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DDI 08
KO: KNOCK OUT!!!!
The Anti-Space!!!!!
Index......................................................................................1-2
A2: Solvency
1NC Shell..............................................................................3-7
Solvency Extensions
SBSP Takes a Long Time....................................................8-9
Solar Cells Inefficient..........................................................10
Satellite Arching Destroys Satellites...................................11
Micrometeoroids Kill Satellites..........................................12
Space Causes Cancer...........................................................13
SBSP Doesn’t Compete With Terrestrial Power..............14-15
Incentives Fail.......................................................................16
NASA Fails – Privatizing Is Key.........................................17
NASA Fails...........................................................................18
The NSSO Is Useless............................................................19
Inherency
1NC Shell..............................................................................20
Links
Politics – Plan Popular.........................................................52
Politics – Plan Unpopular....................................................53
Business Confidence.............................................................54
Oil DA...................................................................................55
Spending...............................................................................56-57
States CP
Solvency................................................................................58
This file is lacking in the space impact area. In order to get more cards, dig a little through the aff file or, better yet,
cut your own cards! Enjoy smashing whatever space aff you might face. Good luck!!
1. There are huge barriers that stop solar power satellites for the next 40 years: all their
sources are terrible
CNN 7/1/08 ("How to harvest solar power? Beam it down from space!"
http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/05/30/space.solar/index.html)[JWu]
But a number of obstacles still remain before solar satellites actually get off the ground, said Jeff Keuter,
president of the George C. Marshall Institute, a Washington-based research organization. "Like any activity in
space, there are enormous engineering challenges," he said.
One major barrier is a lack of cheap and reliable access to space, a necessity for launching hundreds of
components to build what will be miles-long platforms. Developing robotic technology to piece the structures
together high above Earth will also be a challenge. Then there is the issue of finding someone to foot what will
be at least a billion-dollar bill.
5. Even with substantial technological leaps SPS will not be a competitive source for
terrestrial power
National Research Council, 2001, Laying the Foundation for Space Solar Power: an assessment of NASA’s
Space Solar Power Investment Strategy, http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309075971/html/R1.html#pagetop
Successful development of an economically viable SSP will require substantial leaps in development of
space solar array, PMAD, thermal control, wireless transmission, and launch technologies. However,
improvements in PV solar array technologies alone will not enable SSP to be economically competitive
with terrestrial utility electricity. The theoretical maximum solar cell conversion efficiency is between 50
and 60 percent for crystalline multijunction solar cells (Kurtz et al., 1997) and between 30 and 40 percent
for amorphous and polycrystalline thin-film photovoltaics (Reinhardt, 2001a). Even for the case of 60
percent efficient crystalline solar cells, the array specific power will be limited to values less than 500
W/kg. Assuming that the SSP solar array must produce 3 GW of power (to result in 1.2 GW to the ground),
the mass of a 500-W/kg solar array alone will be 6×106 kg, approximately 241 times that of the space
shuttle’s maximum cargo capability—clearly a formidable challenge. Even assuming the SERT program’s
launch-to-GEO goal of $800/kg, the cost of launching the array alone would be $4.8 billion. In the case of
thin-film PV, using even 40 percent efficient arrays at 1,200 W/kg would require approximately 100
launches of the current space shuttle (at maximum payload capacity) for the array to reach LEO. It is clear
from this simple analysis that improvements in PV-based power generation technologies alone, even to
theoretical efficiency limits, will not enable SSP to be economically viable for competitive baseload
terrestrial electric power, regardless of solar array cost. Even if the solar array were free, the overriding
factor is the cost of placing it in orbit.
SPS is too long term – we can achieve the same result better by focusing on terrestrial
renewables
Popular Mechanics, January 08 ("Space-based solar power beams become next energy frontier."
popularmechanics.com/science/air_space/4230315.html?series=35)[JWu]
As envisioned, massive orbiting solar arrays, situated to remain in sunlight nearly continuously, will beam
multiple megawatts of energy to Earth via microwave beams. The energy will be transmitted to mesh receivers
placed over open farmland and in strategic remote locations, then fed into the nation’s electrical grid. The goal: To
provide 10 percent of the United States’ base-load power supply by 2050.
Ultimately, the report estimates, a single kilometer-wide array could collect enough power in one year to rival the
energy locked in the world’s oil reserves.
While most of the technology required for SBSP already exists, questions such as potential environmental
impacts will take years to work out. “For some time, solar panels on Earth are going to be much cheaper,”
says Robert McConnell, a senior project leader at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Colorado. “This is
a very long-range activity.”
Status quo solar cells suck; "thin film" cells can't stand the heat
Kennedy Space Center, October 02 ("Spaceport Visioning Concept Study". Involving Rainer Meinke of
Advanced Magnet Lab; Dr. John Olds of Georgia Institute of Technology, Department of Aerospace
Engineering; Dr. James Powell of Star Tram, Inc; Edgar Zapata of NASA/KSC Systems Engineering Office
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Nexgen_Downloads/Spaceport_Visioning_Final_Report.pdf)[JWu]
Solar cells of the current generation are heavy, expensive and hard to deploy considering the enormous
numbers needed for SSP. Thin film cells represent one viable option for the future [Fig 5]. They hold promise
for low mass, low cost, and high production capability by depositing special materials in very thin (microns) layers
on rolled substrates similar to newspaper printing. In addition, they are flexible, which lends themselves for
deposition on lightweight deployable / inflatable structures needed for packaging of extremely large arrays in launch
vehicles. Unfortunately, the materials considered for these structures (i.e. kapton), do not have the high
temperature properties needed to allow cell growth deposition.
T. Kitamura et al.; Sanmaru, Y.; Kawasaki, T.; Hosoda, S.; Toyoda, K.; Mengu Cho
Discharges and Electrical Insulation in Vacuum, 2006. ISDEIV apos;06. International Symposium on
Volume 2, Issue , 25-29 Sept. 2006 Page(s):nil4 - nil4 (http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/login.jsp?
url=/iel5/4193815/4194906/04194989.pdf?temp=x)[JWu]
Recently, an arcing on satellite solar array due to interaction between space plasma and the array threatening
safety of spacecraft is a big issue. The arcing causes degradation of solar array at malfunction of instruments
on satellites. The discharge is caused by differential potential between satellite body and insulator surfaces like
coverglass of solar array, which are charged by ambient plasma. This single shot discharge is called "primary arc".
The primary arc can evolve to so-called "sustained arc" that permanently short-circuits adjacent solar cells or
a solar cell and conductive substrate. In order to prevent arcs on the surface of solar array, it is necessary to carry out
arc tests simulating discharge phenomenon on solar array. In this paper, we investigated the effect of plasma
environments on sustained arcs. GaAs solar cells were used for the test. Laboratory tests were carried out with an
external circuit simulating a spacecraft power system. Solar array coupon panels simulating the hot and return ends
of a string circuit were tested under various combinations of string voltage and string current. We revealed that the
threshold conditions for sustained arc formation were different in test plasma environment even when the string
voltage and the string current are same.
Kennedy Space Center, October 02 ("Spaceport Visioning Concept Study". Involving Rainer Meinke of
Advanced Magnet Lab; Dr. John Olds of Georgia Institute of Technology, Department of Aerospace
Engineering; Dr. James Powell of Star Tram, Inc; Edgar Zapata of NASA/KSC Systems Engineering Office
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Nexgen_Downloads/Spaceport_Visioning_Final_Report.pdf)[JWu]
The current state-of-the-art voltage level for photovoltaic arrays is 160v used on the International Space
Station. It is estimated that the arrays for a SSP platform would have to operate at 1000v or higher. At these
higher levels it is known that self-destructive arcing occurs [Fig 6]. Design and manufacturing techniques to
prevent such damage are in the process of development by Dale Ferguson of GRC [Refs 5 and 6]. In order to utilize
existing facilities and equipment, initial development is being performed at the 300-volt level.
Aceti et al, (R. Aceti & G. Drolshagen, European Space Research & Technology Centre, Norway; J.A.M.
McDonnell, Unispace Kent, UK; T.Stevenson, Mare Crisium, UK) November 94 ("0Micrometeoroids and Space
Debris - The Eureca Post-Flight Analysis" ESA (European Space Agency) Bulletin Nr. 80,
http://www.esa.int/esapub/bulletin/bullet80/ace80.htm)[JWu]
Every spacecraft in Earth orbit is exposed to a flux of space debris and meteoroid particles. Currently more
than 7000 large man-made objects orbiting in near-Earth space can be tracked from the ground with radar or by
optical means. A much larger number of smaller man-made debris items and micrometeoroids that are orbiting
the Earth cannot be detected from the ground. These particles are a hazard for both long-term missions and
large spacecraft. While the risk of collision with a large piece of debris or a large meteoroid is very small,
particles less than one millimetre in size cause craters visible to the naked eye. Typical impact velocities are 10
km/s for space debris and 20 km/s for meteoroids. Larger particles can penetrate the outer shielding of a
spacecraft and can damage its internal equipment. As a result of this threat, designers have to consider the
risk of particle impacts in the planning of every space mission. In addition, particle fluxes in space are also of
considerable scientific interest.
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, 12/80, Ionizing Radiation Risks to Satellite Power
Systems (SPS) Workers in Space, for the U.S. Department of Energy (alex werner)
“Thus, for example, in 10,000 workers who completed ten missions with an exposure of 40 rem per mission, 320
to 2,000 additional deaths, in excess of the 1640 deaths from normally occurring cancer, would be expected. These
estimates would indicate a 20 to 120 percent increase in cancer incidenc!!!!e in the work-population.”
Many factors prevent SSP from competing with terrestrial electricity generation
Joel S. Greenberg, President Princeton Synergetics, Aerospace America, May, 2000; Pg. 42
SSP faces several challenges in competing with terrestrial electricity generation: - The relative immaturity
of the technologies required for SSP makes it difficult to assess the validity of its cost estimates and likely
competitiveness. As with most space development initiatives, orders-of-magnitude reduction in the cost of
launch and deployment are necessary. In addition, the NASA studies have assumed all on-orbit operations,
including construction and maintenance, to be accomplished telerobotically. - Achieving an economically
viable SSP will require that government play a major role in developing a relevant technology base that can
be exploited by industry. It would be premature for the government to make commitments (through loan
guarantees or tax incentives, for example), other than possibly pursuing a technology development and
demonstration program. - State-of-the-art conventional technologies feature numerous environmental
controls, eroding somewhat the environmental advantage of nonfossil fuel technologies. - Actual and/or
perceived health risks associated with exposure to electric and magnetic fields generated by SSP are likely
to cause significant public concern. - National security and economic considerations may cause some
countries to require equity participation in SSP, to rely on it for only a small share of their energy
portfolios, or to decline its use altogether.
National Research Council, 2001, Laying the Foundation for Space Solar Power: an assessment of NASA’s
Space Solar Power Investment Strategy, http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309075971/html/R1.html#pagetop
The current SSP technology program is directed at technical areas that have important commercial, civil,
and military applications for the nation. A dedicated NASA team, operating with a minimal budget, has
defined a potentially valuable program—one that will require significantly higher funding levels and
programmatic stability to attain the aggressive performance, mass, and cost goals that are required for
terrestrial baseload power generation. Nevertheless, significant breakthroughs will be required to achieve
the final goal of cost-competitive terrestrial baseload power. The ultimate success of the terrestrial power
application depends critically on dramatic reductions in the cost of transportation from Earth to GEO.
Funding plans developed during SERT are reasonable, at least during the 5 years prior to the first flight
demonstration in 2006 (see Table ES-1).
Resources for the Future, 2000, Satellite Solar Power Faces Considerable Economic Challenges, April 21,
http://www.rff.org/rff/News/Releases/2000/Satellite-Solar-Power-Faces-Considerable-Economic-
Challenges.cfm
Because the technology needed to develop SSP is still in its early stages, it is difficult to assess how much it
will ultimately cost to develop, and thus how competitive it may be compared to other forms of energy, the
RFF study says. For SSP to be competitive, significant reductions would be needed in the costs of
launching the satellites into space and other key technologies.
Leonard David, Senior Space Writer, Space.com, April 21, 2000, Space Power for an Energy-Hungry
Earth?, http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/solar_power_satellite_000421.html
"But … it's going to be very difficult to make it competitive with terrestrial power," she [Molly Macaualey,
an economist who led the study] told SPACE.com. "It's a very hard sell." "My concern with satellite-solarpower
advocates is that they aren't looking over their shoulders to realize that technological change and
innovation in markets is happening within conventional approaches." There have been dozens of
approaches to building power-beaming satellites. "But fundamentally, so long as it costs as much to get to
space, we've got a major problem," she said
Molly Macauley, Resources for the Future, 2000, Testimony before House Committee on Science,
“Commercializing Space,” July 18, http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-CTst-00-macauley-July18.pdf
Some other concerns with tax approaches include: Losses. Tax exemptions for revenue earned in space
may not make much difference if like much new industry, many space businesses initially operate at a loss,
which they can carry forward, and thus have no tax liability for many years. Propping up the wrong
business model. For activities that generate taxable income, income tax exemptions under the “Zero
Gravity, Zero Tax” bill could prop up otherwise unsuccessfully projects for the proposed twenty-five year
duration of the exemption. Loan guarantees may have the same undesirable effect. Investments might be
made solely for the tax advantages yet the investments may simply not make sense and thus not lead to a
viable industry. Although the proposals have “sunset” provisions, some space businesses may survive only
because of the tax breaks rather than being robust on their own. For instance, the Omnibus Energy Act of
several years ago allowed tax credits for investment in renewable energy. Investments in solar, geothermal,
biomass, windfarms, and other energy technologies were made on the basis of the tax break rather than
economic soundness of the technologies. When the tax preference ended, the development of the industries
was set back a least a decade. Subsidies as part of the business model are the wrong model. Effect on the
budget. To maintain the government’s budget each year, taxpayers must make up the difference in tax
revenue when credits, exemptions, and loan guarantees (when default occurs) reduce revenue that would
otherwise flow to the public treasury. Who bears the risk. In contrast with the risk that the private sector is
taking in financing our ‘dot.com’ industry, in which case the risk is borne by the investor rather than other
taxpayers, supporting space commerce through the tax code forces all taxpayers to bear the risk in that
industry. By forcing taxpayers to take the risk of space investment, the legislative proposals imply, from a
public policy perspective, that space commerce is more desirable for the good of the country – thus worth
underwriting by the public at large – than other activities in medical research, tax credits for investment in
magnetic levitation (maglev) transportation development).
NASA would not pursue space solar power. Current priorities prove
Taylor Dinerman, author and journalist based in New York City, 5/19/08, “NASA and Space Solar Power,”
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1130/1, Malek
There was no follow-up to this study, partly because of a lack of urgency in the era of cheap energy that existed a
decade ago and also because NASA did not, and does not today, see itself as an auxiliary to the Department of
Energy. NASA does science and exploration and not much else. Along with its contractors it can develop new
technologies that apply directly to those two missions, but outside of that it will resist being forced to spend
money on projects that it does not see as falling within those two missions.
Technology development in general has been cut back. The NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts has been closed.
There is a minimal ongoing effort to build up some technologies that may in the future be useful for reusable launch
vehicle development, but it is hard to see how this fits into a coherent future program. The agency has its priorities
and is ruthlessly sticking to them.
Space solar power through NASA is seen as encroachment onto other department’s turfs
Taylor Dinerman, author and journalist based in New York City, 5/19/08, “NASA and Space Solar Power,”
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1130/1, Malek
NASA is not the US Department of Spatial Affairs: it does not have the statutory authority to control, regulate, or
promote commercial space activities such as telecommunications satellites, space tourism, space manufacturing, or
space solar power. Such powers are spread throughout the government in places like the FAA’s Office of
Commercial Space Transportation, the Department of Commerce, and elsewhere. Even if NASA were somehow to
get the funds and the motivation to do space solar power, these other institutions would resist what they
would recognize as an encroachment on their turf.
The NSSO is a toothless organization and is not taken seriously by the government.
Dwayne Day, writer for the space review, 6/9/08, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1147/1
But in this case, the activists touting the NSSO study do not understand where the NSSO fits into the larger
military space bureaucracy. The National Security Space Office was created in 2004 and “facilitates the
integration and coordination of defense, intelligence, civil, and commercial space activities.” But any office that
“facilitates” the activities of other organizations has limited influence, especially when those other
organizations are much bigger and have their own interests and connections to the senior leadership. The
NSSO has a minimal staff and budget and does not command any assets—it does not fly any satellites, launch
any rockets, or procure any hardware, all of which are measures of power within the military space realm. Simply
put, the NSSO exists essentially as a policy shop that is readily ignored by the major military space actors
such as Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command, and the National Reconnaissance Office whenever it
suits them. As one former NSSO staffer explained, the office consists of many smart, hardworking people who
have no discernible influence on military space at all. In fact, for several years there have been persistent
rumors that the NSSO was about to be abolished as unnecessary, irrelevant, and toothless.
Add to this the way in which the NSSO’s solar power satellite study was pursued—the study itself had no budget. In
Washington, studies cost money. If the Department of Defense wants advice on, say, options for space launch, they
hire an organization to conduct the study such as the RAND Corporation, or they employ one of their existing
advisory groups such as the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. All of this requires money to pay for the experts to
perform the work. Even if the study is performed by a committee of volunteers, there are still travel, printing, staff
support, overhead, and other expenses. Costs can vary widely, but at a minimum will start in the many tens of
thousands of dollars and could run to a few million dollars. In contrast, the NSSO study of space solar power had
no actual funding and relied entirely upon voluntary input and labor. This reflects the seriousness by which
the study was viewed by the Pentagon leadership.
Reusable launch vehicle capabilities are being solved for at rapid rates with out
government incentives
Dewey Parker, Major, USAF, 4/99, “ACCESS TO SPACE: ROUTINE, RESPONSIVE AND FLEXIBLE
IMPLICATIONS FOR AN EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE,”
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/99-154.pdf, Malek
International and US companies are currently “…racing to build the world’s first commercial reusable
launch vehicle to serve the booming telecommunications satellite market. The winner of this new space race could
earn a lock on…lucrative contracts to launch up to 2,000 next-generation communications satellites over the next
decade.”7 There are currently at least five US companies participating in the commercial race. These
companies have articulated some pretty heady goals and “…plan to slash launch costs to just a third or even a fifth
of today’s average launch price of $5000/lb.”8 Such a reduction in launch costs would continue fueling the boom in
satellite operations. It is important to note that the government does not fund these companies and “…unlike most
history-making spaceplane projects, these efforts will be funded largely with private money from wealthy
individuals and companies.”9 The government is funding a completely separate reusable launch vehicle effort
in coordination with industry. The Government RLV Status section of this chapter details this combined effort.
The combination of these two programs may yield success much earlier than either program would produce in
isolation. The rapid development of small and inexpensive Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers by the
commercial sector in response to commercial economic forces is an apt analogy. These commercial receivers in
turn greatly influenced the design and implementation of military receivers. The launch vehicle government and
private industry effortmay well follow the same model. The most apparent haracteristic of this government-
industry fusion in the GPS receiver analogy was the speed at which developments occur
Bruce Gagnon. Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, 1999 (Bruce K.,
"Space Exploration and Exploitation," http:/lwww.space4peace.orglarticleslscandm.htm)
We are now poised to take the bad seed of greed, environmental exploitation and war into space. Having
shown such enormous disregard for our own planet Earth, the so-called "visionaries" and "explorers" are now
ready to rape and pillage the heavens. Countless launches of nuclear materials, using rockets that regularly
blow up on the launch pad, will seriously jeopardize life on Earth. Returning potentially bacteria-laden space
materials back to Earth, without any real plans for containment and monitoring, could create new epidemics
for us. The possibility of an expanding nuclear-powered arms race in space will certainly have serious
ecological and political ramifications as well. The effort to deny years of consensus around international space
law will create new global conflicts and confrontations.
Other technologies developed at the lunar installation have equal value to us here on the Earth. As we breathe, CO2
is exhaled. Here on the Earth it is thought to change our climate, on the Moon it would soon kill the
inhabitants unless it is dealt with. Therefore a means must be found to reclaim the oxygen from the CO2 and
use the carbon as an extra resource. On the Earth today pure water is becoming an increasingly valuable
resource. On the Moon it would cost over $100,000 per gallon, necessitating extreme measures to reclaim it
from the bath, clothes washing, and even from our waste. These same technologies could be fed back into the
terrestrial economy, improving our water usage and lowering the cost of additional water extraction infrastructure. A
pound of food delivered to the Moon is also enormously costly and therefore an early effort to grow nutritious
plants and eventually animal husbandry will be required. Learning how to do this in this extremely resource
constrained environment could teach us much to help with the growing concerns over our food supplies here on the
Earth.
Bruce Tonn, Futures Studies Department, Corvinus University of Budapest, 2005, “Human Extinction Scenarios,”
www.budapestfutures.org/downloads/abstracts/Bruce%20Tonn%20-%20Abstract.pdf)
The human species faces numerous threats to its existence. These include global climate change, collisions with
near-earth objects, nuclear war, and pandemics. While these threats are indeed serious, taken separately they fail
to describe exactly how humans could become extinct. For example, nuclear war by itself would most likely
fail to kill everyone on the planet, as strikes would probably be concentrated in the northern hemisphere and the
Middle East, leaving populations in South America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand some hope of
survival. It is highly unlikely that any uncontrollable nanotechnology could ever be produced but even it if
were, it is likely that humans could develop effective, if costly, countermeasures, such as producing the
technologies in space or destroying sites of runaway nanotechnologies with nuclear weapons. Viruses could indeed
kill many people but effective quarantine of a healthy people could be accomplished to save large numbers of
people. Humans appear to be resilient to extinction with respect to single events.
Space exploration will lead to the spread of pathogenic viruses through biohazardous land
samples
Bruce Gagnon. Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, 1999 (Bruce K.,
"Space Exploration and Exploitation," http:/lwww.space4peace.orglarticleslscandm.htm)
Potential dangers do exist though. Barry DiGregorio, author and founder of the International Committee Against
Mars Sample Return, has written that "…any Martian samples returned to Earth must be treated as
biohazardous material until proven otherwise." At the present time NASA has taken no action to create a special
facility to handle space sample returns. On March 6, 1997 a report issued by the Space Studies Board of the
National Research Council recommended that such a facility should be operational at least two years prior to
launch of a Mars Sample Return mission. Reminding us of the Spanish exploration of the Americas, and the
smallpox virus they carried that killed thousands of indigenous people, DiGregorio warns that the Mars samples
could "contain pathogenic viruses or bacteria."
Robert Roy Britt, Senior science writer, managing editor of LiveScience, 1/21/2k
http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/planetearth/flu_in_space_000121.html
So say Sir Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe of the University of Wales at Cardiff. And while there is
much doubt by many other scientists that the flu comes from space, Hoyle and Wickramasinghe are generating
a lot of interest with their idea. In a new paper, to be published in an upcoming issue of the Indian journal
Current Science, the researchers present data that show how previous periods of high sunspot activity
coincided with flu pandemics (large-scale epidemics). A roughly 11-year cycle of solar activity is increasing
now and is expected to peak soon, other scientists agree. Hoyle and Wickramasinghe say we can expect
another flu pandemic to accompany the solar peak "within weeks." By that claim, perhaps debate over their
research will soon be settled. Injecting the flu into our atmosphere The researchers say that the virus, or a trigger
that causes it, is deposited throughout space by dust in the debris stream of comets, which are thought by
many researchers to harbor organic material. As Earth passes through the stream, dust (and perhaps the virus)
enters our atmosphere, where it can lodge for two decades or more, until gravity pulls it down.
Bruce Gagnon. Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, 1999 (Bruce K.,
"Space Exploration and Exploitation," http:/lwww.space4peace.orglarticleslscandm.htm)
The Pentagon, through the U.S. Space Command, is working hard to ensure that the space corridor will remain
open and free for private corporate interests. Weapon systems such as nuclear powered lasers and anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons are now being funded, researched, and tested in the U.S. It will only be a matter of
time until deployment of space based weapons will follow. In the Space Command’s document, Vision for
2020, they state that "Historically, military forces have evolved to protect national interests and investments – both
military and economic. During the rise of sea commerce, nations built navies to protect and enhance their
commercial interests. …The control of space will encompass protecting U.S. military, civil and commercial
investments in space…. Control of space is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within
the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required." A parallel, military highway will
be created between the Earth and the planets beyond. Documents commissioned by the U.S. Congress suggest that
U.S. military bases on the Moon will enable the U.S. to control access to and from the planet Earth. The logo of the
U.S. Space Command is "Master of Space."
Humans will not become extinct. Ingenuity, genius, and luck ensure.
Bryan Jamieson, Writer and Political Commentator, 7/9/2006, “The Answer,”
http://www.zeppscommentaries.com/My%20Town%20Essays/theanswer.htm
As a result, I doubt that we will see a planet with twenty billion people on it by 2106. I doubt we will even reach ten
billion (we’re currently around 6.5 billion). The problems we face are real, and we aren’t going to be able to solve
them through proactive means. We will wind up alleviating them by dying off in large numbers, which is what
happens to species at the top of the food chain on a regular basis. I believe humans will survive the next 100 years
precisely the same way they’ve survived the previous 4.5 million years: they’ll muddle through. There will be
flashes of genius, of greatness, of courage, that will prevent the race from sinking itself. We will die off but
enough humans will survive to keep the race going.
Asteroids won’t cause extinction. Extinction level collisions happen less than every 500,000
years.
Nick Bostrom, director of the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, 2006, Global Agenda,
www.globalagendamagazine.com/2006/Bostrom.asp)
It is sad that humanity as a whole has not invested even a few million dollars to improve its thinking about how
it may best ensure its own survival. Some existential risks are difficult to study in a rigorous way but we will
not know what insights we might develop until we do the research. There are also some sub-species of
existential risk that can be measured, such as the risk of a species-destroying meteor or asteroid impact. This
particular risk turns out to be very small. A meteor or an asteroid would have to be considerably larger than
1km in diameter to pose an existential risk. Fortunately, such objects hit the Earth less than once in 500,000
years on average.
Dr Brian Martin, physicist in stratospheric modeling, research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of
Science, Australian National University, and a member of Sana, Sana update, March 1984)
Yet in spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there was almost no scientific support for such a
possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach [2], with fallout clouds gradually enveloping the
earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people
who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during the first
few days. Global fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to
millions of cancers worldwide over many decades) [3]. In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace
movement have left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction.
Nuclear war may kill large cities but it will not cause extinction
2. No Other Nation would be Able to Challenge the U.S. in Space if it Deployed Space
Weapons
Everett C. Dolman, 9/14/2005, "US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space." E-Parliament Conference on
Space Security
And America would respond -- finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is
unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to
provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of
investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability -- essentially from scratch -- would
provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to
displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would
opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing,
depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race
in space should the US deploy weapons there -- at least for the next few years -- is extremely remote.
3. The US must develop offensive space capabilities to protect our assets from attack
Everett Carl Dolman, School of Advanced Studies (SAAS), 2003, “Space Power and US Hegemony: Maintaining a
Liberal World Order in the 21st Century”, http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/spaceforum/Dolmanpaper%5B1%5D.pdf //
[E.Berggren]
John C. Kunich, 97, “Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival." Air Force Law Review. Vol. 41
Mitigation, or response, could take several forms, depending in part on the nature and magnitude of a given threat,
once it has been detected and evaluated. One possible response would be evacuation of the impact zone, to minimize
loss of life. A closely related response is preparation to minimize the resultant damage due to fires, tidal waves,
earthquakes, acid rain, and other after-effects, and to provide medical care to the victims. These forms of response,
though important, would be grossly inadequate when dealing with a truly massive threat such as those discussed
previously. In the event of a massive strike from space, the resultant apocalyptic disasters would render such efforts
as fruitless as rearranging the deck chairs while the Titanic sinks. The only meaningful response to a massive
strike is some form of direct intervention. Direct intervention may entail deflection or destruction of the
approaching space object to prevent or mitigate any impact with Earth. The means for achieving this fall
partially within the realm of existing military capabilities, and partially within the ambit of technologies
superficially similar to some proposed/experimental aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Depending
on the physical size and other attributes of the threatening object, a variety of countermeasures might be effective in
diverting or destroying it. Earth-based nuclear devices such as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or their
submarine-launched counterparts might suffice. Non-nuclear options conceivably would work, including kinetic
energy or laser systems such as were explored under SDI. Some of these may require space-basing to be effective,
while others may work in an Earth-based mode.
Thomas D. Bell, 1/99, Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and Technological Inevitabilities..
Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University
Force application from space will give a new meaning to responsiveness and lethality in global attack and
precision engagement. It will revolutionize the way the United States projects military power because it will
allow the application of force against any target on the face of the earth through space. From a robust space-
based laser system, or a ground-based system transiting space, the US will have the capability to conduct a
strategic air campaign on the order of Desert Storm in a matter of minutes without the need for deploying
forces. By extension, the capability will also exist to conduct an interdiction campaign without the need to
deploy forces.
Steven Lambakis, 02, "Putting Military Uses of Space in Context." Future Security in Space: Commercial,
Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs. Ed. James Clay Moltz. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies
There are sound political and strategic justifications for looking to space. First, a weapon that exploits Earth's
orbit may increase the number of foreign policy and military options available to our leaders and
commanders. More options mean that a leader may not be forced to take a more destructive or weaker course
of action, that he has choices on how his country should act in a dynamic, complex, and often dangerous
world. Effective military options, in other words, can work to improve deterrence and stability and help
leaders deal more intelligently, even more diplomatically, with surprises.
Lori Scheetz, fall 2006, "Infusing Environmental Ethics into the Space Weapons Dialogue." Georgetown
International Environmental Law Review. Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 2006): 57-82
Proponents of weaponizing space focus on American military dependence on space and a sense of increasing danger
of a ballistic missile attack. Supporters argue that space weapons might be able to address threats from small,
enemy satellites, ground-based anti-satellite weapons, and high altitude nuclear explosions. With the growing
concern in the United States over terrorists and unfriendly nations, weaponizing space to bolster U.S.
national security is close to becoming a reality. Furthermore, the 2005 report of the Presidential Commission on
the Future of Space Exploration, ("Aldridge Commission Report"), focuses on the commercialization of space.
Space weapons could be used to protect these new commercial interests, along with providing diplomatic
leverage and creating offensive potential from space.
2. U.S. has more to gain for hegemony over negotiations not deploying space weapons than
deploying weapons
Kenneth S. Blazejewski, a JD/MPA joint degree student at NYU School of Law and the Woodrow Wilson School,
Spring 2008, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1, pg. 45-6
A second reason for US commitment not to place weapons in space is the negotiating leverage such a concession
would provide. Of course, such leverage cannot be taken for granted. Rather, agreement not to weaponize outer
space could be loosely conditional on making progress in other areas of US security. There are at least three
areas where the United States could expect to gain concessions from China in return for a commitment not to
weaponize space. First, China's participation at the CD strongly suggests that it might be willing to begin
negotiations on an FMCT, a top security priority of successive US governments, if the United States agrees to
negotiate on space weapons. Since China's commitment to the FMCT can facilitate the FMCT commitments of India
and Pakistan, its participation is critical. Second, the United States can demand greater support from China on
the Proliferation Security Initiative. The PSI, which seeks to prevent illicit sea and air transport of fissile material,
has been identified by the Bush administration as a key program in reducing the possibility of acquisition of nuclear
weapons by a terrorist organization. To date, China's muted opposition to the PSI stands as one of the greatest
impediments to a fuller development of the initiative. Chinese cooperation could be vital to this program's success.
Third, the United States should demand greater transparency in Chinese military planning, especially with
regard to ASAT and space-focused programs. Such transparency, long sought by US defense officials, would
reduce the likelihood of potential conflicts over speculative intelligence and give the United States greater insight
into how military decisions are made (and whether China indeed suffers from a stovepiped bureaucracy). I argue
that progress in each of these three areas would represent a greater security gain than proceeding with the
weaponization of space. If the United States is able to negotiate a quid pro quo in one or all of these areas in return
for a commitment not to weaponize outer space, the agreement would represent a clear US net security gain.
3. US Hegemony inevitable: Balancing against the U.S. is all hype–states have an incentive
to speak out against the united states but not to counter it
Steven Brooks, Asst Prof, and William Wohlforth, Professor, both at Dartmouth, International Security, Summer
2005
The key cases of soft balancing are quite recent, so reliable inside information can be scarce. The chief putative
soft-balancing powers -- France, Russia, and China -- are also not known for the transparency of their
executive decisionmaking. And public rhetoric presents difficult analytical challenges. A government with a
sincere interest in soft balancing may not want to advertise it. At the same time, all four other dynamics may
generate balancing rhetoric from policymakers, creating prima facie evidence for a soft-balancing explanation.
Leaders motivated chiefly by domestic political considerations are hardly likely to say so; they may detect domestic
political advantage in touting the balancing element even if countering the threat from U.S. power is not the real
issue. In turn, leaders who have sincere policy differences with the United States may talk up balancing to help
build a coalition to increase their bargaining leverage. Being seen by Washington as a potential soft-balancer
has risks, to be sure, but it also holds out the promise of magnifying one's bargaining influence and the
significance of any concessions one might make. Governments that pursue relative economic advantages for
themselves or their constituents may find it convenient to cloak the policy in high-minded talk about checking
U.S. power. And the United States is so prominent on the global stage that it can potentially serve as a
convenient focal point for other states that seek to cooperate on regional security issues. States will likely have
strong disagreements on the specifics of how to cooperate at the regional level; a public stance against U.S.
policies may be one issue they can agree on. Balancing rhetoric can thus be a useful rallying point for
stimulating regional cooperation.
The fall of U.S. hegemony is inevitable—every attempt to sustain it will cause terrorist
backlash and resistance
Parag Khanna expert on geopolitics and global governance, Director of the Global Governance Initiative and
Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation 08 ("Waving Goodbye
to Hegemony", newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604, January 27)[JWu]
It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second
term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as
warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has
absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port
of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and
gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America's
standing in the world remains in steady decline. Why? Weren't we supposed to reconnect with the United
Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can, and should, lead it to collective security and prosperity?
Indeed, improvements to America's image may or may not occur, but either way, they mean little. Condoleezza
Rice has said America has no "permanent enemies," but it has no permanent friends either. Many saw the
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs
of imperial overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened America's armed forces, and each assertion of power
has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks, insurgent groups and "asymmetric" weapons
like suicide bombers. America's unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to
block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That new global order has arrived, and
there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.
States won’t balance the U.S.–military buildups are only to improve bargaining position,
not to limit hegemony
Steven Brooks, Asst Prof, and William Wohlforth, Professor, both at Dartmouth, International Security, Summer
2005
Distinguishing bargaining from soft balancing is also crucial because a key reason states may now seek greater
capabilities is not to check U.S. power, but rather to be in a better position to bargain over the appropriate
responses to security challenges from other states or actors. This is, for example, a major impetus for enhanced
EU military capacity. It is an article of faith among many Europeans that the United States will take them
seriously only if they are more capable militarily. This desire to influence Washington is understandable. On
any given global security issue, each government is likely to have its own favored approach that fits with its
traditions, ideas, and interests (commercial and strategic). Moreover, there are situations in which states are
concerned that the manner in which the United States might address a security issue could redound negatively
for their own security. Key here is that the concern is not about a direct security threat from the United States;
rather, the security connection is indirect "blowback" from various U.S. policies that increase the threat from
other actors (e.g., France's fear that a U.S. invasion of Iraq would only exacerbate the problem of al-Qaida-style
terrorism). This threat of indirect blowback is hardly inconsequential, and it is not surprising that other great
powers will sometimes bargain hard with Washington to change its approach when they see this threat
emerging. States are not indifferent to how security issues are resolved, and so may be willing to invest in
capabilities that give them a seat at the bargaining table.
No one will ever counterbalance the U.S.–great powers differ only in how to solve regional
problems, not whether to solve them in the first place
Steven Brooks, Asst Prof, and William Wohlforth, Professor, both at Dartmouth, International Security, Summer
2005
Ultimately, what appears new about the behavior analysts are calling soft balancing is not its significance, but
its perceived prominence on the agenda. What used to be considered standard diplomatic bargaining is now
likely trumpeted as balancing because real balancing of the kind that has appeared so often throughout
history -- competing great-power alliances, arms buildups, brinkmanship crises, and the like -- was cleared
off the international agenda in 1989-91 with the end of the Cold War. Importantly, the concept of balancing rose
to prominence in a world in which great power security relations were dominated by the direct threat that they
posed to each other. Today, by contrast, the likelihood of great power war is exceedingly low. Weak states and
nonstates pose the main security challenge, and the great powers argue primarily over the best way to
address them. Balance of power theory has no utility in explaining great power relations in this world
Space weapons damage military power by increasing the vulnerability of its military center
of gravity
Bruce M. Deblois, Summer 03, “The Advent of Space Weapons,” Astropolitics, Vol. 1 No. 1
In this view, a space-weaponizing country creates both the powder keg of global instability (where it has
weakened its own international posture) as well as the spark of regional instability (where it has made itself a
target of pre- emption and escalation). Coupled with this very unstable environment, it can also be argued that the
same country that weaponizes space may actually damage its own military power. Much of the impetus behind
space weaponization stems from perceived military utility, to include national missile defense applications for boost-
phase intercept, time-critical targeting, and defense mechanisms for critical space systems. Ironically, the posturing
of more military assets in space could actually weaken the military posture of those that seek further military
advantage in that domain. Space assets are already a center of gravity (CoG), or at least a critical concentration
of military force enhancement assets. To deploy more systems in space in an attempt to protect this CoG only
complicates the problem. In spite of the added defenses, the preponderance of threats will remain: denial and
deception, electronic warfare (e.g. uplink and downlink jamming), ground facilities disruption, micro-satellites
(e.g. space mines), direct ascent interceptors or even a nuclear detonation in space.
A. U.S. not pushing for space weapons. Complications and other priorities ensure.
Nina Tannenwald, Director International Relations Program, Brown University, Summer 04, “Law Versus Power
on the High Frontie: The Case for a Rule-Based Regie for Outer Space,”
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/tannenwald.pdf, pg. 5
Although SPACECOM and its supporters aggressively assert their views, advocates of weapons in space may be
in the minority, even in the Pentagon. As many observers recognize, the interests of the United States in space are
much broader than SPACECOM presents. U.S. testing and deployment of orbital weapons could make using
space for other military and commercial purposes more difficult. Many in the military, especially those involved
in crucial military support activities, are quietly aware of this, as are officials at NASA and the international space
station, and their supporters in Congress. Congressional support for antisatellite (ASAT) programs does not appear
to be deep or widespread. Serious questions remain as to whether the threats to U.S. assets in space are really as
great as SPACECOM argues, and whether, even if the threats were real, expensive and difficult space-based
weapons would really be the most effective way to deal with them. In many cases, those wishing to hurt the
United States will likely find it much easier, and more effective, to attack terrestrial targets.
Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Center for Defense Information, Washington DC, 2003, “Monsters and
Shadows: Left unchecked, American fears regarding threats to space assets will drive weaponization”,
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1884.pdf
It is obvious that American space systems do have inherent vulnerabilities. It is also obvious that technologies for
exploiting those vulnerabilities exist, or are likely to become available over the next several decades. However,
neither vulnerabilities in American systems nor the potential capabilities of others necessarily translate into
threats. In order to threaten American space assets, a potential adversary must have not only the
technological ability to develop weapons and the means to develop and use them, but also the political will and
intent to use them in a hostile manner. There is little evidence to date that any other country or hostile non-
state actor possesses both the mature technology and the intention to seriously threaten American military or
commercial operations in space—and even less evidence of serious pursuit of actual space-based weapons by
potentially hostile actors. There are severe technical barriers and high costs to overcome for all but the most
rudimentary ASAT capabilities, especially for development of on-orbit weapons. It further remains unclear
what political drivers—outside of American development of space-based weaponry—would force American
competitors, in the near- to medium-term to seriously pursue such technology. Moreover, there is little public
concern voiced by other space-faring nations, including American friend and allies, about potential threats to
their space-based assets—although China and the Russian Federation are uncomfortable with the possibility that
the United States might deploy ASAT capabilities. This may be explained by the fact that no other nation’s military
and commercial operations are so space-dependent, but it also may be that these nations simply do not see the
emergence anytime soon of a credible threat.
Tariq Malik, writer for Imaginova Corporation, 1/22/04, Think Tank Warns Against Space Weapons Systems,
http://www.space.com/news/weaponized_space_040122.html
Satellites orbiting high above Earth are a crucial resource for the U.S. military in terms of communications,
reconnaissance and global positioning. But a new report warns that too much of a space military presence,
mainly the use of space-based weapons systems, may inevitably cause more problems than they're meant to
solve. Should the U.S. military "weaponize" space, the report states, it will most likely be affect global
commerce, weaken American ties with other nations and eventually lead to space weapons proliferation as
other groups develop countermeasures or their own space weapons systems. The study, called Space Assurance
or Space Domination? The Case Against Weaponizing Space , was released by the Henry L. Stimson Center, a
Washington D.C.-based nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank aimed at enhancing international peace and security.
"When you weaponize space, you invite company," said Michael Krepon, who wrote the report and served as the
founding president of the Stimson Center. "When we go first, others will come second. That is an absolute
certainty." Once killer satellites start destroying one another above Earth, they will cause space debris that
could harm benign satellites used by civilian agencies and companies around the world, which in turn affects
global economy, according to the Stimson report. If other nations or groups choose not to put their own space
weapons in orbit, they could develop ground-based countermeasures like electronic jamming or spoofing devices to
confuse U.S. machines. A ballistic missile could disable satellites in low-earth orbit by detonating a nuclear
device, subjecting any ground troops relying intelligence from those satellites to possible attack, the study
noted. Finally, the report added, space weapons systems could hurt U.S. diplomatic ties on the ground, with other
nations constantly mindful of its space forces in Earth orbit. Krepon said there is a distinction between the
current militarization of space -- which uses satellites to support forces on the ground -- and weaponization,
defined in the study as the flight-testing and deployment of any system to specifically as systems used to "fight
a war in space or from space, or military capabilities on the ground designed to kill satellites in space."
John E. Shaw and Simon P. Worden, 2002, “Whither Space Power?: Forging a Strategy for the New Century
In the meantime, we should expect an increasing use of space for "global utilities." These utilities warrant the
term in its fullest sense. Access to high-data-rate, space-based, global access communications (complemented by
effective but not ubiquitous terrestrial networks) is increasing and will likely see continued deployment of the so-
called big LEO constellations of small communications satellites. The Internet is also going to space. The next
utility, the global positioning system (GPS), has been less recognized but is more encompassing. It already
precisely locates goods, services, and people. However, as the GPS becomes the mainspring of an increasingly
accurate global clock, commerce will depend on it in invisible ways. As the means to provide nanosecond
global accuracy, power and communications channels will come to depend on it implicitly in order to work.
Other utilities, such as global traffic management via space-based radar, are on the horizon. And, as noted
above, we can look for energy grids to migrate to space in the next century.
3. Turn: Space weapons risk arms races, accidental nuclear war, and are vulnerable to
attack
Lori Scheetz, Fall 06, “Infusing Environmental Ethics into the Space Weapons Dialogue,” Georgetown International
Environment Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 2006): 57-82, pg. 62
Many in the arms control community, on the other hand, believe that space weapons will destabilize the global
community and promote a costly arms race. Emphasizing the destabilizing consequences of space weapons,
Thomas Graham Jr. asserts that, because American missile interceptors in space could quickly wipe out Russian
early warning satellites, the mere existence of these weapons will escalate tension between the two countries
and place Russia on constant alert. One false signal from an early warning satellite could lead to a Russian
nuclear strike. Moreover, weaponization of space might not significantly reduce American vulnerability to
attack because most weapons systems will depend on ground facilities and radio links, which can be attacked
through electronic hacking and jamming. The actual weaponry based in space is also susceptible to attack.
5. Turn: China would retaliate to US space weapons deployment but favors an arms
control over a weapons approach
Hui Zhang, PhD in nuclear physics, research associate in the Project on Managing,and Pavel Podvig, 08, “Russian
and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, pg. 65
In summary, the development and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including weapons in space,
would definitely encourage a number of responses from China including technological development, military
counter- measures, and political realignment. The type of response would depend on the specific infrastructure of
U.S. missile defense and space weaponization programs. At the moment and in the near future, China's major
response would be to take an arms control approach, such as firmly advocating at the CD a legal instrument
to prevent space weaponization. Facing very limited missile defense deployment, e.g., the initial GMD currently
under deployment, China might focus on building more road-mobile ICBMs and developing a variety of
penetration aids. If a stronger missile defense system with more interceptors is deployed, China would need to
produce more fissile material to fuel more warheads, thus influencing its FMCT participation. If China is
confronted with the deployment of a layered (or space-based) missile defense system, it could consider
additional measures such as using ASAT weapons.
Thomas Graham, representative of the president for arms control, nonproliferation and, and disarmament, 12/05,
“Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War,” http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-
spaceweapons.asp
The history of the last 50 years teaches us that, if dangerous weapons and technologies are to be controlled to the
safety and security of all, it must be done early, before the programs become entrenched. That time may well be now
with respect to weapons in space. The United States does not have a secure future in space without broad and
sustained international cooperation. The deployment of weapons in space, whether offensive or defensive,
would make this necessary cooperation difficult if not impossible. There would likely be retaliation, which
would seriously degrade the progress that has been made over the last five or six decades toward multilateral
international cooperation in space. The groundwork for a comprehensive treaty-based regime has been laid, and
the importance of this objective is clear. Much work remains, but the creation of a space regime, under which the
international community decisively enshrines space as a peaceful environment, ultimately is the only
thoroughgoing alternative to a weaponized space free-for-all. The United States and the rest of the world risk
being rendered forever vulnerable to the vagaries and fluctuations of technology development. In this age of a
worldwide struggle against international terrorism, this is the last thing we should want.
Space weapons increase likelihood of war. Creates incentives for pre-emptive attack.
Nina Tannenwald, Director International Relations Program, Brown University, Summer 04, “Law Versus Power
on the High Frontie: The Case for a Rule-Based Regie for Outer Space,”
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/tannenwald.pdf, pg. 34-5
In terms of their geostrategic impact, space-based weapons do not simply enhance existing threats but introduce a
new and greater danger because of the threat they pose to strategic stability. The vulnerability of space-based
weapons will likely create incentives for preemptive attack to protect them during a crisis, greatly increasing
the likelihood of war. Further, although supporters of space weapons claim that, consistent with the United States'
defensive orientation to the world, such weapons would be for defensive purposes, the reality is that, given their
characteristics, many of them are inherently offensive weapons. It is widely recognized that space-based
ballistic missile defense systems could carry out surprise attacks against terrestrial targets or satellites.
Space weapons lead to “hair trigger” response, hightening chances of accidential war
Charles S. Robb, Winter 99, “Star Wars II,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 13
The third consequence of U.S. space weaponization would be the heightened probability of strategic conflict.
Anyone familiar with the destabilizing impact of MIRVs will understand that weapons in space will bring a new
meaning to the expression "hair trigger." Lasers can engage targets in seconds. Munitions fired from satellites in
low-earth orbit can reach the earth's surface in minutes. As in the MIRV scenario, the side to strike first would be
able to destroy much of its opponent's space weaponry before the opponent had a chance to respond. The
temptation to strike first during a crisis would be overwhelming; much of the decisionmaking would have to
be automated. Imagine that during a crisis one of our key military satellites stops functioning and we cannot
determine why. We--or a computer controlling our weapons for us-must then decide whether or not to treat
this as an act of war and respond accordingly. The fog of war would reach an entirely new density, with our
situational awareness of the course of battle in space limited and our decision cycles too slow to properly command
engagements. Events would occur so quickly that we could not even be sure which nation had initiated a strike. We
would be repeating history, but this time with far graver consequences.
China's Information Office of the State Council, November 22, 2k ("China's Space Activities, a White
Paper", viewed on Spacered; http://www.spaceref.com/china/china.white.paper.nov.22.2000.html)[JWu]
China's participation in international space cooperation started in the mid-1970s. During the last two decades
or more, China has joined bilateral, regional, multilateral and international space cooperation in different
forms, such as commercial launching service, which have yielded extensive achievements. 1. Bilateral
Cooperation: Since 1985, China has successively signed inter-governmental or inter-agency cooperative
agreements, protocols or memorandums, and established long-term cooperative relations with a dozen
countries, including the United States, Italy, Germany, Britain, France, Japan, Sweden , Argentina, Brazil,
Russia, Ukraine and Chile. Bilateral space cooperation is implemented in various forms, from making
reciprocal space programs and exchanges of scholars and specialists, and sponsoring symposiums, to jointly
developing satellite or satellite parts, and providing satellite piggyback service and commercial launching
service In 1993, a Sino-German joint venture - EurasSpace GmbH - was established, and a contract on the
development and manufacture of Sinosat-1 was signed with DASA and Aerospeciale in 1995. Sinosat-1, which
was successfully launched in 1998, was the first cooperative project on satellite development between the
Chinese and European aerospace industries. The collaboration between China and Brazil on the project of an
earth resources satellite is making good progress, and the first such satellite was successfully launched by China
on October 14, 1999. In addition to cooperation on complete satellites, China and Brazil are cooperating in the
areas of satellite technology, satellite application and satellite components. The cooperation between China and
Brazil in the space sector has set a good example for the developing countries in "South-South Cooperation" in
the high-tech field. 2. Regional Cooperation: China attaches great importance to space cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region. In 1992, China, Thailand, Pakistan and some other countries jointly sponsored the "Asian-Pacific
Multilateral Space Technology Cooperation Symposium. " Thanks to the impetus of such regional cooperation,
the governments of China, Iran, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan and Thailand signed the
"Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Small Multi-Mission Satellite and Related Activities" in
Thailand in April 1998. Besides the signatory countries, other countries in the Asia-Pacific region may also join
the cooperative project, which has helped to enhance the progress of space technology and space application in
the Asia- Pacific region. 3. Multilateral Cooperation: In June 1980, China dispatched an observer delegation to
the 23rd Meeting of UN COPUOS for the first time, and on November 3, 1980, China became a member
country of the committee. Since then, China has participated in all the meetings of UN COPUOS and the
annual meetings held by its Science, Technology and Law Sub-committee. In 1983 and 1988, China acceded to
the "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," "Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space," "Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, " and "Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,"
and has strictly performed its responsibilities and obligations.
China's Information Office of the State Council, November 22, 2k ("China's Space Activities, a White
Paper", viewed on Spacered; http://www.spaceref.com/china/china.white.paper.nov.22.2000.html)[JWu]
IV. International Cooperation China persistently supports activities involving the peaceful use of outer
space, and maintains that international space cooperation should be promoted and strengthened on the
basis of equality and mutual benefit, mutual complementarity and common development. Guiding
Principles The Chinese government holds that international space cooperation should follow the
fundamental principles listed in the "Deceleration on International Cooperation on Exploring and Utilizing
Outer Space for the Benefits and Interests of All Countries, Especially in Consideration of Developing Countries'
Demands," which was approved by the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations in 1996. China adheres to
the following principles while carrying out international space cooperation: - The aim of international space
cooperation is to peacefully develop and use space resources for the benefit of all mankind. - International
space cooperation should be carried out on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, mutual
complementarity and common development, and the generally accepted principles of international law.
- The priority aim of international space cooperation is to simultaneously increase the capability of space
development of all countries, particularly the developing countries, and enable all countries to enjoy the
benefits of space technology. - Necessary measures should be adopted to protect the space environment and
space resources in the course of international space cooperation.
China does not want space weapons. Too much space debris limits space accessibility.
Keith R. Payne, Autumn 01, "Action-Reaction Metaphysics and Negligence,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4
China also fears the increasing population of space debris. Such debris, resulting from 50 years of space
activity, already poses a considerable hazard to spacecraft. Under U.S. space weaponization plans, this crowding
problem could worsen as a large number of space weapons could be deployed in LEO. The launching and
testing of weapons would also increase space debris. Moreover, deploying space-based weapons in the
increasingly crowded realm of LEO would leave less room for civilian systems. Those problems would also occur
during periods of peace. If a number of satellites were to be destroyed during the course of a war, some
scientists warn, they would create so much debris that it would prevent future satellites from being stationed
in space and generally limit space access. Indeed, pointing to the debris problem, Chinese scientists and officials
have said that space weaponization should be considered an environmental threat as well as a security
problem.
NASA, 3-21-01 (Science and Technology Directorate at NASA, "Beam it down, Scotty",
http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2001/ast23mar_1.htm)[JWu]
Lasers are also under consideration for beaming the energy from space. Using lasers would eliminate most of
the problems associated with microwave but under a current treaty with Russia, the U.S. is prohibited from
beaming high-power lasers from outer space.
Space Weapons kill US hegemony and put civilian and commercial satellites at risk.
Hui Zhang, PhD in nuclear physics, research associate in the Project on Managing,and Pavel Podvig, 08, “Russian
and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, pg. 74
A focused space weapons ban would reduce the proliferation of ASATs. It would reduce the risk of a "Space Pearl
Harbor" for other military and civilian satellites. As many experts in the United States point out, the heavy
dependence of the United States on its space assets means that it "has more to lose than to gain by opening the
way to the testing and deployment of ASATs and space weapons." For example, the United States is now more
dependent on satellites to perform important military functions than is any other state. By placing weapons in
space, the United States might stimulate others to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against U.S.
space assets. It would be very difficult for the United States to maintain unchallenged hegemony in space
weaponization, and many have argued that the United States' current military advantage in space assets would
be lost or degraded by weaponization. Space weaponization would also threaten U.S. civilian and commercial
assets. The economy and society of the United States are highly dependent on the applications of commercial
satellites. Placing weapons in space would make these satellites much more vulnerable.
Merrill Matthews, 10/13/06, And the Nobel Prize for the Most Innovators Goes too…,
http://www.ipi.org/ipi/ipipressreleases.nsf/70218ef1ad92c4ad86256ee5005965f6/f8b066cd433064b8862572050054
b4d4?OpenDocument
We are pleased to announce that innovation is alive and well in the U.S. Indeed, if Nobel Prizes are any
indication—and they seem to be a pretty good indicator—the U.S. is the most innovative country in the world,
hands down. The New York Times ran a story looking at Nobel Laureates in medicine. According to the Times, “In
the last 10 years, for instance, 12 Nobel Prizes in medicine have gone to American-born scientists working in
the United States, 3 have gone to foreign-born scientists working in the United States, and just 7 have gone to
researchers working outside the country.” Pretty impressive, we’d say. Moreover, of the “six most important
medical innovations of the last 25 years,” four of them “were developed in American hospitals or by
American companies,” and one other was “improved” in the U.S. The Times goes on to say, “Even when the
initial research is done overseas, the American system leads in converting new ideas into workable
commercial technologies.” That got us to thinking, how does the U.S. fair is some of the other scientific fields?
Apparently, even better. Of the 14 winners of the Nobel Prize in economics since 2000 (some years had multiple
winners), 12 were listed with a U.S. affiliation (a few included a second country, such as Israel). Of the 20 winners
of the Nobel Prize in physics since 2000, 14 had a U.S. affiliation. Finally, of the 18 Nobel Prize winning chemists,
11 identified with the U.S. Looking at the sciences (including economics), the U.S. is by far the leader. No other
country even comes close. Of course, many of the top scientists are trained in the U.S. But others move here after
graduating to pursue their careers because of the country’s deep commitment to innovation. For all the
(often-justified) complaints about the American education system, when it comes to creating and supporting
world-class innovators, we must be doing something right.
James Moore, PhD from The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in finance, 9/27/06, Innovation
From the Grassroots Up, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/jim/2006/09/27/ibms-open-source-conspiracy-patent-reform-
in-the-service-of-big-bus/
Taken as a whole, the US innovation ecosystem is the best in the world. The US is the most innovative nation
on the planet. Our patent system is at the center of our innovation. It enables investment in research and
development by individuals, universities, and companies. Our innovation rate is far above the Europeans,
and they have the most “reformed” system. We have the most traditional patent system, and the best
technical and economic results. We also have the most open industry structures, the highest percentage of
small businesses, the highest levels of venture activity. All of this, I believe, is because we have the most well-
developed market for innovation. By contrast Europe is dominated by big companies that monopolize the
output of local engineers and scientists by forcing them into empoyee status.
Space Weapons kill cooperation crucial to solve proliferation, climate change, and
terrorism
Karl P. Mueller, associate political scientist at RAND, 5/8/2002, Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space
Weaponization Debate, http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/spaceforum/TotemandTabooGWUpaperRevised%5B1%5D.pdf
Sanctuary internationalism also warns of potential coupling between space weaponization and nuclear instability, on
several levels. First, and perhaps least seriously in the current global environment, opponents of space-based
ballistic missile defense, like generations of BMD critics before them, fear that such systems would weaken the
deterrent potency of major powers’ second-strike nuclear forces. Second, sanctuary advocates are concerned
that anti-satellite warfare could contribute to nuclear instability by disabling space-based ballistic missile
launch detection systems, reducing strategic warning and potentially allowing states to launch missile attacks
anonymously, and thus with hope of avoiding retaliation. Third, they note that conventional space weapons,
such as kinetic energy projectiles launched from orbit, might have considerable utility in their own right as
part of a first strike against an enemy’s nuclear capabilities. Finally, they argue that space weaponization
might encourage nuclear proliferation, since states facing threats from space weapons but lacking the ability
to respond in kind or to neutralize the danger would be likely to seek asymmetric means to shore up their
security, among which the acquisition of nuclear weapons might be attractive.
3. Their Johnston evidence says that US hegemony is key to protecting China and none of
their evidence says that Japanese hegemony reduces US hegemony.
Simon Collard-Wexler, and Thomas Graham et al, 7/06, “Space Security 2006,” pg. 34
The broader category of space situational awareness, within which space surveillance is a primary capability,
remains one of the ³most urgent space security shortcomings² of the US according to leading experts. Therefore, it
has been bolstering such capabilities. The US Deep View program plans to develop a high-resolution radar-
imaging capability to characterize smaller objects in Earth orbit. The US Space Surveillance Telescope
program will ³demonstrate an advanced ground-based optical system to enable detection and tracking of
faint objects in space, while providing rapid, wide-area search capability.² Also under development are the
SBSS, set for launch in 2007, and the Orbital Deep Space Imager. Both surveillance systems are expected to have
inherent capabilities for identifying and tracking orbital debris in GEO, but are being developed as part of the
broader US space control mission (see Space Systems Negation). The Naval Fence was transferred to Air Force
control in 2004 when it was renamed the Air Force Space Surveillance System. The oldest US space surveillance
system, it consists of three transmitters and six receivers capable of making some 5-million detections each month of
objects larger than a basketball.
2. Their Riswan card says that we already have the tech we need to conduct military
affairs. It gives examples of multiple technologies that are constantly being advanced.
Plan angers dems – dems trying to kill NASA and use it’s funding for their own priorities
Spacedaily.com, 5/2/07, “Weldon Says Democrats Set To Cripple Manned Space Program”,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Weldon_Says_Democrats_ Set_To_Cripple_Manned_Space_Program_999.html
U.S. Rep. Dave Weldon, M.D. (R-FL) today excoriated the Democratic leadership for failing to allow a vote on an
amendment he proposed that would have kept Congress from raiding NASA's budget to fund a 35% increase for the
National Science Foundation (NSF). "It's increasingly clear that Democratic leaders have our manned space
program in their crosshairs," said Weldon. Weldon noted that at the hearing to introduce his proposal Rep.
Dennis Cardoza (D-CA), who sits on the powerful Rules Committee, said he opposed the amendment because he
was 'not convinced' of the need for human space exploration. Weldon originally introduced the amendment after
the Democrats proposed an astounding 40% percent ($2 billion) funding increase for NSF this year alone. The
proposed increase was made possible earlier this year when Democrats cut a half-a-billion dollars from NASA
funding. NASA and NSF are funded through the same budget account and compete for the same pot of money.
"Democrats are on a glide path to cripple our manned Space program. It's time the space community saw this
for what it is: an assault on our commitment to build the Shuttle replacement, return to the moon, and maintain our
strategic advantage in space. It's also an assault on the civilian workers and contractors who are about to have their
lives disrupted because Democrats can't divert NASA funding fast enough to their other priorities."
SSP would provide all the energy in the world, making oil obsolete
National Space Society, independent, educational organization; preeminent citizen's voice on space 10/07, (""An
investment for today – an energy solution for tomorrow" http://www.nss.org/legislative/positions/NSS-SSP-
PositionPaper.pdf)[JWu]
Solar energy is routinely used on spacecraft today, and the solar energy available in space is literally billions
of times greater than we use today. The lifetime of the sun is an estimated 4 to 5 billion years, making SSP a
truly long-term energy solution. Space solar power can have an extremely small environmental footprint,
perhaps competitive with ground-solar and wind, because with sufficient investments in space infrastructure, the
SSP can be built from materials from space with zero terrestrial environmental impact. Only energy receivers
need be built on Earth. As Earth receives only one part in 2.3 billion of the sun's output, SSP is by far the
largest potential energy source available, dwarfing all others combined. Development cost and
time, of course, are considerable. This makes SSP a long-term solution rather than a short-term stop-gap,
although there are some intriguing near-term possibilities. In any case, SSP can potentially supply all the
electrical needs of our planet.
One year of SBSP provides almost all remaining oil energy combined
James Bloom, The Guardian staff writer, 11-1-07, ("Power from the final frontier",
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/nov/01/guardianweeklytechnologysection.research)[JWu]
The space office sees energy supply as one of strategic importance as oil supplies dwindle; according to a report
by Germany's Energy Watch Group published last week, "peak oil" output occurred last year, and will fall by
7% annually to half its present levels by 2030. The space office notes that all remaining oil resources are
estimated to contain 250 terawatt-years of energy; but that a one-kilometre wide band in geosynchronous
orbit receives about 212 TW-years of energy each year.
Arthur Smith, President Long Island Space Society, 8-11-03 ("the case for space based solar development",
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/ssp-03b.html)[JWu]
We already have an immense fusion reactor working for us in our solar system, ultimately responsible for
almost all our energy choices. All we really need to do is make better use of it by tapping into it more
directly. Any rational energy policy for the United States must support the steps needed to make that
happen: increased investment in reducing launch costs, reserving radio frequency spectrum for power
transmission, and moving towards a billion dollars per year in a robust and diverse program of R&D on
space solar power.
CNN 7/1/08 ("How to harvest solar power? Beam it down from space!"
http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/05/30/space.solar/index.html)[JWu]
NASA and the United States Department of Energy studied the concept throughout the 1970s, concluding
that although the technology was feasible, the price of putting it all together and sending it to outer space
was not. "The estimated cost of all of the infrastructure to build them in space was about $1 trillion," said
John Mankins, a former NASA technologist and president of the Space Power Association. "It was an
unimaginable amount of money."
NewScientist 10/11/07 ("Pentagon backs plan to beam solar power down from space"
http://environment.newscientist.com/article/dn12774)[JWu]
Space-based solar power would use kilometre-sized solar panel arrays to gather sunlight in orbit. It would
then beam power down to Earth in the form of microwaves or a laser, which would be collected in antennas on
the ground and then converted to electricity. Unlike solar panels based on the ground, solar power satellites
placed in geostationary orbit above the Earth could operate at night and during cloudy conditions.
"We think we can be a catalyst to make this technology advance," said US Marine Corps lieutenant colonel Paul
Damphousse of the NSSO at a press conference yesterday in Washington, DC, US.
The NSSO report (pdf) recommends that the US government spend $10 billion over the next 10 years to
build a test satellite capable of beaming 10 megawatts of electric power down to Earth.
One space-based laser costs billions, and $150 million each time to fire
Richard L. Garwin, B.S. in Physics from Case Institute of Technology, PhD in Physics from the University of
Chicago, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Adjunct Research Fellow in the Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University; and Adjunct Profewwor of qhysics at Columbia University, 5/14/03,
“Space Weapons: Not Yet,” http://www.pugwash.org/reports/sc/may2003/space2003-garwin.htm
Another weapon of considerable interest is the Space Based Laser. These weapons could attack over long distances
at the speed of light, although space mines and the ABL could be equally prompt. A SBL could also attack terrestrial
targets, but only with suitable laser wavelengths to penetrate the atmosphere. The current candidate SBL lasers
cannot attack ground or airborne targets. A single SBL, costing billions of dollars, could typically have a range
of at most 3000 km, unless the SBL constellation were conceived to have a large number of redirecting ("fighting")
mirrors3. Under those circumstances, a competitive system could use a ground-based laser, redirected by such
mirrors3. Cloud at the GBL site would cancel the capability of a GBL, so several would be needed to have high
probability that the system would be operable at any time. In any case, the fighting mirrors might be classed by
the potential victims as weapons in space as well. An SBL would be a very expensive means of attacking a
satellite, but might be more useful for missile defense purposes. With relatively few SBL in orbit, one might need to
be used at 3000 km range. At that distance, with no loss through the atmosphere, a perfect mirror of 3 m diameter,
and laser power output of 3 MW in the 3.8-micron DF band, a target protected with 3 cm of cork could withstand
about 200 MJm-2 before exposing the target surface to laser heat. (Some Minuteman ICBMs have had a 0.6-
centimeter layer of cork to protect the booster from skin friction heating during launch. Such a layer would be
vaporized with about 50 MJm-2 (5 kJcm-2) from a SBL.) The laser consumes fuel at a rate of some 3kg/MWs, or
9 kg/s, and it would need to fire for 1700 s at the assumed 3000-km range, thus using 15 tons of fuel, at a
launch cost for fuel of $150 million per target attacked. At a range of 1000 km, the launch cost would be some
$16 M per target. Other countermeasures are feasible and could be multiplicative—such as the slow rotation of the
booster during launch.
"F@#k you!...[pause]...That's a stupid argument!...[pause]...[insert dramatic middle finger]!..."
-- Bill Shanahan on "How to Answer 'The Earth Is Flat' Argument"
57/59
Space Based Solar Power Neg ____/____
DDI 08
KO: KNOCK OUT!!!!
Links
Spending
Official Lifeboat Foundation, 12/24/07, Near term low earth orbit space based solar power,
http://nextbigfuture.com/2007/12/near-term-low-earth-orbit-space-based.html
Low earth orbit (LEO) systems offer the advantage of reducing the scale of the solar power systems. Most solar
power systems proposals have been for geosynchronous orbit (GEO). This means that the rectennas to receive the
energy have to be huge (like the size of Manhattan.) and the systems have to generate gigawatts to justify the size of
the system. The GEO solar space satellite systems end up having an initial start up cost of tens of billions of
dollars.
Gamble-Risley, 9-6-2006( Michelle, writer for the Engineering News-Record, “California Extends Rebate Plan to
Municipal Utilities, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do >, NJ)
Boosters of solar-energy generation are anticipating boom times following enactment of a California bill that
expands the 10-year, $2.9-billion California Solar Initiative created in January. The law, known as SB 1, caps a two-
year effort to make the state the national leader in solar energy. SB 1 extends the coverage of the initiative, also
known as the Million Solar Roofs program, and creates $100.8 million in incentives for residential and commercial
establishments to install solar power systems by 2018. The California Public Utilities Commission created the
earlier program, but CPUC's authority extends only to investor-owned utilities. Under SB 1 the program now covers
municipal utilities such as Sacramento Municipal Utilities District and Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power. The
program aims to generate 3,000 MW using solar energy.The bill creates certainty for the future by offering
incentives and making solar energy attractive, says Les Nelson, executive director of the Rio Vista-based California
Solar Energy Industry Association. The new rules increase the net-metering cap for solar photovoltaic (PV) systems,
allowing energy consumers whose systems generate excess power to sell it into the electrical grid. "This provision
allows customers to capture the full value of their solar PV system's electrical generation," Nelson says. Industry
officials expect California's solar program to influence the PV market elsewhere. "I believe California will become
an aggressive solar market much like Germany and Japan, two countries widely known as solar energy users,"says
George Douglas, spokesman for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, Colo. He also notes that
emerging solar technology such as thin-film technology will help drive down prices, creating more market demand.
The states can fund NASA in everyway to develop space solar satellites-Epscor proves