1

Aguirre v Rana, B.M. 1036, June 10, 2003

Doctrine:​ The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege​. ​It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

Facts:
Rana passed the 2000 bar exams. One day before the oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the bar,
complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. The Complainant charged
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The
Courtallowed Rana to take his oath but did not allow him to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

Complainant alleges that the respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.

Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled ​Formal Objection to
the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice- Mayor. ​Respondent represented himself as
counsel for and on behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for Bunan.

On the charge of violation of law, the complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, the respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel
for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate Bunan without the latter hiring him. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Respondent confirmed that he assisted Bunan but only as a person knowledgeable of law and not as a lawyer. Further, he
avers that he signed the pleading not as a lawyer. Respondent also claims he already resigned on 11 May 2001 and claims
that politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate.

Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC): Respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of
law. The OBC therefore recommends that the respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

Issue: ​W/N Rana should be admitted in the Bar - NO

Held:
The Court affirmed OBC’s findings that Rana acted as Bunan’s counsel and filed a pleading as a lawyer prior to his admission
into the Bar. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to
represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.

Further, Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
Candidate Emily Estipona- Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC and filed a petition on her behalf. Clearly, he practiced law
prior to entry into the Bar. Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court.

In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law are considered as practice of
law, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
Hence, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
 2
Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to
be a member of the Philippine Bar

The practice of law is a privilege limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. It presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer
is an officer of the court.

A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.

It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. Respondent should know t​hat two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
 3

Cayetano v. Monsod, GR No. 100113, September 3, 1991

FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC
in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963); an
operations officer with the World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986); legal
or economic consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986); member of Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-judicial Davide Commission
(1990).
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.Challenging the
validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent possesses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court. As such, the petition is
dismissed.
 4

Cruz v. Atty. Cabrera, AC No. 5737, October 25, 2004

FACTS:​ Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility .Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several
actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the
counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing, respondent said that the complainant is misinterpreting himself as a lawyer and
raised his voice saying, “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” respondent’s imputations of complainant’s
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear
anymore in cases respondent was handling.

Respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for
the Mina family against whom the complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further the
complainant's illegal practice of law. Moreover, complainant wore a barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when
she issued an order stating "[i]n today’s hearing both lawyers appeared;" Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an
administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court "Hay naku masama yung
marunong pa sa Huwes! OK?" the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court’s Third Division. Respondent prays that the
complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE​: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:​ IBP Commissioner recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for three months for violating Rule
8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open
court against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under
Criminal Cases. Likewise he did not refute the complainant's allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not
allowed to practice law for seven years by the SC for using contumacious language in his dealing with others.

We hold that respondent’s outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such a single outburst, though uncalled for, pointed out to the trial court that the
complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of the complainant's appearance. Though a lawyer’s language
may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.
Nonetheless, the complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases.
 5

Ruthie Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio, AC No. 6705, March 31, 2006

Facts: ​Atty. Carlos Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries Inc. until his
appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Petitioner, Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter of
former president of Taggat who took over the management and control of the company after the death of her father.
Sometime in July 1997, employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint alleging that the complainant withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause. Respondent as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor was assigned to conduct the
preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651informations for violation of
Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Complainants contend that respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests and should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by
Taggat employees. Complainants also contend that the respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. They seek the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government
prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the
criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. Respondent further contends that the fees were paid
for his consultancy services and not for representation; he added that consultation is not the same as representation and that
rendering consultancy services is not prohibited.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sagucio was engaged in private practice of law while being a public official.

Ruling: ​Yes, the act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts
that are characteristic of the legal profession. It covers any activity, in and out of the court, which requires the application of
law, legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. Respondent argues that he
only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 and 1996
as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law”.
 6

Alawi vs. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997

Facts: Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one housing unit from E B
Villarosa & Partners Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company. Shortly thereafter,respondent wrote to the company
expressing his intent to render the contract ​void ab initio​. Respondent sent several letters, all of which were signed as ATTY.
ASHARY ALAUYA. On learning of the respondent's letters, Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her
grounds was respondent’s usurpation of the title “attorney”, which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly
use. Respondent justified his use of the title by assertion that it is synonymous with “counselors-at-law” a title to which Sharia
lawyers have a rightful claim. Adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counselor” is often mistaken for “konsehal”

Issue: Whether or not the respondent, a member of Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney.

Ruling: ​No. The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

This court has already had occasion to declare that persons who passed the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Sharia courts. Respondent disinclination to use the title of counselor-at-law
does not warrant his use of the title of an attorney.
 7

Banogan vs. Zerna, G.R. No. L-35469, October 9, 1987

Facts ​ On February 9, 1926, the cadastral court rendered a ruling regarding a land dispute from the predecessor Filemon
Banogon, after 31 years the petitioners herein, Encarnacion Banogon, Zosina Munoz and Davida Muno, contended for a
review of the said ruling on March 18, 1957. However after 61 years the petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the
motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. To this, the petitioners contended for a petition of certiorari to
the respondent judges herein.
The petitioners argue that while the said case has been decided upon an unbelievable amount of years ago, the said
decision is not final and executory as the land dispute has yet to be registered in favor of the private respondents of the said
case. They contend that due to their failure to register the said land a year after the final judgement was made, the petitioners
then have the right to contend for the amendment. of the initial judgement even with the lapse of time.

The respondents argued however, the decision was already final and executory 30 days after the court had rendered
its final judgement, and further questions that they slept upon for 31 years the said rights that they are now belligerently
contending. The respondents questioned the intention as to the realization and contention of the petitioners when the case
has been already decided upon for more than half-a century.

Issue ​Whether or not the petition should be reconsidered.

Ruling: ​The court ruled to dismiss the petition with costs against the petitioners. The court reiterated that as officers of the
court lawyers should ensure the proper administration of justice so as it would not bring about pointless suits to achieve their
cunning purpose, pursuant of the Lawyer’s Oath and further emphasized that;
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."
 8

Ledesma vs. Climaco, G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 197In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.

Facts Adelino Ledasma, the petitioner herein initially served as the counsel de officio in the case pending before Judge
Climaco to wit he filed for a petition to withdraw his appointment as the counsel for the said case.He contended for such, as
he cannot fully commit himself to the said case because of his appointment as the Election Registrar for the Commission on
Elections.
The respondent judge , however, denied the petition for purposes of expediency, since granting the petition will result
in the delay of the case and that Judge Climaco argued that this was not the first instance Atty. Ledasma filed for a petition to
withdraw as the counsel de officio.

Issue ​Whether or not Atty. Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio considering his appointment as
Election Registrar.

Ruling ​The court ruled against the petitioner and in favor of the respondent Judge. As in this case, if Judge Climaco rendered
judgement in favor of the withdrawal of Atty. Ledesma, it would prejudice the defendants of the case. Furthermore the court
emphasized that as it the practice of the law is a privilege burdened with conditions, it is upon the imperative of every member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to take the client’s precedence over self-interest.

MARCIAL A. EDILION, A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978

FACTS:
Herein respondent Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP’s Board of
Governors adopted a resolution which recommends to the court the removal of respondent’s name from the Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues. Through the IBP’s then President, said resolution was
submitted to the court for consideration and approval. The Court then required respondent to comment on the
resolution and he submitted his comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees and the IBP’s President
and Board of Governors were also required to reply to respondent’s comment. ​Respondent Edillon argues that
Sections 1, 9 and 10 constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing and to pay his corresponding dues and as a
consequence of his non-compliance, he is being deprived of his rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Therefore he concludes that the provisions are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent
similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said
matter is not among justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an administrative nature pertaining to
administrative body.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the court is without power to compel him to become a member of the IBP
2.​ ​Whether or not the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void
3. Whether or not the power of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid

RULING:
1. ​To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom to
associate. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. But assuming that the
questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the Police Power of the State.
2. ​Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Philippine Bar.
3. ​In matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision
have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities
holding such are legion.
 9

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Jr. BM 1370, May 9, 2005

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.; Requesting exemption payment of IBP dues.

Facts ​:

Petitioner Atty. Cecilio Arevalo requesting exemption from payment of Integrated Bar of the Philippines dues.

Petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the
years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil
Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year
2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service
since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.

Issue​ :

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice
of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

Held ​:

Petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay

P12, 035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that
the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack
of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well
as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.

A lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by
the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court.
 10

Santos Jr. v. Llamas, AC 4749, January 20, 2001

Facts:​ Respondent, Atty. Francisco Llamas, was complained of misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues.
For a number of years, he has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings, he only indicated
“IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. The records show a Certification dated March 24,
1997 from the IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida Javier that respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Petitioner
also cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was
subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had a criminal case involving estafa but was appealed pending in
the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, claimed that he is only engaged in a “limited” practice of law and under RA
7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption is the payment of
membership dues.

Issue:​ Whether or not Atty. Llamas is exempted from payment of IBP dues.

Held:​ No, the lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. In accordance with this provision, respondent can only engage in the practice of
law by paying his dues and it does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice. Moreover, the
exemption invoked by respondent as a senior citizen does not include exemption from payment of membership or association
dues.
 11

Rolly Pentecostes v Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, A.M. No. P-07-2337, August 03, 2007

Facts:

- Respondent atty. Marasigan is the clerk of court VI of RTC Kabacan, North Cotabato. Respondent was tasked
with the safekeeping of a Kawasaki motorcycle that petitioner owned that was a subject of a carnapping case.
- On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M’lang North Cotabato turned over the said motorcycle to
respondent for safekeeping.
- Respondent thereafter turned over the motorcycle to the Police station of Kabacan, North Cotabato.
- After several hearings for the determination of the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial court issued an order for
its release to petitioner.
- However, despite several demands made by petitioner for the release of the said motorcycle, respondent failed to
deliver the motorcycle to petitioner.
- Respondent contends that the said motorcycle was released to herein petitioner, however, petitioner refused to
receive such, claiming that the said motorcycle was already “cannibalized” and unserviceable.
- Petitioner charged respondent with an administrative case of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
public officer for the loss of the motorcycle.

Issue:

- W/N Respondent is administratively liable for the loss of the said motorcycle

Held:

- Yes, respondent is in violation of Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which states that the clerk shall
safely keep all record, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge.
- In the present case, respondent was charged with the custody and safekeeping of petitioners’ motorcycle, and to
keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, upon
prior authority from the trial court.
- By transferring petitioners’ motorcycle to the Kabacan Police station without proper authority granted by the trial
court, respondent failed to perform his duty of keeping it under his care and possession. He must suffer therefore
the consequences of his act or omission, which is akin to misconduct.
- The court held that since this is the respondents first offense and no taint of bad faith was present, a 15 day
suspension w/o pay was deemed appropriate being found guilty of Simple Misconduct.
 12

Father Ranhilio C. Aquino et al v. Atty. Edwin Pascua A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007

Requirement to Remain in Good and Regular Standing - [ Christine Asares]

FACTS:

Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy with Lina M. Garan and other
complainants filed a letter-complaint against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan for allegedly falsifying two
documents by making it appear that he had notarized the AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT of one Joseph B. Acorda and one
Remigio B. Domingo entering as Doc No 1213 & Doc No 1214 Page 243 Book III Series of 1998 on Dec. 10, 1998. But these
entries did not appear in the Notarial Register of respondent; that the last entry was Doc No 1200 executed on Dec. 28, 1998;
and that, therefore he could not have notarized Doc Nos 1213 & 1214 on Dec 10, 1998.

Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the
oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli.

Complainants maintain that Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.

The case was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation. The OBC affirmed that
the complainants are correct in maintaining that respondent falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned
affidavit-complaints which is a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary public but also as a member of the Bar.The
OBC respectfully recommended that the notarial commission of Atty Pascua be revoked and that he be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of 6 months.

ISSUE:​ Whether or not Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct and should be suspended.

RULING​: Yes. Respondent was found guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his
Notarial register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. And he was suspended from the
practice of law for 3 months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
His notarial commission, if still existing, was also ordered revoked.

RATIO:
A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court has
invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their
duties.
 13

Administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

Requirement to Remain in Good and Regular Standing

Case No. 13 - Jaymie Angelica P. San Jose

Facts:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City.
Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that ​administrative and
criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain​ in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) and as a result of which he was dismissed from the service. The Deputy of Court Administrator
(DCA) required Judge Quitain to explain the ​alleged misrepresentation and deception​ he committed before the JBC ​based
on the​ ​lack of disclosure in his submitted Personal Data Sheet (PDS)​ – failed to disclose subject administrative case
relating to Grave Misconduct and that he was dismissed from service pursuant to Administrative Order No. 183.

Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. ​Respondent explained​ that during the
investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he
resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he tendered his
irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the ​honest belief
that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation​; that his resignation amounted to an
automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that the issues raised therein became moot and academic; and that
had he known that he would be dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he
knew he would never be appointed.

The ​court contends ​that Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government
service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, ​he had full
knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him from the
government service.

Issue: WON the judge be excused of his lack of disclosure or omission in the PDS.

Ruling:

No. As a member of the Bar, he should know that his ​resignation​ from the NAPOLCOM ​would not obliterate any
administrative liability he may have incurred​, much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal of the administrative
case filed against him. Iit is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the
Judiciary. ​Respondent is guilty of dishonesty​. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of
integrity. The court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of
the Judiciary. They have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be
free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. The court condemns, and will never countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.

Thus, respondent is ​guilty of grave misconduct​ which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not
resigned during the pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the ​penalty of a fine of P40,000.00​. It appearing that he has
yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the ​FORFEITURE of all
benefits​, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is ​PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED
from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned
and/or controlled corporations.
 14

Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty Ismael F. Mejia, Adm Case No. 2984, August 31, 2007
Facts​: On July 29, 1992, the respondent, Atty. Ismael Mejia was disbarred following the complaint of Rodolfo Bernardo
against the respondent for misappropriating a sum of P67,710 entrusted to him by the complainant in connection to the
property of the complainant, also for falsifying certain documents, and issuing a check knowing that he does not have any
funds in the bank in order to pay the sum of P50,000 to the complainant where he obtained such load. On June 1, 1999, he
filed a petition praying that he would be allowed to practice law again but it was denied by the court and on January 23, 2007,
fifteen years after he was disbarred, he filed a petition to be reinstated in the practice of law.

Issue​: Whether or not the respondent should be reinstated.

Held​: Yes, the court granted his petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. For it was shown that ever since his
disbarment fifteen years ago, there was no other transgression attributed to him, he also has shown remorse , and that he is
already of advanced years. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.
 15

Velez v. Atty. De Vera A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006

FACTS: An administrative case against Atty. De Vera was file before the State Bar of California which arose
from an insurance case Atty. De Vera handled involving Julius Willis III, who figured in an automobile in 1986. Respondent
was authorized to receive by the father of Willis for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Respondent received
the case which he then deposited to his personal account; The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years. However, the respondent resigned from the California
Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California. Petitioner claims that such information was
concealed by the respondent; such and other circumstances which IBP board deems that respondent is not fit to be a member
of the board, hence his removal was sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who was suspended from the practice of law in said
foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the
foreign jurisdiction.

RULING: No. Since no final judgment of suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. De Vera despite a
recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up
the Supreme Court of California.

We emphasized that the judgment of suspension giants a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not
grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute
into similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds
for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes
prima facie evidence of unethical acts of lawyer.

Cynthia Advincula, complainant v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata,respondent (AC No. 7204, March 07, 2007)

FACTS:

Before Us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging
the latter with Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged that sometime on the 1​st week of December 2004, she sought the legal advice of the respondent,
regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent the Demand Letter dated December 11,
2004 to the concerned parties.

On 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, the respondent met with the complainant to discuss the relevant matters relative to
the case which the complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a
sum of money. On both occasions, complainant rode with the respondent in his car where he held and kissed the complainant
on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; Additionally, on 6 March 2005, at along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after
corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and
forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of
shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to refer the case with
another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. On the following day, March 7, 2005, respondent sent
 16
another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na
tyo." (I don’t know what to do so you may forgive me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).

A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP
Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005 and on 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B.
Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation, recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension
on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with modification,
the recommendation of the Investi`gating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating
with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

HELD:

No. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing condition to preserve
their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for
remaining in the practice of law.

Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its
officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the
public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.

In the case at bar, the acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips
are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come
to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a
 17
cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text
message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant
disbarment or suspension.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED. However, the respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his
clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future.
 18

Cruz v. Mina, GR No. 154207, April 27, 2007

FACTS

Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for
Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness​.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in ​Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.​ that a
non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that
his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him
to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on
the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court
(Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in ​Cantimbuhan;​ and set the case
for continuation of trial.

ISSUE

WON the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant

​HELD

In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138
provides:

Sec. 34. ​By whom litigation is conducted. - ​In the court of a justice of the peace​, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member
of the bar.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. Rule 138-A, LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE,
should not have been used by the courts ​a quo i​ n denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the
simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
 19
Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999
GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., ​complainant,
vs. ​ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, ​respondent.

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:
On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed a Petition for disbarment against Atty. Primo R. Naldoza.
The precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent, as counsel for complainant, appealing a decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). The said case was resolved in favor of the complainant therein on October 5, 1992.
The respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said decision had already become final and unappealable, convinced
the complainant to appeal the case before the Supreme Court.

When respondent filed the said appeal, he misrepresented to the complainant that it had to pay a cash bond. I order to cover up
his misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt
representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.

Respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that he had already been acquitted in
the criminal case for estafa. Respondent maintains that he should be cleared of administrative liability, because he was
acquitted of estafa which involved the same facts. He argues that the issue involved there was “the very same issue litigated in
this case,” and that his exoneration “was a result of a full blown trial on the merits of this case.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for disbarment against the respondent be dismissed because he has already been acquitted of estafa
which involved the same facts.

HELD:
No. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is required. Thus, a criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.

It should be emphasized that a finding of guild in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein,
the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before the Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative
liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters,
such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.

Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to
cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his
misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.

[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large,
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach (​Resurrecion v​. ​Sayson​).
 20
In ​Obia v​. ​Catimbang​, the Court meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the money entrusted to him:

The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney.
These acts are noted with disapproval by the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza has been DISBARRED.

 21

Vda. de Barrera v. Laput, A.C. No. 217 November 27, 1968

FACTS:

Complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera seeks the disbarment of respondent Casiano U. Laput, upon
the ground that, being her counsel, as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Macario Barrera,
in Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, he (Laput) had misappropriated
several sums of money held by him in trust for said estate and tried to appropriate two parcels of land
belonging to the same, as well as threatened her, in a fit of anger, with a gun, into signing several
papers, despite the fact that she is 72 years of age. That the respondent Casiano U. Laput instead of
acceding to her (his) client's request became angry and told complainant to sign the papers, at the same
time drawing his revolver from its holster and placing it on his lap with the evident purpose of intimidating
the complainant, an old woman of 72 years old, into signing the papers or pleadings presented for
signature. The complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera intimidated by the threat
aforementioned was compelled to sign as in fact she did sign, said pleadings against her will.

Issue:
Whether or not Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct.

Held:
Yes. Laput should be disbarred for Gross misconduct. The offense in this case is compounded by the
circumstance that, being a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, the offender should have set
the example as man of peace and a champion of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended
party is the very person whom the offender was pledged to defend and protect — his own client. It was
also found that the documents were made by the counsel to end the proceedings and be able to collect
his fees. The act of placing the gun on the client’s lap is an act of threatening the client, and so the
respondent was suspended for 1 year on the grounds of Gross Misconduct.

Rule 138, Section 27 reads: "SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the Supreme Court on what grounds.
— A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
 22

Barrientos v. Daarol, A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993

FACTS:

Victoria Barrientos is a 20 years old, single, college student during her relationship with Transfiguracion Daarol,41 years
old, married but separated for 16 years, General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative. That
relationship was consummated, with a promise of marriage, without the complainant’s knowledge that he is married.
When she got pregnant, the respondent told her that he could not marry her because of his status. He suggested
abortion but did not insist when the complainant disagree. The respondent failed to take care of her until she delivered a
baby girl. She filed an administrative case ​against respondent with the National Electrification Administration which was
dismissed, hence, ​ she filed for the disbarment of the respondent.

ISSUE: W/N Daarol should be disbarred

HELD:

Yes. He was found to be guilty of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar. The complainant
was never informed that he is married which he disclosed after she became pregnant. ​More importantly, respondent
knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest him
legal capacity to contract another marriage.He also suggested abortion. Good moral character is a condition which
precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is
a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.
 23

Tabas v. Malicden, A.C. No. 5602. February 3, 2004

A.C No.5602 Feb. 3, 2004

Hilda D. Tabas, Complainant

V.s Atty. Bonifacio B. Mangibin, Respondent

​Facts​:

Complainant Hilda Tabas sought the disbarment of respondent Atty. Bonifacio Manginbin, for allegedly having committed
forgery.

Hilda Tabas avers that on March 5, 2001, a certain Anastacia Galvan from Sta. Monica La union mortgaged to her piece of
real property to secure a 48,000.00 loan. The deed of mortagage of real property was duly registered with the office of the
register of the province of La union and annotated in the tax declaration of property. However, On October 17 2001, a certain
Lilia Castillejos falsely representing herself as Ms. Tabas appeared before the respondent and asked him to prepare a
discharge of the said mortgage and to notarize it afterwards.After having prepared the questioned discharge of real estate
mortgage and without asking Lilia Castillejos for anything other than community tax certificate (CTC) respondent notarized the
said deed. Subsequently the mortgagor, Anastacia Galvan mortgaged the property again this time with Rural bank Naguilan
(LU).

Respondent admits that the discharge of real estate mortagage is a forgery, but denies liability for falsification under a claim
of good faith.

Issue​:

Whether the respondent is liable for violating the Notarial law for which his commission as notary public should be revoked
and he should be suspended also from the practice of law.

Held​:

The court decision for violation of the notarial and the code of professional responsibility Atty’s Bonifacio Manginbin notarial
commission is revoked. And he is disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of 2 years.

Respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for a period of one (1) year, effective immediately. As Respondent’s
conduct showed serious lack of due care in the performance of his duties as a notary public. Because of his carelessness,
respondent failed to notice the glaring difference in the signature of mortgagee in the deed of real estate mortgage from her
purported signature in the questioned discharge of real estate mortgage.

A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the public at
large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined. A notary public should not
notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of matters stated in the document.
 24

Melvyn G. Garcia v. Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno, A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 3, 2015

FACTS:

Atty. Raul Sesbreno represented the two daughters of Dr. Melvyn Garcia, for an action for support against him.
The complainant filed two complaints for disbarment on the ground of the respondent’s previous conviction of
homicide on which Sesbreno fired on the two drunken men who passed by his house, wherein a certain Luciano
Amparadon died. He was later paroled. ​Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus,
Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law. Sesbreño argued that his sentence was commuted and
the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. The respondent further alleged that
homicide does not involve moral turpitude. He claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad
faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.

ISSUE:

W/N Sesbreno should be disbarred

HELD:

Yes. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as
attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. While not all cases of homicide
involves moral turpitude, Sesbreno’s case is not an exemption. Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place
and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the
death of Amparado.Even if Sesbreno has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a
full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those
possessing good moral character. A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition
of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.
 25

Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig and Atty. Karen E. Baydo, A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

FACTS:
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s when they were both
students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty.
Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez. Atty. Catindig admitted
to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the
Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City.​ ​Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant.​ ​Atty. Catindig told Dr.
Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he
would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter​9​ in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s
scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter​10​ written and signed by Atty. Catindig
for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her
once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a
halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig
filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the
State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA).

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted
Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to
declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still
subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall
apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was
attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned
from his firm in January 2001.For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty.
Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures;
she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that
despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law firm.

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within 90 days from notice.

ISSUE:

W/N the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.

HELD:

Yes. Atty. Catindig should be disbarred because t​he facts that were gathered from the evidence were adduced by the parties
and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establishes a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not
only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was then
followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously,
 26
15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already falling
apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.

The Decision of the SC to ​Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and tty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. However, in the case of ​the charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of evidence.

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the
practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:c​ hanRo
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — ​A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, ​grossly immoral conduct​, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Atty. Roy B. Ecraela v. Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan, A.C. No. 10676, September 8, 2015.

Facts: ​This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalanan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority
as an educator, and “other unscrupulous activities” which cause “undue embarrassment to the legal profession” Complainant
and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the UP College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer
group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members of the
Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin with whom he has three children. Complainant avers that
while married to Jardiolin, respondent has a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women
between the years 1990-2007.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred.

Ruling: ​Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the Supreme Court for grossly immoral conduct.

CANON 1- A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

CANON 7- A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession. Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain
one’s good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a
mockery out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through
technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required
of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.
 27

Heirs of Amada A. Zaulda v. Isaac Z. Zaulda, G.R. No. 201234, March 17, 2014

The controversy stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession and declaration of ownership filed by the heirs of
Amada Aguila-Zaulda. A petition for review on certiorari dismissing the petition for review of the petitioners,on its Resolution in
March 6, 2012, denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. One of the reason the Petition for Review dated
September 9, 2010 dismissed is that, there was no competent evidence regarding petitioners’ identity on the attached
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping as required by Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice which now requires a photocopy of petitioners’ competent evidence of identity.

The issue is whether or not the failure to attach a competent evidence of identity in a Notarial Practice is a ground for case
dismissal.

The court granted the petition and the prior decisions are SET ASIDE.

As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification, records 16 show that he proved his identity
before the notary public through the presentation of his Office of the Senior Citizen (OSCA) identification card. Rule II, Sec. 12
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of identity.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a senior citizen card is one of the competent identification cards recognized in the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason, there was compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the perception of
the CA, attachment of a photocopy of the identification card in the document is not required by the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof, is silent on it. Thus, the CA’s dismissal of the petition for
lack of competent evidence on the affiant’s identity on the attached verification and certification against forum shopping was
without clear basis. Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, non-attachment
thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently held that verification is merely a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not render the
pleading fatally defective. It is simply intended to provide an assurance that the allegations are true and correct and not a
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may in fact order
the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or it may act on the pleading although it may not have been verified,
where it is made evident that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that the ends of justice may be served. The
Court, in Altres v. Empleo, issued guidelines based on previous jurisprudential pronouncements respecting non-compliance
with the requirements on, or submission of a defective, verification as well as on certification against forum shopping. The
Court reminds all members of the bench and bar of the admonition in the often-cited case of Alonso v. Villamor.