In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar

as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators,

violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as
settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. 201 That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court,
in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor 202 (Bengzon), held
that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a
certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially,
under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such
fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves
also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly,
said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013
PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which
contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the
PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the
projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to
veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto
power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless."213
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as
a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate
PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and
hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of
PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This
kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system
fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the
prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-
described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the
entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects
of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature,

the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would
then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-
characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would
be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of
spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts
and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore,
does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme

has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining
relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of
a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project,
and per implementing agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF
Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation,
to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater
degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse
to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth
of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even
commendable ends.218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders
Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they
point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct,
financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which
turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners." 219 They
also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF
excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the
"PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite
useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.‘" 220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,

which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder
that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official
functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust
connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the
Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper

expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional
oversight. As mentioned in Abakada, 222 congressional oversight may be
performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power
of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it,
its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by
either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article,
has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes
it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To
a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect,
be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must
be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization
runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that:

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in
the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike
down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent
defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has
allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-
enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has
violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred
unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which
they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it
has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process,
denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the
affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence
of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the
power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes
only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under
the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it
has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed
out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any
name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect.
Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has
monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in
government to look forward with the optimism of change and the
awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public
debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not
purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides
this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may
heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is
the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the

constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all
legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such
as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional
Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or
collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate
in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such
as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and
revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment,
unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of
past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous
PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which
confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all
informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly
deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test
in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.