Foreign Policy Analysis (2007) 3, 295–315

Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the

‘‘Rogue State’’ Concept by U.S. Foreign
Policy Elites
K. P. O’Reilly
University of South Carolina

In the aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy dialogue has shif-
ted from its half century focus dominated by the superpower struggle
with the Soviet Union to the challenges presented by so-called ‘‘rogue
states.’’ For many observers, however, the term ‘‘rogue state’’ is viewed
as problematic failing to providing either a clear picture of who and
what constitutes a rogues state, or, perhaps more importantly, the rami-
fication of this term on U.S. policy action. In examining the public
statements of key U.S. foreign policy decision makers over the course of
1993 to 2004, this paper offers insights as to the perceptions which
manifest the ‘‘rogue’’ stereotype as exhibited by statements on the poli-
cies and behaviors associated with rogue states. What is revealed is a rel-
atively fixed and stable image over time as held by key decisions-makers
with similar unity expressed as to policy prescriptions. Combining per-
ceptions of power capabilities and cultural judgments unique to this
rogue stereotype, the rogue image presents a challenge to U.S. strategy
demanding attention to the future threat posed by these states while
also constraining policy options.

The purpose of this work is to examine the developing notion of the ‘‘rogue
state’’ as perceived by U.S. foreign policy elites.1 Of primary concern is whether
and how the notion of a so-called ‘‘rogue states’’ impacts perceptions and, in
turn, influences policy prescriptions by constraining the range of actions consid-
ered by decision makers.2 A starting point for investigation is whether a discerna-
ble rogue image exists among U.S. foreign policy decision makers. Coinciding
with the developing perceptions of rogue states is the matter of how the rogue
stereotype might influence policy making—what reactions, in terms of policy
advocacy, are prompted when viewing a state as a rogue? This question has

Author’s note: The author thanks Harvey Starr, Richard Herrmann, and Jerel Rosati for their comments and sug-
gestions on previous versions of the article as well as the discussants and panelists at the 2006 International Studies
Association Conference held in San Diego, CA. Additional thanks are owed to the editors and reviewers from For-
eign Policy Analysis for their helpful suggestions and comments.
1
While related terms such as pariah state and other pejorative labels have existed throughout history (see Geld-
enhuys 1984; Hoyt 2000a), this work shall focus specifically on the term ‘‘rogue’’ in the context of post-Cold War
U.S. foreign policy discourse and policy.
2
Nincic (2005) prefers the term ‘‘renegade regimes,’’ highlighting the distinction between states and regimes.
For the purposes of this paper the terms ‘‘rogue,’’ ‘‘rogue state,’’ and ‘‘rogue states’’ will be used throughout. The
distinction between states and regimes is useful for Nincic’s examination of international and domestic behaviors
of rogue regimes, however, given that this paper will examine how the conception of a ‘‘rogue’’ may influence U.S.
foreign policy this regime ⁄ state distinction is of lesser importance here.

 2007 International Studies Association.

Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
296 Perceiving Rogue States

important policy ramifications given that the dilemma of dealing with rogue
states is seen as highly problematic serving to constrain what should be a differ-
entiated approach for U.S. foreign policy given the complexity of post-Cold War
international relations (Litwak 2000). For many observers, the term ‘‘rogue
state’’ is problematic, failing to providing either a clear picture of who and what
constitutes a rogue state, or, perhaps more importantly, its ramifications on U.S.
policy action (Caprioli and Trumbore 2005). Nevertheless, the concept of the
‘‘rogue state’’ has become part of U.S. policy discourse representing a ‘‘political
reality’’ affecting state behavior (Hoyt 2000a). It is precisely because the use of
the term rogue may directly impact the range and nature of policies pursued by
U.S. decision makers that a better understanding the image of the rogue state is
essential.
While consulting the existing literature on the rogue image as a starting point,
this paper will turn to examine the public statements of U.S. foreign policy-
makers from 1993 to 2004 analyzing how policy makers utilize this term, what
behaviors and attributes are associated with rogues, and what policy prescriptions
are advocated in dealing with these states. Through examining the statements by
policy makers, this paper will address three specific questions as regarding the
relationship between the notion of the rogue state and U.S. foreign policy. First,
does a definitive rogue image actually exist among U.S. foreign policy decision
makers and what are the constituent parts of this image? Second, as among U.S.
administrations, and even as to specific actors within these administrations, do
they differ as to their image of rogues and the policies that they advocate? Third,
what are the strategy prescriptions advocated by U.S. foreign policy decision-
makers towards rogue states and are they consistent with decision makers’ per-
ceptions of rogue states? Additionally, it is hoped the discussion of the rogue
image might shed light on the interaction between perceptions of power and
threat held by policy makers. More generally, by offering insight regarding both
the cognitive imagery and the belief systems that decision makers operate under,
we can better determine how actors’ expectations are affected and the resultant
impact on policy choices.

Birth of the ‘‘Rogues’’

With the end of the Cold War the strategic landscape that existed for a half cen-
tury changed drastically. Whereas the superpower rivalry between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union had provided a fixed point of reference in calculating to which
camp other states belonged, U.S. foreign policy makers now faced an increas-
ingly vexing problem of now determining which countries were friends or foes
in the this newly emerging international system. No sooner had the fear of
superpower aggression subsided, however, when regional aggression took center
stage with the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Specifically, ‘‘[t]he change in think-
ing about rogue states was further reinforced by the fact that the end of the
Cold War coincided with a hot war in the Persian Gulf’’ (Litwak 2000:240). The
potential of regional aggression and instability having a ripple effect in the inter-
national system served to transform and affix the attention of U.S. foreign policy
makers (Klare 1995). In analyzing elite U.S. policy makers, Hoyt (2000b:297)
contends that in the aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. strategic thinking has
undergone a shift whereby ‘‘the ‘rogues’ have supplanted the ‘Reds’’’ as focal
points of policy.
The investigations as to the current incarnation of the ‘‘rogue’’ label have
reached strikingly similar conclusions as to those actions which typify rogue
behaviors and policies. Tracing the development of the rogue ‘‘demonology,’’
Klare (1995) points to an evolution where concerns in the 1980s over terrorism
transformed into fears of a third world power acquiring weapons of mass destruc-
 K. P. O’Reilly 297

tion (‘‘WMDs’’). Of this transformation Klare (1995:27–28) writes, ‘‘[f]rom 1990

on, the general model of a ‘rogue state’ ruled by an ‘outlaw regime’ armed with
chemical and nuclear weapons became the standard currency of national security
discourse.’’ Although using a more pejorative tone, Tanter (1998:40) contends
that ‘‘[p]racticing terrorism, possessing a large-scale conventional force, and
seeking weapons of mass destruction qualify a state for admission to the show-
room of miscreants.’’ In attempting to quantify the process, Hoyt (2000b) set
about analyzing the statements of U.S. policy makers from 1993 to 1998. Hoyt
found four categories into which statements on rogue actions could be classified.
These categories were the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction capabil-
ities, involvement in international terrorism, posing either a global or regional
military threat, and challenging international norms. Most recently, the policies
of the pursuit of WMDs and support of terrorism were reaffirmed as important
identifiers of rogues (Nincic 2005).
Clearly, policies in pursuit of WMDs and support of terrorism represent
explicit threats which U.S. policy makers can point to when singling out rogue
states. Nevertheless, the literature highlights other factors as indicative of whe-
ther a particular state is labeled as a rogue. Merely because a state pursues one
or more of these policies does not guarantee that a state will be labeled a
rogue. This selectivity is particularly striking in regards to nuclear weapons pro-
liferation where in the case of de facto nuclear weapon countries like India,
Pakistan or Israel, these nations have avoided being grouped with the so-called
rogue states.3 Hence these policy actions do not serve as a litmus test in and
of themselves.
Aside from the aforementioned policies linked to rogue states, these actors are
condemned for pursuit of a broader set of policies which are seen as implicitly
threatening to the international community. According to Nincic (2005), these
indeterminate threats poised by rogues fall into two kinds: first, massive internal
repression and, second, overt aggression against another state. These latter
actions, however, are not necessarily indicative of threats posed by rogues, but
rather point to the nature of the governing regimes which in nearly all cases are
perceived as non-democratic. Thus, in addition to the pursuit of dubious poli-
cies, the perceived nature of rogue states as nondemocratic regimes appears to
be of equal importance, rising to a level of being a necessary but not sufficient
condition.
The perception of the governing regimes appears to be a critical explanatory
factor for the difficulty in U.S. interactions with rogue states. Dealing with rogue
states is viewed as presenting a special challenge as ‘‘… rogue regimes are more
subject to the politics of personality…. the policies of the new rulers are more a
reflection of the whims of charismatic individuals than the outcome of bargain-
ing among multiple centers of power’’ (Tanter 1998:1).
Accordingly, perceptions of the nature of governance within a rogue state
inform views held by decision makers as to matters of legitimacy, rationality, and
respect for the rule of law. As one commentator has offered, the labeling of a
state as a rogue is ‘‘a certificate of political insanity’’ (Rubin 1999). These per-
ceived differences in governing at the domestic level are transferred to the
approach rogue states take toward the international system. Commenting on the
position of rogue states in the international system, former U.S. Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright remarked:

3
These three states are deemed de facto nuclear weapons states whereby their status as ‘‘nuclear weapon
states’’ is not recognized by the 1970 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, in the cases of India and Pakis-
tan highly publicized weapons tests have been undertaken by those states. As for Israel, despite no official confirma-
tion of it possession of nuclear weapons, it is widely acknowledged by experts as possessing such capabilities.
298 Perceiving Rogue States

The third group are the rogue states—those that not only do not have a part in
the international system, but whose very being involves being outside of it and
throwing, literally, hand grenades inside in order to destroy it.4

Albright’s statements build upon the foundation offered by President George

H.W. Bush, who in assessing the emerging international system following the
end of the Cold War, publicly proclaimed the potential for a ‘‘new world
order… freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and
more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world,
east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony.’’5
As alluded to in these statements, rogues are perceived as antagonistic towards
the existing ‘‘society of states,’’ rejecting common interests and values, and
unburdened by the common set of rules which other states are bound (Bull
1977). Given the position of the U.S. in the post-Cold War international system,
it is not surprising that it has sought to impose its normative outlook in creating
the rules for an orderly international system. Indeed, the emerging new world
order described by President George H.W. Bush specifically required U.S. leader-
ship. In seeing itself as a principal architect of the emerging post-Cold War inter-
national society, the U.S. has taken on a protector status to enforce the rules
singling out and condemning those states which oppose the current standards
(George 1993).
Accordingly, perceptions of rogue states as deviating from the prevailing
international society serve as a critical starting point as to how the rogue
image influences what policies are deemed suitable or unsuitable a priori.
What one sees in reviewing the development of the rogue label, particularly
as to U.S. foreign policy, is that the alleged danger posed by rogue states is
not simply one of perceived power capabilities, but also equally, if not increas-
ingly, a matter of perceptions whereby these states are not seen as sharing
similar values.

Perceptions, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Rogue Imagery

The relevance of understanding individual decision makers and their cognitive
processes to gain insights on foreign policy decision making is nothing new. Per-
ceptions of hostility and friendliness have long been viewed as crucial determi-
nants in relations between states (Boulding 1956, 1959; Holsti 1962). The
importance of ‘‘belief systems,’’ as these individualized collections of images
were termed by Holsti, lies in their role in influencing individual cognitive pro-
cesses (George 1979). In essence, a belief system becomes a ‘‘cognitive map’’
with which decision makers structure the environment around them, allowing
them to ‘‘experience and cope with the complex, confusing reality of the envi-
ronment’’ (Holsti 1976:19–20). These cognitive short-cuts can aid the decision-
making process by stripping away complexities, however, often the stereotypes
generated by one’s belief system leads to the pitfall of misperception (Jervis
1976; George 1980; Levy 1983). Hence whereas the simplification provided
by cognitive images may lead to decisive action, the reliance on such images
also increases the risk of misconstruing reality resulting in ineffective, or worse,
self-defeating policy actions.
In developing the connection between decision makers’ belief systems and pol-
icy decisions, research in the area of image theory has sought to create ‘‘a theory
4
Madeleine Albright, ‘‘Remarks at University of South Carolina,’’ February 1998. http://secretary.state.gov/
www/statements/1998/980219c.html.
5
President George H.W. Bush, ‘‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and
the Federal Budget Deficit,’’ September 11, 1990. http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1990/
90091101.html.
 K. P. O’Reilly 299

of strategic decision making that identifies the primary judgments guiding inter-
national images, or stereotypes, and the selection of international policies’’
(Alexander et al. 2005:28). A critical underlying assumption in cognitive imagery
is the notion of ‘‘cognitive balance.’’ This concept, devised by Heider (1958),
refers to the idea that a subject will seek an equilibrium, or balance, between
one’s emotional sentiments towards another person or object and their cognitive
picture of said person or object. Hence, those persons disliked by a subject
would be connected to negative attributes and vice versa for instances where the
subject views a person in a positive light. These stereotypes do not merely have
the potential for misperceptions, but more importantly can also provide post
hoc rationalizations justifying policy action (Herrmann 1985). Particularly, the
construction of negative images serves to reduce an actor’s own moral inhibi-
tions in taking threatening or violent action against the target state (Herrmann
1988). Accordingly then, insights as to the type of image held of a target state
can inform us as to what constraints, or lack of constraints, a state may have
towards conducting certain policies.
Therefore, coinciding with our question of how the rogue image influences
U.S. foreign policy discourse, is determining the constitutive elements that devise
the rogue image as utilized by decision makers and how those elements impact
the range of policy actions considered; in essence what is the ‘‘rogue image?’’
Does the use of the term rogue, with its corresponding perceptions, shed light
on a new line of strategy in dealing with such states? Moreover, in light of the
2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, does the labeling of a state as a rogue imply a
more hostile or aggressive policy posture or does the term merely replace or sup-
plement conventional perceptions of ‘‘enemy?’’
Although stopping short here of proposing a new and unique ‘‘rogue image,’’
image theory provides a useful framework in structuring the discussion of how
rogues are perceived and, in turn, the policy actions which might then be expec-
ted. As developed by previous research, image theory requires the determination
of three relationship dimensions which are deemed critical (Herrmann and
Fischerkeller 1995). First, what is the judgment as to the threat or opportunity
presented by the other state? Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995:425) proposed
that, ‘‘images of other actors can include a judgment that the other actor is
threatening, presents an opportunity to exploit, or represents a chance for
mutual gain.’’ Second, what is the perception of the other state’s relative power?
Returning to an original question posed by Boulding, Herrmann and Fischerkel-
ler see perceptions of power and capabilities as shaping and constraining policy
options. Weaker target states may permit attack while stronger target states call
for a more cautious policy of containment. Third, what are the perceptions of
the target state’s cultural status and relative sophistication? As to this relationship
dimension, Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995:426) write ‘‘if subjects believe, for
instance, that they are dealing with a target that respects a cultural norm against
violence, then they may choose different policies than if they believe the target
community glorifies martial and fascistic norms.’’ In advancing the theory of
cognitive balancing, Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995:425) incorporate this
cultural factor claiming that ‘‘strategic choice will not be a function of perceived
threats, opportunities, and relative power alone.’’
Given the image traits that emerge from these relationship dimensions, Herr-
mann and Fischerkeller advance a set of hypothesized ‘‘strategy scripts’’ of antici-
pated policy actions based on the applicable image (see Table 1). Therefore, not
only does image theory offer a yardstick for assessing perceptions of others, but
also of equal importance it the fact that these images are seen as critical in dri-
ving strategic choice. Accordingly, the judgments made as to the three relation-
ship dimensions impact foreign policy objectives and hence policy actions
toward the target state.

TABLE 1. Stereotypical Images, Perceptions, Strategic Judgments and Strategic Choices
Image Attributed Motives
Enemy Motives are judged to be
evil and unlimited; they
can include a variety of
imperial interests in
economic, ideological,
and communal
domination
Degenerate Leaders are more
concerned with
preserving what they
have than with a vision
for the future and have
accepted their fall from
greatness, only wanting
to make it less painful
Source: Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995)
Attributed Capabilities
If aggressor is met with
strong opposition, it will
be exposed as a paper
tiger; this domestic
weakness overrides
empirical evidence
of substantial capability
Country is less strong that
it might be, its available
power instruments are
discounted due to its
unwillingness to actively
defend itself or enter
into confrontation
300
Description of Strategic Judgments Strategy Script for Dealing
Decision Making About Target with this Actor
Leaders are bound by a Threat Containment
common cause and are Comparable capability Deter
able to plot and execute Comparable culture Protect and shield
complex sinister plans Build major alliance system
Protect geopolitical assets
in Third World from
target
Protect credibility as a
major power ⁄ attractive ally
for Third World
Decision making is Opportunity through Revisionism
confused and perhaps domination Rollback and deter
Perceiving Rogue States
anarchic; country lacks Comparable ⁄ declining Build major alliance system
focused leadership, capability Protect geopolitical assets
organization, and Comparable ⁄ declining in Third World from
discipline culture target and attract
new allies
 K. P. O’Reilly 301

In assessing the relationship dimensions presented by rogue states, it appears

to correspond with more than one of the images as to one or more of the inter-
action dimensions critical to image theory.6 Indeed, based on the extant litera-
ture, a resultant image of a rogue state materializes as a mixed image combining
elements from both the images presented in Table 1: enemy image (i.e., consti-
tuting a threat) and degenerate image (i.e., cultural inferiority). In summarizing
the previously examined literature in the terminology of image theory, the rogue
image appears to combine the perceptions of the target state as having incom-
patible goals, as having an inferior culture (i.e., lower cultural status), and as
possessing lesser power capabilities, but with the important caveat of seeking to
dramatically increase its capability through the development of WMDs. For
image theory, the enemy image with its combination of goal incompatibility,
comparable power capability and comparable cultural status most clearly presents
a situation of a threat.
Yet as defined in image theory, an ‘‘enemy’’ is perceived as possessing substan-
tial power capabilities on par with one’s own. In contrast, rogue states, while
painted often as regional bullies capable of threatening their neighbors, pale in
the light of comparison with the power capabilities of the U.S.. It is precisely this
wide gap in capabilities that is seen as driving these rogue states to develop and
acquire WMDs. Additionally, while the enemy image portrays one’s adversary as
having clearly incompatible goals, there is a simultaneous perception that they
possess comparable cultural status or sophistication (Alexander et al.). Although
thought of as evil and untrustworthy, one’s enemy is nevertheless seen as posses-
sing a complex society and respecting relatively similar cultural norms (Herr-
mann and Fischerkeller). Such similar cultural equality is rarely afforded to
rogue states, however. Their defiance of perceived international norms, along
with the questionable nature of their domestic politics, discredits rogue states’
legitimacy in challenging the status quo of the international community in the
eyes of U.S. decision makers. Conversely, the degenerate image with its combina-
tion of goal incompatibility, lower power capability and lower cultural status
presents an opportunity.
In revisiting the idea of cognitive balancing, both the enemy image and the
degenerate image serve to relax the inhibitions of taking assertive or violent
action against such states. In particular, the presence of a threat, as in the case
of the enemy image, can serve to further validate aggressive action. However,
due to the relative power associated with these images, drastically different strat-
egies emerge as noted in Table 1. While presenting a threat, the enemy image
with its perception of comparable power capabilities calls for a restrained policy
of ‘‘containment.’’ Meanwhile, given the perceived vulnerability of a degenerate
state, an aggressive policy of ‘‘revisionism’’ is forecast even though such a state is
not a threat. Therefore, a critical determinant to be decided regarding the rogue
image is whether the application of this imagery constitutes the presence of a
threat or an opportunity to further one’s own interests. This determination
directly influences the nature of the strategy expected. In using image theory,
with its reliance on cognitive balancing as a guide, differing interactions produ-
cing different images should result in differentiated strategies.
So what does the rogue image interaction equation tell us? Do rogue states
present a threat or an opportunity? As noted above, the most distinguishing fea-
ture of the rogue image is the notion of the target state as possessing lesser

6
While this paper will focus on two stereotypical images which most closely correspond with the features associ-
ated with rogue states in policy makers’ public statements, it should be noted that Herrmann and Fischerkeller
(1995) developed three other images: Ally, Colony ⁄ Dependent, and Imperialist. Further, other potential images are
possible through use of the interaction dimensions detailed by Herrmann and Fischerkeller. For additional exam-
ples see Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi (1997) and Alexander, Levin, and Henry (2005).
302 Perceiving Rogue States

power capabilities yet pursuing capabilities—in the form of WMDs—to drastically

enhance their power status. This idea of rising power capabilities sets the rogue
image apart from the degenerate images, which allegedly present opportunities
to advance one’s own interests through domination. However, it is arguable
that—in the case of rogue states—whether the opportunity for domination pre-
sents itself precisely because of the activities of these states in altering the power
capabilities dimension. While unable to achieve any real parity in total power,
rogue states, through the development and acquisition of WMDs, can attain a
perception of sufficient power capabilities inhibiting a strategic judgment labeling
such states as opportunities.

Application of the ‘‘Rogue Image’’ in U.S. Foreign Policy

Keeping in mind the perceptions which appear to underlie the ‘‘rogue image,’’
the remainder of this paper seeks to examine the usage of the term ‘‘rogue’’ by
U.S. foreign policy-making elites as to both behaviors and policies attributed to
rogues and policy prescriptions for dealing with such states. By having an ideal-
type rogue image we can not only assess the statements of policy makers against
this image, but also assess whether the policies advocated are consistent with the
expected hypothesized strategy script for dealing with rogue states. These state-
ments and the advocated policy prescriptions can also help to further clarify
whether policy makers perceive rogues as threats or opportunity for U.S. foreign
policy.
In analyzing of the public statements of policy makers, three central questions
will guide the inquiry:
• What is the nature of the usage and frequency of the term ‘‘rogue’’ by
U.S. policy makers?
• What sort of attributes and behaviors do policy makers attribute to
rogue states and how does this compare with the idealized rogue
image?
• Do the policy prescriptions advocated by policy makers in dealing with
rogue states conform to expected policies given how rogues are per-
ceived?
To assess these issues empirically, a database was constructed compiling the
public statements of selected U.S. foreign policy elites from the period of 1993–
2004 that specifically mention the term ‘‘rogue.’’ The policy actors chosen for
the analysis were the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.
Analysis of the selected public statements generates both quantitative and qualit-
ative data for use in answering the questions above regarding the rogue image.
For each actor, slightly different document search methods were used due to the
various archiving practices and protocols of the respective agencies. For the
Department of Defense, the agency’s website was searched for all public state-
ments and remarks containing the term ‘‘rogue’’ utilizing the site’s built-in
search engine. For the Department of State, searches were conducted on the
catalogued speeches and remarks of Secretaries of State sorted annually by spea-
ker. Regarding presidential speeches, searches for statements using the term
‘‘rogue’’ were conducted on the online version of the annually reported Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents. While it was originally hoped that this study
might replicate and expand upon the data collected by Hoyt (2000b) which
examined all instances of the term ‘‘rogue’’ included in executive branch docu-
ments, the variations in document storage and archiving practices would have
biased the results by over representing the current Bush Administration. Never-
theless, the modification as to the data examined, limiting it to instances of
 K. P. O’Reilly 303

public statements by the specified elite policy makers, allows for sampling of the
entire population of relevant statements and avoiding sampling bias.
With appropriate and sufficient search parameters established, the searches
generated 294 documented public statements by the actors containing the term
‘‘rogue.’’ Of note, in those instances where the searches generated duplicative
records of the same statement, where the term ‘‘rogue’’ was said by a person
other than one of the examined actors (i.e., reporter, other foreign official), or
where the term was not applicable due to its specific usage (i.e., Rogue river in
Oregon, rogue militias, rogue elements, rogue agency, rogue police, etc…) the
data was not included. Once the statements were identified and verified, each
was individually analyzed as to their content in four element areas significant to
the study:
• Mention of particular nations as rogues either specifically or as refer-
enced in the pertinent discussion by the speaker.
• Behaviors attributed to rogue states (i.e., aggressive, irresponsible,
opposing peace, etc…)
• Policies attributed to rogue states (i.e., support of terrorism, acquisi-
tion of nuclear materials, development of chemical, biological and ⁄ or
nuclear weapons, development of long-range missiles, etc…)
• Statements as to U.S. policy taken or to be taken against rogue states
(contain, deter, engage, sanctions, etc…).
By analyzing these statements it is hoped that one may determine the image
perception that key U.S. foreign policy makers have of so-called rogue states and
the policy prescriptions advanced in dealing with these states. Through this data
we attempt to determine if a distinct, as well as consistent, rogue image has
developed in U.S. foreign policy discourse and if the policies advocated are in
accordance with these perceptions.

Data Analysis and Discussion

Usage of the Term ‘‘Rogue’’ by Foreign Policy Elites
In accordance with the findings by Hoyt (2000b), the use of the term ‘‘rogue’’
has remained a fixed feature of U.S. foreign policy discourse utilized by policy
makers at the highest level (Table 2) . During the period examined, President
Clinton accounts for 23% of all instances where the term is found in documen-
ted public statements. This finding is not altogether surprising given that Presi-
dent Clinton was in office for eight years, far longer than any other actor in the
relevant timeframe. Overall, when combined with the statements of President
Bush, presidential statements discussing rogues account for nearly a third of all
the collected statements. That the combined statements for the Secretaries of
State7 account for 36% of the recorded statements, the most of all actors exam-
ined, presents an interesting dilemma given some of the previous theorizing as
to the development of the term rogue which will be addressed in the following
sections below.
In measuring the usage of the term rogue annually from 1993 to 1998, Hoyt
(2000b) observed that use of the term gained increasing prominence over the
course of the first Clinton Administration. Accordingly, proliferating usage of
7
On June 19, 2000, during a domestic radio interview Secretary Albright stated that the U.S. State Department
was no longer using the term ‘‘rogue’’ but rather utilizing the term ‘‘states of concern.’’ Accordingly, the research
indicates instances where documents and publications by the State Department employed this new descriptive lan-
guage. Nevertheless, in searching the speeches and public statements of Secretary Albright, along with President
Clinton, no instances, other then Albright’s June 19, 2000 interview, revealed the use of the term ‘‘states of
concern.’’
304 Perceiving Rogue States

TABLE 2. Public Statements by Actor 1993–2004

Actor No. of Public Statements Percentage

Secretaries of Defense
Perry (1993–1996) 12 0.041 (4%)
Cohen (1997–2000) 51 0.173 (17%)
Rumsfeld (2001–2004) 28 0.095 (9%)
Secretaries of State
Christopher (1993–1996) 19 0.064 (6%)
Albright (1996–2000) 43 0.146 (15%)
Powell (2001–2004) 45 0.153 (15%)
Presidents
Clinton (1993–2000) 69 0.234 (23%)
Bush (2001–2004) 27 0.091 (9%)
n = 294

the term during that administration reached a high point in 1997. Similarly, ana-
lysis of the public statements of elite U.S. policy makers during this same period
reflects this increasing usage, exhibiting a high point in 1997 also (see Figure 1).
Despite falling from this peak, the usage of the term rogue in public statements
has remained relatively constant. Where the number of statements using the
term rogue holds in the single digits for the earlier years of 1993 and 1994, the
subsequent years witnessed a nearly threefold increase, with an average of 28
public statements annually during 1995–2004. In breaking down by administra-
tions (Clinton I, Clinton II, and Bush I) the proliferating usage of the term
‘‘rogue’’ is again revealed. Whereas Clinton I had 61 mentions, the number of
statements more than doubled to 133 during Clinton II. Although the number
of statements fell off in the first Bush administration, at 100 statements this num-
ber is far ahead the pace of the early 1990s during Clinton I.
This disparity between Clinton II and Bush I appears at odds with the conven-
tional wisdom regarding the Bush administration’s position toward rogue states
given its hard-line foreign policy often characterized in terms of the ‘‘axis of
evil’’ comment during Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address. Just as Hoyt
(2000a) noted that the increasing usage in 1997 coincided with the efforts of the
Clinton Administration to get the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty ratified
by the Senate, there appears fertile ground for further research examining of
the impact on domestic political audiences of the usage of the term rogue. Of
note, future research might detect a similar pattern in the early days of the first
Bush administration in is efforts to gain support for furthering development of a
national missile defense program. Another possible explanation goes to the issue

50
45
40 44
# of public statements

35
30 33 35
30 31 30
25
20 25
21
15
10 15 14
5 9
7
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year

FIG. 1. Number of Public Statements Using ‘‘Rogue’’ 1993–2004.

 K. P. O’Reilly 305

of formal and informal organization of the respective administrations. Where

Clinton is often portrayed as a centralized, hands-on administrator, perhaps even
micro managing policy matters, Bush has been characterized as a delegator
(Clarke 2004). Given the seemingly prominent position of influence held by Vice
President Dick Cheney on matter of security and foreign policy, it is likely that if
public statements by the Vice President were included the number of relevant
statements pertaining to rogue states during Bush I would increase (Mazarr
2007; Shannon and Keller 2007). Unfortunately, as noted in the methodology
section above, data limitation issues prohibited the ability to accurately compare
statements made by the administrations’ vice presidents. So too the prominent
and influential roles played by individuals in lower level or second tier depart-
ment positions during the first Bush administration would likely increase the
number of overall statements. In particular, assistants and deputies like Paul
Wolfowitz, John Bolton, and Richard Armitage, were highly visible during Bush I
with each possessing an issue portfolio making them responsible for offering
public statements regarding official administration policy (Shannon and Keller).
Nevertheless, whether attributing the usage of the term to strictly short term
political interests or to organizational arrangements, the terminology of the
rogue state has firmly established itself within the U.S. foreign policy discourse.
In particular, the data demonstrate that the use of the term rogue has pene-
trated the vocabulary of U.S. foreign policy decision makers at the highest levels
of government. The persistent usage would appear to indicate that the concept
is here to stay and, therefore, is exceedingly relevant for purposes of analyzing
the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

Who are Rogue States and What are they Doing?

The list of states most often painted with the rogue label is not surprising. As
reported in Table 3, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya have achieved the dubi-
ous status as rogue states. Combined these states comprise 94% of all instances
when a state was specifically referenced as being a rogue. These data conform
with conventional wisdom where a cursory look at news headlines over the last
decade would reveal these states as those most seen as preoccupied with the
acquisition and development of WMDs, supporting and sponsoring terrorism,
and generally conducting themselves in a manner U.S. policy makers deem as
outside the bounds of the international community. As discussed above, however,
these policy choices do not serve as a litmus test in determining which states
qualify for the gallery of rogues. Looking at the remaining states to make the list
of those specifically referenced, one sees states that while perhaps acting in con-
formance with one of these policies, such as Cuba and Syria which have been

TABLE 3. ‘‘Rogue’’ States: 1993–2004

States No. of mentions Percentage

Iraq 54 0.325 (32%)

Iran 49 0.295 (29%)
North Korea 34 0.205 (20%)
Libya 21 0.126 (13%)
Syria 3 0.018 (2%)
China 1 0.006 (1%)
Cuba 1 0.006 (1%)
Burma 1 0.006 (1%)
Zimbabwe 1 0.006 (1%)
Pakistan 1 0.006 (1%)
n = 166
306 Perceiving Rogue States

designated as supporters of terrorism by the U.S. State Department, these states

largely earn their rogue status for other reasons. Specifically, these secondary
states have earned the label of rogue not so much for the fact that they present
threats due to overt power capabilities, but rather due to the fact that they are
perceived as nondemocratic often portrayed as totalitarian or authoritarian
regimes.
Now that we have seen which states U.S. policy makers have labeled as rogues,
what is it about these states, their policies and behaviors, which may contribute
to them earning this dubious distinction? As to specific policy actions attributed
to rogue states, two policies are mentioned frequently by U.S. foreign policy
elites. In fact, while numerous general behaviors are attributed to rogue states, a
point to be further explored below, the only policy actions mentioned specific-
ally were the acquisition and ⁄ or development or WMDs ⁄ weapons technology
(e.g., long range ballistic missiles) and the support ⁄ sponsorship of terrorism
(Table 4). Although providing generalized statements depicting rogues as aggres-
sive, outlaws, and intolerant, to list just a few examples, no other discernable spe-
cific policy actions were mentioned.
The predominance of these policy actions conforms to the idea that rogues
constitute a threat and seek to enhance their power capabilities surpassing their
position in the international community. However, the data indicate that the
potentiality of the future threat versus the present threat posed by rogues is of
the greatest concern. The imbalance of the threat posed by rogue states is reflec-
ted in the fact that when an actor specified the policy action of a rogue or
rogues, 84% of the time the policy mentioned was the acquisition or develop-
ment of WMDs or advanced weapons technology. This far exceeded the 16% of
mentions specifying support or sponsorship of terrorism. While both policies
point to the issue of power capabilities, the inordinate attention paid to the
acquisition and development of WMDs conforms to the formulation of a rogue
stereotype whereby these states are perceived as posing a threat by seeking to
rapidly and disproportionately obtain power capabilities.
This focus on very specific policies pursued by rogue states is contrasted by the
much more expansive list of behaviors used by policy makers in describing these
states. Although the precise language offered some variation, 46 distinctive be-
haviors were cataloged as used in connection with the term rogue. These specific
statements of behavior have been grouped into six behavior types. For the
purposes here the six behavior-types are: Threat; Outlaw; Decision Making;
Misconduct; Intolerance; and Governance. These behavior-type categories were
constructed combining linguistically synonymous adjectives. In the case of
‘‘Governance’’ attributed behavior such as vicious oppressor, eliminate political
opponents, and commit torture were grouped together. Similar grouping along
linguistically synonymous lines was conducted for each of the other four beha-
vior-type categories.
As to the categories of Threaten and Outlaw, while closely associated, the two
behavior-types are distinguished here by the specificity and degree of the attrib-
uted behavior. Threatening behaviors consist of more purposive actions linked
to the causation of harm, either actual or potential, to other countries. By way of
example, the ‘‘Threat’’ category entails instances where rogue state behavior was
TABLE 4. Policies of Rogue States

Specified Policy action No. of mentions Percentage

Acquire and ⁄ or develop WMDs ⁄ weapons technology 213 0.838 (84%)

(i.e., Ballistic Missiles)
Support and ⁄ or sponsorship of terrorism 41 0.161 (16%)
n = 254
 K. P. O’Reilly 307

described as: blackmail, menace, intimidate, coerce, threaten, aggressive, terrify,

terrorize, barbaric, spread fear, etc….8 Meanwhile, Outlaw behaviors are less
directed, more general actions suggesting harm aimed at the ‘‘international com-
munity’’ through disregard for international norms. Examples of behaviors categ-
orized as ‘‘Outlaw’’ behaviors include broken promises, stir-up discord among
states, oppose peace, deceive, deny, against norms of civilized behavior, under-
mine the international community, reject international law and the international
community, and so on…. A more specific example of a statement containing
behavior categorized as ‘‘Outlaw’’ would be Secretary Albrights’ statement that
‘‘The third group are [sic] what we have called the rogue states. They not only
do not see an advantage to a functioning international system but they feel that
they are more important when they can disrupt the international system.’’(italics added)9
By way of comparison, the following statement by Secretary Albright was categor-
ized as a ‘‘Threaten’’ behavior: ‘‘…such as the threat posed by rogue states with
dangerous weapons that might have Europe within their range and in their sights.’’(italics
added)10
As shown in Table 5, Threat and Outlaw behaviors each account for over a
third of all cataloged behavior descriptions with 38% and 37% respectively.
These behavioral attributes portraying rogue states as threats to the U.S. and the
international community are consistent with the previous literature. Further-
more, statements describing rogues as undermining the international commu-
nity, opposed to peace, and acting against the norms of civilized behavior
reinforce the rogue image with such states being perceived by U.S. policy makers
as deviants in the international system. The approximate parity as to the number
of statements presenting either Threat or Outlaw behaviors reinforces the propo-
sition that the cultural status dissonance plays an integral role in determining
who is and is not a rogue.
The remaining four behavior categories also serve to emphasize the cultural
and institutional differences of rogue states generally assailing decision making,
temperament, and domestic governance. In nearly 25% of the mentions of
rogue behavior, U.S. policy makers sought to describe rogues in terms of defici-
encies in their conduct both internationally and domestically. Rogues are depic-
ted as reckless and irresponsible, engaging in random acts and violence. Their
actions on the international stage are portrayed as mischief and misconduct.
Domestically, rogue states are painted as having repressive governing regimes
oppressing their populace, committing torture, and eliminating political opposi-
tion. Represented as unpredictable and exhibiting the willingness to violently

TABLE 5. Behavior of Rogue States

Behavior Category No. of Mentions Percentage

Threaten 53 38%
Outlaw 51 37%
Irresponsibility 16 11%
Governance 9 6%
Misconduct 6 4%
Intolerance 2 1%
n = 139

8
A complete listing of the 46 distinguishable attributed behaviors is provided in Table I found in the Appen-
dix. Table I also groups the behaviors according to the behavior-type category used for the purposes of this study.
9
Madeleine K. Albright, ‘‘Press Conference at the Department of State,’’ Washington, DC, January 24, 1997.
http://www.state.gov/www/statements/970124.html.
10
Madeleine K. Albright, ‘‘Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,’’ October 7, 1997. http://
www.state.gov/www/statements/971007.html.
308 Perceiving Rogue States

oppress their own people, the decision-making process of rogue states is ques-
tioned. Particularly, rogues are depicted as exhibiting irrational behavior caused
either by the nature of flawed internal institutions or exhibiting a willingness to
incur excessive costs to obtain their goals.
This depiction of rogue states raises an interesting dilemma as to U.S. policy
given that actor rationality weighs in as a critical underlying assumption of deter-
rence theory. While alluding to the flawed decision making of rogue states, U.S.
policy makers have directly questioned the efficacy of deterrence in handling
these actors. U.S. officials have routinely referred to rogues as unconventional,
hinting at the difficulty in applying the principles of deterrence. As early as the
first Clinton Administration, Secretary of Defense William Perry openly ques-
tioned the viability of a policy of deterrence toward rogue states calling such
states ‘‘undeterables,’’ who may be ‘‘madder than MAD [Mutually Assured
Destruction].’’11 Again in 1998, Perry’s successor, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, asserted that rogue states are ‘‘less concerned with the consequences of
WMDs use.’’12
As noted above, the general count of statements made reveals that Secretar-
ies of State during 1993–2004 made the most statements concerning rogues.
While the U.S. military establishment has be credited with introducing the
term into U.S. foreign policy discourse in its current incarnation (Klare 1995),
it appears more and more that diplomats, as exemplified by the Secretaries of
State, have co-opted the term. Despite its origins tied to reinvigorating the mil-
itary threat environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term has
as much a presence in the discourse of diplomats as for military actors.
Although the differences in the percentages is not great with Secretaries of
State at 36%, Presidents at 32%, and Secretaries of Defense at 31%, this pre-
sents an interesting commentary on how the term rogue has been used as well
as the perceptions that come with it. Rather than its initial focus on threat
assessment, the prevalent use of the term by the chief U.S. diplomat serves to
emphasis the non power aspects of the rogue label. Rather than a designation
based on threats due to acquisition of power capabilities (i.e., WMDs), rogues
are by the same token referenced by their failures to comply with international
norms and persistence on residing outside the mainstream of the international
community. Statements by Secretaries of State Albright and Powell, emphasize
both the outlaw and governance features of rogue states over those behaviors
characterized as threatening. Conversely, the statements of both Secretaries of
Defense Cohen and Rumsfeld largely focus on the threatening behaviors with
such depictions dominating 79% of Cohen’s statements and 38% of Rumsfeld’s
statements. This difference in how rogues are characterized appears to plays
out in the policy prescriptions offered by the various actors as well.

Policy Prescriptions Toward Rogue States

Given that U.S. policy makers have depicted rogue states in terms of threats,
outlaws, and also irrational actors, what are the implications for U.S. policies?
What policies are prescribed by U.S. policy makers in dealing with the threat
of rogue states? Within the data set are 266 observed instances where policy
makers mentioned specific U.S. policy actions or advocated policies aimed at
rogue states. Of these observations, 20 distinct policy actions were articulated.
Of these 20 policies only four were mentioned with any regularity meriting

11
William Perry, ‘‘Speech Delivered at George Washington University,’’ April 25, 1996. http://www.defense-
link.mil/speeches/1996/s19960418-perry.html.
12
William Cohen, ‘‘Remarks to the National Press Club,’’ March 17, 1998. http://www.defenselink.mil/tran-
scripts/1998/t03171998_t0317npc.html.
 K. P. O’Reilly 309

TABLE 6. US Policy Actions Toward Rogue States

Specified Policy Action No. of mentions Percentage

Nonproliferation efforts (Treaties, export controls, etc.) 79 0.297 (30%)

Missile defense ⁄ missile shield 67 0.252 (25%)
Cooperation ⁄ strengthen alliances and partnerships w ⁄ others 41 0.154 (15%)
Sanctions ⁄ embargo 26 0.098 (10%)
Deterrence ⁄ deter 10 0.037 (4%)
Military force 7 0.026 (3%)
Isolate ⁄ ostracize 6 0.022 (2%)
Engagement ⁄ diplomacy ⁄ negotiation 6 0.022 (2%)
Contain 6 0.022 (2%)
Defend 3 0.011 (1%)
Int. pressure ⁄ increase pressure 2 0.007 (1%)
Interdict 2 0.007 (1%)
Enforce UN resolutions 2 0.007 (1%)
Reform 2 0.007 (1%)
Pre-emption 2 0.007 (1%)
Retaliate 1 0.004 (.4%)
Coercive diplomacy 1 0.004 (.4%)
Refuse to cooperate 1 0.004 (.4%)
Deploy armed forces 1 0.004 (.4%)
Surveillance 1 0.004 (.4%)
n = 266

mention in excess of 10% of the overall observations. The complete listing of

policy action types and their respective frequencies is reported in Table 6. The
two most often mentioned policy actions were efforts to sustain and expand
the nonproliferation regime and development of a defensive missile shield.
Combined these two actions were mentioned 55% of the time, with 30% for
sustaining and expanding the nonproliferation regime and 25% for missile def-
ense. Following behind these leading policy actions are Cooperation ⁄ Streng-
thening alliances and partnerships, and Sanctions ⁄ Embargoes at 15% and 10%
respectively.
Notable, however, is that mentions of sanctions and embargoes constitute
barely 10% of the specific mentions of U.S. policy actions toward rogue states.
Given the recent spate of academic literature reviewing the use of these policy
tools, albeit generally critical of their effectiveness, an observer might have
expected these policies to have been more prominent (see Pape 1997; Haass
1998; Pregg, 1999; O’Sullivan 2003). Furthermore, Litwak (2000) has noted
that the use of economic sanctions was a centerpiece of comprehensive con-
tainment pursued by the Clinton administration. Surprising as well is the relat-
ively infrequent mentions of policy actions more synonymous with an offensive
or aggressive policy posture. Actions such as interdiction, use and deployment
of military forces, and, the more controversial pre-emption, when combined
approximate less than five % of specifically mentioned policy options. Accord-
ingly, it appears that U.S. policy makers show overall little interest in pursuing
policy actions to aggressively change rogue states either by overthrowing the
government or their ideology and orientation to the outside world. This find-
ing places the instance of 2003 invasion of Iraq, with its express impetus of
regime transformation, in puzzling and singular company. Casting this in
framework of image theory, policy prescriptions made by U.S. policy makers
more closely adhere to the strategy script of ‘‘containment’’ linked to the
‘‘enemy’’ image. On far fewer occasions are policies advocated which coincide
310 Perceiving Rogue States

with the more assertive ‘‘revisionism’’ expected in the case of viewing the other
through the ‘‘degenerate’’ image.
Just as it was seen that the various actors within administrations emphasized
different behavior traits of rogue states, a similar pattern emerges as to the offer-
ing of policy prescriptions. Moreover, differences regarding policy prescriptions
emerge among the administrations as well. Again, actor differences are seen
when comparing secretaries of state and defense throughout the administrations
respectively. When examining the two most often cited policy prescriptions, sus-
tain ⁄ expand the nonproliferation regime and development of a defensive missile
shield, the Secretaries of State as a group (Christopher, Albright, and Powell)
mentioned sustaining ⁄ expansion the nonproliferation regime four times more
often then the development of missile shield. This result is nearly inverted when
examining the statements of Cohen and Rumsfeld who as regarding the two poli-
cies overwhelming proffered development of a national missile shield as a policy
prescription in dealing with rogue states. However, during the first Clinton
administration, Secretary Perry made 10 references advocating the sustain-
ing ⁄ expansion of the nonproliferation regime compared to only three advoca-
ting the development of a national missile shield in regards to rogue states. At
the presidential level the differing emphasis on policy prescriptions is again
exhibited. Whereas Clinton made mention of sustaining ⁄ expanding the nonpro-
liferation regime on 25 occasions compared to six prescribing development of a
national missile shield to deal with rogues, Bush made reference of expanding
the nonproliferation four times in contrast to 15 mentions of a national missile
shield.
Overall, the data indicate numerous instances where policy prescriptions align
with a general deterrence strategy rather than a more tailored policy objective
of specifically deterring and preventing rogues from possessing weapons tech-
nologies which will increase their power capabilities. Specifically, efforts to con-
struct a defensive missile shield can be viewed in terms of the deterrence
strategy component of retaliation. The question that arises in light of these data
is why the focus on policy actions which are part of a more general strategy of
deterrence? In particular, given the descriptions of rogue states as ‘‘unconven-
tional,’’ ‘‘undeterable,’’ and ‘‘irrational,’’ the efficacy of a deterrence strategy
would seem problematic at best. Moreover, a strategy of deterrence appears at
odds with both the perceptions of power capabilities and cultural status of the
rogue state.
As rogue states possess lesser capabilities and present a perceived threat focus-
ing on the future attainment of instruments creating power capability parity, it
would be expected that a more powerful actor would utilize their advantage
before such parity develops. Such actions might include more aggressive or
offensive tactics given the current accounting of capabilities. For instance, where
the other actor is perceived as having comparable, but declining, capabilities,
image theory anticipates a strategy script, including the launching of a direct
attack, to be advocated. This aggressive policy toward degenerate states is based
as well on the perception that such actors are simultaneously experiencing a
decline in cultural status. These states are perceived as on the verge of collapse
being portrayed as ‘‘disorganized, chaotic, anarchic, and lacking the will to
defend itself’’(Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995:431), hence a ‘‘degenerate
state’’ is seen as presenting opportunist circumstances. Conversely, the rogue
state is perceived as a threat, albeit a future threat. Given that a policy of deter-
rence comports with neither the present threat nor cultural status of the rogue
state, why have U.S. foreign policy decision makers advocated what appears to be
a logically misguided strategy in dealing with rogues? Is this an instance of dis-
connect between rhetoric and implementation or does this signify a disquieting
inflexibility in U.S. strategic thinking?
 K. P. O’Reilly 311

Conclusion
In examining the public statements of U.S. foreign policy elites during the per-
iod 1993–2004, we witness an increasing and continuing usage of the rogue label
at the highest ranks of foreign policy decision making. Although initially con-
ceived for use in military strategic planning, usage of the term rogue abounds in
the statements by key diplomatic actors, both Presidents and Secretaries of State
alike, whose usage exceed that of Secretaries of Defense. This usage by actors
responsible for both diplomatic and military action points to the complex mix-
ture of characteristics and behaviors that comprise the rogue stereotype evolving
after the Cold War.
There appears to be a definitive rogue image held by U.S. foreign policy decis-
ion makers. While multifaceted, the perceptions held by key U.S. decision
makers about rogues appear to be relatively stable and fixed over the decade
examined. Foremost, the data illustrate that concerns about the future threat
posed by rogues (e.g., the development of WMDs) far exceeds that of current
power capabilities (e.g., state sponsorship of terrorism) in the mind of policy
makers. In describing the behavior of a rogue state, however, policy makers are
as likely to emphasize the general outlaw nature of rogues with their disregard
for what U.S. leaders view as international norms then in describing rogues in
terms of more specific and directed threatening behavior. Furthermore, in des-
cribing rogues, policy makers expend considerable energies in public statements
solidifying the ‘‘us versus them’’ nature of the relationship assailing rogue states
on the grounds of institutional (e.g., decision making) and cultural (e.g., intoler-
ance) deficiencies. Although presenting evidence of converging criteria for the
rogue image, the labeling of some states as rogues and others not still present
the challenge of seemingly selective application given the relatively fixed criteria
shown in policy makers public statements.
As to the comparison of the rogue image devised among the U.S. presi-
dential administrations subject to the time period examined several overarching
commonalities were uncovered, differences were detectable among the adminis-
trations, as well as between actors within particular administrations. A main dif-
ference noted among the administrations revolved around the issue of voiced
policy prescriptions. Specifically, the statements of the two Clinton administra-
tions differed with those of the first Bush administration with the former mak-
ing more mention of policies for sustaining and pursuing nonproliferation
efforts. Nonetheless, aside from this difference as to policy advocacy among the
administrations three findings regarding rogue states held across administra-
tions. First, when describing the policy actions undertaken by rogue state, these
states are nearly universally accused of sponsoring terrorism as well as seeking
the acquisition ⁄ development of WMDs. Second, Secretaries of States were more
prone to emphasize those behavior characteristics portraying rogues as outlaw
in respect to the international community and as possessing of dubious govern-
ing regimes. Meanwhile, Secretaries of Defense overwhelming stress the threat-
ening behavior characteristics of rogues. Third, as for resulting policy
prescription in managing rogue states, the total of the elicited policy prescrip-
tions demonstrates a predisposition towards policies associated with a contain-
ment strategy overall.
In answering the third question posed at the outset of this study—the nature
of the policy prescriptions advocated towards rogue and their consistency with
the rogue image devised by policy makers—one must return to the useful frame-
work provided by image theory whereby relationship dimensions can be com-
pared with expected policy. As to the perceptions tied to rogue states, it appears
that rogues present a unique interaction rather than merely an extension of pre-
viously theorized notions of ‘‘enemy.’’ In combining interaction dimensions of
312 Perceiving Rogue States

the perceived cultural differences ⁄ inferiority of rogues along with a hybrid per-
ception of power capabilities, rogues present a dilemma in determining whether
they constitute a threat to or an opportunity for the furtherance of U.S. foreign
policy. In offering guidance as to this threat versus opportunity distinction,
image theory directs us to the strategy script or policy actions pursued against
such states. In answering this question then, the public statements of U.S. for-
eign policy decision makers appear to overwhelmingly conclude that rogue states
present a threat by offering policy prescriptions aligning more with a policy of
containment, comporting with the enemy image, rather than a policy of open
aggression.
Given that the perceptions of rogues differ from that of the more traditional
enemy image while nevertheless perceived as threats to U.S. interests, the effect-
iveness of some policy actions commonly mentioned seem questionable given
the behaviors attributed to rogue states. While advocating a strategy comprised
of policy actions seeking to contain rogue states, U.S. policy makers also strongly
advocate the development of defensive measures to protect against attacks from
rogue states. One notable defensive measure put forward to deal with rogue
states has been the development of a defensive missile shield. The application of
containment strategies is problematic for two reasons. First, given that the public
statements reveal concern over the future threat posed by rogue states, through
their acquisition ⁄ development of WMDs, containment strategies fail to prevent
rogues from actually developing these improved power capabilities which drive
the perception of threat in the first place. Second, given that rogues are rou-
tinely characterized as deficient in their decision making, the sensibility of a pol-
icy connected with an idea of defense and retaliation in the classical deterrence
theory sense raises questions. Seemingly, driven by the threat (albeit future
threat) component of the perception held of rogue states, policy makers rely
on a containment strategy at odds with the cultural component of the
rogue stereotype. At the same time, this perception of cultural dissonance
appears to inhibit advocacy of policy prescriptions other than containment such
as engagement.
While this study has examined how U.S. policy makers’ perceive ‘‘rogue state’’
and resulting policy prescriptions, a question for further study is how, and if,
states are able to transition out of the ‘‘rogue’’ category. Of recent note, Libya’s
abandonment of its WMD programs in 2003 has lead to a dramatic reversal of
U.S. policy with the reinstatement of diplomatic ties after a nearly 30 years sus-
pension. Yet, while resolving notions of threat, no meaningful domestic reform
has occurred as to the governing regime in Libya. This and much more (fortu-
nately) can be done to explore the interplay of power and culture in driving
policy makers’ belief systems. As argued here, exploring the conception of threat
as defined by both power and cultural perceptions can yield fruitful results in
seeing how policy makers view the world around them and act accordingly.
Further, by examining the belief systems of U.S. policy makers as oriented
towards the international community generally and then as to rogue states
specifically, it may be determined if U.S. policy makers are prone to act more
aggressively towards rogues as expected under the cognitive balancing concept
underlying image theory.
Accordingly, by examining perceptions of U.S. foreign policy-making elites,
future research can seek to affix game model constructs to U.S. actions towards
rogue states as revealed by both U.S. policy preferences and the perceived behav-
iors and actions of rogues. By better understanding how U.S. policy makers
perceive the world and how this impacts the policy options they choose, scholars
can hope to inform policy makers of the importance that perceptions of others
accurately reflect reality and seek to avoid the pitfalls of misguided and ineffec-
tive policies.
 K. P. O’Reilly 313

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Appendix
Table I. Attributed Rogue Behaviors: 1993–2004

Specified by Behavior-Type Category No. of Mentions Percentage

Threaten
Blackmail 14 0.103 (10%)
Aggression ⁄ aggressive ⁄ random violence 13 0.093 (9%)
Intimidate 9 0.066 (7%)
Coerce ⁄ threaten 5 0.037 (4%)
Menace ⁄ menace U.S. security 3 0.022 (2%)
Hold U.S. hostage 2 0.015 (1%)
Terror ⁄ terrorists 2 0.015 (1%)
Spread fear 1 0.007 (1%)
Barbaric 1 0.007 (1%)
Threats 1 0.007 (1%)
Nuclear terrorism 1 0.007 (1%)
Deter U.S. response 1 0.007 (1%)
53 38%
Outlaw
Outlaw ⁄ undermine int. community ⁄ reject int. law and community 23 0.169 (17%)
Oppose U.S. values 9 0.066 (7%)
Oppose peace ⁄ destroy peace ⁄ kill peace 4 0.029 (3%)
Kill peace ⁄ enemy of peace 4 0.029 (3%)
Deny 2 0.015 (1%)
Deceive 2 0.015 (1%)
Hurt free nations 1 0.007 (1%)
Sow tension ⁄ instability 1 0.007 (1%)
Broken promise 1 0.007 (1%)
Stir-up discord among states 1 0.007 (1%)
Against norms of civilized behavior 1 0.007 (1%)
Not good citizens in the world 1 0.007 (1%)
Outlaw states 1 0.007 (1%)
Undermine the community of democracies 1 0.007 (1%)
Defy int. community 1 0.007 (1%)
Supporting extremists to destabilize moderate 1 0.007 (1%)
countries in the region
51 37%
Irresponsible
Reckless ⁄ rash 3 0.022 (2%)
Reckless aggression 3 0.022 (2%)
Miscalculate 2 0.015 (1%)
Irresponsible 2 0.015 (1%)
Reckless 2 0.015 (1%)
Reckless acts 2 0.015 (1%)
Instable 1 0.007 (1%)
Random attack 1 0.007 (1%)
Undeterred by threat of retaliation 1 0.007 (1%)
Deterrence may not work ⁄ ‘‘undeterrables’’ 1 0.007 (1%)
18 13%
Governance
Bad gov’t for its own people 4 0.029 (3%)
Torture ⁄ crimes against humanity 3 0.022 (2%)
Eliminate political opponents 1 0.007 (1%)
Vicious oppressors 1 0.007 (1%)
 K. P. O’Reilly 315

Table I. (Continued)

Specified by Behavior-Type Category No. of Mentions Percentage

9 6%
Misconduct ⁄ mischief
Misconduct 1 0.007 (1%)
Mischief making 1 0.007 (1%)
2 1%
Intolerance
Hatred 1 0.007 (1%)
Intolerance 1 0.007 (1%)
2 1%
n = 139