INTRODUCTION

On July 2010 newspapers in Toronto, Canada carried reports of

Toronto Police Officers involved in public order duties being chastised

by the media, public and members of the Police Authority for their

concealment of their name tags whilst on duty. It questioned the

motive of the officers and the need for accountability for their actions.

This incident provides a similar context for the discussion of question

one (1) and interpreting the main issue of this phenomenon. What is

the issue here? Is it one of accountability of the officers to the public

and by extension to his chief constable? Is it a case of non-compliance

of the police to any orders or regulations or is it a case of defiance

based on his own assessment of the situation?

In this essay I would try to determine which of these issues relate

to the phenomenon and use it to interpret the question. I would then

use a relevant theory to provide an explanation for this phenomenon.

The second part of the essay will look at the design of an evidence-

based strategy for improving accountability in light of the theory. This

strategy will look at the empirical evidence and seek to translate the

findings into some form of policy or regulations to make the officers

more accountable. The third part of the essay will look at designing a

simple experiment to determine the effectiveness of the strategy. The

fourth part would comprise of the leadership plan for implementing the

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entire effort forward. The fifth chapter will conclude with a summary of

the essay; emphasizing on the main points outlined.

At the end of this essay, the relevant theory will be identified and

a successful strategy, field experiment and leadership plan will be

implemented relying on an evidence-based foundation.

APPLICATION OF A THEORECTICAL MODEL

During the G20 Summit in Toronto in July 2010, Toronto Police

spokeswoman Meaghan Cory in commenting on reports of police

officers not wearing nametags on public order duty stated, “ It’s a

professional standards issue and/or potentially an issue of

misconduct…………” (McLean, 2010). This case bear similar

resemblance to the salient issue of the phenomenon being addressed

in the essay question and beg the query as to the exact nature of the

problem to be discussed. Is it an issue of defiance (Sherman 2010),

lack of accountability (Reiner and Spencer 1993); legitimacy (Tyler

1990) or non-compliance to regulations (Scholz, 1997)?

I would like to focus on it as an issue of misconduct as suggested

and interpret it as a matter of non-compliance to rules and regulations

and attempt to place it within a theoretical context to explain its

occurrence (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1991). This will require a broad

applicability of understanding and application of criminological theory.

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It also explores regulatory compliance for organisations and extends

that applicability to the individuals of the organisation also.

Makkai and Braithwaite (1991) posits that the usefulness of regulatory

compliance in such an instance and go on to further explain that even

if the issue is a distinct case of regulatory compliance and not

compliance with criminal law; the framework of criminological theory is

still useful in explaining regulatory compliance. (Bartrum & Bryant,

1997; Walker, 2002).

Criminology offers many theories related to enforcement and

compliance. Among these are the social control theories that focus on

the strategies and techniques that help to regulate human behavior

and leads to conformity and compliance of rules and regulations. It

addresses the general topic of how groups control the behaviors of

members and how more powerful individuals control less powerful

individuals (Klitzner & Sole-Brito, 2002). The most common application

of social control theory to compliance and enforcement is found in

deterrence research. Criminologists have long considered the

relationship between the threat of sanctions and crime and many have

employed the perceptual model of the deterrent process (Paternoster,

1987). Perceptual deterrence posits that the true impact of criminal

sanctions on offending depends on the individual perceptions of the

risks of his/her being caught and punished.

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 The main components of deterrence theory are certainty (how

likely sanctions are to occur), severity (the degree of consequences

associated with the sanctions), and celerity (how swiftly sanctions are

imposed). Ross (1984) defines the central postulate of deterrence

theory this way “ Undesirable behavior will be reduced to the extent

that the relevant public perceives the threatened sanctions as certain,

severe, and promptly imposed”.

Each of these components is hypothesized to negatively affect crime.

i.e. when sanctions are highly likely, swiftly imposed and punitive,

criminal behavior will abate. Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) in proposing a

model for the integration of all three components concluded in their

findings “ the certainty of punishment was a far more robust deterrent

to offending than the severity of the punishment”:

The empirical validity of the deterrence perspective has been

addressed by the meta-analysis (Pratt & Cullen, 2005; Pratt et al,

2006) of over two hundred studies. It argues that as originally

conceived, deterrence theory is more focused on the way individuals

weigh or perceive the relative costs and benefits associated with

behavioral choices (Pratt et al 2006). One of the key findings of Pratt et

al (2006) meta- analysis review of deterrence studies was that there is

a fairly consistent evidence of a moderate inverse relationship

between the certainty of punishment and crime rates, which can be

reasonably be attributed to deterrence.

Deterrence theory lays out a framework of compliance and

corporate behavior and how to manage it (Sherman, 2010); the

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concept being assumed here that the police belong to an organization

and their behavior is regulated by that organization (Pearce & Tombs

1990). It is this premise that will be used to provide a comprehensive

strategy to enforce compliance of rules and regulations as desired.

APPLYING AN APPROPIATE STRATEGY

The question of what is the best strategy for compliance has

always been the main focus of regulatory research (Hopkins, 1994).

The issue of whether to punish or persuade (Braithwaite, 1985) will

often dictate what strategy will be used to bring about compliance.

Advocates of the persuasive approach argue that the instant

prosecution for every violation is counter-productive since it places the

employee on the defensive and limits communications about

compliance problems with the employer (Rees, 1988; Bardach &

Kagan, 1982). The advocates for the punishment approach also argue

that this approach is the only way to get employees to obey the rules

and regulations of the organization (Rees, 1988). They adopt a “

deterrence “ strategy with enforcement “ going by the book” to apply

“ sanctions” for regulatory violations (Grabowski & Braithwaite, 1986).

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This may foster a subculture of resistance, particularly if a

regulation/rule is felt to be unreasonable (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).

In such cases punitive sanctions are apt to backfire, leading to

defiance (Sherman, 1993).

An escalating series of options must be available and the

organization must be prepared to enforce those options where officers

are behaving culpably. These options have been described as an

enforcement pyramid (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992) , flexible regulatory

enforcement ( Rees 1988), and the graduated enforcement response

( Carson & Johnstone, 1990). All these model after Ayres and

Braithwaite’s 1992 enforcement pyramid, which is called the “ benign

big gun strategy”.

This model is built around persuasion and cooperation and will only be

effective when more punitive sanctions are also available (the “big gun

in a hierarchy of increasing punitive measures). In designing effective

evidence based strategy to ensure accountability based on the

deterrent theory, the question is which one of its components to base

my strategy upon; certainty or severity of the punishment? I propose a

combination approach to the strategy; as evidenced by Ayres and

Braithwaite (1992) enforcement pyramid and the empirical evidence

and findings of general crime data (Eide, 2000). This supports the

general theory of deterrence; that probability of detection and

conviction, along with increases in sanctions tend to reduce crime.

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 Firstly there needs to be developed a set of policies, standards

and procedures capable of preventing any further misconduct. This is

an accountability procedure that involves the direction and control of

police through formal agency policies such as specifying approved and

forbidden actions in written policies (Davis, 1975).

Next would be the oversight of the standards by a high level of

command staff. This is to ensure that the routine supervision of

personnel not complying with the required standards by means of

inspections and audits and that deterrence decay (Sherman 1990)

does not occur.

Effective communications of the standards and procedures must

be relayed to the police officers. This would ensure that the officers are

knowledgeable of the component parts of the rules and regulations

and their sanctions. Ross (1984) also notes that publicity of increased

enforcement leads to increase perception of the certainty of

punishment.

Lastly there must be the enforcement of disciplinary mechanisms

when violations or non-compliance occurs. The offender must believe

that the celerity and severity of the disciplinary actions will be imposed

(Ross, 1984). Compliance strategy depends upon the expected penalty

facing the police officers and the probability of the detection being

communicated and the severity of punishment, if caught. A key

question is whether the probability of punishment is a more effective

deterrent than the severity of the punishment and how to test the

effectiveness of the proposed strategy.

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COMPLIANCE AND EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY

Sherman (2009) notes that experiments are elegant in their simplicity and there is

a need to be also simple in their analysis. This simplicity allows for people to be able to

easily grasp the meaning of the results. It is with this tenet in mind that I will design a

protocol or blue print of a randomized control trial (RCT) for a police field experiment.

The protocol will consist of the research problem, literature review, aim, hypothesis and

method of investigation (O’Brien & Wright, 2002).

The purpose of the experiment is to test the effectiveness of the compliance

strategy and the deterrent effects of punishment. It will focus on and assess the effects of

the certainty of a sanction threat on the incidence of hiding nametags and to compare this

to the severity of such a sanction in deterring such misconduct (Charles & Rowe, 1973).

A review of literature on criminal deterrence (von Hirsch et al, 1999) concentrated on the

issue of ‘marginal deterrence’, i.e. the effects of making changes to the certainty, severity

and celerity of punishment. This research confirmed earlier deterrence studies, and found

substantial negative correlations between the likelihood of conviction

(a "certainty" measure) and crime rates. (A "negative correlation" meaning that increased

likelihood of conviction is statistically associated with declining crime rates, or vice-

versa.).

Therefore the aim of the experiment is to determine the effectiveness of the

compliance strategy and seeks to reject the null hypothesis “ that the perceived severity of
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sanction will increase compliance of rules and regulations as compared to perceived

certainty of sanction “

The method of investigation will be to select three police divisions within the

country. These police division coded A, B & C will have to represent the highest

percentage of public order incidents in the country. In addition there must be a

corresponding number of reported incidents of misconduct in relation to not wearing

nametags on duty for the past year to allow for research design.

Police division A would be designated the control group and there would be a pre

recording of the amount of reported incidents of misconduct of not adhering to policy of

wearing nametags. In this group the supervisors would ensure that the rules and

regulations about wearing nametags would be daily briefed at the beginning of any shift.

No specific mention would be made to either the severity of sanctions or measures to

ensure certainty (probability) of detection of violators.

Police division B would be designated experimental group #1. There will be pre

test recording of all recorded past reports of misconduct for the last 12 months. In this

group, supervisors will brief officers daily at the beginning of each shift about the rules

and regulations and specifically about the severity of the sanctions for violations.

Police division C would be designated experimental group #2. There will be pre

test recording of all reports of misconduct over the last 12 months. In this group the

supervisors will brief the officers daily on the rules and regulations and specifically the

systems in place (certainty) for detecting non-compliance of the rules.

The methods used to collect data will be social observation by undercover teams

unknown to the units in the jurisdictions. There would be an amalgamation of data

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received from reported incidents from the public or media. The statistical analysis will

look at the mean difference between the pre and post test findings of the groups over a

one-year period of public order incidents. The outcome measure for this experiment

should be a statistical reduction in reported incidents in the experimental division # 2

based on the findings of von Hirsch et al, (1999).

CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP PLAN

“Controlling police behavior is a management problem” (Skogan

and Meares, 2004; p.78); the concern being how the chief constable

influences the behavior of his officers. In their review of police

literature, Brogden et al (1988) notes that there are two forms of police

reforms; the first being “rule-tightening “ as a means of controlling

police discretion and “changing the informal culture of the police

organization” It is within these two broad context that I would base my

leadership plan to carry my strategy forward. In rule tightening; I would

briefly look at processes I can provide leadership direction for

increasing accountability, procedural fairness and the legitimacy of the

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strategy. In addition I will look at a way of trying to change “the code

of silence” one of the informal cultural norms of the police service in

regards to breaches of conduct.

Tyler (2007) posits that people comply with the law for

normative reasons and that preparedness to obey the law is a function

of the perceived institutional legitimacy. The preparedness to comply

is a function of the perceived fairness of procedures and the personal

style of the officials carrying out the procedures and much as the

perceived fairness of the outcomes (Tyler and Huo, 2002). The

drafting of the rules and regulations for the compliance strategy will be

committee based with representation and input by the officers

association. This directive will ensure that it is a participatory process

and “ buy in” is gotten across the organization.

Effective accountability is vital to the achievement of the goals of

policing. Many experts argue that police agencies that reduce

problematic officer behavior will enjoy greater trust among citizens and

will receive greater cooperation from citizens (Bayley, 2002, Harris,

2005). It is with this in mind that specific accountability measures will

be put in place to ensure the accountability of the officers on duty and

their supervisors with respect to wearing of nametags. It is an

established principle in policing that first line supervisors (sergeants)

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plays a critical role in directing and controlling office behavior in police-

citizen interactions (Walker 2007). Additionally they play a critical role

in most policing accountability functions. I would establish policy for

the ratio of sergeants to officer (the span of control); set at one

sergeant to eight officers. Investigations have found that misconduct

problems occur where departments fail to meet adequate span of

control standards (Bobb, 2002).

Punch (1983) has suggested that police culture has as its

primary allegiance not the organization; but the job and the peer

groups that make up the organization. This allegiance also has its own

informal rules and regulations about how things are done; what should

or should not be done in certain situations and why things are done the

way they are (Chan, 1996). One of the major concerns is the apparent

code of silence and solidarity among police officers when faced with

allegations of misconduct and the manipulation of records to protect

themselves against supervisors (Manning, 1977).

Training in ethics and ethical behavior must be an important

component of my leadership plan to take this strategy forward. This

training must resonate from top to bottom within the service and

ethical conduct and standards established as an integral component of

police operations and behavior. Officers must constantly be reminded

of what’s right and what’s wrong. Several types of evidence suggest

that ethical values may shape rule adherence behavior and ethical

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concerns motivate self-regulatory behavior in organisations (King &

Lennox, 2000; Rechtschaffen, 1998).

CONCLUSION

Was it a question of accountability or non–compliance in the

introduction of the essay to the phenomenon of police officers not

wearing nametags? As identified in the example (Insidethestar.com,

2010); misconduct and non-compliance was determined as the main

issue and the deterrence theory was applied as the criminological

theoretical framework. The applicability of other economic models of

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deterrence was integrated and the components of certainty, celerity

and severity of punishment used as the core discussions factors (Nagin

and Pogarsky, 2001).

Using this model, a strategy of persuasion versus punishment

was explored and a modified enforcement pyramid model espoused by

Braithwaite and Ayres (1992) selected. A simple experiment protocol

(O’Brien& Wright, 2002) was then designed to test the effectiveness of

the strategy. This RCT experiment used a control group and two

experimental groups to test the hypothesis of certainty of punishment

will result in increased compliance as compared to severity of

punishment. A statistical analysis of mean difference being proposed

to produce the findings. Finally a leadership plan for the way forward

was developed. It focused on devising processes of legitimacy,

procedural fairness, accountability and ethics training to change

ingrained cultural norms (Chan, 1996).

Police officers must be held accountable for their actions and the

chief constable is responsible for the controlling of his officers behavior

(Skogan and Meares, 2004). The systems and procedures the chief

constable put in place will reflect on the professional conduct of the

agency and accountability of his officers as required by law.

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