PRIL - Cases in The Syllabus - Part Three I - Personal Law To Domicile

Part Three – Choice of Law
I. Personal Law: Lex Patriae and Lex Domicilii
YU VS REPUBLIC
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16517 November 29, 1961
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF GERARDO YU, alias MONGMONG, TO BE

ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, GERARDO YU alias MONGMONG, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Isidro R. Redulla for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Hon. Hipolito Alo, presiding,
dismissing the petition of Gerardo Yu alias Mongmong for naturalization.
Petitioner, is a legitimate son of Yu Hing Se and Irinea Tan, subjects of Nationalist China. He
was born in Calape, Bohol on April 22, 1930. He has permanently resided there since his birth,
never leaving the Philippines. No declaration of intention to become a citizen was filed by him
for the reason that petitioner was born in the Philippines and has completed his elementary
education in the public schools and his secondary education in private schools recognized by
the government.
Opposition to the application was filed by the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that
applicant's probity or capacity for truth is questionable, after he misrepresented himself as well
as his mother to be Filipino citizens which he went through two separate marriage ceremonies
with his wife; admitted violation of the income tax law and consequent lack of respect for his
citizenship, and lack of knowledge of the responsibilities thereof. The court below found that he
committed falsification in his application for marriage license (Exh. "1") when he declared
therein that his citizenship is Filipino; that he also made a false statement when in his marriage
contract with one Elisa M. Bustamante, on August 18, 1956, he stated that his nationality is
Filipino (Exh. "SS"), and that he made a third false statement when he married his wife on May
4, 1957 before the parish priest of the Immaculate Concepcion Church, Cubao, Quezon City
(Exh. "TT"), when he declared that he was a Filipino.
The court below, upon finding the above false statements made by petitioner, declared:
Q — How about your nationality?
A — Chinese
Q — In your marriage application?
A — Yes, Sir.
But the fallacy or mendacity in this assertion was bared when oppositor offered in
evidence petitioner's application for marriage license (Exhibit 1) wherein he states that
he is a Filipino citizen. After Exhibit 1 had been offered in evidence, petitioner again took
the witness stand and explaining the contents of Exhibit 1 he asserted that, while he and
his future wife were in the City Hall of Manila, an unknown person approached them and
offered his help in the preparation of the papers; that this unknown person asked the
necessary data; that two hours after, the unknown person handed over documents to be
signed by them; that to his (petitioner's) surprise it appeared in exhibit I that his
nationality was Filipino, notwithstanding the fact that he previously told the unknown
person that he was a Chinese citizen.
If it were true that petitioner had discovered before hand that his application for marriage
license (Exhibit 1) stated that he was a Filipino citizen, it is strange why he subscribed it
under oath before a Notary Public.
To save himself from the damaging effect of his application for marriage license (Exhibit
1), petitioner asserted that his application for marriage license (Exhibit 1) was actually
signed by him on the date of his marriage August 18, 1956, but it was antedated to make
it appear to have been signed by him on August 6, 1956; that he did not appear before a
Notary Public to swear to this marriage license (Exhibit 1); that after receiving marriage
license on August 18, 1956 he and his future wife were immediately taken upstairs the
City Hall of Manila where their marriage was solemnized by a Minister who, after the
marriage, gave them the marriage contract. (Exhibit "SS"). (pp. 25-27, Record on
Appeal).
The judge, therefore, denied the petition in the following language:
We sympathize with petitioner in his eagerness to become a Filipino citizen; but it would
be a gross dereliction of duty to disregard the law requiring every applicant for
naturalization to be of good moral character. Although petitioner is a physician, this
alone is insufficient to entitle him to become a citizen of the nation. He must further show
that he is a law-abiding person, a man of sterling character capable to stand against the
slightest temptation to transgress any law or rules of conduct sanctioned by human
dignity. Without these moral qualifications, he can not be considered an asset to the
country, whatever may be the magnitude of his knowledge in medical science. (p. 30,
Record on Appeal)
In his appeal before us, counsel for petitioner-appellant argues that when petitioner-appellant
and his wife went to the City Hall in Manila for the purpose of contracting a secret marriage, he
was totally ignorant of the procedure for marriage, that the person who prepared his application
for marriage license never asked him his citizenship; and that he signed the papers without
reading and verifying the truth of the statements appearing therein; that petitioner and his wife
belong to the younger generation and they did not have any friends or acquaintances who
would intercede for and help them in their application for marriage license; that the petitioner-
appellant was indubitably the victim of the pernicious practice of unscrupulous individuals known
as "fixers" and that it was his misfortune to have such an individual prepare his application, etc.;
that the evident good faith of petitioner is shown by the fact that he married his present wife in a
second religious ceremony; and that he has passed his course in medicine with high honors,
and is now engaged in the practice of his profession (medical) since June, 1957 together with
his wife.
In the same way as the judge of the court below, we are in sympathy with his plight but we
cannot close our eyes to the fact that he has violated the express provision of the law that a
foreigner desiring to contract marriage must secure before hand a certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage to be issued by the diplomatic or consular official of his country. (Art. 66,
Republic Act No. 386.) This requirement for foreigners is contained in the instruction at the back
of the application for marriage license. He has also made false statements on three occasions,
for which he may not be excused, whatever may have been his motives. With the above false
statements he made, it is evident that he cannot claim an irreproachable character.
For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from denying his petition for
naturalization is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon
and De Leon, JJ.,concur.
ELLIS VS REPUBLIC

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16922 April 30, 1963
IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE,

MARVIN G. ELLIS and GLORIA C. ELLIS, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Leonardo F. Lansangan for petitioners-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal taken by the Government from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C. Ellis for the adoption of a Filipino baby girl
named Rose.
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California, is 28 years of age. On
September 3, 1949, he married Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are
citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959, at the Caloocan
Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary
Villa — an institution for unwed mothers and their babies — stating that she (the mother) could
not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family.).
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the
hearing of the petition on January 14,1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in
the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United
States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time. They had been in
the Philippines before, or, to exact, in 1953.
The only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent residents in the Philippines,
petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
provides that:
"The following cannot adopt:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Non-resident aliens;".
xxx xxx xxx
This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we sympathize
with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us
no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualified deny to petitioners the power to adopt
anybody in the Philippines.
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status
of a natural person is determined by the latters' nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have
jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the
status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. Under our political law, which is patterned after the
Anglo-American legal system, we have, likewise, adopted the latter's view to the effect that
personal status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary
law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p.
305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit
adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of
foreign decrees of divorce — regardless of the grounds upon which the same are based —
involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum, even when our
laws authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v.
Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58
Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29, 1955)".
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines — and, hence, non-resident
aliens - we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status, under either the nationality
theory or the domiciliary theory. In any event, whether the above — quoted provision of said Art.
335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over theres or merely affects the cause of action, we
have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners herein, and it has been so held in
Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April 25, 1962) and Katansik v. Republic L-15472 (June 30,
1962).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be
entered denying the petition in this case.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., took no part.
MERCADO VS MANZANO
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was
suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual
citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the election. The board of
canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner
sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision
and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the
COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor.
This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the
private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.
On the issue of whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he
was not the original party in the disqualification case, the Supreme Court ruled that under Sec. 6
of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, intervention may be
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered. As regards the issue of citizenship, the Court ruled that by filing a
certificate of candidacy when he ran for
his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced
his American citizenship.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987 (R.A. No. 6646);
INTERVENTION, ALLOWED IN PROCEEDINGS FOR DISQUALIFICATION EVEN
AFTER ELECTION IF THERE HAS BEEN NO FINAL JUDGMENT RENDERED; CASE
AT BAR.– Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter
in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is ―a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City
even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.‖
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of
the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner
came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no
proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting
private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo vs.
COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the election of the
respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time
petitioner filed a ―Motion for leave to File Intervention‖ on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner‘s purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified ―from running for [an] elective local position‖ under Section 40(d) of
R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Nor is
petitioner‘s interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have
garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner
had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against
private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed
in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
2. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; DISTINGUISHED FROM DUAL ALLEGIANCE. –
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
factoand without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of
Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2)
Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers‘ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by
the laws of the latter‘s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other
situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a
citizen of another state; but the above cases are possible given the constitutional provisions
on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual‘s volition. With
respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: ―Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.‖
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. – In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the
concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase ―dual citizenship‖ in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in
R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to ―dual allegiance.‖
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one
of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: ―[D]ual
citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not
she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.‖
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
4. ID.; ID.; FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY SUFFICED TO RENOUNCE
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR. – By filing a certificate of candidacy when he
ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have
as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC it was held: It is not disputed that on
January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation
not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code would disqualify him ―from running for any elective local position?‖ We answer this
question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran
for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he ―had long renounced and had
long abandoned his American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was
stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before
he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.‖ On this point, we quote from the assailed
Resolution dated December 19, 1995: ―By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo
lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.‖ These factual
findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have
not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998,
private respondent had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered
simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar vs. COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to
private respondent in the case at bar: … Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was
both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino… [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be ―express,‖ it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either “express” or “implied.” To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear
true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the
other hand, private respondent‘s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of
his election of Philippine citizenship.
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL
Balase, Tamase, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo Ongsiako for private respondent.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were

candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one
was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, [2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELEC‘s Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios
Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based
on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered
as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-
31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father
and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on
September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino
and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which
he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. [3] The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.[4] Petitioner‘s motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en
banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. [5] The pertinent portions of the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws
under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as
his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents
brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents
also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an
alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine
citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance
to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself
as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his
US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on
May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand
eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who
obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two
thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty
four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be
far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues
involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second
Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondent‘s certificate of
candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the
position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper
notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano
as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice
mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that 
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was
already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and
voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of
Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7
May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even
assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent

Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he
was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was
petitioner‘s motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to
initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be
permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he
has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or
proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission.  In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the

Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenor‘s rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor
an interest to protect because he is ―a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati
City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent
be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.‖
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from
the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in
several cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and
the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared
the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a ―Motion for Leave to File
Intervention‖ on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner‘s
purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified ―from running for [an] elective
local position‖ under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner‘s interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner‘s motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present
petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner‘s motion for intervention but also with
the substantive issues respecting private respondent‘s alleged disqualification on the ground of
dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano
possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice
mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as ―disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship.‖ This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides
with him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress
has ―command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
local elective office.‖
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. [9] For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers‘ country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter‘s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual‘s volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: ―Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.‖ This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows:[10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have
circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance and
I reiterate a dual allegiance  is larger and more threatening than that of mere double
citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of
the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double
citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the
problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of
the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600
chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely
known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of
the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China
in the People‘s Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were
represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that
time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of
Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound
by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were
concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner
Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown
Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese  it is of common knowledge in Manila. It
can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means
economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new
section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO
LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with
dual allegiance, thus:[11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in

the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who
spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which
pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which
elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national
security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave
of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People‘s Republic
of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to
Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance
to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary
of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep
concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant
to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could
be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the
real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of
double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed
amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional

Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase ―dual
citizenship‖ in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring
to ―dual allegiance.‖ Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of
the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: ―[D]ual citizenship
is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a
citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.‖ [12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: [13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: ―Any
person with dual citizenship‖ is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under
the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is
no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must
elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country
of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a
situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when
he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin
or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect,
be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines
is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman‘s
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: ―I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.‖
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon
him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove
that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce ―all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty‖[14] of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen
of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions
of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our
courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the
requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we
would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be
resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign
will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth
at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent ―effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law,‖ so that now
he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was
made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have
been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that ―A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory.‖ To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondent‘s certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained
the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF ―NATURAL-BORN‖ OR
―NATURALIZED‖) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY
SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE
LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND
THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT
MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY
THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code would disqualify him ―from running for any elective local
position?‖ We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he ―had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At
best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interimwhen he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.‖
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
―By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,
and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government.‖
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of
the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner‘s contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondent‘s certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioner‘s contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority
since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as
an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an
American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There
is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his
American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said
in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere
fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of
said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship
must be ―express,‖ it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either “express” or “implied.‖
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent‘s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.
Pardo, J., no part.
[1]
Petition, Rollo, p. 5.
[2]
Per Commissioner Amado M. Calderon and concurred in by Commissioners Julio F.
Desamito and Japal M. Guiani.
[3]
Id., Annex E, Rollo, pp. 50-63.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 78-83.
[5]
Per Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and concurred in by Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe,
Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, Japal M. Guiani, and Luzviminda G. Tancangco. Commissioner Julio
F. Desamito dissented.
[6]
176 SCRA 1 (1989).
[7]
Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991); Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436 (1994);
Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400 (1995); Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996).
[8]
R.A. No. 7854, the Charter of the City of Makati, provides: ―Sec. 20 ¾ The following are
disqualifiedfrom running for any elective position in the city: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship.‖
[9]
JOVITO R. SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (1995).
[10]
Id., at 361 (Session of July 8, 1986).
[11]
Id., at 233-234 (Session of June 25, 1986).
[12]
1 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 203 (Session of June 23, 1986).
[13]
Transcript, pp. 5-6, Session of Nov. 27, 1990.
[14]
C.A. No. 473, §12.
[15]
86 Phil. 340, 343 (1950).
[16]
387 U.S. 253, 18 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1967), overruling Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 2 L. Ed.
2d 603 (1958).
[17]
257 SCRA 727, 759-760 (1996).
[18]
185 SCRA 703, 711 (1990). See also Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 96 L. Ed.
1249 (1952).
[19]
169 SCRA 364 (1989).
AASJS VS DATUMANONG

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS

AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of
Justice,Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a
writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225,
entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or

adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to
their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or
invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225
unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship.
Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who
become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign
citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of
the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance
without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. 2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual
allegiance is inimical to the national interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy
that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not
allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective
renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath
recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and
categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic. 3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is
necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During
the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in
fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - - the
retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he
observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that
under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether
with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution…
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional
injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to
facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in
one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He
explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to
the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter
which the Philippine government will have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is
involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which
did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of
dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he
explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign
citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time,
owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual
citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he
wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a
Member of the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national
interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not
addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is
hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He
stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the
other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath
says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears
allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the
present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one
of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the
problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country. 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in
drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 5 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned
foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No.
9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law
on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court
could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law
yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano, 6 already had drawn
up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship. 7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution,
dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by
Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual
allegiance.8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a
self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections
2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set
specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. 10 Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case
of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner
misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but
merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with
the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the
duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself
has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and
legislation by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
(On leave)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
(On leave)
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," Book IV,
Title III, Chapter 1 (on the Department of Justice), states:
xxxx
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the Department

shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(6) Provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the
laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens;
xxxx
2
Rollo, p. 9.
3
Id. at 48.
4
11 Journal, House of Representatives (August 26, 2003).
5
An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship may be Lost or
Reacquired. (Approved on October 21, 1936.)
xxxx
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. - A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
xxxx
6
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 630.
7
Id. at 643.
8
Rollo, pp. 55-56.
9
Supra note 7.
10
Records, Constitutional Commission 365 (July 8, 1986).
11
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001, 369 SCRA 394.
12
Id. at 431.
II. Nationality (Lex Patriae)
REPUBLIC VS MADDELA

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21664 March 28, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION Petitioners,

vs. HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch II, and MIGUELA TAN SUAT, Respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-21665 March 28, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION Petitioners,

vs. HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch II and CHAN PO LAN, Respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.: virtual law library
These are actually two (2) separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction but are decided jointly because the issues presented proceed from the same factual
background.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
The pertinent facts are not disputed. On April 29, 1963 the Court of First Instance of Quezon
(Branch 11), Hon. Manolo L. Maddela presiding, rendered a decision in its Special Proceeding
No. 4012, which is hereunder quoted in its entirety:
This is a petition to have the petitioner Miguela Tan Suat, a Chinese National, to be
declared a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General has been represented by Assistant
Fiscal Jose Veluz. During the trial it has been established to the satisfaction of the Court
that sometime in the year 1937 petitioner was legally married to Sy Ing Seng, a Filipino
citizen; and that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
to become a Filipino citizen. After the submission of the evidence for the petitioner, the
court inquired from Fiscal Veluz if he has any opposition to the petition to which the
Fiscal answered that he has no opposition, neither has he any evidence to warrant
opposition. The Court had it announced to the public if there is any opposition to the
petition of Miguela Tan Suat to be declared a Filipino citizen and nobody in the crowded
courtroom registered his opposition.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, petitioner Miguela Tan Suat is hereby declared a
Filipino citizen by marriage and the Commissioner of Immigration is hereby ordered to
cancel the necessary alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of
residence of the petitioner and to issue the corresponding identification card.
On the same day the same court rendered another similarly worded, decision in its special
Proceeding No. 4013, this time in favor of Chan Po Lan. This second decision reads:
This is a petition to have the petitioner Chan Po Lan, a Chinese National, to be declared
a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General has been represented by Assistant Fiscal Jose
Veluz. During the trial it has been established to the satisfaction of the Court that
sometime in the year 1961, petitioner was legally married to Cu Bon Piao, a Filipino
citizen; and the petitioner has all the qualifications and more of the disqualifications to
become a Filipino citizen. After the submission of the evidence for the petitioner, the
court inquired from Fiscal Veluz if he has any opposition to the petition to which the
Fiscal answered that he has no opposition, neither has he any evidence to warrant any
opposition. The Court had it announced to the public if there is any opposition to the
petition of Chan Po Lan to be declared a Filipino citizen and nobody in the crowded
courtroom registered his position.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner Chan Po Lan is hereby declared a Filipino

citizen by marriage and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration is hereby
ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate
of residence of the petitioner and to issue the corresponding identification card.
On July 1, 1963 the Solicitor General 1 filed separate notices of appeal from said decisions, at
the same time requesting an extension of ten (10) days within which to file the corresponding
records on appeal. However, because of the unexplained failure of the Clerk of Court of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon to forward the records immediately despite repeated requests
therefor by the Solicitor General, the latter, unable to prepare the records on appeal, filed the
instant petitions instead, including the Commissioner of Immigration as co-petitioner in view of
the fact that the dispositive parts of the decisions of the lower court are addressed to him for
compliance.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
On August 10, 1963 we issued in each case a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution
and enforcement of the judgment. Thereafter these two cases were submitted for decision
without any answer from the respondents.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
Private respondents' identical prayer in the lower court was for a declaration of their Filipino
citizenship and for an order to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel their
respective alien certificates of registration on the ground that they had married Filipino
husbands. In granting the said prayer the lower court was clearly in error. At that time
jurisprudence had already set the question at rest: no person claiming to be a citizen may get a
judicial declaration of citizenship.
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said
breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the parties to a
controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their
status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance,
no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or
petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be
made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said
status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization
by judicial decree. But there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial
proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan v. Republic, L-
14159, April 18, 1960).2
Before these cases were submitted for decision, the Solicitor General filed a motion, dated
February 14, 1964, to cite the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Quezon for
contempt by reason of his failure to forward the records of these cases to this Court despite our
resolution to that effect. It appears, however, that after the said resolution was issued the Clerk
did send those records and the same were received here on January 24, 1964. The question of
contempt has therefore become moot.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are hereby granted; the questioned decisions are set aside
and the writs of preliminary injunction previously issued are made permanent. Costs against
private respondents.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
The Solicitor General was not furnished a copy of either after the petitions below, nor
did he authorize the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon to appear in representation of his
office.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
2
See also: (Palaran vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15047, January 30, 1962; Channie Tan vs.
Republic, G.R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-
15775, April 29, 1961; Delumen vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-5552, January 28, 1954.)
BURCA VS REPUBLIC

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24252 January 30, 1967
IN RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to possess all qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of
cancelling her alien registry with the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION.
ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner and appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor and appellant.

Imperio & Tinio and Artemio Derecho for petitioner and appellee.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo Burca — "as possessing all
qualifications and none of the qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for
the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration". 1 She avers that
she is of legal age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St.,
Ormoc City; that before her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China,
with ACR No. A-148054; that she was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao, and holder
of Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333. After making a number of other allegations
and setting forth certain denials, she manifests that "she has all the qualifications required under
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications required under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473" aforesaid.
Notice of hearing was sent to the Solicitor General and duly published.
The Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the petition on two main grounds, viz: (1)
that "there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual"; and (2) that as an application for Philippine citizenship, "the petition
is fatally defective for failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law", such as, among others, petitioner's former places of
residence, and the absence of the affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
Trial was held on December 18, 1964. Sole witness was petitioner. With the documentary
evidence admitted, the case was submitted for decision.
The judgment appealed from, dated December 18, 1964, reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition, and declaring

that ZITA NGO BURCA petitioner, has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino Citizen and that she being married to a Filipino
Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of
allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final and executory.
The controlling facts are not controverted. Petitioner Zita Ngo was born in Gigaquit, Surigao
(now Surigao del Norte), on March 30, 1933. Her father was Ngo Tay Suy and her mother was
Dee See alias Lee Co, now both deceased and citizens of Nationalist Republic of China. She
holds Native Born Certificate of Residence 46333 and Alien Certificate of Registration A-
148054. She married Florencio Burca a native-born Filipino, on May 14, 1961.
1. By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not
— by the mere fact of marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen.
Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the Philippines,
Congress — in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law legislated the
following:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the import of the constitutional and statutory precepts just
quoted with a uniform pronouncement that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the
status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully
naturalized.2 Which means that, in line with the national policy of selective admission to
Philippine citizenship, the wife must possess the qualifications under Section 2, and must not be
laboring under any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4, of the Revised
Naturalization Law.3
This Court, in Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, et al., L-21332, March 18,1966, explains the
reasons for the rule in this wise:
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2
of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4, are not
mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not
disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred
upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies
only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude', so that a blackmailer, or a

maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court,
would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such a
person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an
applicant for citizenship 'must be of good moral character'.
Similarly the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in

government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain
"herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution;
yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to
organized government", nor affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines
opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the necessity or of
violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their
ideas'. Et sic de caeteris".
Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not to any alien woman on the sole basis of
her marriage to a Filipino — "irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and
identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions". 4
The rule heretofore adverted to is to be observed whether the husband be a natural born
Filipino,5 a naturalized Filipino,6 or a Filipino by election.
2. We next go to the mechanics of implementation of the constitutional and legal provisions, as

applied to an alien woman married to a Filipino. We part from the premise that such an alien
woman does not, by the fact of marriage, acquire Philippine citizenship. The statute heretofore
quoted (Sec. 15, Revised Naturalization Law), we repeat, recites that she "shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines" if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized".
How then shall she be "deemed" a citizen of the Philippines? An examination of the Revised
Naturalization Law is quite revealing. For instance, minor children of persons naturalized under
the law who were born in the Philippines "shall be considered citizens thereof". Similarly, a
foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the
parents, "shall automatically become a Filipino citizen".7 No conditions are exacted; citizenship
of said minor children is conferred by the law itself, without further proceedings and as a matter
of course. An alien wife of a Filipino does not fit into either of the categories just mentioned.
Legal action has to be taken to make her a citizen.
There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino citizenship. 8 Citizenship is not
an appropriate subject for declaratory judgment proceedings. 9 And in one case, we held that
citizenship of an alien woman married to a Filipino must be determined in an "appropriate
proceeding". 10
Speculations arise as to the import of the term "appropriate proceeding". The record of this case
disclose that, in some quarters, opinion is advanced that the determination of whether an alien
woman married to a Filipino shall be deemed a Filipino citizen, may be made by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 11 Conceivably, absence of clear legal direction on the matter
could have given rise to divergence of views. We should aim at drying up sources of doubt.
Parties interested should not be enmeshed in jurisdictional entanglements. Public policy and
sound practice, therefore, suggest that a clear-cut ruling be made on this subject.
If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become ipso facto a citizen, then she must
have to file a "petition for citizenship" in order that she may acquire the status of a Filipino
citizen. Authority for this view is Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain
language is: "Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, shall file with the competent
court" a petition for the purpose. And this, because such alien woman is not a citizen, and she
desires to acquire it. The proper forum, Section 8 of the same law points out, is the Court of
First Instance of the province where the petitioner has resided "at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition".
It is quite plain that the determination of whether said alien wife should be given the status of a
citizen should fall within the area allocated to competent courts. That this is so, is exemplified by
the fact that this Court has taken jurisdiction in one such case originating from the court of first
instance, where an alien woman had directly sought naturalization in her favor. 12
And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office, agency, board or
official, to determine such question, we are persuaded to say that resolution thereof rests
exclusively with the competent courts.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of
this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all
the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both
of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance
where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition;
and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise —
other than the judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien
wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a "petition for
citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that
efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and
4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as
one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petition "a citizen of the Philippines".
We go to the merits of the petition.
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao that her former
residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In
court, however, she testified that she also resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a
course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a
petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former places of residence".
Residence encompasses all places where petitioner actually and physically resided. 13Cebu,
where she studied for one year, perforce comes within the term residence. The reason for
exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that "information
regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his
actual, physical surrounding". 14 And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as
to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the
petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal. 15
Viewed from another direction, we find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not
supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the
Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period
of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that
said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner
likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the
petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". 16
The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is important to know
who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the opportunity to check on their
background to ascertain whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may
be taken on its face value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the
petitioner". These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the
character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail. 17
Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were
presented. This does not meet with the legal requirement.
Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
petition dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldival and Castro,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Special Proceeding 653-0, Court of first Instance of Leyte, Branch V (Ormoc City), R. A.
p. 5.
2
Cua vs. Board, etc., 101 Phil. 521, 523; Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, et al., 101 Phil.
459, 463. See also the second case of Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, et al., L-21332,
March 18,1966; Lee Suan Ay et al. vs. Galang, etc., et al., L-11855, December 23, 1959.
3
Lo San Tuang vs. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; Tong Siok Sy vs. Vivo, etc., et
al., L-21136, December 27, 1963; Lao Chay, et al. vs. Galang, L-19977, October 30,
1964; Choy King Tee vs. Galang L-18351, March 26, 1965; Austria, et al. vs. Conchu, L-
20716, June 22, 1965; Co Im Ty vs. Republic, L-17919, July 30, 1966..
4
Choy King Tee vs. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965.
5
Austria, et al. vs. Conchu supra.
6
Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, et al., 101 Phil. 459, 460; Lo San Tuang vs.
Galang, supra; Lao Chay, et al. vs. Galang, supra.
7
Paragraphs 2 and 3, Section 15, Revised Naturalization Law.
8
Channie Tan vs. Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, L-15775,
April 29, 1961; Palaran vs. Republic, L-15047, January 30, 1962.
9
Obiles vs. Republic, 92 Phil. 864, 867; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 287, 289;
Tan vs. Republic, L-16108, October 31, 1961; Santiago vs. Commissioner, L-14653,
January 31, 1963; Board of Commissioners vs. Domingo, L-21274, July 31, 1963.
10
Brito et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965.
11
Rollo, pp. 32-45.
12
Co Im Ty vs. Republic, supra.
13
Tan vs. Republic, L-22207, May 30, 1966.
14
Tan vs. Republic, supra, citing Qua vs. Republic, L-19834, October 27, 1964.
15
Tan vs. Republic, supra, citing Chang vs. Republic, L-20713, April 29, 1966; Chan Kiat
Huat vs. Republic, L-19579, February 28, 1966; Republic vs. Reyes, et al., L-20602,
December 24, 1965.
16
Section 7, Revised Naturalization Law.
17
Ong Kim Kong vs. Republic, L-20505, February 28, 1966, citing Ong vs. Republic, 55
O.G. No. 18, pp. 3290, 3295.
MOY YA LIM VS COMMISSIONER

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C. Zaballero
and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No.
49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as
it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case
thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against
the Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines
and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon
her failure to do so."
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been
denied, the case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their
respective evidence.
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor
General are these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa

to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation
made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's
visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau
Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2").
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13,
1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which
would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher
Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart
from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions,
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines
up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January 25, 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of
her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a
half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau
Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for
a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except
one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or
sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so
holds, that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same
reason as set forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent
portions of which read:
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman

who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it
should be held to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable
terms. The clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably
implies that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue
of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the
explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay,
Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However,
from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might

herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being
disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen
by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA
LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming
not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the
qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a
temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at
least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization
Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be

deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a
Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the
Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who herself is
not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose

authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to
expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25,
1962, or just a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is
evident that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or
avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This
cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a

temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and
voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a
period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back
on her representation to stay permanently without first departing
from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al.
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September
29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-
6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration
Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by
the decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also
on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the

Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country
and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper
visa and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act
503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the

administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and
in the performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the
Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in
determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of
Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon
may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his
jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and
insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot
write either language.
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in
the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in
the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau
Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of
course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said
appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged
marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a
child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT
HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED
NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN
WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF
HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL
THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED
IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER

WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR
CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL
CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL
WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S

MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE,
MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH
BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE

COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION
OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED
TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH
WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION
OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE
FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'

COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE
COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO
LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-

APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN
THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41,
RECORD ON APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the
two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien
visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will
enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot
go back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing from
the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil.
Immigration Law);
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically
confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and
none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs.
Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would necessarily
cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our
discussions, more or less, on said objections.
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants'
second and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of
fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has been admitted into
the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves
the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine
consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with
the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is
premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note
the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe
to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had
become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have
held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without having to depart as
required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the
Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines

permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine
consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately
become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally
bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose,
and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor
confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of
convenient ruses employed by alien to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent
residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned,
such as inChiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration
Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time,
and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him
subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without first
departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of
the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise
of "change" or "correction", for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is
above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision,
encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so
permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent
admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our
government to spend time, money and effort to examining and verifying whether
or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In
the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return
to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he
entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a
temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still
leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo
the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become
incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal
means this has been conferred upon him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor
children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of
the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they
still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not they
have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a
requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd
construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice
Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became
also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would
follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such
citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for
section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond
deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be
returned to the depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien
visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all
the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines
outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because
by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is
inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed therefore, appellants'
second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that
appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it
has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the
record that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization
by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General
implicitly concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau
Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for naturalization,
she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case,
without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of
this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855,
promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713, 1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs.
Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that
over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who
marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization
proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other
applicant for naturalization, 2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as
the motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us,
however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even
reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated
in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473,
underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the
one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose
authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely
departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she
married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the
Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a
Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of
acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do
so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery
of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave,
because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The
Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our
present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage
to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to
depart from the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the
affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok
Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were
correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been
naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from would have
to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in
the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose
behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." Thus the
issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the
Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which
petitioners rely, reads:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of

the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship
to his foreign wife, unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly
held in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this
limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage,
those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under
section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with

any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of

violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable

contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are
at war, during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United

States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly
Giok Ha does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as
the parties who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within
the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof,
petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from
alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a case
against the respondents-appellants.
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the

lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly
Giok Ha may "be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in
our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the
parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have
any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above
decision as regards the following propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the
marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully
naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of
Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage,
only those disqualified from being naturalized under Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to
recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the
impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications, 5 specially considering that the
decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior
of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15,
Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar
provision in the naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not
requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc.,
as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of
the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7
Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op.
Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman
to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of
persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised

Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who married a citizen of the
Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been
dissolved, and on the assumption that she possesses none of the
disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows
the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad
Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of
inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a
citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of

the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above
provision, means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not
belong to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95,
s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers,
Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned
in the law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an
illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the
Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child
follows the citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec.
of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a
Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the
Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of
Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this
Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101
Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her
passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purpose of
deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of
said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case,
however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation
proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court
denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly
Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a
citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must
show, in addition, that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino
citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires proof that
the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under section 4 of
the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino

citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The
lower court, therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the
deportation proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites
indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged
validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis
supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties
concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the
disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization
proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this
country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she
thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not
possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without
the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is,
as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary
of Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven.
Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this
Court, 6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of
which held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino

citizen needs only to show that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the
statute, such as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for
naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary. (See: Leonard v.
Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s.
1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No.
L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the
abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male
Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she
"herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from
being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of the
causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the
right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner
of Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the
ground that a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the
petitioner.
We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for
disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant
of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any
of those specified causes may not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of
Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from
acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino
husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
(please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying
the petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No.
L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the
above-quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a
male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she
herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from
being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of the
causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the
right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine
citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is

not a new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph I of
Section 15 Of Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not
vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully
naturalized"', and, quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice,
namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No.
28. s. 1950, "this limitation of section 15 excludes from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens
of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134,
s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law
was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as
follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary
stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of
Immigration asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration
within 24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be
confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing
order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond
confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in
forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an
order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity to
present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before
final judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule 110; U.S.
v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an
alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the
terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the
Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and conditions thereof,
declare it forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the meanwhile, on April 1,
1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the
Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion
and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not
relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1
April 1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the
bond — failure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized
period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report
to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice —
were committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen
to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter.
She must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen
by naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by
law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the
appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the
alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly
Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary
of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series
of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office,
I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not
requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
naturalization by judicial proceedingsbut merely that she is of the race by persons who may be
naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the
construction of the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly
new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc.,
et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua,supra, which followed
that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand
then of the particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in
Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no more than obiter
dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act,
the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized,"
so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as
this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the
qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the
apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice
Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly
Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-
disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the
said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of
rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30,
1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in
the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961.
She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her
permit, and when she was requested to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she
refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position,
she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the disqualifications
enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the
court, the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the
disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all
the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc.,
provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not
the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-
disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the
basis of the decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F
11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the
woman "should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by
existing laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or
opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for
citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion,
the Court said: "If, whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the
question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her
citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only prove such
marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the further qualifications
necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will be
practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may
have existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy
arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white
woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an
American citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on
residence, moral character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as
amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might
become citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified.
Thus, the pertinent provisions of that law provided:
Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens — Philippine

citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who
are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the
Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United
States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may
become citizens of said country if residing therein.
Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following cannot be

naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to
organized government or affiliated with any association or group
of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
government; (b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or
believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects
of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at
war, during the period of such war.
Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons comprised in subsection
(a) of section one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire
Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of their petition.
The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section

one shall, in addition to being not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of
the following qualifications:
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period

of not less than five years, except as provided in the next following
section;
Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and

irreproachable manner during the entire period of their residence
in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which they are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less
than one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some
known trade or profession; and
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native

tongue.
In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides,

declare in writing and under oath his intention of renouncing
absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign
authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or
subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then
stood, alien women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be
deemed citizens of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who
were not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular
possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or
foreigners who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of that
country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3
of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents and
purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No.
473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial
consideration from the qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to
its proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove
the features of the existing naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the
Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by
racial affinity and, second, to foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political
Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The
result is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be
understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from
that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is
that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2
of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien
woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of
the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down
in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified
to become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats "qualifications" and
"disqualifications" in separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that
even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be understood
that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v.
Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the
class of disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to follow the
citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or
race of persons qualified to become citizens by naturalization — the assumption
being always that she is not otherwise disqualified.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the

Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the
Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no
proof in this case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any way
disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a
Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to
become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the
same being self-serving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-
20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a
previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son
to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision
granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was contested in court,
Justice Barrera held:
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775,

promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-
13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband
became a naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of
the Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself possesses all the
qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case,
there is no allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to
become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a decision was
favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that
he (the husband) would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of
her temporary stay.
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA
876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua
Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung,
Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh,
Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in
1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines
required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice
Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351,
March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted Philippine citizenship on
January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year. Choy King Tee first came
to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her
last visa before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her
husband asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration,
as well as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied
as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the
issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments of
Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the
national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. 7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14
SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the
writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of Immigration, considering that
Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had
submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did
Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June
30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to
expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying
exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative
requirements of the law." 9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar
held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the dependency of the
naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be allowed to take the oath as
Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show
that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed
above, 11 even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-
13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point
now under discussion is settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section
15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman, who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the

naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and
a foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless
he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall
be considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching the age
of majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American
Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of
allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man
who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from
not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also possess all
the qualifications required by said law? if nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go
Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the
question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted
for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck
Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other
circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the
matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im
Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice
Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because (they
wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to
tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the
motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curae 13 in the Burca
case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful
manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical
aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who
have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and
acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their
status as such by the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts.
Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views
of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court
decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later
in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically
repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha.
Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to
indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing,
Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted
from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a
reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per
adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under
American sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a
consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic Laws,
the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later
the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted
by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of
citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This
made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or orientation
of our own; everything was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside

herein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred
and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23,
1912, by adding a provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law

for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except
such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided,
That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of
marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil
Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the
change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed
that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of
naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien
woman with a native born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the marriage,
although Section 13 thereof provided thus: .
SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and
minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case
shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same
legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the
following provisions were added to the above Section 13:
SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections
thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married

to a citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine
Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized

under this law, being under the age of twenty-one years at the
time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the
Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who

have been born in the Philippine Islands after the naturalization of
their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939,
the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this
decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word
in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to
Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our
naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha
to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite
clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is
no need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the
time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the
qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in
1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963,
in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications
provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her
to become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows:
That "like the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons
who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as
Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section
providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor
of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section
2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support
for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood
as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons
under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be
qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of
cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the
qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated
in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine
citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v.
Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136,
December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew
to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the
interpretation of a similar law in the United States after which Section 15 of our
Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of February
10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act
No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former
Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26,
1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
limited to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not
citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions of the United States;
and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the
United States, may become citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The
reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American Citizens is
restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified
thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there
was at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of the two countries
and hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation
given in the United States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of
alien women marrying American citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the
enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on
June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the
provision found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that
when Congress chose to retain the said provision — that to be deemed a
Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized," the reference is no longer to the class or race to which the
woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to the
qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2
and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms
of statutory construction.
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is
believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found
worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of
marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral
character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and
traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for
naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not
entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen.
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same
conclusion thus:
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been
residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27,
t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13,
t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the principal
Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words

emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien
woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being disqualified under any of the eight
("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to
claim our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in its
second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is that the
woman be not disqualified under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the
question at issue could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only
the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855,
Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She
must possess the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly
established the rule that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473
(the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one
who "might herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the
disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses
the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan
v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-
20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v.
Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26,
1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under
section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its
section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the
wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that
citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the
statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not

previously convicted by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still,
it is certain that the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in
view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of
good moral character."
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in

government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain
"herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is
not "opposed to organized government," nor affiliated to groups "upholding or
teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination
for the success or predominance of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying

exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the
other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee
Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was
derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the
same territorial and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court
has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30,
1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study
thereof cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on
which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not entirely
unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are
eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening
the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of
Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that
Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine citizenship may

be acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under
the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States;
(c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United
States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of
race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more
evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation
during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable stations flowing from our
staffs as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act
2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority without which it could not have been
done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act
of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones
Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been footed earlier. In truth,
therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the
exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence
Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial
discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished
to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the
fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended
purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of
Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in
character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider
the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to
confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein
mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who
could be American citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any
idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but more
accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the
laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act
2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States already provided for the
following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized
government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization
entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized
government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the
unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals
or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other
organized government, because of his or their official character, or who is a
polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under
Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of
fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the
United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of
May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act
2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial
exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States
Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the rationalization in
the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by
Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial
discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the construction
adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of
the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act
3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the
Raised Statutes of the United States as it stood before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal,
the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite
unmistakable construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that had occasion
to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered, as if it were written in the statute
itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its
unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the
American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the
construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United
States and all administrative authorities, charged with the implementation of the naturalization
and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v.
Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct.
756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo
of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and
administrative authorities is contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v.
Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922,
26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d
ed. p. 117) provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of
February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section
provided "that any woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British
Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which provided that "any woman
married, or who shall be married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized,
shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and
privileges of a natural born subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411,
Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative
to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any
woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act,
... shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage ..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are
repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired
or retained under either of such sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of
September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as the
marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore,
depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283,
284, construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term,
"who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the
application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act,
existing at the time, only required that the person applying for its benefits should
be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to
the class or race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of
the other provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character,
or to any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or
deportation of aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also
construed the Act of 1855, declaring that "any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and might herself be
lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." He held that "upon the
authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the case," the statute must be
construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or race
that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who marries a
citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it
should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the
time of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.
In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit
court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of
Prussia came to the United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr.
Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage
she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had
complied with all of the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of
naturalization. He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L.
ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who might be lawfully
naturalized.
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman

came to the United States from France and entered the country contrary to the
immigration laws. The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of
New York, with the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ
of habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she married a
naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth Circuit
held, affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be discharged from
custody. The court declared: "The rule is well settled that her marriage to a
naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The status
of the wife follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her
husband's domicil became her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165.
Fed. 980, had before it the application of a husband for his final decree of
naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration
authorities at New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous
and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the
husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of
that contingency District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the husband's
application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was determined
whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the
express ground that the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her.
At the same time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization would
not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become lawfully
naturalized. "Her own capacity (to become naturalized)," the court stated "is a
prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the
married status cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually
decided in that case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing more
than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something more than that, we
find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge
Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who
married an American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United
States, could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a
disease which under the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for
her exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought
into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed.
322. In that case, however at the time the relators married, they might have been
lawfully naturalized, and we said: "Even if we assume the contention of the
district attorney to be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman
who would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not affect these
relators."
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was
also said to be inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be
a citizen and the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one
now before the court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place before
any order of exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated
after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative
provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a court, and works no estoppel.
The administrative order is based on the circumstances that existed at the time
the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order
being carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of
exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted
with a contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to
actual deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we
think it plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if,
after the making of the order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily
to remain, she in good faith marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the
validity of her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under international law
and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be
an alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her,
as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained
the right of the officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances:
She entered this country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in
Turkey. She was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the
following September, and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued.
Pending hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody
of her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was that she was afflicted
with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her entry. One of the
reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married a
citizen of the United States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge
Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such
circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts
shown." He held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or
override the immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country
of the wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien
woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law from admission to the
United States does not come within the provisions of that section. The court
relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities
were cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed
1994 and held that where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of
France as an alien prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States,
she thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her
citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was
contended, her marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws and preventing her deportation, such
fact should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an action
commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was
dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the
statute by the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14
Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that
residence within the United States for the period required by the naturalization
laws was riot necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she
having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided
in the United States, she and her husband having continued to reside abroad
after the marriage.
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907,
in an opinion rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an
unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in
New York and went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to
reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was taken before a United
States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act
(34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p.
637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered this country for the
purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution
and practicing the same within three years after landing. It appeared, however,
that after she was taken before the United States commissioner, but prior to her
arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to
a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of
her marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove
with her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life
had been, but professed to believe in her good intentions. The question was
raised as to the right to deport her, the claim being advance that by her marriage
she bad become an American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The
Attorney General ruled against the right to deport her as she had become an
American citizen. He held that the words, "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that
compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required.
27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our
observation that Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to
provide, in 19, "that the marriage to an American citizen of a female of the
sexually immoral classes ... shall not invest such female with United States
citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall be solemnized after her
arrest or after the commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under
this act."
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral

class avoiding deportation through the device of marrying an American citizen.
(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien
woman of any other of the excluded classes, either before or after her detention,
should not confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter
the country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19 would not have
been confined solely to women of the immoral class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We have
found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose
statements in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the subject would seem
to give such impression. The case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited
among the first of the decisions 19 simply held:
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women

married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for
whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married"
or "who shall be married," do not refer in our judgment, to the time when the
ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that,
whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state
of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the passage of the Act
or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a
citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship
upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women whose
husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater
number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our
opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the
necessity of any application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the
object, there is no reason for the restriction suggested.
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit
the application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act,
existing at the time only required that the person applying for its benefits should
be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat.
at L. 153.
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York,
in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest
extension to its provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under
existing laws" only limit the application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the
previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that the person applying for its
benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but also) ... not an alien enemy." This is
simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was
decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30,
1813, as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case
of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no
other non-racial requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is
demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous
naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is impotent, since
as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in
Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the
application of the law to free white women, must be interpreted in the application to the special
facts and to the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or
not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and
nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law
in force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court
drew the evidence that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act
473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section particularly its subdivision (c), being
the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what should be
required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also
possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good
moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution,
irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and
write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in
certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely
intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper
premises, We have come, to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already explained above
of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the
clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15 is, an exact copy of
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of
Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by American courts and
administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above,
there can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised
Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken, from the Act of February 10,
1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of
residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be
considered, and that the only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to
which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the
very case ofLeonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the
explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in
the Act of 1855,supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen" while it may
imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by
ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court,
upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on
that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the
equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore, whatever an act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing,
must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established
concerning "such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the
contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of
Congress, or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a
situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is
understood that the construction already given to such statute before its being copied constitute
part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different connotation or
meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining
the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in accurate factual premises related to the real
legislative background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any
point of view. There is no question that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less
substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-
existed already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it
were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as
amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act,
without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1
have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American
jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such
qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the
corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and that what
should be considered only are the requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1
together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section
15 could have been intended to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American
courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase
and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that, time,
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it had
been repealed expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic
naturalization of alien wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to
regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other
applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as
already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already
abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be natural
judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the
approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its
settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial
naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to
conclude that our law still follows the old or previous American Law On the subject. Indeed,
when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already
autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old
American law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S.
Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of the old law. What
then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the
Americans had amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the
construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our
legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American courts had given it
a construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be
possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, but as things
stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled
construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators even ignored the
modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these
circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to
say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed
independently of the previous American posture because of the difference of circumstances
here and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of a statute, We
cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of
view seems to indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in
effect, the so called racial requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine
laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in
Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they
have always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess
them were the ones who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from
any of the disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically identical to those in the former law,
except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression
anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or
cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of this
Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of
the secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements
were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the
law, why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a
lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead the meaning that
what were previously considered as irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as
seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section
15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act
2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter,
necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the phrase in question "who may
be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification under
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups
of persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling
under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1,
could not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than
decreasing, the disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by
what alchemy of logic such elimination could have convicted qualifications into disqualifications
specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in
the law distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American
jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining
"who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute governing the status
of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was merely copied verbatim from
the American statutes.
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions,
whether here or in the United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the
same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-
appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications" —
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction

that Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must
affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under
Section 2, before she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon
an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith
manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the
following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for

naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant
"must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of
not less than ten years." If this requirement is applied to an alien
wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten
years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her
husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose
law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she
automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of
her husband, this could mean that for a period of ten years at
least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired
continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no
guarantee that her petition for naturalization will be granted, in
which case she would remain stateless for an indefinite period of
time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for

naturalization that he "must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or
must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation." Considering the constitutional prohibition against
acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of hereditary
succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring
to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have to prove that
she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession
or occupation. The income requirement has been interpreted to
mean that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the
said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong
vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-
20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove
that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than
her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common
knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most
wives in the Philippines do not have gainful occupations of their
own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the dependence of the
wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of
supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in
mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a
woman marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and
housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how
can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify
her for citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization

"must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of the
Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the
school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has minor
children by a previous marriage to another alien before she
marries a Filipino, and such minor children had not been enrolled
in Philippine schools during her period of residence in the country,
she cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of this
Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be
enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they follow
the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666,
March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian
Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-
4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26,
1950). Considering that said minor children by her first husband
generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for
such requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante
ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence

prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced to five
years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman." It is
absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be
required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to qualify
for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino
husband must reside for ten years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien
wife related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a
foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the
general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to
an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly
granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No.
3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law), there was no
law granting any special privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as
any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine
legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation made by the
Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife
follows the nationality of the husband; but the Department of State
of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife
of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our
Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs
(23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being
political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the United States. Accordingly, the stated taken by the
Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act No. 3448, was that
marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the
former citizens of this counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in

1928 adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
(Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this

Court did, in such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the
qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would
become illusory. It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the
manifested object of the statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object,

and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which
will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should
receive the former construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493,
45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285.
See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15
Phil. 85 [1910).
... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be

avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a
construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance
with the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will
result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be
avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest,
or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a
construction which will result in absurd consequences.
So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result

would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has
been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in
futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the
legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will
be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to
have been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which
would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague
is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an
intent to confer an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326,
pp. 623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the
construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of
such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult if not practically impossible in
some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary
applicant for naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and
logical to assume that Section 15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien women who
by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes
and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there
can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine
citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound to be,
serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in
joining a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs
and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no one
should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality
the extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the
husband. Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy rationalization in
Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the
question. The avowed policy of "selectives admission" more particularly refers to
a case where citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for
naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national
policy of selecting only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here a
choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this
policy finds no application in cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of
law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual
claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he
satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to
declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to
prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines,
"irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with
Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions." A minor child of a person naturalized
under the law, who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is
likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or he adheres
to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien wife of a Philippine
citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized,
i.e., that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the
law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in
this regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It
is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an
alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain
a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113
Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women: Historical Background and Commentary." UNITED NATIONS,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such
objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire
citizenship derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the
Philippines where tradition and law has placed the husband as head of the
family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the family group.
Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family
(Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a vital and enduring
interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our
country, there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and
wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one is that of the other.
(See De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because
of the theoretic identity of husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the
nationality of husband should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon
one should be the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v.
Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The status of the wife
follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's
domicile became her domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law being
that the property relations of husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal
partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and
identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it
cannot be that the husband's interests in property and business activities
reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and
be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for
the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit
that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where
the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all
concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was
understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized," found in the
American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American
courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in the view that Philippine
statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular
reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in the circumstances
between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the world, and
the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come.
Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our
jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure,
entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable
authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now
under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily
from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the
United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the
late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it
took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of
Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of
the United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to
adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the
Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly
understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americansipso facto,
without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they
possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals
and American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all
previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be
instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by
entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of
law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be
otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical
and practical. There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every
case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in
Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a
Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already noted,
was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the
foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held
that despite her apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a
Filipina, without her undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her
claim that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the
Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without
submitting to a naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily
be in the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final
because there is still pending with Us a motion for its reconsideration which vigorously submits
grounds worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons
expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine
the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to
be a citizen of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship
reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none
of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law;
(2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3)
Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or
otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying
or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law,
a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the
petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to
prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization
law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for
naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines."
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested
with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by
Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and
above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization apparently from
declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her
marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her
Filipino husband; she remains to be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance
before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to
wait for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required
period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principle
local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in
some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of
intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible
witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is
ordered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then,
but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon
a cursory reading of the provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the
"effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title,
and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some
effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be
benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether
or not the Court might have overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion
different from that complained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave
importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the
ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our
decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by
the law or by the national policy it seeks to endorse.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in
the Bar and well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive
and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum
they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present
case -- that an alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does
not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only
through ordinary naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization
Law, and that all administrative actions "certifying or declaring such woman to be
a Philippine citizen are null and void" — has consequences that reach far beyond
the confines of the present case. Considerably more people are affected, and
affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The newspapers report that as
many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are affected by this
decision of the Court. These are women of many and diverse nationalities,
including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese,
Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of whom have
been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all exercised rights and
privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have acquired,
separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property,
and they will have sold and transferred such property. Many of these women may
be in professions membership in which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless
stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in business
activities for which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by
law. All these married women are now faced with possible divestment of personal
status and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete
good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been accepted as correct for more
than two decades by the very agencies of government charged with the
administration of that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines
which would visit such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives
and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs.
Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 — when Chief Justice Concepcion
observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases
— although referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to those
obtaining in the case at bar — may have contributed materially to the
irregularities committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced the
parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed
was valid under the law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the
Solicitor General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state
"how many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of
naturalization have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for
naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the
periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic
was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was decided) "and
(b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the decision in the present
case was rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's
motion for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as
of the data contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in
the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of
naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin
the prospective application of its construction of the law made in a previous decision, 24 which
had already become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not
have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while
the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at
the most become the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds
therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of

naturalization of the parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and
a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless
he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall
be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age
of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American
Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of
allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization
Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial
conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out such a procedure,
remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any
undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the
consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the
members of his immediate family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain
terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be
"considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling
here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not
born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also
redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer their
permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if
born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino
citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine
(American) Consulate of the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of
allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor
children, falling within the conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the
provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law
itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA).
Indeed, the language of the provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is
claimed that the same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to
the wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative
fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone
the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a Filipino.
Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative
naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately treats the wife differently
and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the
Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the
Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign
religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons
under general conditions applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women
who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is
whether or not the legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political
law in the Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is
often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman
married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of
the classeswho may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political
Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the
1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua,supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United
States statutes from which our law has been copied, 28a the American courts have held that the
alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the
Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien
woman who marries a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a citizen herself, without
the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601
[1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106,
239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph
(a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and
that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction among the
courts and administrative authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien
woman who married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law
and as a consequence of the marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization
proceedings, provided that, it could be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not
disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already
made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The
only point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United
States, the American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such construction,
approved the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to
judicial naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for
citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting
such a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the
aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to adopt
the latter law and its settled construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the
United States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis
the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of her
citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used
to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a
developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which
our own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis
for Us to construe said law along the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us
to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not institutionally permissible for this
Court to do. Worse, this court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit
Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly
implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow
and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceedings do not have to
submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the
proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and
minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case
shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same
legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that
under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the
same proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the
widow and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the
petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment
becomes executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of
said Section 16 contemplate the fact that the qualifications of the original
petitioner remains the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that
"The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children
are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during
the life of the petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to
continue the proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it
were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to consider the decision
rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person
can not be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an
oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take
the oath of allegiance for the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin
merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper
certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased
husband, shall have been completed, not on behalf of the deceased but on her
own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the benefits of his naturalization.
In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a
citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that "any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor
children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act
No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case
at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow could not have been lawfully
naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9
minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the
Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No.
16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to
Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common
sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for
reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel:
.
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be

considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed
that Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under
which foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring
citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed.
890 [1898] ; see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152
[1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who
are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine
Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only
those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the
acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative
naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an
alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien
woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172; Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186
[1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of

the Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship.
Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised
Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her
marriage, the alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United
States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon
the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US
Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507],
December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923
[23 398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised

Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of
1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and
taken to be a citizens" while it may imply that the person to whom
it relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means
or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court,
upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that
such person is on that account practically any the less a
citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or
"judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to
be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law,
be considered as having been duly adjudged or established
concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect
accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien
woman shall, under certain circumstances, be "deemed" an
American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is
equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an Act of Congress
or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne, Citizenship
of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship
and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the
first paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a
textual analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically
become" as used in the above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The
leading idea or purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by
operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their
relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the
Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the
provision concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to whom they are
related, the effect is for said persons to become ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all
minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship,
necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory
requirements do not ipso factobecome citizens; they must apply for naturalization
in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect
of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the
Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which
such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a
minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the
Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact
of relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the time
when the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is able to
prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some 25 years
after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and
should, therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he
became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman who
married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her
marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her
citizenship status became in question), that she is one who might herself be
lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine
citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine
citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very
phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien
wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizenunless and until she proves that
she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms
that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or
acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to
establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and
proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies
that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the)
power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v.
Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That
she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at
her marriage, she became a citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the
status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be
lawfully naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of
citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for
citizenship, that is, she is not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may
herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law that the
proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by Congress, not by the courts)
a citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its
holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has
proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was that the
alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they
failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101
Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded to the lower court for determination of
whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was
disputed by the Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the
purpose of " proving her alleged change of political status from alien to citizen"
(at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being
deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This
Court finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified under Section
4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on
record, the claim of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon
her marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that in these
decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives "might
(themselves) be lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did not
become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the
decisions merely held was that these wives failed to establish their claim to that
status as a proven fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when
citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship
status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be
required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in
order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status
commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is established as a
fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be
lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a
Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven
fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no
difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of
the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself
be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former
becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a
proven fact. But neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become a
citizen of the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal
proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In
such a case, the presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be.
(U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There
is a presumption that a representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna
Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what
substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to
have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be
called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter in to a transaction or
business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is
that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such
procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of
the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the
truth is that the same situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as
the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to
"appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and
judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler
for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these
are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that
the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in
Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be
considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from
acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino
husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
(please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying
the petition.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will
probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding,
depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not
touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the
matter be settled once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants'
petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his
authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and
the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.
Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Followed in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R.
No. L-13790, promulgated Oct. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 300; Lu Choy Fa vs.
Commissioner, G.R. No. L-20597, Nov. 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 604; the other cases
are discussed in the opinion.
2 Justices Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result.
3 Kua Suy v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-13790, Oct. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 300; Lo
San Tuang v. Galang, G. R. No. L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638; Sun Peck
Yong v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 874; Tong
Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876; Choy King Tee
v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402; Austria v. Conchu,
G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336; Brito v. Commissioner, G.R.
No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539; Ly Giok Ha v. Galang (2nd), G. R.
No. L-21332, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 414; Go Im Ty v. Rep., G.R. No. L-
17919, July 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 797.
4 Supra. (101 Phil. 459).
* See, also Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 28, s. 1950; No. 96, s. 1949; Nos. 43, 58,
98 and 281, s. 1948; No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940.
5 In the deliberations, Chief Justice Concepcion explained that his opinion was
not meant to give that impression.
6 Justice Barrera penned the decision in Sun Peck Yong, supra, and Tong Siok
Sy v. Vivo, supra.
* Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473; Ly Giok Ha @ Wy Giok Ha v. Galang,

54 Off. Gaz., 356.
7 To avoid repetition, the pertinent portions of the opinion will be quoted in a

more appropriate place later in this decision.
8 G.R. No. L-21332, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 414.
9 Pertinent portions of the opinion of Justice Reyes will be quoted later in a more
appropriate place in this decision.
10 17 SCRA 797.
11 See id., pp. 801-804.
12 One can easily perceive from the language of Justice Makalintal in Choy King
Tee that he was expressing the consensus of the Court's membership then
rather than his own personal views.
13 The law firms PAREDES, POBLADOR & NAZARENO; LICHAUCO, PICAZO

& AGCAOLI; MEER, MEER & MEER; PONCE ENRILE, SIGUION REYNA,
MONTECILLO & BELO; RAMIREZ & ORTIGAS; SALVA, CHUA & ASSO.; and
SYCIP, SALAZAR, LUNA, MANALO & FELICIANO.
14 See quotation from Lo San Tuang earlier on pp. 27-32 of this opinion.
15 See opinion of the Secretary of Justice, No. 79, s. 1940.
16 For ready reference, attached as an appendix of this decision is a brief study

of all the naturalization laws of the United States from 1790 to 1970 showing how
the matter of qualifications and disqualifications, whether racial or otherwise,
have been treated in the said statutes, from which it can be readily seen that the
disqualification of alien wives from becoming citizens has not been always
exclusively on racial grounds during the period that the Act of Feb. 10, 1855 and,
later, section 1994 of the Revised Statutes were in force.
17 The statement in Sinco's book cited by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang does
not indicate any authoritative source. In any event, for the reasons already stated
the racial motive could at most be only one of the reasons for the elimination of
Section 1.
18 A more extensive discussion of the relevance of this repeal of 1922 is made

further in this opinion.
19 Decided, April 15, 1869, next to Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373.
20 More accurately, the phrase "free white persons," does not only refer to
people of the white race but also to non-slaves.
21 In this connection, it is to be noted that all the naturalization laws of the United
States from 1790 provided for such qualifications of residence, good moral
character, adherence to the Constitution.
22 (f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have
not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire
to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
23 After Ly Giok Ha and Cua, the Secretary of Justice found more reason to
sustain the previous view of the Department on the matter. See opinions already
cited.
24 Og Son Cui v. Republic, G.R. No. L-9858, May 29, 1957, 101 Phil. 649.
25 Somehow, the language of the whole law conveys the idea that only male
aliens are contemplated for judicial naturalization.
26 Three possible situations are contemplated, namely: (a) the woman is already
married to the alien before the latter's naturalization; (b) she marries him after
such naturalization; or (c) she marries a native-born Filipino; in all these
instances, the effect of marriage is the same.
27 Brother Cannon of La Salle College and Father Moran of Ateneo University.
28 Former Dean of the College of Law, U.P. and later President of the University,
now delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1971.
28a Sec. 1994 Revised Statutes.
* It should be observed, parenthetically, that by its very nature, citizenship is one

of the most difficult facts to prove.
OH HEK HOW VS REPUBLIC

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27429 August 27, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.

OH HEK HOW, petitioner appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Eliezer M. Echavez for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R.
Rosete and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for oppositor-appellant.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
A decision granting his petition for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines having been
rendered on January 16, 1964, petitioner Oh Hek How filed, on January 17, 1966, a motion
alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he
be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate
of naturalization. Upon petitioner's testimony, taken on February 9, 1966, the date set for the
hearing of said motion, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an
order authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate
of naturalization was issued to him.
The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of
February 9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal. Before the same was approved, it also moved
to cancel petitioner's certificate of naturalization, upon the ground, among others, that it was
issued and the oath taken before said order of February 9, 1966, had become final and
executory. Acting upon this motion and petitioner's opposition thereto, the court issued, on
October 3, 1966, an order granting the motion, but, at the same time, authorizing the taking of a
new oath by the petitioner and the issuance in his favor of another certificate of naturalization,
after thirty (30) days from notice to the Solicitor General. Thereafter, or on November 26, 1966,
the court approved the record on appeal and, once more, authorized the petitioner to "take a
new or proper oath to validate the first one made on February 9, 1966." The case is now before
us on said record on appeal filed by the Government.
At the outset, it is obvious that the oath of allegiance taken by petitioner on November 28,
1966, and the certificate of naturalization issued to him in pursuance thereof, as well as the
authority given therefor by the lower court, are null and void. Indeed, the order of February 9,
had not — and up to the present has not — become final and executory in view of the appeal
duly taken by the Government. What is more, petitioner's second oath was taken, not only after
the filing of the notice of appeal 1 and the submission of the record on appeal, but also after the
approval thereof. In other words, the lower court had already lost its jurisdiction over the case. 2
Again, petitioner's net income in 1960 and 1961 was P3,945.65 and P5,105.79,
respectively, or from about P330 to P425 a month. His income tax return for 1962, filed
subsequently to the institution of this case, showed a net income of P6,485.50 for that year, or
about P540 a month. Considering that petitioner has a wife and three (3) children, one of them
of school age, at the time of the filing of his application for naturalization, his aforementioned
income is not a lucrative one. Indeed, it has been held that the following incomes are not
lucrative, from the viewpoint of our naturalization laws, namely: (1) P4,200 3 or P5,000 a
year 4 for one married, with five (5) children; 5 (2) P6,000 a year for one married, with two (2)
minor children; 5 and (3) P6,000 6 or P6,300 a year 7 for one married, with only one (1) child.
Lastly, it is conceded that petitioner has not required from the Minister of the Interior of
Nationalist China the permission required by the laws thereof for a valid renunciation of his
Chinese citizenship. In Go A. Leng v. Republic, 8 a decision granting the application for
naturalization of a Chinese national was reversed by this Court, upon the ground, among others,
of "his failure to secure" the aforementioned permission.
It is argued that the same is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an
alien, as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be
controlled by any foreign law. Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides, however, that
before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear," inter alia,
that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or citizen." The obvious
purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2)
distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No.
2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and
any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his
Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such
had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which
citizenship is acquired." The question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is
necessarily governed — pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of
China, not by those of the Philippines. 9 As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be
naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist
China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of
nationality.
The view to the contrary, adhered to in Parado v. Republic, 10 Chausintek v.

Republic, 11 and Lim So v. Republic 12 has been superseded by our ruling in the subsequent
case of Go A. Leng v. Republic 13 which we hereby reiterate.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the oath of allegiance taken, on
November 28, 1966, by petitioner Oh Hek How, as well as the certificate of naturalization issued
in pursuance thereto, are hereby declared null and void, with costs against said petitioner, who
is, moreover, directed to surrender the aforementioned certificate of naturalization to the Clerk
of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, within ten (10) days after this decision
shall have become final. It is so ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur in the result.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1
Qua v. Republic, L-21418, Dec. 31, 1965; Jose Syson v. Republic, L-21199, May 29,
1967; Republic v. Santos, L-23919, July 29, 1968.
2
Kwan Kwock How v. Republic, L-18521, Jan. 30, 1964; Tio Tek Chai v. Republic, L-
19112, Oct. 30, 1964; Lee v. Republic, L-20148, April 30, 1965; Cheng v. Republic, L-
20013, March 30, 1965; Lee Ng Len v. Republic, L-20151, March 31, 1965; Tan Huy
Liong v. Republic, L-21671, Feb. 28, 1966; Ong Kim Kong v. Republic, L-20505, Feb.
28, 1966; Co Im Ty v. Republic, L-17919, July 30, 1966; Lim Eng Yu v. Republic, L-
20809, Aug. 31, 1966; Yong Sai v. Republic, L-20483, Sept. 30, 1966; Dy Bu Si v.
Republic, L-22076, Oct. 29, 1966; Syson v. Republic, L-21199, May 29, 1967; Go Yanko
v. Republic, L-21542, Aug. 10, 1967; Cu King Nan v. Republic, L-20490, June 29, 1968;
Republic v. Santos, L-23919, July 29, 1968; Leon Te Poot v. Republic, L-20017, March
28, 1969.
3
Uy v. Republic, L-19578, October 27, 1964.
4
Tio Tek Chai v. Republic, L-19112, October 30, 1964.
5
Ng v. Republic, L-21179, January 22, 1966.
6
Chua Lian Yan v. Republic, L-26416, April 25, 1969.
7
Tan v. Republic, L-16013, March 30, 1963.
8
L-19836, June 21, 1965.
9
Yañes de Barnuevo v. Fuster, 29 Phil. 606; Babcock Templeton v. Babcock, 52 Phil.
130; Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67; Sikat v. Canson, 67 Phil. 207; Arca v. Javier, 95
Phil. 579, 584-585; Vivo v. Cloribel, L-25411, Oct. 26, 1968.
10
86 Phil. 340.
11
89 Phil. 4.
12
89 Phil. 74.
13
Supra.
TECSON VS COMMISION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.,respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a “precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,”[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by
those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the
qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are
waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver
screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he
not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion
resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003
before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in
support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth
of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of
Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives
Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe
or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information
about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of
Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844,
No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of
death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900
until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‗Fernando Poe, Jr.‘), and Victorino X. Fornier," and
the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting
that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due
course to or cancel FPJ‘s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact
(i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –
―Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false‖ –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code -
―Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers
and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge
of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections‖ -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested
party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which
power ―includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.‖
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to,
and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to
our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as ―not (being) justiciable‖
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to
enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the
Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under
the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme
Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
―Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
―Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.
―Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation
of the winner.‖
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and
not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission
on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the
concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to
determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept
grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights
and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. [8] In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests
to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century,
the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary
for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. [9] Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right
to participate in the exercise of political power. [10]The 20th century saw the next stage of the
development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic
well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development,
in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects
of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a
low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to
the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. [14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in
Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to
be the subject of differing views among experts; [15] however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14
August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of
children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July
1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of
the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among
which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889,
which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
―(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
―(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
―(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
―(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy.‖[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated
that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force,
would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove
therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or
dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their
industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus –
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they
did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American
laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to
the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill
of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred
and ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a ―citizen of the Philippines‖ was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term ―inhabitant‖ was
taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular
Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. [24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to
01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was
given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle
ofjus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States
and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. [25] More
about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United
States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein." [26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for
the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones
Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of
Congress in 1912 -
―That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2)
residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law,
by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino
citizenship -
―Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
―(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
―(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
“(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
―(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
―(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.‖
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate
children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant
of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973
Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns -
―Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
―(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
“(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
―(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship,
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
―The following are citizens of the Philippines:
―(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
―(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
―(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime
of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli andjus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a ―natural-born‖ citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident
of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September
1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17
May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta
Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an ―uncertified‖ copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September
1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried,
and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August
1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American
citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be
that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September,
1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-
born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the
custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit
"21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his
Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the
admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the
marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the
death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos,
Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his
argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
―Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
―x x x xxx xxx
―(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a
public office.‖
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
“Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.‖
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2)
the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested
origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred. [31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at
the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou
was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner
would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898
to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou
was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a
person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of
all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the
child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of
an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if
done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a
record of birth, a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to the new code was Act No.
3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
―In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified.‖
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of
filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The
failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is
whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry
record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No
such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both
parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as
required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or
either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in
any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition
of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in
such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the
child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or
at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of
voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this
Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by
competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article
131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who
was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be
demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove
filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and
might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however,
could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so
as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or
indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by
the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175
provide:
―Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
―(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
―(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
―In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
―(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
―(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
―Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.
―The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.
―x x x xxx x x x.
―Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same, evidence as legitimate children.
―The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.‖
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.‖
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under
Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the
voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article
278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition
of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and
welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal
affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status
of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the
State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family
and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which
determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of
a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."[37]
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although
they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and
wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing
property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil
effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions
that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of

the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the
Civil Code,[39] such as on successional rights and family relations. [40] In adoption, for instance,
an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same
rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil
law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary
and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate
and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance
of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these
bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the
primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain
only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should
thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law
purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about
pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree‘
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.‖
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or
unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a
relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts
of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with
Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
―1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
―2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
―3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,‘ or `FPJ‘.
―4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ‘ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
―x x x xxx xxx
―7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they
were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced
to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
―8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
―9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation
of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
―10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
―x x x xxx xxx
―18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan
Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe,
Sr.
―Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be

difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test
for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results
of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is
to deny progress."
Petitioner’s Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a
year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his
mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court
in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be
a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was
irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.
―First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was
about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese
father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the
naturalized stepfather.
―Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public
office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
―Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was
whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
―Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship
of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father,
Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court
therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his
son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a
Filipino.
―The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court
said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino
because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
―x x x xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but
twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate
child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
―The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs.
Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children
rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
―x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What

possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public
officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child
of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from
holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is
neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the
distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated.‖
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed
fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to
help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent
FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are ―those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines.‖ There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction
over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which
has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President
in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G.
R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter‘s
capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest
under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked
only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the ―en masse Filipinization‖ that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as
so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate
and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe,
Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for
want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled ―Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,‖ for failure to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the
petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring.
Puno, J., on leave but was allowed to vote; see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote on the matter.
Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should have been
remanded.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs and also with J. Puno‘s separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales.
Carpio-Morales, J., see dissenting opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion.
[1]
Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor, 45 O.G. No. 31, 1269.
[2]
Sec. 2. Mode of review. – A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. (Rule 64)
[3]
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Rule 65)
[4]
17 SCRA 761.
[5]
See Rule 66, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
[6]
The Politics of Aristotle, edited and translated by Ernest Barker, Oxford University Press,
London, 1946. at p. 93.
[7]
Id., at 95.
[8]
Introduction, ―The Conditions of Citizenship,‖ edited by Bart Van Steenbergen, Sage
Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi (1994).
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
Under the codified Novisima Recopilacion promulgated in Spain in 1805, the following were
considered denizens (vecinos) " all foreigners who obtained the privilege of
naturalization, those who were born in these kingdoms, those who residing therein may
be converted to the holy Catholic faith; those, being self-supporting, established their
domicile therein; and in the case of a foreign woman who married a native man, she
thereby becomes subject to the same laws and acquires the same domicile as her
husband; those who establish themselves in the country by acquiring real property;
those who have trade or profession and go there to practice the same; also those who
practice some mechanical trade therein or keep a retail store;....those who reside for a
period of ten years in a home of his own; and also those foreigners who, in accordance
with the common law, royal orders and other laws of the kingdoms, may have become
naturalized or acquired residence therein. (Leon T. Garcia, ―The Problems of Citizenship
in the Philippines,‖ Rex Bookstore, 1949, at p. 4)
[14]
Garcia, supra., at p. 3.
[15]
Justices Malcolm, Recto and Florentino Torres believed that the law was effective in the
Philippines. Those who entertained the contrary view were Justices Imperial and
Villareal. (Garcia, supra., at 4.).
[16]
Garcia, supra., pp. 5-6.
[17]
Under the Royal Decree of August 23, 1868, the following were considered foreigners --- (1)
The legitimate and recognized natural children of a father who belongs to another
independent state, and the unrecognized and natural and other illegitimate children of a
mother belonging to another State born outside of the Spanish dominions, (2) The
children specified in the preceding paragraph, born in the Spanish dominions or on
board Spanish vessels on the high seas if they do not, on attaining the age of majority
fixed in the laws of the Kingdom, elect Spanish nationality, (3) Those being Spaniards,
acquire another nationality, as well by renouncing the first as by accepting employment,
from another government without the authority of the sovereign and (4) The woman who
contracts marriage with a subject of another State. (Garcia, supra., pp. 6-7)
[18]
Under the law, the following were foreigners (a) All persons born of foreign parents outside of
the Spanish territory; (b) Those born outside of the Spanish territory of foreign fathers
and Spanish mothers while they do not claim Spanish nationality, (3) Those born in
Spanish territory of foreign parents or foreign fathers and Spanish mothers while they do
not make that claim, (4) Spaniards who may have lost their nationality, (5) Those born
outside of the Spanish territory of parents who may have lost their Spanish nationality;
and (6), the Spanish woman married to a foreigner. (Garcia, supra., p. 7)
[19]
Velayo, infra., p. 11.
[20]
Article 17, The Civil Code of Spain.
[21]
Garcia, supra, pp. 6-7.
[22]
Ramon M. Velayo, ―Philippine Citizenship And Naturalization,‖ Central Book Supply, Manila
(1965), pp. 22-23.
[23]
Ibid., p. 30.
[24]
Garcia, supra, at pp. 31-32.
[25]
Garcia, supra, pp. 23-26.
[26]
Velayo, supra, p. 31
[27]
Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Constitution.
[28]
Per amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ.
[29]
23 Phil 315 (1912).
[30]
Supra., which held that jus soli was never applied in the Philippines.
[31]
Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil 148.
[32]
Article 131 Old Civil Code.
[33]
Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil 729.
[34]
17 SCRA 788.
[35]
95 Phil 167.
[36]
125 SCRA 835.
[37]
Vicente J. Fransisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Bk I, 1953 at p. 5
[38]
29 Phil 606.
[39]
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any
of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be
probated in the Philippines.
Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according
to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code
prescribes.
Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or
subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall
have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign
country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the
country where they may have been executed.
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
[40]
Article 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul
general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the
marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer
with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official.
Article 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign
country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to
submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective
diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal
capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such
capacity to contract marriage.
Article 26. xxx
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Article 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in the marriage settlements, the
property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the
place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence. This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the
Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but
affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities
for their extrinsic validity.
[41]
See Ching Leng vs. Galang, L-11931, October 1958, unreported.
[42]
354 SCRA 17.
[43]
20 SCRA 562, Paa vs. Chan 21 SCRA 753.
[44]
82 Phil. 771.
[45]
91 Phil. 914, unreported.
[46]
21 SCRA 753.
[47]
68 Phil 12.
[48]
248 SCRA 300 (1995)
AASJS VS DATUMANONG (SUPRA)
III. Domicile (Lex Domicilii)
NUVAL VS GURRAY
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30241 December 29, 1928
GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
NORBERTO GURAY, ET AL., respondents.
NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee.
Mabanag and Primicias, Gibbs and McDonough, and Mariano Alisangco for appellant.
Sison and Siguion and Franciscco Ortega for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, upholding the defense of res judicata and dismissing the quo
warranto proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio Nuval against Norbeto Guray and others,
with costs against the petitioner.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assign the following alleged errors as committed by the
trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the judgment rendered upon Gregorio Nuval's
petition for the cancellation of Norbeto Guray's name on the election list of Luna is
conclude and constitutes res judiata in the present case.
2. The trial court erred in not holding that Norbeto Guray at the time of his election, was
ineligible for the office of the residence in said municipality.
3. The lower court erred in not finding in its judgment that the petitioner is entitled to hold
the office in question.
In regard to the first assignment of error, the evidence adduced during the trial of the case
shows:
That on May 11, 1928, and within the period fixed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3387, Gregorio Nuval filed, in civil case No. 1442 of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and registered in the election
list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered candidate for the office of municipal
president of said municipality, a petition against Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his
name from the election list of said municipality, not being a qualified voter of said municipality
sine he had not resided therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said
Administrative Code.
Proceedings were had upon the petition in accordance with sections 437 and 438 of the same
Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, and Judge E. Araneta Diaz, rendered judgment dismissing
it because, in his opinion, Norberto Guray was a bona fide resident of the municipality of Luna
from Janury 1, 1927. As that order was not appealable, Norberto Guray's name remained in the
election list of the municipality of Luna.
The general election having been held on June 5, 1928, Norbeto Guray was elected to the office
of municipal president of Luna by a plurality of votes, Gregorio Nuval obtaining second place.
On June 7, 1928, the municipal council of Luna, acting as the municipal, Norberto Guray,
elected to the office of municipal president of the said municipality of Luna for the next
triennium.
On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto as provided in
section 408 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, asking that Norberto
Guray be declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos to the election as
required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to be eligible to an elective
municipal office.
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment
rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name from the election
list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in quo
warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act. No.
3387 is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except
when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in
which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower judges
have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for execution was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as qualified voter of
the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of the president of said
municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said municipality.
The present proceedings of quo warranto was intreposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a
registered candidate voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray,
as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two
cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of
capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of
Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165.)
In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter
was the conclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of
Luna, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious
matter in his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does
there exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not
the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while
in the present proceedings of quo warranto, the case of this action is that Norberto Guray has
not the one year's legal residence required for the eligibility to the office of municipal president
of Luna. Neither does there exist, therefore, identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) Identity of parties; (b)
identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 850). And as
in the case of the petition for exclusion and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is
no identity either of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there
is no res judicata.1awphi1.net
For the above considerations, the trial court erred in holding that the judgment rendered in the
case on the petition of Gregorio Nuval asking for the cancellation of Norberto Guray's name in
the election list of Luna is conclusive and constitutes res judicata in the present case.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the evidence establishes the following facts:
Up to June 27, 1922, Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his birthplace,
where he had married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. On that date he was
appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, Province of La Union. The rules of the provincial
treasurer of La Union, to which Norberto Guray was subject as such municipal treasurer, require
that municipality treasurers live continuously in the municipality where they perform they official
duties, in order to be able to give an account of their acts as such treasurers at any time. In
order to qualify and be in a position to vote as an elector in Balaoan in the general election of
1925, Norberto Guray asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna, where
he had voted in the general elections of 1922, alleging as a ground therefore the following: "On
the ground of transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th day of June, 1922. My
correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;" and in order to be registered in the
subscribed affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of election inspectors of precinct No. 1 of
Balaoan, by virtue of which he was registered as an elector of the said precinct, having made
use of the right of suffrage in said municipality in the general elections of 1925. In his cedula
certificates issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from the year 1923 to 1928,
included, he made it appear that his residence was the residential district of Balaoan. In the year
1926, his wife and children who, up to that time, had lived in the municipality of Balaoan, went
back to live in the town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents, due to the high cost of living in
that municipality. Norberto Guray used to go home to Luna in the afternoons after office hours,
and there he passed the nights with his family. His children studied in the public school of Luna.
In January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a house of strong materials in Luna, which
has not yet been completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. On February 1, 1928,
Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the 16th of
the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph, which was accepted on the same day,
also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided with a cedula by himself as
municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him resident of said town, he
obtained another cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was dated
January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of
Luna, Province of La Union. On February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the
cancellation of his name in the election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928,
he applied for registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that he had been residing in said
municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he made of the cedula certificate antedated.
In view of the facts just related, the question arises whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal
residence of one year immediately prior to the general elections of June 5, 1928, in order to be
eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna, Province of La Union.
There is no question but that when Norberto Guray accepted and assumed the office of
municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union, he transferred his residence from the municipality of
Luna to that of Balaoan.
The only question to determine refers to the date when he once more established his residence
in the municipality of Luna.
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one
in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified
by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so
used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place,
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
(People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and acquired
another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of Luna, he needed
to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time prescribed by the law, and
for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so, but his personal presence in said
municipality.
By reason of his office as municipal treasurer of Balaoan and on account of the rules of the
provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction was such municipality, Norberto
Guray had to reside and in fact resided in said municipality until the 6th of February, 1928 when
he filed his resignation from his office, which was accepted on the same date. The fact that his
family moved to the municipality of Luna in the year 1926 in order to live there in view of the
high cost of living in balaoan; the fact that his children studied in the public shool of said town;
the fact that on afternoons after hours he went home to the municipality of Luna and there
passed the night with his family, are not in themselves alone sufficient to show that from said
year he had transfered his residence to said municipality, since his wife and children lived with
his father-in-law, in the latter's house that only in the month of January, 1927, did he begin the
construction of a house of strong materials, which is not yet completed, nor occupied by himself
or his family, His aftrenoon tips to Luna, according to his own explanation given to the provincial
treasurer, were made for purpose of visiting his sick father. His own act in recording in his
cedula certificates for the years 1927 and 1928 issued by himself in his favor as municipal
treasurer of Balaoan, that his place of residene was that municipality, and in taking out a new
cedula in the municipality of Luna of February 20, 1928, and having the date of its issuance
surreptitiuosly put back to January 15 1928, show that until the date of his resignation he did not
consider himself as a resident of the municipality of Luna. The fact that his wife and children
lived in Luna not in his own house but in that of his wife's father since the year 1926, cannot be
looked upon as a change of residence, since a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment of the former (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71) and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.
The present case is different from that of Doctor Apacible cited by the appellee in his brief.
Doctor Apacible never had abandoned his legal residence in the Province of Batangas,
nothwithstanding that he had been living with his family in the City of Manila, taking out his
cedula certificates here, but he never exercised the right of suffrage here. Norberto Guray
abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality of Luna, transferring it to the municipality of
Balaoan by reason and an account of the requirements of the rules of the provincial treasurer of
La Union, under whose jurisdiction is said municipality, exercising his right of suffrage in the
latter.1awphi1.net
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and in law Norberto
Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and began to acquire
another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he filed his resignation from
the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding, and which resignation
was accepted; and on being elected municipal president of Luna in the general elections of
June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal residence necessary to be validly elected to said
office.
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of municipal
president of Luna is hereby held to be unlawful and quashed and, in consequence, he has no
right to take possession of said office, petitioner Gregorio Nuval being the one legally elected to
said office with a right to take possession thereof, having secured second place in the election.
With costs against the respondent. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., dissents.
RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
February 1, 1929
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a motion praying for the reasons given that the judgment rendered in this case on
December 29, 1928 be reconsidered, and another rendered affirming the judgment appealed
from.
In regard to the grounds of the motion with reference to the defence of res judicata, as the
movant does not adduce any new argument in support thereof, and inasmuch as this court has
already discussed question at length, we find no sufficient reason to grant the motion on said
grounds.
As to the other grounds touching this court's holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who has
been legally elected to the office of municipal president of Luna, La Union, and entitled to take
possession thereof, having received second place, we consider them meritorious, for the reason
that 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy in case a person not eligible should be
elected to a provincial or municipal office, does not authorize that it be declared who has been
legally elected, thus differing from section 479 of the law, which contains such an authorization,
and for the reason, furthermore, that section 477 of the said law provides that only those who
have obtained a plurality of votes, and have presented their certificates of candidacy may be
certified as elected to municipal offices. Elective offices are by nature different from the
appointive offices. The occupation of the first depends on the will of the elector, while that of the
second depends on the will of the authority providing for it. Inquo warranto proceedings referring
to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect, while
in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the
legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court
cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he
were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who
has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second
case, the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is
entitled to occupy the office.
In view of the foregoing, we are of opinion that the judgment rendered in this case on December
29, 1928, should be, and is hereby, amended, eliminating from the dispositive part thereof, the
holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who has been legally elected, so as to read as follows:
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of

Municipal president of Luna, is hereby declared unlawful and quashed and,
consequently, that he has no right to take possession of said office, with costs against
said respondent.
So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLAMOR, J., dissenting:
In consequence of my dissenting opinion from the decision in this case, I am compelled to

dissent likewise from the ruling on the motion for reconsideration. And I take this opportunity of
stating the grounds of my dissent. In the opinion prumulgated on December 29, 1928, among
other things, the following was stated: "Proceedings were had upon the petition in accordance
with section 437 and 438 of the same Code, as amended by Act 3387, and Judge E. Araneta
Diaz, rendered judgment dismissing it because, in his opinion, Norberto Guray was a bona
fide resident of the municipality of Luna from January 1, 1927. As that order was not appealable
Norberto Guray's name remained in the election list of the municipality of Luna."
The same decision states: "In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter was the exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election
list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter in his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has
been elected. Neither does this exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the
litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not
the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be qualified voter therefor, while in
the present proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the
one year legal residence required for eligibility to the office of the municipal president of Luna.
Neithe does there exist, therefore, identity of causes of action.
Further on, it states: "In the year 1926, his wife and children who, up to that time had lived in the
municipality of Balaoan, went back to live in the town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents.
Due to the high cost of living in that municipality. Norberto Guray used to go home to Luna in
the afternoons after office hours, and there he passed the night with his family. His children
studied in the public school of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a
house of strong materials in Luna, which has not been completed, and neither he nor his family
has lived in it. On February 1, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to
be spent in Luna, and on the 16th of the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph,
which was accepted on the same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already
provided with a cedula issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31,
1928, declaring him a resident of the said town, he obtained another cedula from the
municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was dated January 15, 1928, in which it was
presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of Luna, Province of La Union.
On February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in
the election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, he applied for the
registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that he had been residing in said municipality for thirty
years. For this purpose he made use of the cedula certificate antedated."
Considering the facts that related in the majority opinion, I believed that, setting aside
technicalities, the question of the residence of the protestee-appellee Guray was decided by the
court holding that he was a bona fide resident of the municipality of Luna, since January 1,
1927. I believe it is plain that Norberto Guray's residence follows him as the shadow follows the
body that casts it, whether it be in his capacity as voter, or in his eligibility for the office of
municipal president. The fact is that the Court of La Union found Guray to be a bona fide
resident of the municipality of Luna since January 1, 1927. From that date until the general
elections (June 5, 1928), I believe more than one year has elapsed, and consequently, Guray
had the legal residence of over one year at least, in the municipality of Luna at the time of his
election as municipal president.
In this jurisdiction the courts have ever looked upon resident as purely a matter of intention,
manifested by the acts, conduct and circumstances of the person choosing a place as his
permanent dwelling place and home. It was so understood by the Philippine Commission in
discussing the first election law, whose provisions upon the residence of voters and eligibles
have not been amended up to the present time. The domicile or legal residence has been define
as the place where a person has a principal house or habitation, or where he kepts his family
and his chief place of business. The intention in every case is the real object of investigation. If
a man leaves his town and removes to another by reason of his business, but with the intention
to return to it, he has lost his residence in said town. The mere change of dwelling place does
not involved a change of residence if it be not accompanied by intention. Hence it has been held
that if one has removed to another town solely by virtue of his appointment as the municipal
treasurer, but with the intention to return to his original town, he has not lost his residence in his
original town. The words good faith accompanying the word residence must be taken as a
description of the state of mind of the person claiming residence. For example, if a man
removes to province with the sole object of remaining one year in order to become a candidate
for the governorship, he may be held to be a resident in bad faith, while he may be bodily
absent from the province for a long time and yet have in his mind the constant intention to
return. If it be so, he would be a resident in good faith of the place he had left.
It is evident that bodily presence in a place, accompanied by the intention to live therein forever,
establishes domicile or residence. But bodily presence in this place is not residence; it is a mere
proof, if you wish, tending to demonstrate residence. At most, personal presence is presumptive
proof that a person intends to reside where he is. But such a presumption may be rebutted by
other acts, conduct, and circumstances of the person, clearly showing his intention to establish
his home elsewhere. The herein protestee-appellee Guray, at least January, 1927, kept his
family in the municipality of Luna, he went there at night to sleep with them, his children studied
in the public school of said municipality, and he had a house of strong materials built in Luna,
although it was not yet completed, as stated in the majority opinion. But all these acts show his
intention to establish his legal residence in the municipality of Luna.
The fact of having paid his personal cedula in Balaoan is of trivial importance in showing legal
residence, for, as Governor-General Smith said in the resolution of the protest against the
election of the provincial governor of Batangas, Apacible, hundreds of persons have taken out
their cedulas outside of their residential province without having lost their legal residence as a
result thereof. Governor-General Smith himself, who lived nine years in the Philippines, and
took out his cedula in Manila, had his residence in San Francisco, California, because his
intention was to go back and live there permanently.
There is no further need of amassing citations, but let a recently decided case be remembered,
namely, the quo warranto proceeding of Ira vs. Abano (p. 380. ante). The facts in that case are:
Maximo Abano is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the competent age he
removed to Manila to complete his education. While living temporarily in Manila, Abano
registered as a voter there. Shortly after having been admitted to the bar and after the death of
his father, Abano went back to live in Meycauayan. From May 10, 1927, up to the present
Abano has considered himself a resident of Meycauayan. When in 1928 the election where
about to be held, he filed a petition for the cancellation of his registration in Manila, which was
dated April 3, 1928, but his petition was denied by the city officials because it had not been
deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless, Abano presented himself as a
candidate of the municipal presidency in Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was by popular
vote elected thereto. In that case it was held:
1. A candidate who was elected to the office of municipal president and who at the time
the election was registered as a voter of Manila and not the municipality in which he was
a candidate, is nevertheless eligible to the office, and proceedings in the nature od quo
warranto instituted by virtue of the provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as
amended, by the vice-president elect of the municipality, who challenged the right of the
municipal president elect, to the position to which elected on the ground that the
municipal president was ineligible, cannot be successfully maintained.
2. The Election Law makes use of the terms 'qualified voter in his municipality,' and
qualified elector therein. To be a qualified voter, does not necessarily mean that a
person must be a registered voter. It is sufficient for the candidate to possess all of the
qualifications prescribed in sectio 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in
section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality
does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for.
3. One may be qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not
confer the right; it is but a condition presented to the exercise of the right. Registration
regulates the exercise of the right of the suffrage. It is not a qualification of such right.
4. The question of the residence for the purposes of the Election Law is largely one of
intention.
In another, and yet a more recent case (Vivero vs. Murillo, G. R. No. 30271) 1, it was held: "A
student living with his parents in a certain barrio of a municipality, which barrio is latter
separated to be organized as an independent municipality, who for several years pursues his
studies in several provinces of the archipelago, supported by his parents, returning to the latters'
home during his vacations in the newly organized municipality, does not lose his residence in
said municipality, either on account of having resided in different provinces as a student, or of
having registered as a voter in the former municipality and is eligible as municipal president of
the new municipality even if his registration as a voter in the municipality to which the new one
originally belonged has not been cancelled."
The same view of the question of legal residence has been sustained by the Philippine
Assembly in the protest against the election of the representative of the southern district of
Manila, Fernando Guerrero, and in that of the representative for the second district of Manila,
Luciano Cinco. (Journal of Sessions of the Assembly, December 6, 1917, and November 29,
1927, respectively.)
Wherefore, I am of opinion that the motion for reconsideration should be granted on the ground
that the protestee and appellee had the legal residence to become eligible to the office of the
municipal president of the municipality of Luna. With respect the second ground of the motion
for reconsideration, I agree with the majority opinion that a candidate who received second
place in the election cannot be declared elected to said office simply because the one who
received first place turned out to be ineligible.
Footnotes
1 P. 694, post.
VELILLA VS POSADA

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43314 December 19, 1935
A.L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, plaintiff -appellant,
vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee.
Ohnick and Opisso for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instant of manila in an action to recover
from the defendant-appellee as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P77,018.39 as
inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed against the estate of Arthur G.
Moody, deceased.
The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of facts as follows:
I. That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.
II. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, certified copy of
which marked Exhibit AA is hereto attached and made a part hereof, by virtue of which
will, he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and
still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, United States of America.
III. That on February 24,1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator of the
estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, the same being designated as case No. 39113 of said
court. Copy of said petition marked Exhibit BB is hereto attached and made a part
hereof.
IV. That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition will of the deceased Arthur
Graydon Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court in a
decree dated May 5, 1931. Copies of the petition and of the decree marked Exhibits CC
and DD, respectively, are hereto attached and made parts hereof.
V. That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of
the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order issued by the court in said
case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit EE is hereto attached and made a part
hereof; and that during the hearing for the declaration of heirs, Ida M. Palmer presented
as evidence a letter dated February 28, 1925, and addressed to her by Arthur Graydon
Moody, copy of which marked Exhibit FF hereto attached and made part hereof.
VI. That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of
bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are more fully shown in the
inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special administrator with the court in said case
No. 39113, certified copy of which inventory marked Exhibit GG is hereto attached and
made a part hereof. This stipulation does not, however, cover the respective values of
said properties for the purpose of the inheritance tax.
VII. That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of the
late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return, certified copy of which marked
Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a part, hereof.
VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period from
January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, certified copy of which marked Exhibit 11 is hereto
attached and made a part hereof, was also prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.1awphil.net
IX. That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed with the
court its report, certified copy of which marked Exhibit KK is hereto attached and made a
part hereof.
X. That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the
attorney for the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a letter, copy of which marked Exhibit LL is
hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XI. That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the letter of the
Collector of Internal Revenue referred to in the preceding paragraph. Said answer
marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XII. That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for Ida M. Palmer
another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto attached and made a part
hereof.
XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied in a letter,
marked Exhibit OO, hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of
P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019.75 on January 19, 1932,
making assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the
assessment for income tax against said estate.
XV. That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest
made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.
XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing of the
present case.
Manila, August 15, 1933.
In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral and
documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came
to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business in these Islands up to
the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. He had no business elsewhere
and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other
intangibles and personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at
P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at
P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the
Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property of any kind located anywhere
else. In his will, Exhibit AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities of
the Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. Palmer, he
stated:
I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the Philippine
Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and Testament . . ..
The substance of the plaintiff's cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his complaint as
follows:
That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands under
or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected upon
transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person not
domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of
inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, credits and other
intangible properties as aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation
of property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of
the Philippine Islands.
Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as follows:
SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. — Every transmission by virtue of

inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance.
devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands and real rights in
such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands, of any
shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima organized
or constituted in the Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or
rights in any partnership, business or any personal property located in the Philippine
Islands shall be subject to the following tax:
It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a "non-resident
of the Philippine Islands". The answer, besides the general denial, sets up as a special defense
"Arthur G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date of his death, a resident in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was engaged actively in business." Issue was thus joined
on the question: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?
The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any evidence that
Moody's domicile was elsewhere than in Manila at the time of his death based on the
proposition that as no such objection was made before the Collector of Internal Revenue as one
of the grounds of the protest against the payment of the tax, this objection cannot be considered
in a suit against the Collector to recover the taxes paid under protest. He relies upon the
decision in the case of W.C. Tucker vs. A.C. Alexander, Collector (15 Fed. [21, 356). We call
attention, however, to the fact that this decision was reversed in 275 U.S., 232; 72 Law. ed.,
256, and the case remanded for trial on the merits on the ground that the requirement that the
action shall be based upon the same grounds, and only such, as were presented in the protest
had been waived by the collector. In the case before us no copy of the taxpayer's protest is
included in the record and we have no means of knowing its contents. We think, therefore, the
preliminary objection made on behalf of the appellee does not lie.
We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to whether Arthur
G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his death. Moody was
never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal domicile in the Philippine Islands from
1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a fortune from his business in the
Philippine Islands He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to
the date he left Manila the latter part of February, 1928, under the following circumstances: He
was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and been informed by Dr. Wade that he would
be reported to the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required
by the law. Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his promise to
Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part
of February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance
certificate. The record does not show where Moody was during the remainder of the year 1928.
He lived with a friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929
where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. The record does not show
where Moody was in the interval between April, 1929, and November 26, 1930, on which latter
date he wrote a letter, Exhibit B, to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him mis interest in the
Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603
shares. In this letter, among other things, he states: "Certainly I'll never return there to live or
enter business again." In this same letter he says:
I wish to know as soon as now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently decided either to sell
or put in a line of school or office supplies ... before I go to the necessary investments placing
any side lines, I concluded to get your definite reply to this ... I have given our New York buying
agent a conditional order not to be executed until March and this will give you plenty of time ...
anything that kills a business is to have it peddled around as being for sale and this is what I
wish to avoid. He wrote letters dated December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the same
line to Wendt. As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these letters were written,
there can be no doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper
Colony had he returned to the Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice,
but from confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine
Islands.
There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new
domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present for some months
in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had a
domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished
to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there again. Much less
plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in February,
1929. The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to
where in Paris he had any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no
evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own
account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment of a
legal domicile there. The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return
to Manila does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three
months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the
purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The evidence in the record indicates
clearly that Moody's continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to
and reasonably accounted for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious departure,
namely, to evade confinement in the Cullion Leper Colony for he doubtless knew that on his
return he would be immediately confined, because his affliction became graver to us while he
was absent than it was on the day of his precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself
in the Philippines where he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.
Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual
residence". The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual residence" of this
unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where
he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country
he visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the
abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new
domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent
that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a complete
dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign
country.
The contention under the appellant's third assignment of error that the defendant collector
illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody estate is, in our opinion,
untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by the Collector of Internal Revenue in his
letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount of P59,986.69 was received by
the estate of Moody as dividends declared out of surplus by the Camera Supply Company is
clearly established by the evidence. The appellant contends that this assessment in taxation:
First, because the corporation paid income tax on the same amount during the years it was
accumulated as surplus; second, that an inheritance tax on the same amount was assessed
against the estate, and third, the same amount is assessed as income of the estate. As to the
first, it appears from the collector's assessment, Exhibit 11, to the collector allowed the estate a
deduction of the normal income tax on said amount because it had already been paid at the
source by the Camera Supply Company. The only income tax assessed against the estate was
the additional tax or surtax that had not been paid by the Camera Supply Company for which
the estate, having actually received the income, is clearly liable. As to the second alleged
double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the additional income tax in question are
entirely distinct. They are assessed under different statutes and we are not convinced by the
appellant's argument that the estate which received these dividends should not be held liable for
the payment of the income tax thereon because the operation was simply the conversion of the
surplus of the corporation into the property of the individual stockholders. (Cf. U.S. vs.Phellis,
257 U.S., 171, and Taft vs. Bowers, 278 U.S., 460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended,
which is relied on by the appellant, plainly provides that the income from exempt property shall
be included as income subject to tax.
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his
death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and, second, because his legal
domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine Islands. Costs against the
appellant.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GODDARD, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. I think the evidence clearly establishes that Moody had permanently
abandoned his residence in the Philippine Islands. But even so, his estate would be liable for
the takes which the plaintiff-appellant seeks to recover in this action. Section 1536 of the
Revised Administrative Code makes no distinction between the estates of residents and of non-
residents of the Philippine Islands. The case of First National Bank of Boston vs. State of Maine
(284 U.S., 312; 76 Law. ed., 313), relied on by the appellant is not in point because in that case
the estate of the deceased was actually taxed in both the state of his domicile, Massachusettes,
and in the state where the shares of stock had their situs, namely, the State of Maine. But in the
case before us there is no evidence whatever that the estate of Moody had been taxed
anywhere but in the Philippines. (Cf. Burnet. Commissioner, vs. Brooks, 288 U.S., 378.)
UJANO VS REPUBLIC

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22041 May 19, 1966
MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
Tagayuna, Arce and Tabaino for petitioner and appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor F. C. Zaballero and Solicitor
Camilo D. Quiason for oppositor and appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is married to
Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. He left the
Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where after a residence of more than 20
years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. He returned to the Philippines on
November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay. He owns an
agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than
P5,000.00. He receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from the Social Security Administration of
the United States of America. He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce
his allegiance to the U.S.A.1äwphï1.ñët
After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that
petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his petition for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: "One of the qualifications
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have resided in the Philippines at
least six months before he applies for naturalization' [Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63].
This 'residence' requirement in cases of naturalization, has already been interpreted to mean
the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile
(Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state
where he lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary
absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words domicile is characterized
by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor,
either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually present in this country
cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only
temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the
present case, petitioner, who is presently a citizen of the United States of America, was
admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the
filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to
the present. Such being the case, he has not complied with the specific requirement of law
regarding six months residence before filing his present petition."
We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it to be a correct
interpretation [Section 3 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63] which requires that before a person
may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall have resided in the Philippines at least six
months before he applies for naturalization." The word "residence" used therein imports not only
an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic, L-18885, January 31,1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52
Phil. 645). Indeed, that term cannot refer to the presence in this country of a person who has
been admitted only on the strength of a permit for temporary residence. In other words, the term
residence used in said Act should have the same connotation as that used in Commonwealth
Act No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, even if in approving the law permitting the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship our Congress has liberalized its requirement by foregoing
the qualifications and special disqualifications prescribed therein. The only way by which
petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a quota for permanent
residence so that he may come within the purview of the residence requirement of
Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CAASI VS COURT OF APPEALS

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.
Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the
position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local
elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of
the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No.
87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for
the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision
dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition
for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card
holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the
US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He
allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United
States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the
plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional
elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of
Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently
establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the
contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his
intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in
successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic
requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials
(sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no
legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo,
G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign

country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is
incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove
that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be
qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo,
G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel,
respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus,
etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied Miguel's
motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the
regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The
Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the
qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC
has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal
obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of
the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are
appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder
is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his
status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on
January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change
his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines
(B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the
present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign
countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in the Philippines is a
question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which
Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his
departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding
his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,"Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of
Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies
him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the
following information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and

work in the United States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R.
No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United
States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the
intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a
visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S.
Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating
the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose

of permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a
broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the
country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during
the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in
general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person
and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to
remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights
of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident
alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of
life liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person the
equal protection of the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to the
right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien
is entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal
constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he
acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office,
not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country

shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a
candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate
who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the
Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act
or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country.
Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus
Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly
bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal
mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a
candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the
municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of
filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public
office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not
possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he
resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18,
1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their
lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that
those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the
interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must
keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to
preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the
United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a
green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have
this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this
time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if
that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to
benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he
made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January
18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his
election thereto was null and void.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos.
87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The
election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby
annulled. Costs against the said respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
MARCOS VS COMELEC
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to
the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
election." 2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution
— seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House
of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record
94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued
declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing

the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the
same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of
the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995
deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the

COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise
filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of
the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking
her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to

register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of
Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter
stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her
six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC
to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove
respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the
creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the
First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the
judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote
of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and
petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
"Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake"
on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She
averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical"
presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an
accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever
absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum,
she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has
been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although
she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She
asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of
the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she
can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since
she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and
instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest

mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since
on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which
she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City
in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked
was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because
there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in
the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or

misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made,

she cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of
respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the
"inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly
conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment
cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The
change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks
to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit
the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of
manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an
untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical
accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of
candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A,
Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation
of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three
(3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such
limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8,
1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be
persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot

be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as

synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-
Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the
Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan,
Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not
Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First
District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification
where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the
face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time
that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City,
she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator,
she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered
voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro
Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident
of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for
the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan,
Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter
with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation
of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could
not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she
filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places,
including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban
her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several
occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her
school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when
she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile
by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old
domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus
non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as
her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that
she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence.
Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year
prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was
evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First
District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the
First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that
on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that
she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence
in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First
District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing
proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission

RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein
to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should
the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held
May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May
14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes
compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of
Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of
the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation,
petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues
may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying

petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed

exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May
8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in
the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent
to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence.22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons,
he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu
vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to

indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place
of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled
is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this
Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without
the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is:
What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature?
Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others,
"and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think

Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to
go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering
that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence
in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied
the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence
in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears
to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly
make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run
in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was
a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down
in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source
of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,

Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the
first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District
of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995
maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites
certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she
lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter.
Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in
San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of
the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is
where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence
and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the
intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family
in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality,
notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in
question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the
saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be
held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to
his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for
any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be
one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials
who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This
strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by
positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in
election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established
her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school.
She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went
to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his
office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President
Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the
Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of
the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept
her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-
publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the
ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties
to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in
our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of
the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could
not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there
again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and

establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former
domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in
the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as

they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia.
Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion
cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall
transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home
or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place
to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article
110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of
the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife
should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to
conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced
with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference
to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some
difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the
purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used
synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of
a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place;
on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one
place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons,
revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has
given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence
or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under
the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting
to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her
husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the
instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that
court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in
case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the
judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D.
52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland,
where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not
be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the
remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can
still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as
the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of
alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we
can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of
the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was
ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the
City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70)
was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the
Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently
has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is
rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have

affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to
return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to
make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession
and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all
income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which
she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear
that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by
any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place
of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places
of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing
which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that
found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's
rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as
the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home
in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her
"homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified
as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our
discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be
highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of
her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the
subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to
this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI
Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities,
this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined

on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general
public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute

containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered
without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which
may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of
statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of
doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or
some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of
B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction

over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to
either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and
spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual
what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat
the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while
things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other
candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article
VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution
guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal
propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents
were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in
the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her
initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it
was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she
continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law,
and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained why the domicile of the
wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon
the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the
presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the
other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as
it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with this objective,
Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former
President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit
that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of
the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise
of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the
wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior
domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Viña, 6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority

live, with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from
where the latter live, they have their ownindependent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different
domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to
their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right
conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during
her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any
way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the
wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law
and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the
family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the
congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of
law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in
San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her
husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member
of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila
during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil
Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence
shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that
"a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her
husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends." 7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989
of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. 8 He
echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her
husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead
husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the
Philippine setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband
and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from
him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first
reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member
of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 Thepresumption that the wife retains the
domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept
and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It
was under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided
where women were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by
Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d 14 are American state court decisions handed
down between the years 1917 15 and 1938, 16 or before the time when women were accorded
equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-
ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating
laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed
v. Reed, 18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho
law that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate
administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based
distinction. These significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women
virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their
husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris
Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they
observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of
married women and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why
a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law." 19 In publishing
in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law
Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result
of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as
her unmarried sister." 20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to

the anachronistic common law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that
the Court has no choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many
degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of
gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth
Romero, cited a few of them as follows: 21
xxx xxx xxx

Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under
certain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from
others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from
her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only
from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within
the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if
his income is sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social
standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the
discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law
being proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow
absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced
spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts.
However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as
the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds
for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the
respondent in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an
attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts to
attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the
petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three consecutive
years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator

of the conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife
may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the
spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the
husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to
the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership
without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father
whom the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations,
to eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on
August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the
unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities. 22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by
abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the
joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the
system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over
their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the support of the family; 25 the
right to jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of
profession, occupation, business or activity. 27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is
Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the
family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should
live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the
husband and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court
of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband,
thus: 28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in
certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is

dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct

or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she
cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant
quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for
10 years with different women and treated his wife roughly and
without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no

money to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time
insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA,
34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life
as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home

(Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the
wife from the control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of
interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his
rare lectures after retirement: 29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to

emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at
parity with him insofar as the family is concerned.The wife and the husband are
now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of
the family properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties
of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no
longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the
family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as
started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the
anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of
the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by
Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not
free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that
the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm
guarantees of due process and equal protection of
law. 30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her
dead husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a
gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family
solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous
fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it
explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of
women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of
women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and
men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we
insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that
petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the
necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue
after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the
universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also
restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of
the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her
Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban
domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their
domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law
disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common
law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's
domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to
reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her
affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several
requests for my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I
filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the
national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in
Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not
livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did
not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine

Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South
Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of
my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG
to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All

Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and
entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol

Gunigundo for permissions to —
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and

farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the
Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in
his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed
me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,

Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this
Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered properties
in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause
repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in which
event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is
not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all
expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please
extend the necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine
residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and
renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose,
Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG
permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of
Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San
Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within
the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the
First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of
residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner
is nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period
of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's
Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration
Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence
in the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the
First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months
before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting
1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence,
her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private
respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where
she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence
in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this
original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was
corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote
"since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct
a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of
right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC, 34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx

The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the
original certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11,
1959, did not render the certificate invalid.The amendment of the certificate,
although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial
compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March
8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the
disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary
evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of
Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless
contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too
insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people
of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any
public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached
reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal
obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's
representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her,
she averred: 36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant
petition is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended
registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2").
After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District
to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as
petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First District.
He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create
another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District
and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such
bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed
the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to
submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting
Opinion, 37 held:
xxx xxx xxx

Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private
respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow
respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not
lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the
New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively
Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte,
wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the
Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the
Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under
Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on
Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed
"Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on
February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the
Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that
he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried
to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in
Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in
the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court
unanimously promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as

it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District
and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We
also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province
of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein)
was constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is
instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and
Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank
harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to
a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by
torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and
discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light
and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged
by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in
its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ."
Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can
claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None
can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will
of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand
Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the
electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate
this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean
towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the
inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law
precedents on the domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own
culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile
dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of
advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if
the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this
gender-based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has
been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of
Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any
present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in
which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary
purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons
one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose
intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every
individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or
of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of
origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5).
Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for
himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of
the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and
acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus
manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile oranimus non revertendi (Romualdez
v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation
of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual
residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from
marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means
domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval
v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections
misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by ruling that
petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement.
Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and
registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the
rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300).
Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise
petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due
to her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her
husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes
an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with
another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos.
By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is
for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one
another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or
moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife
retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the
latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her
marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair
situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no
longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon
her husband's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private
respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned
Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the
party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of
origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v.
Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. §16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original
or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent
unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that
petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her
domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional
one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991
to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which
sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient
stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she
ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San
Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her
residence certificate 2and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose,
Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in
her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6). 3 It was in the same
month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan,
Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January
28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of
the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never
bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential
election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until
August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that
both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it
indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to
be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification
required by the 1987 Constitution.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was
disqualified from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should,
nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a
straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying
practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its
shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second
Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on
April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on
May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the
results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously
noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously
reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be
suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the
interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on
aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for
election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First
District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year.
Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth.
Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death
certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his
lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer
to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we
shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by theponente and in the other separate
opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the
husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile
remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left
behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the
domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence
or domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to continue giving obeisance to his
wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has
ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin
upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be
endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one
will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then
one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established,
a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as
defined by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered
more murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things,
it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as
dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile
in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of
women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social
rights are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this
century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by
Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures,
mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil
Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as
the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such
role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind,
foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the
residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the
rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a
few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the
purposes specified under the law; 6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. 7 As regards the property pertaining to the
children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence
may the mother assume his powers. 8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on
her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons.
To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title,
except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree. 9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case
the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is
sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious
and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective
prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her
husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11The mother who contracts a
subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased
husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again,
and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their
children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no
protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations
and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines
was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown
by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly
anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the
burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of
rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which
entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the
instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its
Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such
principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with
regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their
residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were
speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its
emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are
the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights" 16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of
discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the
unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now giventhe right jointly to fix the family
domicile; 18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is
the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly; 20 the father and
mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated
common child 21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned,
Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building
Act" 22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts
equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts;
and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports,
secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this
Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and
that "All obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the
family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the
International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware
of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded,
to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them
back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial,
according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows
are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the
same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by
the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically
revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile
of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which
are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her
election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added
together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year
requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.

The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up
ideals and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure
that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its
basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities
of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance.
Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express

statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz,
121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he

is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and

administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2,
Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law ofcandidates to an elective office.
Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction
to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year
residency requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is
basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and
judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a
number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable
by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay)
or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In
election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez
vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . .
Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of
domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain
there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period
of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with
having committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction
of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore
been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate
is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of
votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the
performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of
ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation
is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election,
returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this
case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and
the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of
this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if
for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an election
to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so
much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey.
Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the
disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or
her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is
far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case
of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon
vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was
restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by
the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza
(Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections,
(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified
as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In
effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight
members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion,
Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with
three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.)
One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435)
which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v.Paredes, (23 Phil.
238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with
Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one
reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others
were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast
for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes
were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible,
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to
disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to
be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned
only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in
the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in
the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered
valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a
candidate's qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the
law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no
provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warrantoproceedings
against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned
with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the
incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a
candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial
or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent

authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. (Emphasis added)
§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he

is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis
added)
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
§ 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by

final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon
motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For
Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were
false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration
Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of
Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less
than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of
candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not
qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false
representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of
certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to
declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be
explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being
a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person
from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the
House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of
certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false
representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to
their citizenship, 1 age, 2 or residence. 3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed
upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election
protests 4 or quo warranto proceedings 5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or
protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before electionthe qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified
as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending,
commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins
because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided
that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has
been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in
this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265,
Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still
pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers. 7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are
eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to
be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving
charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No.
7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.
By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's
qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent
about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or
OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of
candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25,
§ 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law
or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by
a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the
Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC
even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but
also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in §§ 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate
or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply
that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473)
That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not
suffer from any of disqualifications provided in § 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited
election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable
practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of
"manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results
of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's
qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a
proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be
prevented from assuming office even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election

protest or action forquo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10
days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice
Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either
with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX,
C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must
be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in the case of
the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not
allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility
in the case of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases
against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-
009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the
eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First
District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995,
May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and
ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the
extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the
disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered
void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr.
Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end
with the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that —
"no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age,
able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been
understood as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the
Court in numerous cases 1where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly
proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside
therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place,coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within
which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less
than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person
only has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year
before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which
case he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year
residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of
congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in
order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be
disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where
he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several
residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as
there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district
most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term
"residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and
actual presence in one district must in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar
with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the
one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not
versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now
assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the
Comelec en banc) —
University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she
went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived
with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with
him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang

Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She
claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped
to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992
respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent
filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for
cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No.
157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31,
1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous
Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in
157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No.
1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident
in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The
pertinent entries therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/

Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot,

Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy.

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION:
________ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR

IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by
my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of
Candidate) 2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive
component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding
that petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district
of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st
district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte,

the next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of
Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for
representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec,
G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early
1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and
it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus
Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for
other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning
of the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its
concern with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even
during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified
candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court
or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a
candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when
evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the
elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted"
and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner
simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the
candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the
disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this
Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It
has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from
among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at
the same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on
the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are
pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have
taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a
time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place
in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her
husband having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with
him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San
Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely
in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty
positions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos
Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of
the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the
Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have
been merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her
certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and
resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in
the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in
order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte."
On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for
Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a
registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila
and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election
Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that
municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had
been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be
elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of

Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8.
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a
new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied
with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference
between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for
purposes of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be
synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in
contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural
laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in
and inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept
of the latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and
domicile by operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have
taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the
"domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition
of a new domicile in a different place. 1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's
domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth,
domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place
of birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party
or domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from
marriage, 3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of
origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law
subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not
only international or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile
of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban
City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila,
thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to
have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her
having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and
his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence
in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed,
against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the
status of domiciles of choice. 5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her
requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever
attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the
abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's
own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of
choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin
(domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner
had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is
therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal
change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections, 7 and
advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic,
1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the
time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no
indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because
of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of
the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile
automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium
necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not
intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the
law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or
putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that
one cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that
petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the
equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in
accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic
reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss
by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her
marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by
the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of
inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he

thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that
chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts
legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new
domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her
candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his
domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be
absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the
fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or
by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason,
the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this
contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice
(unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that,
such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation
of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary andlegal abandonment of a domicile of
origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the
termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired
her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that
during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of
a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife
has the right to elect her own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her
deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence,
to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her
husband and will continue after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles
68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code,
the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive
how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the
domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true
that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that
has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having
gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power
was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy.
Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her
own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of
women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and
statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial
pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's
desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner.
Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there
is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation
but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having
automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the
political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present.
Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her
amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the
election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues
raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the
COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176
SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the
only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the
COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence
of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division
dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond
cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in
the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or
misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that
the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission
or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of
origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in
her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately,
was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a
candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A
holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or
Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her
marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by
operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own
intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising
from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the
Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which
was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a
predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence.
This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For
instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a
profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix
the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for
the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons,
however, the wife may be exempted from living in the residence chosen by the
husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to
follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for
years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different
home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of
law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes
or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and
subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d
Domicile § 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family
domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the
spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term
"family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and
the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on
the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her
husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's
marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is
that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the
last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27).
Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived,
but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his
death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin
but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband
at the time of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan,
Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her
husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal
home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her
sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of
May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also
voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a
widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the
Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of
voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B,"
attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted
this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15
March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration
Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and
her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as
Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte?
In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition),
she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to
return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San
Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration
Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it
nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned
her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of
recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294
[1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original
residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in
business in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the
reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence
to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public
service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or
air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government
institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases
and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of
course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to
consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an
abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should
have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her
affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her
"domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this
domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such
a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the
facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954
conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a
new oneanimo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile,
[1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely
committed an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving
and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To
me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the
affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC,
200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having
admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal
consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion
rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion
is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased
husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the
burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She
miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Separate Opinions
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while
things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other
candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article
VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution
guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal
propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents
were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in
the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her
initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it
was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she
continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law,
and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained why the domicile of the
wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon
the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the
presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the
other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as
it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with this objective,
Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former
President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit
that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of
the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise
of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the
wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior
domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Viña, 6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority

live, with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from
where the latter live, they have their ownindependent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different
domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to
their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right
conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during
her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any
way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the
wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law
and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the
family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the
congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of
law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in
San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her
husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member
of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila
during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil
Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence
shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that
"a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her
husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends." 7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989
of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. 8 He
echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her
husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead
husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the
Philippine setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband
and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from
him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first
reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member
of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 Thepresumption that the wife retains the
domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept
and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It
was under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided
where women were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by
Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d 14 are American state court decisions handed
down between the years 1917 15 and 1938, 16 or before the time when women were accorded
equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-
ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating
laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed
v. Reed, 18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho
law that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate
administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based
distinction. These significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women
virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their
husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris
Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they
observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of
married women and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why
a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law." 19 In publishing
in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law
Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result
of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as
her unmarried sister." 20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to
the anachronistic common law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that
the Court has no choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many
degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of
gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth
Romero, cited a few of them as follows: 21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under
certain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from
others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from
her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only
from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within
the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if
his income is sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social
standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the
discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law
being proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow
absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced
spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts.
However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as
the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds
for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the
respondent in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an
attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts to
attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the
petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three consecutive
years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator

of the conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife
may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the
spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the
husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to
the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership
without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father
whom the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations,
to eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on
August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the
unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities. 22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by
abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the
joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the
system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over
their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the support of the family; 25 the
right to jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of
profession, occupation, business or activity. 27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is
Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the
family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should
live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the
husband and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court
of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband,
thus: 28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in
certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is

dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct

or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she
cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant
quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for
10 years with different women and treated his wife roughly and
without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no

money to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time
insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA,
34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life
as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home

(Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the
wife from the control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of
interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his
rare lectures after retirement: 29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to

emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at
parity with him insofar as the family is concerned.The wife and the husband are
now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of
the family properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties
of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no
longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the
family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as
started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the
anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of
the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by
Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not
free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that
the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm
guarantees of due process and equal protection of
law. 30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her
dead husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a
gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family
solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous
fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it
explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of
women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of
women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and
men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we
insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that
petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the
necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue
after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the
universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also
restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of
the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her
Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban
domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their
domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law
disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common
law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's
domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to
reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her
affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several
requests for my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I
filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the
national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in
Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not
livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did
not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine

Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South
Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of
my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG
to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All

Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and
entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol

Gunigundo for permissions to —
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and

farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the
Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx

42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in
his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed
me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this

Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered properties
in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause
repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in which
event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is
not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all
expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please
extend the necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine
residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and
renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose,
Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG
permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of
Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San
Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within
the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the
First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of
residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner
is nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period
of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's
Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration
Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence
in the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the
First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months
before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting
1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence,
her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private
respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where
she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence
in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this
original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was
corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote
"since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct
a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of
right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC, 34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the
original certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11,
1959, did not render the certificate invalid.The amendment of the certificate,
although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial
compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March
8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the
disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary
evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of
Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless
contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too
insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people
of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any
public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached
reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal
obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's
representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her,
she averred: 36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant
petition is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended
registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2").
After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District
to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as
petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First District.
He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create
another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District
and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such
bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed
the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to
submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting
Opinion, 37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private
respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow
respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not
lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the
New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively
Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte,
wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the
Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the
Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under
Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on
Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed
"Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on
February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the
Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that
he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried
to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in
Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in
the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court
unanimously promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as

it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District
and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We
also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province
of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein)
was constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is
instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and
Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank
harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to
a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by
torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and
discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light
and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged
by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in
its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ."
Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can
claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None
can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will
of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand
Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the
electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate
this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean
towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the
inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law
precedents on the domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own
culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile
dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of
advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if
the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this
gender-based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has
been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of
Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any
present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in
which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary
purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons
one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose
intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every
individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or
of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of
origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5).
Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for
himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of
the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and
acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus
manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile oranimus non revertendi (Romualdez
v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation
of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual
residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from
marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means
domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval
v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections
misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by ruling that
petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement.
Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and
registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the
rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300).
Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise
petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due
to her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her
husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes
an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with
another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos.
By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is
for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one
another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or
moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife
retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the
latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her
marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair
situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no
longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon
her husband's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private
respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned
Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the
party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of
origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v.
Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. §16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original
or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent
unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that
petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her
domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional
one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991
to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which
sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient
stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she
ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San
Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her
residence certificate 2and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose,
Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in
her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6). 3 It was in the same
month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan,
Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January
28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of
the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never
bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential
election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until
August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that
both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it
indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to
be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification
required by the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was
disqualified from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should,
nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a
straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying
practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its
shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second
Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on
April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on
May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the
results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously
noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously
reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be
suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the
interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on
aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for
election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First
District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year.
Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth.
Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death
certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his
lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer
to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we
shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by theponente and in the other separate
opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the
husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile
remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left
behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the
domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence
or domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to continue giving obeisance to his
wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has
ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin
upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be
endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one
will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then
one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established,
a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as
defined by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered
more murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things,
it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as
dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile
in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of
women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social
rights are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this
century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by
Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures,
mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil
Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as
the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such
role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind,
foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the
residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the
rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a
few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the
purposes specified under the law; 6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. 7 As regards the property pertaining to the
children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence
may the mother assume his powers. 8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on
her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons.
To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title,
except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree. 9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case
the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is
sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious
and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective
prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her
husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11The mother who contracts a
subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased
husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again,
and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their
children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no
protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations
and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines
was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown
by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly
anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the
burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of
rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which
entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the
instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its
Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such
principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with
regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their
residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were
speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its
emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are
the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights" 16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of
discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the
unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now giventhe right jointly to fix the family
domicile; 18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is
the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly; 20 the father and
mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated
common child 21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned,
Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building
Act" 22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts
equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts;
and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports,
secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this
Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and
that "All obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the
family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the
International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware
of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded,
to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them
back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial,
according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows
are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the
same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by
the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically
revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile
of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which
are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her
election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added
together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year
requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up
ideals and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure
that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its
basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities
of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance.
Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express

statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz,
121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he

is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and

administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2,
Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law ofcandidates to an elective office.
Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction
to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year
residency requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is
basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and
judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a
number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable
by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay)
or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In
election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez
vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . .
Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of
domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain
there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period
of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with
having committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction
of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore
been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate
is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of
votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the
performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of
ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation
is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election,
returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this
case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646

xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and
the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of
this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if
for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an election
to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so
much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey.
Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the
disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or
her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is
far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case
of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon
vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was
restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by
the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza
(Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections,
(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified
as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In
effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight
members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion,
Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with
three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.)
One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435)
which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v.Paredes, (23 Phil.
238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with
Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one
reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others
were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to
disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to
be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned
only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in
the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in
the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered
valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a
candidate's qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the
law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no
provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warrantoproceedings
against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned
with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the
incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a
candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial
or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent

authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. (Emphasis added)
§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he

is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis
added)
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
§ 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by

final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon
motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For
Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were
false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration
Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of
Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less
than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of
candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not
qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false
representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of
certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to
declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be
explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being
a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person
from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the
House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of
certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false
representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to
their citizenship, 1 age, 2 or residence. 3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed
upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election
protests 4 or quo warranto proceedings 5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or
protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before electionthe qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified
as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending,
commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins
because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided
that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has
been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in
this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265,
Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still
pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers. 7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are
eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to
be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving
charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No.
7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.
By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's
qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent
about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or
OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of
candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25,
§ 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law
or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by
a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the
Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC
even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but
also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in §§ 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate
or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply
that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473)
That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not
suffer from any of disqualifications provided in § 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited
election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable
practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of
"manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results
of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's
qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a
proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be
prevented from assuming office even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election

protest or action forquo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10
days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice
Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either
with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX,
C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must
be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in the case of
the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not
allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility
in the case of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases
against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-
009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the
eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First
District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995,
May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and
ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the
extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the
disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered
void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr.
Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end
with the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that —
"no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age,
able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been
understood as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the
Court in numerous cases 1where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly
proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside
therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place,coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within
which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less
than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person
only has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year
before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which
case he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year
residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of
congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in
order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be
disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where
he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several
residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as
there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district
most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term
"residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and
actual presence in one district must in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar
with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the
one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not
versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now
assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the
Comelec en banc) —
University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she
went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived
with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with
him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang

Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She
claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped
to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992
respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent
filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for
cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No.
157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31,
1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous
Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in
157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No.
1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident
in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The
pertinent entries therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/

Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy.

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY

WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION:
________ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR

IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by
my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of
Candidate) 2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive
component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding
that petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district
of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence
in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte,

the next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of
Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for
representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec,
G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early
1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and
it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus
Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for
other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning
of the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its
concern with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even
during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified
candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court
or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a
candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when
evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the
elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted"
and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner
simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the
candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the
disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this
Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It
has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from
among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at
the same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on
the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are
pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have
taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a
time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place
in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her
husband having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with
him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San
Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely
in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty
positions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos
Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of
the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the
Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have
been merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her
certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and
resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in
the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in
order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte."
On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for
Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a
registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila
and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election
Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that
municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had
been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be
elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of

Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8.
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a
new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied
with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference
between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for
purposes of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be
synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in
contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural
laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in
and inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept
of the latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and
domicile by operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have
taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the
"domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition
of a new domicile in a different place. 1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's
domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth,
domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place
of birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party
or domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from
marriage, 3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of
origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law
subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not
only international or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile
of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban
City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila,
thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to
have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her
having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and
his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence
in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed,
against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the
status of domiciles of choice. 5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her
requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever
attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the
abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's
own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of
choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin
(domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner
had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is
therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal
change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections, 7 and
advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic,
1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the
time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no
indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because
of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of
the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile
automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium
necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not
intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the
law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or
putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that
one cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that
petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the
equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in
accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic
reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss
by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her
marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by
the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of
inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he

thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that
chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts
legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new
domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her
candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his
domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be
absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the
fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or
by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason,
the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this
contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice
(unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that,
such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation
of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary andlegal abandonment of a domicile of
origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the
termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired
her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that
during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of
a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife
has the right to elect her own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her
deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence,
to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her
husband and will continue after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles
68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code,
the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive
how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the
domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true
that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that
has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having
gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power
was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy.
Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her
own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of
women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and
statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial
pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's
desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner.
Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there
is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation
but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having
automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the
political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present.
Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her
amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the
election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues
raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the
COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176
SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the
only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the
COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence
of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division
dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond
cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in
the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or
misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that
the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission
or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of
origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in
her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately,
was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a
candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A
holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or
Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her
marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by
operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own
intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising
from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the
Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which
was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a
predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence.
This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For
instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a
profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix
the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for
the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons,
however, the wife may be exempted from living in the residence chosen by the
husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to
follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for
years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different
home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of
law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes
or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and
subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d
Domicile § 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family
domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the
spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term
"family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and
the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on
the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her
husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's
marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is
that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the
last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27).
Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived,
but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his
death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin
but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband
at the time of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan,
Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her
husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal
home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her
sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of
May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also
voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a
widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the
Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of
voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B,"
attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted
this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15
March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration
Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and
her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as
Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte?
In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition),
she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to
return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San
Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration
Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it
nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned
her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of
recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294
[1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original
residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in
business in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the
reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence
to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public
service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or
air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government
institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases
and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of
course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to
consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an
abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should
have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her
affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her
"domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this
domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such
a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the
facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954
conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a
new oneanimo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile,
[1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely
committed an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving
and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To
me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the
affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC,
200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having
admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal
consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion
rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion
is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased
husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the
burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She
miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Footnotes
1 Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1881).
2 CONST, art. VI, states:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write,
and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1.
3 Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941).
4 Rollo, p. 114, Annex "D".
5 Rollo, p. 110, Annex "D".
6 Rollo, p. 113.
7 Rollo, p. 111.
8 Rollo, p. 115, Annex "E".
9 Signed by Virgilo S. Oledan, Provincial Election Supervisor IV,

Leyte; Rollo,
p. 116, Annex "F".
10 Rollo, p. 117, Annex "G". Petitioner explained the circumstances

surrounding the filling up of the original certificate thus:
1. On March 8, 1995, I filed my certificate of candidacy for Member of the

House of Representatives (Congresswoman) of the First Legislative
District of the province of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filomeno A.
Zeta.
2. I learned lately that Congressman Cirilo Montejo wants to disqualify me

as I allegedly lack residence in the constituency because of the entry of
the word "SEVEN" in Item No. 8 of my certificate of candidacy.
3. I read my certificate of candidacy before signing it and thought of the

word "RESIDENCE" to mean actual or physical residence, and the word
"SEVEN" merely reflected my actual and physical residence in Barangay
3.1. The word "SEVEN" was placed on my certificate of candidacy to

indicate that at lease one (1) month had passed from my registration as
voter of Tolosa, Leyte, on January 28, 1995, when I wrote "06" months
under "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE" as my actual or physical residence in
the town.
4. I thought then that the sense in Item No. 10 of my certificate of

candidacy stating "THAT I AM eligible for said Office" was sufficient to
affirm that I possess all the qualifications, including my residence, for
Member of the House of Representatives for which I am aspiring in the
May 8, 1995 elections.
5. The fact, however, is that my domicile or residence of origin is

Tacloban City, a component city of the First Legislative District of Leyte I
never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which I
always intended to return whenever absent; indeed in 1992, I returned to
Tacloban City to live and stay there. On November 5, 1992; I bought my
Residence Certificate No. 15226186L there, which is made an integral
part hereof as Annex "I" (Annex "2" hereof).
11 Id., at p. 120. See also, Rollo, p. 130-133, Annex "I", petitioner's

Affidavit explaining her residence:
13. I established my domicile, however in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City

in 1938, when was little over eight (8) years old. Shortly after my mother
died on April 7, 1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez,
brought me and my brothers. . .and my sisters to Tacloban, Leyte (now
Tacloban City) his hometown.
xxx xxx xxx
18. I have always considered Tacloban City as my permanent residence

or residence of origin have not abandoned and have never intended to
abandon my permanent residence or residence of origin there. To it I
always intend to return whenever absent.
19. In 1952, I went to Manila to work with my cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
20. In May, 1954, I married President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was

still the congressman of Ilocos, Norte.
21. As a dutiful wife who loved him deeply, I lived with him in Batac,
Ilocos Norte and registered as a voter there.
22. In 1965, my husband was elected President of the Republic of the

Philippines. Together, we lived in Malacañang Palace and I registered as
a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
23. My registration as voter in Batac, Ilocos Norte; San Juan, Rizal (now
San Juan, Metro Manila); and San Miguel, Manila, was for convenience
because I had to live with my husband to serve him when he was
congressman, Senator and President of the Republic of the Philippines.
During those years however, I never intended nor desired to abandon my
domicile or residence of origin in Tacloban City, which I established since
I was a child.
xxx xxx xxx

33. Throughout the Marcos Presidency, I spent most of my birthday
anniversaries and attended the Sto. Nini Fiesta in Tacloban City. I
regularly visited my domicile or residence of origin in Leyte and even held
important functions and entertained guests and foreign dignitaries there.
34. After President Ferdinand E. Marcos and I, together with our children
and innocent grandchildren were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii, in February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequestered by the
PCGG, and were destroyed and cannibalized.
xxx xxx xxx
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside
in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte even if my residences there
were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The
PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
xxx xxx xxx
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the
residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my
negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in
Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
12 Rollo, p. 122.
13 Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores

formed the majority opinion. Commissioner Remedies A. Salazar-
Fernando dissented.
14 Rollo, p. 64.
15 Rollo, p. 57-64.
16 Petitioner filed a "Motion to Recall Resolution Promulgated on April 24,

1995 and to Dismiss the Petition Because of Lapse of Jurisdiction;
Alternatively, Motion for Reconsideration." The Commission's May 7,
1995 Resolution treated the same simply as a Motion for
Reconsideration.
17 Commissioners Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-

Fernando and Julio F. Desamito dissented. All filed separate dissenting
opinions. In disqualifying petitioner, the majority held:
As it stands now, only the Certificate of Candidacy respondent filed on

March 8, 1995, stands, and on the basis of the entries therein, she is
disqualified to run for failure to meet the constitutional requirement of one
(1) year of residence in the place where she wanted to be elected.
18 Rollo, p. 78, Annex "B".
19 Rollo, Annex "D".
20 19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100 Phil. 221 (1956).
21 Id. at 969.
22 Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954).
23 Id.
24 52 Phil. 645 (1928).
25 Citing People v. Bender 144 N.Y.S., 145.
26 61 Phil. 36 (1934).
27 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
28 Id, see also Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 (1966); Nuval v.

Guray, supra
note 22.
29 II RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 110

(July 22, 1986).
30 Id.
31 199 SCRA 692 (1991).
32 Id, at 714.
33 61 Phil. 36 (1934).
34 96 Phil. 294, 299-300 (1954).
35 B.P. 881, sec. 117 states:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or

country solely by reason of his occupation; profession; employment in
private or public service; educational activities; work in military or naval
reservations; service in the army, navy or air force; the constabulary or
national police force; or confinement or detention in government
institutions in accordance with law shall not be deemed to have lost his
original residence.
36 Rollo, p. 38.
37 18 Am Jur 219-220.
38 20 Am Jur 71.
39 TOLENTINO 1 COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE

CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987).
40 Id.
41 TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON CIVIL

CODE, 220 (1987).
42 Under modern laws, it is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the
domicile of the wife is determined by that of her husband must obtain.
Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from
that of her husband where the theoretical unity of the husband and wife is
dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the
husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of
the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of
the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of
the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the
benefit of the husband's domicile. 9 R.C.L., 545, cited in De La
Vina, supra. If the law allows the wife to automatically revert to her
original domicile or acquire a new domicile under these situations, all the
more should it sanction a reversion — or the acquisition of a new domicile
by the wife — upon the death of her husband.
43 41 Phi. 13 (1920).
44 The rule that the wife automatically acquires or follows her husband's
domicile is not an absolute one. A specific situation recognized in Spanish
jurisprudence involves the one in which husband acquiesces (1 Manresa
223) or gives his tacit consent (Scaevola, Civil Code; 354.)
45 42 Phil. 54 (1921).
46 Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy recognizes the same Civil Code distinction.

However, taking another approach, she writes:
(6) The above Article (Article 69, FC) uses the term "family domicile"
instead of family residence because the spouses may have multiple
residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences,
which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its
corresponding benefits. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 102 (1988).
47 Rollo, pp. 132-133.

48 The provision reads: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election.
49 Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983).
50 American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac.
742; Heillen v. Phillipps, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69
Mo. App. 39; State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585.
51 Supra, note 39, citing Huffines v. Gold 154 Tenn. 583, 588; 288 S.W.
353, 354.
52 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has

been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7 Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate Candidacy.

The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
53 CONST., art. VI, sec. 11 states:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral

Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all questions relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . .
1 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, bk., v. 3, 1131 (a) (W. Ross translation,

1925 ed).
2 It provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read
and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election."
(Emphasis supplied)
3 There are two (2) other instances when a married woman may have a
domicile different from the husband: (1) if they are legally separated
pursuant to par. 1, Art. 106 of the Civil Code, and (2) if the husband
forcibly ejects the wife from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with
another. (De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano, 41 Phil. 13 [1920]).
4 Op cit.
5 Id., at pp. 16-17.
6 Id., at p. 20, citing 1 Manresa 223.
7 25 AM JUR 2nd S. 48, p. 37.
8 28 CJS on Domicile, S. 12, 27; 25 AM JUR 2nd on Domicile S. 62, 46.
9 28 CJS, S. 12, p. 24.
10 Restatement of the Law, 2d, Conflict of Laws 2d., S. 21, p. 84.
11 Ibid.
12 83 U.S. 442; 21 Law Ed. 442; S.C. 16 Wall 130.
13 Supra.
14 Supra.
15 In re Green's Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800, 165 N.Y.S. 1063,
99 Misc. 582.
16 Clark et al. v. Baker et al., 196 SE 750, 186 Ga 65.
17 Lefcourt, Women and The Law, 1990 ed.
18 404 US 71.
19 28 CJS S. 12, p. 25 citing Shute v. Sargent, 36 A 282, 67 N.H. 305.
20 Op cit., p. 84.
21 Women's Status in Philippine Society, UP Law Center, 1979, pp. 4-6.
22 In submitting the draft of the Family Code to President Corazon

Aquino, the Civil Code Revision Committee stated:
Close to forty years of experience under the Civil Code adopted in 1949
and changes and developments in all aspects of Filipino Life since then
have revealed the unsuitability of certain provisions of that Code,
implanted from foreign sources, to Philippine culture; the unfairness,
unjustness, and gaps or inadequacies of others; and the need to attune
them to contemporary developments and trends.
In particular — to cite only a few instances — (1) the property regime of

conjugal partnership of gains is not in accord with Filipino custom,
especially in the rural areas, which is more congenial to absolute
community of property; (2) there have considerably been more grounds
for annulment of marriage by the Church than those provided by the
Code, thus giving rise to the absurd situation of several marriages already
annulled under Canon Law but still considered subsisting under the Civil
Law and making it necessary to make the grounds for annulment under
both laws to coincide; (3) unequal treatment of husband and wife as to
rights and responsibilities, which necessitates a response to the long-
standing clamor for equality between men and women now mandated as
a policy to be implemented under the New Constitution; (4) the
inadequacy of the safeguards for strengthening marriage and the family
as basic social institutions recognized as such by the New Constitution;
(5) recent developments have shown the absurdity of limiting the grounds
for legal separation to the antiquated two grounds provided under the
Civil Code; (6) the need for additional safeguards to protect our children
in the matter of adoption by foreigners; and (7) to bring our law on
paternity and filiation in step with or abreast of the latest scientific
discoveries." (Emphasis supplied)
23 Article 96, Family Code.
28 Op cit., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 98-99.
29 As cited in Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp.

184-185.
30 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: "No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
31 Exhibit "E"; see also Exhibit "B" in SPA No. 95-001.
32 Exhibit "A" in SPA No. 95-009.

33 Exhibit "2" in SPA No. 95-009.
34 2 SCRA 957, 960 (1961); See Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607
(1960); Gabaldon v. COMELEC, 99 Phil. 898 (1956).
35 Section 26, Article II of the Constitution also provides: "The State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service . . . ."
36 Annex "G," Petition.
37 Petition, Annex "B-1" pp. 6-7.
38 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1951).
1 See Articles 68-73 of E.O. 209, as amended, otherwise known as The

Family Code of the Philippines.
2 Residence Certificate No. 15226186L, dated Nov. 5, 1992.
3 PCGG Chairman Gunigundo's letter addressed to Col. Kempis.
1 Art. VI, Sec. 6, Const.: "No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election."
2 Art. 110: "The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
3 Art. 110, Civil Code.

13 Art. II, Sec. 2, Const.
14 Part IV, Art. 15, Paragraph 4, CEDAW.
15 Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive

Order No. 227, July 17,1987, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
16 Art. II Sec. 11, Const.
17 Art. II, Sec. 14, Const.
18 Art. 69, Family Code.
22 Republic Act No. 7192 approved February 12, 1992.
23 Ibid., Sec. 5.
1 Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992) (for mayor).
2 Loong v. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760 (1992) (for regional vice

governor).
3 Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Abella v. COMELEC, 201

SCRA 253 (1991) (for provincial governor).
4 Co. v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991) (election protest against a

Congressman).
5 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) (quo warranto against a

governor); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941) (quo warranto against a
mayor); Larena v. Teves, 61 Phil. 36 (1934) (quo warranto against a
provincial board member); Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 (1932) (quo
warranto against a governor): Yra v. Abaño, 52 Phil. 380 (1928) (quo
warranto against a municipal president); Vivero v. Murillo, 52 Phil. 694
(1929) (quo warranto against a municipal president). Cf. Aznar v.
COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990) (quo warranto although prematurely
filed, against a governor-elect).
6 R.A. No. 6646, § 6; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 1.
7 OEC, § 76.
8 Lagumbay v. COMELEC, 16 SCRA 175 (1966).
1 Nuval vs. Guray, G.R. No. 30241, December 29, 1928; Larena vs.
Teves, G.R.
No. 42439, December 10, 1934; Gallego vs. Verra, G.R. No. 48641,
November 24, 1941; De los Reyes vs. Solidum, G.R. No. 42798. August
31, 1935; but see Romualdez vs. RTC, Br. 7 Tacloban City, where a
sudden departure from the country was not deemed "voluntary" so as to
constitute abandonment of domicile both in fact and in law.
2 Annex "A" Petition, pp. 2-4.
1 Struble vs. Struble, Tex. Civ. App., 177 S.W. 2d, 279, 283.
2 This is also referred to as natural domicile or domicile by birth (Johnson

vs. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed. Cas. 863).
3 Story, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 46; Railroad Co. vs. Kimbrough, 115 Ky
512, 74 S.W. 229; and Johnson vs. Harvey, 261 Ky. 522, 88 S.W. 2d 42,
46, 47, as cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.
4 Article 110, Civil Code.
5 Towson vs. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48, 52; Fisher vs. Jordan,
C.C.A. Tex., 116 F. 2d. 183, 186; Minick vs. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So.
483, 488; Hartzler vs. Radeka, 265 Mich. 451, 251 N.W. 554.
6 Citing 18 Am. Jur. 219-220.
7 Montejo vs. Marcos, En Banc, May 10, 1995.
8 Citing 20 Am. Jur. 71.
9 Cheely vs. Clayton, D.C., 110 U.S. 701, L. Ed. 298.
10 In re Gates' Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800 — In re Green's

Estate, 164 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582, affirmed 165 N.Y.S. 1088, 179
App. Div. 890, as reported in 28 C.J.S. 27.
11 Clark vs. Baker, 196 S.E. 750, 186 Ga. 65, op. cit. 37.

PRIL - Cases in The Syllabus - Part Three I - Personal Law To Domicile

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

PRIL - Cases in The Syllabus - Part Three I - Personal Law To Domicile

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Part Three – Choice of Law

I. Personal Law: Lex Patriae and Lex Domicilii

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-16517 November 29, 1961

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF GERARDO YU, alias MONGMONG, TO BE

Isidro R. Redulla for petitioner-appellant.

Q — In your marriage application?

The judge, therefore, denied the petition in the following language:

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-16922 April 30, 1963

IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE,

Leonardo F. Lansangan for petitioners-appellees.

"The following cannot adopt:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Non-resident aliens;".

xxx xxx xxx

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Section 3. Discretion of Commission.  In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or

We shall discuss these issues jointly.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the Department

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

II. Nationality (Lex Patriae)

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-21664 March 28, 1969

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION Petitioners,

G.R. No. L-21665 March 28, 1969

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION Petitioners,

MAKALINTAL, J.: virtual law library

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner Chan Po Lan is hereby declared a Filipino

Republic of the Philippines

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor and appellant.

The judgment appealed from, dated December 18, 1964, reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition, and declaring

Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude', so that a blackmailer, or a

Similarly the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in

2. We next go to the mechanics of implementation of the constitutional and legal provisions, as

We go to the merits of the petition.

MOY YA LIM VS COMMISSIONER

Republic of the Philippines