Illusions of Control: How We Overestimate Our Personal Influence

Author(s): Suzanne C. Thompson

Source: Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 8, No. 6 (Dec., 1999), pp. 187-190
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of Association for Psychological Science
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 CURRENT DIRECTIONS INPSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 187

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of control. In
Illusions of Control: How We ticipants' judgments
these studies, people tried to get a

Overestimate Our Personal Influence green light to come on by pushing

a button. They were told that the
Suzanne C Thompson1 button might control the light, but,
in actuality, there was no relation
Department of Psychology, Pomona College, Claremont, California
ship between participants' actions
and whether the light came on. The
came on 25% of the time for
In an set of studies, light
Abstract intriguing
in the low-reinforce
Illusions ofcontrol are Langer (1975) showed that people participants
ment condition and 75% of the time
often overestimate their control
common even in purely for those in the high-reinforcement
even in situations governed purely
chance situations. are of how often
They In one of Langer's condition, regardless
by chance. stud
particularly likely to occur in or when the button was pushed.
that are characterized ies, some people were allowed to
settings Estimates of personal control over
their own lottery ticket, and
involvement, fa pick were in the
by personal the light quite high
others got a ticket picked for them.
miliarity, foreknowledge of condition?
Later, were the high-reinforcement
the desired outcome, and a participants given a moderate
equivalent to to inter
option of exchanging their ticket
focus on success. Person
mediate degree of control.
for one in a lottery with more fa
based factors that affect illu
vorable odds. Despite the fact that
sions of control de
include
exchanging the ticket increased the
pressive mood and needfor WHEN DO PEOPLE
odds of winning, those who had se
control. One explanation of il OVERESTIMATE CONTROL?
lected their own lottery ticket num
lusory control is that it is due
ber did not choose to exchange this
to a control heuristic that is
used to estimate control by as personally chosen ticket. People Do people always overestimate
seemed to think that choosing their their control? Evidently not. You
sessing the factors of inten
own ticket increased their odds of may have noted in the studies just
tionality and connection to
winning?as if their action of described that the illusions of con
the outcome. Motivational in
choosing their own ticket gave trol occurred for people who select
fluences on control
illusory ed their own lottery tickets or who
them some control over the out
and consequences of overesti
come of the lottery. Similar illusions were in the high-reinforcement
mating one's control are also
condition. in the other
covered. of control have been demonstrated Participants
in a variety of circumstances. conditions were not so susceptible
Alloy and Abramson (1979) ex to thinking they had control. Both
Keywords situational and person-based fac
tended the study of illusory control
illusions of control; perceived
factors that affect tors influence whether or not peo
control by manipulating
illusory control and measuring par ple will overestimate their control.

Copyright ? 1999 American Psychological Society

 188 VOLUME 8,NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 1999

Situational factors include per task involves acting to get a de tion for themselves, the setup is
sonal involvement, familiarity, sired outcome than if the point is ripe for illusory control. In addi
foreknowledge of the desired out to avoid losing what they have. tion, nondepressed individuals and
come, and success at the task. Evidently, the former type of task those with a need for the outcome
Personal involvement refers to leads to a focus on successes and are
particularly prone to overesti
someone the active agent as the latter highlights the losses. mate their control.
being
opposed to having others act for Even the patterning of successes
him or her. When people act for and failures can affect the focus on
success or failure. A WHY DO PEOPLE
themselves, illusory control is like string of early
no personal action is successes leads to higher estimates
OVERESTIMATE THEIR
ly, but when
involved?for when of personal control than does a CONTROL?
example,
someone else selects their tickets string of early failures, even if the
or throws the dice for them?the total number of successes over the The question of why illusions of
sense of being able to control the entire session is the same. control occur was first addressed
outcome is greatly diminished. The person factors that have an by Langer (1975), who proposed
Familiarity is another important in effect on illusory control include that skill and chance situations are
fluence on illusions of control. mood and need for control. In confused. This confusion is
easily
When circumstances or the materi circumstances, nonde to when
many especially likely happen
als being worked with are familiar, pressed individuals tend to overes chance situations have the trap
it is easier to have inflated judg timate their control, whereas those pings that are characteristic of skill
ments of personal control than who are in a depressed mood have a based situations(e.g., familiarity,
when the situation or task is new. more realistic assessment of their choice, involvement). However,
to an outcome there are several a
Foreknowledge of the desired outcome, ability control reasons why
the extent to which people know (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). These confusion of skill and chance situa
the outcome they want when they effects are found even when mood tions is not by itself a good expla
act, is a third condition that affects is manipulated experimentally. nation for the variety of conditions
whether or not personal control Nondepressed who under which illusions of control
participants
will be overestimated. In a predic are put in a depressed mood appear. For example, the factors
tion situation, actors know which a mood-induction tech that increase control are
through illusory
outcome they want to achieve nique make control judgments broader than ones that reflect a
when they act. In contrast, in a similar to those of participants confusion between chance and con
the action is who are chronically trollable situations.
postdiction situation, depressed Illusory control
taken before the actors know the (Alloy, Abramson, &
Viscusi, is also more likely in situations that
a focus
outcome they would like. Illusions 1981). Although the topic has not involve on success rather
of control are stronger in predic been studied extensively, there is than failure, as well as among indi
tion than in postdiction situations. some indication that a strong need viduals who are in a
positive
rather
Success at the task has a major in for control can also lead people to than depressed mood and who
fluence on whether or not person overestimate their potential to af have a need for control. Also, feed
al control is overestimated. fect outcomes. In an experimental back that highlights failures and
Success versus failure has some demonstration of the effects of negative moods can eliminate or
times been manipulated experi need for control, participants who reverse illusory judgments of con
were to a
mentally by the number of times randomly assigned trol. None of these effects is easily
they are were more
people get the outcome "hungry" condition explained by a confusion of skill
trying to achieve (e.g., the light likely than participants in a and chance elements.
comes on 75% vs. 25% of the time). "sated" condition to think they My and I have of
colleagues
the outcome is random could control a chance task for fered a more
Although complete explana
and not in
response to partici which a was a tion of why illusions of control
hamburger prize
pants' behavior, participants who (Biner, Angle, Park, Mellinger, & occur (Thompson, Armstrong, &
get the outcome they want at a Barber, 1995). Thomas, 1998). We propose that
high rate have significantly and To sum up, people do not al people use a control heuristic to
substantially higher estimates of ways overestimate their control, judge their degree of influence over
their control than those who get but when the situation is one that is an outcome. A heuristic is a short
the desired outcome at a low rate. familiar and focused on success, cut or simple rule that can be used

People
are also more likely to when the desired outcome is to reach a judgment, in this case, an
overestimate their control if the known and people are ac estimate of one's control over
taking

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 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 189

achieving an outcome. The control intend to effect a out the fact

that participants had no
particular
heuristic involves two elements: come. Success-focused tasks in control, the motive for control had
one's intention to achieve the out crease illusions
of control because a strong effect on control judg
come and the perceived connection these circumstances lead actors to ments: Participants who were paid
between one's action and the de overestimate the connection be for each appearance of the green
sired outcome. Both intention and tween their action and the success screen had significantly higher per
connection are cues that are used to ful outcome. They do this because ceptions of control than partici
one has. If with on
judge how much control compared tasks focusing pants lacking this motive.
one intended an outcome and can failure, success-oriented tasks pro to the control-heuris
According
see a connection between one's duce more instances in which ac tic model, motives for control affect
own action and the outcome, then tors' actions are followed
by the judgments of control by biasing ei
perceptions of personal control are desired outcome and because ther judgments of intentionality or

high. these types of tasks direct attention of connection. For ex

judgments
Like most heuristics, this simple to success; both of these factors in ample, believing that one could
rule will often lead to accurate crease perceptions of the number have foreseen the outcome height
judgments because
intentionality of positive confirming cases. ens a sense of acting intentionally.
and a perceived connection (e.g., Failure experiences and a focus on Therefore, for individuals who are

seeing that the outcome immedi losing have the opposite effect by motivated to have control, judg
follows one's action) often the times when ac ments of intentionality can be
ately highlighting
occur in situations in which one tors' behavior is not followed by heightened through the hindsight
does, in fact, have control. the desired outcome, thereby bias, in whichindividuals overesti
However, the heuristic can also weakening the perception of con mate the
degree to which they
lead to overestimations of control nection. Depressed mood may be could have an out
anticipated
because intentionality and connec associated with lower assessments come. Counterfactuals, or
imag
tion can occur in situations in of personal control because people ined alternative outcomes to an
which a person has little or no con who are depressed focus on fail event, are another route for a con

trol. For example, gamblers playing ure, not on success. Because of this trol motive to increase illusions of
the slot machines in Las Vegas pull focus on failure, they are less like control. Perceptions of connection
the handles with to can be
the intention of ly than nondepressed people strengthened through the
getting a combination to notice and overestimate the con use of controllable counterfactuals
winning
slide into place. When their handle nection between their own behav because an
imagining undoing
pulling is followed by the desired ior and successes. tecedents that are controllable by
outcome, a connection is estab the actor heightens the connection
lished between their action and the between action and outcome. For
outcome. Because DOES WANTING TO HAVE a who
intentionality example, lottery winner
and connection are strong, the CONTROL LEAD TO thinks, "If I hadn't thought to buy
to think ILLUSORYCONTROL? have won
stage is set for gamblers that ticket, I wouldn't
that they have some control in this $1,000" the connection
highlights
situation. Because the benefits of believing between her action and the desired
The control heuristic
provides a oneself to have control (e.g., posi outcome, whereas imagining a
unifying explanation for all of the tive mood and increased motiva counterfactual with an uncontrol
various factors that have been tion) may be realized even if one's lable element would lessen the
found to affect illusions of control. control is illusory, it seems reason connection.
Each is influential because it af able to suggest that people are
fects perceived intentionality or often motivated to overestimate
the connection between one's be their control. Some recent studies
THE CONSEQUENCES OF
havior and the outcome. For exam inmy lab have examined the effects
ILLUSORYCONTROL
ple, personal involvement is essen of a motive for control on illusory
tial for the illusion of control control judgments. Participants
because connection between an worked on a computer task that Not all people overestimate their
actor's actions and an event cannot was similar to the light task de control. de
personal Moderately
be observed or unless scribed earlier. Motive for control individuals tend to have a
imagined pressed
the actor acts. Foreknowledge is was manipulated by paying some realistic sense of how much they
important for illusory control be participants for each time a green are to an outcome.
contributing
cause without it the actor cannot computer screen appeared. Despite Does that mean that people are bet

Copyright ? 1999 American Psychological Society

 190 VOLUME 8,NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 1999

ter off if they overestimate their measured with a simulated child

Recommended Reading
control? care task in which mothers tried to
personal
a few studies have
ad terminate the crying of an audio
Only Alloy, L.B., & Abramson, L.Y. (1979).
dressed the issue of the adaptive taped baby. Mothers judged their (See References)
ness of illusory control per se. control over stopping the tape by Langer, E.J. (1975). (See References)
Some of these studies have found a button. In Thompson, S.C, Armstrong, W., &
pushing actuality, their Thomas, C
were not to (1998). (See Refer
that illusory control enhances responses connected
ences)
adaptive functioning. A study by the operation of the tape. A subse
Alloy and Clements (1992) exam quent simulation assessed the
ined college students who varied in mothers' ability to learn effective
Note
the degree to which they exhibited responses for getting an infant to
the illusion of control. Compared stop crying. Mothers with a high il 1. Address
correspondence
to
with students who tended not to lusion of control on the first task Suzanne of
Thompson, Department
have illusions of control, students were more to helpless Psychology, Pomona College, Clare
susceptible
who illusions of ness on the second task, for exam mont,CA 91711.
displayed greater
control had less negative mood ple, by not responding even when
after a failure on a lab task, were control was References
possible.
less likely to become discouraged Which is the correct view: that il
Alloy, L.B., & Abramson, L.Y. (1979). Judgment of
when they
subsequently experi lusory thinking is generally useful contingency in depressed and nondepressed
students: Sadder but wiser? Journal of
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Experimental Psychology: General, 108,
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people
occurrence or Alloy, L.B., Abramson, L.Y., & Viscusi, D. (1981).
month later, given the challenging tasks, that people Induced mood and the illusion of control.
of a high number of negative life are better off if they have an accu Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41,
1129-1140.
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Alloy, L.B., & Clements, CM. (1992). Illusion of
to an illusion of control their situation? a third control: Invulnerability to negative affect and
susceptible Perhaps
at a risk for de is correct: Sometimes il depressive symptoms after laboratory and nat
may be decreased possibility ural Stressors. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,

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Biner, P.M., Angle, S.T., Park, J.H., Mellinger, A.E.,
comparison to those individuals other times it is not. For example, & Barber, B.C. (1995). Need and the illusion of
who are not. illusions of control may be reassur control. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 21, 899-907.
In contrast to this positive find ing in stressful situations, but lead
Donovan, W.L., Leavitt, L.A., & Walsh, R.O. (1990).
is also evidence that to take risks
ing, there
Maternal Illusory control and its
people unnecessary self-efficacy:
effect on susceptibility to learned helplessness.
overestimating one's control is not when they occur in a
gambling Child Development, 61,1638-1647.

adaptive. For example, Donovan, context. The challenge for re Langer, E.J. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 32,
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gated illusory
to answer (1998). Illusions of control, underestimations,
trol on child-care outcomes. The riety of situations this and accuracy: A control heuristic explanation.
of control was important question. Psychological Bulletin, 123, 143-161.
degree illusory

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