Cogniţie, Creier, Comportament / Cognition, Brain, Behavior

Copyright © 2006 Romanian Association for Cognitive Science. All rights reserved.
ISSN: 1224-8398
Volume X, No. 4 (December), 625-635

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS
Mircea MICLEA*, Bianca MACAVEI
Department of Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

ABSTRACT
The present study has experimentally investigated the relationship between
religious beliefs and negative emotions. We found that the mere association
of a chain of negative events with the presence of a merciful and omnipotent
spiritual being induces less worry and sadness and increased hope in the
future than when the same events are presented alone. The former religious
attitudes may intensify the impact of the actual religious beliefs in the
generation of positive emotions. We found also that the meaning-making
process induced by the religious beliefs is an implicit, tacit rather than an
explicit inferential process.

KEYWORDS: religious beliefs and values, negative emotions, irrational beliefs

During the last 20 years the interest in religion and its connections to
psychology has increased substantially. The topic became accepted as part of
mainstream psychology and psychological intervention once multiculturalism
became a “forth force” in psychology (Worthington, Kurusu, McCullough, &
Sandage, 1996).
In an attempt to define concepts, religiousness came to be considered by
most researchers as a multidimensional construct (Spilka, Hood, & Gorsuch,
1985). Most researches rely on Allport’s (1959) definition of intrinsic versus
extrinsic religiousness. According to Allport, intrinsic religiousness "regards faith
as a supreme value in its own right. It is oriented toward a unification of being,
takes seriously the commandment of brotherhood, and strives to transcend all self-
centered needs" (Allport, 1966 p. 455). On the other hand, extrinsic religiousness is
"strictly utilitarian; useful for the self in granting safety, social standing, solace and
endorsement for one's chosen way of life" (Allport, 1966 p. 455). Although
initially considered bipolar constructs, the two types of religiousness are now

*
Corresponding author:
E-mail: micleamircea@psychology.ro
626 M. Miclea, B. Macavei
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

considered rather as separate unipolar constructs (Donahue, 1985). A number of

studies show religion to be associated positively with mental health (understood as
lack of psychopathology and/or prosocial behavior) in persons with intrinsic
religious motivation and negatively in persons with extrinsic religious motivation
(Donahue, 1985). Some data also suggest that intrinsic religiousness is negatively
related to trait anxiety (e.g. Baker & Gorsuch, 1982; Bergin, Masters, & Richards,
1987; Petersen & Roy, 1985), while extrinsic religious orientation and negative
religious coping (e.g., avoiding difficulties through religious activities, blaming
God for difficulties) are associated with higher levels of depressive symptoms
(Smith, McCullough, & Poll, 2003).
We should also make a clear distinction between religious beliefs and
religious values. Religious beliefs are propositional statements a person considers
to be true about religion. Religious values are superordinate organizing statements
of what a person considers important (closer to the concept of intrinsic religious
motivation presented above) (Worthington et al., 1996). If a person holds religious
beliefs but does not consider them important in his/her life it is likely that these
beliefs will not influence behaviors and emotions. Furthermore, as some authors
suggest (Worthington et al., 1996), it is important to focus on specific religious
beliefs/values and their impact on behavior and affect. In an attempt to increase
specificity and rigor, as well as connect religious beliefs to other cognitive factors
proved to play a major role in the development of certain functional and
dysfunctional behaviors and emotions, during the last years more and more
researchers have tried to bring religious beliefs closer to the classical models of
mental disorders. In a meta-analysis involving 147 studies, Smith et al. (2003)
showed that depressive symptoms and religious beliefs show a mild but negative
correlation (r = -.096) and that the negative correlation between religiousness and
depressive symptoms is higher when subjects go through stressful situations. Using
a group of 271 persons diagnosed with clinical depression, Murphy, Ciarrocchi,
Piedmont, Cheston, Peyrot, and Fitchett (2000) tried to connect the cognitive
factors emphasized in the well-known hopelessness theory of depression
(Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989) to religious beliefs and behaviors. Their
results show that religious belief, but not religious behavior, is a significant
predictor of lower levels of hopelessness and depression beyond demographic
variables. Religious beliefs proved to be both indirectly (by levels of
hopelessness), and directly (though a weaker association) related to depression,
which points out to a largely unexplored category of affect-generating cognitions
in need of investigation.
However, to our knowledge, there is no study attempting to connect
religious beliefs as major factors in the generation of functional and dysfunctional
negative emotions (depression and sadness) to A. Ellis’s rational emotive behavior
therapy (REBT). According to the REBT theory of emotion formation, the
proximal factors responsible for the generation of emotions are evaluative
 M. Miclea, B. Macavei 627
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

cognitions (rational and irrational beliefs). Specific to Ellis’ cognitive theory of

emotion is the assumption that there are qualitative differences between certain
similar emotions. As such, there is a qualitative difference between functional
(adaptive) and dysfunctional (maladaptive) emotions. Rational beliefs underlie
functional emotions, while dysfunctional emotions rely mostly on irrational beliefs.
As a consequence, depressed people are also sad, while sad people do not have to
also be depressed. The major irrational beliefs underlying depression are
demandingness and the global negative evaluation of personal worth.
Demandingness (DEM) refers to absolutist requirements expressed in the form of
“musts” and “shoulds”. Global negative evaluation of personal worth or self-
downing (SD) appears when people tend to be excessively critical of themselves
and make rather global negative evaluations about their personality. On the other
hand, sadness appears when people prefer their wishes and desires come true and
accept themselves as fallible and having better or worse specific performances
rather than globally evaluating their personal worth (Ellis & Dryden, 1997). Ellis’s
solution to the problem of self-rating is that people abandon the quest for self-
esteem and strive for unconditional self-acceptance. Unconditional self –
acceptance (USA) means that “the individual fully and unconditionally accepts
himself whether or not he behaves intelligently, correctly, or competently and
whether or not other people approve, respect, or love him”(Ellis, 1977, p. 101), and
has been proved extremely important in promoting mental health.
Concerning people’s ability to tell apart functional from dysfunctional
emotions, a recent study by Opris and Macavei (2005) showed that people without
psychopathology could easily differentiate between the prototypical functional and
dysfunctional feelings at the subjective level.
Taking into consideration both the need to investigate specific religious
beliefs and the intent to bring these particular types of cognitions closer to the
mainstream psychology models of emotion and emotional disturbance, in the
following prospective study we aim to:
1 – investigate the impact of specific religious beliefs (i.e. the use of major
characteristics of Jesus Christ in the meaning-making process associated to
negative events) on emotional distress in a non-clinical population; and
2 – investigate the relationship between specific religious beliefs (referring to
major characteristics of Jesus Christ) and evaluative beliefs in the generation of
both functional and dysfunctional emotions.

METHOD

Participants
Seventy students from Babes-Bolyai University, assigned in a framing
group and a non-framing group, participated in the study in exchange for course
credits. Eligible subjects were at least 19 years of age, completed study materials,
628 M. Miclea, B. Macavei
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

and had no major mental or physical illnesses. Age ranged from 19 to 32 years
(mean age=19.81, SD= 1.70). Eighty-five point seven percentages (85.7%) of the
sample described themselves as Orthodox, 4.3% as Roman-Catholic, 2.9% as
Greek-Catholic, 2.8% as Baptists, and 4.3% as other religion or no religion. Of all
participants, 15.7% were male and 84.3% were female. When questioned about the
importance of religion in their life, 45.7% stated it was very important, 34.3% said
it was important enough, 14.3% indicated medium importance, 4.3% indicated
very little importance, and 1.4% said religion was not important at all.

Materials1
A story was created, describing the following negative chain of events:
1. An astronaut has remained isolated on a remote planet (activating
statistically negative event);
2. Loss of radio contact with other humans (loss situation);
3. Death of the only other survivor who was his friend (loss situation and
social isolation);
4. Progressive sickness and increased physical weakness of the astronaut
(threat situation).
For the framing group, but not for the non-framing group, other two
elements are added:
1. Belief of the astronaut that all events on that planet, are due to the
presence of a spiritual entity (attribution of cause of events);
2. Belief that the spiritual entity has the following characteristic:

unseen;

omnipotent;

kind;

omniscient;

just;

loving;

merciful with the astronauts . These are, in fact the main
characteristics of God extracted from the Holy Bible in a
preliminary study applied to the study situation but the name
of God did not occurred in the story. .
Following the reading of the story the participants from the non-framing
group were asked to answer the following questions:
1. What could the astronaut believe about the troubles he has been
through? (construction of meaning, free answer);
2. How trustful could the astronaut be in his future? (hope in the future,
evaluated on a 1-100 Likert scale);

1
study materials can be obtained on request from the first author (MM).
 M. Miclea, B. Macavei 629
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

3. How worried could the astronaut feel? (negative emotions – worry,

evaluated on a 1-100 Likert scale);
4. How sad could the astronaut feel? (negative emotions – sadness,
evaluated on a 1-100 Likert scale);
5. What could the astronaut believe to be the cause of all the trouble he
had been through? (attributions of cause, free answer).
Following the reading of the story, including the additional beliefs of the astronaut
about the cause of the events and the characteristics of the spiritual being,
participants were asked to answer the following questions:
1. What could the astronaut believe about the troubles he has been
through? (construction of meaning, free answer);
2. How trustful could the astronaut be in his future? (hope in the future,
evaluated on a 1-100 Likert scale);
3. How worried could the astronaut feel? (negative emotions – worry,
evaluated on a 1-100 Likert scale);
4. How sad could the astronaut feel? (negative emotions – sadness,
evaluated on a 1-100 Likert scale);
5. What does the astronaut know about the spiritual entity present on the
planet (recalling of entity characteristics, evaluated by number of listed
attributes).

Variables
The independent variable was the context, with two modalities framing
(the story included information about the presence of the spiritual entity and its
positive attributes) and non-framing (the story did not include any information
about the presence of a spiritual entity).
The dependent variables were: (1) trust in the future, (2) worry, and (3) sadness.

Procedure
Initial screening was meant to exclude persons with mental and
physical illnesses and persons younger than 18. Persons not meeting the
inclusion criteria but in need of psychological assistance were offered low-
cost therapy referrals. The administration of experimental tasks was
conducted by a licensed psychologist. Thirty-one subjects read the story
without framing and thirty-nine participants read the story with framing.
Immediately after having read the story, all participants answered the 5
questions corresponding to each situation (framing or non-framing). All
study materials were administered in group, in one session, without time
limit after obtaining the informed consent of the participants.
630 M. Miclea, B. Macavei
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

Data analyses methods

Data was entered and analyzed using SPSS. The independent samples T
test was used to compare the framing and non-framing groups on variables like
trust in the future, worry and sadness.
To assess the possible impact of importance of religion for the subjects
involved in our study, comparison analysis was performed separately for subjects
who indicated religion as “very important” and “important enough” on the one
hand and subjects who indicated religion as “medium important”, “of very little
importance” and “not important at all” on the other hand.
To assess the impact of explicit memory of the entity characteristics upon
the dependent variables, extreme score groups were created (m +/- 1SD) and
compared on the three dependent variables.
Qualitative preliminary analysis (calculation of percentages) was used to
assess (1) construction of meaning for both groups, and (2) causal attribution of
events for the non-framing group.

RESULTS

Group statistics, t and p values for comparisons between framing and non-
framing groups are presented in Table 1. We found that both worry and sadness are
significantly lower for the framing group than for non-framing. We found also, that
faith in the future is significantly higher for the framing group as compared to the
non-framing one (all p’s < .05). Thus we can say, relying on these data, that the
experienced sadness and worry is reduced when a negative chain of events is
associated with the involvement of a spiritual entity and hope is increased.

Table 1. Group statistics, t and p values for comparisons between framing and non-framing
groups.

Framing/Non-framing t p
Trust in the future 2.53 .01
Worry 3.78 <.001
Sadness 2.26 .02

Group Statistics

Std. Std. Error

N Mean Deviation Mean
TRUST non-framing 31 43.45 23.09 4.15
framing 39 58.51 25.81 4.13
WORRY non-framing 31 77.26 21.90 3.93
framing 39 55.21 25.90 4.15
SADNESS non-framing 31 76.39 23.39 4.20
framing 39 62.26 27.85 4.46
 M. Miclea, B. Macavei 631
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

However, when subjects are separated in two groups according to the

declared importance of religion in their life, the above results are maintained only
for the more religious group, meaning that the framing induced experimentally is
intensified by the former religious attitudes of the subjects.

Table 2. Group statistics, t and p values for comparisons between framing and non-framing
groups for the subjects for whom religion is medium and little important.

Framing/Non-framing t p
Trust in the future 0.80 .43
Worry 2.13 .054
Sadness 0.36 .72

Group Statistics

Std. Std. Error

N Mean Deviation Mean
TRUST non-framing 7 27.43 22.68 8.57
framing 7 39.14 31.09 11.75
WORRY non-framing 7 75.00 27.08 10.24
framing 7 44.29 26.84 10.14
SADNESS non-framing 7 77.86 26.12 9.87
framing 7 82.14 17.29 6.53

Table 3. Group statistics, t and p values for comparisons between framing and non-framing
groups for the subjects for whom religion is very important or important enough.

Framing/Non-framing t p
Trust in the future 2.42 .01
Worry 3.18 .002
Sadness 2.56 .01

Group Statistics

Std. Std. Error

N Mean Deviation Mean
TRUST non-framing 24 48.13 21.46 4.38
framing 32 62.75 22.94 4.06
WORRY non-framing 24 77.92 20.79 4.24
framing 32 57.59 25.50 4.51
SADNESS non-framing 24 75.96 23.13 4.72
framing 32 57.91 28.00 4.95
632 M. Miclea, B. Macavei
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

Because the explicit memory of the characteristics of the spiritual being

could impact on the emotions experienced, in case of the framing group extreme
score subgroups were created (m +/- 1SD) and compared on the three dependent
variables (i.e. trust in the future, worry, and sadness).
Results show that there are no significant differences between the
subgroup who recalled very few and the subgroup who recalled very many spiritual
entity characteristics. Our interpretation was that the framing effect is produced
rather by implicit processes, tacitly than through explicit inferences.

Table 4. Group statistics, t and p values for comparisons between subjects in the framing
group who recalled very few and subjects in the framing group who recalled very many
spiritual entity characteristics.

High/Low recalling t p
Trust in the future 0.30 .76
Worry 0.39 .69
Sadness 1.28 .21

Group Statistics

Std. Std. Error

RECALL N Mean Deviation Mean
TRUST high 14 59.14 25.49 6.81
low 8 62.50 23.75 8.40
WORRY high 14 57.86 19.88 5.31
low 8 53.38 33.67 11.91
SADNESS high 14 71.07 20.59 5.50
low 8 57.13 30.29 10.71

Construction of meaning seems to be highly influenced by framing.

Results suggest that when subjects associate a negative chain of events with the
presence of a merciful and omnipotent spiritual entity they tend to interpret events
as parts of a divine plan and find meaning in the positive ending of that plan
(74.35%) despite transitory hardship. On the other hand, the non-framing group has
interpreted the negative events rather as a punishment (41.93%), or the implacable
involvement of fate (22.58%)
 M. Miclea, B. Macavei 633
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

Table 5. Construction of meaning (percentages of the framing and non-framing groups

indicating different ways of interpreting the event)

Divine plan Learning Punishment Bad luck Destiny

with a experience from a
positive spiritual
ending entity
Framing 29 3 7 - -
N=39 (74.35%) (7.69%) (17.94 %)
Non-framing 5 1 13 5 7
N=31 (16.12%) (3.22%) (41.93%) (16.12%) (22.58%)

Table 6. Attribution of cause (percentages of the non-framing group indicating different

possible causes for the situation in which the astronaut finds himself)

Other Self An upset Destiny Hazardous Inadequacy Unidentified

people spiritual job of equipment causes
entity
Non- 2 2 2 7 4 9 5
framing (6.45%) (6.45%) (6.45%) (22.58%) (12.90%) (29.03%) (16.12%)
N=31

Considered all together our results show that a religious frame induces a
tacit meaning-making process that mediate the impact of negative events. People
feels less worry and sad and more trustful in future when a chain of negative events
are connected to the involvement of a merciful and omnipotent spiritual being than
it is absent in the meaning-making process.

CONCLUSIONS AND GENERAL DISCUSSIONS

Results from our first study suggest that the mere association of a chain of
negative events with the presence of a merciful and omnipotent spiritual being
produces less worries and sadness and increased hope for the future. However, it is
important to notice that the association between belief in the presence of a positive
spiritual entity on the one hand, and negative emotions and faith in the future on
the other hand is valid only for those subjects for whom religious attitudes play a
major part in their life. In other words, it is possible that, unless basic religious
beliefs are not central to one’s belief system they will not significantly impact
emotions. We also found that religious beliefs mediate the relationship between
negative events and emotional reactions rather via an implicit meaning-making
process than through an elaborated, explicit, inference-based mechanism. Next,
results suggest that in the absence of framing and in the context of severe negative
life events people who believe in God tend to develop fear of being punished by
634 M. Miclea, B. Macavei
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

Him. Should this hypothesis be validated in future studies, a major implication

would reside in the way prayers and other religious rituals are performed during
times of distress. Positive characteristics of God may have to be repeatedly cued in
order to lead to negative emotion reduction.
The results of our study are limited in several ways. First, we used non-
clinical subjects, in normal life situations. However, Smith et al. (2003) suggest
that depression is strongly associated with religiousness in studies involving people
who are undergoing stress due to recent life events. Therefore, it is also possible
that some of the cognitive factors involved in the generation of depressive
symptoms (e.g., irrational beliefs, unconditional self-acceptance) as well as
religious beliefs be associated more strongly with emotional distress if subjects
were going through difficult life events. Further, in future studies we should also
consider using clinical groups to make our findings useful in terms of clinical
practice emotion generation (automatic thoughts, schemata, irrational beliefs) and
their impact on emotions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was supported by CEEX-M1 Grant no. 124 (AnxNeuroCog) from the
Romanian Ministry of Education and Research.

REFERENCES

Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Alloy, L. B. (1989). Hopelessness depression: A

theory-based subtype of depression. Psychological Review, 96, 358-372.
Allport, G.W. (1959). Religion and prejudice. The Crane Review, 2, 1-10.
Allport, G.W. (1966). The religious context of prejudice. Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion, 5, 447-457.
Baker, M., & Gorsuch, R. (1982). Trait anxiety and intrinsic—extrinsic religiousness.
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 21, 119-122.
Bergin, A., Masters, K., & Richards, P. (1987). Religiousness and mental health
reconsidered: A study of an intrinsically religious sample. Journal of Counseling
Psychology, 34, 197-204.
Chamberlain, J.M., & Haaga, D.A.F. (2001). Unconditional self-acceptance and
psychological health. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior
Therapy, 19, 163-176.
DiGiuseppe, R., Leaf, R., Exner, T., & Robin, M.W. (1988). The development of a measure
of rational/irrational thinking. Paper presented at the World Congress of Behavior
Therapy, Edinburgh, Scotland.
DiGiuseppe, R., Robin, M.W., Leaf, R., & Gormon, B. (1989). A discriminative validation
and factor analysis of a measure of rational /irrational beliefs. Paper presented at
the World Congress of Cognitive Therapy, Oxford, UK.
DiLorenzo, T., Bovbjerg, D., Montgomery, G., Valdimarsdottir, H., & Jacobsen, P. (1999)
The application of a shortened version of the profile of mood states in a sample of
 M. Miclea, B. Macavei 635
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 625-635

breast cancer chemotherapy patients. British Journal of Health Psychology, 4,

315–325.
Donahue, M. (1985). Intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness: Review and meta-analysis.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 400-419.
Ellis A. The basic clinical theory of Rational-emotive Therapy. In A. Ellis & R. Grieger
(ed.), Handboock of Rational-emotive Therapy. New York: Springer.
Ellis, A., & Dryden, W. (1997). The Practice of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy.
Springer Publishing Company.
Macavei, B. (2002). A Romania adaptation of the Attitudes and Beliefs Scale 2. Romanian
Journal of Cognitive and Behavioral Psychotherapies, 2, 105-122.
Murphy, P.E., Ciarrocchi, J.W., Piedmont, R.L., Cheston, S., Peyrot, M., & Fitchett, G.
(2000). The Relation of Religious Beliefs and Practices, Depression and
Hopelessness in Persons With Clinical Depression. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 68, 1102-1106.
Opris, D., & Macavei, B. (2005). The distinction between functional and dysfunctional
negative emotions; An empirical analysis. Journal of Cognitive and Behavioral
Psychotherapies, 5, 181-195.
Petersen, L., & Roy, A. (1985). Religiosity, anxiety, and meaning and purpose: Religion's
consequences for psychological well-being. Review of Religious Research, 27, 49-
63.
Shacham, N. (1983) A shortened version of the profile of mood states. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 47, 305–306.
Smith, T. B., McCullough, M. E., & Poll, J. (2003). Religiousness and depression:
Evidence for a main effect and the moderating influence of stressful life events.
Psychological Bulletin, 129, 614–636.
Spilka, B., Hood, R., & Gorsuch, R. (1985). The psychology of religion: An empirical
approach. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).
Worthington, E.L., Kurusu, T.A., McCullough, M.E., & Sandage, S.J. (1996). Empirical
Research on Religion and Psychotherapeutic Processes and Outcomes; A 10-Year
Review and Research Prospectus. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 448-487.