THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL APRIL 2008 219

What price supersonic speed? an applied

market research case study Part 2
B. Chudoba, A. Oza and G. Coleman
University of Texas at Arlington
Arlington, Texas
USA

P. A. Czysz
HyperTech Concepts LLC
St Louis, Missouri
USA

ABSTRACT 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The first supersonic business jet to enter the market will not face its
competition from rival supersonic designs under development. Its
true competitors are the then current generation of highly evolved
high-subsonic business jets when compared on economic grounds.
For a price tag of $1m for the new conception of very light jets,
ranging up to $45m for the highest-performing ‘race-horse’-like
corporate jets, this breed of aircraft is able to accommodate the needs
of most executives, VIPs, officials, from corporate transportation to
cargo services of civil to military origin. Understanding the state of
modern business class aircraft and their market is essential in
gaining base knowledge required for any supersonic business jet
endeavor aiming at a prospective market. The key descriptors for
this marketplace are market potential, market productivity, and
market drivers, altogether being a measure for growth and consumer
demand. Such common denominator is used to gain the under-
standing necessary to ascertain and visualise the top level implica-
tions regarding any supersonic business case. Having assembled an
understanding of the key descriptors for business aviation, the study
first analyses the flight operation of traditional subsonic and high-
subsonic business jets. Such perceptive is then complemented with
the peculiarities associated with supersonic operation, ultimately
defining the supersonic solution space consisting of market viability,
efficiency, and overall flight performance. Consequently, a vehicle
development strategy and mission specification are suggested for the
first generation of supersonic business jets (SSBJ) and supersonic
cargo jets (SSCJ).
1.1 Background
Business jets constitute an important business tool, offering versa-
tility to a diverse consumer base in today’s fast-paced and high-
performance global economy. With the utilisation of a corporate jet,
a business person has the ability to accomplish in one day what takes
nearly three days with a commercial airliner(1). If time truly is
money, then the operational capability of the business jet serves its
purpose well.
1.2 Research approach selected
Reference 2 briefly reviews past and present supersonic business jet
(SSBJ) projects. Acknowledging the overall SSBJ development
challenge, it becomes obvious that a high-technology product devel-
opment mentality prevails, optimistically adapting not yet available
or proven industry capability in the primary areas of advanced
propulsion, aerodynamics (e.g., supersonic laminar flow), and
operation (e.g., low-boom configuration). Without exception, these
projects have in common to be technically complex and costly,
translating into an uncertain programme launch and entry into
service time plan. Consequently, no SSBJ hardware programme has
ever been launched until today. It should be mentioned here that
simply putting forth the ‘mindset’ for a SSBJ is not always sufficient

Paper No. 3239. Manuscript received 18 September 2007, revised 20 February 2008, accepted 26 February 2008.
The first part of this paper was published in the March 2008 edition of The Aeronautical Journal.
220 THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL
to ensure success. To this end, it is the authors’ hope that the reader
clearly understands the research approach adopted to avoid ‘wishful
thinking’ at all cost, enabling to systematically survey, interpret, and
incorporate the rich pool of history lessons learned related to the
technology and operation of civil and military supersonic aircraft
project case studies(2,3,4).
Since the 1980s, history has not been kind to those organisations
hoping to breach into the world of supersonic flight for business
aviation. To summarise, two words are commonplace: PROJECT
CANCELLED. Institutions ranging from NASA, Boeing, and
Lockheed to business jet manufacturers including Gulfstream,
Sukhoi, Raytheon, and Dassault have all tried, unsuccessfully to
mature the SSBJ towards a programme launch. So, is the current
generation of SSBJs doomed to relive the lessons of the past?
Clearly, termination of a project usually does not result in a public
disclosure of why these previous ventures have been cancelled.
The objectives for this paper are twofold:
1. comprehend and document lessons learned related to high-speed
transportation; and
2. determine what constraints the market does impose before SSBJ
design work actually begins.
The present study has adopted the following ground rules:
● design for the existing high-subsonic business jet infrastructure
resembling the true marketplace;
● shift away from the restrictive concept considering SSBJs as an
exotic VIP means of transportation only; thus, allow design
features to address a broader customer base whilst resulting into
a practical product with an economic flight rate;
● design what the market can conveniently tolerate from a vehicle
operational productivity versus cost perspective; avoid the
mentality to strive for vehicle perfection but instead balance
operational utilisation and development risk versus purchase
price and time to market;
● encourage sustainable growth through fleet development: first
arrive at feasible but simple design to capture marketplace and
enable first-hand critical path analysis, resulting in refined
commercialisation through product development.
1.3 SSBJ product development challenge
The corporate aviation industry is, like the commercial aviation
industry, driven by innovation to satisfy market demand and to
control product success in a highly competitive market place(5). In
such an environment, any misjudgment of the available market or
required product performance clearly jeopardises project or
programme success. The above ground rules are particularly unfor-
giving in the case of the SSBJ, where the identification of the true
business case is an absolute requirement before design work can
begin. Using the above understanding, additional challenges to
overcome include the fact that the metrics for corporate trans-
portation differ significantly from commercial transportation,
where aircraft productivity is solely defined using descriptors like
seats available, load factor, speed, annual aircraft utilisation, and
number of aircraft in the fleet, all equating into annual individual
aircraft passenger miles and the size of the fleet(6). Corporate trans-
portation is additionally characterised by the ‘VIP-parameter’, a
difficult to quantify parameter having a profound effect on overall
aircraft productivity. Dependent on the individual corporate
operator, aircraft productivity is usually compromised for VIP
necessities and perceptions like executive seniority level, status,
prestige, privilege, and comfort, ultimately translating into decisive
corporate productivity.
Note that the argumentation presented throughout the paper does
not propose on how best to design a SSBJ; instead, the research team
APRIL 2008
recommends a strategy towards the first generation of feasible and
commercially viable SSBJs, thereby creating an evolutionary path
towards future high-speed transportation. The premise adopted is,
that this first step does not require a costly high technology
approach, but an affordable tactic very well within the available
industry capability.
2.0 CORPORATE AVIATION – A MARKET
ASSESSMENT
A variety of market forecasts characterise the current state and future
trends of business aviation. Outlooks from Honeywell, Rolls-Royce,
the Teal Group and Walsh Aviation have been reviewed, analysed
and compared, see Ref. 6. Note that the reviews from Honeywell and
Rolls-Royce are considered the ‘gold standard’ for the business
aviation industry(7). From this discussion, the present section
provides an abbreviated perspective only on the future of corporate
transportation.
2.1 Business jet deliveries
Predicting a cyclic market requires numerous considerations, but
none as important as understanding the historical trends. With this
regard, the benchmark in the industry was recognised in 2001, when
787 business jets were delivered. Shortly thereafter, the jet market,
along with the economy, transitioned into a recession. The industry
recovered abruptly in 2003 into a traditional cyclic behaviour. By
2004, 562 deliveries were accumulated aided by a sudden economic
turnaround. This growth was not predicted to occur for several
years(7). From the year 2005 onwards the business jet deliveries are
steadily increasing, with 710 deliveries in 2005 and 885 units in
2006. At the time of writing, the 2007 figures are unavailable;
however, this upwards trend is generally expected for the year 2007.
A range of scenarios have been discussed when considering the
future of the corporate industry, see Ref. 6. Honeywell and Rolls-
Royce are optimistic with their predictions through 2024 and
embrace the potential for record setting growth. Though the market
is not explicitly outlined by Honeywell after 2015, the overall
upward trend agrees with the Rolls-Royce projections. The Teal
Group favors a more moderate outlook but overall confirms the
promising corporate jet market potential. Walsh Aviation presents
the most conservative forecast, thereby reflecting the instabilities in
global economy and others which may translate into uncertain
corporate profits. According to Boeing, the year 2009 possesses the
largest potential for a new product release. Honeywell and Rolls-
Royce projections tend to agree with such assessment since the
opportunity for growth is significant. In summary, economic growth
is stronger than any time before. Corporate jet forecasts generally
agree with the pattern of continued travel growth seen today.
Prospective SSBJ manufacturers should be able to capitalise on the
opportunity of economic stability and corporate profits.
2.2 Business aviation segment forecasts
Each of the four market forecasting organisations, Honeywell, Rolls-
Royce, Teal Group, and Walsh Aviation have their own methods of
classifying business jets. Growth in each segment requires the
manufacturer to distinguish where best to encourage product
activity. This situation is becoming more complicated when
assessing the implications of introducing a new product, the SSBJ. It
is required to understand the driving factors and implications of
segment growth.
Honeywell and Rolls-Royce project that while growth can be
expected in all segments, the middle to upper classes of business jets
will benefit most. The Walsh Aviation report agrees related to
medium aircraft, but takes a more conservative stance for longer
CHUDOBA ET AL WHAT PRICE SUPERSONIC SPEED? – AN APPLIED MARKET RESEARCH CASE STUDY – PART 2 221

SSBJ Max Cruise Speed(Mach)

SSBJ Range(km)
BJ Max Cruise Speed(Mach)
BJ Range(km) Cost and Range Penalty
Cost (Millions)
Cost (Millions)
Time Savings Max 16,000 100 Cost per
and Cost penalty $90
Max 2.5 $90 100 Cost per Range $80 $83 $80 Aircraft
Curise $83 Aircraft (km) 80 (Millions)
$80 $80 12,000
Speed 2 80 (Millions)
(Mach) 60
$50 $50 $46
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Figure 1. Maximum cruise speed and cost comparison of supersonic Figure 2. Maximum range and cost comparison of supersonic
business jets with high-subsonic business jets. business jets with high-subsonic business jets.

range aircraft. In general, the Honeywell and Rolls-Royce forecasts
predict the medium to very long-range (ultra long-range) segment to
dominate growth over the next decade. The higher end of the market is
of particular interest because of the elevated end-user stability with
focus on quality rather than quantity. The particular success of this
high end market emphasises the continued presence of an exclusive
business jet class where price ($45-50m) is a novelty for the best
product available(8). The consequence of this argument is the inability
to access a larger share of the consumer base. In this context, the SSBJ
projects currently under development are targeting a purchase price of
$80 to $100m, thereby drastically limiting the customer base to the
very privileged and wealthy. Clearly, such SSBJ conception does not
compete against the larger share of the market nor does it compete
within the existing market. Instead, this first-ever SSBJ product is
endangered to isolate itself within an ultra-narrow bubble, questioning
its contribution to sustainable economic growth while demonstrating
an uncertain self-supporting future. Speed at what cost? The above
outlined show-stopper is consistently confirmed by the lack of any
commitment towards launching a SSBJ hardware aircraft development
programme until today. Then, it is apt to explore and decipher the
acceptable tolerance level of todays and future economies related to
SSBJ cost, speed and range.
3.0 MARKET PRESENCE AND DESIGN
IMPLICATIONS TOWARDS THE SSBJ
The idea to complement the existing means of transportation with a
SSBJ has been under discussion since the late 80s. Since then,
Concorde has been retired from service, bringing into question the
ability of the market to sustain and provide motivation for a super-
sonic mode of transportation, see Refs 2 and 9. Still, acknowledging
today's available industry capability as a reference, it appears that the
SSBJ can become an economic reality. It is clear that the balance
between SSBJ productivity and market response is governed by its
overall cost structure. The past 20 years have witnessed an
imbalance between those governing factors, resulting in the failing
to launch a viable SSBJ development programme. The key question
emerges: what combination of capability, cost, and market demand
will tolerate and subsequently result in a self-sustained SSBJ?
3.1 High-subsonic and supersonic business jet
performance and cost comparison
The proposed SSBJ projects(2) promise to significantly increase
cruise speed and reduce flight times compared to current high
subsonic business jets. Such time savings have been identified
desirable by many corporations around the world. However, at what
point does the purchase price and operating cost of the vehicle
outweigh the time savings? Clearly, supersonic business jets will be
more expensive to operate compared to their high-subsonic counter-
parts(2). Thus, to remain competitive, it is the purchase price coupled
with key performance characteristics which become a primary
indicator for programme success.
3.1.1 Speed and range vs cost
Figures 1 and 2 compare the maximum cruise speed, range, and unit
cost for the proposed SSBJ projects with representative high-
subsonic high-performance aircraft, the Cessna Citation X (world’s
fastest business jet), the Gulfstream G550 (world’s longest range
business jet), and the Bombardier Challenger 300 (an average
business jet). As expected, the SSBJs produce a dramatic increase in
cruise speed while the range remains a primary operational concern.
However, this significant speed increase coincides with a dramatic
increase in aircraft unit price.
3.1.2 Max takeoff and fuel weight
The comparison of SSBJ projects with current high-performing high-
subsonic business jets does not correlate exactly. In particular, due to
the small size and high cost of the currently proposed SSBJ projects, it
appears that they do not compare well with the medium weight class
vehicles (Citation X and Challenger 300) although the flight ranges are
similar. In contrast, the SSBJs show similar weight characteristics
compared to the ultra long range business jets, see Fig. 3, and fuel
weight characteristics, see Fig. 4. However, this comparison identifies a
large range and cost discrepancy. This subsequently requires a separate
comparison of the SSBJ to both, the (a) medium weight class business
jets, and (b) the ultra long range business jets.
3.1.2.1 Comparison: SSBJ vs ultra long-range business jet
Although the SSBJs perform a similar mission compared to the ultra
long range business jets, they provide increased speed at the expense
of operational cost (fuel, maintenance) and purchase price. For most
of the cases shown, the maximum take-off weights (Fig. 3) and fuel
weights (Fig. 4) compare well for the ultra-long range business jets
with the SSBJs. However, to travel the same distance as an ultra
long range business jet, one refueling stop is required for the SSBJs,
thereby doubling the amount of fuel required. From an operations
perspective, to economically perform a long range mission, the time
advantage for a SSBJ must justify the increase in fuel consumption
and associated cost.
222 THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL APRIL 2008

SSBJ M TOW If the additional operational cost implicit with the SSBJ are
SSBJ simular to Ultra deemed acceptable for the mission, then the issue becomes one of
BJ Long Range BJ
purchase price only. With the exception of the Sukhoi designs, the
MTOW 80000 weight class
current SSBJ projects’ purchase prices are double the value of a
(kg)
Gulfstream G550, which is a high-value business jet. Considering in
60000 addition the SSBJs small passenger capacity, see Fig. 5, supersonic
corporate transportation is at a severe disadvantage. Again, the
40000 produced time savings, thus speed, may not justify doubling the
purchase and fuel cost relative to ultra long-range business jets.
20000

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3.1.2.2 Comparison: SSBJ vs medium weight class business jet
While the SSBJ designs presented are significantly heavier
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Figure 3. Maximum take-off weight comparison for
SSBJs and high-subsonic business jets.
for a SSBJ is easily four times the cost of a medium weight class
Cessna Citation X (the fastest business jet) and requires as much as
four to five times the amount of fuel for the same mission. SSBJ
airframers tend to offset this fact by promoting the considerable time
advantage, thereby implying that the significantly higher purchase
price is justified without discussion. By comparison, most new SSBJ
projects must justify a 400% increase in unit price along with a
possible 500% increase in fuel consumption. In summary, purchase
price becomes the dominant design variable responsible for the
definition of the SSBJ business case.

3.1.3 Comparison summary

Although the discussion presented here appears to doom SSBJs in
general as inherent failures, this is neither the case nor our intent.
The objective of this section has been to merely highlight how the
current SSBJ projects weigh against the current generation of
corporate jets. Consequently, the significantly higher SSBJ purchase
price, coupled with appreciably higher operational cost, both factors
do not compare well with the current generation of high-subsonic
business jets. This apparent ‘catch-22’ type situation explains the
enduring stagnation towards a practicable SSBJ until today.
Supersonic flight of aircraft resembling the size and speed of current
SSBJ design proposals inevitably results in a high operational cost
Figure 5. Pax comparison for supersonic business jets and overhead (too small and too slow), see Refs 2 and 10. Consequently,
high-subsonic business jets. the remaining variable available to reduce the cost of supersonic
flight at the scale of the SSBJ is to significantly reduce the purchase
price, a fact impossible when (a) developing a new airframe and (b)
SSBJ fuel weight
SSBJ simular to Ultra
when incorporating technology beyond today's industry capability.
BJ Long Range BJ Note that the operating cost for a SSBJ must compare directly to the
40000 weight class available time savings, thereby enabling us to define a viable
Max
Fuel
mission. Furthermore, to remain competitive, the purchase price
Weight 30000 should not exceed a reasonable upper limit compared to other high-
(kg) end business jets. This naturally restricts the amount of new
20000 technology which economically integrates into a new design and
may result in a more realistic solution for continued growth.
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3.2 Product development strategy
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Figure 4. Maximum fuel weight comparison
for SSBJ and high-subsonic business jets.
reinvent itself for the SSBJ; therefore, the SSBJ must successfully
function and adapt to the constraints imposed by the existing
marketplace. With the modern business jet aircraft gradually
reaching a developmental plateau, the market is more than ever
aware of the looming prospect and pitfalls revolving around super-
CHUDOBA ET AL WHAT PRICE SUPERSONIC SPEED? – AN APPLIED MARKET RESEARCH CASE STUDY – PART 2
Figure 6. Difference of perspective from
market approach to market design.
sonic business transportation, especially at a time where the barrel
oil reaches and may even exceed the $100 limit. The parameters of
concern are cost, speed, range, and passenger capacity. Figure 6 is
organising the lowest cost designs towards the left, the highest cost
designs are located towards the right. Note that such cost trends do
not coincide with an increase or decrease in passenger capacity as
seen with commercial transports. Consequently, the SSBJ designs
positioned towards the right of the figure can be considered higher-
risk products due to their lower overall productivity. Actual refer-
ences for comparison can be derived from both Sukhoi SSBJ
designs, see Fig. 6. Comparing the Sukhoi SSBJ cost targets with
the high-subsonic business jets cost reference, the projected $50m
purchase price for the S-21G and S-21 is striving for convergence in
cost and passenger capability, conforming most effectively with the
existing business aviation market. This approach to product devel-
opment is typically seen with Russian designs: lower cost approach
and simplicity based on existing industry capability resulting in a
lower risk effort while offering an effective and first to the market
product solution. Conversely, there is the Western approach to
product development, where technological gain is utilised to the full
in order to arrive at a product advantage while, at the same time,
accepting an increased overall risk. Still, the all-new SSBJ designs
projected until now are straining the opportunity for success while
moving the design away from the consumer base.
The validity of the above argument should not be undervalued.
Simple, cheap, and effective appear to be strong attributes
describing a promising evolutionary development approach
applicable to the first generation of SSBJs. The success of
numerous Russian products by being ‘first’ is sufficient testament
confirming the overall potential of the approach. Consider for a
moment the Tupolev
Tu-144 and the Space Station Mir; both achievements are represen-
tative examples of how available industry capability has been
utilised to pioneer a market. Obviously, maintaining such leadership
role requires timely maturation of new technology to complement
the available industry capability and ultimately product. Thus, be
aware that the ‘simple, cheap, and effective’ approach is as well
prone to failure, as seen with the abandoning of the Tu-144 in 1978
after only three service years.
3.3 Placement of SSBJs into the existing corporate
market
The introduction of the first generation of SSBJs into the existing
corporate marketplace necessitates SSBJ designs with a purchase
price notably below the $80-100m apiece price tag. This key
requirement circumvents the otherwise inevitable isolation from the
223
SSBJs
Figure 7. Market distribution: 2005-2024(11).
potential market, as seen with all projected SSBJ projects to date.
Conforming to the core of the corporate market most adequately
showcases an ability for renewed and sustainable growth, bringing
with it considerable access to consumers. Figure 7 depicts jet deliv-
eries and market value for a 20-year forecast of the business jet
industry. According to Rolls-Royce(10), the market distribution
clearly indicates a ‘top heavy market’, see Fig. 7. It is to be
expected that manufacturers will continue to invest profoundly into
the light medium to very long range aircraft class, thereby demon-
strating confidence into an already established and promising future
market characterised by a strong customer base. The projected SSBJ
market volume is indicated in Fig. 7 based on information provided
by the Aerion Corporation(12). The reference points are described as
300 to 500 supersonic business jet deliveries with an estimated
purchase cost of $80-90m over a 20-year forecast, average 400
shipments and $85m each. This narrow benchmark translates into
an equally narrow space within the market, see Fig. 7. Note that the
bizliners (large business airliner), which are less expensive
compared to a SSBJ, control a larger market presence. Unlike the
highly evolved high-subsonic business jet competition, the SSBJs
are limited in growth due to their high value for low volume charac-
teristics. This setting tends to isolate this aircraft category from the
remainder of the market, thereby translating the SSBJ market into a
‘one-dimensional market’ being highly vulnerable since it depends
on sustainable growth. Having established the first generation of
SSBJs, it is required to further integrate follow-on SSBJ generations
with their high-subsonic counterparts and customer base. Ideally,
the SSBJ market should reciprocate the trends put forth by high-
subsonic business jets and must remain accessible and competitive.
4.0 UNDERSTANDING OPERATIONAL
ASPECTS OF HIGH-SUBSONIC
BUSINESS AVIATION
The flight operations analysis evaluates the characteristics of key
operational parameters with the intention to determine the best
operational profile for a SSBJ. The competing market is defined by
existing high-subsonic business jets and evaluating their represen-
tative parameters will help to determine the solution space in which
the SSBJ has to operate with emphasis on best market potential,
efficiency, and overall flight performance. The objective of the
present section is to determine the constraints and trends associated
within the existing business jet industry. This analysis is funda-
mental in determining under what conditions a SSBJ can economi-
cally fit the market, as it is the flight operational aspect which most
strongly influences consumer appeal, aircraft value, operational
224 THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL
Table 1
Representative BJ specifications
cost, and overall performance. Once the governing operational
parametrics are understood, the mission specification can be
deduced. Therefore, this section begins by defining and analysing
the operational requirements of existing high-subsonic business jets
and then applies this understanding to the emerging class of SSBJs
in the follow on section where a SSBJ flight operations analysis is
performed to determine the trends and sensitivities relating to
speed, range, time zone effects, frequency and number of stops. The
SSBJ flight operations analysis finally defines a mission and recom-
mends flight operational profiles, thereby representing the starting
point for any follow-on conceptual design study.
4.1 Subsonic business jet flight operations
Today’s business jets possess a maximum range capability from
around 1,200nm (2,222km) to 6,600nm (12,223km) and the speed
ranges from about 375kt (695km/h) to 522kt (968km/h). Three
representative aircraft have been chosen to analyse specified routes
and determine flight characteristics. Table 1 shows the range and
speed characteristics of the Cessna Citation X being the highest
speed business jet and the Gulfstream G550 as the longest range
business jet on the corporate jet market. Consequently, these two
aircraft are representative for the wide spectrum of business jets
available. To represent an average performing business jet, the
characteristics for the Citation X and G550 have been averaged and
the Bombardier Challenger 300 has been selected as a represen-
tative aircraft for this class.
Before the operational evaluation can begin, the classification
system for business jets should first be addressed. One accepted
figure of merit for classifying corporate transports is that of
maximum take-off weight (MTOW). By this value, the business jet
aircraft are divided into eight categories. Although these do not
linearly correspond to range, there is a general relationship between
MTOW and range. Consequently, for the present analysis, these
classifications will be subdivided into the following three general
working definitions: short range (1,500-2,000nm), medium range
(2,000-3,900nm), and long range (3,900-7,000nm) business jets.
4.2 Business jet airport operation
A key aspect determining the versatility and desirability of business
jets is the availability of airport alternatives. Figure 8 illustrates that
the number of airports available to the business jet community is
dependent on the runway length, thereby implying a certain field
performance. Clearly, corporate jets offer superior operational flexi-
bility compared to commercial transports. Figure 8 is based on
airport data for 12 distinct nations throughout the world with paved
runways(13).
Not only does an executive who utilises a business jet have a
larger selection of airports to choose from, he also experience a
much faster turnaround time during technical stops (between 30 to
40 minutes) compared to commercial transports. The short
corporate turn around times are a result of the aircraft size and the
fact that business jets are specifically serviced by the airport fixed
base operator (FBO). The FBO serves to provide fuel, oil, catering
and cleaning, as well as airframe, propulsion, and accessory
services.
APRIL 2008
Approx. 6000
Airports Light
3000 Business Jets Over 3047 m
2500 Med. Business 2438-3047 m
2000 Jets 1524-2437 m
Number of Airports 1500 914-1523 m
1000 Commercial Under 914 m
500 Transports
0
1
Runway Length Groups (m)
Figure 8. Number of runways versus runway length
(based on sampling 12 major countries).
4.3 Effect of ETOPS on business jet operation
The extended-range twin-engine operation performance standards
(ETOPS) are chosen to safeguard the operational ability of the
aircraft with an appropriate diversion time to a suitable airport in the
event of a single engine failure during flight over water. Certification
is meticulously derived from critical-engine flight performance over-
land, over-water, during prevailing weather interactions, due to
aircraft modifications, and engine and airframe operating histories.
This approach safeguards the ability of the aircraft to arrive at a
suitable airport assuming average piloting skills. Clearly, it is of
significance to understand the latter implications on the corporate jet
industry.
In practice, ETOPS is primarily regulated through the certification
authorities of the United States and the European Union, authorised
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The FAA, until now, recognises
business jet operation without constraints, excluding it from ETOPS
regulations. In contrast, with the European Union in transition and
the EASA not yet representing an independent organisation, an
EASA-JAA affiliation has been adopted allowing select JAA actions
to be performed under EASA. Within its jurisdiction, the JAA desig-
nates that business jets adhere to the ETOPS 120 minute rule. For
the operator, this difference translates into significant latitude in
route selection.
Before ETOPS certification is approved, first an aircraft system-
wide reliability assessment must be performed to indicate the satis-
faction for type design approval and operational approval. Type
design approval is described as the determination whether the
airframe-engine combination has satisfied the propulsion system
reliability criteria for ETOPS. Secondly, the operational approval
concentrates on the operators' capability to demonstrate propulsion
system reliability, special engineering, and flight crew procedures
with reference to the airworthiness regulations from which they
originated. With the approval system often times being statistically
motivated, preference is biased towards longer-range operator
experience for accelerated certification. Consequently, an
unfavorable record could result in a prolonged certification process
ultimately downgrading the corporate jet’s functionality while
compromising its market position. Clearly, our ‘cheap, simple and
effective’ research and development paradigm towards the first
generation of SSBJs appears to be constrained thus compromised
with regards to ETOPS regulations and their execution. Such
situation complicates the still incomplete SSBJ certification
framework and understanding available to the designer today.
4.4 Business jet route analysis
To accomplish a route analysis requires the three selected business
jets in Table 1 to consistently compare for one representative route
that adequately depicts business jet flight performance and flight
operations. To choose this route, the exceptional range capability of
CHUDOBA ET AL WHAT PRICE SUPERSONIC SPEED? – AN APPLIED MARKET RESEARCH CASE STUDY – PART 2 225

the Gulfstream G550 (longest range jet) has been selected as the
reference for comparison. Thus, the route chosen is the city pair
New York to Moscow, which equates to 4,085nm, see Fig. 9.
The flight performance of each of the three representative
aircraft, the G550, Citation X, and Challenger 300, has been
analysed along this route. The G550 is capable of making the
journey without a technical stop while the Citation X and
Challenger 300 are both required to make two technical stops
towards their destination resulting in an increased overall trip time.
The results of this route analysis are presented in Fig. 9 by
providing the number of technical stops on the particular route
chosen, the individual flight times and corresponding distances.
Figure 9. Reference route selected for
Despite the inherent speed advantage of the Citation X, the ability
business jets: New York to Moscow.
of the G550 to connect the city pair non-stop gives it an overall time
advantage. Comprehending the interplay of these key performance
parameters for high-subsonic speeds will aide to determine SSBJ-
specific performance sensitivities and constraints related to speed,
range, time, number of stops, and the ratio of subsonic to supersonic
miles flown over land to water. For the SSBJ, the percentage of
miles flown over water/land becomes a dominant factor affecting
overall programme viability from an operational and economic
position when compared to subsonic corporate jets. This perfor-
mance and operational characteristic is directly related to the
aircraft geometry-induced sonic boom intensity and signature.
Although several SSBJ designs are already adopting the operational
advantages of the ‘low-boom’ aircraft concept, costly technology
development has not yet transformed this concept into industry
capability. Figure 10 depicts the average percentage of miles flown
over water for a random sampling of subsonic business jets. Though
this figure indicates that around 25% of air miles are over water, it
is important to distinguish that the underlying statistics sample US
flights only, thus are not presenting a global average. Clearly, the
over water percentage does increase for a global perspective. In this Figure 10. Average percent miles flown over water and land(14).
context, the reference route analysed earlier (New York to Moscow)
rates 29% over land and 71% over water operation. This fact is of
importance since over-water operation tends to tolerate higher sonic load compared to its subsonic counterparts, the increased take-off
boom intensities compared to over-land operation. Clearly, the distances result in reduced airport flexibility compared to standard
lower the sonic boom intensity measured on the ground, the higher business jets, but still superior flexibility compared to commercial
the aircraft productivity due to larger permissible speeds and transports. In addition, SSBJs may require technical stops for
therefore decreased flight times. However, development of ‘low- refueling dependent on the range of the target destination. In order
boom’ designs currently translates into substantial R&D efforts to maximise supersonic operational time savings, technical stops
leading to high SSBJ purchase prices at a time where the regulatory must be constrained in number and duration. FBO services at
framework defining acceptable over-land overpressure intensities is available airports are, again, a useful way to accomplish this.
not yet in place.
5.3 Effects of ETOPS on supersonic business jet
operation
5.0 SUPERSONIC CORPORATE
Despite the absence of SSBJ specific ETOPS regulations, it can be
OPERATIONS METRICS assumed that SSBJs will have to comply with the same regulatory
framework applicable to subsonic business jets, being the ETOPS
120 minute rule. However, the single engine failure scenario for a
5.1 Supersonic business jet flight operations SSBJ will differ significantly compared to its subsonic counterparts.
As presented in the previous section, corporate transportation is When a SSBJ diverts from its supersonic design point to a sub-
appealing when overall productivity is improved. Enabling the optimal subsonic OEI flight scenario, flight performance deterio-
executive to journey independent of commercial flight schedules rates significantly requiring larger fuel reserves compared to
often justifies the utilisation of a subsonic business jet. Further, subsonic jet. Either the ETOPS regulations have to be modified
considering supersonic travel with its perceived time gain is the specifically for the SSBJ, or design guidelines will have to demand
next logical step towards maximising corporate productivity. three instead of two engines to enable supersonic flight with OEI.
However, what is the economic and operational threshold justifying The current regulatory environment is catered specifically for
the operation of a SSBJ? Will it have the same versatility in airport subsonic business jets and is therefore unable to answer these
selection? For what routes are time savings practical at what cost? questions.
Is sonic boom suppression a prerequisite for successful SSBJ
operation?
5.4 Supersonic business jet route analysis
This first order supersonic business jet route analysis will enable us
5.2 Supersonic business jet airport operation
to comprehend the sensitivities related to SSBJ operation and
As seen with Fig. 8, there is a large selection of airports that ultimately design. The long range and short range scenarios are
business jets are able to utilise. Since the SSBJ requires a larger fuel discussed individually.
226 THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL APRIL 2008

11.0

10.0
4085 nm Boom , No Bo om Crossover

9.0

8.0

Time (hours)
~ 4.6 h r S S BJ (M1. 8)
~ 5. 1 h r S S BJ (M1. 6) 7.0
~ 5. 7 hr SS BJ (M1. 4)

Figure 11. New York to Moscow city pair: 6.0

SSBJ best case scenario (no stop, no sonic boom). Mach 1.4 with Sonic Boom
Mach 1.6 with Sonic Boom
Mach 1.8 with Sonic Boom
Mach 1.4 no Sonic Boom 5.0
Mach 1.6 no Sonic Boom
Mach 1.8 no Sonic Boom
Curren t Business Jets
4.0
Route of ~ 4000 nm

3.0
5 4 3 2 1 0
Nu mber of Stop s

Figure 13. Time sensitivities due to number of stops.

Table 2
Number of stops vs flight time (New York to Moscow)
Figure 12. New York to Moscow city pair:
less desirable scenario (no stop, with sonic boom).

5.4.1 Long-range mission scenario

This first case evaluates the SSBJ operating under ideal conditions
on the representative New York to Moscow city pair (4,085nm)
without a technical stop and no sonic boom imposed speed
limitation. Three different speeds are considered (Mach 1⋅4, Mach
1⋅6, and Mach 1⋅8) to arrive at a basis for comparison with the G550
representing best subsonic route performance. Figure 11 illustrates
the resulting times and routes for this scenario assuming a ‘low-
boom’ design. The second case considers the same operational
scenario while taking the currently accepted over-land sonic boom
speed restrictions into account (valid for high-boom designs like
Concorde). Figure 12 presents the resulting flight times while
marking the approximate East-bound area affected by the operational
no-boom restriction. The Concorde flight route including technical
stops is plotted for comparison.
As to be expected, the low-boom SSBJ reduces flight time up to
25%. The no-stop supersonic flight time scenarios presented with
Figs 11 and 12 and the G550 subsonic flight time scenario shown
with Fig. 9 provide a basis to assess the time saving potential and
implications related to supersonic long range flight. Clearly, the total
number of operational stops and the choice of flight speed determine
the conditions for which a competitive operational time advantage
can be obtained in the first place.
Until here, the ideal low-boom aircraft scenario has considered no
technical stops. In a second step the number of stops is varied,
ranging from zero to four stops, see Fig. 13 and Table 2. Figure 13
shows that the speed advantage of the SSBJ vanishes with three to
four technical stops over 4,000nm range since four technical stops of
the SSBJ average the subsonic business jet flight time.
Consequently, two technical stops represent the upper limit of stops
for the 4,000nm mission. The lower ‘target’ limit is, obviously, no
stop on a target route of at least 4,500nm. In addition, Fig. 13
displays trends trading operational Mach number for either the high-
boom design or low-boom design. Of importance here is the overlap
of the low-boom design (no sonic boom) with the high-boom design
(with sonic boom) plots. Note that the Mach 1⋅8 aircraft with sonic
boom is actually faster compared to the Mach 1⋅4 aircraft with no
CHUDOBA ET AL WHAT PRICE SUPERSONIC SPEED? – AN APPLIED MARKET RESEARCH CASE STUDY – PART 2
Figure 14. Low-boom versus high-boom
time sensitivity trade with speed.
Buus ine ss Je ts
ts
S SB J W ith No S
Soni c Boom
S SB J W ith S oni c B oom
Figure 15. New York to Miami: short range mission.
sonic boom. Therefore, the high-boom SSBJ is commercially viable
as long as the route is largely over water. Note that this distinction is
of significance, since the research and development overhead for the
high-boom design may provide a true business case in comparison to
the projected low-boom designs.
The sensitivity trade between low-boom designs versus high-
boom designs is visualised with Fig. 14. It is clear that increasing
speed generates time savings. In particular, this effect is magnified
for the low-boom design with increasing operational Mach number
(advantageous not having a sonic boom with increasing design
speed). However, the resulting design complications with increasing
speed may lead to an undesirable ‘snowball effect’, ultimately
resulting in excessive cost. Therefore, the first generation of SSBJs
may justify a reasonable medium speed. Then, the operational
advantage of the low-boom design diminishes compared to the high-
boom designs, ultimately leading to a convincing business case for
high-boom designs.
5.4.2 Short-range mission scenario
The short range route analysis is conducted in a similar manner
compared to the New York to Moscow route analysis. The New York
to Miami short range mission is selected, totaling 1,090nm. Again,
the analysis is conducted for no stops and three different speeds
(Mach 1⋅4, Mach 1⋅6, and Mach 1⋅8). In addition, representative
227
Table 3
New York to Miami: total time for Business Jets and SSBJs
Figure 16. SSBJ vs BJ: journey time savings vs route distance.
subsonic business jets (Citation X and Challenger 300) are selected
for reference. The mission for this analysis is presented with Fig. 15
and results of this analysis are shown in Table 3. Figure 15 shows
two different routes: one over land and the second mostly over
water. This accounts for the low-boom and high-boom designs
analysed respectively. The subsonic business jets and low-boom
SSBJ are routed over land, whereby the high-boom SSBJ route is
adding approximately 200nm to the mission. Overall, Table 3
indicates time savings for both, the high and low-boom SSBJs
compared to the subsonic counterparts. Since the overall time
advantage does reduce with shorter missions, the central question
becomes what distance is too short to elicit an acceptable time
advantage leading to economical operation?
The answer to this question is provided when comparing total
flight time versus route distance for subsonic and supersonic
business jets, see Fig. 16. Assuming the highest operational speed
for both flight vehicle classes, there is a clear trend indicating that
with decreasing route distance the overall ‘speed’ time savings are
steadily decreasing. This leads to a first conclusion that the SSBJ
would not prove economical for flight distances below 500-800nm.
To be more precise requires factoring in the cost of operation for a
specified distance. The marginal time savings obtained may not
outweigh the increased operational cost of a SSBJ for the short range
mission at all. Clearly, it is up to the individual corporate operator to
define the flight distance below which SSBJ operation is perceived
non-economical.
228 THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL
Figure 17. Time zone travel effects.
5.4.3 Business travel operation
In order to comprehend daily operation of the SSBJ as experienced
by the passenger, it is required to consider time zone travel effects. It
becomes important to determine under what operational conditions
the SSBJ does provide substantial and truly practical time benefit
during these hours. Figure 17 helps to determine travel schedules for
the business man. The scenario describes two flights from Los
Angeles (LA) to Tokyo. The first involves a B747, represented by the
lighter line, departing LA at 08:00 am. Because Tokyo is a full 17
hours ahead of LA, 08:00 am in LA corresponds to 01:00 am in
Tokyo. The flight is approximately 11 hours long, arriving in Tokyo
at 12:00 pm (noon) with only five hours of the work day remaining.
The SSBJ, however, represented by the darker line, also leaves at
08:00 am from LA, but arrives in Tokyo close to 08:00 am, approxi-
mately four hours earlier compared to the B747. This opens the entire
working day to the executive in case he/she has been able to rest. For
a longer route, such as from New York City to Tokyo, the time
difference is such that early departure from New York results in
arriving at Tokyo where the work day is about to start. This obvious
time advantage can only be utilised in case the traveler has been able
to rest accordingly during the transit. Therefore, the benefits for speed
may or may not dissolve, dependent on the individual resting state of
the business person and productive schedule planned for the same
day. The worst case manifests in that the time zone effects do not
allow an immediate productive working day upon arrival although
supersonic transportation still minimised overall transit time.
5.5 SSBJ flight operations and design recommendations
The first SSBJ recommendation relates to the significance of the
targeted mission range capability. A minimum and maximum range
value has been established from observing Trans-Atlantic and Trans-
Pacific flight range requirements. The range required to traverse the
Atlantic Ocean with no technical stops spans 3,000nm to 3,500nm,
whereas the Pacific Ocean with no technical stops equates to
5,000nm to 6,000nm. The Trans-Atlantic route should be regarded
as the lower absolute limit since this range capability enables the
SSBJ to traverse the Trans-Pacific route with one technical stop.
SSBJ designs currently under development show a fuel weight that
is approximately 50% of maximum take-off weight (MTOW). Thus,
the range target for SSBJs will likely be found between the extremes
of 3,500nm and 6,000nm. A good compromise between the number
of technical stops, fuel load and MTOW requirements will place the
design range into the 4,500nm region, thereby providing mid Trans-
Atlantic range performance as seen with the longest-range business
jet (Gulfstream G550). This range target allows, at minimum, the
ability to travel from New York to London or Moscow nonstop, but
requires one technical stop for the Los Angeles to Tokyo route. Be
APRIL 2008
aware that having a technical stop over the Pacific may unfavorably
interrupt the resting pattern of the passengers.
The second SSBJ recommendation is to correctly define the
number of technical stops. In order to maintain a time advantage
over the subsonic counterparts, the designer needs to ideally reduce
the number of stops to zero for as great a range as possible above the
target mission range of about 4,500nm.
The third SSBJ recommendation relates to the design requirement
specifying the permissible strength of the sonic boom signature
reaching the ground, ultimately leading to a low-boom or high-boom
design and associated cost implications. Route selection (water or
land dominated), range, speed, and finally cost implications dictate if
a SSBJ business case does exist in the first place. Note that the SSBJ
business case has to be based on available industry capability in
contrast to non-verified technology.
The fourth SSBJ recommendation addresses the choice of the
design speed. The target speed for the first generation of SSBJs
should be between Mach 1⋅4 and Mach 1⋅8 while taking effects of
sonic boom strength and overall range capability into account. This
is due mostly to the sensitivity of the relationship between speed,
range, route choices, and overpressure intensity.
6.0 PROPOSED SSBJ VEHICLE DESIGN
STRATEGY
The Concorde, through knowledge acquired from regular airline
operation, has extended our experience of supersonic civil aircraft
operation until its retirement in 2003. This means that lessons can
be drawn from over a span of about 45 years from the date at which
the conceptual design got underway. The SSBJ has to be based on
past civil and military aircraft design experience, to which technical
risk may have to be added with moderation. Collard(15) comments
that “On the Concorde project past experience was small and
technical risk tremendous, and in retrospect it is surprising how
‘right’ the overall configuration was.” In this context it should be
noted that Concorde was certified to both, the performance level
guaranteed to the airlines and the stringent airworthiness require-
ments defined specifically for the supersonic transport (SST). This
compromise aircraft, however, turned out to be too small and slow
for the Atlantic mission to be economical. With a payload fraction
of only 6% of MTOW, small differences in aircraft performance,
weight, or fuel consumption could have easily eroded the payload
entirely. “The technical difficulties associated with designing a new
and highly original aircraft were compounded by the fact that
throughout the development the design was being carried out on a
‘no margin’ basis’(15).
6.1 SST versus SSBJ/SSCJ productivity metrics:
what way to go?
There is, for now, no SST/HSCT market for people mass trans-
portation identified by neither the operator nor manufacturer.
However, if there is no immediate supersonic solution in sight for
the 100+ PAX category, can the SSBJ/SSCJ realistically contribute
to air transportation and how should this be done? At this point one
needs to clearly distinguish the SST productivity metrics contrasted
by the SSBJ productivity metrics, which are distinctly different
from each other as outlined earlier. Let us first understand the logic
of people mass transportation either through (a) established high-
subsonic transports and (b) a family of dedicated SSTs/HSCTs.
As the population growth shows little sign of slowing down and
the per capita income also continues to grow with the parallel
growth of discretionary income encouraging and stimulating more
travel, the volume of world airline traffic continues to grow
inexorably. “Airline traffic analysts assert that the passenger-mile
growth, sustained – although slowing down somewhat – at
CHUDOBA ET AL WHAT PRICE SUPERSONIC SPEED? – AN APPLIED MARKET RESEARCH CASE STUDY – PART 2
consistent rates of around 5% per year, will result in the doubling of
traffic during the first couple of decades of the next century. The
only question is exactly when.”(9) As a result, the producers of the
world’s air transport capability, the airlines, will therefore have to
keep pace in some way. The challenge becomes that of generating a
high enough passenger-mile output from the current aircraft fleets.
Davies(9) defines the primary contributors to passenger-mile produc-
tivity as reproduced in Table 4. Considering people mass trans-
portation, let us discuss how one can increase passenger-mile
productivity. With the following we are presenting the individual
productivity contributors (parameters) as identified by the arith-
metic formula given in Table 4.
Parameter (b) internal load factors: Internal load factors have,
according to data by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), leveled off at a world average of about 68%.
Conclusion: Productivity cannot be increased by filling more
seats.
Parameter (c) speed: Speed has, according to ICAO data, reached
a plateau at an average of about 680km/h (422mph, 367kt). The
speed can be higher especially for long routes, but airlines are
reluctant to operate aircraft beyond their most economical speed,
which is for most jets around 570mph or 495kt.
Conclusion: Productivity cannot be economically increased by
flying faster.
Parameter (d) annual aircraft utilisation: Annual aircraft utili-
sation has also reached a peak, as airlines have increased their
average stage lengths, eliminating immediate stops, and benefiting
from reduced maintenance times as airframes and engines become
more reliable.
Conclusion: Productivity cannot be increased by more flying per
aircraft.
Parameter (e) fleet size: Fleet size can only be increased if the
traffic increase can be absorbed with the deployment of additional
aircraft. Another constraint to fleet size is the lack of available
airport capacity since airport servicing space is at a premium.
Clearly, airport congestion becomes a serious barrier to increased
airline flight frequencies.
Conclusion: Productivity cannot be increased by adding more
flights.
For mass passenger transportation, we have already eliminated four
of the five contributing parameters which combine to quantify
airliner productivity. The missing contributor left to discuss is (a)
seats.
Parameter (a) seats: “The answer lies in an analysis of the trends,
and drawing upon the lessons of history, where correlations can be
examined, and cause-and-effect relationships can be established”(9).
Consequently, responsible forecasters have to look far ahead deter-
mining market demand (number of passengers per flight) which
drives product response.
Conclusion: Productivity can be increased by selecting the right
aircraft size according to actual and future demand.
The market demand and product response relationship is conve-
niently demonstrated with Fig. 18 as originated by Davies(9) and
adopted accordingly in the present context to include SSTs, HSCTs,
subsonic and supersonic corporate jets. In short, this depiction illus-
trates past and expected future trends for people mass transportation
(high-subsonic transports and SSTs/HSCTs) that will decide the
choice of aircraft size in the future. Clearly, Fig. 18 explains the
incentive behind the development or non-development of high-
subsonic transports, SSTs, and HSCTs in context of the progressive
growth of jet airliner seating capacity. In addition, the region of
corporate VIP transportation (segmented business jets) is indicated
only. The following significant conclusions can be drawn for SST
and HSCT people mass transportation and SSBJ corporate VIP
transportation:
229
Table 4
People mass-transportation metrics
● The first generation SSTs would have been too large for the
actual market demand.
● On a first glance it appears that the second generation HSCTs
would have been sized properly for the market demand at the
time. To be economic, the HSCT has to be large and fast;
however, ticket price would have isolated the HSCT fleet.
● The available Concorde fleet has ‘dropped’ out of the available
market for being too small (and too slow, see Part 1 of this
series). Although its smaller size may appear to serve the
available first class passenger distribution better compared to
the HSCT (easier to fill Concorde compared to HSCT), the
resulting small fleet and limited seating capacity turned out to
be highly non-competitive compared to the family of high-
subsonic jets.
● Business jets providing corporate VIP transportation follow
usually an entirely different productivity metric compared to
people mass transportation.
● Consequently, the mechanism valid to determine the existence
or nonexistence of a people mass transportation SCT or HSCT
market are not applicable to determine the existence or nonex-
istence of a corporate VIP transportation SSBJ or SSCJ
market.
● As shown for people mass transports in Fig. 18, at a first
glance it appears that the average passenger load per flight
distribution and fleet planning could be assembled in analogy
for subsonic corporate transports, thereby helping us to
comprehend the true productivity metrics of the business jet
category. This would, however, require the availability of
operational business jet statistics. Unfortunately, corporate
operators tend not to release such data since it would disclose
significant operational ‘scatter’ when comparing operators,
thereby disclosing the operator-specific corporate productivity
philosophy which tends to deviate significantly from the
rational commercial transport productivity metrics. Figure 18
does not, for this reason, include any useful corporate transport
size projections in analogy to the commercial transports.
● For the class of subsonic and supersonic corporate VIP trans-
ports, the weighting of the parameters (a) to (e) needs to be re-
evaluated while it is required to complement them with a
VIP-specific productivity parameter.
● Having realistically assessed and interpreted the SSBJ demand
and resulting cost structure based on design and operational
requirements, such perspective currently identifies a promising
market niche for the SSBJ and SSCJ in contrast to the
SST/HSCT case. Because the passenger distribution for
corporate transportation is dominated by first class customers,
such fact enables economic employment of a fleet of SSBJs as
long as the acquisition cost are kept reasonably low, as long as
the flight time advantage is real and practical, as long as the
operational range is competitive with the subsonic counterparts
to compensate for the inevitably higher direct operating cost
(DOC) for this category of aircraft.
230 THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL
Figure 18. Natural progression of flagship or front-line airliner size for international operations demonstrating the need
for the very large airliner contrasted by SSTs, HSCTs, and corporate aviation (modified from Ref. 9).
● The SSCJ follows a productivity metric not offered with any of
today's subsonic counterparts (high-priority cargo). When
comparing the SSBJ with the SSCJ, the business case for the
SSCJ appears strongest due to the high payload fraction realised
with the SSCJ.
6.2 Distinguishing vehicle design strategy
At this point we are in the position to classify commercial and
corporate civil supersonic aircraft development objectives into three
distinct classes.
1. National prestige projects: consisting of politicised first gener-
ation SSTs and second generation HSCT commercial mass
transports and projects.
2. Corporate prestige projects: consisting of certain past and
present SSBJ projects. Those technology-dominated projects
serve to advance key technologies aimed at leap-frogging an
isolated market segment with breakthrough technology, while
at the same time to augment the corporate advertising platform
for an existing product line.
3. Pioneer or pathfinder projects: take a far more pragmatic
approach in defining a practical business case based on existing
industry capability. Those pathfinder projects aim to establish a
civil supersonic transportation capability by starting with a
practical product advanced in increments. Figure 19 explains
the SSBJ development approach selected by the AVD Lab for
APRIL 2008
the Supersonic SpiritLear project in contrast to past and current
SSBJ projects. Note that the understanding generated since
1988 with the Su-21 is invaluable to the design community,
often incorporating dual use (civil/military) mission require-
ments. Still, it is of importance to contrast and discuss the ‘new
airframe’ development approach seen until today with a
‘minimum change configuration’ approach towards the SSBJ.
7.0 CONCLUSION
Based on the applied market research study presented for the SSBJ
class of vehicles, the inferences offered are grouped into (a) market
analysis, (b) flight operations, and (c) high-subsonic competition
analysis. The recommendations are presented in an effort to develop a
SSBJ business case that is conscious to the requirements of the existing
business jet market. Note that the study does not directly address how
to design a SSBJ, but it discusses the boundary conditions of the
market and their implications on the required product development
strategy with the sole intention to maximise product success.
A. Market analysis
Increase in energy prices reciprocates to a proportionate gain in jet fuel
prices resulting in an overall rise in aircraft operating costs. An already
‘thirsty’ SSBJ has to remain economically friendly to maintain growth.
Fractional ownership companies will increase consumer confidence by
reducing the overall risk for all parties in participation. Allowing the
SSBJ to be more accessible to a wider market space equates to more
CHUDOBA ET AL WHAT PRICE SUPERSONIC SPEED? – AN APPLIED MARKET RESEARCH CASE STUDY – PART 2
Figure 19. AVD Lab research and development strategy selected to maximise success rate.
aircraft deliveries. Productivity increases for derivative missions, in
particular the supersonic cargo jet (SSCJ). Market productivity must be
mapped to arrive at an optimal growth rate potential available within the
same market space. The primary benefit is that it quantifies and validates
the business case for business aviation and air-cargo transportation.
Market Potential needs to be retained despite the disparity between the
cost increase for the current business jet and SSBJ industries, which is
straining the opportunity for success by moving the design away from the
consumer base. The goal of the SSBJ is not to replace the subsonic
counterpart but to supplement the market. Therefore, the SSBJ can not
create its own market but must exist within the current business jet
market. The Business aviation outlook for the next decade is encour-
aging. 2009 has been identified as a product release date that is favorable
to the market. Thus, the near term appears to be promising for market
introduction of a SSBJ pathfinder product.
B. Flight operations
The design mission range should be at least 4,500nm. The number of
stops should be limited to zero for as high of a range as possible
above the 4,500nm minimum target range. Multi-disciplinary design
trades are required during the conceptual design phase to decipher
the implications of the low-boom versus the high-boom designs. An
operational and performance advantage does exist for low-boom
designs. However, low-boom design solutions do not yet present
industry capability, therefore tend to result in stagnating projects. In
contrast, a pathfinder high-boom design delivers sub-optimal perfor-
mance but may demonstrate overall project feasibility. Practical
design speeds range between Mach 1⋅4 and Mach 1⋅8, being
primarily dependent on overpressure signature, route selection, and
design range. It can be assumed that the SSBJ needs to comply with
current business jet ETOPS regulations. SSBJs demonstrate less
operational flexibility when compared with their subsonic counter-
parts, but they demonstrate more flexibility when compared with
commercial transports.
C. High-subsonic competition analysis
The current SSBJ projects are scheduled to begin service by around
2011. Current projects struggle with technical, financial, and
regulatory difficulties that make this date overly optimistic. The
apparent stagnation seen with all technology-dominated SSBJ
projects to date can be understood when benchmarking their
economic potential with ultra long range and medium weight class
business jets. The SSBJ is at a clear disadvantage in case its flight
time savings does not justify doubling the purchase price and
doubling the fuel cost relative to the ultra long range business jet
competition. Comparing technology-dominated SSBJs with medium
weight class business jets, the overall time savings must justify a
400% increase in purchase price and a possible 500% increase in
fuel consumption.
231
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The presented design trade studies were supported by Spirit Wing
Aviation. The views and conclusions contained in this report are
those of the authors. The authors like to acknowledge the contribu-
tions of additional AVD Lab team members: Kristen Roberts, Bryan
Mixon, and Brad Mixon.
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