Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
A.C. No. 7472               March 30, 2010
LIGAYA MANIAGO, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated
April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the
practice of law despite having been suspended by the
Court.
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against
Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 699-2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De
Dios, with office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo
City. Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty.
De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the
Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited
from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that
there is a civil case (Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and
another case (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against
Miyata before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134, where
Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel. Complainant
averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the
practice of law for her flagrant violation and deliberate
disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were
cases filed against her client, Miyata. She, however, denied
that she was under suspension when she appeared as his
counsel in the cases.
Respondent explained that an administrative case was
indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as
A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-
month suspension. She served the suspension immediately
upon receipt of the Court’s Resolution on May 16, 2001 up
to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October
19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001,
which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her
capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo
City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007,
ordering respondent to desist from practicing law and
revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007 and
2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable,
respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due
deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a
Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court on account
of Judge Farrales’ letters to all courts in Olongapo City and
to some municipalities in Zambales, which "gave the
impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume
her practice of law and that her notarial commission for the
years 2007 and 2008 is revoked." Acting on the said
motion, the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in
this wise:
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De
Dios) – Respondent’s Urgent Motion for Clarification dated
14 March 2007 praying that the Court declare her to have
served her six (6) months (sic) suspension and her
resumption of law practice on 17 November 2001 onwards
as proper is NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves
to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her six
(6) month suspension and her recommencement of law
practice on 17 November 2001 as PROPER pursuant to the
Resolution dated 30 January 2002.
Respondent averred that for the period stated in the
affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which she
allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in
any way prohibited from practice. The complaint, she
added, was baseless and malicious, and should be
dismissed outright.
In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court
referred the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
for evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the
OBC directed the complainant to file a supplemental
affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of
Atty. De Dios and the particular courts where respondent
appeared as counsel in the following cases: (1) Criminal
Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3)
Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.
In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a
Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which reads:
2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay
[nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de
Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach ang
Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial
Court[,] Olongapo City.
3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay
[nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios
noong October 10, 2005, nakasaad din ito sa
Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-
6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong
September 26, 2005 at hanggang ngayon ay
pending pa sa Court of Appeals.
4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang
Certified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the Session
ng Subic Municipal Trial Court na kung saan ay
nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case No.
042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus-
Simeon Pullido noong December 14, 2001.
5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment
ni Atty. de Dios, x x x -
5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios
noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan
vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-
2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1)
araw pa lamang mula magsimula ang kanyang
suspension noon[g] May 16, 2001.
5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong
May 18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma.
Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo
Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay
dalawang (2) araw mula magsimula ang
suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a)
affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista noong
May 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit executed by Jessica
Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at (c) isang
Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on
May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na ito ay
ginawa noong nagsimula na ang suspension ni
Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito
bilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa aking
personal na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong
hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty. de
Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma.
Cristina B. Layusa na may petsang 12 February
2007 at sa admission ni Atty. de Dios na
nagsimula ang kanyang suspension noong May
16, 2001.
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by
respondent, stating that there were no new matters raised
in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that "the
opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as
contained in her letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot
supersede the Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this
Honorable Court." According to her, the resolution should
be the "final nail to the coffin of this case."
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its
Memorandum for the Court’s consideration.
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by
complainant in her affidavit was the OBC’s reply to an
inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator
regarding the status of Atty. De Dios.1 Therein, the OBC
made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not
automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K.
Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and
Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v.
Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al.
and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto,
et al., which states:
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until
he would have satisfactorily shown his compliance with the
Court’s resolution is a caveat that his suspension could
thereby extend for more than six months. The lifting of a
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the
period stated in the Court’s decision, and an order from the
Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is
necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of
his profession.2
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first
present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting
certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from
the practice of law during the period of suspension.
Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a
favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a
resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him
to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was
unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No.
4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice
of law without submitting the required certifications and
passing through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid
confusion and conflicting directives from the Court, the
OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy
on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law.1avvphi1
The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the
OBC.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right
but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. 3Whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme
Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that
privilege.4 However, as much as the Court will not hesitate
to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time,
also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the
freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED
that the following guidelines be observed in the matter of
the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice
of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be
suspended from the practice of law, the Court
shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the
decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to
file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision
final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of
suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of
the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she
has desisted from the practice of law and has not
appeared in any court during the period of his or
her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be
furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to
the Executive Judge of the courts where
respondent has pending cases handled by him or
her, and/or where he or she has appeared as
counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as
proof of respondent’s compliance with the order
of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the
statements made by the lawyer under oath shall
be a ground for the imposition of a more severe
punishment, or disbarment, as may be
warranted.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency
of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case
No. MDD-1) 
R E S O L U T I O N 
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
 
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines. 
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency
of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.  the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President
Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
reads:  cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative
.... Should the delinquency further
continue until the following June 29,
the Board shall promptly inquire into
the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action
it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
shall be sent by registered mail to the
member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned. 
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating
his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. 
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President
and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.  Case No. 526 and the authoritative
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976.
After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The
matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.  Governors shall determine with the
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's
pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par.
2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove
cited).  personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend
to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2
Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is
found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:  Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of
dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys. 
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in
the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:  "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition
SECTION 1.  Organization. — There is
hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the 'Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all
persons whose names now appear or
may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.  ...
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the
following words of the Court Rule: 
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every
member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of
approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition
to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be
a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of
legal force and effect. 
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable
nature pertaining to an administrative body." 
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the
Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are
made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions
of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the
exercise of the legal profession. 
The matters here complained of are the very same issues
raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was 
fully convinced, after a
thoroughgoing conscientious study of
all the arguments adduced in Adm.
materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
the Commission on Bar Integration,
that the integration of the Philippine
Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable'. ...  of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).  practice of law and the integration of
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the
Court.  6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which
every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of
the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of
which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility
breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated
by overriding considerations of public interest and public
welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and
legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes
upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all
legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of
the police power over an important profession. The practice
of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the
court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. (5) Promulgate rules concerning
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a pleading, practice, and pro. procedure
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise in all courts, and the admission to the
the Bar ..., 
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: 
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under
such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of
SECTION 1. Within two years from the
the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal
approval of this Act, the Supreme
is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
Court may adopt rules of Court to
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
effect the integration of the Philippine
discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence,
Bar under such conditions as it shall
the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining
see fit in order to raise the standards of
the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
the legal profession, improve the
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
administration of justice, and enable
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a
the Bar to discharge its public
body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated
responsibility more effectively. 
May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire
to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.  Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even
without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in
31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To
practice of law. 
this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
prevail over authority because then society win fall into profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.  conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent
of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
But the most compelling argument sustaining the
submit himself to such reasonable interference and
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise
interest in his concerns. 
power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of
the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: 
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must
already fall. 
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have
the following powers: 
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we
now concisely deal with them seriatim. 
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the
Court is without power to compel him to become a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of
the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he
is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the
provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution
that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which
power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay
a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration. 11
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.
the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of ..." 
property without due process and hence infringes on one of
his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ...
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police
and the admission to the practice of law and the integration
power of the State, and under the necessary powers
of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this
legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court. 
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of
its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12 Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
illegal. 
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not
a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.  should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is
hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its
Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of G.R. No. L-12426             February 16, 1959
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, 
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions
vs.
and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the
legion. 14
Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment
Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon MONTEMAYOR, J.:
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is
inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the
Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio
argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
Office.
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no
less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task
to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a examination for the purpose of determining who are
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
honorable profession and to protect the public from Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover
overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent
Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's
Association that one who has passed the bar examinations
and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to
practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring
members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and
pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a
condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before
said office, such as representing applicants in the
preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in
excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor
General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases
"does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of
actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be
handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who
pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent
Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent
Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring
further condition or qualification from those who would wish
to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in
the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of
scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by
the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165,
otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines,
which similar to the United States Patent Law, in
accordance with which the United States Patent Office has
also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of
the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner
of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to
who practice before the United States Patent Office, the
respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the
past, would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations the passing of which was imposed as a
required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to
our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the
Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members
of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put
in issue. And we have given it careful thought and
consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional
power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in
good standing may practice law anywhere and before any
entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in
the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether
or not appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc.,
constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation
services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists
in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice
by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953
ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.
I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions
thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
In the first place, although the transaction of business in the
Patent Office involves the use and application of technical
and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such
business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent
Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in
accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the
Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of
facts to be established in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our
Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be
patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to
public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention
shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or
used by others in the Philippines before the invention
thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in
the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been
in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one
year before the application for the patent therefor. Section
10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and
actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a
patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation
of a patent; that although any person may apply for such
cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is
authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent.
Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for
cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of
hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the
Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is
warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the
expiration of three years from the day the patent was
granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if
the patented invention is not being worked in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or
if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is
not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms,
or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license
on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached
by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented
article or working of the patented process or machine of
production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in
the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention
relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health
or public safety. All these things involve the applications of
laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for
legal knowledge, training and experience for which a
member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and
many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director
involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct
evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No.
165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the
registration of a design, any party to a proceeding
to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory
license, and any party to any other proceeding in
the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from
any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the
transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts,
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a
court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists,
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.  that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of
the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the
Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding
patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions.
Patents are public records, and it is the duty of
the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to
any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40
Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original
initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting
and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to
decide whether the patent is new and whether it
is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in
awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial
function. In passing on an application the
commissioner should decide not only questions
of law, but also questions of fact, as whether
there has been a prior public use or sale of the
article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis
supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a
member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent
Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of
course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or
necessary, may require that members of the bar practising
before him enlist the assistance of technical men and
scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such
as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or
machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a
lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of
land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan
and technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly
authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice
or to do business before him to submit an examination,
even if they are already members of the bar. He contends
after the United States Patent Law; and of the United
States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an
examination similar to that which he (respondent) has
prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the
following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A
register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the
names of all persons recognized as entitled to
represent applicants before the Patent Office in
the preparation and prosecution of applicants for
patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the
provisions of these rules shall only entitle the
person registered to practice before the Patent
Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in
good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any
State or Territory of the United States who fulfills
the requirements and complied with the
provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his
name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx     xxx     xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will
be admitted to practice and register unless he
shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in
writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to
the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of
good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and
technical qualifications necessary to enable him
to render applicants for patent valuable service,
and is otherwise competent to advise and assist
him in the presentation and prosecution of their
application before the Patent Office. In order that
the Commissioner may determine whether a
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
person seeking to have his name placed upon
either of the registers has the qualifications
specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
character and repute, and of sufficient basic
training in scientific and technical matters must
be submitted and an examination which is held
from time to time must be taken and passed. The
taking of an examination may be waived in the
case of any person who has served for three
years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of
Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases
is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which
reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing
the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other
parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of
good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to
enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to
competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other
business before the Office. The Commissioner of
Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or
in any particular case from further practice before
his office any person, agent or attorney shown to
be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross
misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the
said rules and regulations, or who shall, with
intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead,
or threaten any applicant or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective business before the
office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising.
The reasons for any such suspension or
exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of
the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
petition of the person so refused recognition or so 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth
suspended by the district court of the United Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of
States for the District of Columbia under such Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal
conditions and upon such proceedings as the Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations
said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code.
supplied) We understand that rules and regulations have been
promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and
Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic
Government, to govern the transaction of business in and
Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just
to enforce the law for said bureaus.
reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and
regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice
before him should submit to and pass an examination. We Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an
reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for express and clear provision of law giving the necessary
purposes of comparison: sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to
practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director
reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal
subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
area are more or less complicated, such as the
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation,
different from the provisions of the United States Patent etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also
Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall
Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the first pass an examination to qualify.
Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that
they possess the necessary qualifications and competence
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members
to render valuable service to and advise and assist their
of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice
clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of
law, and in good standing, may practice their profession
a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our
before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the
Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point.
business in said office involves the interpretation and
Our attention has not been called to any express provision
determination of the scope and application of the Patent
of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the
Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation
qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the
of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the
Patent Office.
functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial,
so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are,
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make
regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is
secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his
granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited
branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws
from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to
relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau.
an examination or tests and pass the same before being
Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and
permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the
No costs.
Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of
the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations
necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
G.R. No. 155224 August 23, 2006
VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS
AMBROSIO and ATTY. EMMANUEL
MARIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition for review is the April 30, 2002
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68080
which modified the order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, Branch 151, in JDRC Case No. 2568
entitled Ma. Aurora D. Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.
The facts follow.
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner Vinson
Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as
JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by
respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio
and Emmanuel Mariano. 
During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a
settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights over
their minor child and the separation of their properties. The
proposal was accepted by petitioner and both parties
subsequently filed a motion for approval of their agreement.
This was approved by the trial court. On November 25,
1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda
was declared null and void. 
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were
well-compensated.3 They, including their relatives and
friends, even availed of free products and treatments from
petitioner’s dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they
billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5
million4 which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead,
petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12
million5 as "full payment for settlement."6
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court 7 a counsel without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids
motion  unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself. 
for payment of lawyers’ fees for P50 million.8 Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with
clients concerning their compensation and to resort to
On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to
judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty.
Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed
Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano. 
only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.11
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as
In the case at bar, respondents’ motion for payment of their
follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to Atty.
lawyers’ fees was not meant to collect what was justly due
Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for
them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and
The issues raised in this petition are:
perks already given to them was an act of unconscionable
greed which is shocking to this Court.
(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction
over the claim for additional legal fees and
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are
members of an honorable profession, the primary vision of
(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal which is justice. It is respondents’ despicable behavior
fees. which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some
people. The vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala.
The practice of law is a decent profession and not a money-
First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the
making trade. Compensation should be but a mere
necessary petition as an incident of the main action in
incident.12
which his services were rendered or in an independent suit
against his client. The former is preferable to avoid
multiplicity of suits.9 Respondents’ claim for additional legal fees was not
justified. They could not charge petitioner a fee based on
percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect.
The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the
The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and
declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, had jurisdiction
services from petitioner’s business — all of which were not
over the motion for the payment of legal fees. Respondents
denied by respondents — more than sufficed for the work
sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10%
they did. The "full payment for settlement"13 should have
of the value of the properties awarded to petitioner in that
discharged petitioner’s obligation to them. 
case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding was
additional payment for legal services rendered in the same
case.  The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award
of attorneys’ fees cannot be denied. Lawyers are officers of
the Court and they participate in the fundamental function
Second, the professional engagement between petitioner
of administering justice.14 When they took their oath, they
and respondents was governed by the principle of quantum
submitted themselves to the authority of the Court and
meruit which means "as much as the lawyer
subjected their professional fees to judicial control. 15
deserves."10 The recovery of attorney’s fees on this basis is
permitted, as in this case, where there is no express
agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees. Basically, it is WHEREFORE, the petition is
a legal mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court
from running away with the fruits of the legal services of of Appeals dated April 30, 2002 in CA–G.R. CV No. 68080
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
is hereby MODIFIED. The award of additional attorney’s
fees in favor of respondents is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160334             September 11, 2006
GUENTER BACH, petitioner,  time
vs.
ONGKIKO KALAW MANHIT & ACORDA LAW
OFFICES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the
Decision1 dated 8 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74445, entitled, "Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit &
Accorda Law Offices v. Guenter Bach."
The facts as culled from the records of the case are as
follows:
On 7 November 1994, petitioner Guenter Bach engaged
the services of respondent law firm Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit
& Accorda Law Offices to represent him in a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, docketed as
Civil Case No. 95-224. The parties signed a "Fee
Agreement," for the legal services to be rendered by
respondent. The provision for payment of the legal services
reads:
(a) seven and one-half (7 ½ % ) of all cash
recoveries, including damages, interests,
attorney's fees and costs; as well as
(b) five percent (5 %) of the market value of all
properties awarded to [the petitioner] by the court
or obtained through the compromise agreement,
valued at the time of recovery.2
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
However, on 5 December 1995, respondent withdrew its
appearance as counsel of petitioner, due to policy
differences. On 18 December 1995, respondent sent the
termination billing3 for the services they rendered and billed
petitioner the total amount of P1,000,000.00 plus 2%
interest for every month of delay in payment, based on the
provision for termination of services stated in their Fee
Agreement, thus:
(C) Interest for late payment
All fees mentioned herein are payable within
seven (7) days from receipt of our statement of
account. It is understood that all late payments
shall be subject to interest payment at the rate of
2 % per month of delay, a fraction of a month
being considered as one month, counted from
the date the fees shall fall due, without need of
prior demand. 
xxxx
(F) Termination Clause
It is understood that you may terminate our
services at any time. In such an event, we shall
be entitled to collect fees for legal services
already performed and results obtained based
on quantum meruit."4
On 7 March 1996, respondent filed with the RTC a
Notice5 of Charging Lien over the properties of the spouses
Bach.
6 fees for services rendered under Civil Case No.
On 5 February 1997, the RTC issued an Order  directing
the annotation of the charging lien in the amount
of P1,000,000.00 on all the titles of the spouses Bach's
personal and real properties enumerated in the notice of
charging lien.
On 11 February 1999, respondent received a copy of the
Order7 dated 8 June 1998, granting petitioner's Motion to
Withdraw his petition in Civil Case No. 95-224.
Despite respondent's demands for his legal fees, petitioner
failed and refused to pay. Thus, respondent filed a
Complaint8 for a sum of money also before the RTC of
Makati, Branch 148, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-514.
Respondent prayed for the payment of the
following: P1,000,000.00 as the latter's lawful fees for
services rendered in Civil Case No. 95-224, plus 2%
interest from date of final demand until paid; P250,000.00
as exemplary damages; P200,000.00 representing billable
spent in prosecuting the case, plus
another P150,000.00 for any appeal taken; and P50,000.00
as litigation expenses and the cost of suit.
Within the period for filing an Answer, petitioner filed a
Motion9 to dismiss on the ground that respondent's claim
had already been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished. Petitioner contended that prior to
respondent's withdrawal as counsel in Civil Case No. 95-
224, petitioner had already paid respondent's services in
the total amount of P200,000.00. On 9 August 1999, the
Motion to Dismiss was denied 10 by the RTC for lack of
merit. Petitioner failed to file his Answer; thus, he was
declared in default and respondent was allowed to present
its evidence ex parte.11
On 24 January 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment in
favor of the respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant and the latter is hereby
ordered to pay the following:
1. The amount of P750,000.00 as plaintiff's lawful
95-224, plus interest at the rate of 2% per month
from the date of demand until paid;
2. P700,000.00 representing billable time which
was spent in prosecuting this case;
3. P50,000.00 as and litigation expenses, and
4. Costs of suit.12
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
Not satisfied, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which modified the RTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, Based on the foregoing
premises, the instant appeal is PARTLY
GRANTED and the appealed January 24, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City-Branch 148 in Civil Case No. 99-514 is
hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, the award
of P700,000.00 representing billable time
allegedly spent in the prosecution of the case a
quo is hereby DELETED. All other aspects of the
appealed DECISION are UPHELD.13
Hence, this Petition filed by petitioner Guenter Bach raising
the following issues to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE CONCEPT
OF QUANTUM MERUIT, THE AMOUNT
OF P750,000.00 AS FEES FOR SERVICES
RENDERED WITH INTEREST PEGGED AT 2%
A MONTH FROM DATE OF DEMAND UNTIL
FULLY PAID IS REASONABLE
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS LEGAL BASIS
TO AWARD P50,000.00 AS AND FOR
LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS OF
SUIT.14
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the P750,000.00
awarded to the respondent by way of quantum meruit, with
interest of 2% a month from date of demand until fully paid,
is excessive, unreasonable and confiscatory. Thus,
petitioner prays for reduction of the same.
Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court approved the
attorney's fees in the total amounts of P750,000.00 plus 2
% interest for the services rendered by respondent in Civil
Case No. 95-224. In this regard, the rule is that the issue of
the reasonableness of attorney's fees based on quantum
meruit is a question of fact, and well-settled is the rule that
conclusions and findings of fact by the lower courts are
entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed
except for strong and cogent reasons. The findings of the
Court of Appeals by itself, which are supported by
substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of
review by the Supreme Court.15 Thus, in the exercise of the
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
Supreme Court's power of review the findings of facts of the worth of the attorney's services. Courts may ascertain also
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is
Supreme Court. There are, however, recognized reasonable under the circumstances.18 In no case,
exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd Rules of Court, which provides:
or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's fees;
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when
agreement as to fees.- An attorney shall be
in making the findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
entitled to have and recover from his client no
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
more than a reasonable compensation for his
admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when
services, with a view to the importance of the
the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
subject - matter of the controversy, the extent of
findings are conclusions without citation of specific
the services rendered, and the professional
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
as to the proper compensation, but may
the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
on its own professional knowledge. A written
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
contract for services shall control the amount
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if
to be paid therefor unless found by the court
properly considered, would justify a different
to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
conclusion.16 Exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the
(Underscoring supplied.)
case at bar, and so this Court shall make its own
determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the
case. We have identified the circumstances to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney's
fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service
Ordinarily, therefore, we would have remanded this case for
rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the
further reception of evidence as to the extent and value of
nature and importance of the litigation or business in which
the services rendered by respondent to petitioner.
the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed;
However, so as not to needlessly prolong the resolution of
(5) the amount of money or the value of the property
a comparatively simple controversy, we deem it just and
affected by the controversy or involved in the employment;
equitable to fix in the present recourse a reasonable
(6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of
amount of attorney's fees in favor of respondent. 
the services; (7) the professional character and social
standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; and (9)
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being
sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.19
services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its
extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing
Responsibility enumerates the following factors which
party to the prevailing party.17
should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
The issue in this case concerns attorney's fees in the
(a) the time spent and extent of services
ordinary concept. Generally, the amount of attorney's fees
rendered or required;
due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer's compensation.
In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney's fees is (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable involved; 
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
(c) the importance of the subject matter;  3. Further, respondent annotated a notice 22 of lis
(d) the skill demanded; 
(e) the probability of losing other employment as
a result of the acceptance of the proffered case; 
(f) the customary charges for similar services and
the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which
he belongs;
(g) the amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;  Spouses Bach in Makati, covered by TCT No. S-
(h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; 
(i) the character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and  Bach in Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by TCT No.
(j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to
respondent as compensation for their services
on quantum meruit, based on the factors
abovequoted, it is proper to consider all the facts
and circumstances obtaining in this case.  property by Luzviminda Bach;
It is undisputed that respondent firm had rendered services
as counsel for the petitioners in Civil Case No. 95-244. The
services rendered consist of the following:
1. Respondent was able to annotate a
notice20 of lis pendens on the property of
Spouses Bach in Caloocan City covered by TCT
No. C-12112, thereby preventing easy disposition
of the property by Luzviminda Bach;
2. Respondent was likewise able to annotate a
notice21 of lis pendens on the property of
Spouses Bach in Pasig City covered by TCT No.
48223, thereby preventing disposition of the
property by Luzviminda Bach;
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
pendens on the property of Spouses Bach in
Dasmarinas, Cavite covered by TCT No. T-
339282, thereby preventing disposition of the
property by Luzviminda Bach;
4. Additionally, respondent annotated a
notice23 of lis pendens on the property of
Spouses Bach in Tanza, Cavite, covered by TCT
No. T-255263, thereby preventing disposition of
the property by Luzviminda Bach;
5. Respondent also worked on the annotation of
the notice24 of lis pendens on the property of
62541, thereby preventing disposition of the
property by Luzviminda Bach;
6. Respondent worked on the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens on the property of Spouses
T-380848, thereby preventing disposition of the
property by Luzviminda Bach;
7. Respondent annotated a notice25 of lis
pendens on the property of Spouses Bach
situated in Tagaytay City, covered by TCT No. P-
705, thereby preventing disposition of the
8. Respondent filed the Petition 26 for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of petitioner with
his wife;
9. Respondent prepared an affidavit27 in favor of
petitioner attesting to the fact of petitioner's
marriage and their properties acquired during his
marriage with Luzviminda Bach:  respondent Law Firm in the minutes dated 25
10. Respondent prepared an ex parte motion28 to
declare petitioner's wife to have waived her right
to file answer for failure to file the same within the
period granted by law and to direct the public
prosecutor to determine whether or not a
collusion exist;
11. Respondent prepared a Petition29 for
appointment of a receiver and to compel
petitioner's wife to render an accounting;
12. Other services included the filling of several
oppositions30 to certain motions filed by
petitioner's wife;
13. Respondent filed a motion31 to set the case
for preliminary investigation;
14. Respondent filed an ex parte motion32 to
declare petitioner's wife in default;
15. Respondent submitted a supplemental
comment33 on the motion for leave to withdraw
funds from Certificate of Participation filed by
petitioner's wife; 
16. Respondent filed a manifestation and
motion34 praying the court to direct petitioner's
wife to designate her lead counsel in the case;
17. Respondent prepared a Reply35 to comments
on opposition of petitioner;
18. Respondent was able to secure an
Order36 from the said court freezing the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) account in the
name of petitioner's wife, Luzviminda Bach,
containing about P6,500,000.00, representing the
balance of the proceeds from the sale of their
conjugal property in Pasig City;
19. Respondent represented petitioner in
numerous hearings in Civil Case No. 95-224,
evidenced by the signatures of the lawyers of
April 1995, 27 April, 1995, 14 June 1995, 27 June
1995, 1 August 1995, 11 August 1995, 22
September 1995,10 October 1995, 17 October
1995, 1 December 1995, 7 December 1995, 29
March 1996 and 16 January 1997;37
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
20. Conducted several preliminary and post
litigation conferences in the proceedings for
preliminary injunction leading to the freezing of
the bank account of the parties; and
21. Prepared and sent out numerous letters to
third parties and entities to protect the interest of
petitioner and notices to petitioner updating him
of the status of the case and the courses of
action taken by respondent Law Firm.38
In sum, the services rendered by the respondent as
enumerated above and as admitted 39 by Atty. Mario
Ongkiko during the ex parte hearing, consist of annotating
notice of lis pendens on the conjugal properties of petitioner
and his wife; filing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage; preparing and filing various pleadings and
documents relevant to the case; obtaining a freeze order of
petitioner's funds in the UCPB; attending hearings in Civil
Case No. 05-224, and sending notices to petitioner
updating the latter of the status of the case. Nothing in Civil
Case No. 95-224 so far appears complicated and no extra
ordinary skill was needed for lawyers of respondent Law
Firm to accomplish what they had done in the case before
they withdrew their appearance. We do not find herein a
situation so intricate that demands more than a careful
scrutiny of the legal matters involved. These are simply the
normal duties of a lawyer that he is bound by law to render
to his clients with utmost fidelity for which his client must
not be burdened to pay an extra price. It bears stressing
that at the time respondent firm withdrew their appearance
due to policy differences with petitioner, the case was still in
its initial stage.  Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
Guided by the above yardstick and so much of the pertinent
data as are extant in the records of this case and in the
exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount
of P500,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for
the legal services rendered by respondent to the petitioner.
The imposition of legal interest on the amount payable to
private respondent as attorney's fees is unwarranted. Even
as we agree that parties can freely stipulate on the terms of
payment, still the imposition of interest in the payment of
attorney's fees is not justified. In the case of Cortes v. Court
of Appeals,40 we ruled that Article 2209 41 of the Civil Code
does not even justify the imposition of legal interest on the
payment of attorney's fees as it is a provision of law
Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado
governing ordinary obligations and contracts. It deleted the
6% interest imposed by the appellate court on the payment
of attorney's fees. It ratiocinated by citing Mambulao
Lumber Co. v. Philippine National Bank,42 thus:  supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that the fees
Contracts for attorney's services in this
jurisdiction stands upon an entirely different
footing from contracts for the payment of
compensation for any other services. x x x
[A]n attorney is not entitled in the absence of
express contract to recover more than a
reasonable compensation for his services; and
even when an express contract is made, the
court can ignore it and limit the recovery to
reasonable compensation if the amount of the
stipulated fee is found by the court to be
unreasonable. This is a very different rule from
that announced in section 1091 of the Civil Code
with reference to the obligation of contracts in
general, where it is said that such obligation has
the force of law between the contracting parties.
Had the plaintiff herein made an express contract
to pay his attorney an uncontingent fee
of P2,115.25 for the services to be rendered in
reducing the note here in suit to judgment, it
would not have been enforced against him had
he seen fit to oppose it, as such a fee is
obviously far greater than is necessary to
remunerate the attorney for the work involved
and is therefore unreasonable. In order to enable
the court to ignore an express contract for
attorney's fees, it is necessary to show, as in
other contracts, that it is contrary to morality
or public policy (Art.1255, Civil Code). It is
enough that it is unreasonable or
unconscionable. (Emphases supplied.)
We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture
and lawyers are not merchants.43 Law advocacy, it has
been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns
it births are simple rewards for a job done or service
rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits
which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental
interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it
is subject to State regulation.44
A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client's cause
and a trustee of his client's cause of action and assets; he
is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and
participates in the fundamental function of administering
justice in society.45 It follows that a lawyer's compensation
for professional services rendered are subject to the
he charges and receives remain reasonable and
commensurate with the services rendered, but also to
maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to
which he belongs. Upon taking his attorney's oath as an
officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority
of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional
fees.46
Though we reduced the award of attorney's fees and
disallowed the imposition of interest thereon, the fact that
an attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice
underscores the need to secure to him his honorarium
lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much
entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition of
fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on
the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to
see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is
also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With
his capital consisting only of his brains and with his skill
acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the
protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the
part of his client to escape payment of his just
compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the
best in him to secure justice for his client, he himself would
not get his due.47
expenses of litigation. Article 2208, paragraphs 2, 5 and 11,
of the Civil Code, authorize the recovery of such fees "(2)
When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate x x x or to incur expenses to protect his
interest; x x x (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim; x x x and (11) In any
other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered." Considering the fact that respondent was
drawn into this litigation by petitioner to protect and defend
their interest and taking into account the services already
rendered by respondent to petitioner, the sum
of P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation and cost of suit
would be reasonable under the premises. 
Legal Ethics – THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Cases
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS to the effect that the attorney's
fees awarded to respondent is REDUCED to P500,000.00,
the legal interest of 2% on the amount due to respondent
is DELETED, and the award of litigation expenses
is REDUCED to P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

(except In Re: Cunanan)

Averell B. Abrasaldo – I-Estrellado