than animal and has the all-important power of human speech. Duban’s head,
despite any similarities in reanimation magic, is no monkey’s paw.27 And though it shares the
humanity and the vengeful motive of another relic from the fantastic literature tradition — the
1902) for a literary example of an animal relic that is enchanted by an Indian fakir and brought
severed hand that kills its imperialist collector in Guy de Maupassant’s short story “La main” /
“The Hand” — Duban’s uppermost appendage has the all-important lips, throat, and tongue that
allow him to speak. Finally, his head, which we can also call his crown, retains for him the social
status of a spiritual figure. Because his head directly addresses audiences during performances,
he is received by them as a powerful figure, as a sage, both before and after his death. He is
The rare ability to mystically come to life and to speak is what distinguishes the Sage
Duban from the exotic relic once housed in Egyptian Hall that he most closely resembles: the
severed head of an Egyptian mummy. This is the same head, discussed earlier in relation to
metonymy, from Bullock’s catalogue and his collection’s first exhibition in 1812 (131). I
mention this curious relic once more, because both the head of the Sage Duban and the head of
this nameless Egyptian mummy are presented as collectible relic commodities. They each exist
as traces of death rituals (one from a beheading; the other from a burial) and thus their value is in
The difference, of course, is that the head in “The Sage Duban” performance, as well as
the one played by the unknown actor in Stodare’s “The Sphinx” illusion, is an abstract
representation. Such heads are fictional relics made from the bodies of fictional characters.
Though they are played by flesh-and-blood actors to make them look convincingly mummified
and to make the illusion of resurrection believable, they are fakes. They are actors posing as
props. The true mummy, bought at an English port and displayed by Bullock in the early 1800s,
was made from real human remains. It was displaced from its grave, added to a collection, and
can be classified as an actual, factual relic. The heads in Stodare’s illusion and in our Sage
Duban performance are convincing magical versions of such a relic. With the help of makeup,
costuming, and acting, these stage heads simulate, as closely as possible, veritable human
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remains to help audience members engage in the “as if” of fiction-making that occurs when one
willingly suspends disbelief in a theatre. By virtue of looking as if they were pulled from the
shelf of a museum like Egyptian Hall, The British Museum, or some other private collection of
oddities, the heads tap into collectors’ and museum visitors’ fantasies of how reality might
rupture if a relic in a display case suddenly came to life and spoke. This is what the combination
of magic performance and storytelling makes possible that a museum visit does not. In “The
Sphinx” and “The Sage Duban,” audience members are allowed to convince themselves that a
fantastic-marvelous relic has supernatural power and, at least for a moment, that a mummified
item in the museum speaks to them. The immediate cultural and political meanings of this
magical speech are shaped by the way in which the magician character presents this fantastic-
marvelous head.
The Superlative Pepper character in “The Sage Duban” was written and performed so as
to give Duban a voice, to place his revolutionary message center stage and to empower him as an
autonomous symbol of foreign magic. As such, the magician in our performance becomes a self-
referential parody and critique of the Colonel Stodare character from “The Sphinx.” The
Superlative Pepper’s name indicates this. It is a conscious refusal of the false military rank of
“Colonel” chosen by Joseph Stoddart and of what I suspect was an intentional francization of his
own last name when he adopted “Stodare” for the second part of his stage moniker. In our
production, the adjective “Superlative” is also a jab at the self-aggrandizing qualifiers used by so
many nineteenth-century as well as modern-day conjurors as part of their stage names.28 The
28
The Great Wizard of the North, The Great Lafayette, The King of Koins, The Amazing
Kreskin, and The Amazing Randi are a handful of nineteenth- and twentieth-century examples.
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adjective or social title denoting high status — “The Great ___,” “The Amazing ___,” “Colonel
___,” “Professor ___,” and so forth — why not emulate them all with the general grammatical
term “Superlative,” which has the added benefit of knowingly mocking itself?
The Superlative Pepper’s name is the first hint that his narrative function in “The Sage
shifting as much attention as possible away from his own character and towards Duban as the
self-governing locus of the performance’s magic. In this regard, our adaptation made two subtle
yet significant departures from Colonel Stodare’s presentation of “The Sphinx” illusion. First,
the Superlative Pepper makes clear that Duban’s mummified head was purchased for a large
amount of money from a magician during a journey abroad. This is a reference to the traditions
of exotic collection and commodification of relics that occurred at Egyptian Hall. It is meant to
avoid the sense of entitlement suggested by one version of Stodare’s lines regarding the Sphinx,
in which he rather implausibly is “bequeathed” the relic by an Egyptian conjuror (Lamb 68). The
goal in this presentational change is to eliminate any suggestion that the magic of the exotic other
is easily inherited when one is neither from that place nor has any familial ties with the foreign
magician who owned the relic in question. Bullock and English privateers bought and removed
by force the Egyptian mummy that came to be displayed at Egyptian Hall, just as Belzoni
employed the significant economic and political force of the British empire to acquire the bust of
Ramses II.
The second, and more significant, alteration made to the magician character in “The
Sage Duban” adaptation is the removal of any suggestion that he is a master controlling Duban’s
head as if it were a slave or some kind of captive animal. In our production, the Superlative
Pepper does not cast a spell on Duban’s lifeless head to awaken him. In fact, he is never
commanded to do anything. Instead, Pepper simply states that legend has it that every 144 years
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the telling of the Sage Duban’s story has the power to unlock the box containing him and to
resurrect him. The performance becomes an experiment that puts this rumor to the test. In the
climactic scene already described, when the Sage Duban’s head comes back to life, it does so of
its own accord and speaks lines that effectively put King Yunan in his place. This differs from
Stodare’s version of the illusion, in which the magician “calls” for the Sphinx to open “its” eyes,
to smile, and to make a speech as if the head were something like a bizarre, trained pet, or some
kind of magical familiar, rather than a mystical human being (10 London Times). Thus, the
function of the Superlative Pepper character is primarily one of third-person narration. He helps
Duban tell his story rather than hijacking it to tell one about himself. The result is a performance
about how storytelling as an art, and as a magic ritual, can save lives, end lives, and bring the
dead back to life. It is not dedicated to celebrating the importance or the power of the Superlative
Pepper who is simply the magician-as-colonialist-collector who presents the head of the Sage
Duban to a twenty-first-century audience. The story is ultimately Duban’s and its message is that
The script created from “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban,” Duban’s role as
a fantastic-marvelous head who voices an anti-oppression theme, and the parodic magician
persona who introduces him to the audience as an individual rather than a servant, all transform
Stodare’s colonialist illusion “The Sphinx” (1865) into the postcolonialist adaptation “The Sage
Duban” (2009). I still consider this adaptation to be a short illusion play in-development and one
that, to reiterate the sentiment of T.S. Eliot’s manifesto for writing poetry, is still experimenting
with the most productive ways to rediscover and to build upon magic’s past while also forcing its
illusions into dialogue with other art forms in new and challenging ways. Questioning the
cultural functions and the social histories of those illusions from the nineteenth century that the
West celebrates, is one step towards heightening the self-critical revolution that magic, like
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poetry, music, fiction, and all other arts, requires to respond to the cultural and political realities
of today.
with an analysis of the dramaturgical research of “The Sphinx,” which “The Sage Duban”
adaptation team required to pragmatically reconstruct both the props and the deceptive
choreography of Stodare’s optical illusion. These details, gleaned from written archives and
embodied repertoires, are crucial for ensuring the proper perceptual reception of the illusion’s
magic within the mind of spectators. The cultural significance and interpretive meanings of those
“The Sphinx” within the context of its performance venue — Egyptian Hall — is literally the
center of this discussion. The history of colonialist collection at the venue and the
prefiguring of the British empire’s subsequent conquest of Egypt. Finally, “The Sage Duban”
adaptation has been read as a postcolonial critique and an aesthetic response to what is currently
known about Stodare’s illusion and its presentation. This concluding, post-production analysis is
a record of our faithful-yet-free adaptation experiment and its implications for future adaptations.
This discussion, without my initially realizing it, is also an argument for magic
adaptations which create critical imaginative geographies and writerly spectators. “The Sage
Duban” project, in this sense, contributes to an early personal adaptation philosophy that engages
with the magic of the foreign other through celebration and humanistic exploration of the
unknown rather than a colonialist domination or conquest of it. Future adaptations must be even
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more radical and must create critical imaginative geographies within the minds of spectators
instead of naive ones. Performances in which other foreign magic rituals, ones which may not
resemble Western magic shows whatsoever, need to be placed into thoughtful dialogue with
colonial history and the clash of various cultural conceptions of magic. Such performances call
for a more experimental, avant-garde and Brechtian approach. This approach must mystify its
audiences while also forcing them to question the cultural mythologies and ideological
assumptions of their local community’s magic traditions. In short, the creation of critical
imaginative geographies requires the participation of engaged, writerly and critical spectators.
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Epilogue
and Manifesto
This study of adaptation and reception began in the cave of the magician Alicandre and
with a mystical phrase spoken by his newly enfranchised Amanuensis: “Not in this life, but in
the next.” These words, and the scene from which they come in Kushner’s The Illusion, have
provided one of the guiding metaphors for our conceptual journey throughout these pages: the
process of reincarnation. The theoretical underpinnings of this project came from investigating
the deaths of powerful concepts in reader-response, rediscovering their existence in other fields
such as intertextual studies, and applying them in modified forms to the emerging field of
performance studies.
The desire to analyze the author as a magician who employs principles of deception
arose, not surprisingly perhaps, from the ineffable short stories written by Jorge Luis Borges.
Without his penchant for mysticism, for mystery and for impossible objects, I am not convinced
that that unique tradition known as fantastic literature would ever have revealed itself to me as
the nearest literary equivalent to experiencing great magic performed live. With this Borgesian
quality of magic’s reality-slippage aesthetic in mind, the metaphor of reincarnation guided a few
Hitchcock, Almodóvar, Mamet and Jay. Analyzing various versions of the “Lamb to the
Slaughter” murder mystery and “The Flue” confidence trick as different incarnations of specific
source texts led to my argument that visual storytelling media nearly always produce critical
spectators. This is true even when the object of study recorded by the camera is the usually
Finally, the practical challenges of reconstructing “The Sphinx” stage illusion and
adapting its magic to a more postcolonial and critical narrative, “The Tale of King Yunan and the
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Sage Duban,” were overcome by thinking through the process of culturally informed
question of how to give the dramatic reanimation of a magic relic meaning onstage led to more
profound questions about the socio-historical functions of the illusion in question. The challenge
of delving into the complex history of Egyptian Hall as a colonial, multi-modal performance
venue breathed new life into my personal philosophy of magic adaptation. As a result, my
current practice-based research as a performance studies scholar and a magician calls for
adaptations of illusions that insist upon the creation of critical imaginative geographies and
writerly spectators.
But what is the future of this work? Another adaptation mantra, sourced from Kenneth
Burke’s A Grammar of Motives, comes to mind as a fitting answer: “The scene contains the act”
(3). This concise statement made by a literary theorist and philosopher came to me first as a
lesson in dramatic adaptation from one of my magic mentors, David Ben. It came to his attention
through discussions and magical collaborations with Teller. To paraphrase Burke’s original use,
this motto means that a scene — a setting or background — determines the act: the action that
should occur in said scene (3). He illustrates this definition with an allusion to a scene in which
Shakespeare’s Hamlet is tempted to follow his Father’s ghost. The Prince’s companions warn
him not to do so, because they worry that the spirit may lead Hamlet to the dark edge of a cliff
and that such an ominous setting might influence him to commit suicide. The suggestion is that
For the magician, the basic lesson of “the scene contains the act” is one of listening to a
given performance environment to determine what materials and effects might organically be
magically producing a golden coin from inside a bread roll to impress one’s hosts at the
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nineteenth-century dinner table in France (510-512). As he states in his description, this piece is
adapted from the tradition of itinerant conjurors performing magic in the shops of a town to
generate interest in their larger, public performances there. The performer would visit a bakery,
buy a roll or a pastry and produce a gold coin from it. He would then excitedly buy another item,
produce a gold coin from that and continue the feat until the curiosity of those present in the shop
environment’s mise-en-scène become proper scenes for the magical act “La pièce d’or dans un
Saturday Night Live (SNL hereafter) pushes this adaptation principle of “the scene contains the
act” to another level — the level of understanding newer media settings and the new kinds of
acts made possible by such storytelling technology. In a brief guest appearance that aired at a
time when televised specials would make announcements insisting that their cameras would not
cut away or rely on editing during a magic effect, Penn and Teller appear side-by-side and facing
the camera in a medium-long shot. Penn, who stands behind the duo’s magic table, asks the SNL
studio audience to let viewers at home know that he and Teller are not using any special editing,
blue screens or projections in their performance by shouting “Yeah!” whenever he asks them
“Are we live?” He wants to ensure that spectators outside of the studio know that what they are
seeing on screen is precisely what is being done in person. Teller begins the magic by causing a
card to rise out of a deck. Then, the entire pack levitates one card at a time from his right hand to
his left hand waiting above. A series of inexplicable effects follows, which are presented as
parodies of the day’s most successful magicians. Teller vanishes a tiny jet, a gift-shop-sized
statue of liberty and a miniature Empire State building to lampoon David Copperfield’s
contemporary, large-scale illusions. They then make fun of Harry Blackstone Jr.’s preferences by
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performing downright baffling versions of “The Dancing Handkerchief” and “The Floating Light
Bulb.” The last star to be mocked is Doug Henning. Teller brings out a Rainbow Bright doll to
represent one of Henning’s flower-child stage assistants. The doll impossibly floats up in a pose
Teller then picks up a small metal hoop, places it above the doll’s head and we watch as it rises
As Penn delivers the final line “We are Penn and Teller. No longer comedy magicians,
but rather real magicians,” the camera continues its single long take and tracks backwards into
the studio audience space to reveal the act’s modus-operandi: the two magicians have been
hanging upside down for the entire routine. There is a moment of pure reality-slippage along
with a Brechtian pulling-back of the curtain as the camera operator flips the device 180 degrees
to finally show viewers at home the perspective the live studio audience has had throughout the
performance. Suddenly, we are looking at the scene with the same kind of skeptical eyes that
Galileo used to re-evaluate his assumptions about gravity while watching a swinging chandelier.
Penn and Teller continue to “levitate” cards, light bulbs and other props with the aid of gravity
for a few moments to emphasize this revelation before unstrapping their feet from a metal
All within its final few seconds, this six-minute, avant-garde magic act transforms its
viewing audience from passive, naive spectators into active, critical ones who are forced to
ponder the rarified performance environment of Saturday Night Live as well as gravity itself. It
might be argued that those watching from home have the most complete reception experience.
For they are first able to enjoy the readerly plaisir (“pleasure”) of the magical levitations,
vanishes and animations before being left with the writerly jouissance (“bliss”) of pondering
how masterful control of mise-en-scène, acting and technology have the power to completely
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conceal and thereby defamiliarize gravity. However, I would argue that those in the live studio
audience are equally privileged double-model spectators during this performance. The writerly,
meta-view of Penn and Teller performing upside down only a short distance from them is
certainly their primary level of receiving the magic created. This proximity allows them a much
greater amount of time to reflect upon the equally interesting mystery of how 100 little details
are being managed by the pair to create the illusion of everyday naturalness, while
uncomfortably hanging by their feet. How does the cup that Penn seems to be drinking water
from stick to the table? How long did they have to train to memorize this choreography from an
upside down position without having their movements look like those of astronauts afloat in
space? Furthermore, these spectators are free to watch the show from the perspective of those
viewing it from home thanks to monitors placed throughout the studio audience. These spectators
are given the agency to shuttle between a naive or a critical reception experience at any point.
an avant-garde manner with Burke’s statement “the scene contains the act” to create highly
inventive adaptations of previously familiar magic effects. Their performance piece does this by
taking advantage of the meta-, dual-audience nature of SNL’s performing environment. The pair
combines their alternative Vaudeville training in breaking the fourth wall. Penn Jillette began his
career as a juggler, clown and fire eater; Teller began as a professional street magician. As a
magic team, both listen to the scene of SNL to create an appropriate act. Because they are
comedy magicians who break the traditional one-man-magic-show mold, because they already
fully understand the possibilities of breaking the fourth wall, and because they are bold enough
mediation environment of SNL, they are able to generate faithful yet free adaptations of the
For these reasons, the “scene contains the act” is the current refrain of my work as it
Following “The Sage Duban” project, I have experimented much more widely with unusual
performance scenes to create unique magic adaptations. This led to a collaboration with
architects and artists at a gallery in Toronto called New Gendai workstation. There, I completed
my first piece of performance art magic, titled “Exits and Entrances,” with architect and
improvisational musician Marcin Kedzior. Since the scene of the gallery was a self-reflexive
meditation on the process of constructing an art gallery, I chose to magically enter and exit the
gallery by penetrating one of its walls with my body. This action produced a hole, a kind of
portal that laid bare the gallery’s interior layers. Out of the ensuing hole, objects representing the
building’s previous lives were produced: a pull of yarn to symbolize when it was a tailor’s shop,
a decaying VHS tape from its time as a video shop, a dusty beer bottle from its existence as a bar
and more.
performance troupe Ars Mechanica. Instead of adapting magic to an art gallery space, this role
has presented me with the challenge of adapting stage illusions to several theatre environments.
In three diffeent locations we performed a show based on Alexander Graham Bell’s invention of
the telephone and his relationships with his deaf mother and wife. In addition to the obstacles of
devising stage magic effects that expressed the paradox of communication, this kind of
adaptation work has taught me how to teach non-magicians the necessary choreography,
naturalness and sleight-of-hand required to perform magic onstage. As this work on what became
the Summerworks 2013 production of Show and Tell Alexander Bell in Toronto was being
completed, Marcin Kedzior and I were collaborating once again to create an experimental magic
which a composition of silence turns the environment where it is performed into the sound of the
composition itself, is an excellent example of how searching for new scenes leads to the creation
of previously unimagined acts. This search is the lifeblood of successfully free yet faithful
adaptations. “Magic Sounds” is the name of the performance that I created in collaboration with
Kedzior who played the roles of musician, dancer and architect as we developed our experiment
inspired by Cage’s work. We began by carefully rereading Cage’s Silence and many of his other
writings roughly one year in advance of performing “Magic Sounds” at The Future of Cage
Credo conference held the 25th-28th of October 2012 in Toronto. The basic goal of the
performance was to see what kind of magic a musician would perform and what kind of music a
magician would make. One part of that performance whose spirit was particularly infused with
the radical tendencies of John Cage’s writings was simply called “Manifesto.” Playing in the
creative scene of Cage’s oeuvre resulted quite naturally in the act of writing a manifesto for
magic.
The writing of “Manifesto” became infused with a greater number of magic effects and
its title was changed to “Experimental Magic Manifesto 1.0” on the occasion of its next
again to become “Experimental Magic Manifesto 2.0” for its adaptation to Stanford’s Prosser
Theater at the nineteenth annual Performance Studies International (PSI) symposium in June
2013. The title of the manifesto, and its parodic appropriation of the numbering system used by
software designers, is only one aspect of its intentionally incomplete nature. The magic effects
performed using the very material pages upon which the manifesto is written become more
expressive of those pages’ content with each of its new lives. Each of these incarnations
constituted a new act performed within the context of a new scene. Like all writing and
252
performing, a composition is never complete. Some give better illusions of completeness than
others. Even when a piece of text is literally set in stone it is still modified by subsequent writers,
readers and environmental changes. In other words, a composition is never really dead and this is
a good thing.
As Cage’s work teaches us, the specific site of a performance —its walls, its seats, its
creaky door, the hum of its air conditioning system and above all the living presence of its
spectators — is a new scene, a new setting, a new form. As such, that specific setting demands
new acts, new actions and new content. We must choose the less obvious, the underexplored
scenes, the thus far overlooked cultural settings if we wish to discover and develop new acts. For
these reasons, certain lines in “Experimental Magic Manifesto 2.0” are left blank. For these
reasons, Marcin Kedzior is forced to discover the percussive possibilities of a new performance
space each time the manifesto is enacted. For these reasons, I cannot predict what the actual site
or the word-for-word script of “Experimental Magic Manifesto 3.0” will be. Nevertheless, I can
guarantee that it will be built upon the foundation of the adaptation philosophy developed as a
result of this dissertation. I am also sure that with each performance the manifesto will arrive one
step closer to materializing the interdisciplinary school of avant-garde performance magic that it
imagines. What follows is a script of that text’s most current performance — an imbrication of
theory and practice. The praxis of magic has an ethical responsibility to create a community
[ ] = setting, actions or tech cues | _______ = audience participation | bold = magic effect
[A music stand at stage-left is turned so that it faces the audience. On this stand sits the
magician’s smartphone, which receives a call from the musician’s phone. The smartphone on the
stand is placed on speaker mode. A stand-up microphone near it is angled to pick up and amplify
253
whatever sounds it makes (including feedback). The musician then moves freely throughout the
performance space to rattle his phone as a percussion instrument against the floors, walls,
chairs and spectators. If someone coughs into the phone held by the musician, that cough is
transmitted to the smartphone on the stand and is played through its speakerphone. This sound,
thanks to the microphone, is then broadcast over the theater’s PA system. The effect is an echoic,
otherworldly one. Sometimes it sounds like a megaphone. This arrangement allows the musician
to literally play the room and its spectators as a percussive surface during the magician’s
reading of the manifesto.]
[Musician begins to play the space between performers and the audience]
Percussion is Revolution.
I say the word “magic.” The first word that you think of is:
- _______
- ___________
The manifesto is a radical call to arms, a violent sweeping away of what came before, a
disturbing, often vulgar, often sacrilegious, always shocking and always revolutionary vision of
an art’s future that calls a new group, a new philosophy and a new artistic practice into being.
Take a look at the insane, polarizing and also brilliant manifestos written by the Dadaists, the
Surrealists, the Futurists, the Situationists, Fluxus, Antonin Artaud, the authors of Cahiers du
cinéma and so many other fearless and even downright reckless fringe groups whose efforts have
had a lasting influence on the history of art and culture.
Though these groups initially sprang from the vision of one or a handful of individuals boldly
testing the limits of a particular art, they grew into vibrant philosophies and international avant-
garde movements that quickly exceeded any single artistic discipline.
[Magician turns the first page of the manifesto into a fireball and tosses it towards the audience
on the word “risk”]
We cannot seem to find them. North America is a desert into which magic is slowly sinking.
[A lone and reverberating whistling effect is created by both the musician and the magician]
Language turns the mirage into then, the oasis into now.
Now, then.
[Magician stabs the second page of the manifesto to the wall of the performance space]
This is the death of the magician as Las Vegas icon, the death of what Gob in Arrested
Development represents and the death of what Jack in Robert Lepage’s Spades is: narcissism and
the spectacular greed of capitalism.
We are tired of every show being a mirror for the reproduction of celebrity — we want to look
into mirrors and not meet ourselves.
The audience is always more important than the magician, because magic only ever truly exists
within the minds of the spectators.
Let us celebrate that: the spectator as magician and the magician as humble custodian of the
impossible.
It points to a negative magician/spectator relationship in which the magician tricks the spectator
with a certain amount of malevolence. This is baggage from the Western history of cardsharping,
advantage play and the victim-oriented language of Erdnase.
[Pause]
So we prefer to spend our lives performing what Spanish and Latin American magicians call
juegos de magia.
[Musician kicks the phone, as if it were a soccer ball, and passes it to the magician]
Children are game experts. They are exceptional magic consultants. They understand how
improvisation mingles with constant wonder and the subversion of expectations.
The playful,
clown-infused magic philosophy of Juan Tamariz and the ethereal writings of magia ficcional by
Gabi Pareras allow us to experience three transformations of spirit:
O, how the spirit becomes a camel; and the camel a lion; and the lion, finally, a child.
Chas!!!
257
We said that.
La percusión es la revolución
The death of secrets is the birth of sharing and experimentation with alternative performance
techniques.
North American magicians have acquired the distasteful habit of heavily commodifying and
dying with their secrets.
They turn the tiniest sleight-of-hand techniques and the tiniest gimmicks into secrets and then
market them at the wholesale and retail levels in the magic industry. This industry is mostly
funded by magic aficionados who will never perform magic in front of the public. They are toy
train collectors, buying toy trains.
This, along with the limitations that come with corporate “gigs” as the main venue option for
full-time professional magicians, has turned the art in upon itself. The art has become the Villa
Straylight in Gibson’s Neuromancer — a labyrinth of incestuous corporate oligopolies.
And so magic struggles to build bridges to the outside. It struggles to experiment with forms of
ordering. It struggles to intervene in other domains. It struggles to construct the bridges
necessary for a robust avant-garde, for a true magic multitude.
Even so, we see these new bridges rising now. We are here to increase the struggle. We are here
to help magic escape from its self-imposed and hackneyed straightjackets.
258
Therefore, we demand the active construction of interdisciplinary schools where the secrets of
magic are openly shared with the techniques of object manipulation,
[Magician performs object manipulation with the final page of the manifesto]
acting, clown, bouffon, puppetry, circus, visual arts, filmmaking, new media, digital technology
and on . . . and on . . . and on . . .
We want the kinds of institutions, spaces, and resources that made the experimental
collaborations of John Cage and Merce Cunningham possible.
The first questions are ones of space.
The structural incantations that reveal previously hidden rooms.
Beyond the history, materials and social programming of space;
Toward the entanglement of thought and action in space.
The goal is to make space speak.
We feed and furnish it,
We lay mines into its walls of rock,
When they detonate,
geysers and bouquets of stone erupt to shake us awake.
the use of everything that drifts within range to aid and multiply us.
This is the new magic: revealing ourselves and the world as inherently unmeasurable, despite so
many attempts to flatten life.
This is the new magic: a constant, improvisational grappling with the materials and social
realities to which our bridges lead.
This is the potion we drink to awake from the Sleeping-Beauty haze of Benjamin’s dreaming
collective.
Percussion is revolution
[The lights dim and an image of Borges’ Aleph appears on the page]
We are children,
[Blackout]
260
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