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Conde v.



Casiano Abaya died on April 16, 1899, unmarried. Paula Conde, mother of natural
children Jose and Teofista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya,
moved for the settlement of the intestate succession. The deceased’s brother,
Roman Abaya, opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the
nearest relative of the deceased. Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of
law, the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of
all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take
possession of all the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him;

Paula Conde asserts that the her right was superior to that of Ramon and prayed
that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano and
that the same be adjudicated to her. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Conde stating
that: That the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize
Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the
petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with
respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and
therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said
intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya. Ramon Abaya
appealed the said decision.


Whether or not Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children
with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya.



The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during
his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts
only during the life of his presumed parents.

Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or
their heirs; while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural
child, since it does not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the
presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter.

Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal
character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time
during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted
to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while insane, or
after action had been already instituted. (ART. 118)

So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child's inheritance, it is

necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be
present, since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime, being
personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible
of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore,
where no express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception,
extinguished by his death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance
of the deceased child.

Pamplona v. Moreto (not CA)


During their marriage, Sps. Flaviano Moreto and Monica Mariega acquired several
parcels of land---lots 1495,4545 and 1496. More than 6 years after the death of
Monica, without the consent of the heirs of his wife and before any liquidation of the
conjugal partnership , Flaviano executed a deed of absolute sale covering lot 1495
in favor of the petitioners, Geminiano Pamplona. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona
and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as
Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to
Geminiano Pamplona. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano
Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the
subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to
be the subject matter in the deed of sale although the fact is that the said portion
sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.

When Flaviano died intestate, respondents demanded from the petitioners to vacate
the premises on the ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot as the same
belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter
was already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs
who are the heirs of Monica. . When the petitioners refused to leave, an action for
the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale as regard one-half of the property
subject matter of the said deed was brought by the respondents against the


Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property subject
of litigation.



When Monica died, the estate of the deceased became the property of the
community of property between the surviving spouse Flaviano and his children with
the deceased in the concept of co-ownership. Since Flaviano was entitled to ½ pro-
indiviso of the entire land area as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right
to dispose of his share to the Pamplonas.

Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the
deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn
the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration
of P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same.
Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private
respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and
1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering
and transfering the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on
his death to his heirs, the herein private respondents. Under Article 776, New Civil
Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their deceased
parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and
obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art.
1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased
Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are
the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is
transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq.
meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor
Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply
with said obligation.

People v. Umali- CRIMINAL LAW CASE to. Promise, eto lang relation sa WILLS.


Francisco Manalo,a detention prisoner was touched by the appeal made to him by
the policeman and agreed to help in the identification of the source of the
marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to help him in some cases pending
against him.

With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation
Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known
to him. The instruction was for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased
by him to the police headquarters. Few minutes there after, Manalo returned with
two (2) foils of dried marijuana which he allegedly bought from the accused Gloria
Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on
the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana
foils from accused Gloria Umali.

Umali, alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he
stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to
have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.


Whether or not Manalo was qualified to be a witness.



In the absence of any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain substantial
facts, said factual findings are entitled to great weight, and indeed are binding even
on this Court.
Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to others
may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or

conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes

into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons convicted
of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified
from being witnesses to a will." (

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned
crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a
will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when
he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.

The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of
evidence that he was actuated by improper motive. Hence, in the absence of any
evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his
testimony must be accorded full credence.

Avera v. Garcia


Eutiquia Avera instituted for probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was
made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for
the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing,
the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who
testified that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that
the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter
point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request
of the testator.

When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single
witness whose testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at
the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to
comprehend what he was about.

After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the proof thus
presented, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the
will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly
executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate. From this judgment an
appeal was taken in behalf of the persons contesting the will, and the only errors
here assigned have reference to the two following points, namely, first, whether a
will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a
single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the
other two; and, secondly, whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason
of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are
written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.


Whether or not the will should be admitted to probate regardless of the grounds



Upon the first point, while it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay be
proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses

Upon the second point, the instrument now before us contains the necessary
signatures on every page, and the only point of deviation from the requirement of
the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin instead of the left. By
the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is authenticated
and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have
been protected by being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry
could be exhausted without discovering the slightest difference between the
consequences of affixing the signatures in one margin or the other.

The same could not be said of a case like that of Estate of Saguinsin, supra, where
only the leaves, or alternate pages, were signed and not each written page; for as
observed in that case by our late lamented Chief Justice, it was possible that in the
will as there originally executed by the testratrix only the alternative pages had
been used, leaving blanks on the reverse sides, which conceivably might have been
filled in subsequently.

The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will
of Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Avanceña, in a case where the signatures were placed at the bottom of the page
and not in the margin, said:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments
and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last
will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to
any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such
deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.