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A Case Study
POPRC’s Decisions on the EU’s
Proposal Concerning Endosulfan
World exports of chemicals reached $1705 billion in 2008. The Europe has the
lion’s share of close to 60%. The US comes distant second with 11% share.
Year World exports of Of this ,exports Share of
Chemicals ($bn) from Europe Europe (%)
In the world of trade and commerce, for every move there will be a motive. Industry
observers feel that to run around the strict WTO rules, the Europe is increasingly
using the Stockholm Convention to apply trade restrictive measures on certain high
volume, low priced generic chemicals manufactured outside the Europe. Eliminating
the use of generic chemicals and pesticides helps in sustaining the Europe’s
supremacy in the chemical trade.
It is relevant to note that over 90% of the chemicals reported to the Stockholm
Convention for their ban are initiated by the European Union/Europe. All of these
are low-priced generic chemicals not manufactured within the EU at present.
This report chronicles how the POP Review Committee (POPRC) often fails to operate
in line with its own rules of procedure and the text of Stockholm Convention, under
pressure from the Europe. This will be illustrated using the recent example of how
the European Union’s (EU) proposal on the pesticide Endosulfan at the Stockholm
Convention was dealt with by the POPRC.
Endosulfan ranks among the top ten insecticides used the world. Its current
consumption in the world is estimated to be 45 million litres per year. Besides
being used as an agricultural insecticide, it is also used as a veterinary insecticide
in the US. Until 2006, the EU was the largest producer and exporter of Endosulfan
in the world. Its production in the EU ceased in 2006 reportedly due to commercial
reasons. The next year, i.e. in 2007, the EU notified Endosulfan for inclusion in
Stockholm Convention. It is no secret that eliminating production and use of
Endosulfan through the Stockholm Convention would bring huge economic gains
to the EU, the world leader in pesticides production and trade.
The EU dominance in the POPRC decision-making process totally flouts the technical,
procedural, transparency and ethical requirements of the Stockholm Convention. For
the Convention to survive, the accountability and due process must be restored.
1
Why the POPRC decision
regarding Endosulfan must be invalidated ?
Reason No.1 – Conflict of Interest. A POPRC member cannot be a
spokesperson for the notifying party
The expert review on the EU’s proposal concerning Endosulfan tabled at POPRC-
3 (Nov, 2007) was postponed to POPRC-4 (Oct, 2008) as demanded by Dr. Tarazona,
the POPRC member from the EU. In fact, it must also be mentioned that Dr. Tarazona-
speaking on behalf of the EU- initially submitted that the EU wished to withdraw the
proposal concerning Endosulfan. But he subsequently sought postponement of its
review by a year after brief consultations with the Chair of POPRC.
The text and rules of the Stockholm Convention do not empower a POPRC member
to be the spokesperson for the notifying party. They do not allow delaying the review
from one POPRC to another either. Therefore, the demand made by Dr. Tarazona
was thoroughly illegitimate.
The notifying party in this case was the EU. The POPRC member (Dr. Tarazona)
who made the demand was also from the EU.
This is a clear case of procedural abuse. Rather surprisingly, the Chairman of the
POPRC did not reject the demand from Dr.Tarazona, but hastily agreed to it. This
episode showed strong bias and favoritism to the EU inherently present at the POPRC.
Dr. Tarazona repeated his objectionable and questionable role at the next POPRC
too.
Dr. Tarazona attended POPRC-4 (Oct, 2008) as an “observer” as his term as a
POPRC member had expired in May 2008. But he was the one who “officially”
presented the Endosulfan proposal on behalf of the EU to the new POPRC members
at the POPRC-4 much to the surprise of many. As per the Convention, observers can
not officially initiate and lead the scientific review.
For over three hours Dr. Tarazona was misusing his position and guiding the new
POPRC-4 members into a preconceived line of decision tailor-made to serve the
interests of the EU. He planted a lot of prejudice in the minds of POPRC members
even before they began their formal review of the EU’s proposal. The audio recordings
of the POPRC-4 proceedings would give full details of this sordid episode.
As an ex-POPRC member and as an “observer” at the POPRC-4, Dr. Tarazona had
no rights to officially present the EU proposal before new POPRC members. He
brazenly breached the terms concerning conflict of interests applicable to POPRC
members as given in COP’s decision SC-1/8.
Reason No. 2 – Suppression of facts. Auditing of records required
Though, the demand to delay and postpone the POPRC review of the EU proposal
was orally made by Dr. Tarazona (a POPRC member from the EU), it was recorded in
the final report of POPRC-3 as if this demand came from the entire POPRC-3.
2
An independent audit of the audio recordings of POPRC-3 proceedings would expose
the suppressed truth.
The assigned reason for the postponement was that “vital information” was missing
in the EU’s proposal. If “vital information” was indeed missing, the proposal should
have been set aside by the POPRC-3 as per Article 8 of the Convention.
The web page of the POPRC in the meantime claimed that “At its third meeting,
the committee considered the proposal submitted by European Community”. This
was false and misleading. The POPRC-3 did not consider the proposal as it was never
introduced at its meeting.
But the Secretariat and the POPRC Chairman allowed the EU, the notifying party,
to amend the proposal between POPRC 3 in 2007 and POPRC 4 in 2008.
This is a serious contravention. At the POPRC-4 (Oct 2008) China and India
submitted a Conference Room paper against admissibility of the carried forward
(and amended) proposal of the EU. The Conference Room Paper (UNEP/POPs/POPRC-
4/ CRP-3) tabled by China and India stated that:
At the last POPRC meeting held in Nov 2007, European Commission’s proposal
and dossier on Endosulfan was not introduced though it was listed in POPRC-3
agenda….., the POPRC-3 did not examine/evaluate the EU proposal under Annex D
of the Convention….The… proposal is now listed once again in the agenda for POPRC-
4.
a) If it is satisfied that the screening criteria are fulfilled, it must make the proposal
and is evaluation available to all Parties and observers and invite them to submit
the information specified in annex E to the Convention; or
b) If it is not satisfied that the screening criteria have been fulfilled, it must set
aside the proposal.
3
Ignoring this protest note, the POPRC Chair resorted to voting to decide if the
EU’s proposal (that had not been tabled and examined at the POPRC-3) could be
considered by the POPRC-4. Encouraged by the EU, the majority of the POPRC
members favoured consideration of the EU proposal.
It is submitted that the Chair of the POPRC has no rights to resort to voting to
grant himself powers to do things that are not prescribed and permitted under the
Convention. This set a bad precedence and if not checked, might open a Pandora’s
Box in future with a plethora of unintended and undesirable consequences.
Reason No. 4 – Notifying party cannot submit its own evaluation
report to the POPRC members
At the POPRC-4, a drafting group was formed to do preliminary evaluation of
the EU proposal against Annex D criteria and to prepare a draft report for final
consideration by POPRC members. An EU member openly supplied to this group a
pre-drafted review of the EU’s proposal for adoption by POPRC-4. This showed that
the EU had sent its POPRC members to the meeting with a self generated review on
its own proposal.
One question that should be asked by everyone is : On what basis can the EU be
allowed the special and nonexistent privilage to submit review of its own proposal
to the POPRC?
Objecting to this questionable practice, the POPRC member from India in his
dissent note said:
“…… practice of allowing notifying party(EC/EU) to also submit a “pre drafted
review of its own proposal” to POPRC to guide the discussions…. is both unfair
and unlawful in a multilateral convention as it goes against the principle of equity
and justice…. Stockholm Convention cannot allow this”.
Reason No. 6 – Preparing Annex E risk profile by the notifying party (EU)
Post-Annex D review, preparing the draft risk profile for the chemical under
review (for Annex-E review) is the responsibility of the POPRC. However, in case of
the EU proposal on Endosulfan, the draft risk profile was prepared and supplied to
the POPRC by the European Commission using the services of an ex POPRC member-
Dr. Tarazona. He prepared the risk profile on contract, for a fee using the services
of his own family owned firm M/s Green Planet Environmental Consulting SL, Madrid,
Spain.
It should be reiterated that both during the Annex D review and during the Annex
E review, it was the EU that prepared the review reports for adoption (by majority
voting) by the POPRC.
So, the notifying party and the reviewing party were in reality the same. This is
thoroughly objectionable.
Hiding the dissent note of a POPRC member is an unfair practice. It goes against
the spirit of transparency. It violates rule 33 of COP’s decision SC-1/7.
POPRC-5, convened during Oct 2009 (i.e. nearly 6 months after COP-4) neither
discussed nor took cognizance of the concerns raised by India in its conference
room paper. Effectively, it also ignored the follow up action pending on India’s
paper .
Besides, the Chair of POPRC pushed the impugned EU proposal once again through
Annex-E review by majority voting (and not by consensus as required). Many
POPRC members abstained from voting as a mark of protest.
It is clear that the Chairman of the POPRC repeatedly takes substantive decisions
by voting using non existing power and discretion – even while ignoring protests by
many POPRC members and members of the COP,
This must be probed, questioned and his controversial decisions must be reversed.
The trade measures authorized by the Stockholm Convention are in fact identical
to the ones in the WTO’s technical regulations such as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement (SPS Agreement) and the Technical Barrier to Trade agreement (TBT
Agreement). To be compatible with the WTO provisions applicable to SPS and TBT
Agreements, the decisions taken in the Stockholm Convention should have sufficient
scientific justification and should not be developed and applied arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminatorily or as disguised restriction under international
trade.
The POPRC Chairman did not allow any scientific debate or discussions on the
draft paper that was produced based on EU’s own (Dr. Tarazona’s) review at the
POPRC-5. Disallowing any scientific discussions, and disallowing all voices of dissent,
the decision that “EU’s proposal met Annex E criteria” was taken by majority voting
in a matter of 13 minutes on the final day of POPRC-5.
This type of arbitrary, biased discriminatory, unfair, faulty and deceitful decisions
cannot be allowed in the Stockholm Convention leading to development of
irreversible trade measures on globally traded chemicals.
In a significant decision on how to identify the risk and how the risk must be
evaluated, the WTO’s Appellate Body had in the dispute involving US and European
Community in the EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat products (Hormone case)
observed :
“… it is not sufficient that the risk assessment concludes that there is a possibility
[of risks]… a proper risk assessment must evaluate the probability [of the
risks]…some evaluation of the likelihood [of the risks] is not enough…”
7
Suggested Corrective Actions:
The author has qualifications in science and environmental law. He attends all meetings of the Stockholm
Convention since 1998, representing Indian Chemical Council (ICC) and has authored many policy advocacy
papers concerning global chemical conventions.
8
Justice is not fairness of outcome; but
fairness of procedure in arriving at the outcome
- Anonymous
For further information, contact:
S. Ganesan
Chairman
International Treaties Expert Committee
Indian Chemical Council, INDIA
Tel: +91 99595 52725
E-mail: tsganesan@rediffmail.com