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EN BANC
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system,
upon which the workings of the contentious and adversarial system in the
Philippine legal process are based - the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the
client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate
is also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and
confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this
instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of
protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the
performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro
Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz
Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA
Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included,
among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations
and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where
its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More
specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law
firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's
equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the
shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with
their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to
the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances.
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and
acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in
keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings.ii[2]
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity
of the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will
be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and
identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded
by the PCGG as defendants herein.
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same
conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion
from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4,
1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures
required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping
them as party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the
PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
II
III
IV
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity
of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will
be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and
identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded
by the PCGG as defendants herein. (Underscoring ours)
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as
defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on
the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties
as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners’ inclusion as co-defendants in
the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name
their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients.
Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as
against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended
Complaint.
II
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and
confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one
more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded
by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice;
and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding
spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus
reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the
party bestowing it.xxvii[27]
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil
Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901.
Section 383 of the Code specifically “forbids counsel, without authority
of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or
his advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment.”xxviii[28] Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of
Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
xxx
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be
withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of
judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full
discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the
law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds
of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it
demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in
refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar.
Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the
answer must be in the affirmative.
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig,xxxv[35] involved the same exception, i.e. that
client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability
exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client
in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer’s legal advice was
obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into
the activities of the “Sandino Gang,” a gang involved in the illegal
importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners,
represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang,
Joe Sandino.
A client’s identity and the nature of that client’s fee arrangements may be
privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong
probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate
that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this
rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal law.
Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,xxxvii[37] prompted the New York
Supreme Court to allow a lawyer’s claim to the effect that he could
not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to
civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab
she was riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second
taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both
against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified
in the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney
of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact
was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the
owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company,
prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he
was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances
that the man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court
held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional
capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance
company had hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial.
The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder
when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating
that it would be used in an action or claim against him.xxxviii[38]
It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the second cab
came to the attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His
client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed
on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of
the summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the
court reserved decision are sustained.xxxix[39]
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the
general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by
persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in
income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the
clients are useful to the government for but one purpose - to ascertain
which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the
records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the
payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or
penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a
feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal
guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime.
Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the
attorney here involved was employed - to advise his clients what, under
the circumstances, should be done.xliii[43]
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which
could qualify as exceptions to the general rule.
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or
legal service sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less
than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid
down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners’ ticket to non-
prosecution should they accede thereto:
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that
the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers,
regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of
the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional
advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of
assignment covering their clients’ shareholdings.
EN BANC
MALCOLM, J.:
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined.
The disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened
in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the
prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the
querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and
participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially
corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the
theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the
fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only
participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master,
in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the
accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The
defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1,
which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
AFFIDAVIT
Answer: No more.
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
HILARION NIEVA
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
Municipal President
The discussion of the case in court has revealed three different points of
view among the members participating, all leading to the same result of
acquittal. Under such circumstances, it is, course, difficult for the writer
of the opinion to do entire justice to those theories which do not conform
to his own. However, an effort will be made to present the various
opinions, leaving it for any individual member to enlarge upon the same,
if he so desires.
The Chief and Mr. Justice Villamor would disregard entirely the first
assignment of error and would, therefore, refrain from all discussion
relative to the admissibility of Exhibit 1. Confining themselves
exclusively to an analysis of the evidence other than Exhibit 1, they find
that Eugenio Toledo has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The contradictions in the testimony for the prosecution pointed
out by the trial judge do not impress these members of the court so
seriously. In reality, there being but one witness for the prosecution who,
on account of her relations with Filomeno Morales, and the land troubles,
might be expected to exaggerate, and there being on the contrary
exculpatory evidence for the defense, even without Exhibit 1, the
Government has not made out its case. Consequently, on the testimonial
facts, these members vote for acquittal.
II
The second view is that for which Messrs. Justices Romualdez and Villa-
Real are responsible, and is that Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in
evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving it effect, in relation
with the other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty. What
has heretofore been said with reference to the state of the record need not
here be repeated. It only remains to be stated that Exhibit 1 was made by
Sisenando Holgado on the same morning that the fight occurred and
without the interval of sufficient time for reflection. The declaration of
Sisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party
and not the party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation
between the statement and the fact of which it forms part as strongly
tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion of
afterthought. The nature and circumstances of the statement do not
disclose intrinsic evidence of premeditation as revealed in a long,
coherent, closely connected story. The modern tendency is toward the
extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the
needs of justice when other evidence of the same fact cannot be
procured. (22 C. J., pp. 461 et seq.; U. S. vs. David [1903], 3 Phil., 128.)
III
A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are
not here controlling. Most of them do not concern the confessions of
declarants shown to be deceased. Practically all of them give as the
principal reason for denying the admission of a confession of a third
person that he committed the crime with which the accused is charged,
that it was not made under oath. Here the declarant is deceased and his
statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring
with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought,
there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling
statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When
Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio
Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he
did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1
should have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but
as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the other
proven facts.
This broad principle made its way slowly. There was some
uncertainty about its scope; but it was an uncertainty in the
direction of breadth; for it was sometimes put in the broad form
that any statement by a person "having no interest to deceive"
would be admissible. This broad form never came to prevail
(post, par. 1576). But acceptance was gained, after two decades,
for the principle that all declarations of facts against interest (by
deceased persons) were to be received. What is to be noted, then,
is that from 1800 to about 1830 this was fully understood as the
broad scope of the principle. It was thus stated without other
qualifications; and frequent passages show the development of
the principle to this point.
But in 1884, in a case in the House of Lords, not strongly argued and not
considered by the judges in the light of the precedents, a backward step
was taken and an arbitrary limit put upon the rule. It was held to exclude
the statement of a fact subjecting the declarant to a criminal liability, and
to confined to statements of facts against either pecuniary or proprietary
interest. Thenceforward this rule was accepted in England; although it
was plainly a novelty at the time of its inception; for in several rulings up
to that time such statement had been received.
The same attitude has been taken by most American courts,
excluding confessions of a crime, or other statements of facts
against penal interest, made by third persons; although there is
not wanting authority in favor of admitting such statements.
It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this
barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent
accused vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal a
perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very
gallows, by the rule culprit now beyond the reach of justice.
Those who watched (in 1899) with self-righteous indignation the
course of proceedings in Captain Dreyfus' trial should remember
that, if that trial had occurred in our own courts, the spectacle
would have been no less shameful if we, following our own
supposed precedents, had refused to admit what the French court
never for a moment hesitated to admit, — the authenticated
confession of the escaped Major Esterhazy, avowing himself the
guilty author of the treason there charged. (3 Wigmore on
Evidence, 2d ed., secs. 1476, 1477.)
We would like finally to turn attention to what was said by the editor of
L. R. A. in his note in volume 37 hereinbefore referred to, viz:
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for
the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement
of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other
words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and
the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be
closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is
available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be
heard. Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared,
his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other
grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered
inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable,
— something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this
necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's
interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to
tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
JUDGMENT
For three somewhat divergent reasons, we are all of the opinion that the
defendant-appellant Eugenio Toledo should be given the benefit of the
reasonable doubt which prevails in our minds. Accordingly, the
judgment appealed from will be reversed and the defendant and appellant
acquitted, and as it appears that he is now confined in Bilibid Prison, an
order will immediately issue directing his release, with costs de oficio.
SECOND DIVISION
REGALADO, J.:p
That it took more than six years to obtain a verdict for the child's
death is a distressing indictment of the criminal justice system,
particularly its investigative and prosecutory pillars. How the case
managed to reach its logical denouement, however, is a tribute
and does honor to the other component of the system — the
community participation — which is the redeeming feature in this
bizarre and repulsive case of barbarity to an innocent, helpless
victim who was just a stage out of infancy.
A warrant for the arrest of Robert Cloud was issued on June 11,
1990 which was returned unserved. Alias warrants were issued on
June 29, 1992 and September 22, 1992 and finally on April 15,
1993. Appellant was arrested by the police at No. 22 Lourdes
Castillo Street, Galas, Quezon City and was thereafter committed
to jail. On April 26, 1993, duly assisted by counsel, he was
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
FISCAL PONFERRADA:
Q Madam witness, do you recall
where were you on August 2, 1988
at around 11:00 in the morning,
madam witness?
A No, sir.
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q After that?
A I see (interrupted)
COURT:
Q At that time?
FISCAL PONFERRADA:
Q So at that time in the hospital you
did not see the boy, madam
witness?
The defense, on the other hand, argues that at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, appellant was not in his house
and that the boy, John Albert, must have fallen from the stairs
leading to the second floor of the house. The defense presented
appellant and he testified that he left the house on the day in
question and only learned upon his return that his son was already
dead, thus:
A Yes, sir.
Q In the morning?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, your son, where was he at
the time you left the house, Mr.
Witness?
A No, sir.
A Yes, sir.
A Teresita Alconyes.
A No, sir.
A Yes, sir.
A No, sir.
Q When you learned that your son
died from your aunt, what did you
do?
A Yes, sir.
A None, sir.
A Yes, sir.
A No, sir.
A "Sila ho."
A Grandmother, sir.
A Yes, sir.
A No, sir.
A Yes, ma'am.
COURT:
Q Both buttocks sustained injuries
according to your findings?
FISCAL RAMOS:
The Solicitor General posits the view that the outbursts of that
grandmother constituted exceptions to the hearsay rule since they
were part of the res gestae. Those inculpatory and spontaneous
statements were: (1) "Pinatay siya ng kanyang ama" (he was
killed by his own father); (2) Putang ina ang ama niya . . . walang
awa sa anak niya . . . hayop siya" (His father is a son of a bitch . . .
without pity for his son . . . he is an animal); and (3) Appellant did
not allow his son, John Albert, to accompany her and when the
boy started to cry and would not stop, appellant beat his son very
hard, tied his hands, and continued beating him until excreta came
out of his anus. 17
The trial court was of the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard or
saw does not merely constitute an independently relevant
statement which it considered as an "exception to the hearsay
rule, only as to the tenor rather than the intrinsic truth or falsity of
its contents." 18 We will clarify this. Insofar as the statements of
Rufina Alconyes are concerned, they are admissible as part of the
res gestae, they having been caused by and did result from the
startling, if not gruesome, occurrence that she witnessed; and
these were shortly thereafter uttered by her with spontaneity,
without prior opportunity to contrive the same. The report made
thereof by Josephine Aguilar is not hearsay since she was actually
there and personally heard the statements of Alconyes which she
recounted in court. Her account of said statements of Alconyes
are admissible under the doctrine of independently relevant
statements, with respect to the tenor and not the truth thereof,
since independent of the truth or falsity of the same they are
relevant to the issue on the cause of the death of the victim.
Against the foregoing facts which came from the lips of these two
women who had no ill motives whatsoever against appellant and
the circumstantial evidence arising from his abnormal and
inexplicable post-incident behavior, as well as the physical
evidence which will hereafter be discussed, we have merely the
bare denial of appellant and the testimony of his faithful houseboy
cum driver, Herminio Acosta. Since the latter is the star witness of
the defense, we will consider his testimony in extenso.
These are the pertinent parts of his representations in the trial
court:
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A Yes, sir.
A No, sir.
A In the morning.
A Yes, sir.
A I don't remember.
A I saw Abet.
A He had blood.
Q Where?
A Lola arrived.
A Yes, sir.
Q Was there any remark made by
an old woman while you were
holding the boy?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
ATTY. MADAMBA:
Q What time?
A No, sir.
The second floor could not be more than four meters from the
ground floor, not so highly elevated even for a straight fall
therefrom. In fact, as the trial court elicited from appellant, the
stairs from which the boy allegedly fell had only nine steps. It did
not even go straight down but went four steps to the first landing
then turned right where another five steps led to the ground floor.
20
Evidently, if one merely fell down such stairs, that fall would be
broken at the landing where the stairs turned at a right angle, and
even if he still continued rolling in that new direction, the
momentum would have been greatly reduced. That would be true
even if that person did not merely slip or fall, but was pushed or
thrown, down the stairs.
That is why when the victim was brought to the hospital, Acosta
never even mentioned at all that the boy merely fell down the
stairs. The normal action of any person bringing a patient to a
hospital, especially a medico-legal case, is to give information
even tentatively as to how the injuries were sustained. Yet,
although the grandmother was announcing to everybody that the
boy was killed through violent maltreatment by his own father,
Acosta says he merely told her to keep quiet, and he forthwith left
the hospital. He never dared to tell his present cock-and-bull story
or mention the conjured accident on the stairs, especially to the
medical staff whom he knew he could not delude, and yet he has
the effrontery to do so before this Court.
A I don't know. 24
SO ORDERED.
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